American Government and Politics PhD Reading List · PDF fileAmerican Government and Politics...

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American Government and Politics

PhD Reading List

George Mason University (Updated February 6, 2014)

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Contents American Political Development and Thought ............................................................................................. 2

Methods ........................................................................................................................................................ 4

Presidency ..................................................................................................................................................... 5

Legislative Politics ........................................................................................................................................ 7

The Courts ................................................................................................................................................... 12

Elections and Voting Behavior ................................................................................................................... 14

Bureaucracy and Public Administration ..................................................................................................... 18

Political Parties and Interest Groups ........................................................................................................... 21

Public Opinion and Political Behavior ........................................................................................................ 25

Public Policy ............................................................................................................................................... 28

Race, Gender, Inequality ............................................................................................................................. 30

This reading list, while not exhaustive, is extensive and should be approached as a “greatest hits”

list of recommended readings for anyone who seeks to demonstrate mastery and competency

across a variety of subfields in American politics. Throughout the document, items marked with

an asterisks (*) are considered especially important or pivotal.

1 Syllabi consulted:

PLSC 541, American Policymaking Institutions and Processes. Penn State University, Fall Term, 2008. Prof. Frank Baumgartner. Graduate Seminar in American Politics. Fall 2007. Professor David Redlawsk. GOVT 510 American Government and Politics. Spring 2011. Professor Priscilla M. Regan. Congress & Legislative Behavior. Spring 2010. Professor Michael McDonald. GOVT 712 Problem Solving/Data Analysis II. Fall 2012. Professor Michael McDonald. GOVT 719 Political Behavior. Spring 2008. Professor Michael McDonald. GOVT 719 Comparative Electoral Institutions. Spring 2013. Professor Michael McDonald. PS 2200: American Government and Politics. Fall 2009. Professor Kristin Kanthak. GOVT 510 American Government and Politics. Spring 2012. Professor Michael McDonald. Graduate Seminar in American Political Institutions, University of Wisconsin. Spring 2011. Prof. Michael Tofias. GOVT 605: Seminar on the Presidency. Fall 2012. Prof. Robert J. McGrath. GOVT 755: Seminar in Politics and Bureaucracy. Spring 2012. Prof. Robert J. McGrath. Formal Political Theory Applied to Congress. Spring 2012. Prof. Robert J. McGrath. Graduate Seminar in American Politics II. MIT. Spring 2010. Prof. Charles Stewart III. PS 2200: American Government and Politics. Fall 2011. Professor Kristin Kanthak. Legislative Process, University of Pittsburgh. Fall 2011. Prof. Jennifer Nicoll Victor. Interest Group Politics. Spring 2007. Prof. Jennifer Nicoll Victor. GOVT 510 American Government and Politics. Spring 2012. Prof. Jennifer Nicoll Victor. American Politics Graduate Field Seminar. Fall 2011. Prof. Jonathan Wand.

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American Political Development and Thought Ackerman, Bruce. We The People, volumes 1-3.

*Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale UP. Bailyn, Bernard. 1992. Faces of Revolution: Personalities and Themes in the Struggle for American

Independence. New York: Vintage Books. Beard, Charles. 1913. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Beer, S. H. (1978). “Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America.” The American Political

Science Review, 72(1), 9–21. *Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1965). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional

Democracy. University of Michigan Press. Conlan, T., & Dinan, J. (2007). “Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of

American Conservatism.” Publius, 37(3), 279–303. Dahl, R. (1958). “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model.” The American Political Science Review, 52(2),

463–469. *Dahl, R. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. Yale University Press. *Dahl, R. (2013). A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition. University of Chicago Press. Declaration of Independence; Articles of Confederation; US Constitution, and Federalist Papers 1, 10,

and 51. Retrieved from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdoxmainpg.html *Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. *Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row. Du Bois, W.E.B. 1903. The Solus of Black Folk.

*Elster, J. (1995). “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process”. Duke Law Journal, 45(2), 364–396.

Fabbrini, S. (1999). ”The American System of Separated Government: An Historical-Institutional Interpretation.” International Political Science Review, 20(1), 95–116.

*Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. (1994). Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale UP.

Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies, 44(5), 936–957.

Hartz, L. (1991). The Liberal Tradition in America. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Hayek, Friedrich A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty.

*Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. (1997). Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Huntington, S. P. (1981). American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Harvard University Press. Kernell, S., & McDonald, M. P. (1999). “Congress and America’s Political Development: The

Transformation of the Post Office from Patronage to Service.” American Journal of Political Science, 43(3), 792–811.

Key, V. O. (1949). Southern Politics in a State and Nation. University of Tennessee Press. Knight, J. (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge University Press. Lasswell, Harold. (1959). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Meridian Books. *Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six

Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Locke, John. 1980 (1690). Second Treatise of Government. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company,

Inc. *Lowi, T. J. (2009). The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States. W W Norton &

Company Incorporated. Lukes, Steven. 1986. (1974.) Power: A Radical View. Macmillan.

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*Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. (1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge University Press.

*March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” The American Political Science Review, 78(3), 734–749.

*Mills, C. W. (1999). The Power Elite. Oxford University Press. Morgan, Edmund. 1975. American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia. W.W.

Norton. Morgan, Edmund. 1988. Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and

America. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge

University Press. Olson, M. (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” The American Political Science

Review, 87(3), 567–576. Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). The Search for American Political Development. Cambridge

University Press. Page, S. E. (2006). “Path Dependence.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1(1), 87–115. Pain, Thomas. 1792. The Rights of Man. Paine, Thomas. 1776. Common Sense. Ramsden, G. P. (1996). “Media Coverage of Issues and Candidates: What Balance is Appropriate in a

Democracy?” Political Science Quarterly, 111(1), 65–81. *Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Belknap Press. Regan, P. M., & Deering, C. J. (2009). “State Opposition to REAL ID.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism,

39(3), 476–505. Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (2009). Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America.

Longman Publishing Group. *Riker, William H. (1982). Liberalisam Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of

Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights, Ill: Waveland Press, Inc. Shepsle, K. A. (1989). “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach.”

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(2), 131. Shulman, George. 2008. American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American Political Culture. Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Skocpol, T., & Finegold, K. (1982). “State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal.”

Political Science Quarterly, 97(2), 255–278. Shepsle, Kenneth. A. (2010). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. New York: W.W.

Norton. Smith, D. A., & C. Tolbert. (2004). Educated by Initiative: The Effects of Direct Democracy on Citizens

and Political Organizations in the American States. University of Michigan Press. Smith, Rogers M. 1997. Civil Ideals: Conflicitng Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. Smith, R. M. (1993). “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America.” The

American Political Science Review, 87(3), 549–566. Stoker, L., & Jennings, M. K. (2008). ”Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization.”

American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 619–635. Thelen, K. (1999). “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political

Science, 2(1), 369–404. Tichenor, D. J., & Harris, R. A. (2002). “Organized Interests and American Political Development.”

Political Science Quarterly, 117(4), 587–612. *Tocqueville, A. de. (2000). Democracy in America. University of Chicago Press.

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Walker, J. L. (1966). “A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy.” The American Political Science Review, 60(2), 285–295.

*Weber, Max. 1904. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Wilson, J. Q. (2006, August). “American Exceptionalism.” The American Spectator. Retrieved from

http://spectator.org/archives/2006/10/02/american-exceptionalism Wilson, W. (1958). Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. Mundus Publishing. Wolin, Sheldon. 1990. The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution. Johns

Hopkins University Press. Wood, Gordon S. 2011. The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States. New York:

The Penguin Press.

Methods Aldrich, J., & Cnudde, C. F. (1975). “Probing the Bounds of Conventional Wisdom: A Comparison of

Regression, Probit, and Discriminant Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science, 19(3), 571–608.

*Alexander, George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (2005). MIT press

Almond, G. A. (1990). A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science. SAGE. APSA. (2004). The Evolution of Political Knowledge: Theory and Inquiry in American Politics. Ohio State

University Press. *Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time Series Cross-

Section Data." American Political Science Review 89 (September): 634-47. Berry, W., & Sanders, M. (2000). Understanding Multivariate Research: A Primer For Beginning Social

Scientists. Westview Press. *Brady, Henry E. and David Collier (Eds). 2010. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared

Standards. Rowman & Littlefield. *Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving

Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis, 14(1), 63–82. Braumoeller, B. F. (2004). “Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms.” International

Organization, 58(4), 807–820. *Gill, J. (1999). “The Insignificance of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing.” Political Research Quarterly,

52(3), 647–674. Gill, J., & Witco, C. (2013). “Bayesian Analytical Methods: A Methodological Prescription for Public

Administration.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(2), 457–494. Gosnell, H. F. (1933). “Statisticians and Political Scientists.” The American Political Science Review,

27(3), 392–403. Helberg, C. (1996). Pitfalls of Data Analysis. Retrieved from http://my.execpc.com/~helberg/pitfalls/

*Johnson, Janet Buttolph and H.T. Reynolds. (2012). Political Science Research Methods, 7th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

*Kam, Cindy D. and Robert J. Franzese Jr., (2010). Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

*Kellstedt, Paul and Guy Whitten. (2013). The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

*King, G. (1986). “How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science.” American Journal of Political Science, 30(3), 666–687.

*King, G. (1995). “Replication, Replication.” PS: Political Science and Politics, 28(3), 444–452.

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King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press.

Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1980). Applied Regression: An Introduction. SAGE. Miller, J. E. (2008). The Chicago Guide to Writing about Numbers. University of Chicago Press. Ordeshook, P. C. (1986). Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge University

Press. Primo, D. M., Jacobsmeier, M. L., & Milyo, J. (2007). “Estimating the Impact of State Policies and

Institutions with Mixed-Level Data.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 7(4), 446–459.

Presidency Bailey, M., & Chang, K. H. (2001). “Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional

Preference Estimation.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 17(2), 477–506. Barber, J. D. (2008). The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Pearson

Longman. Bartels, L. M. (1988). Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. Princeton University

Press. *Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. “A

Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.” Perspectives on Politics, 10(3): 571-597.

Brace, P., & Hinckley, B. (1991). “The Structure of Presidential Approval: Constraints within and across Presidencies.” The Journal of Politics, 53(4), 993–1017.

*Burden, B. C., & Hillygus, D. S. (2009). “Polls and Elections: Opinion Formation, Polarization, and Presidential Reelection.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39(3), 619–635.

*Cameron, C. M. (2000). Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge University Press.

*Canes-Wrone, B. (2001). “The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 313–329.

*Canes-Wrone, B., & Shotts, K. W. (2004). “The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion.” American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 690–706.

*Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. The party decides: presidential nominations before and after reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Covington, C. R., Wrighton, J. M., & Kinney, R. (1995). A “Presidency-Augmented” Model of Presidential Success on House Roll Call Votes. American Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 1001–1024.

Deering, C. J., & Maltzman, F. (1999). “The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power.” Political Research Quarterly, 52(4), 767–783.

Edwards, G. C., Kessel, J. H., & Rockman, B. A. (1993). Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Geer, J. G. (1988). Assessing the Representativeness of Electorates in Presidential Primaries. American Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 929–945.

*Groseclose, T., & McCarty, N. (2001). The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 100–119.

*Heclo, H. (1975). OMB and the Presidency - The Problem of “Neutral Competence.” Public Interest, 38, 8099.

Holbrook, T. M., & McClurg, S. D. (2005). The Mobilization of Core Supporters: Campaigns, Turnout, and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 49(4), 689–703.

https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8667419&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S1537592712001624

https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8667419&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S1537592712001624

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Howell, W. G. (2003). Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton University Press.

*Kernell, S. (2007). Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Cq Press. *Kiewiet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1988). Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations

Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, 32(3), 713–736. *Kousser, T., & Phillips, J. H. (2012). The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing

on Policy. Cambridge University Press. Krause, G. A., & Cohen, J. E. (2000). Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional

Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders, 1939-96. The Journal of Politics, 62(1), 88–114. Lewis, D. E. (2010). The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic

Performance. Princeton University Press. Mayer, K. R. (1999). Executive Orders and Presidential Power. The Journal of Politics, 61(2), 445–466.

*McCarty, N. M. (2000). Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics. The American Political Science Review, 94(1), 117–129.

McCarty, N., & Razaghian, R. (1999). Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885- 1996. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 1122–1143.

*Miller, J. M., & Jon A. Krosnick. (2000). News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 301–315.

Mitchell, D. (2010). Does Context Matter? Advisory Systems and the Management of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 40(4), 631–659.

Moe, T. M., & Howell, W. G. (1999). Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29(4), 850–872.

Moe, T. M., Cohen, J., Dickinson, M., Jacobs, L. R., Mayer, K. R., Rockman, B., … Wood, B. D. (2009). SYMPOSIUM: The Future of Presidential Studies. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39(4), 701–818.

Mutz, D. C. (1995). Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries. The Journal of Politics, 57(4), 1015–1042.

Nelson, M. (2009). The Presidency and the Political System, 9th Edition. CQ Press. *Neustadt, R. E. (1991). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from

Roosevelt to Reagan. Simon and Schuster. Nicholson, S. P., Segura, G. M., & Woods, N. D. (2002). Presidential Approval and the Mixed Blessing of

Divided Government. The Journal of Politics, 64(3), 701–720. Norpoth, H., & Sidman, A. H. (2007). Mission Accomplished: The Wartime Election of 2004. Political

Behavior, 29(2), 175–195. Peterson, M. A. (1992). The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest

Group Liaison. The American Political Science Review, 86(3), 612–625. *Pfiffner, J. P. (2010). The Modern Presidency. Cengage Learning. Pfiffner, J. P. (2011). Decision Making in the Obama White House. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41(2),

244–262. Pfiffner, J. P., Burke, J., Dickinson, M., Haney, P., McKeown, T., Rudalevige, A., Hult, K. (2005). Special

Issue: Presidential Decision Making. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 217–360. Ragsdale, L., & Theis, J. J. (1997). The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-92.

American Journal of Political Science, 41(4), 1280–1318. Rudalevige, A. (2002). Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative

Policy Formulation. Princeton University Press. *Skowronek, S. (1993). The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton.

Harvard University Press.

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*Wlezien, C., & Erikson, R. S. (2002). The Timeline of Presidential Election Campaigns. The Journal of Politics, 64(4), 969–993.

Legislative Politics Adler, E. Scott. 2002. Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System.

University of Chicago Press. *Adler, E. Scott and John D. Wilkerson. 2013. Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving. Cambridge

UP. *Adler, E. S., & Lapinski, J. S. (1997). Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition:

A Constituency Characteristics Approach. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 895–918. Ansolabehere, S., & Jones, P. E. (2010). Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting.

American Journal of Political Science, 54(3), 583–597. *Anzia, S. F., & Berry, C. R. (2011). The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen

Outperform Congressmen? American Journal of Political Science, 55(3), 478–493. *Arnold, R. D. (1992). The Logic of Congressional Action. Yale University Press. Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1990). Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios. The

American Political Science Review, 84(3), 891–906. Balla, S. J., Lawrence, E. D., Maltzman, F., & Sigelman, L. (2002). Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and

the Distribution of Legislative Pork. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 515–525. Banks, J. S. (2000). Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures. The American Political Science Review,

94(3), 677–681. Baron, D. P. (1994). A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization. Legislative

Studies Quarterly, 19(2), 267–296. *Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures. The American Political Science Review,

83(4), 1181–1206. Bawn, K. (1997). Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and

the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 13(1), 101–126. Bianco, W. T., & Sened, I. (2005). Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing

Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures. The American Political Science Review, 99(3), 361–371.

Binder, S. A. (1997). Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge University Press.

*Binder, S. A. (1999). The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. The American Political Science Review, 93(3), 519–533.

Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Radcliffe, P. M., & Brandon L. Bartels. (2005). The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members, 1993-94. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 549–579.

*Brady, D. W., & Volden, C. (2005). Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush. Westview Press.

Bratton, K., & Rouse, S. (2011). Networks in the Legislative Arena: How Group Dynamics Affect Cosponsorship. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36(3), 423–460.

*Calvert, R. L., & Fenno, R. F. (1994). Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate. The Journal of Politics, 56(2), 349–376.

Campbell, J. E. (2011). The Midterm Landslide of 2010: A Triple Wave Election. The Forum, 8(4). *Carey, J. M., Niemi, R. G., & Powell, L. W. (1998). The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23(2), 271–300.

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Carpenter, D. P., Esterling, K. M., & Lazer, D. M. J. (2004). Friends, Brokers, and Transitivity: Who Informs Whom in Washington Politics? The Journal of Politics, 66(1), 224–246.

*Clausen, A. R. (1973). How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. St. Martin’s Press. Clinton, J. D. (2006). Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House. The

Journal of Politics, 68(2), 397–409. *Clinton, J. D. (2007). Lawmaking and Roll Calls. The Journal of Politics, 69(2), 457–469. Clinton, J., Simon Jackman, & Rivers, D. (2004). The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data. The American

Political Science Review, 98(2), 355–370. Cooper, J., & Brady, D. W. (1981). Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon

to Rayburn. The American Political Science Review, 75(2), 411–425. Covington, C. R., & Bargen, A. A. (2004). Comparing Floor-Dominated and Party-Dominated

Explanations of Policy Change in the House of Representatives. Journal of Politics, 66(4), 1069–1088.

*Cox, G. W., & Katz, J. N. (1996). Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow? American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 478–497.

Cox, G. W., & Katz, J. N. (2002). Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution. Cambridge University Press.

*Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005). Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge University Press.

*Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2007). Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, R. H., Oleszek, W. J., & Lee, F. E. (2011). Congress and Its Members, Fourteenth Edition. CQ Press.

Deering, C. J. (2005). Foreign Affairs and War. In Institutions of American Democracy: The Legislative Branch, Paul Quirk and Sarah Binder, eds. Oxford University Press.

Denzau, A. T., & Mackay, R. J. (1983). Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior. American Journal of Political Science, 27(4), 740–761.

Dion, D. (2001). Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. University of Michigan Press.

Dodd, L. C., & Oppenheimer, B. I. (2012). Congress Reconsidered, 10th Edition. CQ Press. *Durr, R. H., Gilmour, J. B., & Wolbrecht, C. (1997). Explaining Congressional Approval. American

Journal of Political Science, 41(1), 175–207. Epstein, D. (1997). An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power. Public Choice,

91(3/4), 271–299. *Esterling, Kevin. 2007. "Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in

Congressional Committees." American Political Science Review 101 (Feb.): 93-109. Erikson, R. S. (1988). The Puzzle of Midterm Loss. The Journal of Politics, 50(4), 1011–1029. Eskridge, W., & Ferejohn, J. (1991). The Article I, Section 7 Game. Georgetown Law Journal, 80, 523. Eulau, H., Wahlke, J. C., Buchanan, W., & Ferguson, L. C. (1959). The Role of the Representative: Some

Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke. The American Political Science Review, 53(3), 742–756.

Fenno, R. F. (1962). The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration. The American Political Science Review, 56(2), 310–324.

*Fenno, R. F. (1977). U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration. The American Political Science Review, 71(3), 883–917.

*Fenno, R. F. (1978). Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Little, Brown and Company. Fenno, R. F. (1995). Congressmen in Committees. Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University

of California, Berkeley.

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Ferejohn, J. (1986). Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation. In Congress and Policy Change, Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, eds. New York: Agathon Press, Inc.

*Finocchiaro, Charles J. and David W. Rohde. 2008. “War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33(1): 35-61.

*Fiorina, M. P. (1989). Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment. Yale University Press. *Fowler, J. H. (2006). Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks. Political Analysis,

14(4), 456–487. Friedman, J. N., & Holden, R. T. (2009). The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What’s Gerrymandering

Got to Do with It? The Journal of Politics, 71(2), 593–611. Froman, L. A., & Ripley, R. B. (1965). Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House

Democrats. The American Political Science Review, 59(1), 52–63. *Gailmard, S., & Jenkins, J. A. (2007). Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House: Fingerprints of

Majority Party Power. The Journal of Politics, 69(3), 689–700. Gailmard, S., & Jenkins, J. A. (2009). Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in

the Senate. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 324–342. *Gerber, E. R. (1996). Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives. American Journal of

Political Science, 40(1), 99–128. Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1987). Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An

Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 3(2), 287–335.

*Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990). Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature. American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 531–564.

*Hall, R. L. (1987). Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making. The American Political Science Review, 81(1), 105–127.

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