AMONGST THE EAGLES

Colonel Bernd Horn

AMONGST THE EAGLES

THE BATTLE OF MOUNT LA DIFENSA

Copyright © 2013 Her Majesty the Queen, in right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence.

CanadianSpecialOperationsForcesCommand 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa,OntarioK1A0K2

ProducedforCANSOFCOMProfessionalDevelopmentCentreby17WingWinnipegPublishingOffice.WPO30990

Coverartwork:“ScalingMountLaDifensa”byKatherineTaylor

MONOgrAPH13:AMONGSTTHEEAGLES:THEBATTLEOFMOUNTLADIFENSA

CANSOFCOMProfessionalDevelopmentCentreMonographSeriesEditor:Dr.EmilySpencer

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

PrintedinCanada.

Theviewsexpressedinthispublicationareentirelythoseof theauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviews,policyor

positionoftheGovernmentofCanada,theDepartmentofNationalDefence,theCanadianForces,theCanadianSpecialOperations

ForcesCommandoranyoftheirsubordinateunitsororganizations.

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FOREWORD

Iamdelightedto introducethethirteenthmonographcreatedbytheCanadianSpecialOperationsForcesCommand (CANSOFCOM)Professional Development Centre (PDC). This series remains animportanttooltoexpandthegrowingbodyofliteratureonSpecialOperationsForces(SOF)ingeneralandCanadianSpecialOperationsForces (CANSOF) in particular. In thismanner, those in the Com-mand,aswellas thoseexternal to it,cancontinueto learnmoreabout SOF, particularly our contribution to the Canadian ArmedForcesandtheGovernmentofCanada.

Amongst the Eagles: The Battle of Mount La Difensa,isparticularlysignificantasithasadirectlinkagetoourCANSOFheritage,namelythe First Special Service Battalion, the Canadian component oftheFirstSpecialServiceForce(FSSF).Infact,theCanadianSpecial OperationsRegiment (CSOR)perpetuates theFSSFandcarriesonitsBattleHonours,includingLaDifensa.Thisbattle,whichoccurredonthenightof2/3December1943,carriedallthehallmarksofaSOF approach: daring; cunning; and tenacity. Where a conven-tional approach repeatedly failed at great loss of life, the unex-pected,asymmetricmethodologyappliedbytheFSSFachievedan unmitigated victory. In fact, LaDifensa created the FSSF legend. Assuch,theBattleofLaDifensaprovidesnotonlyawindowontheCANSOFlegacy,italsofurnishesarecordofSOFcourage,tenacityandeffectiveness.

Asalways,IbelievethisvolumeisanimportantadditiontothebodyofSOFliteratureasitprovidesasignificantcasestudyofavictorythatwasadirectresultofSOF’sadherencetohardtraining,carefulplanningandimplacablecommitmenttomissionaccomplishment.Ihopeyoufindthispublicationinformative.Inaddition,Ihopethat

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itsparksdiscussionandreflection.PleasedonothesitatetocontactthePDCshouldyouhavecommentsortopicsthatyouwouldliketoseeaddressedaspartoftheCANSOFCOMmonographseries.

Dr.EmilySpencerSeriesEditorandDirectorofEducationandResearchCANSOFCOM PDC

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AMONGST THE EAGLES: THE BATTLE OF

MOUNT LA DIFENSA

The jagged rock cut into fingernails with the intensity of a redhotpoker. Althoughhisfingersandhandswerenumbwithcoldandhisbrainfatiguedbylackofsleepandexertion,thepaincutthroughhis consciousness creatingaviciousexplosionof sensa-tion.Nonetheless,theclimberstifledhisinstinctivereactiontocryout.Withtheenemydefensivepositiononlyhundredsofmetresabovehimonthesummitofthemountain,anynoisecouldprovefatal.

Thewallfacewasjaggedandtreacherouswithlooserocks.Deepravinescutthroughtherockprovidingscantimprovementforfootorhandholds.Daysofrainhadturnedthevegetationandearthtosoggy,slipperyplantsandmud.TheDecembercoldonlyaddedtothemiserymakingeveryeffortthatmuchmoredifficult.And,thedarknessandfogprovedblinding.

But then, the shadows are exactly what the Forcemen sought.Their objective was the top of a 963 metre mountain feature.Conventionalforceshadtriedtoassaultitseveraltimesusingthepredicable, more accessible southern approach. They failed oneachattemptwithheavycasualties.Notsurprisingly, theenemyhad focused their defensive strongholds on exactly that accesspoint.

WhentheCommander5thArmygavethetasktotheFirstSpecialServiceForce(FSSF)theFSSFCommanderquicklydiscountedtheobvious, “easy”approach.Rather,heopted foramorecunning,boldandriskyattackplan.HedecidedthattheForcemenwould

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scaleterraintheGermanshadassessedasimpassibleandtakethenorthernapproachupa70degree slope thatemptiedonto thebackoftheGermanpositions.Theriskwashighbutcapturingtheobjectivewasimperative.

The First Special Service Force

ThegenesisoftheFSSFwasinEnglandwithLordMountbatten’sCombinedOperationsHeadquarters (COHQ) andPrimeMinisterChurchill’s personal support. The original concept, code namedOperationPlough,entailedaguerrillaforcecapableofoperationsinNorwaytoattackthehydro-electricandheavywaterplantsinthatcountryinordertodisrupttheGermanwarindustryandtheNAZI atomic weapons program. Some thought was also put tousing the force todestroy thePloestioil fields inRomaniaand/ortodestroyhydro-electricfacilities in Italy. Inall,theplannersreasonedthatinanyofthesetargetsahardhittingraidingforcewouldnotonlydamageGermany’svitalwarindustrybutitwouldalsotieupGermanforcesrequiredtoprotectfacilitiesandchasedowntheguerrillaforce.

TheAmericansacceptedtheprojectandPrimeMinisterChurchilland LordMountbatten very quickly convinced the Canadians toparticipateaswell.Asa result,aUS/Canadianbrigade-sized for-mationwas createdwithAmericans andCanadians serving sidebyside,wearingthesameAmericanuniforms,inamilitarycom-mand that was completely integrated. At any given moment itwasimpossibletodifferentiateCanadianfromAmericanandviceversa.Eachhadofficerscommandingtroopsoftheothernation.At inception,theCanadianscontributed697all rankstothefor-mation,representingapproximatelyaquarterofthetotalnumberoftroops.1

TheCanadianWarCabinet authorized theCanadian componentoftheFSSFinJuly1942,atthesametimeas1CanadianParachute

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Battalion. Initially, the Canadian component was given the des-ignation2nd CanadianParachuteBattalion (2CdnParaBn). Thenameofthisunit,however,wasmisleading.Itwasnotaparachutebattalion at all, but rather a commando unit. The designationwasassignedforsecurityreasonstocoverthetruenatureof itsoperationalmandate.2On25May1943, thenamewaschangedto reflect its real nature. Itwas re-designated the 1st CanadianSpecialServiceBattalionanditrepresentedtheCanadianelementofthejointUS/CanadianFirstSpecialServiceForce(FSSF).3

Fromthestart, theCanadianArmy took their commitment seri-ously and attempted to pick the best soldiers possible for thisunique endeavour. Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the Americancommander of the FSSF, made it clear that he preferred that Canadian volunteersbe chosen in the “lower ranksbetween18and45[yearsold],physicallyruggedandmentallyagile,physicallyable andwilling to takeparachute training.”4 It becameobvioustoeveryoneconcernedthatsuperiorphysicalfitness,experience, maturity, and youth were the cornerstones on which the FSSFwouldbeforged.5Inaddition,Frederickalsostressedthatitwasimperative that each man be able to work efficiently indepen-dentlyorinsmallgroups,regardlessofthetacticalsituationorop-erationaltheatre.RossMunro,therenownCanadianwarreporter,noted that the First Special Service Force “will be a continentaleditionofcommandosoftheBritishArmy.”Headded,“Inselect-ing themen tomake it up, emphasis will be placed on ‘youth,hardnessandfitness.’”6

As the initial focus of the FSSFwas to be sabotage, raiding andguerrilla type warfare, the Forcemen were trained in a widespectrum of skills including parachuting, demolitions, unarmedcombat,extensiveweaponshandling,mountaineeringandarcticwarfare.Physicalfitnessveryquicklybecamethedecisiveselec-tiontool.Only thehardestofmencouldpersevere the training.

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Forinstance,membersoftheFSSFwere“capableofmarching35milesadayacrossroughcountryor90mileswithoutrest.”7

Notably, the Force was to be ready to deploy to Norway on 15December1942foranarduousandverydangerousmission.Assuch,evenastheFSSFwasintheprocessofestablishingitself,itstrainingregimeandtempowereinover-drive.Uponarrivalmem-bersundertooktheirjumptraining,whichinsomecases,wasallof48hoursasopposedtothemorestandardthreeweekcourse.InAugust1942,journalistDonMasoncapturedthecontemporaryimage of the force that was being created in Helena Montanawhere they were based. “The cream of Canada’s hard-fightingarmy youth,” he described, “is training in the United States to-dayfor‘aerialcommando’raidingwhichonedaysoonwillmaketheGerman and the Jap think cyclones have struckwhere theythoughttheyweresafeandsecure.”8

However,bylate1942itbecameclearthatOperationPloughwasnotgoingtohappen.Therewerethreemajorimpediments.First,Frederick’srequestforthetemporarydiversionof750LancasterbombersforecastforthemiddleofJanuary1943toinserthisfor-mationhitanimmediatewall.TheintractablearchitectofBritain’sstrategic bombing campaign Air ChiefMarshal Charles Portal oftheRoyalAirForce(RAF)responded,“That isourbestbomber.”Hecontinued,“ifyoucanshowuswherePloughcanaccomplishmorein itsoperationthanonethousandLancasterscoulddoonthebombingrunsweshallconsidertheplaneforyouruses.”9

Frederick’s next dose of reality occurred when the Combined Operations Command planners briefed him on the Commandoraidingprogramand,moreimportantly,theworkofBrigadierColinGubbins’SpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE)andtheirNorwegiansabotage campaign. Although the SOE had never even heard ofthePloughProject,ortheFSSFforthatmatter,theytoohadplansforsabotagingmostofthetargetsthattheFSSFwastheoretically

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earmarkedtodestroy.Significantly,Gubbins’planrequiredveryfewaircraftandonlytwoorthreeNorwegiansoldiersforeachtarget.10

Thefinalnail in thecoffin resulted fromColonel Frederick’sdis-cussion with Major-General Hansteen, the Commander-in-Chiefof the Norwegian Armed Forces. Hansteen bluntly informedFrederick that the King and PrimeMinister of Norway opposedtheconceptofthePloughProject.Theywereconcernedthatthelarge-scaledestructionofpowerwouldcreateagreaterhardshipontheNorwegianpeoplethanitwouldontheGermans.Notably,although they welcomed any assistance in ousting the occupy-ingGermanforces,theydidnotwishtodosobydestroyingthe vital industrial infrastructurethatwaskeytoNorway’seconomicwell-being.11

Andso,withnoapparentaircraft,nohostcountrysupportandacompeting organization that appeared to have amore efficient,more precise and less resource-intensive means of achieving thesamegoal,ColonelFrederickquicklyrealizedthatthePloughProject was doomed. Any doubt he may have harboured wasquickly dashedwhenhe returned to London tomeetwith LordMountbatten prior to his flight to Washington DC. The Chiefof Combined Operations candidly explained to Frederick thatthe Plough Projectwas no longer a pressing issue. By this timeCombinedOperationsand thewhole raidingconceptwasundersiegebytheWarOffice.TheAlliedeffort,particularlyasaresultofAmericanmightand industrial capacity,wasslowlybeginningto turn the tide of the war. Raiding and subversive activities,never fully supported by themainstreammilitary, were further marginalizedas large scale conventionaloperations, suchas theinvasionofNorthernAfrica,tookshape.

Moreover,MountbattenhadnomeansofinfluencingthereleaseofaircraftandheconcededthatSOEprovidedamoreeconomicalmeansofachievingthedesiredresult,nottomentionatamore

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politicallyacceptablepricefortheNorwegiangovernmentinexileinLondon.Assuch,bothmenagreedtoletPloughdie.FrederickquicklysentamessagetohisformationinHelena,Montana.TruetoFrederick’scharacter–itwasshortandtothepoint:

Suspend effort on present line…New planmay be radi-cally different and not concernedwith hydroelectric orother industrial installations...Cease training on hydro-electricinstallationsand...stressgeneraltacticaltraining,toincludeattackoffortifications,pillboxes,barracksandtroopconcentrations.Changeinweaponsmaybeneces-sary to provide greater firepower, so suspend furthersmallarmstrainingpendingadecision.12

On his return toNorth America, Colonel Frederick briefedGen-eralGeorgeMarshall,theAmericanArmyChiefofStaff.HethenleftforMontanaunsurewhethertheFSSFwouldbecontinuedorscrapped.ThatdecisionwasnowleftwiththeGeneralStafftogetapoliticaldecision.By8October1942,theCanadianChiefoftheGeneralStaffforwardedatelegramtoLieutenant-GeneralAndrewMcNaughton, Canada’s overseas commander, informing him ofthelatestturnofevents.TheCanadianswerenowwaitingfortheAmericans to make known their intentions prior to articulatingtheircontinuingsupport.

However, Major-General J.C. Murchie’s missive provided sometellingclues.Thealternativesconsideredwere:

A. ContinuewithSpecialServiceForceifAmericanssodesire.

B. Amalgamatewith1stParachuteBattalion.

C. DisbandandDispersePersonnel.

D. RetainasanOrdinaryParachuteBattalionForServiceandAbroad.13

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Importantly,MurchiehighlightedthenegativeeffectsofoptionsB,CandD.Hestatedeachhasthe“disadvantageofunwelcomepub-licityovercancellationofhighlypublicizedSpecialServiceForcesashaveBandCoverapparentcurtailmentofourplans forCdn[Canadian]ParachuteTroops.”14

In due course theAmericansdecided toproceedwith the FSSF.On 17 October, General Marshall informed Major-General Maurice Pope, the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington,DCthatadecisionwasreachedtoretaintheFSSFasaspecialunit.15 ItwasnowuptotheCanadianstoconfirmtheircontinued participation. Although militarily a will to continueseemedtobepresent,theultimatedecisionwasthepurviewofthepoliticians.16As such, theWarCabinetCommitteediscussedthe issueon28October1942.FromaCanadianperspectivetheexistenceofthe“elite”FirstSpecialServiceForcewasconsideredby thegovernment tobeofmarginal operational valueafter itsoriginalmissionwas cancelled. TheMinutesof theWarCabinetCommitteenoted,“Thoughthefutureemploymentoftheunitwasdoubtful,beyonditsexistenceasa‘stand-by’force,acceptanceoftheU.S.proposal[continueunit’sexistenceforspecialoperations]wasrecommendedasatokenof intimateco-operationbetweenthetwocountries.”17

Assuch,theFSSFbecameinmanywayshighlyspecializedinfantrycapableofawiderangeofoperations invirtuallyanyterrain. InAugust1943,theFSSFparticipatedintheassaultonKiskaIsland.As the Japanesehadalreadywithdrawn from theAleutians, theFSSF was quickly returned to the mainland and prepared for operationsinItaly.HeretheForcewouldmakeanameforitself.

Mount La Difensa

On28October1943, theFSSFwasfinallydeployed foroverseasduty,specificallyintheMediterraneanAreaunderthecommand

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ofGeneralDwightD.“Ike”Eisenhower.18TheAmericanshadbe-gun planningforthiseventualityshortlyafterthePloughProjectwasformallycancelled.19AlthoughtheoperationinKiskaprovidedamomentary distraction,US planners had all along determinedthat “military developments indicate a very profitable possibleuse for the Force in theMediterranean area. Special training indemolitionsandinrangeroperationsespeciallyqualifiestheFirstSpecialServiceForceforsuchanenterprise.Planningisnowpro-ceedingwithaviewtousingtheForceforearlyactioninItaly,Sar-diniaorSicily.”20Asaresult,theCanadiangovernmenthadalreadygivenitsapprovalfortheAmericanemploymentoftheFSSFinthe Mediterraneantheatretwoweekspreviously.21

TheForcearrivedinItalyon19November1943andmovedintoa formerGermanartillerybarracksatSantaMariaCapuaVeterewheretheyawaitedtheirorders.OriginallyEisenhowerhadear-markedtheFSSF“asstrongreconnaissanceunitsforflankprotec-tionintheApenninesandforraidsbehindenemylinesandlaterpossiblyintheFrenchAlps,”aswellas“forindependentguerrillaand sabotage activities in Balkans and for support of groups.”22 But on 22November he assigned the FSSF to II Corps, US FifthArmy, under Major-General Geoffrey Keyes, who in turn reas-signedtheForceunderoperationalcommandofthe36thDivisionunderMajor-GeneralFredL.Walker.

The Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant-GeneralMark Clark,waspresentlystuck.IthadlandedatSalerno,Italyon9SeptemberandmanagedtoclawitswaythroughaseriesofGermandefensivelinespushingtheretreatingGermanforcesnorthwardsuptheItal-ianpeninsuladrivingthemuptheVolturnoRivervalleyandintothemountainousinterior.ButprogressbegantogrindtoahaltinOctoberastheautumnrainsswelledstreamsandrivers,floodingthe countryside and turning the terrain intomud. Bridgeswerewashedout,roads,wheretheyexisted,deteriorated,trailsturnedtoslop,andmovementofanysortbecamedifficultatbest.

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Moreover, the Germans now dug-in behind the Winter Line,whichwas a network of fortifications/defensive lines that wereanchoredbynaturalobstacles.Theprimarydefensivelinewithin

Map

byWilliamCon

stab

le

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thedefensivesystemwasthe“GustavLine,”whichranacrossItalyfromthepointjustnorthofwheretheGariglianoRiverflowsintotheTyrrhenianSeaintheWest,throughtheformidableApennineMountains,totheSangroRiver,whereitemptiesintotheAdriaticSeaintheEast.Therewerealsoanumberofsecondarydefensivelinesthatintotalmadeupthe“WinterLine.”

By mid-November the Fifth Army was abruptly blocked at thesouthernendofthisdefensivenetwork,specificallyattheMigna-noGap,anaturalchoke-pointleadingtotheLiriValleyandRome.AtMignano,thiscomponentoftheGermanWinterLinewasan-choredonMountSammucrotothenorthandthemountainchainmassofMountCamino-MountLaDifensa-MountMaggioretotheSouth.FromthisformidablemountainredoubttheGermanswereabletodominatetheapproacheswithacommandingviewofthesurroundingarea. Theycombinedthisobservationwithartilleryfireandasaresultwereabletorainastormofsteelonanythingthatmovedon theapproaches to theirpositions. RepeatedAl-liedattemptsatattackingthemountainstrongholdsinNovemberresultedinfailureandheavycasualties.Infact,thegroundwassoexposedtoenemyfirethatmanyoftheAmericanandBritishdeadwereleftonthebattlefieldasitwasimpossibletocollectthem.23

And so, with the arrival of the FSSF, generals Clark, Keyes andWalkerhadalreadymadeplansfortheemploymentoftheforma-tion.On24November1943, Keyes issuedhis orders forOpera-tionRaincoat.TheFSSFwassoontogointoitsfirstcombat.TherenewedFifthArmyoffensivewasbasedonasimultaneous twocorps attack against Mount Camino and Mount La Difensa. Ontheleft,British56thDivisionwasresponsibleforassaultingMountCamino,whileKeyesgavethetaskofseizingMountLaDifensatotheFSSF.24ThesimultaneousassaultwasparamountasthefailuretotakeonewouldjeopardizetheotherastheGermanpositionson either mountain dominated the approaches to the other.

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Aswell, for the Allies, punching through themountains was of the greatest importance to rejuvenate the offensive and drivetowardsRome.

Mount La Difensa topographical profile.

Clearly,theirfirstmissionwasnotaneasyone.MountLaDifensastood out as an unassailablewall against theAllied advance uptheItalianpeninsula.The2ndRegimentwasgiventhetaskoflead

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assaulting regiment. Colonel D.D. Williamson gathered someof his key staff and conducted an initial reconnaissance of the mountainon24November1943.Whattheysawwasdisconcerting. “ItisveryhighandruggedandpromisesrealdifficultiesingettingupevenwithoutGermanopposition,”thewardiaristnoted.25

Theirdismayisnothardtounderstand.MountLaDifensawasaformidableterrainfeature.Theonlyaccessiblepathtoitssummitwas the southern slope that formed a natural ramp to the top.Thisrampemptiedoutontoahighaltitudedepressionshapedlikeasaucer.

Initialforaysseemedtoreinforcetheconventionalwisdom,name-ly the only approach was the southern ramp. However, key totheprocesswasthecontinuingeffortsofLieutenant-ColonelTomMacWilliam, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment who Williamson tasked as responsible for spear-heading the attack. He assigned a small team consisting of hisDeputy Commanding Officer (DCO), Major Ed Thomas, and 1stCompanyOfficerCommanding(OC),CaptainBillRothlin,aswellastwoscoutsSergeantsTommyFentonandHowardVanAusdale,toconductamoredetailedassessment.

At first theymade little progress in the thick bush andbrambleatthefootofthemountain.ButVanAusdale,aNorthAmericanNativepossessinganuncannyeyeforgroundandtotallyathomeinthewilderness,seemedtofindapossiblesolution.Hewasat-tractedtothelarge60-metrecliffsonthenorthsideofthemoun-tainandtheobscurelittletrailleadingtotheirbase.Thenorthernroute had its appeal. The approachwas considered impassable,therefore, theenemywouldmost likelynotbothertodefend it.Moreover,theForcemenallhadmountaineeringtrainingsotheyshouldbeabletoscalethecliffs.Itwasriskybutofferedtogreatlysurprisetheenemyiftheysucceeded.

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WilliamsonboughtoffontheapproachandproposedittoColonelFrederick.BeforeagreeingtotheplantheCommanderoftheFSSFarrangedforapipercubaircrafttoflyhimovertheobjectivetogetabetterlookattheterrain.Seeingthegroundfromabird’seyeviewhequicklyrealizedthenorthernapproachwastheonlyviablesolutiontoseizingthemountainwithoutdecimatinghisranks.

Theplanwasnowset.Ontheeveningof1December,theForcedepartedSantaMariaat approximately1600hours and movedforwardtoabivouacareaatthebaseofthemountain.Theridetothefrontlinewasnervewracking.“Theskylitupsporadicallywithgreatflashesoflightasdarknessfell,”DonaldMackinnonrecalled,continuing “Guns, big guns deemed to be firing all around us.”He remembered, “The noisewas deafening and as the skywasilluminatedwe could see the surroundingmountains and lowerclouds.”Whatalwaysstuckwithhimwasthefactthat“Therewasamenacingfeelingaboutit.”26Hewasnotfaroffthemark.

Colonel A.C. Marshall and his 1st Regiment on the mountain.

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Oncetheyoff-loadedfromthetrucksatPresenzano,theyhada16kilometermarchthroughthemudtotheirbivouacarea.The1stRegiment,whichwasthedivisionalreserve,andthe3rdRegimentremainedatthebaseofthemountainreadytosupporttheattackonLaDifensa.Frederickalsotaskedthemwithprovidingstretcherbearers and transporting supplies up themountain once it wassecured.“Oncewearrivedatthebaseofthemountain,”remem-beredPrivateEugeneForward,“weweretoldtomakeourselvesascomfortableaspossibleandwaitforfurtherdevelopments.”Hecontinued:

Duringthistime2ndRegimentwasmakingitswayupthemountain. This waiting period was terrible. We weresoakingwet.Ourcigarettes,ourLifeSaverscandies,andourtoothpowderturned intomush.Everythingwehadwaswet.Wecheckedourweaponsandweweretoldtomadesurethatour.45swerenotstuckintheholsters.27

Another veteran had a similar recollection. He explained, “Thebase of the mountain was slop, reminiscent of a World War Ibattlefield.”28

Forthe2ndRegiment,however,themarchwasnotover.TheynowmovedfurtheronfoottoabivouacareaontheeasternslopeofMountLaDifensa.Themarchwasslowandtediousintheheavymudandthe2ndRegimentdidnotreachitsdestinationuntil0600hourson2December1943.Fortuitously,thedayopenedupwithclearskiesandabrightsun.ThisweatherallowedtheForcementoattempttodrytheirequipment,cookawarmmealonamountainstove and clean theirweapons. The enemy, however, remainedactiveandtheForcemenhadtoexercisecautionasthemountainapproacheswereunderconstantenemyobservationandfire.

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Mount La Difensa operations 2-6 December 1943

Map

byAmyPierrson

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Finally, at 1830 hours, 2nd Regiment commenced its move intothe assembly area.Not surprisingly, it proved tobe a challengein itself.Heavy fog,pouring rainanddeepmudmade themovetotheforwardjumpingoffpositionanordeal.LieutenantAdnaH.Underhillrecalled:

SecondRegimentcontinuedtoslogforward.Therainalsocontinued, and the only light was the flash of artilleryshellsexplodingabovethemonthemountain.Otherwise,itwaspitchblack.With everyman carrying from75 to100poundsandwithfootingvaryingfromslipperyrocksto six inchesofmud, thoughtsofpersonal injury fadedfrommindandwerereplacedwithadulldeterminationtoreachwhateverobjectivewasplannedforthenight.29

Atapproximately2200hoursthe2ndRegimentreachedthebaseofthecliffsandwereinpositiontobegintheascent.Ataboutthe610metrelevelthemountainabruptlytransformedintoasheercliff.TotheForcemenitappearedasifthemountainrose“straightupinsolidgraywalls.”30LieutenantMitchellrecalled,“Themountainloomedoverusandtheechoofartillerythroughthemountainsgaveaneerie feeling.Whenourartillery shellsexplodedon thetop,thesmokewoulddrooldownthefaceofthemountainandgaveaspookyappearance.”31

Tosoftenup theenemy fortificationsandcover theapproach,adiversionary bombardment blanketed the German positions onthesummitofLaDifensaandMountCamino.Thebombardmentwasimpressivebyanystandard.Approximately925gunsfromUSII Corps andBritishXCorpshammered theobjectiveareas. ThequantityofordnancedroppedonMountLaDifensa,alsoknownasHill960,promptedmanyoftheForcementocallit“themilliondollarmountain.”

Withthethunderofartilleryinthebackgroundthe2ndRegimentnow stood in front of their last obstacle prior to engaging the

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enemy.Themomentoftruthhadarrived-wasthereapassableroute to the top?ScoutsVanAusdaleandFentonclamberedoffintothenightfollowedbymencarryingcoilsofropestostringoutandcreatetwofixedlinesthatotherscouldusetoassistwiththeascent.Thescoutsclawedtheirwayup,theirarmandlegmusclesstrainingas theydesperately soughthand-holds in thedarkandforced their hands and toes into crevices and cracks in thewallface.Luckily inplacesthesheercliffssoftened intosteepgradesthatmadetheclimbabiteasier.VanAusdalealsofoundanaturalchimneyintherockformationthatcreatedasteepbutclimbablechanneltothesummit.Afterwhatseemedlikeaneternitythetwoscoutsreachedthetop.Theyhadfoundaroutethattheybelievedwould support the assault. Importantly, they had installed fixedlinestohelpothersmaketheascent.

The scouts now returned to report their success to Lieutenant-ColonelT.C.MacWilliam,theCOofthe1stBattalion,2ndRegiment.Thenataround0100hours,Frederickgavethe2ndRegimentthego-ahead.Thescoutsgathereduptheirweaponsandequipmentandproceeded tomake theirwayup themountain for the sec-ond time. This trip, however, the remainder of the 1st Battalionfollowed.Theleadassaultingbattalionwentinrelativelylightwithonlyweapons,ammunitionandsmallpacks.Theirplanwastogetallthreecompaniesupthecliffandthenforalltoshakeoutintoextendedline(1stCoyleft,2ndCoyinthecentreand3rdCoyright)fortheactualattackontheGermanpositions.The2ndBattalion,inreserve,followed.Theywerelessfortunateastheyclimbedwithpacksweighinganywherefrom35-50kilogramsconsistingofad-ditionalweapons,ammunitionandequipmenttoconsolidatethepositiononcecaptured.32

At the bottom of the cliff, on a narrow ledge, Frederick had set-up his forward formation command post (CP) and anxiouslyawaitedtohearreportsonprogress.Meanwhile,withtheAllied

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bombardmentblanketingthesummit,theGermansquicklyreal-izedsomethingwasafootandbegantodroptheirownmortarandartilleryfireontheapproachestothemountainhopingtocatchtheadvancingtroops.Theirfire,however,wasfarfromthecliffsonthenorthsideofthemountain.

Despite the weather and terrain, the assault was apparently progressingwell.Thescouts,particularlyVanAusdale,hadchosentheroutewell.Inthewordsofhispeers“[VanAusdale]gotustothetopthatnight.”33MajorEdwardH.Thomas,akeyproponentofthenorthernapproachplan,described:

Thedifficultyof the climbwith combat loadswas com-pounded by the dark night and the wet, treacherousterrain. Scrambling in the dark up the rocky trail withevery foot and handhold doubtful demanded superhu-man effort bymen loadedwithweapons, ammunition,radiosandlitters.Toourears,everyrockdisplacedclat-tered downhill with soundmagnified a thousand timesandraisedthequestioninourminds,‘didtheenemyhearthis?,anotverycomfortingthought.34

Sergeant Bert Hopkins captured it more succinctly. He remem-bered:

Weclimbedthebackofthemountain.Itwasquiteacliff.Wehadropes,wewentup. Itwentwell. Itwasraining,anditcoveredthenoise.Sometimesrocksbecamelooseandfell,butwegottothetopunimpeded.35

TheForceintelligenceofficerwasanotherwhocapturedthefeatofthe2ndRegimentassaultelementwhenheexplained:

The difficulty involved in this move comes into sharpfocuswhenitisrememberedtheclifffaceofLaDifensa

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beginsat2,000footlevelandextendsupwardsatapitchof60or70degreesforapproximatelyanother1,000feet.Thiswasthecleftthat600riflemen,carryingpackswhichwouldhaveforcedlessermentotheground,negotiatedwithout a sound. They groped for crevices with frozenhandswhilestretchingtheirmusclestotheachingpointtokeepfromslidingbackwards.likesomanysnakes,thesectionscrawledovertheclifffaceand,singly,brokeovertherim.36

Theprogressmadewaslaudable.Afterall,thedifficultyoftheter-rainwasonlyoneofthechallenges.Theconditionswereextreme.Rainandfogmadeeverythingdifficult.Onecompanycommandergavesimplefinalinstructions.“Inthisdamnedfog,”hedeclared,“wemaymiscalculate,butJerrycan’tseeanymorethanwecan,andonce theshootingstarts,we’llknowwherehe is. Laydownfireandmoveinwithbayonet,grenadesandTommyguns.”37

Oncetheyreachedthetopofthecliff,theystillhadapproximately100 metres of rocky ground to cover, which was buried under two to six inches of snow, before they reached their objective.1st Company cleared the rimat 0300hours and spreadout intoskirmishlineandslowlycreptforward.By0430hours,althoughhavinglostcontactwiththe1stCompany,the2ndCompanywasinpositionandradioeditsheadquarterstoletthemknowthecrestofthemountainwasjustahead.

Moments later ColonelWilliamson,whowith his regimental CPpartyhad fallen inbehind the2ndBattalion toworkhisway tothetopofthesummit,passedonthemessagetoFrederickathisforward CP. The importance of themessage stemmed from thefact thatthe142ndRegimentwaswaitingforwordthattheFSSF hadseizedthepeakofLaDifensasothattheycouldbegintheirassaultonMountMaggiore.AsWilliamsonandhisteamwereap-proximately75metresfromthecrestwordfilteredbackthatthe

22

1stBattalionhad lostcontactwith its1stCompany inthegloomypre-dawndarkness. At the sametime aGermanmachine pistolfired intothenight inthedistance. Williamsonapparently fear-ingthattheplanwasunravellingquicklydecidedtoreturndownthemountaintoreporttheturnofeventstoFrederickpersonallysincehewasunsureiftheradioswereworkingproperly.38

DespitetheabsenceoftheregimentalCommander,theplancon-tinuedtoplayout.Only3rdCompanywasstilltoreachitsassaultposition.Thensuddenly,atapproximately0530hours,astheleadbattalionhadreachedthesummit inentiretyandwaspreparingtopositionitselffortheassault, inthefoggypitchdarkness,thetranquility of the mountain top exploded as the Germans sud-denlyrealizedtheywereno longeralone.Beginningslowlywiththecrackofgunfire,itsoonturnedintoaroarasatorrentofsteelblanketed themountain top asmortars,machine guns and riflefiresweptthesummitofLaDifensa.39

FSSF fighting position on the top of La Difensa.

Artworkby

Ted

Zub

er.

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Sergeant Hopkins asserted, “When we reached the top we re-grouped in our platoons and sections. One of our recce teamswent forward and came across some Germans. That got thingsgoing.”Henoted,“Aftertheinitialcontactthey[Germans]foughthard. They were entrenched in foxholes.”40 Don Mackinnon’s recollectionwassimilar:

We [3rd pl, 1st Coy] reached the topwithout challenge.TheGermanshadnot set updefensivepositions abovethecliffsassuming that thisapproachwasunassailable. Idon’trecallgreatdifficultyintheropeclimbbutithadtohavebeenaverydifficulttaskwiththeweaponsandgearwewerecarrying.Knuckles,shinsandkneestookaterrif-icbeatingbutfearandurgencygaveustheadrenalinandstrengthnecessarytokeepmovingup.OnceonthetopwestartedalonganarrowroughandrockypathtowardtheGermanpositionsconcentratedinasaucer-likeareaaheadofus.Itseemedquieternowaswetriedtomakeaslittlenoiseaspossible.Secondandthirdplatoonswereclose behind us on the path. The whole company hadreached the topwithoutdetection.Wehadgot furtherthananyearlierassaultsandhadachievedtheelementof surprise so necessary to the success that followed.Suddenlythesoundofrocksfalling,aGermanvoicechal-lengingourtwoscouts.Allhellbrokeloose! 5thSectiondovebehindasmallridgeofrocksimmediatelyinfrontofthem.6thSectionsprawledtotheleftinamoreexposedposition.Germanmachinegunfirewaswithering,hittingtherocksinfrontofusandsprayingshaleallaroundus.41

TheCOofthe2ndRegiment,Lieutenant-ColonelT.C.MacWilliam,adheringtoFrederick’sdictumofcommandingfromthefront,ac-companiedtheadvanceplatoonof1stCompany.Whenthefiringbeganhewasalreadynear therimof thesaucer.Despiteheavy

24

fireandadesperate,savagestruggleagainstatenaciousfoe,Mac-Williamandhis leadcompanyseized thepeakof themountain.Fromashellholeatthesummit,attheforwardmostpositionoftheassault,henowdirectedtheattackagainsttheremainingen-emypositions.Thesituationwastenuous.Theleadcompanyhadtakenseverecasualtiesinthechaoticstruggletotakethesummit.Addingtotheconfusion,MacWilliamhadtemporarilylostcontactwith2nd and 3rdCompaniesduringthearduousclimbupthecliff.And, tomakemattersworse, thenewly takenpositionwas sub-jectedtoheavymortarfireandincessantsniperfire.

Sergeant Chauffeur, a platoon sergeant remembered, “Weweregreen.Whenwehitthefirsthedgeabovethecliffsomemortarscamein.Theblastscaredusandwefroze.Thentheyreallybegantoworkusover.Wecrouchedthereandguysbegangoingdownonallsidesofme.”42AlanBlackwellrememberedthevisualeffectofthebattlefieldastheypreparedtoassault.“Icanhonestlysay,”hewrote,“itwaslikewalkingintohell.”43

Theinitialassaultallowedthe2ndRegimenttogainasolidfootholdaroundthenorthrimofthesaucer.Thefightingwasconfusedandsavage in the early morning murkiness. “Visibility continued tobeclosetozero,”recalledLieutenantUnderhill,“Unlessabreezescatteredthefog,itwasalmostimpossibletodistinguishobjectsmorethantenfeetaway.”44

IndividualsandsmallgroupsslowlyclawedtheirwaythroughtheGermanpositions. One veteran recalled, “As Lieutenant KarlD.Kaashledhisplatoonintothegloom,twomoreenemymachine-gunswererattlingtothefrontwithsuchvolumethatheorderedtheplatoonintoafiringlineforsupport.Takingtwomenhead-vancedon the guns. Caughton theflank, thefirstmachine-guncrew surrendered intact, similar tactics caught the second crewstill firing when a hand-grenade silenced the gun. Few enemywerefoundalive.”45

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The 3rd Platoon, 1st Companynow confrontedwhat seemed likethe highest point of the mountain plateau. Here the Germanshad built a complex of fortifications in caves and pillboxes thatseeminglywereleftuntouchedbytheAlliedbombardment.Fromheresixenemymachinegunsprotectedthenorthernapproach.Sheetsofflameindicatedtherewereatleastthreemachinegunpositionsbusyfiringoutintotheearlymorningmurkiness.Asthe 3rd Platoonlaydownawalloffire,theremainingtwoplatoonsof1stCompany,aswellas2ndCompanyinitsentirety,movedquicklyintopositionsontheflankof3rdPlatoonandlentweighttotheirfirepower. This effort forced theGermans out of their positionsandtheywithdrewacrossthesaddletoMountRemetanea,whichwasalsoknownasHill907.

PrivateLoringWalingexplained,“Itwasaviciousbattleforashorttime,andafterthebattletherewerealotofcounterattacks,theenemyusedmortarsterrifically.”46ItwasnotlongbeforeFrederickhimself scrambledup the cliff andmadehisway to the summitwhereapitchedbattleforthesaucer-liketopofthemountainwasstillraging.Thebitterbattleforcontrolofthesummitwaswagedby all ranks. Corporal Gordon H. Baker noted, “senior officersfoughtassavagelyandunrelentinglyastheenlistedmenalongsideofthem.”47

DuringthebitterstrugglecameadefiningmomentfortheFSSF.Asthepopularlegendgoes,CaptainBillRothlinandhistroopshadtrapped a group of Germans in a gun emplacement. A Germanemerged carrying a white flag of surrender. As Captain RothlinmovedforwardoneoftheotherGermansinthegroupshotRoth-lin intheface,killinghim instantly.“Ourgroupmachine-gunnedtherestoftheenemywithallthefire-powertheyhad,”acknowl-edgedoneveteranwhowasapparentlypresent.Itwasfromthatmoment,thatmanyveteransinsistthattheFSSFadopteda“takenoprisoners”policy.48

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Yet, JoeGlass,whowas reportedlybesideCaptainRothlinwhenhewasshotprovidesadifferentaccount.GlassinsiststhatCaptainRothlinandSydGathcrawledup tohisposition.Glasspromptlytold them that therewerewhiteflagsgoingupeverywherebutoneGerman,whohadpinnedGlassdown,wasnotsurrendering.Before Glass could warn them to keep their heads down, bothpeeredupovertherockandwere instantlyshotbytheGermanwhorefusedtocapitulate.49

By 0700 hours, the summit belonged to the FSSF. Despite thechaos,MacWilliam calmlymoved about consolidating his newlywonpositionagainsttheinevitablecounterattack.Oncehegainedsufficient control of his unit he quickly organized an assault onMount Remetanea.Hewanted to strike outwhile theGermansweredisorganizedbeforetheycouldconsolidateinanewdefen-siveposition.However,ashestooduptoleadthewayasuddenmortar barrage seemingly targeted his command group killinghimandwoundingothers inhisparty. MajorThomas,theDCO,assumed command and cancelled the follow-on attack. He wasconcernedabouttheshortageofammunition,theweakenedstateof the2ndRegimentand theuncertaintyof theenemystrength.Colonel Frederick,who had left his forward CPwhen his radiosfailed,agreedwiththedecisionandpassedamessagethroughhisCPtohigherheadquartersthattheattackwouldbedelayeduntilthearrivalofammunition,reinforcementsandresupply.50

This state of affairs did notmean, however, that Frederick wascontenttositidle.Heensuredthe2ndRegimentconsolidatedtheirposition and sent out patrols to determine the enemy’swhere-abouts.

Onthemountaintop,Frederickbegantospawnthelegendofhiscourage. Private Pat O’Neill described, “With bullets raking theair, Frederickmoved from unit to unit, sending out patrols andplacingmeninoutposts,tograduallywidenthepieceofterritory

27

weheld.”51 SergeantGray,a Force scout remembered, “I alwaysthoughtIgotasfarinfrontofthefightinglinesasanybody.But,nomatterhowfaraheadIgot,theColonelwasalwaysfarther.Hewasalwaysclosertobeingshotthananybody.”52

Although thedayhad startedwell for theAllies, theywerenotoutofthewoodsyet.TheFSSFheldthetopofMountLaDifensa.TheBritishhadmanagedtoseizeaportionofMountCaminoandthe 142nd Regiment had eventually captured Mount Maggiore.However, all was tenuous as the Germans still held the saddlebetweenLaDifensaandCamino,aswellasMountRemetaneaandwereusingtheirpositionstopulverizetheAllieswhooccupiedtherecentlywonmountaintops.ByendofthedaytheGermanshadalsopushed theBritishoff theCaminoheights andhad retakenthemonastery.

The 2nd Regiment continued to send out patrols to probe bothapproachesanddefencesaroundHill907,aswellastoclearoutpocketsofGermanmarksmenwhoweresnipingandcausing in-creasingcasualtiesamongtheForcemenonthesummit.Thepa-trolsreportedstrongenemydispositionssouthoftheRemetaneaRidge.Inlightofthecontinuingshortageofmenandammunition,Williamson,whohadmadehiswaybackup themountain,pro-posedtopostponetheattackonHill907untilthefollowingdawn.

Frederickapprovedthedelay.However,hewasalsotakingpressurefromhisimmediateboss,theCommanderofthe36thDivision.ThefailuretotakeHill907meantthattheGermanscouldcontinuetofireonMountMaggioreandendangerthe142nd Regiment’scon-tinuedoccupationof thatobjective.Moreover, theenemycoulduseHill907asajumpingoffbasetolaunchcounterattacksagainstLaDifensaaswell.DespitetheheavycasualtiestheGermanssuf-fered,FrederickandhiscommandersfullyrealizedthattherewerestillalargenumberofGermanforcesassembledcloseby.Assuch,hedirectedWilliamsontoensurestrongpatrolsweredispatched

28

tokeeptheenemypinneddownandtousemaximumartilleryfiretobothpreparetheobjectivefortheupcomingassault,aswellastodisrupttheirabilitytofireonfriendlyforces.

By1700hours,thefirstoftheammunitionresupplyarrived.TheefforttokeepthetroopsatthesummitofLaDifensaresuppliedforcontinuingcombatbecameabattlewithinabattle.SergeantR.E.Blakenoted,“Wejustcarriedpacksnoweapons, justfood,waterandammo.Itwasaverydifficulttrail.”Helamented,“Wecouldn’tusemulesbecauseitwastoosteepforthem.Webecamethemules.”53LieutenantJ.D.Mitchellrecalled,“Wehadourpack-boards loadedwithsuppliesandwecouldhear thefireworksatthetop.Itwassolelyaninfantryaction-mantomanandnoonecoulddoanythingforsupport.”54

Mule team carrying supplies to Forcemen on the top of the mountain, 1944.

Photog

raph

erFredrickG.W

hitcom

be,D

ND/LAC,PA115

709.

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But if the steep, wet, narrow trails and heavy loads were notenoughofanobstacle,theremainingGermanpositionsstillhadcomplete observation over sections of the resupply trails. Notsurprisinglytheyusedtheirmortarsandartillerytogoodeffecttocontinuallyhammertheresupplyeffort.Mitchellwrotewithsomeunderstatement,“Wehadtoclimbthatmountaineverynighttokeepthemsupplied...thedashacrossthatzeroedarea[byGermanartillery]witha loadonyourback,wastiringtosaythe least.”55 SergeantGeorgeWrightexplained,“TheGermanswereapplyingasweepingfirefromoneendofthetrailandthensweptback.Astheywerepoundingthat trailandtheywerealsobombingbothendsofittocutofftheescaperoutes.Theirshellandbombswerebeing guided by snipers who were firing tracers to direct theirfire.”56

Follow-On Operations

Bythemorningof4December1943,theAlliedsituationwasun-dercontrolbutstilltenuous.Thenighthadbroughtpouringrainandabonechillingfog.Fortheexhaustedtroopsmanningthepe-rimeter,underconstantmortarandshellfire,andwithinsufficientclothingandblankets,itwasalongmiserablenight.Major-GeraldMcFadden recalled, “Dawnbrokeonahorrible scene.First lightcamethroughadrippingfog,whichwasaGod-sendforus.Itriedtogetintouchwithotherofficersofthecompany,andrallytheirplatoons.Theywerescatteredallover.”57

That morning the 2nd Regiment was reinforced by the 1st Coy, 3rd Regiment. Colonel Frederick sent the remainder of the 3rdRegimentbackdownthehilltoassistwiththetransportofsup-pliestothetopofthemountain. Inaddition,sinceColonelA.C.Marshall’s1stRegimentwasstillidleindivisionalreserve,the36th Divisioncommanderhadreleasedits1stBattalion,ledbyLieuten-ant-Colonel Bill Becket, the previous afternoon to reinforce the

30

2nd Regiment prior to the attack on Hill 907. However, by the morningof4December,Beckethadstillnotarrived.Itappearedtheylosttheirwayonthemountaininthedark.

As dawn broke Frederick postponed the 0400 hours attack onMountRemetanea. InterrogationofGermanprisonerstheprevi-ous day revealed an enemy counterattack was planned for themorningofthe4th.FSSFpatrolsseemedtocorroboratetheinfor-mationwhentheydiscoveredstrongpocketsofGermansmassingjust south of the Remetanea Ridge. Lieutenant-Colonel RobertMoore, CO of the 2nd Battalion (2nd Regiment), recalled, “In theprocessofmoving,therumorspreadthatacounterattackwasbe-ingmadebytheenemy.Onthebasisofthis,theattackwascalledoffandtheentireregimentremainedalertuntildaylight.”58

TheplanwasnowtowaitoutthecounterattackandthenassaultHill907onthemorningofthe5th.Strongpatrolsweresentoutintheraininattempttoworktheirwaythroughthecloudbankthathadsettledonthetopofthemountainandscourtheentireareato locatetheenemy.ThroughoutthedaytheGermanspoundedthesummitwithmortarandshellfire.

PatrolshadcapturedGermanprisonerswhowerepromptlyques-tionedontheenemy’sintenttocounterattack.Itbecameevidentthat the Germans toowere suffering from the heavy casualtiesand difficulties in resupply in the mountain. Nonetheless, theyreportedthatabattalionlevelattackwastooccurat0300hoursonthemorningof5December.AreportbyanAlliedartilleryob-serverwhosawapproximately400enemytroopsmassingtothesouthwestofHill907lentcredencetotheprisoners’statements.Moorerecounted,“Onthebasisofthis,artillerycoveringfirewascalledtoourfronttobreakupanypossibleassemblyofforceonthepartoftheenemy,andtheregimentagainmaintainedonthealertthroughoutthenight.Theplannedattack[onHill907]wascalledoff.”59

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Themorningof 5December showed somepromise. Theprevi-ousnightseveralcasesofwhiskeyaccompaniedtheresupplyrunallowing each soldier several ounces of spirits. Moreover, Lieu-tenant-ColonelBecketandhis1stBattalion(1stRegiment)arrived.Frederickorderedthemtorelieve2ndRegimentandtakeuptheirdefensive positions so that Williamson’s troops could prepareforadaylightassault thatafternoon.TheBritishseemedon thevergeoffinallyclinchingtheCaminomonasteryandAlliedpatrolsthroughouttheareareportedanapparentthinningoutofGermanforces.Assuch,FrederickfeltconfidentthathecouldfinallypushtheGermansfromtheadjacentmountain.

German fighting position in the mountains.

At approximately 1300 hours,MajorWalterGray,who replacedMajorThomas,whowaswounded thedaybefore,as theCOofthe1stBattalion(2ndRegiment) ledafourcompanystrongbat-talion on the attack.60 Halfway toHill 907, the enemy poured awitheringfireintotheadvancingtroopsforcingthemtodig-inina

CourtesyCan

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hastydefensivepositiononaknollwhiletheysentoutpatrolstodeterminetheexactenemypositions.

With the 1st Battalion pinned down, Williamson deployed his2ndBattalion, reinforcedwith2ndCompany (1stRegiment), to thesoutheasttoclearthesaddleofknownGermanpositions.Theytooquicklycameunderheavyfireand, inadesperate,savagebattlethatwaspressedfromtheflankswithbayonetandgrenades,theForcemencapturedaseriesof“knobs”inthesaddlethathadbeenheldbytheGermans.Asnightfell,theFSSFwasperchedtodrivehome theattack the followingday. Throughout thenight therewerenosignsofaGermancounterattackanditevenappearedasiftheenemywasintheprocessofageneralwithdrawal.

Themorningof6Decemberbroke clear and sunny. The1st Bat-talionlauncheditsattackandadvanceddowntheridgetoHill907.ItsonlyresistancewaslongrangeharassingmachinegunfirefromMount Camino. By noonMount Remetaneawas seizedwith noopposition.Grayexploitedby sending twocompaniesdown thevalleytowardsRoccad’Evandro.Frederickcapturedthemomentwithasituationreporttohishigherheadquarters:

Situationatpresent[6December-1200hours]:Wehavetroopsdowntoourleftboundaryat[thesaddle]andhaveconsolidatedfordefenseoftheareasouthoflaDifensa.Our attack to the west against Hill 907 has progressedbeyondthecrestof907.Wearereceivingmuchmachine-gun andmortar fire from several directions, principallyfromthedrawrunningsouthwestfromlaDifensa, fromwest foothills of Maggiore and from north slopes of Camino.We are endeavoring to place artillery supportfireonthetroublesomeareasbutitisdifficultduetoverylowvisibility and theBritish restrictionsonourartilleryfire.

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IshallpushtheattacktothewestonpastHill907asfarasconditionofmenwillpermit.Menaregetting inbadshapefromfatigue,exposureandcold.

Germansnipersaregivingushellanditisextremelydif-ficulttocatchthem.Theyarehiddenallthroughtheareaandshootburstatanytarget.

Pleasepress reliefof troops fromthispositionaseveryadditionaldayherewillmeantwomoredaysnecessaryforrecuperationbeforenextmission.Theyarewillingandeager,butarebecomingexhausted.

Communication are heart-breaking. Mortar fire (andtravelontrail)knockoutlinesfasterthanwecanrepairthem.Everytimewetransmitbyradioenemydropsmor-taronlocation.

GermanreinforcementsapproachupdrawsouthwestofCamino,butIamunabletotellwhethertheyarereinforc-ingorattemptingtoorganize

Inmyopinion,unlessBritishtakeCaminobeforedarkto-dayitshouldbepromptlyattackedbyusfromthenorth.ThelocationsweholdaregoingtobeuncomfortableaslongasenemyholdsnorthslopesofCamino.61

That night the FSSF consolidated its gains and sent patrols outto ensure they maintained dominance over the area. For theirpart,theBritishpoundedthemonasteryatCaminoandthenextmorningstormedit.Bythemorningof7DecemberBritishpatrolslinkedupwiththeFSSFonthesaddle.AlthoughtheGermanwith-drawalbecameclearlyevident,theyhadleftbehindasmallrearguardthatcontinuedtosnipeandharasswithmortars.Assuch,theremainderofthedayandnightwerespenttyinginwiththe

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Britishandother36thDivisionelementsontheCamino-LaDifensa- Maggiore mountain mass and clearing the last pockets of German resistance. Finally, on the afternoon of 8 December, the142ndRegimentbegantoarrivetorelievetheexhaustedFSSF.

Although the summit of La Difensa was seized after only twohours of fighting, the struggle to capture the entire mountainmassdraggedon. In theend, theForce remainedon the topofthemountainsummitforsixdays.Throughouttheyfoughtatena-ciousenemyaswellastheharshenvironment.Batteredbycold,wind, fog, ice and rain and surviving off of limited rations andoftenmuddywater,theFSSFsoldiersappearedasapparitionsastheydescendedthemountainon9December.OneAmericansol-dierremarked,“theyall lookedalike.”Heobserved,“Theirfacesweregray,expressionless,andtheirclothescakedwithmudandblood.”62Oneoftheveteransexplained,“The impactofhellcanonlybefeltbythosewhofaceit.Itsdescriptionisonlywords.”63

ColonelWilliamson noted, “In the attack on Difensa everythingwassacrificed tocarryammunitionandsupplies.”Heexplained,“Themencarriednoblanketsonlygroundsheets.”64By9Decem-ber1943thesurvivorsofthebattlereturnedtotheirbasecampatSantaMaria.Thecosthadbeenhorrific.TheCanadiancontingentlosttwoofficersand25otherranks(OR)killedormissingandtwoofficersand84ORswounded.TheForceintotallostnineofficersand71ORskilledormissing,withanother11officersand339ORswounded.Thesenumbersamountedtoacasualtyrateofapproxi-mately23percent.65

Outcome

And so, the Force had demonstrated in its first combat that it consisted of courage and determination. Lieutenant-GeneralMarkClarkpraisedtheactionsoftheForceandawardedthema Commander’sCommendation:

35

TheSpecialServiceForcewasgiventhetaskofcapturingLaDifensa,anextremelydifficultpieceofhighgroundintheMt.Maggiorehillmass,thepositionofwhichwasvi-taltoourfurtheradvanceinthatsector.Themissionwascarriedoutatnightinspiteofadverseweatherconditionsandheavyenemyrifle,machinegun,mortarandartilleryfire on the precipitous slopes overwhich itwas neces-sarytoattack.Furthermore,thepositionwasmaintaineddespitecounter-attacksanddifficultiesofcommunicationandsupply.Thefactthatyouhaveacquittedyourselfwellinyourfirstactionunderopenfireisatributetofinelead-ershipanda splendid reward fortimespent inarduoustraining.66

Clarkwasnotalone inhispraise.Major-GeneralGeoffreyKeyessentanotetoColonelFrederickthatstated,“Iamfullycognizantofthestubbornnessoftheenemyandthedifficultiesofweatherand terrain encountered in this seizure of Mt. Difensa and Hill907 [Mount Remetanea], and of the bravery, fortitude, andresourcefulness with which your command overcame them.”67 Nonetheless, perhaps the greatest praise came from theBritishprimeminister,WinstonChurchill,whostatedafterthebattleofLaDifensa,“Ifwe’dhadadozenlikehim[Frederick],wewouldhavesmashedHitler in 1942.He’s the greatest general of all time.”68 Withoutdoubt,theFSSFamazingaccomplishmentearneditselfanameinmilitarylegend.

Epilogue

After a short rest period the Force was sent back into the mountainstoseizeMountSammacro,Hill720andMountMajo.Thenon1February1944,itwassenttotheAnziobeachheadtoassist in thwarting theGermans frompushing the Allied salientback into the sea. Here the FSSF reinforced its reputation for

36

aggressiveness and tenacity. Despite their light armament andonly approximately 1,200 all ranks, they held 13 kilometres offrontline along the Mussolini Canal. Through aggressive nightraiding theystruck fear into theenemywhobelievedtheywerefacinguptoasmalldivision.TheGermansoldiersweresoterrifiedbytheFSSFraidsthattheynick-namedtheForcementhe“BlackDevils.”Inthesubsequentbreak-outphasetheFSSFadvancedonRomeandbecamethefirstAlliedtroopstoentertheEternalCity.UponitscaptureandabriefperiodofrestandrecuperationtheForceseizedtwooftheHyèresIslandsintheMediterraneanSeatoprotect the leftflankof the landingson theFrenchRiviera inAugust1944.TheFSSF then joined theSixthArmyGroup in theadvancethroughSouthernFrance.

TheCanadiancomponentoftheFSSF,however,provedtobeprob-lematicfortheCanadiangovernment.Facingamanningshortageand,asaresult,aconscriptioncrisis,thecontinuingdemandstoprovide reinforcements for the FSSF, which was difficult to ad-ministerandinthecontextofthedyingdaysofthewarwasalsoarguablyredundant,promptedtheCanadiangovernmenttomakeasimpledecision.ThetimehadcometopulltheCanadiansfromtheForce.Assuch,theFSSFwasdisbandedatVillneuve-Loubet,France,on5December1944.

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Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD is a retired experienced Regular Force infantry officer who has held key command and staff appointments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including Deputy Commander of CANSOFCOM, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment and Officer Command-ing 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment. He is currently the Director of the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre. Dr. Horn is also an adjunct professor of history at the Royal Mili-tary College of Canada and Norwich University. He has authored, co-authored, edited or co-edited 35 books and over a hundred chapters/articles on military history, leadership and military affairs.

B. H

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FSSF shoulder patch.

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Mount La D

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The southern approach to the summ

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The dominati

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FSSF fighting position facing in the direction of Mount Remetanea.

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Fog cloaking the top of Mount La D

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NOTES

1 Theactualbreakdownofthe697was:Colonel (2i/c) - 1; Lieutenant- Colonels or Majors – 4; Majors or Captains – 6; Lieutenants – 36; Other Ranks - 650. Message from Canadian Military Attaché to Defensor,Washington,16 July1942.LAC,RG24,fileHQS20-4-32,Mobilizationand Organization, (Vol. 1), Plough Project, (1 CSSBN). Microfilm reelC-5436.

2 2CdnParaBnwasthehigherpriorityofthetwounits.NationalDefence Headquarters (NDHQ) directed the commanding officer of 1CdnParaBntotransferalljumpqualifiedpersonnelwhovolunteeredto2CdnParaBn.Therumourthat1CdnParaBn’ssupposedsisterunitwould see action before they would quickly circulated through theranksof1CdnParaBn.Predictably,manyoftheaggressiveandaction-seekingparatrooperstransferredto2CdnParaBn.

3 SeeColonelBerndHornandMichelWyczynski,Of Courage and Determination: The First Special Service Force 1942-1944 (Toronto:Dundurn,2013) for thedefinitivehistoryon theFSSF.SeealsoMajorJ.W.Ostiguy,ArmyHistoricalSection,“TheFirstSpecialServiceForce,”14March1951,1,DND,DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage(HereafterDHH),file145.3003(D1).

4 Letter fromLieutenant-ColonelC.M.Drury,AssistantMilitaryAt-taché, Canadian Legation,Washington to the Directorate of MilitaryOperations&Intelligence,NDHQ,Washington,7July1942.LAC,RG24,Vol.15301,1stCanadianSpecialServiceBattalion,[Hereafter1CSSBN]WarDiary,August1942.

5 TheaverageageoftheForcemenbetweenJuly1942andDecem-ber 1943was 26 years old. Thiswas considerably higher that otherUSArmyunits. Lieutenant-Colonel PaulAdams, the Force’s executiveofficer, laterpointedout that thiswasa very important factor in theForce’s cohesionandmaturity. MajorScottR.McMichael, “TheFirst

40

SpecialServiceForce,”inA Historical Perspective on Light Infantry,(FortLeavenworth,KS:CombatStudiesInstitute,ResearchSurveyNo.6,U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,1987),172.

6 Ross Munro, “Albertan Second in Command Of Allies’ Super-Commandos,” Unidentified Canadian newspaper clipping, 6 August1942,LAC,RG24,Vol15301,August1942.1st Canadian Special Service Battalion,[Hereafter1CSSBN]WarDiary,Serial1354,August1942.

7 Memorandum,CCOtoCCHQ,“PloughScheme,”19January1943.PRO,DEFE2/6,COCWarDiary.

8 DonMason, “‘Air Commandos’Will StrikeHard atAxis,” news-paperclipping,unknownpublication,2ndCanadianParachuteBattalionWarDiary,LAC,RG24,Vol.15301,August1942.

9 Quoted in Lieutenant-Colonel Robert D. Burhans, The First Spe-cial Service Force. A War History of the North Americans 1942-1944 (Nashville:TheBatteryPress,1996),35.Seealso:Memorandum,Mc-Queen toCGS,8October1942. LAC,RG24,HQS20-4-32, “Mobiliza-tionOrganization(1SpecialServiceBattalion),ReelC-5436;Message,CanmilitrytoDefensor(StuarttoMurchie),GSD2088,8October1942.LAC, RG 24, CMHQ, Vol. 12,305, File 3/Plough/1 “Organization and OperationofProposedPloughProject.”

10 Memorandum,McQueentoCGS,8October1942.LAC,RG24,HQS20-4-32,“MobilizationOrganization(1SpecialServiceBattalion),ReelC-5436.SeealsoMessage,CanmilitrytoDefensor(StuarttoMurchie), GSD 2088, 8 October 1942. LAC, RG 24, CMHQ, Vol. 12,305, File 3/Plough/1 “Organization and Operation of Proposed Plough Project.”JamesWood,“MattersCanadian”andtheProblemwithBeingSpecial.RobertT.FrederickontheFirstSpecialServiceForce,”Canadian Military History,Vol.12,No.4,Autumn2003,21.

11 See Message, Military Attache to DEFENSOR, Ottawa, MA128616/7,12July1942.LAC,RG24,HQS20-4-32,MobilizationOrganizationPloughProject (1st SSBn),ReelC-5436; “MinutesofMeetingHeld at

41

C.O.H.Q.On4.1.43ToDiscussLong–andShort–TermPolicyRegardingNorwegianOperations,”para4.,“CobblestoneOperations.”PRO,DEFE2/6,COCWarDiary;PeterLaytonCottingham,Once Upon A Wartime. A Canadian Who Survived the Devil’s Brigade (PrivatePrinting,1996),49;andBurhans,36.

12 Letter,MarshalltoPope,“SecondCanadianParachuteBattalion,”17October1942.LAC,RG24,HQS-2-32,EmploymentandMovementOperations,1stSpecialServiceBattalion,ReelC-5489.

13 TelegramDEFENSORtoCANMILITRY,No.G.S.D.2088,8October1942.LAC,RG24,HQS-2-32,EmploymentandMovementOperations,1stSpecialServiceBn.

14 Ibid.

15 Letter,MarshalltoPope,“SecondCanadianParachuteBattalion,”17Oct- ober 1942. LAC, RG 24, HQS-2-32, Employment and Movement Operations,1stSpecialServiceBattalion,ReelC-5489.

16 Letter,PopetoCGS,“SecondCanadianParachuteBattalion,”20Oct- ober 1942. LAC, RG 24, HQS-2-32, Employment and Movement Operations, 1st Special Service Battalion, Reel C-5489. See also Tele-gramDEFENSORtoCANMILITRY,No.G.S.D.2088,8October1942.LAC,RG24,HQS-2-32,EmploymentandMovementOperations,1st Special ServiceBn.

17 Minutes of the War Cabinet Committee,28October1942.LAC,RG2,SeriesA-5-BCabinetWarCommittee,MinutesandDocumentsoftheCabinetWarCommittee,Vol. 11,Meetingno.201,28October1942,ReelC-4874.

18 The CanadianWar Committee of Cabinet approved the assign-mentofthe1stCanadianSpecialServiceBattalionaspartoftheFSSFunderGeneralEisenhower’scommandforspecialserviceinItalyortheBalkans on 14October 1943. SeeMemorandum,MND to CGS, “Re:EmploymentofFirstSpecialServiceBattalion,”14October1943.;and

42

Letter,CGStoWilliamson,15October1943.LAC,RG24,SeriesC-1,FileHQS-2-32, Employment and movement operation 1st Special Service Battalion.MicrofilmreelC-5489.

19 Letter,Lieutenant-GeneralJosephT.McNarney,DeputyCOSWarDepartmenttoMajor-GeneralPope,CanadianJointStaff,WashingtonD.C.,20November1942.LAC,RG24,SeriesC-1,FileHQS-2-32,Employ-mentandmovementoperation1stSpecialServiceBattalion.MicrofilmreelC-5489.

20 Memorandum, CGS to MND, 3 June 1943. LAC, RG 24, SeriesC-1,FileHQS-2-32,Employmentand movementoperation1st Special ServiceBattalion.MicrofilmreelC-5489.

21 BriefingNoteforCanadianWarCommitteeofCabinet,“DispatchofFirstCanadianSpecialServiceBattaliontoUnitedKingdom,and itsEmployment in the European Theatre as an Integral Part of the FirstSpecialServiceForce.”LAC,RG24,SeriesC-1,FileHQS-2-32,Employ-mentandmovementoperation1stSpecialServiceBattalion.MicrofilmreelC-5489.

22 Telegram,FromStuarttoPope,7October1943.LAC,RG24,SeriesC-1,FileHQS-2-32,Employmentand movementoperation1st Special ServiceBattalion.MicrofilmreelC-5489.

23 Afterthesummithadbeenseizedandresupplycolumnsworkedtheirwaytothetopthecostofthepreviousassaultsbecameevident.PrivateEugeneForwardrecalled:

The footing was quite bad. This trail was nomore than 16incheswide.Everytime it rainedthesoilwashedaway.Thisexposedlittlestones.Theywerelooseanduneven.Itwaster-rible towalk on these. t certain places itwas quite steep. Atthebeginningofthetrailtherewasanopenareaonbothsides. Aswe got higher,maybe a littlemore than halfway,wecameuponthebodiesofAmericansoldiersfrompreviousattacks.TheAmericansandBritishhadmadeseveralattemptstocapturethemountain.Allhadfailed.Alotofthebodieshad

43

beenstuffedintomattresscovers.Theyhaddonethistodragthebodiesdownthemountain.But Iguessthosewhoweredragging these bodies were forced to abandon their deadcomrades due to the continuous shelling. There were hun-dredsofbodies.Aswemadeourwaytothetopthereweremoreandmorebodies.Icameacrossthissmalltrench.ThereweretwoAmericansoldierssittingintheslittrenchasiftheywereasleep.Buttheyweredead.Thehelmetshadfallenoff.Therainhadbeenbeatingonthemfordaysanddays.Theirhairwas flattened across their foreheads. Itwas terrible. It

wasthenthatrealityofwarhadrevealeditselftome.

Private Eugene Forward (3rd Coy, 3rd Regt) interview, 9 October2003.

24 Clark assigned theBritish46thDivision adiversionary role. Theywere to launch an assault againstHill 360 in an attempt to drawoffGermanforces.

25 War Diary entry, 24 November 1943, 2nd Cdn Para Bn/1CSSBN,November1943.LAC,RG24,Vol.15301.

26 “MemoriesoftheBattleofMountLaDifensa,ByDonaldMackin-non,1stCo.2ndRegt,FSSF.CAFM,FSSFFirstHandAccountsandMemoirs(SimsFonds).

27 PrivateEugeneForward(3rdCoy,3rdRegt)interview,16October2003.

28 Staff-SergeantGordonSims(FHQ)interview.

29 Colonel Adna H. Underhill, The Force (Tucson: Arizona Mono-graphs,1994),120.

30 ClarkLee,“American-CanadianTroopsAreCrackMountainFight-ers,” The Independent Record, 13 February 1944, 16. CAFM, AlastairNeelyFonds,AB22,1FSSF,Vol.1,File3.,9December1943-4April1944.

44

31 J.D.Mitchell,UnpublishedMemoir,“TheWarAsISawItFromMyFoxhole.MyDaysWithTheFirstSpecialServiceForce,”NoDate,45-46.

32 “Narrative History of Events, Period 1-9 December 1943,” 2ndCdnParaBn/ ICSSBNWarDiary,HQ2ndRegt,FSSF,AppxG.LAC, RG24,Vol.15301..

33 EdThomas,“FirstSpecialServiceForce,”personalmemoir.CAFM,FSSFFirstHandAccountsAndMemoirs(SimsFonds).

34 Ibid.

35 SergeantBertHopkins(2ndCoy,2ndRegt).Interviewedbyauthor,20October2003. StaffSergeantBillStoryrecalled,“Thenwestartedupcarryingourweapons,hoistingourammunitionupuntilwehadthewholeof1stCoy,2ndRegtonthetopofthemountain.”SSgtBillStory(HQDetachment,2ndRegt).GregHancockandWayneAbbott,Daring to Die: The Story of the Black Devils, Canada’sHistory Television andNational Geographic Channel, Video documentary, Northern Sky Entertainment,2003.

36 With regard to theuseof ropes,oneveteranexplained, “Itwasonaslant,couldalwaysuseyourfeet-hadtohavesomethingtohangontothough.”“ForceHistory-notes,2dBnCP,Barnesville,22Febru-ary1945.”HooverInstitutionArchives,StanfordUniversity,PaloAlto,California[hereafterHIA],R.D.BurhansFonds,Box18,File:NarrativeNotesForceHistory.

37 Underhill,The Force,125.

38 See affidavits of Captain Eino O. Olson, Lieutenant W.S. Story,Technician Grade 4, C.F. Rigg, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Moore,MajorWalter S. Gray, Staff Sergeant K.R. S.Meiklejohn, all dated 29December 1943. Robert D. Burhans Papers, Box 19, File British andCanadianCorrespondence,HIA.

39 Theactualtimethatthebattlebeganisunclear.Variouspublica-tionsplaceitanywherebetween0400hoursto0530hours.

45

40 SergeantBertHopkins (2nd Coy,2nd Regt) interview,20October2003.

41 “Memories of the Battle of Mount La Difensa, By Donald Mackinnon, 1st Co. 2nd Regt, FSSF.” [Hereafter Mackinnon Memoir]CAFM,FSSFFirstHandAccountsAndMemoirs(SimsFonds).

42 “InterestingTaleofFirstSpecialServiceForceTellsAboutTriptoFarmhouseHeldbyKrauts,”HelenaNews,8April1945,1.CAFM,NeelyFonds,AB22,26June1944-10August1947,Vol.1,File5.

43 AlanBlackwell, 70 Years Next to Paradise (BurnsLake,BC:PrivatePrinting,1998),45.PeterCottinghaminsisted,“Itisimpossibletode-scribetheterrorwhichthesoundofevenoneincomingartilleryshellcan instill in a person.” Peter L. Cottingham,Once Upon a Wartime. A Canadian Who Survived the Devil’s Brigade (Winnipeg: Prairie MountainPublishers,1996),103.

44 Underhill,The Force,136.

45 CitedinCorporalGordonHaroldBaker,unpublishedmemoir,“FirstSpecialServiceForceAug.1942-Dec.1944,”[hereafterBakerMemoir],20.CAFM,AB28,CharlieMannFonds.

46 Private Lorin Waling (2nd Regt, 1st Coy). Hancock and Abbott, Daring to Die.

47 CitedinBakermemoir,20.

48 Thisstoryiswidelytold.ForexampleseeBakerMemoir,21;AllenCowperthewaite, “Maybe Difensa, Maggiore, Cassino, Are A JumbleOfWordsToYou,ButTheyRepresentRealHeroism,”The Independent Record,7August1955,Section2,B-1;andBurhans,106.

49 See John Nadler, A Perfect Hell (Toronto: Doubleday Canada,2005),118.Nadler’sbookisanexcellentsourceoffirstpersonaccountsof thebattle. This incident is a greatexampleofhow“secondhand”storiescantakeonalifeoftheirownwithseriousconsequences.Many

46

GermanPoWswerekilledbasedon the justification thatRothlinwaskilledthroughtreachery.

50 “Narrative History of Events, Period 1-9 December 1943,” War Diary, HQ 2nd Regt, FSSF, Appx G. LAC, RG 24, Vol. 15301, 2nd Cdn Para Bn/1 CSSBN War Diary. Some accounts would arguably placesomeofweightofthedecisionnottoattackonColonelWilliamson,the Commanderof2ndRegiment,whoshowedextremenervousness,fearandlackofdecisiveness.

51 CitedinAnneHicks,The Last Fighting General. The Biography of Robert Tryon Frederick(Atglen,PA:ShifferMilitaryHistory,2006),101.

52 Lieutenant-CommanderMaxwell Hamilton, “TheGreatest Fight-ingGeneralofallTime,”The Retired Officer,October1981,26.

53 SergeantR.E.Blake(3rdCoy,3rdRegt)interview.

54 Mitchell,47.

55 Ibid.Mitchell noted that it took all night to reach the summit.Theywoulddropthesuppliesandthenbringdownthewounded.Healsostated,“Wedidn’tcarryweaponsandthatinitselfgaveusanakedfeeling.”

56 Sergeant George Wright (1st Coy, 1st Regt). Interviewed by au-thors,16October2003.Toavoidconfusion,on4DecemberFrederickorderedthe3rdRegimenttobesolelyresponsible forresupplyingthetroopsonthesummit.IntheSantaMariabarracksamemberofthe 3rdRegimenthaddrawnapictureincharcoalonthewallofaForcemanwitha largepackboard ladenwith rationsandammunition that tow-eredover the soldier.Above ithewrote “Freddy’s FreightersDifensaorBust.”ThenamestuckandtheForcewasoftenreferredtobythisnickname.Burhans,98.

57 Major GeraldMcFadden,Written account. CAFM, AB Fonds 31,EugeneForward.

47

58 Affidavit, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Moore, 29 December1943.HIA,RobertD.BurhansPapers,Box19,FileBritishandCanadian Correspondence.

59 Ibid.

60 Hewasreinforcedwith1stCompany,3rdRegiment.

61 CitedinBurhans,119.

62 CitedHicks,100.

63 MackinnonMemoir.

64 “Noteson interviewwithColDDWilliamson rehistorical sketch on force activities, 1942/December 1943. DHH, File 145.3011 (D1) 1CdnSSBn.

65 Thepercentage isbasedona combatechelonof approximately1,800men.DHH,ArmyHeadquartersReportNo.5,1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, 22 February 1946, 35. The evacuation ofwoundedwas a very deliberate, difficult endeavour. It took sixmen to carry alitterwithaseventh,holdingaropeintherear,actingasabrake.Thetripfromthesummittothebottomofthemountaintookeighttotenhours.GordBakerrecalled,“Itwasnoeasychorepackingawoundedsufferingmandownaroughmountaintrailwhilethepatientscreamedateveryjoltofthestretcher,especiallyatnightwhenitwastoodark forthebearertowherehewaswalkinghalfthetime.”GordH.Baker,“FirstSpecialServiceForce,”unpublishedmemoirs,1998,26.

66 DHH Army Headquarters Report No. 5, 1st Canadian Special ServiceBattalion,22February1946,36.

67 DHH Army Headquarters Report No. 5 Historical Section (GS) DepartmentofNationalDefence,1stCanadianSpecialServiceBattalion,22February1946,36.

68 Hamilton,24.