G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM,petitioners,vs.ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA,"respondent.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution and the decision of the Court of Appeals whereby making the petitioners liable for moral and exemplary damages. Amay Bisaya was having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when an old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to join the party of the former manager of the said hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka. When he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ms. Lim approached him and said to leave the party for it was intended for a number of guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was humiliated by the manner Ms. Lim asked him to leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the other guests. He was accompanied by a Makati policeman in leaving the penthouse. He was more embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that she invited him on the said party.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Ms. Lim constitutes an abuse of right to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to Amay Bisaya.

HELD:No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Amay Bisaya might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. It is unlikely to happen that Ms. Lim exposed him to ridicule and shame because admittedly, Amay Bisaya stated that Ms. Lim was very close enough for him to kiss when she asked him to leave the party. It was intended to be heard only by Amay Bisaya. Nevertheless , his reaction to the request must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nt

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of lawwhich does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 21refers to actscontra bonus moresand has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done withintentto injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.

discussion on volenti non fit injuria:

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine ofvolenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."The doctrine ofvolenti non fit injuria("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injuryor to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her three children,plaintiff-appellee,vs.AGATON ARANETA,defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta.

RULING: No, defendant was absolved from the complaint

The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.