America as a European Power

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America as a European Power: The End of Empire by Integration?Author(s): John PetersonSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 80, No. 4,The Transatlantic Relationship (Jul., 2004), pp. 613-629Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569526

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Americaas a Europeanpower:theend of empireby integration?

JOHNPETERSON

Has the transatlanticalliancereached the end of history?The question may seemfacetious or flippant, implicitly connecting Fukuyama's notorious descriptionof the post-Cold War international world, and Kagan's nearly-as-notoriouscontention that an unbridgeable gulf has opened up between AmericanMartiansand European Venusians.' Yet the question is a serious one. In a 'waron terrorism', led by a hegemon with no permanent alliances, is the postwarpartnershipbetween Europe and America now a historical artefact?To answer the question, it helps to consider whether a bedrock principle ofpostwar US foreign policy-the notion of America as a 'European power'-remains solid. Is Europe still a special sphere of US interest, for reasons of bothglobal strategy and cultural affinity?2 The principle is rooted in a historicalnarrativeof evolving relations between the United States on the one hand and,on the other, a Europe that was split in two and contained the primary frontline of the Cold War, but whose western half as a coherent geopolitical con-struct, possessing enough political solidarity and responsiveness to Americanleadership to make the 'West' viable as an alliance.One of the most intriguing accounts of the narrative s that of the Norwegianhistorian Geir Lundestad.3 According to Lundestad, the transatlanticalliancebecame a product of three factors:* US political support for European integration, which itself was crucial tothe success of what became the European Union (EU);* American affinity for the (admittedly naive) idea of constructing a 'United

States of Europe', modelled on American federalism;* the consistency of US supportfor European unity, which remained remark-ably steady over time.

FrancisFukuyama,Theendofhistoryndthe astman Londonand New York: HamishHamilton,1992);Robert Kagan, Of paradisendpower:America ndEuropen thenewworld rderNew York:Knopf,2003).There is in anycasea clearenough connectionbetween Fukuyama,Kaganand otherswho havedevelopedsimplethesesaboutrapidchange n international oliticsand distilled hem down to theirvery essences n memorable,media-friendlyoundbites.2 See RichardHolbrooke, America,aEuropeanpower',Foreign ffairs4:2, March-April 995, pp. 38-5I.3 GeirLundestad, Empire'y integration:he UnitedStates ndEuropeanntegration,945-97 Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997).

InternationalAffairs80, 4 (2004) 6I3-629


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John PetersonThus, America sought a unified Europe as a central element in a 'negotiated'

postwar international order, which itself featured a coherent and purposefulWest as a central pillar.4 Admittedly, the western alliance was a scene offrequent quarrelling,but also of genuine negotiation on policy. US power wasexercised mainly through persuasion: 'There were a surprising number ofinstances in which the United States modified its own positions when thoseefforts at persuasion failed.'5The essence of Lundestad'sargument is that America became and remaineda European power mainly by extending its postwar 'empire' throughintegration and negotiation. In the language of foreign policy analysis,a strong,united Europe became a milieugoal of US foreign policy, or one that aims toshape the broad international order. It was usually prioritized when it clashedwith American possession oals, or objectives which furthered specific, materialnational interests.6 Most of the time, a collectively powerful Europe wasviewed as fundamental to the health of the most important US security allianceand, by extension, a democratic international order.Yet three events-the election of George W. Bush, the terrorist attacks ofii September 200I (9/I ) and the Iraqiwar-could collectively be viewed asproducing deep, lasting ruptures, both in postwar American policy towardsEurope and between Europe and Ame rica.7merican behaviour since 9/II,especially during the weeks and months preceding the 2003 Iraqwar, has givensustenance to fears that the United States has embraced a new policy of'disaggregation' of the EU: that is, seeking to maintain America's status as aEuropean power through the use of divide-and-rule tactics, thus allowing theUS to dominate (individually much less powerful) EU member states. IfWashington could be reasonably sure of the EU's collective support for USpolicy objectives, a strong Europe would be welcomed. But Iraq showed theEU to be both weak and divided as a collective, and surprisingly supportive ofAmerican aims if approached as 25 separatestates. From a US perspective thecherry-picking of European allies was a remarkable success, despite over-whelming European public opposition to the Iraq war. What other policy,besides disaggregation, could the US possibly embrace?In the background, according to Kagan, both sides have undergone tidalcultural shifts leading to almost diametrically opposed views of how power isand should be wielded in the pursuit of international order and security.Neither side can persuade (nor, of course, force) the other to accept its view:

4 G.John Ikenberry,Aftervictory:nstitutions,trategicestraint,ndtherebuildingforderftermajorwars(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress, 000).5 Councilon ForeignRelations,RenewingheAtlanticartnership,eportof anindependent askforcesponsoredby the CFR (New York:CFR, 2004), p. Io. Given that one of the co-authorsof thisreportis Henry Kissinger, his claimmightseema controversial ne.6 See ArnoldWolfers,Discord ndcollaborationBaltimore:ohns HopkinsUniversityPress,I965).7 John Petersonand MarkPollack,eds, Europe,America, ush LondonandNew York:Routledge, 2003);G. Lindstrom ndB. Schmitt,eds, Oneyearon:lessonsfromraq,ChaillotPapersno. 68 (Paris:EUInstitute orSecurityStudies,2004).

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Americaas a EuropeanpowerEuropeis turning awayfrompower ... into a self-containedworld of laws and rulesand transnationalegotiationandcooperation .. Meanwhilethe United Statesremainsmired n history,exercisingpowerin an anarchicHobbesianworld where internationallaws and rulesareunreliable,andwhere truesecurityand the defence andpromotionof a liberalorder stilldependon the possessionand use of militarymight.8

This article offers a critical, interpretive analysisof theses and counterthesesabout where transatlantic relations have been, especially over Iraq, and wherethey are now going. Its central arguments are that the Bush administration'sapparentshift towards a European policy of disaggregation is unproven, and inany event is unlikely to mark a permanent change in US policy towardsEurope. All alliances are means to a specified set of ends. Given all the politicalnoise over Iraq, the United States and Europe are surprisingly close to agree-ment on ends for the international order, even if important differences remainconcerning means. The war in Iraqhas acted to obscure a significant increase inactual transatlantic policy cooperation, particularly on transnational securityissues in the aftermath of 9/I . Apparent conflict on long-term strategy forcountering international terrorism-America's penchant for pre-emption vs.Europe's preference for 'draining the swamp', or trying to cut off the roots ofinternational terrorism-is for the most part a phoney war. The Bushadministration's infamous US National Security Strategy admits that 'there islittle of lasting consequence that the US can accomplish in the world withoutthe sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in ... Europe.'9 On the Euro-pean side, it is difficult to detect any interest in either a prolonged political riftwith the United States or the abandonment of the EU's still very youngaspiration to a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). In short, whileAmerica and much of Europe disagreed over Iraq,there is little disagreement-about ends, if not means-in the war on terrorism.

The toryso farScanning the broad landscape of postwar US-European relations, severalchallenges to Lundestad's empire by integration thesis may seem to emerge.First, fostering an integrated Europe could be viewed as a relatively insigni-ficant, politically cheap US policy objective (in the sense of having few tangibleconsequences) compared to the far more fundamental goals of ensuring thatNATO remained the pre-eminent organizationfor preservingEuropean securityand for US-European political exchanges. Giving political support to whatbecame the EU was thus a second-order concern compared to maintainingNATO's supremacy and American domination within it. Second, support for aUS-style United States of Europe was purely rhetorical and confined to a fringe8 Kagan, Of paradiseand power,p. 3.9 US State Department, The National SecurityStrategyof the United Statesof America(Washington DC: TheWhite House, 2002), p. 25.

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John Petersonof the American political class. When tangible gestures were made to supportmajor steps forward in European integration, they were inspired by ulteriormotives: self-interested US objectives on global trade, Central and EasternEurope, or the Balkans. Third and finally, postwar American support for theEuropean project was not consistently strong. The United States vacillatedbetween ambivalence and outright hostility to European integration, andveered in the latter direction especially when Republican administrationsprioritized European security concerns or perceived that US and Europeaneconomic interests were diverging.All of these objections tend to lose their force if the period of more than halfa century after 1945 is considered as a single longueduree.A dominant themeboth of major works of historiography on the immediate postwar period and ofthe memoirs of leading statespersonsis that the earliest, crucial steps towardsEuropean institution-building would most probably never have taken placewithout American sanction and even encouragement.'0 No postwar USadministration ever took the view for long that a strong NATO wasincompatible with a cohesive EEC/EC/EU."I

American fondness for the vision of a federal Europe was hardly mono-polized by political cranks. It was shared (in chronological order) by WilliamFulbright, the longest-serving chair (I959-74) of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, by key foreign policy figures within the Kennedy administration,and by Bill Clinton, who began his political career on the staff of Fulbright'sSenate Office. Regardless of what came of them, all major US gestures ofsupport for European integration, starting with the Marshall Plan, includingKennedy's Grand Design for a 'concrete Atlantic partnership'and Nixon andKissinger's 'Year of Europe', proceeding to Bush Sr'sTransatlanticDeclarationand culminating in Clinton's New Transatlantic Agenda, implicitly acceptedthat European unity was a boon to US geopolitical objectives, not a goal to betraded off against them.

Finally, whether European unity would always serve US interests was acontested assumption in allpostwar US administrations.The Nixon shocks andReagan-era agitation over 'FortressEurope' certainly did mark nadirs in US-EC relations. However, the historical record shows, consistently, that USpolicy eventually swung back towards an 'empire by integration' strategy, asevidenced by its acceptance that major integrative projects-the single market,the euro, enlargement-served America's milieu goals.

IO See PascalineWinand,Eisenhower,ennedyndthe UnitedStates fEuropeNew York: St Martin's,I993);JeanMonnet, MemoiresParis:Fayard, 976);Dean Acheson,Presentt thecreationNew York:Norton, I969);Nelson D. Lankford,The astAmericanristocrat:hebiographyfAmbassadoravidK. E.Bruce, 898-1977, ol. I (New York:Little,Brown, I996).The EuropeanEconomic Community(EEC)createdby the I957 Treatyof Rome becametheEuropeanCommunity(or, officially, Communities',EC) followingthe I986 Single EuropeanAct. TheEC was transformednto the 'FirstPillar'of the tri-pillaredEuropeanUnion by the I992 MaastrichtTreaty,which created he 'SecondPillar' or the CFSPand the 'ThirdPillar' orjusticeand home affairspolicies.

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Americaas a EuropeanpowerA somewhat different question concerns means, not ends: has Washingtonever accepted that America's status as a European power is best served througha progressively more bilateral, Brussels-centred relationship with the EU, as

opposed to an alliance based on state-to-state relationships with individualEuropean capitals, or the traditional security alliance centred on NATO?Washington's recent dyspeptic reactions to moves to make the EU a defenceand security organization by fleshing out its European security and defencepolicy (ESDP) are hardly unprecedented historically. Still, the broad, seculartrend in the postwar period, especially since 1989, has been in the direction of amore Brussels-orientated, EU-focused American policy towards Europe.'2A separate objection to the Lundestad thesis might centre on the argumentthat America's backing for European unity was subject to a law of diminishingreturns. As long as the EEC/EC/EU remained too weak to be a serious rival toAmerican power in Europe, encouraging the emergence of a more cohesiveEurope was a low-cost exercise promising some (at least) tangible returns onspecific projects, such as the democratization of Central Europe. However,after Iraq the Bush administration became convinced that damaging 'theoriesof rivalries' had infected key European capitals, specifically Berlin and Paris.According to this view, European integration was approaching a thresholdwhere Europe would become capable of challenging American power, in so faras it could deny the legitimacy of US policy objectives and taint them with thelabel 'unilateralist'-and all with greater effect than in the past.An even more basic protest might be levelled at the empire by integrationhypothesis. Was America then, and is it now, a classically 'imperial' power inthe sense of a global power that has always dominated its subjects despite anycosmetic appearance of negotiating with them? Few questions in con-temporary international relations are subject to as much debate.'3 Of course,much depends on how empire is defined. If any hierarchicalsystem of politicalrelationships featuring one clearly dominant state wielding decisive influence isconsidered an 'empire', then an imperial America is a reality in the earlytwenty-first century. If, on the other hand, the dominant power seeks bargainswith other powers, enforced by rules and institutions, and operates on the basisof diffuse reciprocity, then, according to Ikenberry, 'this is not empire; it is aUS-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent.'I4

12 John Peterson,EuropendAmerica:artnersndrivals n internationalelationsBoulder,CO andOxford:Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming 2005).13AndrewJ. Bacevich,Americanmpire:herealitiesndconsequencesfUS diplomacyCambridge,MA andLondon: HarvardUniversityPress,2002); BenjaminR. Barber,Fear's mpire: ar, errorism,nddemocracy(Londonand New York:Norton, 2003); MichaelMann,IncoherentmpireNew York and London:Verso, 2003); EmmanuelTodd, After heempire:hebreakdownftheAmericanrderNew York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2003); Niall Ferguson,Colossus:heprice fAmerica'smpireNew York andLondon:Penguin,2004); Chalmers ohnson, Thesorrowsfempire:militarism,ecrecyndtheendoftherepublicNew York:Metropolitan,2004).14G.John Ikenberry,Illusionsof empire:definingthe new Americanorder',Foreign ffairs 3: 2, March-April 2004, p. 154.

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John PetersonIf this latter view is accepted (and it is rejected by many), the currentinternational order actually does have an antecedent.'5 The postwar inter-national order saw the US extend its 'empire' (loosely defined) to Western

Europe by aiding in its reconstruction and encouraging its empowermentthrough political and economic integration. Postwar America may not be theonly historical case of an imperial power seeking to empower, as opposed todominating, its 'subjects' in a vital sphere of influence. But the United Statessustained empowerment for farlonger than the classic empires were able to doin their own imperial domains (before embracing decolonization), thusproducing a nascent 'US-led democratic political order'. In a Cold Warcontext, it was confined mainly to the North Atlantic area (and partsof Austra-lasia) and existed on a far narrower scale than the democratic internationalorder of today-after all, the number of democracies has doubled globally sincethe early i98os. Yet the post-Cold War era revealed that the United States hadplayed a long game in Europe and won. Its consistent support for Europeanunity meant that an EU eventually emerged that was powerful enough itself tohelp propagate and widen a new model, democratic international order, aboveall by coaxing Central and Eastern Europe to embrace liberal democracy andadmitting ten new member states (seven of them formerly members of theWarsaw Pact) to the EU in 2004.Even so, the end of the Cold War could be viewed as marking a deep-seatedrupture in transatlanticrelations, and one far more important and intractablethan the war in Iraq. It is plausible to conclude that the US-Europeanrelationship has never been sufficiently modernized from its Cold Warincarnation as an essentially one-dimensional security alliance constructed for astaticpurpose. Despite the ambitions of the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration and(even more so) the I995 New Transatlantic Agenda, the US and EU haverarely found themselves capable of defining a common agenda, let alonepursuing joint action, on pressing economic and transnational issues, as theyequipped themselves to do on most hardsecurity issues during the Cold War.I6Now, the atrophy of European militariescould be taken to mean that even thisavenue for partnershipis closed off.Yet arguably, the yawning gap between European military weakness andvast investment in US military power is not, as is often supposed, the mainobstacle to transatlanticpartnership.The most intractableproblem is how weakand rudderlessthe European Union remains as a political actor beyond its ownbackyard, and often within it.17 More than ten years after the unveiling of the

15 Antecedent' n the sense of one circumstancehatprecedesanotherand fromwhich the latter ogicallyfollows.I6 The two leadingworks on the New Transatlantic gendaare EricPhilippart ndPascalineWinand,eds, Ever loserartnership:olicy-makingn US-EU relationsBrussels: resses nteruniversitairesEuropeennes/PeterLang,2ooi) and MarkA. PollackandGregoryC. Shaffer, ds, Transatlanticgovernancen theglobal conomyBoulder,CO and Oxford:Rowman & Littlefield, 001).I7 John Peterson, Europe,America,Iraq:worst ever andever-worsening?',TheEuropean nion:annualreview2004/5,Journal of Common Market Studies42: 6, pp. I3-30.

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Americaas a EuropeanpowerEU's CFSP, it remained difficult to think of cases where the government ofany large EU member state had taken even the slightest political risk to defendthe prerogatives of Brussels as a foreign policy power. European divisionsduring the Iraqi war, with nearly all incoming (in May 2004) Central andEastern European EU member states backing the Bush administration againstthe will of France, Germany and others, revealed how immature and unable tospeak for Europe the Union remained. It was far too easy to blame all that hadgone wrong in transatlantic relations on the aggressive unilateralism of theGeorge W. Bush administration.The EU is often conceived in the academy as a 'postmodern' polity(ironically, even by those convinced that it is tightly controlled by its memberstates). 8 Yet, in foreign policy at least, it is only now departing from a'premodern' phase. In other words, according to an optimistic view, it is nowon the verge of being able to speak authoritatively for Europe in internationalaffairs,particularlysince it has finally begun to be equipped with the resourcesand institutions, via a new constitutional treaty, to do so.19This view assumes that future historians will view the EU's 2004 enlarge-ment as a serious step towards modernizing the Union. The new EuropeanUnion of 25 will accentuate the importance of Brussels as a political capital onmatters of foreign policy. Eventually, the new Central and East European EUmember states (along with Cyprus and Malta) will learn the habits and norms ofseeking European consensus as a first reflex. Despite all its failures, includingover Iraq, the EU's CFSP is a 'long game', and there is no sign of any EU statewishing to abandon it.20

According to this view, a critical mass of European governments, post-Iraq,realize that the EU urgently needs renewal. Moreover, the main foreign policytask of the EU, post-enlargement, offers strong prospects for genuinepartnershipwith the United States in terms of actual policy: that is, stabilizing,pacifying and eventually democratizing the Greater Middle East (whatBrzezinski calls the 'Global Balkans'21),or the areaextending from the Balkansto the Middle East through Central Asia and on to Pakistan.A less optimistic (and probably more plausible) view startsby observing thatforeign policy now begins at home. In the Cold War era, foreign policy beganabroad:it was a 'matter of state', formulated in response to external events andassessments of external threat. Now, 'foreign policy is the external reflection ofdomestic politics' and 'foreign policy is of secondary interest until it begins toI8JamesCaporaso, The EuropeanUnion andforms of state:Westphalian, egulatory r post-modern?',Journal f CommonMarket tudies 4: I, MarchI996, pp. 29-52; AndrewMoravcsik, Despotism nBrussels?Misreadinghe EuropeanUnion', Foreign ffairs 0: 3, May/June2001, pp. II4-22.'9 In mid-2004the EU appeared lose to agreementon a new constitutionalreaty,which waslikelytoinclude a rangeof institutional eforms n foreign policy, above all a new 'Union ministerof foreignaffairs'.20 ChristopherHill, 'Rationalizingor regrouping?EU foreign policy since i September200I',Journal fCommonMarket tudies 2: i, March2004, p. I6I.21 ZbigniewBrzezinski,Thechoice:lobaldominationrglobaleadershipNew York andLondon:BasicBooks, 2004).

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JohnPetersonimpinge on domestic issues.'22In short, what happensabroaddeterminesforeignpolicies far less than what happens at home. Against this backdrop, Europeangovernments will have to invest heavily in rhetorical defence of Brussels tosecure ratification of a new constitutional treaty, overcome domestic politicalopposition to it (which will be formidable in some member states), and in themeantime somehow make the EU a more effective global actor. In thecircumstances it is easy to be pessimistic about the EU's ability to startpunching its weight in international politics.

By extension, the most important future determinants of US foreign policy(and, to a considerable extent, transatlanticrelations) are likely to be changes indomestic politics, particularlythe political geography of American politics. Inpolitical terms, the shift of population and wealth to the American south andinner west, and changes (especially redistricting23) that make Congress lessoutward-looking and internationalist, may well produce a more populist brandof US politics and a foreign policy that is more aggressivelyunilateral,at least inrhetorical terms. Yet in practical terms (especially given the large federaldeficits of the Bush years) foreign policy resources are likely to stagnate ordecline. One likely effect would be to encourage future US administrations toseek to share burdens more systematically to try to stabilize the internationalorder-generally, but particularly with the EU and its member states. Thealternative-the US withdrawing from international leadership-is unimagin-able until such time as the war on terrorism is 'over', a contingency that is itselfunthinkable in the foreseeable future.

Disaggregation?The Bush administration should not be given more credit than it deserves forthinking strategicallyabout Europe. Even before 9/I I and all that followed, thesignature publication previewing the Bush administration's foreign policypriorities, authored by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, barelytouched on Europe and never once mentioned the EU.24 Since then, the waron terrorism and wars in Afghanistan and Iraqhave focused US foreign policyfar more on the Greater Middle East (especially), but also on Asia and LatinAmerica, than on Europe per se.22 Robert Cooper, Thebreakingfnations: rder ndchaosn the21st centuryLondon:Atlantic,2003), pp.106-7. The author s a senior EU foreign policy officialwho is widely creditedwith authoringmuch ofthe EU's EuropeanSecurityStrategy seebelow).23 Redistrictingmeansredrawing onstituencyboundaries,usuallywith the objectiveof producingsafeseats hatonly one partyhasany practical hanceof winning. In thesecircumstances, rimary lections,when candidates ampaign or the votes of partymembersandoften tryto appeal o thoseon the'flanks'of theirparties,become a more importantdeterminant f election results hangeneralelections,in which moderatecandidates ften haveadvantagesn competingfor 'swingvoters'. On the electoraleffectsof redistricting,ee GaryC. Jacobson, Terror, errainandturnout:explaining he 2002 midtermelections',Political cienceQuarterly 8: I, Spring2003, pp. 1-22.24 CondoleezzaRice, 'Promoting he national nterest',Foreign ffairs 9: I, Jan.-Feb.2000, pp. 45-62.The closestRice comesto acknowledging he EU's existence s to confirmthat'theUnited Stateshasan interest n shaping he Europeandefenceidentity'(p. 54).

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Americaas a EuropeanpowerNonetheless, America's new European policy of disaggregation might seema logical extension of what has become known as the Bush doctrine, asoutlined in the 2002 US National Security Strategy(NSS).25To simplifyslightly,

its essence is the administration's stated intention to strike pre-emptively atperceived security threats, either alone (if necessary) or with ad hoc 'coalitionsof the willing' (if convenient). As such, the United States might seek to ensurethat it never had to confront an EU with foreign policy structures more robustthan existed at the time of the Iraq war in 2003, which themselves were notsufficient to produce a clearEU policy either for or againstthe war. Holders ofthis view would consider the Iraqwar a defining moment in US policy towardsEurope: the end of empire by integration and the beginning of an effort toensure that Washington could always hand-pick European allies, as it did whenit attracted military support from the United Kingdom, and political supportfrom a range of current and future EU member states.26It is obviously risky toassume that all future US actions in the war on terrorism would be able toattract a similar level of European support. It is downright dangerous to encour-age a united Europe that might actively seek to deny future American actions acloak of international legitimacy. In 2003, Iraqwas not an 'EU issue'. It mightmake sense to try to ensure that the same could be said for future US missionsin the war on terrorism.Conducted along these lines, America's European policy would become ashort game. It would privilege the goal of ensuring that individual Europeanstates would always have to choose whether they were 'with or against' theUnited States in specific missions in the war on terrorism. The question ofwhether the United States should be more concerned about the prospect ofrising European power or spiralling European weakness would be essentiallymoot.27 All that would matter was whether or not, and with what intensity andresources, individual European states supported America's agenda in the waron terrorism.

Yet if American policy prioritizes above all else Europe's contribution tocountering international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD), then it makes little sense to cultivate disaggregation. Evengiven the EU's crisis of purpose over Iraq and its intense internal focus on theconstitutional treaty, the Union has been an active, productive and evencreative source of policy action on many of the most important non-militaryissues in the war on terrorism, bundled together under the rubric of homelandsecurityin Washington orjustice and home affairs JHA)in Brussels.The EU has25US StateDepartment,The NationalSecurity trategy.26 Americanofficialseven claimedto have done the mathsand workedout that,had the matterbeen putto a vote under the EU's formalrules,a qualifiedmajoritywould havesupportedan attackon Iraq.Thispoint was maderepeatedlyn interviewsconductedby the author n BrusselsandWashington nNovember andDecember2003.27 The leadingaccount of Europe'sdeclineis, of course,Kagan's.For a contrary and conoclastic)view,see CharlesA. Kupchan,TheendoftheAmericanra:US oreign olicyand thegeopoliticsfthetwenty-firstcenturyNew York:Knopf, 2003).

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John Petersonemployed its still very youngJHA policy-making apparatus o something closeto maximum effectiveness to agree measures on politically thorny questionsincluding a European arrestwarrant and a common definition of terrorism. Italso has managed to strike broadly acceptable compromises, in response toforceful US demands, on a range of difficult issues including airline passengerdata, container security in the shipping industry, and money-laundering.28 Thebilateral agreement on extradition and mutual legal assistance-a potentiallymajor policy act in the fight against terrorism and international crime-agreedat the Washington US-EU summit in June 2003 would have been entirelyunimaginable even a year earlier.29To be clear, advances in US-EU policy cooperation do not mean thattransatlanticrelations do not need to be modernized. The need to revamp themain channel for US-EU exchanges, the New TransatlanticAgenda, is clear.In particular, the EU must adjust to the fact that 'US policy-makers arebecoming less interested in Europe per se, and more interested in the assets,both militaryand non-military, thatEurope can provide for dealing with globalchallenges, especially terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction.'30Still, there is little prospect of the EU becoming a less importantinstitutional vehicle for delivering European non-military assetsin the war onterrorism. To illustrate the point, the prominence of the EU role in Afghan-istan has not been lost on the Bush administration: the Union has contributedheavily to Afghan reconstruction, giving in fact more than it originally pledgedat the 2002 Afghanistan donors' conference held in Tokyo. Meanwhile, theEU has begun to refocus seriously, in foreign policy terms, on its new 'nearabroad' afterenlargement.3' More broadly, the most crucial difference betweenthe Cold War and post-Cold War international ordersmay be how the focus ofUS foreign policy has shifted from Europe to the Greater Middle East, whereAmerica may be able to fight and win wars alone, but cannot win the peacewithout Europe. Logically, a Europe that is both active and cohesive in theregion is a far more effective partner.

At the same time, supporthas grown in Washington for the idea of 'trilateral'leadership of the Union, with the UK assuming a leading role alongside thetraditional Franco-German alliance. The potential of trilateralismwas illustratedin the aftermath of Iraqby policy initiatives on Iranand defence cooperation.3228See Peterson, Europe,America,Iraq';Monica Den Boer andJorgMonar,'I I Septemberand thechallengeof globalterrorismo the EU as a securityactor',TheEuropean nion:annual eview001 /2,Journal fCommonMarket tudies 9:6, 2002, pp. 1-28.29 See US Mission to the EU, 'US, EU sign legalassistance,xtradition reaties', 5 June 2003, available t

http://www.useu.be/TransAdantic/US-EU%20Summits/June2s50o3 WashingtonSummit/June2So3USEUSummitExtradition.html;ccessed2 May2004.30 FranBurwell,'Rethinkingthe transatlanticgenda',unpublishedpaper,AtlanticCouncil,Washington.31 See EuropeanCommission, WiderEurope-neighbourhood: a new framework or relationswith oureasternandsouthernneighbours', ommunication romthe Commission o the Council andEuropeanParliament, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, I March 2003.32 In October2003, a Europeanmissionconsistingof the British,Frenchand German oreignministers(and ackinganyEU representation erse) securedan agreement albeita fragileone) with Iran o

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Americaas a EuropeanpowerIn a sense, in European foreign policy as well as in NATO, coalitions of thewilling arebecoming the modusoperandi, sshown by European militarydeploy-ments in postwar Afghanistan (by NATO), Congo (with a French-led forceoperating under an EU mandate) and the Balkans (where NATO is graduallygiving way to the EU). The idea that it is counterproductive to hinder theirformation if they can solve a security problem has gained ground, particularlyas the EU has enlarged to 25 member states.

Looking ahead, the view that Europe is disaggregating by itself, sometimesvoiced by American EU-watchers during the heat of tensions over Iraq,33islikely to fade, especially as the new member states are socialized to Brusselsdecision-making while still remaining advocates of Atlanticism in EU foreignpolicy. There is no inherent contradiction between an EU (of 25 or more) thatis subject to stronger and firmer political direction supplied by its largestmember states and an EU that is simultaneously more institutionally coherentin foreign policy (that is, one with a single diplomatic service, an EU ministerof foreign affairs,an effective ESDP, etc.). If anything, the weakness of EUforeign policy to date may be attributedmainly to the failure of governments oflarge member states to invest in the CFSP.The net effect of EU enlargement is likely to be warmer transatlanticrelations. Trilateralismmay be the surest route to an EU that can truly act, asopposed to react, in foreign policy. Official US support for European integra-tion may have become more measured;34but there are few reasons to believethat America under Bush has embraced a new European policy of disaggre-gation, and even fewer reasons to think that it should.

Thefutureof 'pre-emption'It would be difficult to overestimate the consternation provoked in Europeanforeign policy circles by the publication of the Bush administration's NationalSecurity Strategy in 2002. In one fell swoop, the US appeared to arrogate to

suspend ts uraniumenrichmentprogramme ndallow unrestrictednspectionof its nuclear acilitiesbythe InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency. In February 004, the UK andFrance-joined soonafterwards y Germanyandothers-announced the formationof newjoint 'battlegroups',which wouldcombine nationalmilitarycapabilitiesn a hardsense forspecific typesof missions suchasamphibiouslandingsor operationsnjunglesor deserts)andbe capableof almost mmediatedeployment.33Grantreportsan unnamed seniorfigure n the Bushadministration'ellinga seminarof US andEuropeanofficialsandanalystsheldin April2003 in the middle of the Iraqwar)that'Europe s nolongera geopoliticalconstruct, t is disaggregating,or enlargementhasdilutedEurope.'CharlesGrant,Transatlanticift?How tobringhetwosides ogetherLondon:CentreforEuropeanReform, 2003), p. I 3.Asked if the Bushadministration as tryingto splitthe EU, the chairof the House subcommitteeonEuropeanaffairs,Doug Bereuter,replied hat'theEU hasdone a goodjob of doing that itself (quotedin EuropeanVoice, 6June-2July 2003, p. I).34To illustratehe point, consider he choice of words of one US diplomat: We have faiththata unitedEuropewill by andlargepromotepoliciesthataregood not only for the EU, but also forthe US andthe rest of the planet.'See 'US views of Europeandthe EU', address y EU ministercounsellor orpoliticalaffairsKyle Scott to the FreeUniversityof BrusselsEuropeanStudiesInstitute,Brussels, 0April2004, available thttp://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/Apr2004ScottSpeechUSandEU.html;accessed2 May 2004.

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John Petersonitself the right to judge when and how it would attack perceived threats toAmerican security: 'we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exerciseour right of self-defence by acting preemptively.'35 The NSS contained nopromise of negotiations about the circumstances under which US militarypower would be used to pre-empt security threats.As such, it seemed to markthe end of a negotiated international order.In fact, a close reading of the NSS reveals that a liberal, even idealist view ofthe world is its most powerful undertone. Offering perhapsthe most perceptiveof all analyses of the NSS, Michael Mazarr notes that it is a documentoverwhelmingly about terrorism: it contains barely any hint that a futuresecurity threat might emanate from any source other than terrorists or roguestates.36 It is dominated by two strikingly idealistic and thoroughly liberalthemes: first, that the most effective counterterrorismmeasure is the promotionof freedom and 'human dignity'; second, that new opportunities exist for 'alike-minded group of major powers [to] inaugurate a new era in worldpolitics'.What the NSS reveals most starklyis that the US after 9/I I, at least underGeorge W. Bush, is no longer a status quo power. For example, the NSSclearly marked a radical turn away from containment as a security doctrine.37Yet the case that it makes for proactive, even pre-emptive international actionas the only viable response to the convergence of international terrorism andthe proliferation of WMD is at least compelling and forceful, and arguablyintellectually coherent.Over time, this view has attractedconverts in Europe. Less than a year afterthe publication of the Bush doctrine, and remarkablysoon after the traumaofthe Iraqi war, the EU produced the broad outlines of its own EuropeanSecurity Strategy (ESS). Formally authored by the EU's High Representativefor the CFSP, Javier Solana (not, crucially, by any national European politicalfigure or official), the ESS was presented in draft form to a summit of EUleaders held in Thessaloniki in June 2003. It then survived, more or less intact,scrutiny by member governments, and was adopted by EU leaders inDecember 2003.

Unsurprisingly, compared to its American analogue, the ESS is considerablybroader, touching on a range of non-military, transnationalthreats to securityincluding global warming, Europe's energy dependency and global poverty.35US StateDepartment,The NationalSecurity trategy, . 6.36MichaelJ. Mazarr,GeorgeW. Bush,idealist',Internationalffairs 9: 3, May 2003, pp. 503-22 atp. 507.Mazarr's rgument s perhapsess iconoclastic hanit firstappears.See e.g. Keir A. Lieberand RobertJ.Lieber, The BushNationalSecurityStrategy',US oreign olicyagenda:lectronicournal fthe USDepartmentfState7: 4, Dec. 2002, available t http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/I202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm; ccessed7 May2004;RobertJervis,'Understandinghe Bushdoctrine',Political cienceQuarterlyI8: 3, Fall2003, pp. 365-88. Revealingin this context areseveralclosely argued(andalmostentirelycontrary) nalysesby formerClinton administrationfficials,ncludingIvo H. DaalderandJamesM. Lindsay,AmericanboundWashingtonDC: BrookingsInstitution,2003); John Newhouse,Imperial merica:heBushassault nworld rderNew York:Knopf,2003).37RobertJ. Lieber, The follyof containment',Commentary,pril2003, pp. I5-2I.

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Americaas a European owerBut its primary themes are terrorism and WMD, which are identified (alongwith 'regional conflict', 'state failure' and 'organized crime') as the primary'new threats' to European security. The overwhelming emphasis of the ESS ison the need for more proactive European policies:We should be readyto act beforea crisisoccurs. Conflictpreventionand threatpre-vention cannotstart oo early .. Activepoliciesareneededto counter he new dynamicthreats.We need to develop a strategicculture that fostersearly, rapid,and whennecessary, obust ntervention .. We need to be able to act beforecountriesaroundusdeteriorate, when signs of proliferationare detected, and before humanitarianemergenciesarise.38

Revealingly, an apparently anodyne suggestion in Solana's initial draft-that'pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future'-wasreworded in the final version to become an endorsement of 'preventive'ngage-ment, a sign of Europe's allergy to pre-emption.39 Still, read together, the twosecurity strategies reveal a genuine convergence in views about the nature ofnew security threats, and considerable harmony on how they should be coun-tered. Ultimately, doctrinal differences between Europe and America aboutpre-emption are unlikely to be an important barrier to collective westernaction in response to new threatsarisingfrom terrorism,WMD proliferation orfailed states. When such threats arise, there are likely to be other, far moreserious obstacles to pre-emption.One is a lack of clarity in international law. Most international lawyers agreethat pre-emption, or what is sometimes called anticipatory self-defence, couldbe justified in some circumstances, particularlywhen a state can demonstratenear-certainty that it is about to be attacked. The legal origins of pre-emptiondate as far back as I837 and the British attack (on US territory) on the USSCaroline.4? srael's claim to anticipatory self-defence in I967 is often held to bea valid one. However, here as elsewhere, international law is neither well codi-fied nor authoritative. The closest that the United Nations Charter comes to38EuropeanUnion, A secure uropen a betterworld:EuropeanecuritytrategyParis:EU Institute or

Strategic Studies, 2003), pp.II, 17 and I8.39One effectof thisallergicreaction s further o muddythe alreadymurkywaterssurroundinghemeaningsof 'pre-emption'and 'prevention'.Pre-emption s widelyviewed as the use of proactive orceby one statewhen it is a near-certaintyhatit facesan imminent attack.In contrast,preventionusuallymeans'fightinga winnablewarnow in orderto avoid the riskof war laterunder ess favourablecircumstances'.De Wijk argues hat 'althoughcalledpre-emption,the conceptmentioned in the [US]NationalSecurity trategys prevention'.See Rob de Wijk (untitled)n LindstromandSchmitt,eds, Oneyearon,p. 50.40In I837 the Britishmoved to cut off US support or a revolt in easternCanadaby launchinga raid ntoNew York andburningan Americanship.Fiveyears ater,US Secretary f StateDaniel Websterreachedan agreementwith the Britishprohibiting uturestrikesexcept in casesof 'necessityof self-defence,instant,overwhelming, eavingno choice of means,andno moment fordeliberation'.SeeBruceAckerman, Butwhat's the legalbasis orpre-emption?',Washingtonost,20 Aug. 2002, p. B2,also available t http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Public_Affairs/282/yls_article.htm,ccessed7May2004;see also AbrahamD. Sofaer, On the necessityof pre-emption', Europeanournal fInter-nationalLawI4: 2, April2003, pp. 209-26; William H. TaftIV and Todd F. Buchwald,'Internationallaw and the warin Iraq',Americanournal fInternationalaw97: 3,July2003, pp. 557-62.

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John Petersonspecifying pre-emption is in Article 5I, which states that 'nothing in thepresent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if any armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.'Obviously, Article 51 is far from immune to varying interpretations.A second, even more formidable barrier to pre-emption is the quality ofintelligence needed to assess with confidence when pre-emptive strikes arejustified. Leaving aside the question of whether or not any case ever existed forattacking Iraq on grounds of anticipatory self-defence, Iraq's apparent lack ofactive WMD programmes, and the separateinferences of nearly every nationalwestern intelligence service that they existed, showed how much intelligenceneeds to be multilateralized, with actionable intelligence truly shared betweenstates (and agencies within them), to be effective in the war on terrorism. It ismisleading to label Iraq 'one of the worst intelligence failures in Americahistory'.4' The national intelligence service that was most confident in con-cluding that Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and wasclose to a nuclear capabilitywas Germany's. The intelligence failure was global.It will not be the last without a sea-change-on a magnitude that is verydifficult to imagine-in the direction of multilateralizingwestern intelligence.

Finally and relatedly, the experience of Iraq effectively precludes inter-national consensus (or even US domestic consensus) in support of further pre-emptive strikes at any time in the near future. As one Bush administrationofficial puts it, 'we may never have intelligence that's good enough to makepre-emption a viable strategy. Even a 2 per cent failure rate is politicallyunacceptable.'42For the moment, pre-emption seems a paper tiger in terms ofthe threat it poses to international terrorists, rogue states or the transatlanticalliance. In the longer term, proactive, preventive engagement in the war onterrorism is likely to establish itself as the central guiding principle of foreignpolicy in both the United States and Europe.

ConclusionIt might be argued that there remain very fundamental differences betweenAmerican and European approaches to the war on terrorism. The Americanapproach is to attack the disease by hitting at its symptoms, primarily withmilitaryforce. The European approachis more classicallypreventive and holistic.It seeks to 'drain the swamp' in which international terrorism festers, elimin-ating its root causes:poverty, illiteracy, disease, underdevelopment and so on.This predisposition is dismissed by some, in Kaganite style, as one of necessityrather than choice, and a naturalconsequence of Europe's military weakness.Yet the extent to which the US has, perhapsby accident as much as design,embraced much the same strategy is striking. It is visible in the Bush adminis-tration's policies on the Millennium Challenge Account, Afghanistan, AIDS4I William Drozdiak(untitled)n Lindstrom ndSchmitt,eds, Oneyearon,p. 154.42 Interview,US NationalSecurityCouncil, I Dec. 2003.

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Americaas a Europeanpowerand other infectious diseases,43and the 'Greater Middle East'. All have beenineptly handled by the Bush administration-witness its use, even abuse, of theUN's Arab humandevelopment eportn justifying its heavy-handed approach toreforming the Middle East,44 or its blatant partisanship on nearly all issuesconnected with Israel and the Palestinians. Still, it is surprisingly difficult tolabel the Bush administration's foreign policy, in word or deed, as either'realist' or 'neo-conservative'. The war on terrorism has clearly elevated theenforcement of global norms-including no state support for terrorism or theproliferation of WMD-over state sovereignty, itself the sacred cornerstone ofrealist thinking. It is difficult to be precise about what would constitute a neo-conservative foreign policy, and even the Bush administration's harshest criticsdismiss the label as inaccurate or irrelevant to actually existing US policy.45Future historians may well decide that US foreign policy under the Bushadministration has been underpinned by two broad principles. One is aconviction that 'a globalizing world of democratic, trading states is no longerthe world once portrayed by realists.'46That is to say, an anarchic internationalworld of perpetualconflict between self-interested,aggressive,antagonisticstatesis avoidable if more states could be encouraged to embrace democracy, openmarkets and human rights. Another is that, practically speaking, the world isdivided between a modern core and a premodem periphery. As such, the Westhas both a clear interest in exporting freedom, democracy and all that comeswith them to the underdeveloped world and a moral responsibility to do so.If this analysisis correct, or even if it is simply an accurate description of corebeliefs at the root of the Bush administration's foreign policy, then severalconclusions follow. The transatlantic alliance is likely to endure. The 'West'will remain a relatively cohesive ordering device in international politics. TheUnited States will continue to be a European power.

There will always be times when the tenor of public diplomacy will obscurecommonality of purpose in transatlantic relations. The realization that terror-ism and WMD proliferation cannot be deterred only through the use of forceoften seems not to have penetrated the mindsets of the US public, opinionleaders or the media.47 Support for multilateralismin principle remains low inthe United States, and Mazarris probably right to suggest that 'liberal institu-tionalism [is] still not credible to most Americans', a point often unappreciatedin European foreign policy circles.48 It is thus no wonder that the Bush43 The emphasishere is on visibility n termsof statedpolicy, not actualdelivery.Fora scathingattackonUS AIDS policy, see Molly Ivansand Lou Dubose, Bushwhacked:ife n GeorgeW. Bush'sAmericaNewYork: Random House, 2003).44 United Nations,ArabhumandevelopmenteportUN DevelopmentProgramme,RegionalBureau orArabStates,2003).45 See DaalderandLindsay,America nbound.46 Mazarr,GeorgeW. Bush, idealist',p. 507.47 Even the normally ober Washingtonostreacted o the comment of the EuropeanCommissionPresident,Romano Prodi,that force is not always he answer o terrorismby insisting hat 'should suchsentimentsprevail, he next US administration-whether ed by PresidentBush or Senator ohn F.Kerry-may have no alternative o unilateralism'I6 March2004, p. A2o).48 Mazarr,GeorgeW. Bush, idealist',p. 504.

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John Petersonadministration has eschewed Clintonite, or 'European', rhetoric about thevirtues of multilateralism and international cooperation as solutions to the newinternational security dilemma.

In practical terms, however, the main impact of the war on terrorism onUS-European relations has been to promote enhanced policy cooperation.Vastly expanded combined policy efforts, particularlyon internal security, haveproceeded almost entirely untouched by political conflict at the highest levels.Meanwhile, the more the United States invests in nation-building inAfghanistanand Iraq,the more it confronts the roots of international terrorism.It is not unreasonable, and even rational, to expect Washington to begin todevelop increased interest in, and even admiration for, European policy effortsdesigned to 'drain the swamp' in Turkey, Iran and elsewhere. Even the USmilitary is responding to the lessons of postwar Iraq, and in ways which willfacilitate future policy cooperation with Europe, by making large investmentsin 'full spectrum force capabilities', extending to peacekeeping, stabilizationmissions and the training of military police, liaison officers and post-conflictintelligence analysts.49Transatlanticpolicy cooperation in the Greater MiddleEastwill never be untroubled, but it is likely to become increasingly obvious asa minimum (if insufficient) condition for solving the region's problems.

Against this backdrop a new US policy of seeking to 'disaggregate Europe'hardly makes sense, and thus is unlikely. Historically, the EU tends to rise tothe occasion when the United States sends a clear signal that it expects unifiedEuropean positions on specific questions. As has been shown by the UruguayRound, in the Balkans, and most recently in respect ofjustice and home affairspolicy, American pressureis one of the best antidotes to self-serving hypocrisyon the partof European national capitals.The United States has alwaysbeen anunsung regulator of European unity, in that the pace of integration responds toAmerican policy and rhetoric, especially in terms of EU external policy.50The impression that America has embraced disaggregation is at least partiallya product of the willingness, even eagerness, of the George W. Bush adminis-tration to upset the status quo in international politics. Yet its foreign policyobjectives have, for the most part, been entirely consistent with America's'liberal revolutionary tradition' and may even be seen as Wilsonian-idealist.51Ironically, in this context, even Kagan acknowledged that the United Statesfaced a deep crisis of legitimacy after Iraq.52 The view that America hadreached the apex of its international power, and the nadir of its international49 See New YorkTimes, I March2004, p. Ai. Here I also drawon the presentation f WilliamSchneider,chairof the US DefensePolicyBoard,to the German-BritishForum conferenceheld in London on 28Oct. 2003.50See PetersonandPollack, eds, Europe,America, ush.5 Mazarr,GeorgeW. Bush, idealist';Robert Kagan, America's risisof legitimacy',Foreign ffairs 3:2,March-April2004, pp. 65-87. AspostwarIraq hreatened o descend nto chaos,TheEconomist8 May2004, p. 52)reported hat 'mainstreamUS] conservativeswho thoughtthe governmenthadno businessinvadingIraq n the name of idealism felt]emboldened.'52Kagan, America's risisof legitimacy'.See alsoPhilipGordonandJeremyShapiro,Alliesat war:America, uropendthesplitover raq New York:McGraw-Hill,2004).

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Americaas a Europeanpowerinfluence, became almost mainstream.53In political terms, the United Statesseemed to need the legitimacy that Europe could provide nearly as much asEurope needed the global public goods-international order, open markets,regional security, etc.-that only the United States could supply. In practicalterms, few coalitions of the willing in the war on terrorism appeared to becredible without Europe. The United States thus looked likely to remain aEuropean power, albeit of a rather different, perhaps more chastened, prag-matic, even post-Wilsonian kind.

53LawrenceSummers, EuropeandAmerica n the 2IStcentury', ecturedeliveredatLondon School ofEconomics, 13 Nov. 2003 (available t http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2003/lse.html;accessed 7 May 2004).

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