Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

7/30/2019 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131175 August 28, 2001

SPOUSES JOVITO VALENZUELA and NORMA VALENZUELA, SPOUSES ALFREDO QUIAZONand BELLA GONZALES QUIAZON, SPOUSES EDUARDO DE GUZMAN and JULIETA DE

GUZMAN, DE GUZMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SKYFREIGHT BROKERAGE, INC.,ATTY. ROMULO R. BOBADILA and WEB-HEGG CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES,INCORPORATED, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL T. DE GUIA and LETICIAMARIANO DE GUIA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY, METROMANILA, respondents.

BUENA, J.:

In resolving the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in the present case, which motion toamend was filed after the lapse of fifteen years from the filing of the initiatory pleading sought to be

amended, this Court painstakingly considered not only the peculiar circumstances obtaining, but alsoaccorded premium to the legal truism that "adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law"and that the rules of procedure must not be perverted into engines of injustice.1

Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the decision 2of the Court ofAppeals dated 15 August 1997 in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 44185, which nullified and set aside the ordersdated 11 November 19963and 06 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,Branch 231, in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P. The subject orders of the RTC denied privaterespondents' motion to admit amended complaint dated 18 March 1997.

Similarly impugned is the resolution4of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1997, denying privaterespondents' motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents and proceedings unfold.

On 10 September 1981, herein private respondents spouses Manuel and Leticia De Guia filed acomplaint forspecific performance and damages docketed as Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P5againstherein petitioners spouses Jovito and Norma Valenzuela before the then Court of First Instance ofRizal in Pasay City. The complaint prayed, among others, that the Spouses Valenzuela be orderedto execute in favor of private respondents the necessary deed of sale covering the two (2) parcels ofland allegedly subject of a contract to sell between said parties.

On 16 September 1981, private respondents spouses De Guia, upon discovering that the subjectreal properties were sold and transferred by the spouses Valenzuela to herein co-petitionersspouses Alfredo and Bella Gonzales Quiazon, filed Civil Case No. PQ 9432-P6forannulment of sale,

cancellation of title and damages, against spouses Valenzuela, spouses Quiazon, and the Registerof Deeds of Pasay City. In the complaint, private respondents spouses De Guia prayed specificallyfor the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the spouses Valenzuela in favor of the spousesQuiazon, cancellation of TCT Nos. 39396 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon, and thereinstatement of TCT No. 39142 in the name of the spouses Valenzuela, or in the alternative, thereconveyance of the subject properties by the spouses Quiazon to spouses Valenzuela.

On 13 October 1981, private respondents spouses De Guia amended their complaint in Civil CaseNo. PQ-9432-P impleading Webb-Hegg Construction Resources, Inc. as additional defendant.
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On 19 January 1983, spouses De Guia filed in Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P a Motion to Admit SecondAmended Complaint impleading as additional defendant Gerardo Villacorta. Prior to the resolution ofsuch pending motion, Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P was transferred to the Regional Trial Court ofMakati, Branch 133 pursuant to the Judiciary Reorganization Law (B.P. Blg. 129). As a result of thetransfer of the case, Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P was redocketed as Civil Case No. 2723.

On 20 May 1983, the RTC of Makati, Branch 133 issued an order admitting the second amendedcomplaint. Upon motion of the defendants therein, however, Civil Case No. 2723 was returned to.RTC-Pasay, where herein private respondents spouses De Guia filed a motion to admit thirdamended complaint seeking to implead spouses De Guzman, De Guzman DevelopmentCorporation, Skyfreight Brokerage, Inc. and Lawyer Romeo Bobadilla, as additional defendants.

On 30 May 1984, the RTC-Pasay issued an omnibus order7denying the motion to admit the thirdamended complaint and declaring as automatically vacated the order of RTC-Makati, Branch 133,which admitted the second amended complaint. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration,private respondents spouses De Guia then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before theappellate court, docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 04518.

On 27 March 1990, after a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of pendency of anotheraction and splitting a cause of action, the lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint inCivil Case No. PQ-9432-P. Private respondents spouses De Guia appealed the dismissal of saidcase before the Court of Appeals which on 30 March 1994, affirmed the dismissal order of the lowercourt. Aggrieved, private respondents spouses De Guia filed a petition before the Supreme Courtassailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In a Resolution dated 24 July 1995, the High Court dismissed the petition for having been filedbeyond the reglementary period. Private respondents moved to reconsider, which motion theSupreme Court denied via a resolution dated 30 September 1995.

Upon motion of spouses Quiazon in Civil Case Nos. PQ-9412-P and PQ-9432-P, the lower courtissued an order dated 17 January 1996 directing the cancellation of the Notice ofLis Pendens under

Entry No. 81-11596 and Entry No. 81-12186 and the Adverse Claim under Entry No. 81-11601 onTCT Nos. 39386 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon. On 02 February 1996, privaterespondents sought to reconsider the trial court's order.

On 18 March 1996, private respondents filed a motion to admit amended complaint in Civil Case No.PQ-9412-P. Prior to the resolution of the two pending motions, private respondents filed a motion forthe inhibition of the presiding judge of Branch 117, RTC-Pasay. In an order dated 17 April 1996, thecourt granted the motion for inhibition resulting in the re-raffle of Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P toBranch 231, presided by Judge Cesar Z. Ylagan.

In an order dated 11 November 1996, Judge Ylagan denied the motion to admit amended complaintprompting herein private respondents spouses De Guia to file a motion for reconsideration which the

lower court denied.

Private respondents elevated the lower court's order denying the motion to admit amendedcomplaint to the Court of Appeals.

On 15 August 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision the decretal portion ofwhich declares:
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"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED.Consequently, the orders dated November 11, 1996 and February 6, 1997 are SET ASIDEand respondent is ordered to admit petitioners' amended complaint dated March 18,1997."

On 05 November 1997, the RTC-Pasay, Branch 231 issued an order8admitting the amendedcomplaint, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 August 1997. Herein petitioners

filed with the lower court a manifestation with motion to reconsider9

to the effect that they would file a"petition for review on certiorari" before the Supreme Court, to which manifestation privaterespondents filed an opposition. Petitioners then filed a reply to the opposition after which the lowercourt, in an order dated 23 January, decreed " that the admission of the amended complaint andservice of summons are hereby held in abeyance until after the Supreme Court has resolved thecase before it which has effectively placed this court on notice ."

On 17 December 1997, herein petitioners filed the instant petition where this Court is tasked in themain to resolve the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P.Petitioners argue, among others, that the amendment should not be allowed inasmuch as theintroduction of amendments to the complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P would, in effect, "radicallyand substantially change the cause of action and theory" of the case.

The Court sanctions the amendment of the complaint and resolves to strike down the petition. At thethis point, a review of the pertinent provisions regarding amendments is in order. Section 1, Rule 10of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides:

"SECTION 1. Amendment in general. - Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking outan allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or amistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actualmerits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and inthe most expeditious and inexpensive manner." (emphasis ours)

Equally important is Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules:

"SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next precedingsection, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave maybe refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders ofthe court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court,and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard."

Petitioners contend that the foregoing provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure cannot beapplied in the case at bar. We do not agree. Elementary is the rule in this jurisdiction that one doesnot have a vested right in procedural rules, thus:

"Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be considered as applicable to actionspending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in

that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect thelitigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Theretroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who mayfeel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutesconstitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right mayattach to, nor arise from procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested rightin any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure."10(emphasis ours)
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Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure11amended the former rule12insuch manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" wasstricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3,Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause ofaction or defense."13This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change oralteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the

higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objectiveof the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action andproceeding.

Thus, granting arguendo that the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P wouldsubstantially alter or change the cause of action or defense in said controversy, this Courtnonetheless holds that in the higher interest of substantial justice, the introduction of amendments tothe complaint is apropos at this particular instance to forestall further delay in the resolution of theactual merits of the parties' respective claims and defenses. To reiterate, the Rules of Court seek toeliminate undue reliance on technical rules and to make litigation as inexpensive, as practicable andas convenient as can be done.14Rules of procedure, after all, are but tools designed to facilitate theattainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather thanpromote substantial justice, the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation.15ThisCourt will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.16

As the records would readily reveal, the instant case Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P has alreadydragged and suffered protracted delay for a span of twenty years, borne by countless legalskirmishes between the party litigants involving principally entanglement on technical niceties andprocedural rules. In fact, the procedural incidents and interlocutory matters relating to thiscontroversy, to wit, Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P and its related case Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P, havereached no less than the portals of this Court at least twice first, as to the specific issue of thepropriety of admission of a third amended complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9432 and second, as tothe particular query on the validity of the dismissal of Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P, on the groundoflitis pendentia.

By and large, due to the multifarious procedural incidents involving these two suits, albeit issuesconcededly not to be outrightly dismissed as less important, the actual merits of the controversyhave yet to reach their full adjudication, resolution and determination. Under these circumstances,particularly considering the dismissal of Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P on ground of litis pendentia, thedisallowance of the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P would, to our mind,necessarily result in an even greater delay in the disposition and adjudication of the actual merits ofthe case, which run counter to the hallowed office and cardinal objective of the Rules to provide, ateach possible instance, an expeditious and full resolution of issues involving the respective rightsand liabilities of the parties under substantive law.

True enough, the delay that has so characterized the adjudication of the merits of this case whichoriginal complaint was filed practically two decades ago has not escaped the attention of thisCourt. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court allows the introduction of amendments tothe complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P so as to afford the party-litigants the full and genuineopportunity to substantiate their respective claims and defenses and for the trial court to finallyresolve the matters relating to the merits of the case.

Besides, the defendants sought to be impleaded in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P are not left withoutjustifiable recourse. To this end, the law in no uncertain terms provide for the necessary legalimplements and the adoption of effective means and defenses sanctioned by the Rules, whereinboth parties in the controversy may very well advance and protect their respective legal interests. By
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sanctioning the introduction of amendments to the complaint, the issues shall at last be viewed, so tospeak, in the clear light of day and substantial matters therein shall not anymore be lost in the abyssof technicalities and procedural jargon.

On this matter, the discourse of the Court of Appeals is elucidating:

"With the dismissal of Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P in which petitioners (herein privaterespondents spouses De Guia) seek the annulment of the sale made by spouses Valenzuelain favor of spouses Quiazon, complete relief could be obtained by petitioners only by theadmission of the amended complaint. Without the amendment, a favorable judgment forpetitioners would be meaningless, if not futile, as the properties covered by the contract tosell which they seek to enforce had already been sold to spouses Quiazon, who are amongthose sought to be impleaded as additional defendants in the amended complaint.

"x x x The inquiry should be as to whether or not the amendment is necessary to enable theparties, particularly petitioners, to obtain complete relief in just one proceeding. As abovestated, the non-inclusion of spouses Quiazon and others who may have acquired rights orinterest in the properties in question will render the relief originally sought in Civil Case No.

PQ-9412-P incomplete without the sale or transfer to spouses Quiazon being nullified;hence, the need for the amendment. x x x

"x x x Needless to state, the court is of the considered opinion that admission of theamended complaint is not only necessary to afford complete relief to the parties; it will alsoforestall any further need to institute other actions or proceedings arising from the transactionsubject matter of Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P. x x x"

Inasmuch as herein private respondents, in its amended complaint, likewise pray for reconveyanceof the real property, considering that the subject parcels of land were transferred in the name ofspouses Quiazon who notably were not impleaded in the original complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P, it bears to stress that "owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted areindispensable parties without whom no relief is available and without whom the court can render no

valid judgment."17

Additionally, petitioners stubbornly maintain that the principle ofres judicata, specifically the doctrineof conclusiveness of judgment, should find application in the instant case so as to preclude the courtfrom resolving anew the propriety of the amendment in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P, which issue,according to petitioner, was previously passed upon and determined in Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P.

The contention is without basis. Res judicata, either in the concept of bar by former judgment orconclusiveness of judgment, cannot be applied to the present case.

In Vda. De Cruzo vs. Carriaga, Jr.,18this Court speaking through Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado,inked an enlightening discourse on the subject:

"The doctrine ofres judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows:1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes theparties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involvingthe same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and 2) Any right, fact,or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of anaction before a competent court in which a judgment or decree isrendered on the merits isconclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between theparties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose or subject matter of the
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two suits is the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principlesgoverning the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speakingof these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the aforequotedparagraph (b) of Section 49, is referred to as 'bar by former judgment' while the secondgeneral rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section, is known as'conclusiveness of judgment.'

"Stated otherwise, when we speak ofres judicata in its concept as a 'bar by formerjudgment.' the judgment rendered in the first case is an absolute bar to the subsequentaction wince said judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received tosustain that judgment but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for thatpurpose and which could have been adjudged therein. This is the concept in which theterm res judicata is more commonly and generally used and in which it is understood as thebar by prior judgment constituting a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.

"On the other hand, the less familiar concept or less terminological usage ofres judicata as arule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prioraction operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or whichwere necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and relevantmatters which the parties in the second action could properly offer are not concluded by thesaid judgment, the same is not a bar to or a ground for dismissal of the second action.

"At bottom, the other elements being virtually the same, the fundamental difference betweenthe rule of res judicata as a bar by former judgment and as merely a rule on theconclusiveness of judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in the cause of action inboth cases involved whereas, in the second, the cause of action in the first case is differentfrom that in the second case." (emphasis ours)

Proceeding from the foregoing disquisition, the principle of res judicata, requires the concurrence ofthe following requisites:19

"a) The former judgment or order must be final;

"b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a considerationof the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;

"c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and theparties; and

"d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matterand of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially betweenthe same parties." (emphasis ours)

For want of the second requisite, to wit, that the judgment must be rendered on the merits, theinstant case is thus removed from the operation of the principle ofres judicata. Stated differently, ifthe judgment is not on the merits, it cannot be considered as a conclusive adjudication of thecontroversy. Consequently, a judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction, or because ofthe pendency of another action between the same parties and for the same cause , or a judgmentabsolving a defendant because he was not served with summons, or a dismissal on the ground ofmisjoinder cannot operate as res adjudicata on the merits.20


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To this end, it must be noted that the dismissal of Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P was due to litispendentia or the pendency of another action, obviously referring to Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P.Applying the foregoing doctrines, the judgment dismissing Civil Case No. PQ-9432-P, on the groundoflitis pendentia, cannot be considered an adjudication on the merits.21Clearly then, res

judicata cannot apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP.No. 44185 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, theRegional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 231, is hereby ordered to admit herein privaterespondents' amended complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P, to issue the necessary summons toall impleaded defendants therein and to resolve the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 148120 October 24, 2003

RODRIGO QUIRAO, MONICA QUIRAO, ROBERTO QUIRAO, EDILBERTO QUIRAO, JESUSGOLE, GERARDO QUIRAO, LAMBERTO VALDEZ & FEDERICO QUIRAO, petitioners,vs.LYDIA QUIRAO & LEOPOLDO QUIRAO, JR., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J .:

The issue in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is

whether Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz should admit the amendedanswer of petitioners.

Respondents Lydia Quirao and Leopoldo Quirao, Jr. filed before the trial court a complaint forrecovery of possession, ownership and damages against petitioners Rodrigo Quirao, Monica Quirao,Roberto Quirao, Edilberto Quirao, Gerardo Quirao, Jesus Gole, Lamberto Valdez, Federico Quiraoand Avelino Ngitngit.1Respondents claimed that the late Leopoldo Quirao was the owner of thesugarland, subject matter of the controversy. Respondent Lydia is his widow, while Leopoldo, Jr. ishis legitimate son and compulsory heir. They alleged that in 1988, petitioners forcibly tookpossession of the sugarland and appropriated for themselves its income. They prayed for theissuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction for petitioners to vacate the property .2

In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject property was owned by their grandfather,Segundo Clarito; that petitioner Rodrigo Quirao had been in possession of the land even before theSecond World War; and that Leopoldo Quirao never possessed it. They further alleged thatpetitioners Jesus Gole, Avelino Ngitngit and Lamberto Valdez were recipients of EmancipationPatents issued by the government.3

A few months after their Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint citing a Deed ofExtra-Judicial Partition with Sale of the subject property purportedly executed by respondents infavor of a certain Carlito de Juan ("de Juan"). Petitioners contended that since respondents no
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longer own the property, they lack the standing to file the complaint.4They further alleged that it wasonly after they filed their Answer that they learned of the existence of the deed. The trial court deniedthe motion to dismiss for lack of merit.5

The case underwent pre-trial. Petitioners' second counsel, who took over the case, filed an amendedpre-trial brief which reiterated the allegation that respondents were not the real parties in interest as

they had sold the property to de Juan. Trial ensued and after respondents rested their case,petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Amended Answer. "6They sought theamendment of their Answer by adding the alternative defense that even if respondents were theowners of the property by inheritance from Leopoldo Quirao, they (respondents) executed a Deed ofExtra-Judicial Partition of Property with Sale in favor of de Juan. They further claimed that in turn, deJuan sold part of the property to them.7The second sale appears to be evidenced by a Deed ofSale8involving part of the subject property executed by de Juan and petitioners. It also appears thatRodrigo made a partial payment of P50,000.00, evidenced by the receipt signed by de Juan .9

Respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that: (1) it is dilatory and (2) the amendments aresubstantial and cannot be allowed as the parties have already undergone a pre-trial conference.10

The motion was again denied by the trial court. It ratiocinated that the amendments will prejudice therespondents since they had already rested their case and the alleged facts were already existingand known to the petitioners when they filed their answer.11Petitioners' motion forreconsideration12was likewise denied.131awphi1.nt

Petitioners repaired to the Court of Appeals which also dismissed their petition for lack of merit. Theappellate court ruled that the amendments are basically the same issues raised in their motion todismiss and are substantial ones which may properly be refused. It cited Batara vs. Court of

Appeals,14where we held that the negligence and ignorance of petitioners' previous counsels cannotqualify as "transcendental matters" which can outweigh technicalities.15Petitioners filed a motion forreconsideration16but their efforts were in vain.17Thus, this petition based on the following grounds:

A. THE OMISSION AND INACTION SEPARATELY AND INDIVIDUALLY COMMITTED BY

EACH OF PETITIONERS' THREE PREVIOUS LAWYERS CONSTITUTE MERELY SIMPLENEGLIGENCE WHICH, AS A GENERAL RULE, SHOULD BIND THEM. HOWEVER, WHENPUT AND CONSIDERED TOGETHER, SUCH OMISSION AND INACTION ARETRANSFORMED INTO AND COULD BE RIGHTFULLY CONSIDERED AS GROSS ANDRECKLESS AND, HENCE, SHOULD NOT AND COULD NEVER BIND THEM. IT ISHUMBLY SUBMITTED THAT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING, THE

AMENDMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER MAY STILLBE LAWFULLY ALLOWED; OTHERWISE, PETITIONERS WOULD BE DEPRIVED OFTHEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;

B. IN THE HIGHER INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, THE AMENDMENTSSOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER SHOULD HAVE BEEN

LIBERALLY ALLOWED SINCE THIS COURSE OF ACTION WOULD RESULT IN THERESOLUTION OF THE CASE BELOW BASED ON PURE MERITS, RATHER THAN ONPURE TECHNICALITY. MOREOVER, THE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS COULD BE

AMPLY PROTECTED, AND WHATEVER DELAY HAS ALREADY BEEN INCURRED ISNEVER SOLELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONERS;

C. THE COURT A QUO HAS LIBERALLY CONSTRUED THE RULES IN FAVOR OFRESPONDENTS AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED THEM AGAINST PETITIONERS; and
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D. IN ITS DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED THE FOLLOWINGERRORS: 1) IT RULED THAT THE MATTER SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED IN THEORIGINAL ANSWER IS THE SAME ISSUE ALLEGED IN PETITIONERS' MOTION TODISMISS WHICH WAS DENIED BY THE COURT A QUO; 2) IT FAILED TO DISCUSS THETHIRD GROUND EVEN AS THIS WAS EXPLICITLY RAISED BEFORE IT; AND 3) IT

APPLIED THE JURISPRUDENCE LAID IN (sic) DOWN IN THE BATARA CASE.18

The Rules of Court allow amendments of pleadings as a matter of right before a responsive pleadingis served;19otherwise, leave of court must first be obtained.20

Our case law teaches us that amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowedin furtherance of justice. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, decreases as itprogresses, and changes at times to a strictness amounting to a prohibition. Amendments arelikewise subject to the limitation that they are not dilatory.21Thus, trial courts are given the discretionto grant leave of court to file amended pleadings, and their exercise of this discretion will normallynot be disturbed on appeal, unless there is evident abuse thereof.22

In the case at bar, petitioners filed their motion for leave of court to admit amended answer only after

respondents have rested their case. Petitioners argue that the error was due to the oversight of thethree previous counsels. Petitioners' fourth counsel also claims that he learned of the alternativedefense late as his clients (petitioners herein) did not inform him of the Deed of Sale.23Allegedly,they relied on the advice of their previous counsels that the said deed of sale "was a mere scrap ofpaper because it was not signed by Carlito de Juan."24Respondents contend that petitioners' motionis too late in the day.

Petitioners' motion for admission of amended answer may be a little tardy but this by itself is not acause for its denial. Their amended answer alleges that respondents no longer own the subjectproperty having sold the same to de Juan who, in turn, sold the property to petitioners. Theseallegations, if correct, are vital to the disposition of the case at bar. The interest of justice and equitydemand that they be considered to avoid a result that is iniquitous. 1vvphi1.nt Truth cannot be barred bytechnical rules. For this reason, our ruling case law holds that amendments to pleadings are

generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice so that every case may sofar as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to prevent the circuity of action.25

We should always bear in mind that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate theattainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends tofrustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Technicality, when it deserts itsproper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scantconsideration from the courts.26

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambusao,Capiz is directed to admit the amended answer.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133657 May 29, 2002
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REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD., respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 19981, which granted the petition forcertiorari filed by respondent British Steel Asia Ltd. (British Steel) and ordered the dismissal ofpetitioner Remington Industrial Sales Corporations (Remington) complaint for sum of money anddamages. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution2 of the Court of Appeals denying petitionersmotion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On August 21, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint3 for sum of money and damages arising from breachof contract, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-79674, before the sala of Judge Marino M. De la Cruz ofthe Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22. Impleaded as principal defendant therein was

Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel asalternative defendants.

ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the groundthat it failed to state a cause of action against them. On April 7, 1997, the RTC denied the motions todismiss,4 as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration.5 ISL then filed its answer to thecomplaint.

On the other hand, respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before theCourt of Appeals,6 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44529. Respondent claimed therein that thecomplaint did not contain a single averment that respondent committed any act or is guilty of anyomission in violation of petitioners legal rights. Apart from the allegation in the complaints"Jurisdictional Facts" that:

1.05. Defendants British Steel (Asia) Ltd. and Ferro Trading Gmbh, while understood by theplaintiff as mere suppliers of goods for defendant ISL, are impleaded as party defendantspursuant to Section 13, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.7

no other reference was made to respondent that would constitute a valid cause of action against it.Since petitioner failed to plead any cause of action against respondent as alternative defendantunder Section 13, Rule 3,8 the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint insofaras respondent was concerned.

Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional factualallegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 9 of

the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of rightbecause respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto.10

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion11 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 stating that ithad filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said Amended Complaint before thetrial court. Hence, petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the special civil action be suspended.

On January 29, 1998, the trial court ruled on petitioners Motion to Admit Amended Complaint thus:


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WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is NOTED and further proceedings thereon andaction on the other incidents as aforementioned are hereby held in abeyance until finalresolution by the Honorable Court of Appeals (Special 6th Division) of the petition forcertiorari and prohibition of petitioner (defendant British) and/or Manifestations and Motionsof therein private respondent, herein plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.12

Thereafter, on February 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision in CA-G.R.SP No. 44529 as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the writ of certiorari and orders the respondent judge todismiss without prejudice the Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674 against petitioner BritishSteel (Asia) Ltd. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.13

In the same decision, the Court of Appeals addressed petitioners prayer for suspension of

proceedings in this wise:

The incident which transpired after the filing of the instant petition for certiorari andprohibition are immaterial in the resolution of this petition. What this Court is called upon toresolve is whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deniedpetitioners motion to dismiss the complaint against it. The admission or rejection by thelower court of said amended complaint will not, insofar as this Court is concerned, impingeupon the issue of whether or not said court gravely abused its discretion in denyingpetitioners motion to dismiss.14

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, which was denied in aresolution dated April 28, 1998. Hence, this petition, anchored on the following grounds:

-I-

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THECOMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTIONUNDER THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT EVEN AS SAID COMPLAINT WAS ALREADY

AMENDED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND SUFFICIENT CAUSES OF ACTION AREAVERRED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SEC. 2, RULE 10OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

-II-

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IF THE PETITIONERWANTS TO PURSUE ITS CASE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT HAS TOREFILE THE COMPLAINT, THUS PRE-EMPTING THE RIGHT OF THE LOWER COURTTO RULE ON THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND COMPELLING THE PETITIONER TOLITIGATE ITS CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS AN

ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANT IN A SEPARATE ACTION, THEREBY ABETTINGMULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.15


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The basic issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting the extraordinary writof certiorari, correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective complaint under Section 2,Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Stated differently, the query posed before us is: can a complaint stillbe amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pendingproceeding for its dismissal before the higher court?

Section 2, Rule 1016 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be amendedas a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the filing ofan answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of actionor change in theory is introduced.17 The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 ofRule 1018. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leaveof court after an answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations containedin the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense inthe answer.

Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by changes made in thecomplaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presentedany defense that can be altered19 or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance withSection 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to address theallegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable leeway isthus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of ananswer by the defendant.

The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer hasbeen served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss20 or any other proceeding contestingits sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose thisremedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.

Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of

justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard totechnicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants fromincurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had andmultiplicity of suits avoided.21

In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed judgment will precisely resultin multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which the defendants would likely raise thesame or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering thedismissal of the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when the lattercan still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the complaint would notprejudice respondents or delay the action, as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite itsdisposition.

The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not barpetitioners right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all thedefendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, inrespect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims assertedagainst the other defendants.22

Furthermore, we do not agree with respondents claim that it will be prejudiced by the admission ofthe Amended Complaint because it had spent time, money and effort to file its petition before the


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appellate court.23 We cannot see how the result could be any different for respondent, if petitionermerely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. As adverted to earlier,amendment would even work to respondents advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up theproceedings before the trial court. Consequently, the amendment should be allowed in the case atbar as a matter of right in accordance with the rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 1998 and April 28, 1998, respectively,are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22 is further orderedto ADMIT petitioners Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674 and to conduct furtherproceedings in said case.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 119511 November 24, 1998

WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:

What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the event a complaint'ssubsequently amended?

The Case

This is the main question raised in the present Petition for Review seeking to set aside theconsolidated January 31, 1994 Decision 1of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR SP No. 26626 and CA-GR SP No. 27300, which dismissed the petitions in this wise:

Succinctly put, petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion, or anyact without or in excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge in issuing theassailed orders.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Also assailed is the public respondent's February 28, 1995 Reconsideration 3 denying the Motion forReconsideration.

Facts of the Case


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The undisputed facts, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA) and reiterated by petitioners, are asfollows: 4

Records reveal that Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of19,955 square meters located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, covered by O.C.T.No. 12783. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Verzosa.

Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to havethe mortgage foreclosed. On July 21, 1988, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan setthe foreclosure sale on August 17, 1988 at 10:00 A.M.

To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosuresale, Fe Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the ProvincialSheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 16590, for annulment of mortgage with prayer forthe issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On August 22, 1988, defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

On June 8, 1989, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was notpersonally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson.

On June 27, 1989, Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted bythe court.

On June 29, 1989, she filed her amended complaint which bears the properverification.

Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure ofmortgage.

Whereupon, Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him todiscontinue the foreclosure sale in deference to "the said pending case and to theaction to be taken by the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Court.

On July 4, 1989, the foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property wassold to Verzosa being the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriff's Certificate of Salewas approved by Executive Judge Antonio Belen and issued to Verzosa.

On September 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order admitting the amendedcomplaint of Fe Uson.

At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898forcertiorari. He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint wasissued with grave abuse of discretion.

On June 20, 1990, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the Registry ofDeeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan.

On July 5, 1990, or after the expiration of the redemption period of one year, thedefendant Sheriff issued the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale. Thus, O.C.T. No. 12783 in


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Fe Uson's name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. 11087 was issued inthe name of Wilfredo Verzosa.

On July 12, 1990, Verzosa sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosa'sT.C.T. No. 11087 was cancelled and T.C.T. No. 11107 was issued to Martinez.

Meantime, on October 16, 1990, or after one year from the filing of Verzosa's petitionforcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, the said court dismissed the petition, thussustaining the validity of respondent court's order dated September 5, 1989 admittingFe Uson's amended complaint.

On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading asadditional defendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and PilarMartinez and praying, among others, the annulment of the latter's title T.C.T. No.11107.

On August 20, 1991, upon Uson's application for preliminary injunction embodied inher Second Amended Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez),

respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist fromentering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or ownershipover the land in question covered by O.C.T. No. 12783, upon posting by plaintiffUson of a bond of P10,000.00.

Defendant Martinez filed a motion for consideration which was denied on September18, 1991.

On October 30, 1991, after hearing and upon posting of a bond in the amount ofP10,000.00 by Uson, respondent Judge issued an order directing defendantsVerzosa and Martinez and/or any and other persons acting under their command todesist and cease from entering, intruding and making constructions on the landcovered by O.C.T. No. 12783.

On November 22, 1991, respondent judge, acting on Verzosa's motion forclarification of the order dated September 18, 1991, issued an order to the effect thatthe status quo being maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land andthat such status quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registeredowner of T.C.T. No. 11107.

It should be noted that the Complaint alleged that Private Respondent Uson mortgaged the propertyto Verzosa for P25,000, and that the remaining, unpaid balance was P915.75, an amount she waswilling to consign to the trial court. 5

Petitioners challenged by certiorarithe two orders of the trial court. Because the CA dismissed their

petition, petitioners availed themselves of the present recourse. 6

Public Respondent's Ruling

In dismissing the petition forcertiorari, the Court of Appeals held that "the last peaceableuncontested status that preceded the controversy [was] that point . . . when private respondent FeUson was the registered owner of the land in dispute mortgaged to petitioner Verzosa. As owner of


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this property, Fe Uson has every right to protect her rights as such. Clearly, the issuance of the writwould certainly preserve that status quo." 7

In debunking petitioners' theory that the status quo referred to the period when Martinez had alreadypurchased the property from Verzosa, the Court of Appeals held that "the property was registered inher name two years after the start of the controversy, or when private respondent filed her complaint

against Verzosa."8

Thus, the CA sustained the following findings of the trial court:9

For as long as the instant case (Civil Case No. 16590) remains pending, no act of thedefendants subsequent to the filing of this case can make TCT No. 11107 in thename of defendant Pilar Martinez, and the alleged possession of the latter of theproperty in question, valid and be considered the status quo."

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of the Court: 10

I The Court of Appeals erred in not taking into account or dealing squarely with the

nature, effects and proper interpretation and/or application of the doctrine onamendment of pleadings/complaints to the instant case.

II The Court of Appeals erred when it concurred with the Respondent judge thatthe status quo should be reckoned at the time of the filing of the original complaint.

III The Court of Appeals erred when it completely disregarded the legal implicationsand effects of foreclosure, foreclosure sale, expiration of the redemption period, theconsolidation of ownership to your petitioner and the sale to Pilar Martinez.

IV The Court of Appeals erred when it concurred with the respondent judge ingranting an injunction to restrain consummated acts, and in forcing a transfer of

possession from Pilar Martinez to private respondent Fe Uson who has not shownher right thereto.

The present controversy hinges on two questions. First, is private respondent entitled to aninjunctive writ? Second, what is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to preserve?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:

Issuance of the Injunctive Writ

Petitioners primarily allege that the injunctive writ was wrongfully issued in favor of privaterespondent, as the latter had a doubtful, unclear and unadjudicated right for recovery of the propertywhich had been mortgaged, foreclosed and sold to a third party. We disagree.

An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established:

1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;


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2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for thewrit to prevent serious damage. 11

The foregoing requisites are present in this case. The undisputed owner of the property which was

mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon learning of the scheduledforeclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that a restraining order beissued to restrain such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt,except for the remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court. Inother words, she had title to and possession of the property and she claimed to have paid herobligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence,she had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and possession of the mortgagedproperty by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

Given the above factual allegations, it is clear that private respondent was entitled to the injunctivewrit.

Second Issue: Status Quo Ante

The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, andits preservation is the office of an injunctive writ. 12 Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to thepoint when Pilar Martinez was already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa.

We cannot sustain the petitioners, for Martinez' claim to the property is precisely the bone ofcontention. Private respondent, the origin owner of the property, filed a Complaint against WilfredoVerzosa and the provincial sheriff for the annulment of mortgage and the issuance of an injunctivewrit to prevent the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent transfer of ownership. Althoughthe Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the first Complaint wasfiled.

Nevertheless, Petitioner Verzosa and the sheriff proceeded with the foreclosure before the filing ofthe Amended Complaint. Worse, Verzosa sold the property to Martinez one week later. Now,Verzosa and Martinez claim that thestatus quo to be preserved refers to the time before the filing ofthe second Complaint and after Martinez had acquired the property from Verzosa.

Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the Amended Complaint was filed,because the previous Complaints were expunged from the records. Petitioners invoke Ruymann v.Director of Lands, 13 in which the Court ruled that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroactto the date of the filing of the original. Citing other jurisprudence, such as Waje v. Court of

Appeals 14 and Paradise v. Ng, 15 petitioners contend that the original pleading is deemedabandoned when it is amended.

The cited cases offer scant support to the thesis of petitioners. In Ruymann, the Court held that "anamendment to a complaint which introduces a new or different cause of action, making a new ordifferent demand, is equivalent to a fresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the statute oflimitations continues to run until the amendment is filed." 16 In the said case, a complaint forinjunction was amended to include a larger tract of land which had not been included in the originalsuit. The Court held that "the suit will be deemed to have been commenced upon the date ofamendment, in determining whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession to theportion of the tract of land not included in the original complaint(Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Oregon


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244)." 17 It is clear therein that the Complaint was amended to include a new or different cause ofaction or demand; hence, it was as if a new complaint was filed.

It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, ordemands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, noton the date of the filing of the amended complaint. In other words, for demands already included in

the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced upon the filing of such originalcomplaint. In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original, complaintis deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaintintroduces a new or different cause of action or demand.

Hence, it has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the factsoriginally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred bythe statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but beforeservice of amendment." 18 It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formaladmission of the amended pleading. 19 The Court inRepublic v. Marsman20 elucidated:

While in the procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity of and

time for the filing of responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an amendedcomplaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its admission, . . ., the self-evidentproposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the complications that mayarise from undue delays in the admission thereof, such an amended complaint mustbe considered as filed, for the purpose of such a substantive matter as prescription,on the date it is actually filed with the court, regardless of when it is ultimatelyformally admitted by the court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave of andformal admission by the court of an amended pleading after issues have alreadybeen joined as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues whichought either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of anotherproceeding, if they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the originalones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when the courtultimately admits the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive purposes, of such

admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual filing.

In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action ordemand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter toimplead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa.

In the same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the Amended Complaints therein allegednew causes of action.

Similarly unavailing is petitioners' contention that the injunctive writ was applied retroactively and,hence, violative ofRuymann and other subsequent cases. To repeat, Ruymann was wrongly appliedby petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint herein, the present

suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CAwas correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the timeof the filing of the original Complaint.

Finally, petitioners assert that Respondent Court violated the well-entrenched doctrine thatconsummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. As earlier noted, despite the fact thatPilar Martinez already had title to and possession of the disputed property, the CA affirmed the orderof the trial court enjoining her from "entering, intruding and making construction and/or performing


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any act of ownership or possession and any activity over theland . . .; " Petitioners cite the following ruling in Reyes v. Harty: 21

It is a universal principle of the law that an injunction will not issue to restrain theperformance of an act already done. It is undisputed proof in this case, presented bythe plaintiffs themselves, that, at the time this [case] was tried, the plaintiffs had been

completely dispossessed, the defendant being in full and complete possession of thelands in question . . . .

Again, the case cited by petitioner is incongruous with the factual milieu of the present controversy.In that case, the party praying for an injunctive writ had been completely dispossessed of the land inquestion prior to the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, private respondent was still theowner and was in possession of the property at the time the original Complaint was filed. The rule isthat a court should not by means of preliminary injunction transfer the property in litigation from thepossession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possessionasserts ownership thereto. 22When private respondent filed the original Complaint, she had title toand possession of the property and was asserting ownership thereto.

Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is thatconsummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, "where the acts areperformed after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed toperform the acts sought to be restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the injunctionwill not lie because he has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after thebeginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril." 23 It has been held that "[t]he general ruleof law is that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act thereby soughtto be restrained, and before the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, andmay, compel, by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and therebyprevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where a defendant does anact thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action ispending may compel a restoration of the former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may beproper." 24

In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgagesale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. "Ifone in the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thusoutwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. . . . Even where an injunction has notbeen issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoineddoes so at his peril." 25 Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling theproperty to Pilar Martinez, Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril.

Clearly, the Respondent Court did not err in sustaining the Decision of the lower court that the statusquo to be maintained was the situation when title to and possession of the property were still withPrivate Respondent Uson. The precise ruling of the appellate court is aptly reproduced hereunder:

When the present Civil Case No. 16590 was commenced on August 12, 1988, theproperty in dispute was still covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12783, in thename of plaintiff Fe Giron Uson, and there is no dispute that the possession of the saidproperty was still with the plaintiff. That is the status quo sought to be maintained in thequestioned preliminary injunction. It is, therefore, incorrect for defendant Wilfredo P.Verzosa to claim that the status quo refers to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11107 in thename of Pilar Martinez, which is precisely what is sought to be annul[l]ed in the presentcase, and that the possessor of the property is defendant Pilar Martinez who maypossibly have entered into the property while the present case has long been pending,


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and by virtue of the purported sale of the same to her by defendant Verzosa, whose claimof ownership thereof is, in turn, based on the sheriff's sale which is also the very subjectmatter of the present case for annulment. 26

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision of the Court ofAppeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 135442 August 31, 2000

MA. LOUISA T. QUE, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, RTC-Br. 158, PASIG CITY, and NICOLAAS J. KLAVER, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J .:

NICOLAAS JOHANNES KLAVER, private respondent, entered into a Contract to Sell with GoldenDragon Real Estate Corporation (GDREC) on 4 August 1992 involving Unit No. 1902-A of the WackWack Twin Towers. After paying the full purchase price, he executed a Conditional Deed of Saleover the same unit in favor of petitioner Ma. Louisa T. Que.

On 11 September 1995 respondent Klaver filed a Complaint for specific performance and damagesagainst petitioner Que before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1for alleged violation of the

provisions of their contract, referring primarily to her failure to pay the full purchase price and hertaking possession of the property without his consent.

On 11 October 1995 Klaver amended his Complaint by impleading GDREC and its officers JuanMiguel Vasquez and Mariel R. Cruz. As amended, he also sought to recover damages from themand for Que to surrender possession of the unit to GDREC which, in turn, should execute an

Absolute Deed of Sale in his favor.

On 6 November 1995 Que filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the amendment to theoriginal Complaint impleading GDREC as additional defendant transformed the case to onecognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and since the claim againsther was merely incidental, it must be resolved by the HLURB together with the claim against

GDREC.

On 16 November 1995 Klaver filed a Manifestation seeking the dismissal without prejudice of hisComplaint against GDREC, Vasquez and Cruz. Subsequently, he moved to file an AmendedComplaint.

On 17 November 1995 Klaver lodged a Complaint with the HLURB against GDREC and its officersfor unsound real estate practices consisting mainly in their unwarranted delay in the delivery of UnitNo. 1902-A to him.2On 29 January 1996 GDREC filed a Third Party Complaint against Que on


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account of her alleged previous undertaking to assume responsibility for any and all claims whichcould arise on account of the transfer of possession of the unit to her. Que asserted in her Answerthat she had fully paid, if not overpaid, for the unit such that Klaver had lost all rights over it. Shecounterclaimed for damages against him.

Going back to the case pending before the trial court, Que filed her Comment to Klaver's

Manifestation contending that upon the previous amendment of the complaint which includedGDREC as co-defendant, the trial court ipso facto lost jurisdiction over the case and, corollarily,authority to entertain his Manifestation.

In its order of 8 May 1996 the trial court dismissed without prejudice the amended Complaint againstGDREC, Vasquez and Cruz, denied Que's Motion to Dismiss, granted Klaver's Motion to File

Amended Complaint, and admitted the Amended Complaint solely against Que.3On 26 July 1996the lower court denied reconsideration.

Que questioned the Orders of 8 May 1996 and 26 July before the Court of Appeals in a PetitionforCertiorari.4On 29 May 1998 the Court of Appeals denied Que's petition and rejected her motionfor reconsideration on 18 September 1998.

Is the trial court vested with jurisdiction over the case filed by Klaver against Que despite theinclusion of GDREC and its officers in the Amended Complaint?

Que alleges that when Klaver amended his Complaint for the first time, his original Complaint wasdeemed superseded. It disappeared from the records of the case.5She thus argues that Klaver'scause of action in his first Amended Complaint, being one for specific performance against GDREC,was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court but vested in the HLURB. The trial court could not havevalidly acquired jurisdiction over her alone to the exclusion of GDREC because both parties areindispensable for a complete resolution of the case. She further argues that when Klaver amendedhis Complaint the second time, his evident purpose was to confer jurisdiction anew on the trial courtover his cause of action against her. She then invites attention to the circumstance that Klaver'sComplaint before the HLURB was dismissed on 1 August 1996.6The HLURB found that Klaver had

in fact been overpaid by Que amounting to P100,000.00. This ruling was affirmed by the HLURB on12 January 19987and by the Office of the President on 15 December 1999.8The case is nowpending before the Court of Appeals.9On these accounts, she submits that this Court should notallow the case before the trial court to proceed.

Klaver contends on the other hand that upon the filing of the original Complaint the trial courtacquired jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof which jurisdiction continued with the filing of thefirst Amended Complaint that substantially reproduced the same causes of action againstQue, i.e., specific performance and damages. He maintains that inasmuch as his cause of actionagainst Que was independent of the cause of action against GDREC, the inclusion of GDREC in thefirst Amended Complaint merely resulted in misjoinder of a cause of action and party which heremedied by dropping GDREC from the case before the trial court and proceeding only against

Que.10

The petition must be denied. It is settled that jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter of thelitigation is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint .11Klaver's originalComplaint contained the following pertinent allegations: (a) Klaver and Que agreed that possessionof Unit 1902-A would be transferred to Que only upon full payment of the purchase price not laterthan 31 May 1995; (b) Sometime in February 1995 Que was able to get the keys of the unit fromGDREC without the knowledge and written permission of Klaver and started making improvementson the premises; and, (c) Que unilaterally decided to withhold payment of the full purchase
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_135442_2000.html#fnt3


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price.12Klaver thus prayed that (a) Que be ordered to vacate the unit; (b) the amount of P200,000.00Que previously paid be forfeited in his favor; (c) Que be declared a builder in bad faith and that theimprovements she had introduced on the premises be retained by him without indemnification; and,(d) Que be ordered to pay damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. Undoubtedly, Klaver'sComplaint against Que for specific performance and damages was within the jurisdiction of the trialcourt.

Subsequently, Klaver amended his Complaint to implead GDREC and its officers. In determiningwhether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what must beascertained is whether the defendants shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligationwholly different from that stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be considered asstating a new cause of action if the fact alleged in the amended complaint shows substantially thesame wrong with respect to the same matter but is more fully and differently stated, or whereaverments which were implied are made express, or the subject of the controversy or the liabilitysought to be enforced remains the same.13

The amended Complaint against GDRECand its officers made the following material allegations: (a)The true intent and agreement of the parties to the contract to sell was that the sale of the unit wouldinclude two (2) parking lots; and, (b) Despite the clear import of the contract to sell, GDREC failed todeliver the premises to Klaver and arbitrarily turned over the possession of the unit to Que.

On the other hand, the first and second amended Complaints with regard to Que allegedsubstantially the same causes of action as the original Complaint. Consequently, we agree withKlaver and the Court of Appeals that the trial court's jurisdiction continued even with the first andsecond amendments of his Complaint because the amended Complaints averred substantially thesame causes of action against Que.

Also worth noting is that the Complaint a

Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Documents

Transcript of Amended and Supplemental Pleadings