EinsteinmeetsIR:

arelativistapproachtotheriseofJapaninthe19thcentury

Apaperpreparedforthe

MillenniumAnnualConference2012

‘MaterialismandWorldPolitics’

Authors:

MaximilianMayer1

BarbaraPetrulewicz

UniversityofBonn

1Authorcontact:maximilian.mayer@uni‐bonn.de

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EinsteinmeetsIR:arelativistapproachtotheriseofJapaninthe19thcentury

Abstract

Drawing onANT, this paper applies a relativistic approach to the phenomenal rise of

Japanduringthelate19thandearly20thcentury. Itreframescommonperspectiveson

oneoftheclassicalquestionsinIR.Thepointofdepartureistheunderstandingthatour

empirical knowledge about the nexus at which modern states and the expansion of

colonial empires emerges at the one side, and the advent of modern sciences and

technologiesattheotherside,completelydiscreditsarangeofcommonIRnotions.We

suggest analytically focusing on the processes of assembling, reassembling, and

dissemblingactor‐networks.Actor‐networksusuallyentailembedded,interrelated,and

entangled material, discursive, and practical dimensions. The intimate relation and

mutual reinforcement between the construction of a modern state and colonial

expansion are evident in the Japanese case. Exploring how multiple actors have

assembled Japan’s emergence, we suggest that time and material artifacts, built

environments,knowledge,andsubjectivityarenotconstantsbutquestionstoempirical

research. Examining the creative process of assembling that, as it were, created an

entire new reality, then, is key to understand power shifts. Indeed, the Tokugawa

Shogunate turned into theGreatPower Japan throughaprolongedperiodof creative

destruction that reconfigured, translated, and replaced existing materials, identities,

time frames and knowledges. In discussing the case studywe conclude that—besides

foregroundingethnographicmethods—theoutstanding strengthof theANT‐agenda is

to incorporate the extensive extra‐disciplinary bodies of knowledge about subject

matters that are usually ignored in IR.Moreover, ANT offers a foundational collector

that enables IR researchers symmetrically incorporating materials, practices, and

discourses into their apprehension of larger world political phenomena. As such, our

relativistic approach does not only open up a largely uncharted post‐Cartesian

landscapeofnewquestionsandpuzzlesinIR,butalsoallowsforaseriousconversation

withvariousneighboringdisciplinessuchashistory,STS,areaandpostcolonialstudies

andgeography.

Keywords:Powershifts,Japan,IRtheories,ANT,technology,scienceandtechnologystudies,Tokugawa

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TableofContents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 42. Assessingwhatweknow:conceptualnotions,theoreticalapproaches,andontologicalomissions .............................................................................................................................. 63.Apost‐CartesianapproachtoJapan'srise ...............................................................................154.Assemblingagreatpower:Japan’semergence .....................................................................214.1. TheTokugawaperiod:assemblinginsplendidisolation? ........................................224.2. TheMeijiperiod:assemblingthestate/assemblingtheempire ............................365. Discussion ..........................................................................................................................................506. Towardsarelativisticapproachtoworldpolitics............................................................55Literature ....................................................................................................................................................59

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1. IntroductionThestudyofgreatpowers ismucholder than thedisciplineof InternationalRelations(IR).Althoughitnowadaysappearsformanyold‐fashioneditremainsoneofthemostfascinating topics in IR. This article sheds new light on the age‐old puzzle of “risingpowers” through reexaminingMeiji Japan’s rise between themid‐nineteenth centuryand theearly twentieth century. This case constitutes an intriguing andextraordinarypuzzle:notonlyhas thecountrybecome the firstancientpoliticalunit inAsia to fullymodernizeitself.AfterthecollapseoftheTokugawashogunate,italsobecamethefirstnon‐westerngreatpowertoovercomethe“greatdivergence”,whichhadsetaparttheEuropeanempiresandotherformsofpoliticalauthorityallovertheworld.Inaddition,Meiji Japan epitomizes the challenge of “late‐development”. As such, it is oftenpresentedasthemostsuccessfulcaseofstate‐ledmodernization(e.g.Freeman1987).Moreover,scholarshaveemployedthelensesofgreatpowerpoliticsandvariousothertheoreticalperspectivestoanalyzeJapan’sascentwithintheinternationalsystem.Thus,atthefirstsight,onemightinferthatweknowthiscasefairlywell.However,thisarticlearguesthat,especially,theexplanationsputforwardintheconfinesofIRremainunconvincingforseveralreasons.Indrawingonvariousexternaldisciplinarysourcesweshowhow IRsystematicallyneglectscrucialaspectsof Japan’semergence,particularlythe “material” sideof thepuzzle. Furthermore,while this is ahistorical case, it is stillhighlyrelevantforexplainingtoday’sworldpolitics.Forwelive,bynow,inaworldthatisevenmorecharacterizedbythepervasiveroleoftechnologiesthanitwasduringtherise ofMeiji Japan. So, new empirical materials enable us to reconsider certain corenotionsofIRinthelightofapost‐Cartesianunderstanding.Inshort,thepaperhastwointerrelatedaims: forone, it sheds fresh lighton Japan’s rise. Foranother, it engageswith the empirical reality of the pervasiveness of technologies and modern science,which has remained ignored and under‐theorized in the discipline of IR (see Herrera2003,Fritsch2011).ThispaperthendevelopsarelativisticapproachtotheriseofMeijiJapan.Itappliesnewmethodologicaltoolsandsynthesizesawiderangeofexistingknowledge.Especially,theformation of a modern state in Japan and the parallel colonial conquest of itssurroundings cannot convincingly be subsumed under the headers of “institutionalreform”,“thequestforsecurity”,“Japaneseculture”or“racistideologies”.Weinstead

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suggest enriching our analysis to explicitly include the intermingling of materials, forexample technological infrastructures and novel artifacts, natural sciences, andengineeringpracticesthatenabledJapan’sriseinthefirstplace.Thismeanstakingintoaccount a set of ontological parameters that are usually absent from Cartesian IRtheories.So,thewayinwhichweapproachourcasecontributestotheimprovementoftheories of international politics. Especially, we draw inspiration from science andtechnologystudiesinordertomakesenseofarelationalandheterogeneousreality,inwhich ideas,practices,andartifactsareseamlessly interwoven(Jasanoff2004,Hughes1983, Latour 1987, MacKenzie 2009). This post‐Cartesian approach challenges theunbearable lightnessof IR theories that construe theworldas itwereapurely social,discursive,orinter‐subjectivedomain.ReframingthepuzzleofJapan’sriseasactivitiesofassemblingbymeansofasymmetricalmethodology,thus,doesnotonly illuminatethe particular historical subjectmatter under study, but opens up a larger canvas tostimulateIRtheoriesaboutthecontemporaryworld.Havingoutlinedourrationale,ourargumentproceedsinfiveconsecutivesections:first,weexaminetheempiricalknowledgeasitrelatestodifferingapproachestoJapan’sriseincludingmodels of imperialism, systemic theories of world politics, and accounts ofmodernization and state‐led development. Finding that these approaches commonlytendtoeschewthedimensionsof science, technology,andengineering,we introduceourowntheoreticallens.Ourframeworkproposesarelativistmethodologythatdrawson a wide range of inter‐disciplinary data sources and concepts while exploring theassemblingofanewreality. This involves theexplorationofthe revolutionary shifts intime,space,builtenvironmentsaswellassubjectivitiesintheemergingassemblageofmodernJapan.Usingthispost‐Cartesianframework,ourdescriptionisdividedintotwosubsequentsections:1) itexplorestheevolvinghuman‐materialentanglementsduringtheTokugawaperiod(ca.1600to1860);2)itexplorestheprocessesbywhichamodernstate was constructed on the one hand, and the expansion of the Japanese colonialempireontheotherhand(1860to1930).Thelatterprocessesfollowfromtheagencyof various actors and are both technologically mediated and highly controversial.Thirdly,summarizingthemaininsightsweaddressthesignificanceofthiscasestudyfortheorizing and conceptualizingworld politics. In conclusion, we argue that relativisticapproaches, which empirically explore the progressive construction of time, materialenvironments,spatialformationsandcollectiveidentities,representapromisingoptiontoreplaceCartesianIRtheories.So,whiletheriseofJapanbearssomeresemblancetotraditional IR puzzles, it highlights the added value of reframing IR theories, researchmethodology and, thus, empirical concerns. Ultimately, however, taking seriously thereferencetoEinstein involvesmoreradicalshifts intheperspectivesandthepotentialpuzzleswithinpost‐Cartesianresearch.Still,ourpuzzleraisesimportantquestions:howdoes themanner inwhich Japan has established itself as a great power refer to thecontemporaryunderstandingof“power”, “development”,and“underdevelopment” inworldpolitics?Theanswers,aswewillshortlyindicate,leadtoasignificantlydifferentresearchagenda.

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2. Assessingwhatweknow:conceptualnotions,theoreticalapproaches,andontologicalomissions

Morethanhundredyearsofresearchhaveaccumulatedalargebodyofinterdisciplinaryknowledge about “the fact that, among the ancient Asiatic states which during thenineteenthcenturyfeltthepolitical,economic,andcultural impactoftheWest,Japanalonehas risen to the statusofGreatPower.” (Pollard1939:5)Against thisbackdrop,onemightarguethatwecomprehendfairlywellwhatisatstakeinJapan’sphenomenalrise. The puzzle itself is intriguing for its theoretical implications: it is related to thequestionofchangeandthe“emergence”ofpowerininternationalpolitics;itisaprimeexampleofrapidmodernizationandsuccessfuleconomicdevelopment.Indeed,agoodmanyframeworksandtheoreticalperspectiveshavebeenadvancedinordertoexplainthispuzzle.Japan’shistoryhasprovokeddifferentandshiftingstrandsofresearchoverthe last century. Notwithstanding, in scrutinizing the existing knowledge our mainimpetus is our impression that onemight still neglect central aspects and ontologicalparametersof thispuzzle.Particularly,whenbridging thedeserted landsbetweenthebodiesof knowledge that areproduced in area and science studieson theonehand,and thatof IRon theother, Japan’s risesetsofa rippleadissonance in theCartesianframeworkofIR.So,whatconceptualconsiderationsandtheoreticalperspectiveshavebeen related to the rise of Japan? In the following, we briefly review three relevantresearch fields: the examination of Imperial Japan’s expansion; the conceptualtreatmentofemerginggreatpowerswithinsystemictheoriesof IR; theexplorationofmodernizationandlatedevelopmentduringtheMeijirevolution.Thesethreestrandsofresearch, while different in their respective scholarly concerns, constitute a largetreasureofempirical knowledge.WecanemployPollard’saforementionedquotation,whichwaswrittenmorethan70yearsago,asprismtoevaluatetheinsightsaswellasthecontradictionsandtheomissionsofvariousapproachestoJapan’srise.EvolvingexplanationsofJapaneseImperialismThefirstimportantbodyofresearchthatwewanttodrawon,isconcernedwithJapan’sImperialism. Although almost buried in the discipline of IR and its theorizing, thissophisticated body of research examines the reasons and the driving forces behindJapan’s expansion focusing on Tokyo's formal rule to include Formosa (Taiwan; 1895‐45), Korea (1910‐45) and later large areas in Southeast Asia. Geographically, Japan’scolonialismwasanattempttoliquidatetheWesternpossessionsofChineseterritories

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orcountriesthatwerepartoftheBeijing‐centeredTributarysystem.WhiletheJapaneseultimately repelled the “unequal treaties”with theUnited States andGreatBritain in1899 they established their own extraterritorial legal enclaves and zones of informalinfluence mainly in Imperial China such as in Manchukuo (1932‐45) and Shandong(1914‐1945)aswellasinMicronesia.2VarioustheoreticalexplanationsfortheJapaneseexpansionhavebeenput forward.For thepurposeof thisarticle,weconfinethemtothreegroupsthataresubsequentlyinterrogated.Thefirstgroupofargumentsstressesthe importance of Japan’s “cultural heritage”. This involves a militaristic and racialideology enmeshed in philosophical and messianic shintō discourses of nationalsuperiority(Pollard1939,Morishima1982,Armstrong1989).Secondly,others,followingeconomictheoriesofImperialism,havestressedtheprofitinterestsofcorporationsandmerchants or the economic imperative of secure access to foreign markets and thesupplyofrawmaterials.Theseexplanations,however,havelittlemeritconcerningMeijiJapan (see Etherington 1982, Conroy 1966). Lastly, some researchers emphasize thepatriotic desire of Japanese statesmen and citizens to become members of the“civilized” club of Western nations: including equal treatment, full‐blown nationalsovereignty,andalsocolonial rule in thenot‐so‐civilizedneighboringcountries (Suzuki2003, Kal 2005). All these facets were important for Japan’s expansion; yet, theseapproaches typically presuppose a top‐down imperial design. The focus on thecommandinghighs,the“leadersandarchitects”,leaveslittleroomforappreciatingthediversityoftheactorsinvolved,suchasengineers,scientists,settlers,prostitutes,andallkinds of “pioneers” many of whom both mediated and embodied the colonialexpansion. Detailed historical studies about the nitty‐gritty of controversies andbiographical twists suggest that colonial expansion ‐at least until themid‐1920s‐waspursuedmuchmorebydefaultthanbydesign(Wilson2005,Uchida2011).Inaddition,majorpublic controversiesamong theelitesandbeyond, suchas theone referring tothesocalled“Koreanquestion”intheaftermathofthenationalistuprisinginKoreaandtheirviolentcrackdownin1919,defyasimpletop‐downpointofview(Duara2006:55,Ku2002).Moreover,asthe“nationalcharacter”wasitselfunderconstructionandanachievementoftheexactlysameperiod(Ikegami1995), it isdifficulttocontriveJapan’scolonialismwith the featuresof“Japaneseness”.Buteven ifweassume,contra‐factually,a stablesetofculturalnormsandvalueslikethis,couldtheysuddenlystimulatetheventureofcolonialismafterhaving legitimizeda stubborn seclusion forover twohundredyears?Thispropositiondoesnotwithstandlogicalscrutiny.Inaddition,weshouldlistentotheperceptionsof foreign travelers in thepre‐Meijiera.Theydescribe the lateTokugawashogunate as fragmented and largely composed of dispersed social formations—certainlynotconstitutinganationalcommunity(Iwabuchi1994).Inshort,theempiricalrecordridiculesthepremisesofessentialistculturalexplanations:

2FortheorthodoxEnglishliteratureonJapan'scolonialempireseeConroy1960,MyersandPeattie1984,Duus1995,Duus,MyersandPeattie1989,Duus,MyersandPeattie1996.

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“Nothingcouldconvinceusmoreabouttheartificiality,historicity,partialityand falsityof ‘Japaneseness’ thanprecisely theseobservationsof Japaneseindolenceandincapacityforsystematicwork.Afterall,diligence,loyaltyandsystematicworkarenowwidelyacknowledgedasnationalcultural‘traits’oftheJapaneseandareexpectedassuch.Thesenowunfamiliarobservationssuggestthatsuchnational‘traits’areculturalconstructsindynamicprocessratherthanastaticsetofgivenessences.National identity isnotauthenticsomuchasabattlegroundwherevarioussocialgroupscompetewitheachothertodefinethemeaningofthe‘national’”(Iwabuchi1994)

Furthermore, in addition to the difficulties of pointing to a moving target, theexplanations of imperialism that focus on ideational or cultural factors come at theexpenseofthematerial featuresoftheempire.Duetoa logo‐centricview, itneglectsthe crucial supporting, mediating, and framing role of technological infrastructures,engineering and the exact sciences. It also misses the enabling agency of moderntechnologicalknowhowincludingshipbuilding,guns,railways,engineering,architecture,and agriculture (Headrick 1979, Carrol 2006). Numerous contemporaries were fullyaware of the space‐time compression that followed from these innovations (Duncan2005). As such, the recent wave of research on Japan’s colonial expansion providesfurther insights.Addinganewontologicaldimension, ithighlights thesubstantial linksand interactions between colonial expansion and modernization as well as theemergence of exact sciences, modern engineering, and technological infrastructures(Mizuno2009,Wilson2005).Japan’stechnologicalprogressandthewareffortsagainstImperial China and Czarist Russia were mutually reinforcing (Yamamura 1977). Incomparing economic explanations that focus on the exploitative nature of Europeancolonies, Duara (2006:65) argues that Japan’s Imperialism inManchuria represents anew strand of imperial formation characterized “by high levels of investment, thedevelopmentofnewmodesofmobilizationandidentityproduction,andadiscourseofbrotherhood and regional federalism.” Similarly highlighting the interconnections andflowsbetweenthecoreandtheperiphery,Wilsonnotesinrecentresearch:

“one implication is a greater recognition that the colonial relationship isshaped by the responses of the colonised as well as the intentions andactionsofthecolonisers.Anotheristhatlifeinthemetropolis itself isseenasaffecteddeeplybyitscolonies:the‘mother’countryisnolongeracceptedasthemodern,civilisednationthatontheonehandimposesitswillabroadthrough its colonial agents, and on the other continues along its own,independenthistoricaltrajectory.AthirdimplicationisanacknowledgmentthatmainstreamstudiesofJapanesehistoryshouldincludeconsiderationofthe colonies as amatter of course: all ormost topics inmodern Japanesehistory will be relevant to the colonies, and vice versa, and colony andmetropolisshouldnolongerbeinseparatebaskets.”(Wilson2005:288)

Research on the Japanese version of colonialism, following similar historical studies

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about the Spanish, Portuguese, or British colonial experiences (e.g. Darwin 2012),increasingly puts emphasize on the multiple interactions between “core” and“periphery”. Conceptually, this literature deliberately transcends the nation‐centeredperspective. It aims at grasping the repercussions of colonial encounters, imperialeconomic and technological designs, nurtured nationalisms, as well as their variouslinkageswith the construction of amodern state in Japan (Duara 2003, 2006,Wilson2005).Inconclusion,ourcurrentknowledgeaboutJapan’simperialismrendersculture,identity,ordiscourse,iftheyaretreatedasisolatedexplanatoryfactors,as“backgroundvariables”, or if confined to national perspectives progressively problematic. For thisviewdownplaysorsilencestheempirical realityof Japan’smodernstateformation, inwhich essentially everything—material and ideational—was transformed, remodeled,and newly assembled. Returning to IR theory, it is reasonably to say that researchdesignsthatareunabletocaptureinadditionthetechnologicaldimensionsinexorablyintertwinedwitha“risingpower”leadtoflawedmodesofanalysis.TheemergenceofgreatpowersandthelimitsofsystemictheoriesWhereas especially logo‐centric explanations of Imperialism are implausible, theresearch on Imperialism in general helps to enrich our understanding of the subjectmatter.Mostimportantly,itempiricallyandconceptuallyunderscoresJapan’sriseasanimperialpower.Takingseriouslythisstatementisfarfrombanal.Becausethedisciplineof IR privileges a view that foregrounds interactions between “like‐units” we areinsensitive to the historical reality, which does—at least, up to World War II andarguably until the present (Krasner 1999, Duffield 2006)—not resemble an even“anarchical”playingfield.ExploringJapan’sriseremindsoneoftheheavilysegregatedpatterns of world politics. These differentiations of authority, sovereignty, andautonomythat,inparticular,systemicIRtheoryconcealsbydefinition,constrainvarious“state” entities in strikingly differing ways. In this sense Meiji Japan’s experience istelling.Theworldappearslesscharacterizedbysovereigntyas“organizedhypocrisy”ingeneral(Krasner1999),thandividedbyaspecificideologicallyandmateriallybuttressedtopology:ontheonehand,thewebof“modernstatepower”withitsplanetarytendrilsof civilization; on the other hand, the areas “lagging‐behind” that are open tointervention, regulation, and control epitomized, for example, by the system ofextraterritoriallegalauthority.YoshidaShōin,themostinfluentialpre‐MeijiadvocateofJapan’s“nationalization”,whoalsonegotiatedwith theUSenvoy in the1850s,clearlysawthecollaborativewayinwhichtheBritish,theFrench,orUSempiresenforcedthissemi‐colonial practice (Wakabayashi 1992). Against this backdrop, Japan’s riseexemplifiesthesuccessfulattempttoovercomethechasmbetweensovereignWesternpowers and the backwardness of a semi‐colonized space (Suzuki 2005, Spruyt 2000).Indeed, the prominent group of Japanese visitors that traveled through the UnitedStates and Europe in the 1860s and 1870s quickly internalized an important lesson:“Japanwouldneedamodernarmyandnavy,railroads,factories,schools,andamodernbanking and currency system” (Pollard 1939:27) in order to enter the concert of

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Western powers. This comprised not only an “internal” revolution, but also theinstallmentofextraterritorialpractices in informal zonesof influence suchasareas incoastalChinaandthepacificislands(Kayaoğlu2010:68ff).To the extent to which it is empirically untenable to presuppose “like‐units” ininternationalpolitics(Krasner2001),thecaseofJapanhighlightsthetransformationandexpansions thatwereneededtoachievea trulysovereignstatus (Duara2006). Is this,than, not the predestined puzzle for realist explanations? Indeed, the language ofrealists ritualistically refers to the magnitude of power difference that determines ifstates belong to, or are excluded from the “great powers” (Mearsheimer 2001).3 Yet,realistclaimstothisresearchfieldareanemptypromiseasSimonDalby,forexample,argues:

“if American power is understood in imperial terms then it follows thatinternational politics is not a simple matter of international relations anddebates between independent states in some form of anarchical arena.There is obviouslymuchmore to the pattern of international power thaninternational relations models of competing and cooperating autonomousstatessuggest.Territorialassumptionsaboutsovereigntyarenotveryusefulin a world of imperial power; the purposes of states, the supposedrepositories of political aspiration on the part of their peoples, are also indoubt.”(Dalby2004:1)

RealistsandNeorealistspurporttheexistenceofaconceptualapparatusthatisfartooreductionisttoofferameaningfulunderstandingofhowagreatpoweremerges inthefirstplace.Especially,theorizingtheincreased“interactioncapacity”(Buzan,Jones,andLittle1993:chap.4)addslittledepthtoourcomprehensionoftheroleoftechnologiesin the emergence of great powers because it suggests a sort of deus ex machinaoccurrenceof“technical”changeuponwhichunitaryelementsinaclosedsystemhavetoact.Imagine,forinstance,howhelpfularealist’sadvice—boilingeverythingdown,forexample,tomeasurablevariables,suchasdemographics,industrialoutput,andmilitarycapacities—would have been for officials in the Meiji‐government, who aspired toempower their country in themid‐19th century. The example of time standardizationillustrates that “technical change”—empirically—is never isolated from “society” andvice versa. Rather, as historians of modern technology have demonstrated, thisdistinction is flawed from the very beginning (Hughes 1983, Bijker,Hughes and Pinch1987).Constructivist insights intopowershifts in the internationalsystemwouldhaveeven lesspracticalvalue; theywouldbeseverelymisleading,as theyvaguelyconstruetechnologicalchangeasasortof“mastervariable”.BecauseWendtrenderstechnologyan external driver of political change (Wendt 1999:243‐249) it curiously appears

3Therenewedattentionto“empires”similarlyemphasizesthereal‐worlddifferentialsbetweenstates.Itgivesfoddertothosewhosee“sovereignty”asanillusionbothinprincipleandpractice(BarkawiandLaffey2002,Shaw2002).

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completelyoutofthegraspofgovernments.Anotherthornyobstaclethathampersourinquirycomeswiththeoftenimplicitpremisethat“Japan”priortotheMeiji‐revolutioncouldbetreatedasaninfantformofnation,stateorsociety(seeHowell1998).Againstthisnotion,Ringmararguesthatthebakufustate actually resembles a sort of “international system” comparable with theWestphalian order in Europe and theChinese tribute system (Ringmar 2012). Clearly,treatingacountryasifitwereapreexistingunitthatmiraculouslydevelopsexperiencesanincreaseofitscapacities—asrealistandneorealistapproacheswouldsuggest(Waltz1993)—leads into methodological doldrums. In fact, this a‐historical reductionismberefts us of the possibility to empirically capture the historical emergence ofMeiji‐Japan. In contrast, an ethnological exploration swiftly sheds light on the substantialtechnological and ideological innovations, but also the massive controversies, novelconnections and the emerging webs that enabled theMeiji regime to achieve paritywiththeWesternpowers.Describingthecontestedtaskofintroducing,forinstance,theGregorian calendar and clock‐based time synchronizing, illuminates the fundamentaldimensionsof“risingpower”thatareeasilyoverlookedinIR:

“It is important to appreciate that the Meiji government introduced theWestern form of time regulation in 1872 with the intention of leadingJapanese society into ‘civilazation’. Tsutamoto Meiki, one of thegovernmentsmembers,wroteinthedraftofthedeclarationthat:‘wemusttry to bring the people away from superstition and try to lead them intocivilization’ (quoted in Hirose 1978:96). In this period themost importantdutyoftheMeijigovernmentwastonegotiatewiththeWesternpartiesasan equal partner because of the existing unequal contracts with them.Accordingly, theadoptionof theWestern formof timeregulationwasonewayofdemonstratingthattheirownsocietywasacivilizedone.”(Shimada1995:254)

Todepartfromthesubordinateareasandcolonizedmodesofexistencerequiresmorethanadjustingcertainparametersinatop‐downmanner.ThecaseofMeijiJapanshowsthat this involves the collective reinvention and creation of an entire reality—in thefullestsenseoftheword.Thehistoricalrecordsuggeststhatonlythiselevatesanentityinto the domain of the full‐fledged modernized nations (Morris‐Suzuki 1998, Jansen2000). Apparently, great powers do not emerge incrementally under the condition of”allotherthingsbeingequal”.Conceptualizingthisprocessmerelyastheeffectoftheshifts in abstract variables such as “population and product” (Waltz 1993:55) is thushistorically wrong and analytically misleading. In sum, the main schools of IR lack ameaningfulnotionof“power”thatspeakstothe largelyunevenandnon‐Westphalianglobal landscape(seeSuzuki2003). Inaddition,theypropose(albeitoften implicitly)arational understanding of power‐seeking that appreciates neither the inevitablematerial‐cultural transformations, nor the notorious blending ofmythology, ideology,andtechnology,whichispresentnotonlyinthiscase.Assuch,Japan’sascentpointsto

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the lack of both constructivist and neorealist frameworks that would enable us toaccount for the origins of power and power differentials. In turn, the puzzle ofMeijiJapan’sexpansionprovidesanenormouslyrichbodyofempiricalmaterialwhichwecanemploytograsptherealityofpowerandpowershiftsinworldpolitics.GraspingtheJapanesemodernizationandlatedevelopmentA third body of knowledge emphasizes Japan’s successful development as stemmingfrom its top‐down implementation of a modern institutional setting. The Meiji‐eraelites, or so storywent, established amodern political constitution, a legal system, amoderneducationanduniversitysystem,industrialproductioncapacitiesthatpropelledJapan to the “center of world economic dynamism” (Cummings 1984:1). Against theorthodox economic, numerous scholars hailed Japan as an alternative model ofdevelopment;amodelthatenormouslysuccessful,though,rejectingmarket liberalismwhilepreferringstate‐centeredcoordinationandstate‐ledeconomicpolicies(Freeman1988, Henderson 1993, Fallows 1994, see Cumings 1998). Historically, theseperspectivestendtopointtotheinstrumentalroleoftheelitessuchastheSamuraiforthe innovativesuccessesof top‐downdevelopmentandreforms,especiallyduring theMeijiperiod (e.g.Bronfenbrenner1969).Also thisseeminglyappears tobeanelegantexplanation for the strong focus on military build‐up; and, lastly Japan’s drift to a“fascist” society preparing for war the 1930s. Though, already in the late 1960shistorians called in to question themain tenet of theseworks,which builds upon anearlyorthodoxviewonJapan’seconomicascent.Anewgenerationofstudiesshowedthe predominately bottom‐up nature of the Japanese reforms. Non‐elite participantsmadeamajorcontributioneconomicdynamicsandinstitutionalinnovations(Yamamura1997).Thestate‐ledviewtends toover‐emphasize theroleofgovernmentauthoritiesand to‐down policies; an understanding that also underpins later accounts of the“Japaneseinnovationsystem”.Butnumeroushistoricalstudiesshowthelargeextenttowhichnon‐eliteactorsorfake‐Samuraihaveadvancedtheeconomicandtechnologicalcatching‐up(Iwabuchi1994,Yamamura1997).A bottom‐up dynamic, obviously, shackles the central notion of state‐led models of“late‐developing”.Thecentralityofstatepolicies, inaddition, isquestioned ifwehavetotake intoaccounttherepeatedcontroversiesthathaveplaguedtheconstructionofrailwaysandotherradicaltechnologicalnoveltiesasmuchastheeducationsystem,thecalendarreform,theelectrificationortheMeijiconstitution.Also,fromthecomparisonwithChingChina,itbecomesclearthatpeopleinallsocialstratashiftedtheirattitudesand learningbehavioratthattime.Fromthetop‐leveloftheMeijigovernmenttothemerchants, the scholars, the peasants and the factory workers—numerous actorsrealized that the absorption of western technology is more than a mere technicalmatter. Its enactment simultaneously entailed instrumental, practical and symbolicdimensions,which,atthesametime,requiredtransformingtheindividualsubjectivitiesandthecollectivepracticesatonce(Wittner2008).Theseempiricalobservationsdonot

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support the Weber‐inspired idea that underpins some explanations of Japan’smodernization (e.g. Morishima 1982). Zooming in at factories, ministries, shipyards,universities, offices, and schools, we find the meandering and mutation ofsubjectivities—but no pervasive discursive tradition, or a somewhat homogeneousideationalessenceof the Japanese thatpresumably steered thenation’s ascentasanunderlyingdriverorthe“interveningvariable”.Wemustinsteadanalyzethefluidity,themutations,andtheinnovationsinconsciousnessandinstitutionsasintegralpartofthemodernizationprocess.Clearly, this undermines the premises of late‐development frameworks that see theMeijigovernmentandtop‐elitessingle‐handedlymanufacturingthereforminstitutionsand, by extension, amodern Japanese nation state (Amsden 1989, Levy and Samuels1992, Waldner 1999). But these reforms were a messy and unplanned process thatamountstothedoubleeffectofthe“Japanization”ofimportedconcepts,technologies,andpractices,and,meanwhile,toaradicalreconstructionofJapanesesubjectivities.Asa result, various actors jointly produced amixture of ideologies,myths, religion, andinvented traditions (Sakamoto 1996, Morris‐Suzuki 1998). For instance, in order toenable and legitimate the introduction of a seemingly profane technological noveltysuch as the light bulb, Japanese kokugaku‐scholars invented a newmythic theory oflight that explainedwhy the light bulb ultimately originated in Japan and how itwasrelated to the emperor (Wachutka 2004). Similarly, this creative diversity renderstheoretical “copy” or “imitation“ models of Japan’s modernization and late‐development utterly inappropriate4. Not unlike the encounters with modernity inimperialChina(Duara1991),theJapanesehavemixedupaseeminglyirrationalbunchofthings.TheempiricalrealityofthemodernizationprocessinventedShintōcultsnextto railway lines; merged messianic philosophies with high‐precision industries;connected geomantic practices with modern positivist science and the activities ofdivine spirits (see fourth section). Thus, it becomes untenable to understand Japan’slate‐development as interplay between the adoption of modern western politicalconcepts, economic institutions, and technical artifacts on the one hand, and a“Confusion heritage” on the other (e.g. Dore 1979:147). Simplifying accounts ofmodernization that purport conceptual dichotomies and impose “institutional”,“cultural” and “technical” divides eschew the hybrid outcomes of modern stateformation inMeiji Japan (Sakamoto1996).Back in1939,Pollardadvancedthis insightbrilliantly,albeitwithsomebewilderment:

"Thereistobesure,somethingdecidedlyincongruousinthespectacleofamodern Japanese army, amply supported by tanks, heavy artillery, andairplanes,doingthewordofthegodsintheextensionoftheHeavenlytaskin China. No less incongruous, on the other hand, is the position of anemperor, divinely descended and himself worshipped as a Shintō deity,reigning over a land alive with the roar of heavy industry with makes

4ForancriticaloverviewonvariousmodelsseeFraserLow1989.

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possiblethemilitaryeffortinChina”(Pollard1939:34)Similarly,Morishima’s sophisticated “cultural” approachmust be qualified. He claimsthe specific convergence of traditional Confucian and Taoist lines of thinking weresignificant for the way in which the innovators of theMeiji‐revolution have adoptedforeign technologies. Especially, their Shintō‐ethos, according toMorishima, renderedthemfarmorepredestined formodernization than theirChinesepeersacross thesea(Morishima 1982). However, the controversies over “national spirit” that wereintrinsicallyrelatedtotheconstructionofnewinfrastructures,theuseandclassificationof artificial objects, and the implementation of unknownmaterials such as steel andconcrete seriously ridicule Morishima’s Weberian presumption: no single set ofprinciples were guiding theMeiji revolution. The cultural discourses of theMeiji eraconstitute an amalgam of Shintō, neo‐Confucian, nativist, feudal, modernist, andscientificstrandsofthought.Moreover,evenifwemodifyWeber’sideabyassumingtheadoptionof importedtechnologychangedthe“culture” inMeiji Japanasmuchasthelatter framed the employment of the former, we still lack a sufficiently sensibleanalytical framework. The scientific advances of Japanese seismology, which haverevolutionized the Western knowledge and methods to study earthquakes, illustratethatmerely juxtaposing “technology” and “culture” grosslymisses themark (Clancey2006).Insum,althoughspaceconstraintsmerelyallowus tooutlinethestateofknowledge,this bears significant conceptual and methodological insights for IR approaches toJapan’srise.Ontheoneside,IRscholarshavehardlyharnessedtherichanddiversinter‐disciplinary treasure of expertise about this puzzle. On the other side, the empiricaldiversity and complexity of Japan’s rise unravels the shaky premises and limitedontologicalscopeofIRaccountsof“risingpowers”.Moreover,asthesethreebodiesofknowledge incorporate different yet often interrelated perspectives and empiricalmaterials,we should reject theoretical approaches that prematurely de‐emphasize orsilence empirical aspects for they apparently do not fit their conceptual frameworks.Though Japan’s rise has attracted so much scholarly attention, still, crucial empiricalaspectshavebeencompletelylostintheconceptualgridofIR.Particularly,fromapost‐Cartesian point of view, the theoretical approaches that capture only “social” or“ideational” dimensions are bound to scratch at the surface. Ultimately, they riskmisconstruing the interconnected and hybrid processes of state building,modernization, and colonial expansion at the Japanese archipelago. In this sense, ourpaper does not just add another layer of empirical evidence; nor a additionalexplanatory“factor”.Itratheraimsatreframingtheentirepuzzlethroughsymmetricallycapturingpractices,materials,anddiscoursesandtheirconnectionsandinterrelations.Thereby,someof theabovementioned limitationsofourunderstandingareresolved.Furthermore,thisrevealstheshiftindimensionsthatIRbyandlargetreatsasconstants.To thisend,weproposeanovelanalyticalapproach.Thereby, Japan’s rise isexploredthroughthelensprocessesofassemblinganemergingactor‐network.Asthefollowingsectionfurtherelaborates,thiscomprisesasensitivereadingofanalyticaltermssuchas

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“rising”,“power”,or“Japan”.

3.Apost‐CartesianapproachtoJapan'sriseThis section lines out a relativistic approach drawing on methodical insights fromscienceand technologystudies (STS) (Latour2005,LawandHassard1999,Law2004).Through a post‐Cartesian lens,5 first of all, it replaces the “sociology of the social”(Latour2005)withananalytical frameworkthattreatshumansandnon‐humanactorssymmetricalinprinciple.Takingarelativisticunderstandingseriouslyrenderstimespace,that is dimensions that are usually accepted as constants, into subject matters forempiricalresearch(MayandNigelThrift2001).Tosignifythesedimensionsweusethecategories “regimes of time”, “orders of knowledge”, “circulation of artifacts”, “builtenvironments”, and “identity”. But the last category is partly treated as an empiricalconcern in IR, while the others are deemed stable background. Our approach, in anutshell,restsonthreepillars:firstly,afoundationalcollectorthathelpstodescribetherise of Japan as processes of assembling. Secondly, relying on fresh vocabulary, weproposetheconceptsof“translation”and“creativedestruction”.ThistheoreticalmodelputsouranalyticalfocusontheassemblingandreassemblingoftheMeijistateaswellas Japan’s colonialempireaswehave tocapture theagenciesofmutuallyembeddedand interrelatedmaterials,discourses,andpractices.Thirdly, in termsofmethods,wepropose a set of hypothetical propositions to guide this exploration. Approaching thepuzzle of Japan’s rise in this relativist manner, necessarily, leads to a redefinition ofbasicnotionsofIRincludingactorhood,agency,andpower.Foundationalcollector:assemblagesTobeginwith, the ideaofa“foundationalcollector” isnot toaddanother theoreticalaspect to the puzzle. It rather enables our research to account for a fuller picture ofreality. Employing the foundational collector “assemblages” aims at expanding ourontologicalparameters,makingadditionalthings,connections,andagenciesvisible.Atitscoreliesasymmetricalmethodologythatreplacesdichotomistunderstandingssuchas the distinction “social”/“technical” and “science”/“nature” (Latour 2005). So, theterm“assemblage”doesnothavethepurposeof“explaining”.Instead,tomaintaskofapost‐Cartesian approach is writing a thick description that excludes as few actors,practices and relations as possible. In this sense, the emergence of a “great power”constitutesaqualitativeprocess, incontrasttoaquantitativechangeamongpre‐givenlike‐units.Employing“assemblages”—synonymouswith“collectives”, “associations”or“actor‐networks” as foundational collector—enables us to report the full range of5Differentformsof“post‐Cartesian”frameworkshavebeensketchedoutelsewhere(Wendt2004,Pouliout2010).

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practicesandrelationsthatinterconnecthumans,ideas,words,andallkindsofthings.This, apparently, cuts across the usual categorical domains that are cherished in thesocial sciences. Particularly, this foundational collector avoids the customarydiscriminationbetweeninsideandoutsideinIR.Thispaper,then,buildsonanumberofANT‐methodsthatistime‐testedinagrowingbodyofliterature6inordertoanalyzetheevolutionary process through which the “great power” Japan had been assembledduringtheMeijiera.Thisconstructionprocessiscontingentupontheinnovativeagencyofvariousactors,whocontributetoassemblinggettingenrolledinthenewcollective.The non‐static characteristics of assemblages are, conceptually speaking, linked to aperformative understanding of agency and group formation. Accordingly, actorhooddoesnotrefer,forinstance,tonotionsofintentionality.Weavoidpresupposingafixedset of (social) actors while a priori excluding other things. Acting, here, denotes arelational effect of both human and non‐human actors upon other actors. Crucially,theserelationaleffects, that is,whethersomething isamediatormakingadifference,need to be empirically tested (Whatmore 2009). So, to the extent to which“assemblages” assists us to uncover new empiricalmaterials it transcends the purelysocial accounts of Japan’s rise. Because we cannot foresee which actors have beenassembled into one collective this methods defies to rule out, a priori, hybridconnections between humans andmaterial things, infrastructures, artifacts, symbols,spirits, or gods. Furthermore, a relativistic approach implies that stable assemblagesresemble an entire reality comprising a time regime, a knowledge order, builtenvironments, and specific material artifacts. Especially, large and divers actor‐networks, such as “state assemblages”, evolve by gluing together heterogeneouselementswhileobjectifying,normalizing,orqualifyingbasicdimensionsof life suchastime, knowledge, or space (Latour 1987, Law2002). This leads to adifficult question:how the assembling of a “great power” actually works? How might one analyticallycaptureit?Theoreticalmodel:translationsandcreativedestructionExploringtheevolutionofassemblagesrequiresan infra‐language.Twobasicconceptsare advanced here: “translation” and “creative destruction”. These two constitutecomponentsofatheoreticalmodelthatareslightlymoreabstractthanthefoundationalcollector.Theirmainpurposeissettingtheanalyticalgrid inordertotesthypotheticalpropositions about what might be relevant actors and relations. Ultimately, thesetheoretical models are not explanatory, but descriptive tools; no more and no less.Figure1presentstheaxialevolutionarymodelthatdepictstheprocessofassemblingacollectivethathasbeendevelopedelsewhere(seeMayer2012).Thex‐axisreferstothetranslation process and the y‐axis the size of an emerging assemblage. For analytical

6SeeamongothersCalis¸kanandCallon(2010),Latour(1999),MolandLaw(1994),Aradau(2010),LippertandO'Connor(2003),MacKenzie(2009),Mayer(2012),andSchouten(2011).

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purposes,wehavedividedthex‐axisintothreelayers:practicesofgroupformation,thestatusofmaterialobjects,andthedifferentformsofonto‐politics.Moreover,thex‐axisrepresents in a stylizedway three distinct temporary phases of translation. FollowingBruno Latour, themodel uses the original definition of a thing as an “assembly of ajudicial nature gathered around a topic, reus, that creates both conflict and assent.”(Latour 2000:117) Consequently, themodel assumes that innovative actors pick up a“thing”,whichinitiallywasignored,inexistent,orforgotten,inanattempttoassemblefurther actors through the thing. In the beginning, possibly only few actors try toassemblewhilealmostnobodyelse is interested.Actorssetout to (re)assemble.Theyestablish novel connections, construct new alliances, enroll alternative partners, orreconfigureorthodoxthoughts(redarrow).Overtime,thisinnovativeagencybecomescontroversial; things that were ignored thus far turn into matters of concern. But agrowingnetworkofactorsmightfurtherapotentiallylargeassemblage(unknowninitsactorsandextension).Figure1.Theevolutionofassemblages

Source:Mayer(2012) Considering the case of the Meiji revolution, it is accurate to say that whoever hadpushed for innovations—nobles, engineers, scholars, statesmen, generals orentrepreneurs—theirmotivationsweremanifold.Thisincludes,aswillbeshown,belief,vision, profits, truth, glory, problem solving, aesthetics, enrichment, psychology, andadventurism.Theimportanttheoreticalpointtonotehereisthatassemblingdoesnotrequire a uniform motivation. As John Darwin argues in Unfinished Empire, theassemblingofeventhebiggestempirehasworkedwithouta“masterplan”;withouta

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guiding ideology; without a fixed and centrally coordinated set of practices (Darwin2012). In this sense, the core question is which actors possess the creativity andadaptability, first, toovercome ignorance, and, second, tobe capableof “technically”connectingallkindsofactorsandpractices.Ourempiricalknowledgeaboutassemblingclearlyindicatesthatnosingleactor—presumablyatthecommandinghighs—cancarryout this creative process in a top‐down manner. The enormous expansion ofcoordinatedactionthatasuccessfulinnovationpresentsisonlyduetotheabilityofthemany. The reality of Japan’s rise, therefore, cannot be attributed to entities such as“socialstructures”,“culture”or“nationalpolicies”.Ourviewbuildsonnumerousstudiesthat show that the analytical concern with “state‐led” strategies is particularlymisleading,though,anarrayofactorsthatareoftenwronglysubsumedunderthelabelstate are playing important roles. The “nation state” or the “freemarket” constituteitself a complex assemblage, comprising human and non‐human actors (Carrol 2006,Alonso 1994, Callon 2007). Hence, creative destruction elsewhere can affect “stateassemblages” and vice versa. It usually escapes the Cartesian radars of social sciencethat assembling includes the shifts of agency between humans and artificial objectssinceassembling requires theenrollmentofanarrayofnon‐humanactors in the firstplace.Accordingtothehistoryoftechnologicalchange,wecan’tpresumeadeterminingcharacter of technologies, nor technological path‐dependency. In this line, we canpropose that themassive “revolution” that enabled Japan’s rise involved the sharing,therecombination,ortheexchangeofagencyamonghumansandnon‐humans.Assembling activities inevitably evolve through processes of translation. The modelsuggests an assemblage emerges only after various unpredictable adjustments andtransformations. In this phase (red fields) the innovative work of assembling reallybegins. As controversies set in, the relationships among the involved actors includingtheiridentities,properties,andinterestsare“aseriesofnegotiablehypotheses”(Callon1986). From the perspective of the actors, translation means everything remainsunstable.7Themultipleagenciesinvolvednotyetcoordinated.

“Translation is the mechanism by which the social and natural worldsprogressively take form. The result is a situation in which certain entitiescontrol others. Understanding what sociologists generally call powerrelationships means describing the way in which actors are defined,associated and simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their alliances.Therepertoireoftranslationisnotonlydesignedtogiveasymmetricalandtolerantdescriptionofacomplexprocesswhichconstantlymixestogetheravarietyofsocialandnaturalentities.Italsopermitsanexplanationofhowafewobtain the right toexpressand to represent themany silentactorsofthesocialandnaturalworldstheyhavemobilized.”(Callon1986:224)

7Thisfluidrealityisexemplified,forinstance,throughtheexistentialdifficultiesthatthepracticeandtheoryoflawfaceingraspingtechnologicalchanges(BennettMoses2007).

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To construct a collective is a creative and collective process. Multiple interactions,positioning, controversies, and replacements of identities, interests, and properties;otherwise no actorwould get assembled into a stable collective in the first place. Toconstructcollectives,actorsemployawiderangeofpractices—entailingalsotheuseofviolent force. However, far more important is the ability to negotiate, objectify,standardize, normalize, qualify, and connect; in short, to convince other actors tobecome stable parts of an emerging assemblage. But how turns this process oftranslationintoastabilizedcollective?Takingaboutcolonialexpansion, isviolencethekey,whicheventuallycutstheGordianknot?AsthebacklashesofJapanesecolonialruleinKoreashow,theuseofbruteforceanddiscipliningcoerciondoesnotsubstitutetheability to stabilized assemblages. Instead, actors often solve controversies through“boundary objects”—including concepts, artificial objects, notions, images et cetera.Boundary objects become a point of crystallization enabling various actors fromheterogeneous contexts to engage, connect, and negotiate (Mayer 2012).8 They areinterfaces enabling “theweaving together of amultitudeof different elementswhichrenders the question of whether they are 'scientific' or 'technical' or 'economic' or'political' or 'managerial'meaningless.” (Latour 1987:223). In thebeginning, boundaryobjectsareusedpragmaticallytoallowforthefindingofacommonproblemdefinitionorstandardsregardingthematterofconcern.Boundaryobjects,however,doinevitablyleadtothestabilizationofanassemblage.Theglobalclimatenegotiationsexemplifythedifficultytostandardizeandobjectify.Duetoglobalcirculationmodeling—themajorboundaryobjectsinthisarea—fewactorsdenythefundamentalecological interconnectednessof“humanactivities”andbio‐chemicalorphysicalprocessesonaplanetaryscale.Though,nearly25yearsstillfailedtoproduceacommondefinitionofthematterofconcernand,thus,stableprescriptionstosolvetoproblem(Hulme2009).Thesameholdstruefortechnologicalinnovations,whichonlyinretrospect appear to have followed a linear “technical” development trajectory. Incontrast,theiractualempiricalevolutionisfulloftwists,uncertaintyandcontingency—ahistorythatislargelyforgottenlateron.Althoughseveralboundaryobjectsmayexistinparallelfor longperiods,ourmodelassumesthatboundaryobjectstendtobecomeobligatorypassagepoints. Theevolution, then, is in aphaseof stabilization: Practicesweresynchronized; routinesareset;meaning isnormalized;anorderofknowledge isfixed—thereby holding a large assemblage and an entire (new) reality stable.Accordingly, they‐axis inourmodel represents thesizeofanassemblage. It indicatesthenumberanddiversityofhumanandnon‐humanactors,whichareenrolledandactinconcert,asameasureofthepoweranassemblage.Drawing on Joseph Schumpeter,we label the entire phase of translation as “creativedestruction”(Schumpeter1943).Ontheonehand,thistermhighlightstocreativeness

8Amongsciences,forinstance,boundaryobjectssynchronizeresearchwork,facilitatecommunicationamongdifferentprofessionalgroupsandreinforcescientificauthority(ShackleyandWynne1996,Sundberg2007).

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of involved actors that is necessary for assembling.On the other hand, Schumpeter’sterminology emphasizes the resulting “destruction” that inevitably follows frominnovations as well. While Schumpeter mainly concentrated of innovations torevolutionize “economic structures”, in our sense, they reconfigure, more generally,collectivesofhumansandnon‐humans.Duetotheirheterogeneousandfluidcharacterthe assemblages described above have only temporary stable conditions and thetrajectory of evolution can always be reversed.While new assemblages emerge andenroll increasingly more actors other existing assemblages are affected bycontroversies, must realign themselves, or can even break into pieces (Latour 2005).Translations in one assemblage involve the “creative destruction” of another. Thusstabilization leads elsewhere to the reassembling or even the disassembling of actor‐networks. In sum, the theoretical model entailing “translation” and “creativedestruction” suggests to hypothesize the rise of Japan as a process of assembling,reassembling,anddisassembling.Methodology:propositionsfortestingactorsandrelationsBased on the tools of “assemblages”, “translation”, and “creative destruction”, wehypothesize a set of symmetrical propositions that guide our exploration of the 19thcenturyemergenceofJapan.Whileourhypothesescouldbefalsifiedwithrecoursetoempirical observations, they secure that we cautiously progress towards acomprehensivedescriptionofoursubjectmatter.Againstimposingacertaintheoreticalorder upon empirical materials, our post‐Cartesian methodology advances fivepropositionsinordertoempiricallytestagenciesandtherelationsamongactors:

1. Uncounted human and non‐human agencies assemble a modern state inJapanthroughcreatingandconnectingpractices,materials,anddiscourses.2.StabilizingtheJapaneseassemblagedoesenrollthings,people,practices,andconcepts in a way that crisscrosses the “internal”/“external” divide byestablishingconnectionsthroughoutEastAsiaortheentireworld.3. The Japanese colonial empire is constructed by practices from seeminglyincongruent, or even incommensurable domains such as modern science andmessianiccults.4. Stabilizing Meiji Japan as a great power involves the reconfiguring offundamentaldimensionsof realty includingtime,knowledge,spatiality,bodies,subjectivities,andtheformofbuiltlivingenvironments.5.ThecreativedestructionthatenablesJapan’sriseislinked,atthesametime,toprocessesofdisassemblingelsewhere.

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Before we investigate through these five propositions the controversies, thetranslations,andtheenrollmentsofactors,afewnotesareinplacetoclarifythekindsofdata,whichwehavecollectedaswellasthegenericvocabularythatweemployedtoour puzzle. To begin with, the relationship between increases in “power” and theoutreach of technological infrastructures, scientific practices, and the entanglementwith thematerialworldat largehaveremainedagrosslyunder‐researched issue in IR(but see Rosenau and Sing 2002, Herrera 2003). Therefore, we draw on empiricalmaterials and qualitative data that are stemming from extra‐disciplinary sources—including works from history, area studies, sociology, geography, ethnology, colonialstudies, and science studies. The foundational collector “assemblages” enables thisinter‐disciplinaryplunderforitdoesnotaprioriprivilegeafixedsetofactorsorgroups.As we combine a wide array of sources out central purpose is to discover and todescribeaccuratelythemultiplicityofrelationaleffects,actors,andgroupformations.Finally,weemphasizetheawarenessoftheproblematicwordingandvocabularyrelatedtoourpuzzle.Theliteraturereferstothetransformativeperiodthatweexplorebeloweitherasthe“Meijirevolution”orasthe“Meijirestoration”.Forreasonsthatbecomefully obvious in the course of this article, the sheer magnitude of innovations lendssupporttothetermrevolution.9Furthermore,as“Japan”arguablyhasnotexistedpriortotheMeijirevolution,werejecttopresumeanascent“nationstate”—nottomentionalike‐unit inthe“internationalsystem”—whentalkingabouttheTokugawashogunateortheEdobakufu(Ravina1995).Insteadweaimatpreservingasmuchaspossibletheambivalenttermsthatcharacterizeourpuzzle:theco‐evolutionoftheemergenceofamodernnationstateattheJapanesearchipelagoand,atthesametime,theriseofMeijiJapan to great power status. The term “rise”, consequently, does neither signify theestablishmentofyetanothernationinastaticworldofperfectsovereignauthority.Nordoes it imply that a new great power joins the allegedly perennial struggle forhegemony. It is precisely the agencies that these views silence—the actors who areassembling, constructing, connecting, and reframing theirworld— that are at stake ifonewantsexploreshow“Japan”becamea“unit”ofsortsinthefirstplace.Thestoryofthis empowerment is extraordinary. It allowsus to enter the reality of “greatpower”throughtherearwindow.ThepuzzleoftheMeijierashowshowmultipletheagencies,howdiverstheactors,andhowcomplextheactor‐networksnecessarilyareinordertolift a semi‐colonized country above the non‐Westphalian world of extraterritoriallegality,semi‐colonialdependency,andtechnologicalbackwardness

4.Assemblingagreatpower:Japan’semergence This section illuminates the emergence of Japan through exploring the assemblingprocessesthathavevirtuallyconstructedanewrealityduringtheMeijieraandbeyond

9Whiletheusageoftheterm“restoration”isaninterestingobjectfortheexaminationofthehistoriographyofJapan’sriseitself.

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(1868‐1940).Weespeciallyaimatsheddinglightontheevolutionof“regimesoftime”,“ordersofknowledge”,“builtenvironments”,and“subjectivities”duringtheseperiods.Apparently, this task constitutes a considerable inter‐disciplinary challenge and wenecessarilyhave to limitourattention toa fewselectedaspectsonly.Also these fourcategories while usually accepted as constants within essentialist theoreticalframeworksheresuggestanopen‐endedapproach:our relativisticmethodology turnsthem into subject matters for empirical research. They are examined based one orcombinationsof the fivepropositionsdetailed in the last section. In the following,wedivide “Japan’semergence” into threebroadconcerns: first, the characteristicsof the“Tokugawaassemblage”thatpreceded“Japan’s”emergenceasanationstate.Second,thecreationofamodernstateinMeiji‐Japan;and,third,weexplorethegrowthoftheactor‐network through colonial expansion. This division, though it speaks to commonhistoricalandscholarlyperiodization,ishereadvancedforanalyticalpurposestoenablea good description. Certain tenets and traditions of the Tokugawaperiod, as itwere,becomeentangledwithintheevolvingassemblageintheMeijiera.Yet,theformationofamodernMeijistateandthelaterimperialexpansionaremuchmoreintermingledandmutually reinforcing in comparison to their connectionswith earlier historical events,ideas,orpractices.Inthissense,themetaphor“Meiji‐revolution”correctlydenotestheabruptvanishingofa“world,whichthenewregimesystematicallydestroyed.”(Ravina1995:1019) Notwithstanding its half‐arbitrary nature, the threefold division of ourmaterialsthusdoesnotpreventusfromfollowingtheactualconnections,interrelations,orcirculationsthatstubbornlyevolveotherwise.Thesubsequentsectionisnotintendedtoformadefinitiveorcomprehensiveaccount.Itmerelycontributes,inanunorthodoxmanner,tomappinganewlandscape;awildernessofsortsthatappearedimpenetrableorunfathomableforIRtheoriessofar.

4.1. TheTokugawaperiod:assemblinginsplendidisolation?

The term Tokugawa period denotes, translated into our calendar, the years between1603 and 1868. In this period the Shogunate was the center of authority within aconglomerate of domains or “countries” at the Japanese archipelago. The bakufu,located in Edo (ancient name of Tokyo) functioned as the Shogun’s administration.TokugawaIeyasufoundedbothinstitutionsaftervictoriouslyendingaphaseofwarandunrest.Theestablishmentofafeudalorderinvolvedastrictsocialhierarchythatplacedthewarriorclass(samurai),comprisingthedaimyō(feudallords)andthelowerrankingsamurai,atthetopofthehierarchy.Belowthisstatuswererankedsocialgroupssuchasfarmers(hyakushō),townspeople,merchantsandartisans(chōnin),andseveraloutcastegroups.While theemperorofficially investedtheShogun,hewasana‐political figure;merely a source of legitimacy. Taking over the military command from ToyotomiHideyoshiafterthewarwithKorea,theTokugawaclanruledatthecenterofacomplexfeudal structure,which divided themain island among roughly 250 feudal lords (Kim

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1961,Smith1960).Subsequently,theTokugawabakufudominatedJapanesepolitics.Itpurportedly sealed the country from external influences. For example, trade wasrestricted,citizenswereprohibitedfromtravelingabroad,andafterca.1620ChristianmissionariesaswellasPortugueseandSpaniardswereexpelledfromthecountry.Only250yearslater,theappearanceofthe“blackships”ofCommodorePerryin1853forcedthebakufutoopenupthecountrytoUSandBritishtrade(Jansen2000).ThischallengedthebalanceofauthoritywithintheTokugawaregime;abalance,whichwasatthattimealreadyunderheavypressurefromarangeofdynamicsocio‐economictransformationsthat undermined the feudal order (Morishima 1982).10 Yet,when the last Tokogawashōgunagreedtoestablishdiplomaticrelations,acceptedtheinfamousunequaltreatiseallowingforextraterritorial legalcourts,theEuropeanempiresrenderedthecountryasemi‐colonialzone.Ultimately,agroupofSoutherndaimyooverthrewthebakufu inacivilwarshortlybeforetheonsetoftheMeijirevolutionin1868.As scholars critically reexamined earlier historiography, the orthodox understandingabouttheextent,andaboutthemannerinwhichthebakufu“ruled”Japanunderwentmajorrevisions.Especially,althoughtheearlierorthodoxviewsawtheEdobakufuasafeudal administrative institution not comparable to a modern public government,numerous scholars have applied models of European state formation and theirterminology to the bakufu in a sort of a retrospective teleology (Ravina 1995). Incontrast,newresearch ledtoaredefinitionofseveralcharacteristicsof theTokugawashogunate; three of which matter most for our purpose: firstly, the practice of the“sakoku”,thatis,thebakufueffortstoregulatetheinfluxofpeople, ideas,andthings;secondly, thenatureof the “state”against thebackdropofboth theelusive formsofpremodernauthorityandthebiasedhistoriographyofmodernstateformation;thirdly,and related, the significance of the access,which the country actually had to foreigntechnologies, philosophies, and sciences, as a measure of its “backwardness”.Interrogating these aspects the following employs a relativistic methodology.Particularly,wedescribetheTokugawaperiod’s“builtenvironments”,its“timeregime”and the shifting “subjectivities” of its people—in short, essential characteristics of“Japan”priortoits“internationalrise”.MaterialintegrationandjōkamachiOnewaytoapproachtheTokugawaassemblageisanalyzinghowtheshōgunandtheirvassals,emergingfromaphaseofpoliticaldisintegration,warfare,heterogeneousandcompetingformsofauthority,andunregulatedeconomicexchangeswithpeopleoftheentireEastAsianregion(Yasunori2005),haveassembledaneworderbyinterweavingformsoffeudalauthoritywiththe“materiallivingenvironments”.Agoodstartingpoint

10Inthelate19thcentury,thebakufurespondedtofaminesandnaturaldisasterwithaseriesofreformsinformedbyneo‐Confucianideasinordertoreestablishacontrolledsocialorder(HanleyandYamamura1971,Burns2003).

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is the constructionof Edo.At theordersof Tokugawa Ieyasuabackwater villagewasturned into the new capital—the center of a civilization as Ieyasu and the architectsbelieved. Whereas Edo quickly became the “supreme metaphor and mechanism ofbakufuauthority”(Coaldrake1981:246),theearlyshōgunattemptstodelimitate,unify,and integrate their realm took decades. The Tokugawa, first of all, were greatinnovators. For the purpose of stabilizing a feudal assemblage with a strong socialhierarchy, they set out to standardize and regulate the prior customary modes ofprofessions, arts, and artisans; in particular architecture and construction. So, EdosupremelysymbolizedtheblendingoflawandarchitecturebywhichtheearlyShogunswere ordering their country—but military dominance over the other daimyo on themainJapaneseIslandswouldnothavestabilizedtheemergingassemblage.Literally, the shoguns rendered the capital into a boundary object to enable an“integrationproject”afterdecadesofwarandthebreakdownofcentralizedorder.Thedaimyohadnotonlytobuild,onbehalfoftheShogun,thecitythemselves—usingtheirownresources,manpower,andfinances.Edoalsobecametheplaceinwhichthefeudallords and their families had partly to live according to the system of “compulsoryattendence” (sankin kōtai); a principle that was formally codified in 1632. Thus, thedaimyofamilieswereinpersonaassembledinEdo;virtuallyashostagesofthebakufu.Thedesignofacitythatwouldquicklybecometheworld’slargestandmostpopulatedmetropolis withmore than 1Million inhabitantswas based on a distinctively spatial,geomantic, and cosmological plan (Coaldrake 1981:246‐247). The architecture of thebuildingsandthecompoundswereregulatedaccordingtotheclassstatus.Theplanninggranted the samurai an over‐proportionally large space in comparison to the chōnin(townspeople). Over the decades, the bakufu and the city administration began toprescribetheputativedifferencesbetweenarchitecturalforms,styles,andmaterialstobeemployedfortheinteriors,thegateways,andtheroofsamongthedifferentclasses.Thus,theearlyphasesofurbandevelopmentinEdoarecharacterizedbyaremarkable“homologybetweenthephysicalandpoliticalenvironments”(Coaldrake1981:236).Butthisisnottosaythatthebakufu,presumablybecauseofthemilitarydominanceoftheTokugawashōgun,hadstabilizedthefeudalcollectiveinatop‐downmanner.Rather,thecitydesign,regulationsandpracticesevolvedthroughvariouscontroversies.AnimportantexampleisEdo’sroofsthatwereontheonehandamarkerofsocialstatus(allowingonlythedaimyōtohavenon‐woodenrooftile),andaconstantthreatontheotherhand.Theseregulationswhilefavoringdaimyoruntheriskofgreatfiresinthecity.Thelimitsofthebakufucontrolbecameevidentafterthemerekiteikagreatfirein1659.Atthattime,daimyorefusedtorebuildtheworldlargestcastle.Coaldrakeconcludesthe“concertbetweenarchitecturalformsandgovernments”wasfinallyreversedinthecourseoftheTokugawashogunate(Coaldrake1981:257ff).Thefluidityofthefeudalorderisillustratedbythefactthattheedictsforurbanregulationwereoftenineffective.Inpart,thedaimyōandthechōninmettheregulationofroofs,gateways,andfurniturewithignoranceorresistance.Inpart,newlawsoftensealedintolawwhatwasalreadycommonpractice;developedwithouttheconsentofthebakufu.

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So,“ultimatelygatewaysregulatedtheedicts”(Coaldrake1981:284).

Another central element in the construction of the Tokugawa assemblage was thereassemblingoffirearms.PortuguesesailorsbroughtacoupleofgunsonJapanesesoilin the 1550s. The daimyo quickly began using, developing, and manufacturing theseweapons in a large‐scalemanner. The usage of guns in the numerous battles of thisperiod led to massive shifts in tactic, strategies, fortifications, and weapon industry(Brown 1948). At the time of Hideyoshi’s invasion in Korea, the Japanese daimyoarguablyhadmastered landwarwithgunsandcannonsbetter thananywhereelse intheworld.AsinEurope,gunscalledintoquestionthesamurai.Theyaffectedtheclass‐difference during sixteenth century pre‐Tokugawa (Perrin 1999).While the Tokugawaclan owned its military dominance also to guns and cannons, the bakufu, in 1636,ordered the edict of “sakoku” (secluded country). Its goal was partly, to control theartifacts thatwouldenter the country.Thebakufu starteda confiscationcampaign torecollectgunsfromcommoners.Thefinalsuccess,however,wasduetothelargesizeofsamurai class (probably 10 percent of the population). They collectively established afeudal hierarchy that bereft the low classes, first of all, from the right to use anyweapons, which prior was absolutely usual. Meanwhile, the samurai, who for goodreasonsdisgusted guns asweapons stuck to their swords andbows—yetnotwhen itcame to hunting (Perrin 1999). However, peasants have not merely stopped havingfirearms.Instead,thegunsasobjectsbecameentangledinviolentpracticesotherthanwarfare or civil unrest. Indeed, guns were in common usage by farmers as tool tofrighten or kill animals throughout the Edo period (Howell 2009). The TokugawaassemblageisalsoquitedistinctfromtheEuropeanevolutionofcityfortifications.Thedisassembling of guns and cannons led to the virtual absence of city‐walls andfortificationsinthenumeroustownsbuildduringtheTokugawaperiod(seeHall1955).Without doubt, the inexorable nexus of disassembling guns, the objectifying of thefeudal class system, and the construction of the build environments within theTokugawa assemblage is one of the most intriguing and one of the less understoodaspects.To normalize the feudal order throughout the country, the Tokugawa and the vassaldaimyo also reconstructed the entire landscape, in particular, through urbandevelopment.While thebakufu became the central authority among thedaimyō, thedaimyoputthelandsandtownsintheir“countries”underacentralmagistrate,taxationandlawimplementation.Thesemagistrateswerelocatedinthehugenumberofnewlybuild jōkamachi (castle towns). According toHall, “itwould be hard to find a parallelperiodofurbanconstructioninworldhistory.”(Hall1955:43‐44)

“The castle towns thus individually and collectively became the physicalembodiment of the Tokugawa feudal elite. Edo, the shogun's capital,symbolizedthehierarchalunityofthedaimyoundertheTokugawahouse,asthe several daimyo built residences in the shadow of the castle and

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proceededona regularbasis topayyearlyhomage to the supreme feudalauthority. The daimyo's castle towns were butminiatures of this pattern.Themorphology of the castle townwas in essence a cross‐section of thepatternofJapanesefeudalsociety.Thecastletownwasbuiltbyandforthedaimyo and his vassals. The castles, which occupied the center of thesecities, were built to protect the aristocracy. No outer wall enclosed thewholecommunityas inEurope,althoughoutermoatswerenot infrequent(Hall1955:45).

Embodyingthefeudalorder,thejōkamachi,however,ledtonewpracticesthatcametochallenge itsmaintenets,namelytheundisputedsegregationofthesamurai fromthechonin. For one, the samurai became increasingly dependent on the services ofmerchantsandartisans.“TheresultwasaradicalrearrangementofcommercialactivityinJapan.Daimyo,eagertoattracttotheircastlestheservicesofmerchantsandartisans,offered liberal conditions to those who would join them. The old guild system ofmedieval Japan was broken down as merchants took advantage of ‘free’ marketsprovided in the castle towns. Thus as the daimyo rose to power the older centers oftradedeclinedandnewcommunities,surroundingthenewcastles,begantoflourish.”(Hall1955:47)Ontheonehand,theadministrativecontroloverthechōnin intensifiedthroughout the Edo period, restricting foreign trade, regulation urban life andcommercialactivities,butontheotherhand,theoppressionwascounterbalancebythedependencyof thesamurai (Hall1955).Moreover, thechōninwerenot satisfiedwithcommerceandprofit.Theydevelopedakindof“pre‐democratic”culturethatmergedarts,commerce,andlifestylethat,inturn,begantoincreasinglyinfluencetheviewsandattitudes of the samurai (Smith 1960). In sum, the castle cities, that were mostlyconstructed from virtually from nothing between 1580 and 1620 became obligatorypassagepointswithintheTokugawaassemblage.

“NodoubtacertainprovincialismwasinevitableinafeudalsocietysuchasthatofTokugawaJapan.Butwefindthat throughoutthenationthecastlecities took on a remarkable uniform guise as the necessities of alternateattendanceofthedaimyoandtheirretinuesatEdocirculatedtheideasandpracticesofthecentertotheperiphery,andastheenforcedtradeandEdoknitthemerchantsoftherealmmorecloselytogether.”(Hall1955:52)

Building castle townswas but onematerial embodiment of the Tokugawa order. Thepractices of sankin kōtai (alternate attendance) in addition required an elaboratesystemofroadsandtrafficinfrastructure.ThefirstShogunsorderedtoconstructionoffive highways (gokaidō) as means of connecting the “provinces” to Edo (Vaporis1994:17)inordertoenablethegreatdaimyoprocessionsbackonfourthbetweenEdoandtheircastletowns.Theroadsallowedthe250daimyō(whoofcoursetraveledwiththeircourt) tocometoEdoevery twoyearsandthenreside there foroneyear.Theywerealsousedasaprimarywayofcommunication,sincetheyallowedofon‐foottravelof express messengers. As such, these roads were besides the castle towns an

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integrative element of Tokugawa assemblage. Elements of this system were post‐stations(tonyaba),whichhadtosupplythetravellerswithrelayhorses(sometimes,butnotalwaysprovidedbytheEdogovernment)andmenpowerandprovidedlodgingforthe travelers. Due to the bakufu regulation, the local peasants were responsible formaintenanceontheirownexpenseyetwere, in turn,exempted fromtaxation (Mitsui1941:91). As means of control over the movement on the highways, the bakufuestablishedfifty‐threebarriers(sekisho)meantprimarilytocontroltheflowofweaponsinto Edo and assuring that the daimyo’s families who weren’t allowed to leave Edo,didn’tdoit(Vaporis1994:100).Specialpermissionswereneedednotonlytotransportweapons, but also for transporting goods. Most people traveled by foot. Populartransportwasalsopalanquinsandthegoodsweremostlytransportedonthehorseback.“For short distances ox‐cartswere sometimes employed as e. gr. for the transport ofricefromOtsuontheTokaidōtoKyoto.Buttheabsence,asawhole,ofvehiclesontheroadsisoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofthehistoryofcommunicationsinthefeudalage.”(Mitsui1941:92)Ambivalentauthorities,mediatedzones,andsakokuMuchof theearlier literatureon theTokugawa regimehas correctlybeenaccusedofwriting into history the teleology of state formation. To overcome “national” biases,researchers have pointed to the ambiguity of language thatwas characteristic to theEdoperiod.Especially, formsofauthorityand their territorialdelimitationwereneverunambiguous.Tousetranslationssuchas“state”,“country”,or“nation”connectedwitha modernist clear‐cut reading therefore conceals the unstable and contestedemploymentoftherespectivewords intheTokugawaera.AsRavinashows,assumingthe bakufu as a central government, which had ultimately aimed at exclusivelyadministeringsubordinated“domains”ismisleading.InsteadtheTokugawaassemblagewas constituted through ambivalent practices of authority and “multiple systems oflegitimacy” (Ravina1995:1003).TheEdobakufuandthedaimyousedterms fromonesemantic field often interchangeable: “kokuō”, “kuni”, “kokka” could be translated ascountry,land/state,domain,andnation.Thesetermswereappliedinparalleleithertothe entire “country“ or to the daimyō investitures (Ravina 1995:1004ff). In brief, thepolysemanticambiguityisapermanentfeatureofthisassemblage.Certainly,thefeudallords have not seen this ambivalence as something to be erased once and for all; asarguably amodern statewould attempt (cf. Bauman 1991). In this sense, using fixedtranslationsofthesetermsinourresearchpracticerunstheriskofabiasformodernist“clarity”.

“ItisdifficulttotranslateTokugawapoliticaltextsintomodernJapanese:thelanguageofTokugawapoliticsdidnotoutlivetheTokugawapoliticalorder.In 1868/6 the djokan (council of state) designated three types ofinternationaldivision for Japan: ken, fu, andhan.Kenand fuwereancientJapanesetermsforprovincialunitsoftheimperialstateandwerecreatedby

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aggregatingTokugawahouselands,liegevassalholdings,andsmalldomains.Largerdaimyoholdingsweredesignatedhan.Underthepretextofrestoringseventh‐ and eight‐century political institutions, the Meiji governmenteliminatedthewordkuniasaternfordomain.Implicitly,Japanbecametheonly effective country/kuni, the Meiji state the sole state/kokka, and theJapanesepeopletheonlytruenation/kokumin.The introductionofdistincttermsforprefecture,domain,andstatewasthusparoftheconstructionofthemodernstateitself.”(Ravina1995:1007)

Theambivalenceofauthorityisfurtherevidentfromthebakufuprojectofmappingtherealmof the shōgun.Although thebakufu produced themost comprehensivemap todate(Yonemoto2003),thetechniquesofmapmakingwerenotasprecise,invasive,andrelatedtostateengineeringasinEurope(cf.Carroll2006).Infact,theEdobakufuhadto wait for the daimyo to deliver information. Territorial delimitations were often aquestionofconventionandunsettledcontroversiesoverterritoriesremainedwithinthemaps as “disputed land”. This reflected the existence ofmultiple authorities that thebakufucouldevennotoverrideonitsmap.Ontheotherside,thebakufuwasnotaloneinchartingthecountry.Multiplecommercialmapmakersandthebourgeoningliteraturefieldoftravelitinerariesadditionallydrawdivergingpictures(Yonemoto2003).So,asinEurope,mappingplayedacrucialroleinstateformation.Yettheco‐constructionofmapand authority that was particular to the Tokugawa assemblage was radical differentfrom the increasing territorial uniformity and exclusive borders that embodied theemergenceofEurope's“modernstates”(cf.Branch2011).This“inaccuracy”wasrelatedto the state ideology of the bakufu. It has modeled itself—mimicking the ImperialChinese understanding—as a cosmological center of a civilization. This rendered theareas beyond the daimyo estates, where the “barbarians” (i) lived, into “amorphouszones defined by trade, diplomacy and ritual” (Howell 1998:111‐112). But even theauthoritywithinthecivilizedworld(ka)oftheJapanesearchipelagodidonlycomprisedpeoplewhowereendowedwithstatus.Thismeantthatseveralgroupsofoutcastes,inturn,remainedcompletely“ungoverned”bythebakufu.

“Earlymodern Japan's borderswere not the unambiguous lines on amapthatseparatemodernnation‐statesfromoneanother.Evenwithintheinnerboundaries of the core polity lay zones that, like the Ezochi and Ryūkyū,were autonomous yet subject to the authority of the shogunate; theseinternalautonomies includedthedaimyodomains (whosephysicalborderswere relatively clearlydefined), territoriesunder the authorityofBuddhisttemplesandShintōshrines,andthemoreanomalousrealmoftheoutcastes.The internal autonomies of the early modern polity were situationallydefinedaccordingtotherulesof thestatussystem,sothatdifferentsocialgroups understood the political geography of Japan differently. However,the complex internal geography of the core polity had a coherence thatderived from the fixity of the polity's borders: daimyo domains, outcasteterritories, and other spatial units were part of the political order of the

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Tokugawastateandhadnomeaningoutsidethatcontext.Thecorepolity'sinnerboundaries linkedtheoverlapping internalgeographiesofshogunate,domains, temple grounds, and outcaste territories into a coherentinstitutionalwhole.”(Howell1998:112‐113)

Inasimilarway,turningagainto“foreignrelations”,the“actofseclusion”(sakoku)hadbynomeansdrawncleardemarcations.Clearly,theTokugawaassemblagewas,strictlyspeaking, never isolated. The Tokugawa shogunate, however, relied on a complexnetwork of “trade by proxy”, which made it dependent upon certain Daimyo at theSouthern and Northern part of the archipelago as well as on Chinese and Europeantraders—particularlytheDutch(Laver2008).So,thecountrywas“effectivelyintegratedinto East Asian economic networks andmaintained trade relations with nearly everyEastAsiancountry.WhattherulersofJapansoughttoprohibitwastradewithparticularWestern nations, while reaffirming Japan's official relations with China and Korea”(Schottenhammer2007:39).

“Theshogunatedelegated responsibility foroverseeing foreign relations todomainswithhistorical tiestothevarious ‘windows’ontheoutsideworld:the Matsumae domain oversaw trade ties with the Ainu in the Ezochi,Tsushima mediated relations with Korea, and Satsuma regulated contactswithRyūkyū.Tobesure,theshogunateretainedsanctioningpoweroveritsproxies' outside contacts and thus set the parameters for their diplomaticandcommercial activities;moreover, itmanaged the ‘window’atNagasakiitself, although the Dutch and Chinese traders who called there were notrecognizedasofficialenvoysoftheirhomecountries.Nevertheless,thegapbetween the shogunate's interests and perceptions and those of thedomains was wide enough to complicate the functioning of Tokugawaforeignrelations.”(Howell1998:120)

Through assembling a mediated form of “foreign” relations the bakufu, after threedecades, succeeded inmonopolizing trade. It achieved to disassemble the East‐Asianspanningnetworkofillicittrade,humantrafficking,and“piracy”(wakō)inwhichmanydaimyo on the Japanese archipelago were actively participating. When Hideyoshibannedtheuseofforceincoastalproximity,heraisedaclaimto“territorialwaters”,inwhichhewouldactasthesolearbitrator(Yasunori2005:191).Similarly,theEdobakufulatertriedtostemthetidesofunregulatedmovinggoods, ideas,andpeople, inwhichthedisintegratedrestsofImperialJapanwasincreasinglydrawnaftertheChineseMingdynastyhad restricted its foreign tradeand stopped to controlmaritime traffic in thelate 16th century. As Portuguese and Spanish (and later Dutch and British) ships,merchants,andmissionariesbecamepartofthisdynamicallyevolvingnetworkitsweptnotonlythefirstgunonJapanesesoilinthe1540s.Italsoledtothefoundationofnewport cities such asNagasaki. So, by putting in place “seclusion”, thebakufu aimed atstoppingtheuncontrolledflowofgoodsandtheinterminglingofpeople.

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The Tokugawa draw demarcations in terms of authority and identity in order toassemble the “country” (Yasunori 2005, Leupp2003). TheEdobakufu established thenew treatment of residents fromnon‐Japanese origins in consecutive steps;which ofcoursesteeredmajorcontroversies.Thenormalizationofproceduresandpracticesforsorting out “foreigners” needed almost a hundred years. In the pre‐Tokugawa eraDutch, Portuguese, Spaniards, British, Koreans, or Ching‐Chinese, and many otherpeoplewereself‐evidentactors—manyofwhomoccupiedavarietypositionevenwithintherulingclasses.Yet,after1616thebakufuonlyallowedthemtotradeinNagasakiandHirada. It also strictly ruled out by edict “multiethnic cohabitation”. This led todeportations of mixed children and Christian converts, while stigmatizing JapanesewomanwhowereaffiliatedwithEuropeanmen(Yasunori2005:194ff).Whileamongstthe European’s only theDutch obtained to right to stay inNagasaki, new regulationsfinallyrequiredfromChinesemerchantstocarry“shinpai”.Fromtheyear1715ontheyneeded a prescribed form of credentials. Through the use of these artifacts, theTokugawa authorities reassembled their country despite the massive protests ofmerchants, tradersandotherChingChinese residents,who resistedagainst theirnewstatusas“barbarians”.EventhoughtheiridentitywasbynowscriptedaccordingtotheJapanesecalendaranddenotedinalanguagethatstrippedtheheavenlyKingdomofitssuperiority,theChingEmporerKanxifinallyacceptedtheuseoftheshinpai(Toby1985).Ultimately,theshinpaipracticeembodiedtheactiveseparatingoutofallnon‐Japanse‐turned‐aliens.Note that these practices bear no resemblance to textbook accounts of modernsovereignty.11 Keeping ordinary “Japanese” from traveling and trading abroad, the“seclusion” constituted a highly complicated form of mediated relations with andthrough Tribute states. The overlapping of the Tokugawa and the Ching tributesystems—intersecting for instance inKoreaandtheRyūkyūkingdom—ledtorepeatedcontroversiesoverthestatusofsuchcountries,islands,anddomains.Tostabilizetheirassemblage,theTokugawashogunatealsobecameenrolledintheextensiveandoftenvolatile networks of Chinese and European merchants including the trading posts atstrategic positions such as in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Batavia; these networksfacilitated the flow of commodities and communications that was needednotwithstanding “sakoku” (Schottenhammer 2007, Howell 1998). For example, thebakufueventuallystabilizedtheexportofsilvertotheextentthattheproductiontrendsof the daimyo mining precious metals became “closely related with the history ofcolonization and the Far Eastern trade of Europeans.” (Kobata 1965:247) Also, as theextraction and export of precious metals became almost the sole prerogative of thebakufu, the Shogun’s financial powerwere alignedwith “foreign” ships that exportedJapanese silver andbroadback commodities fromChingChina and Indochina suchassugar,spices,medicines,andclothingmaterials,gold,rawandwovensilk.Assuch,thesheer amount of Tokugawa silver influenced commodity prizes and the colonial

11But,perhapsmoresotohistoricalrealworldpracticesofsovereigntyinmiddleEurope(seeOsiander2001).

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expansion in the Americas and elsewhere. At home, the professionalization in silverproductionand the increaseduseof silver coinsenabled the“unificationof currency”undertheTokugawaregime(Kobata1965,Laver2008).Insum, itwasonlyfromaWesternperspectivepossibletoarguethat“sakoku” ledtoJapan’sisolation;whereasthebakufuwaseffectivelytryingtobanCatholicismfromitssoil and reoriented the country towards East Asia (Jansen 2000). The emphasis on“closure”isalsomisplacedbecause,asDutchmerchantsatthesmallislandofDeshimabecameanobligatorypassagepoint inthecourseofsakoku, thescholarsof“Westernlearning”were spreading the information about the latest intellectual, technical, andscientificdevelopmentsinEurope.ThroughthetranslationofDutchbookswesternartsand science such as astronomy,mathematics, physics, anatomy, and surgery enteredJapanesethinkingandpracticeslongbeforetheMeijirevolution(Jansen1984).Resettingthecalendar,innovatinghistoricism,andrangakuAs another crucial aspect of the reset in “foreign relations”, thebakufu established anewregimeoftime.Whatemergesfromdifferenthistoricalstudiesisthefactthatthebakufu relations to theexternalworldwere crucial to its legitimacy (Toby1977). ThisinvolvedthemimickingoftheImperialMingTributesystemanditsstatusas“kingdomatthecenteroftheworld”;onlywithEdoatitscenter.Byresettingthecalendarinthefirst decade of the seventeenth century the Shoguns challenged the Chinese imperialworld order. The Edo bakufu arranged itself at the center of the world bymeans ofcreatinganewcalendar.Particularly, itbeganusingJapaneseeranames intheofficialcorrespondencewith Kingdom Korea, the Ryūkyū Islands andMing China. Through ashiftinlanguagetheautonomouspositionoftheTokugawashōguns(“taikun”)outsidethe Tribute system was emphasized. So, the bakufu reassembled a sort of foreignrelationsonitsowntermsinthefirstdecadesofthe17thcentury(Toby1985).TheEdobakufureconstructedtimesoastoleaveunchangedthebasicstructureofthelunisolarcalendar, which has been introduced from China in the year 604 (a.c.). However, byusingneweranameswithreferencetotheTennō(emperor),theTokogawashogunateassembleda time regime thatobjectified the authority and the autonomyof the Edobakufu as thecenterof theworld (Toby1985). Surely, ifweconsider themagnificentcosmologicaldesignand thearchitectural largessofEdo,whichwasaround1720waybigger thanMadrid, Lisbon, Paris and London,we cannot easily dismiss the shogun’svisiontoresideinthecenteroftheworldasillusory.So,whilethenewtimeregimewasintertwinedwiththebakufuattemptsto“unify”thecountry,atalargerscale,itrenderedthecalendarandthechronologyintoamatteroftranslation across entire “official” East Asia. Until the early seventeenth century, theregionwasaccustomedtousetheImperialChineseeranamesasacommonregimeofperiodization in communications, letters, and exchanges. This complicated thecorrespondencewithKoreaandtheChingEmpire,whichbythanbothusedtheirown

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eraperiodization.But itmadealso the Japaneseunderstandingof the European timemoredifficult.Duringthesixteenthcentury,theEuropeanempireshadtheirownmajorcalendar reform, substituting the Julian calendarwith theGregorian sun‐calendar.OntheTokugawaside,theanno‐dominichronologywaspopular.However,itsmeaningwaslargely unknown.12 In brief, this brewed a cognitive dissonance among the Asiancountries, by now having constructed their separate era name systems, as well asbetweenthemandtheunifiedEuropeantime‐lineoftheGregoriancalendar.The use of mechanic clocks illuminates yet another aspect of time particular to theTokugawa period. “Foreign” artifacts experienced an odyssey within the Tokugawaassemblagedespite sakoku. In the late 16th century,mechanic clockswere knownattheJapanese Island.Missionariesandmerchantsofferedthemasearlyas1560tothedaimyo and other authorities as valuable presents. Though clocks were highlyappreciated in Imperial China, only Japanese smiths started imitating and, finally,building their own indigenous timepieces. However, in order to adopt the Europeandesign, they had to overcome a considerable difficulty. In contrast to EuropeancountriesandChina,TokugawaJapandidnotmeasuretimein24fixedevenhours.TheJapanese instead measured time in terms of six hours per night/six hours per day.Because their recourse to the sun light the duration of an “hour, of course,was notconstantbutrespectivelyshiftingaccordingtotheseason(Cipolla2011).So,the24evenhourclockfacemadenosenseforthem.Yet,theJapaneseclockmakersusedthesamebasic mechanic elements remaking the dial; later, they constructed “wadokei” withseparatedialsfordaysandnights.Theproliferationofclocks,mainlyasluxurygoodsforthebushiclass,hasnotchangedthetraditionalwayofmeasuringtime. It remainedsynchronizedwithnatural rhythmsand standardized through the numerous bell towers in towns and villages (Coulmas2000:71‐74);much like inmedievalandearlymodernEurope (seeLandes2000).Untilthe Meiji era no generic vocabulary denoting exact durations such as “minutes” or“seconds”existed.Thestandardizationoftime,then,meantthatpeoplehad literatelytolearnreadingtheclock.Insum,totheextenttowhichthewadokeiareaninnovativeworkofconstruction,theyconstituteanassemblagethatembodiesinauniquewaytheblendingof the “modern”mechanically fixed timeanda “premodern” regimeof timethat is coupled to natural rhythms, to cultural calendar, and to peasant life (Coulmas2000:90).However,while thebakufunever thoughtof introducing the solar calendar,thesuperiorEuropeanastronomyandtimemeasurementneverthelessmadeanimpact.Through the knowledge of the Dutch astronomical methods, the Tokugawa scholarsbecameawareof theproblematic inaccuracyof the lunisolar framingofdays,monthsandyears.ItenabledthemtoenactfourmajorcorrectionsandcalendarreformsduringtheTokugawaperiod (Coulmas2000:111‐113). In sum, the time regimeof Tokugawa,though it was locally synchronized through bell towers,was as precarious andmulti‐

12InsomeinstancestheTokugawaauthoritieswronglybelievedthatthespecificyearofthefoundationofacountrymeanttheactualnumberofyearssinceitsfoundation(Coulmas2000:112).

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layeredastheauthorityofthebakufu.Lackingtheubiquityofpreciseclocksandstickingtoasystemofnaturallyuneven“hours”,ithasnoresemblancetothemonoculturesoftimethatdeveloped,atthesametime,duringtheEuropeanNeuzeit.Thelastaspectoftimethatwarrantsconsiderationistheadventof“historicism”.Bythelate seventeenth century the scholars of the “kokugaku” school (national learning)reinterpretedancient textsandsetout toconstruct the largestorderof time:history.They achievedwhatBenedictAndersonhas stressed as a critical originof nations (cf.Anderson 1996). Confronted with a phase of social unrest, rapid urbanization andcommercialization, increasing challenges mounted to the bakufu legitimacy theypursued unorthodox ideas and frames. Motoori Norinaga, Ueda Akinari, and othersbegan to capture their country in terms of a “national history”. This involved thecontestationof“transculturalandtranshistorical”principlesthatwerethenormintheTokugawa knowledge order. “Implicated, as well, in this transformation was a newconcern to historicize contemporary modes of discursive practice” (Burns 2003:38).Especially, they attacked the bakufu neo‐Confusian response to the massivetransformationsandupheavals.Againstanemphasison individualvirtueandpersonalattitudes, these scholars relentlessly searched for a difference in virtues (betweenJapan/China). Having discovered history, they contextualized the classical Chinesethoughtswhiletryingtocomprehendthetrulyindigenous“spirit”thatwouldformthebasisofa“national”community.Ineffect,thekokugakutradition,thoughaninternallycontestedcollectionofthoughts,de‐centeredthe“heavenlyKingdom”andput“Japan”as an entity into a historical horizon (Burns 2003). The search for “Japaneseness”,amongotherthings,ledtoareconsiderationofthe“Chinese”contentwithinthestyle,thecharacters,andthegrammarofthespokenandwrittenlanguageatthattime(Ueda2008).IncorporatingtheviewsofWesternscholarsaboutImperialChina,thekokugagkualsoreconfiguredthediscursivebenchmarkfor“superiority”:onecouldbynowchoosebetweenancientChinaortheWestwhileJapan’splaceonthemapwasdivinelysecuredbyitsownnativespirit.

Assembling“history”,yet,involvedalotmorethings.Forexample,thekokugakuschooldevelopedofatheoryofsubjectivityandatheoryof languageontheonehand,whilepropagatingthereinvigorationofShintōpracticesthatcontestedthepredominanceofneo‐Confucian ideas and Buddhist cults on the other. Most crucially, the kokugakupropagatedamythologythatgrantedtheJapaneseemperoracardinalrole.TheTenno,bynow,wasseenasa figureprior tohistory—indisputablystandingoutsidethecyclicebbs and flows of the Chinese dynasties. For the kokugaku scholars, the emperor’sfamilycouldneverdownfallbecause itcouldnot losethe“mandateofheaven” inthefirstplace.ForNorinagaandhisfollowersclaimedtheemperor’sdirectdivinedescentinan unbroken line from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. As the spiritual essence of thenation, the Tennō thus belongs to a time regime radical different from the Chinesedynasties (Burns 2003, Leupp 2003:90, Wakabayashi 1999:30ff). While not directlychallenging thebakufu, importantly, this theory reconfigured theeraname systemofthe Tokugawa. The kokugaku reassembled it from a tool of periodic‐distinction, to a

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historicallyprecisechronologyoftheTennō’spassagethoughttime—andwithhimthehistory of the koku (“nation”). As such, the proponents of “national learning” havecollectively established a novel time regime, which was understood by theircontemporaries as a challenge to thebakufu government.Obviously, thekokugagku’slinearnotionof timesuggesteda telos that contradicted theTokugawa’s “ahistorical”time regime of eras (Burns 2003). The bakufu indeed censored or banned somekokugakuworks.Nonetheless, this setof ideaswas takenupdecades laterduring theMeiji period by the innovators who took up the task of constructing the Japanesenation.

The controversies about the question of “learning” during the late Tokugawa periodillustrate a serious destabilization of the knowledge order (Harootunian 1988,Brownstein 1987). The bakufu came under increasing pressure because of socialdisorder, unrest, and Russian, British and American pressure to open its borders fortrade and investment. Against this backdrop, the central question among the daimyoand the scholars became what the “country” had to learn. How could it preserveindependence,thatis,theprincipleofsakoku?Individualwritersanddifferent“schools”such as theMito‐school and the rangagukshō sought for differing answers. But theirdiscussioncrystallizedaroundtheconceptsof“attackingandrepellingtheBarbarians”(jōi) and “opening the country” (kaikoku). As Wakabayashi stresses, these twoapproaches to sakoku did not stand in clear opposition. The basic meaning andimplicationswasdifferentlyframedbyvariousdiscussants.ThepublicationofAizawa’sShinron(NewThesis)markedawatershedinthisregard.Itwaspublishedin1825,theyear in which the bakufu promulgated jōi as official doctrine— demanding from thedaimyotouseforce ifnecessaryagainst foreignersapproachingtheshoresexcepttheDutch. The Shinronmerged nativist Shintō and Confucian thoughts into a polymorphbodyofknowledge(Wakabayashi1999:4ff.).WhilesupportingjōiAizawaprofoundlyre‐envisionedthespace‐timetheconditionedtheTokugawashogunate.Hiswork

“containedtenetsofproto‐nationalism:theideaandbeliefthatallJapanese,despitetheirunalteratedifferencesinsocialstatus,oweultimatelyloyaltytotheexistingbakuhanstateastheonlyformofpoliticalorganizationpropertoanindependentandsovereignJapan.ThankstothisideologyofJapanasMiddle‐Kingdom, Aizawamade the crucially important shift in world viewfromuniversialempire(tenka)tonation‐state(kokka),aperceptualshiftthatwouldtakedecadeslongerinChina.AftertheappearenceofNewThesisin1825, bakumatsu thinkers and leaders continued to conceive a Japan‐centered world order, but they realized that Japan did not dominate it.”(Wakabayashi1999:9)

On the other hand, the “rangakushō” (Dutch Studies) and the school of “yōsai”(Western learning) answered the core questions much more pragmatic. Drawing ontheirtheoreticalandpracticalknowledgeaboutWesterntechnologyandsciences,theybrushed aside Shintō or neo‐Confucianism systems of thought. The rangaku

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professionals, many of whom studied under Dutch supervision and worked asinterpreters, typically did not belong to the samurai. They gained their know‐howlargely unconnected and unregulated by the bakufu yet in the late Tokugawa theyincreasingly attained influence in bureaucratic decision‐making and public debates.Rangaku scholars were neither necessarily pro‐opening, nor automatically anti‐Tokugawa.Butthesepragmatistssharedacommonmind‐setthatbydefinitionlookedbeyondthe“heavenlyKingdom”forknowledgeandknow‐how.Theyclearlyunderstoodthe shifts inworld politics—often seeing Russia as the prime threat to the Tokugawacountry(Horiuchi2003,Jansen1984).ThedebatetookoffespeciallyafterthereportsaboutChingChina’sdefeatintheOpiumwarsduringtheearly1840s.ThelessonsoftheBritishenforcementofunequaltreatiesgavethediscussionsatthebakufuandamonginformedobserversaboutthepursuitofsakoku and jōi an increasedurgency evenbeforeCommodorePerry’s ships arrived inEdo (Wakabayashi1992).That thebakufuwasbarelyable toup‐keep theprincipleofsokakureframedtheviewonjōi.Realistthinkerspersuadedtheirpeersthatopeningthecountry was unavoidable. Furthermore, many argued to make the country“independent”again “learning from theWest”wasparamount. This, however,meantnotonlytoimportmoderntechnologies.Itratherimpliedtoalsoacquirethe“spiritofmodernWesterncivilization”(Wakabayashi1999:8).YoshidaShōin,themostinfluentialvoiceofthatdaythatcalledfor“expellingthebarbarians”,demandedtothisendatrulyJapanese “national identity” as he believed that the lack of “national” cohesivenessamongthecommonpeoplewasatthecoreoftheChing’sdefeatatthehandofBritishtroops and merchants (Wakabayashi 1992). Similarly, by claiming that the Japaneseshould import the “spirit of civilization”, scholars such as Kukuzawa Yukichi rejectedmerelycopyingtheWest.Instead,Westernizationwasunderstoodastheresponsetheexpansion of the European civilization,which required the creation of a nation state;thisnationstate,morecrucially,constitutedahybrid,impure,andcontingentamalgam.Yuckichididnotsee the“Japanesenationstate“as thematerializationofanallegedlynative “identity” or “spirit” in the essentialist sense; as the kokugaku scholars hadclaimed.Ontheonehand,hisunderstandingofferedtheinnovatorsofstateformationroom to maneuver. They had not slavishly to follow the European blueprint; on theotherhand,Yukichi construed Japan’s successagainst the restof “Asia” thatwere,byand large, unable and unwilling to Westernize (Sakamoto 1996). In sum, thecontroversiesinthelateTokugawaabout“westernlearning”werecloselyconnectedtoconstructionsofidentityandothernessbetween“Japan”,the“West”,and“China”.Theexperiencesfromthepracticeof“westernlearning”proofedthiscontention.Dozensofshipyards were build in the Satsuma, the Saga and the Mito domain after theappearance of Perry’s squadron in Edo had ultimately forced thebakufu to open thecountry. These “westernized” places resembled to a certain degree Yukichi vision of“hybridity”. The organization of the technical instruction, the translation andcollaboration procedures, the reverse engineering as well as the integration of localskills in iron processing created unique “Japanese” instances of industrialization wellbeforetheMeijirevolution(cf.Smith1949).

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4.2. TheMeijiperiod:assemblingthestate/assemblingtheempire

Whenonetakesthemagnifyingglassofpost‐Cartesianpropositions,onestumblesuponenormously complicated networks of human and non‐human actors assemblingwhatwegotusedtocall“theJapaneseempire”.Thistermusuallydepictstheperioddatingfrom theMeiji restoration until the end of theWorldWar II. During this time Japanmanaged to break out of its semi‐colonial status it attained in themiddle of the 19thcenturywithitsincorporationintothetreatyportsystemandasserteditspositionasacolonialpoweritself.Firstly,JapanannexedTaiwan(thenFormosa)fromChinain1895,the southernpartof Sakhalin (Karafuto) andan influence sphere in southManchuria,takenover fromRussia in1905 followed.Koreabecameaprotectorate in1905andapropercolonyin1910andJapancontinuedspreadingitsinfluenceoveralargepartofAsiaPacific(Beasly1987:6).However,thisexpansionwasclearlynottheresultofawell‐planned,top‐downactionoftheMeijigovernment(Conroy1966).Thefollowingsectionespecially focusesontheeventsduringthe lateMeiji (1868 ‐1912)andTaishōperiod(1912‐1926) and early Shōwa period. Following the evidence from numerous recentstudies, the Japanese relationship with its colonies at this time was highly complex,mutually dependent and inexorably intertwined with modern state formation, bothwithin Japanaswellas in thecolonial territories.Notonlydid Japanhadan immenseinfluenceonitsdependentterritoriesinvariousareas,suchascommunication,scienceand education, but the influence alsowent the other direction, rendering knowledgeandidentitiesatthecentrecontroversialaswell(Schmid2000andWilson2005).

Reassemblingtime,reconstructingthebuiltenvironment

The formationof amodern state in Japan involved the constructionof various actor‐networks, the introduction of new artificial objects, and the enlargement ofinfrastructures. While the entire process is too complex and multi‐faced to get fullymappedhere, this sectionmainlyhighlights thenew time regime, the introductionof“foreign” technologies, in Japan in order examine the relation of modern stateformation and Japan’s rise. The establishment of a “modern” form of time in Japanentailedacomplexandmutuallyreinforcingimplementationofregulations,thespreadtechnological artifacts measuring time, and various synchronizations related tomachinesinfactoriesaswellasrailwaylinestotheeffectthattimebecameincreasinglystandardized and synchronized.When adopting theWestern time system in the year1873, a system that the great powers had established through a convention, whichsettled the zero‐meridian at the conference ofWashington in October 1884 the firstgovernmentoftheMeiji‐periodmarkedtostartofaconstructionprocessthatradicallyreconfigured“time”inJapan.Asthepracticalapprehensionandmeasurementoftime

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priortothisphasewashardlyinfluencedbytechnologicalartifacts–beyondbells–thisimplied an evenmore revolutionary shift in the popular time consciousness as it hasbeen the case in Europe (Nakamura 2002, Shimada 1995, Suzuki 2002 etc.). Yet the“timerevolution”inJapanalsocreatedauniqueassemblage.

This is, for example, mirrored by the fact that the emerging reality of a new “time”requiredanewvocabulary.Asthepracticalconstructionandexperienceoftimealteredthe conceptual understanding and the common usage of words for time changed aswell. As Shimada observes, the Meiji era was not only marked by the adoption ofvariousWesternnotions,butalsobylinguisticinnovations.Assuch,thetraditionalwordfor time, as it were, “toki” was complemented by the word “jikan”; the Japaneseincorporated and translated the latter directly from English. The term toki could beunderstoodwith ameaning of duration, but also as a fixed point in time, however itdoesnotfunctionasanoun.Jikan,however,refersonlytodurationandisnotfilledwithanyspecificityof,forexample,“thattime”,asintheuseoftoki.Itcanalsobeusedasanoun.13Shimadaarguesthattheintroductionofthisnewtermwasnecessarybecause“a new aspect of the meaning of time emerged; specifically, time as an object ofthinkingandtimeas thingwhichonecouldpossessandmeasure.”Furthermore,“thisconcept of time expressed an idea of objectified and externalized time, according towhichday‐to‐daylifewasorganised.”(Shimada1995:253)

Theevolvingusageofthenewtermfortimeisillustratedatbestbytheworkingrulesofthe factories, called since than “rōdō jikan” (Shimada 1995:252f). These regulationsunderwentsignificantchangesovertime.Atfirst,arelicoftheoldtimeunderstandingwas to be found in theworking hours system. In the late Edo period the agriculturalclass was using the variable‐hour time system, whereas the ruling class has alreadyswitchedtothefixed‐hoursystem.Attimeswhenthesetwoclassesmet,thisresultedinthe representatives of the lower class having to wait long hours for their superiors,whichwasbroadlysociallyaccepted.Suchwasalsothecaseinfactories,whichworkedusing the fixed‐hour system. According to regulations from year 1873 workers weremadetoarrivetoworkonehourearlybeforetheactualworkstarted.AsSuzukistates“Thatextrahour inthemorningbeforeworkcanonlybeunderstoodintermsofclassrelationswhichdictatethatinamanagement‐runfactory,laborhastoshowupearlyforwork,ifonlytomakesurethatmanagementisnotinconveniencedinanyway.”(Suzuki2002:80) With time however, different factories introduced measures to enforce agreaterworkerspunctuality, themostpopularofwhichwas thepre‐work loud steamwhistle that could be heard in the surroundings of the factory and gaveworkers thesignalofhavingtohurrytothefactory.Togetherwithappearingofclocktowersandaspreadofclocksinshops,theworkersgraduallyhadtogetusedtoafifteen‐minutespanofpunctuality.Atthesametime,regulationswereintroducedwhichenforcedreducingthepayofworkerswhocamein late,andby1886tardyworkerswerenotallowedtoenterthefactoryatall.Thereasonforthisstrictregulationwas, infact,technological.13Asinforexample,“Doyouhavetimethisevening?”“konban,ikangaarimasuka?”

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Since factories at this time used the steam powered motor for powering differentmachines,themosteffectivewaytorunafactory,wastoletalltheworkbeginattheexact moment the motor accumulated enough steam pressure in the boiler (Suzuki2002:79‐85). It is therefore clear that the technological conditions of the productionprocessrequiredfromtheworkersdevelopingadifferenttimeconsciousness.

Asimilarreplacementofthe“old”timeregimesthroughnoveltechnologiestookplacewithregardtorailways.ThefirstlineopenedbetweenShinbashiandYokohama1872sixmonths before the Gregorian calendar and an invariable hour system was adopted.Because of the need to ensure equal time intervals between trains, the railwaytimetable had to operate in accordancewith the new invariable hour system alreadythen. As it was meant as a service for the passengers, who were still functioningaccording to the traditional timesystem, thequestionaroseofhowtoseta standardtimeandwhetherthepassengerswouldbeabletounderstandoperationsbasedonthefixed‐hour time. In order to solve this problem theMinistry of PublicWorks, RailwaySection decided tomove a temple bell to the top of the highest naturalmountain inTokyo (Mt.Atago)and for it tobestruck“onthehour,everyhour, fromonethroughtwelve,dayandnight,everyday”.Ratherthanestablishinganewtimeforthisbell,theMinistry of Public Works gave instruction to synchronize it with the gunfire of EdoCastle,establishingacommontimeandsettingthetimeusedbytheEdoCastleasthestandard time. However the new technology didn’t only make people change theirnotion of the “hour”. It required the Japanese to change their time consciousnessaltogether. It was namely customary to go about ones day using approximately 30minutesasthebasicunitoftime.Butthetimetablesdistributedtothepublicinformedthepassengerstoappearatthestationbetween15and5minutesfromthedeparture.Tardinesswouldresultinmissingthetrain,sincethestationsweretobeclosedatthispoint,preventingtraindelays.AsNakamuraputsit“Inotherwords,peoplewereforcedtoexperiencetimeinminutes,whichtheyhadneverevenconsideredbefore.Iftheywereevenaminutelate,theywouldmissthetrain.”(Nakamura2002:14ff)

Inordertoconvincethegeneralpublicofthesuperiorityofrailwaystoothermeansoftransportation, itwasnecessary toensureanon‐scheduleoperationanddemonstratethe speediness of this way of transport. With this purpose, a number of measuresconcerning timeliness were implemented. Concrete procedures for controlling theaccuracyoftheclocksfortheconductors,stationmasters,anddistributionoftimetablestothepublicwereoftheutmostimportance.Hereanothertechnologicaladvancementplayedacrucialrole.ThetelegraphwasusedtotransmitthecorrectTokyotimetoallstations, playing a central role in the on‐schedule operation (Nakamura 2002:17fff).Furthermore,thestationmastercouldnotallowatraintodepartuntilhehadreceivedatelegraphicmessage from the stationmasterup the line indicating that the respectivetracksectionwasclear(Saito2002:5).

This processes of state formation, of course, involved various controversies anddebates.Assembling“foreign”technology–somethingthathasbeenfiercelydiscussedin the pre‐Meiji decades – was practically contested. Empirical evidence, here, runs

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againstthetop‐downviewsonJapan’smodernization.Forexample,manyscholarshavetreatedtheintroductionofrailwaysasaninstrumentof“theJapanesegovernment”toconvince the Western powers of Japanese civilisational advancement. Yet, theideological controversies present in the discourse about the introduction of this newwayoftransportationandthenetworksofactorsthatinfluencedthefinaldecisionareoftenoverseen.AlreadytheTokugawashogunatepossessedconsiderableknowledgeofrailway technology and might have had plans for building a railway. Also the Meijigovernmentdidn’tactupontheseplansrightaway.RatheritrequiredpressureonthegovernmentfromtheUSlegationtogranttheirconcessiontolayarailwaybetweenEdoandYokohama(whichwassupposedlyalreadygivenawaybytheshogunate).Onlythendid the government start to formulate a policy in this matter. However then, thedecided course of actionwas to construct a railway system independently of theUS.This could have only been achieved thanks to the interests of the Britishminister toJapan,H.S.Parkes,whoarrangedforaneconomicloanontheLondonMarketaswellasintroductionofthetechnologyfromGreatBritain(Hayashi1990).

Whateverthefinaldecision,thisprojectwasconfrontedwithastrongoppositionfromwithin the government itself. The leaders of the Ministry of Military Affairs, mostnotably Saigō Takamori,were of strong belief that spending huge sums ofmoney onrailwayswoulddivertthefundsfromwheretheywereneededthemost,namelyinthebuilding of amightymilitary force. Some also believed that a railway from Tokyo toYokohamawouldenablethemilitaryforcesofGreatBritainandFrancestationedinthelatter to use them in a military invasion on the capital. Others like conservativebureaucrats from Military Affairs and what later became the Ministry of Justice,representedatraditionalexclusionistviewandsimplydemandedthat,howKatsumasaputs it, “machine civilization from vile foreign countries should not be permitted intothe land of the gods”. Thewhole argumentwas turned into ridicule by someothers,whofearedthat“becausetetsu(iron),thefirstChinesecharacterintetsudo(railroad),canalsobereadtomean"losemoney"(kaneoushinau),thelayingofmetalrailswouldcauseJapantomintandprintlargevolumesofmoneythatwouldbelostintheventure.Thedeadseriousnessof thosewhoheldtheseviews,nomatterhowreadilyapparenttheir weirdness, was often manifested in threats to the lives of Okuma and Ito”.(Katsumasa1993)Asalreadymentioned,regardlessthecontroversiesitevokedwiththegovernmentcircles,theMeijitimebroughtrailwaytoJapan.

Notwithstanding these controversies, “most government railways were built usingBritish designs and methods but lines in Hokkaido and the San’yo Railway (Kobe–Shimonoseki)usedAmericantechnologieswhilelinesinKyushuusedGermanmethods”(Saito 2002:6).While increasing the speed of travel, the rail network was expandingquickly.By1889,railwaylineswhereoperatingbetweenTokyoandKobe,TakasakiandNiigata,MaibaraandToyama,FukushimaandAomori,andfurthercities(Saito2002:6).The speediness of transportation and the new routes of traffic redraw theinfrastructural map of the Tokugawa period.While the Japanese road systemwhereconstructed to serve the daimyo processions related to the governance system of

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“alternateresidence”(OhkawawandRosovsky1997:210).Thenewarteriescomprisingroadsandrailways,instead,connectedland‐lockedareaswiththebustlingharborcitiesenabling a dynamic export oriented economic growth in Japan. Connecting thelandlocked prefectures,whichwere themain producers of silk to the port citieswasdecisiveintherapidexpansionofsilkexport,whichwasthemainexportitemofJapanin theMeiji era. To this end, especially, the speed of delivery was critical, since silkcocoonsareveryperishablegoodsandthemarketpricesforcocoonsaswellasrawsilkwerehighly instableat thetime.Comparedtoboats,abigadvantageof rail inspeed,reliabilityandstablefares. Italsohelpedturningcoal intoamajorexportgoodofthattime,seenasitwasbyweightthemostimportantitemcarriedbyrailduringtheMeijiperiod(Erickson1996:40ff).

Mythicalimperialism,constructionsofidentity,colonialentanglements

Claiming that the Japanese project of colonial expansion in Asiawas an idea broughtaboutbytheencounterwiththeWesterncolonialpowersinthelate19thcentury,andconsequently implemented by the government, would be ignoring the historicalmemoriesandthesetsofideasinheritedfromearlier“expansionistexperiences”ashasbeen described in section 4.1. Albeit heterogeneous discourses existed within theJapanese bureaucratic and political elites, the nexus between mythological roots ofJapanand theextensionofauthority is recurrent.Already in the16th century,daimyoToyotomiHideyoshi,havingunifiedJapantoanunprecedentedscaleaftertwocenturiesordisintegration,turnedtothelandsoverseas.StartingwithKorea,hisintentionwastounify“peopleofthefourseas”underhisrule,muchashedidinJapanproper.Inaletterto theKoreanKing (and letters totheKingofLiuchiu, rulesof thePhilipines,FormosaandIndiafollowed),asakeyargumentfortheexpansion,heisbelievedtohaveusedarecollectionofhismothersdreambeforehisbirth,whohadenvisionedaSunenteringher bosom (Kuno 1937:302f, cited in Pollard 1939:17). This reference to the SunGoddess,AmaterasuO‐mi‐kami, illustrateshowmythologicalbeliefswereentangledintheprocessofcolonialexpansionfromthebeginning.BasedonthestoriesfromthefirsthistoricalchroniclesofKōjiki(712)andNihongi(720)‐basictextsoftheshintōreligion‐Japan was a land where Gods came to earth. This served as a basis for variousinterpreters,mostnotablytheaforementionedkokugakuscholarsforJapantobeatthecentre of theworld and ruled by direct descendants of the SunGodess’sGrandchild,Niniginomikoto.

Also in the Meiji period, frequently referred to as the period of “Japaneseenlightenment”,thismythologykeepsbeinginvokedasaforcefulideawiththepoliticalprocess. For example, this kind ofmessianic vision can be found, at the onset of theMeiji revolution in the teachingsof theChōshu samurai, YoshidaShōin,whourges toexpandJapan’scontroloverKamchatka,theKurileIslands,Korea,Formosa,theLiuchiuIslands. His students later became dignitaries of theMeiji government,most notablyYamagataAritomo,whowasresponsiblefortheorganisationofJapan’smodernarmy,a

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princeandagenrō;andItōHirobumi,agenrō,aResident‐GeneralofKorea,aswellasafour times Prime Minister of Japan and the statesman Kido Kōin. As the two latterindividuals belonged to the prominent Iwakura Mission, which travelled throughoutEuropeandtheUnitedStates(1871)tolearnfromthe“West”,themythologicalbeliefs,however,wereblendedwiththeimpressionsandknowledgegainedinEurope.HavingwitnessedthatJapanisnoteventreatedasanequalpartner,letaloneasuperiorpower,evidenceofwhichwasthatnoothercountryhadtotolerateextraterritorialjurisdiction,residential concessions where foreigners ruled themselves within its border, or theirimportandexporttariffsbeingcontrolledbyatreaty;theyadvisedforJapantotakeamoderate international course and start with internal reforms before engaging inexternalwars(Pollard1939:25ff).Through,thequestionofJapan’spositionwasnotjustinfluencedbythenewperspectivesthattheIwakuraMissionpopularizedathome.

TotheextenttowhichFormosa(Taiwan)becamepartofthecolonialempireafter1894,the idea of a top‐down approach based on rational designs is unsustainable. Prior to1894, “Japan did not have a long range plan for the annexation of Taiwan. It is evendoubtfulthatthenotionofannexationeverenteredthemindsofPremierItōHirobumiandForeignMinisterMutsuMunemitsuatthetimeoftheoutbreakofthewar”(Chen1997:61). The immediate consideration thatpreceded the final decision,were in fact,productsof theunexpectedmilitary victory, although “ItoandMutsuwere convincedthatthevictoryvis‐a‐vistheacquisitionofcolonieswouldenhanceJapan'sinternationalprestige;theyviewedmembershipinthe‘colonialclub’asasteptowardequalitywiththeWesternpowers”(Chen1997:62).ButannexingTaiwanledtoseriousrepercussionsat home. Especially, the treatment of the people in Taiwan rendered the Japanesesubjectivitycontroversial.Asnational identitywasunderconstructionalready(Ikegami1995),bynow,thenotionofwhocanbeclassifiedasaJapaneseinthenewterritoriestobegovernedbecameapressingissue.AsHenryputsit,beingaJapaneseatthetimeofcolonialexpansionwas“lessofa fixedentity than itwasa fluid identity frequentlyadjustedtospecificcolonialencountersandprojects”(Henry2005:560).

Although too often blended out by many scholarly works, focussing only on theimplementedpoliciesofthegovernment,theimperialprojectwasessentiallycontested“fromwithin” (see Schmid 2000). The best example for these rampant controversiesrepresentstheso‐called“KoreaProblem”(chōsenmondai).Thisterminusreferstotheinternal Japanesediscussionabout the courseof action towardsKoreabetween1868(whenKorearefusedtorecognizetheMeijigovernment)and1910(when itbecameacolony). Inhis studyof this topicConroy identifies threemainpositions ‐ theLiberals,the Realists and the Reactionaries ‐ differing grandly in their views on the future ofKorea.TheLiberals,mostlypartyman,representedbyFukuzawaYukichirepresentedaprogrammeofhelpingKorea, “helpher from theolderroneouswayofConfucianism,isolation,misgovernmentintothelightofmoderncivilization,towardindependenceandprogress” (Conroy 1956:445). This group however also didn’t act on their own, butcollaborated with their Korean counterparts. And so the close relationship betweenFukuzawa and a Korean progressive Kim Ok‐Kiun led to the former ending up being

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involved inaKoreancoupdeetátof1884andwith timeaccepting ideasactions that“were leading to something quite different than the independent, progressive Koreaoriginally envisioned by the Liberal group”. The second group, the Realists were theleadersof theMeiji governmentwith ItōHirobumi. This group’sprior concernwas to“builtJapanintoafullstrengthWestern‐stylenation,freeofunequaltreaties[and]safefrom foreseeable future dangers.” (Conroy 1956:447) And so their policy, althoughdirected toward progress in Korea, was more prepared to accept “realisticcompromises”. Military measures were to be avoided at first, but with the constantreluctance of cooperation in implementing reforms from the Korean side, strongermeasures became “necessary”.14 Though wanting to remain peaceful, the forcedabdication of the Korean king made the disarmament of Koreans, which in turnprovoked riots and led Japanese forces to burn villages (Conroy 1956:450). The thirdforceintheJapanesediscoursewaspresentedbyReactionaries,representedbyUchidaRyōhei,who revived theoldargued in favourofa “greatoriental federation” (Conroy1956:451)where“aKoreanwouldhardlybedistinguishedfromaJapanese;itwouldbean Asiatic brotherhood” (Conroy 1956:452) Also these forces were linked to theirKoreancounterpartsandwereinvolvedinarebellionagainsttherulingdynasty,muchliketheBoxermovementinChina(Conroy1956:451).

Indescribingthesemutualdependenciesofmythologicalbeliefs findingtheirway intopolitical argumentation and expressing itself in the notion of national and personaldestiny,beingagaincontradictedbytheexperiencesmade“outthere” intheWestorwithinthescopeofwar,makesitclearthatduringtheassemblingofmodernJapanself‐representationandsubjectivityareintrinsicallyintertwinedwiththeexpandingorderofknowledgeandtheenlargingofterritorialscope.AstheexampleoftheKoreanproblemshows,thecolonisationwasnotjustactionatadistance.ItwasintrinsicallyconnectedtoidentityoftheJapanese,aswellasthereassemblingofpowerwithinthestateandinthe colonies. Similarly, colonial governance in Korea implied an intermingling ofpopulationplanning,assimilationpolicies,andlanguagereformsinwhich,forinstance,the Korean orthography, Japanese expressions, policies for language oppression, thereluctantKoreanlinguistics,andthecolonialadministration(Rhee1992).

The story of the Ryūkyū Islands (Okinawa) that usually gets not treated as part ofJapan’scolonialexpansionisevenmoretellingashowcomplexoftheexpansionofMeijiJapan’s state authority evolved. Heinrich argues, “with the Japanese expansion intoTaiwan(1895)andKorea(1910)thebeliefamongRyūkyūansthattheyandtheJapaneseformed ‘the same nation’ (doitsuminzoku), whereas the Koreans and Taiwanese didnot, grew stronger.” (Heinrich 2004:157) Yet, as the national integration of RyūkyūIslandsillustratesthecontinuancesfromthebakufutotheMeijiera,itdefiesclear‐cutnotionsof“sovereignty”.Havingbeenalong‐lastingtributarytotheEmperorandplacedintheauthorityoftheSatsumadomainalready inthe17thcenturytheRyūkyū Islands

14Thesecategoriesarenottobeseenverystrictly,astherewereconsiderablefrictionsalsowithinthisgroup,resultingforonce,inhavingtoreturnarmstoKoreansoldiers,afterrecallingtheordertodisarmKoreantroops.AftertheforcedabdicationKoreansweredisarmedagain(Conroy1956:449).

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wereintheborderzoneoftheTokugawacivilization,yet,atthesametimealsoapartofthe Chinese tributary system. While the people at the Ryūkyū Islands wereintermediaries between the Ming and, later, the Ching dynasty and the bakufu, theSatsuma daimyo imposed laws that forbade the Ryūkyūans to wear Japanese styledhaircuts or clothes, take Japanese names and generally act “like a Japanese” (Smits1999:19).Underthesakokuprinciple,althoughpoliticallyincorporatedintothebakuhansystem, the Ryūkyūans were clearly not seen as “Japanese” (Smits 1999:18ff). Thisattitudechangedwiththeemergenceofkokugaku.ThekokugakuscholarsemployedanewformoflinguisticsclassifyingtheRyūkyūanlanguageasdialectofJapanese(hōgen).Theconsequenceofwhichwerelanguage‐planningactivitiestoeliminatethe“misuse”(goyō) of the just‐codified “Standard Japanese” and “unnatural expressions” (fushizenna hyōgen) (Heinrich 2004:154). And so, following the annexation of Ryūkyū into thenationstatein1872,theMeijigovernmentaimedatfull‐scaleassimilation:

“Assimilationist ideology held that Ryūkyūan customs, tradition andlanguage represented obstacles to the aim of catching up with themainland.Enlightenment,progressanddevelopmentcametobeequatedwith assimilation: a local newspaper columnist Ota Chofu coined thepopular expression that the people of Okinawa Prefecture should alsolearnhowtosneezeinJapanese”(Heinrich2004:156).

Yet,treatingtheRyūkyūansasJapaneseislessself‐evidentthantheslogansencouragingtheuseof the standard Japanese, suchas “Onecountry,onemind,one language too(ikkoku, isshin,kotobamohitotsu)”or“Uniting100millionminds ‐ standard language(ichiokunokokoroomusubuhyōjungo)”mightoneleadtobelieve(Heinrich2004:160,cited after Kondō, 1997:32). The standardizing activities of the Japanese governmentofficialsdidn’t remainunansweredby the inhabitantsof the islands. In theearly20thcentury it was the Ryūkyūans, who graduated at mainland Japanese universities, tosupported their native language and culture,most notably Iha Fuyu. Iha became thefoundingfatherofOkinawastudiesand1916publishedafirsttextbookofRyūkyūanasaforeignlanguage,withaviewtoteachtheJapanese.Thiswasan“attempted,invain,toresisttheprocessofRyūkyūanmarginalisation”,foritwas“notaresponsetodemand,butacriticismofthefactthatthestudyofRyūkyūanwasneverconsideredbymainlandJapanese.” (Heinrich2004:158) Followinghis footsteps, another scholar of “OkinawanStudies” (Tojo Kinjo) criticised the classification of this Ryūkyūan as a dialect ofJapanese,asproposedbythekokugokakurepresentatives(Heinrich2004:161).

Engineeringthecolonialstateandlocalintermediaries

The Japaneseexpansionentailed amassive restructuringof thebuilt environments inthe colonial territories. This process, which Carroll denotes “socio‐materialengineering”, took place in both of the earliest Japanese colonies, Taiwan (previouslyFormosa) and Korea. As it was the case with the British annexation of Ireland, the

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TaiwaneseandKoreansweredescribedtobelivingina“placeunsafefortheabodeofcivilizedpeople”(aboutTaiwan,Hishida1907:275)andin“dirtyanddangerousplaces,both in termsof theirallegedlyunhygienicand immoral conditions” (Henry2005:684)andthereforeweretobe“rescuedfromtheirnaturalstatebyfullyincorporatingthem(…) into [in this case Japanese] civil culture. Taming the land and culturing theenvironment became central to the practice through which this incorporation waseffected.” (Carroll 2006:144) At the core of “civilisatory advancement” weremodernsciences and engineering. Conducting surveys of population and land, introducing aunifiedsystemofweightsandmeasures,andsettingupmedicalandtechnicalschoolswere just a few implemented measures. Often these measures were earlierimplemented in the colonial areas than in the country.15 The governor general ofTaiwan,BaronKodama,basedhisadministrativemeasuresonwhatHan‐YuandMyerscall“biologicalpolitics”.WritesKodama:

“Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances inscience, should be based on principles of Biology. What are theseprinciples? They are to promote science and develop agriculture,industry, sanitation, education, communications, and police force. Ifthesearesatisfactorilyaccomplished,wewillbeabletopersevereinthestruggle for survival andwin the struggleof the ‘survivalof the fittest.’Animalssurvivebyovercomingheatandcold,andbyenduringthirstandhunger. This is possible for them because they adapt to theirenvironment.Thusdependingupontimeandplace,wetooshouldadoptsuitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties thatconfrontus.InouradministrationofTaiwanwewillthenbeassuredofafutureofbrillianceandglory.”(citedafterChangandMyers1963:438)

Accordingtothisprincipleinthenextfewyearsseaportsandharbourswereimproved,soastoadmitlargeships;a251milesrailwaylinefromthenorthernendoftheislandtothe southern, and connecting major cities was erected encompassing 63 stations;almost 2000miles of highwaywere constructed to connect the principal towns withseaports; two submarine cables were lied down to connect Taiwan with Japan andChina; eleven lighthouseswere built (Hishida 1907:277); later on planes to and fromJapanpropercarriedbothmailandcommercialpassengersonadailybasis;alsoeveryday therewas a clockwise and a counter‐clockwise air service flying the island circuit(Kerr 1942:52) to speak only of the area of communication.While these innovationswere at the heart of colonial policies, there implementation relied on many agentsposingas,ifnotinitiatorsoftheprocess,atleastasintermediaries.

The agricultural reforms in Taiwan exemplify the importance of local actors for thestabilizationofthecolonialgovernance.Aftertheadministrationinitiatedtheextensiveland survey of 1920‐1921 it planned organisational and technological change in the

15ThepopulationsurveyinTaiwanin1905,forexample,wasconductedbeforetheMeijigovernmentmanagedtoimplementanationalcensusinJapanproper(Henry2005:654).

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agriculture.However, the implementationof thisplan requireda complexnetworkofinstitutions,policies,knowledge,andpeople:“agriculturemustbestudiedscientifically;newtechnicalknowledgeshouldbeintroducedbymethodsofexampleandpersuasion;thepowerfulpillarof theruralcommunity, the landlordclass,must firstbeconvincedthatthesechangeswereto itsbenefit,andthenmustbeencouragedtotakestepstodirect villagers to adopt and practice new farming methods” (Ching and Myers1963:559).Obviously,thecolonialadministrationstressestheneedfornegotiatingwithvariousinterestsgroups;notatscientificresearch.Inordertoimplementthisreformasystem of agricultural institutions was put in place. In every district an agriculturalassociation (nōkai) was erected, which was organised under the leadership of localofficials in cooperation with landlords and wealthy farmers. These associations kepttight tieswithalsonewlyerectedscientific researchbureaus ‐ themainone inTaipei,theCentralAgriculturalResearchBureauconducting scientific research in soils, seeds,chemistry and live‐stock disease. Tied with this organisation were agriculturalexperimental stations at a district level. In sum, the colonial administration set up anetwork consisting of experimental farms, Japanese fertilizer companies, financingschemes, printed reports, local land lords, and general surveys, which produced“guidelines(…)forvariouspartsoftheisland”,placingTaipeiasobligatorypassagepointtoachieve“agreaterinterchangeofknowledge”.Thesuccessofthisnetwork,however,cruciallydependedontheparticipationofpoliceofficersatthelocal.

“In eachdistrict throughout the island the chief of police exercised thepower to protect and change traditional behavior as well as introducenew customs and ideas; he also was dedicated to stimulating industryand increasing thewealth of his area and laying the groundwork for anewcommunicationsystem.Sincethepolicepenetratedtoeveryvillagehouseholdthroughtheho‐ko(pao‐chia)system,itwasrelativelyeasyforthem to insist on the adoption of new sugar cane or rice seeds andsupervisetheiruse.[Andsot]heearlysuccessoflargesugarcompaniesinincreasing sugar cane cultivation in southern Taiwan was due to theassistanceoflocalpolice,whocompelledvillagerstoswitchfromexistingfoodcropstocane.”(ChingandMyers1963:448)

AssemblinganagriculturalreforminthecolonialTaiwanthereforeinvolvedagencyfromthe administration officials, scientific research centres, local landlords, farmersthemselves and with that a network linking them, as well as, the newly introducedcomplexsystemofpolicing.16

16 “A police office was established in each district (cho) to assist local officials. Each district wasdivided into sub‐districts, containing another echelon of police stationsmanned by police officersappointedbythedistrictpolicechief.Successfulenforcementoflawatthevillageleveldependedonthese officers. This systemwas coordinatedwith the villagemutual aid and protection group, thepao‐chia(ho‐ko).Tenhouseholdsmadeuponechia(ko)andtenchiamadeonepao(ho).ITeheadofeachchiaandpaowaschosenfromamongthevillageeldersandheldaccountabletothepoliceman

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Another example of an unlikely enrolment of new actors can be found in theestablishmentofJapanesecolonialmedicineinKorea.Asexplainedbefore,theambitionof bringing modernity to Korea was a prevalent mind‐set in Meiji Japan. Thegovernmentviewedsanitationasoneofmostimportantstepsofachievingthisproject.Here,ontheonehand,therewerewhatHenrycallsJapanese“popularethnographers”of Korea, closely tied to the institutions and people in power in Korea, producingpublications sold on themarket in Korea, aswell as in Japan targeted to the generalaudience, which used discriminatory language to depict a huge “civilizational gap”between the two countries.And so theydepictedall Koreans tobedumb,pitiful andextremely unhygienic. They were further described as individualistic and clannish,lackingasenseofpublicconsciousness,whichwassupposedtoexplainthelackofsocialfacilities,suchashospitals,schoolsororphanages.ThesedepictionsthereforeservedasanexplanationfortheJapanesecivilizingmission.Atthesametime,surveystoquantifytheneededmeasuresinthescopeoftheurbansanitationprojectswereintroducedbythegovernmentofficials,atasknotyetundertakeninJapanitself.Andsothepowerofnumberswasaddedtotheethnographicdiscourse.Ironically,by1914theimagesbeingpaintedbybothsidesofthediscoursedivergedgreatly,sincetheculturalethnographerscontinuedtheirlineofargumentation,whentheSSAclaimedthecolonyhadreachedanadequateknowledgeofhygiene(Henry2005).

Inherently connected to the sanitation projectswas the advancement ofmedicine incolonialKorea.AlthoughfamiliarwithWesternmedicinethroughmissionaries(treatingfor free) and Japanese doctors in cities with big Japanese presence (treating almostexclusivelyJapanese),mostofthedoctorsinKoreapriortoJapanesecolonisationwerepractitioners of traditional medicine (Son 1999:543).With the year 1894 and reformimplemented by the new Japaneseminister to Korea, thewhole profession lost theirstatusasaneffectoftheabolitionoftheexaminationforherbaldoctors.However,sixyears later a decree has been issued dealing with qualification and registration ofmedical doctors, which made no clear distinction between Korean and Westernmedicine,resultinginWesterndoctorsbeingassignedroyalmedicalserviceinstitutions,andtraditionalpractitionerstopositionsintheHygieneSectionandtothemodernstatehospital.Also thepractitionersofKoreanmedicine still played themain role inpublicmedical services during this period, just as before Japanese colonisation (Son1999:544ff.) Unhappy with this distinction, traditional Korean doctors launched amovement to sustain their discipline and even managed to open their own medicalschool in 1905 teaching 40 students. Due to lack of finances and the interference ofcolonialadministrationitwasclosedonlytwoyearslater.Howeverserioustheintentionof the colonisers was to eliminate herbal medicine, the number of Western‐traineddoctorswassimplyinsufficienttomeetthedemand.In1908,therewereapproximately360Westerndoctorsofwhomonly66wereKorean,buttherewere2593practitionersof traditional medicine (KMA, 1991, p. 48 cited in Son 1999:540). Therefore, the

in chargeofeachpao‐chia. Ineffect, thepolice forcepenetrated intoeveryhousehold.” (ChingandMyers1963:448)

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governor‐general promulgateda “temporary arrangement” implementing a regulationfortraditionaldoctorstoobtainlicencestocarryonprivatemedicalpractices,whereaspublicserviceremainedadomainofbiomedicaldoctors(Son1999:540). Insum,thesetwo examples show how local actors reconfigured the intentions of the Japanesecolonisersofteninvolvingacontestedminglingofscience,culture,andidentity.

Imperialsciences,transmogrifyingexpertise,andgeopoliticalordersofknowledge

Colonialexpansionandthedevelopmentofmodernscienceswerecloselyrelated.Forone, theMeiji governmenterected “imperial universities” in the centresof science incolonialJapan:twoofthemwerelocatedinTaipeiandSeoul(Shillony1986:770).ThosewereoriginallymeantforthesonsofJapaneseresidentsaswellasforpromising localyouth. However, as Zaiki and Tsukahara observe, some of those local students laterbecameactivistsandtheuniversitiesbecameplacesofanti‐colonialresistance.Someofthe former science and engineering students also had a significant influence on theircountries development after achieving of the independence (Zaiki and Tsukahara2007:184). For another, the pursuit of professional carriers and the development ofscientific disciplines were deeply influenced by colonial contexts. AsWilson remarks,officials,soldiersandpoliceareactorscommonlyrepresentedinthescientificdiscourseofcolonisation.Butitisonlyinrecentyearsthatcertainprofessionalgroupshavefoundtheirwayintoscientificanalysis.Inthesecasesitisofimportancenotonlytoinvestigatetheirfunctionasagentsofcolonialism,but“alsohowcolonialisminturnaffectedthemprofessionally:thewaysinwhichtheyoperatedasprofessionalsinthecolonialcontext,howprofessionalknowledgewasacquiredanddeployedundercolonial rule,andhowambiguous was the position that professional groups found themselves in underJapaneserule.”(Wilson2005:294)Twosuchexamplesareofgreatempiricalvalue‐thecaseofJapanesemeteorologyandseismology.

Meteorologyasacolonialsciencedevelopedonthecrossroadsofdifferentdisciplines,novel technologies, and geographic locations. Itwouldn’t have been possiblewithoutmoderninfrastructuresuchasthetelegraph,submarinecablesandrailwaynetworking(Zaiki and Tsukahara 2007:186). It was closely connected to agricultural studies andmilitary strategy, seismology and volcanology. The institutionalisation ofmeteorologybeganwiththeestablishmentofameteorologicalobservatoryonHokkaido(thenEzo)in1872, a central agency, and observatories in further colonies followed. The firstJapaneseuniversitytoopenadepartmentofmeteorologywastheImperialUniversityinTaiwanwithOgasawaraKazoasappointedProfessor.AsZaikiandTsukaharaobserve“Inhis early career, he was a normal practitioner of exact science, conservative, stayedaway from the liberal student culture, and retained idealistic viewsof science for thesakeofhumanwelfare.” (ZaikiandTsukahara2007:193)Due tounknownreasons,hethenshiftedhisfocusfromtheoreticalscienceofphysicstoappliedscienceofweatherforecasting in the Philippines. At that point he stopped publishing his ownwork andtranslated a 10 volumes of works of an American authority in area of weather and

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climate,CharlesDeppermann,whichposedasignificantchangeinhisbiography.AftergoingtoManila,heworkedandpublishedtogetherwithDeppermann.Hisworkssoonstarted tohaveanationalistic sentiment.Duringhis lecturesat theOkayamaMedicalCollege in1944,henoted: “the tropical climatewoulddegenerateethnicquality.”Hearguedfurther“thatgovernmentshouldstrictlymaintaintheJapaneselifestyleabroadin the faceof theharshtropicalclimate,whichcoulderodeJapaneseethnicity.” (Zaikiand Tsukahara 2007:197) Further he suggested, “that in order to overcome ethnicdegeneration, a Japanese “Co‐Prosperity Sphere” should include Australia in New‐Zealand,which, he claimed,weremost suitable for a Japanese colony. Advancementintothesouthernregionwastherefore justifiedasaprocessofacquiringthoseareas”(Zaiki and Tsukahara 2007:198). He referred to Huntington’s map from “Climate andCivilization”,accordingtowhichthedistance fromtheequator indicatesacivilizationsdevelopment, and so European and North America are most suitable areas forcivilization.Thismapput Japan into the second‐tier civilisations.Ogasawaraproducedhis own interpretation of this map, placing Japan in the first tier, but Korea in thesecond, and Hokkaido, Taiwan and Manchuria in the third, clearly using modifiedWestern categories to position Japan better in the world hierarchy. In sum, whileWestern sciencesmade an impact on the nascent Japanese disciplines, but Japanesescientist, at the same time, modified Western concepts to the advantage of Japan.Furthermore, it is evident that colonial science originated at the nexus of Westernscience, newly acquired colonial knowledge and Japanese scientists, and thereforerendersstateformationinasensea“borderless”process.

ThedevelopmentoftheJapaneseseismologyoffersawindowinyetanotherassemblingprocess that merged modern science, traditional knowledge, and different builtenvironments.Confucianscholarshavealwaysclaimedthatearthquakesareprecededby nature sings and can therefore be predicted. This belief of earthquakes beingpredictable became common knowledge in Japan and could have in fact only beenprovedwrongafterthecomingofseismology(Clancey2006:152).Certainbehaviourofanimals,aswellaschangesinbarometricpressurearebelievedbelinkedtoupcomingearthquakes. This traditional knowledge wasn’t automatically dismissed with theintroductionofWesternseismicityscience.ŌmoriFusakichiandSeikiyaSeikei,thefirst“professional”seismologists,devotedthemselvestoreconsiderpremoderntheoriesonthe basis of a scientific theory in order to prove them for the international sciencecommunity.AlsonotinspiredbytheWesternscience,butbyacuriousincidentduringanearthquakea largeareaofstudiesofmagnetism inconnectionwithseismicitywasborn (Clancey 2006:153f). While adopting Western approaches to seismology Ōmorilearned about the new Rossi‐Forel scale of 1883,whichwas then used to depict themeasuredmagnitudeofanearthquakes inaspatial representation(isoseismicalmap).However, this scale draw on the human and physical geography of Europe; withindicatorssuchascrackedwalls,fallenchimneys,fallingplaster,ringingchurchbellsandpeopleexperiencing“generalpanic”.Yet,becausethegeographyofJapanvariedgreatly‐woodenbuildings,neither churchbellsnor chimneys,Ōmorihad to comeupwithadifferent scale, using different proxy variables that were adapted to the physical

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conditionsat theJapanese island.Thiscametotheeffectthatthegeneralbenchmarkfor the magnitude of earthquakes (acceleration) shifted for the end point of “totaldestruction” of the wooden houses in Japan came significantly later then of theEuropeanhouses(Clancey2006:155f).Asaresult,thequalitiesoftheJapanesewoodenhousesbecame intelligible in comparison toWestern architecture. So,whilebuildingsmadeofsteelandconcreteoriginallyenteredMeiji Japanasmodern“improvements”on classical constructionmaterials, the newmethods and instruments of seismology,pioneeredbyJapanesescientists,revealedtheglorioussubstanceofJapanesecultureinthe international arena: “to Japanese seismology, ‘Japanese architecture’was locatednotbetweentwodisciplines,butbetweenJapanandtheWest.”(Clancey2006:162)TheJapanese version of the seismograph was highly recommended and its use quicklyspreadbeyondtheJapaneseempire(Clancey2006:164).17

The civilisatorymission, asdepictedabove,deemed theoccurrenceofearthquakes inthe colonies, in fact, political problems. For example, according to the Treaty ofShimonoseki,Taiwanesehadtherighttochoosewhethertoemigratefortheislandorto staywithin two years of its signing.An inclusion into themodernizationmission isself‐explanatory on the image of Omori representing seismicity along withinfrastructure, suchas railroads,harbours, lighthouses, submarinecablesetc.The firstseismic activities in Taiwan were surveyed as early as 1896. By the end of the 19thcenturyseismographswereconstructedwhichcouldrecordseismicactivityacrosslongdistances. And so it became possible to “read” earthquakes across borders (Kim2007:155ff). “By the first decade of the twentieth century, Tokyo had established itsown seismological knowledge‐producing system, and it monitored seismic activitythroughout the archipelago and beyond” (Kim 2007:160). This technologicaladvancementenabledOmoritospeakaboutan“anomaly inthegeopoliticalhierarchyofthetime.”thebestproofofwhich,wouldbethefactthathetravelledtoItalyafterthegreatItalianearthquakeof1908togivehisexpertise,whichhedidvianewspapersandwasevengrantedanaudiencewiththeItalianking(Kim2007:161):

“In a lecture in Taiwan in 1904, Omori emphasized that delicateseismographscoulddetectearthquakesoriginatingallovertheglobe.WhileinTokyo,heexplained,hecouldobserveRussianandAmericanearthquakes.Furthermore,accordingtohim,seismographssetupinTaiwancouldsimilarlyrecordearthquakesaroundtheworld.Inthislecture,Omoriwasboastingina nationalistic way of Japanese scientific abilities, in the context of ageopoliticalregimewhichrelegatedAsiatoaperiphery.Japaneseseismologyhad progressed remarkably, he emphasized, and thus Japanese science ingeneral deserved to be called “admirable” (Department of CivilAdministration 1907, 70–71). Simultaneously, his rhetoric in this lecture

17 For example, the cooperation with a German laboratory brought about the Bosch‐Omoriseismograph, used in the Panama Canal Zone and the MIT observatory on Hawaii (Clancey2006:171).

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mentionedananomaly,intermsofrelationshipsbetweenthedetectorsandthedetected,totransgressthegeopoliticalhierarchyofthetime.Accordingtohim,evenTaiwan,as longas theperipheral islandhadthesophisticatedscientific instruments, could spy upon the seismicity in the Westernhemisphere.”(Kim2007:161)

5. DiscussionIn summarizing the main outcomes of this study the following section discusses keytheoretical and methodological issues at stake. First and foremost, we suggest torephrasehowweunderstand“risingpower”inworldpolitics.Informedbytheempiricalevidence of the case of Japan’s emergence in the 19th century, “rising” means“assemblingprocessesthatconstructanewreality”.Thiskindofpuzzledemands,ashasbeenargued,afoundationalcollectortosymmetricalinquiryintoa“risingpower”whatcould be alternatively called “empowering”. The formation of amodern nation stateduring the Meiji era entailed, as it were, the creation of an assemblage radicallydifferent from the Tokugawa shogunate in every dimension: time, knowledge,subjectivity, and build environments. The exploration of the Tokugawa assemblagenonetheless has implications for describing “the rise of Japan”. Methodically, thisrequires following thecreativeworkof variousactors,whoentanglehumanandnon‐human elements into a new collective without a priori discriminating betweeninside/outside,fact/value,materials/symbols,technology/society,science/myth.Asthepictureofanisolatedbakufustateisincorrectitisevenlessappropriatetoconstruetheemergenceof amodern state in Japan throughCartesian lenses. In addition, throughdescribing the evolution of this collective we arrive at a better apprehension of theJapanese“backwardness”thanbycomparingtheTokugawaregimedirectlytomodernstates in Europe. Also, a description of the process of creative destruction renderscategoriessuchasborders,units,demarcations,orlevelsamatterofempiricalresearch.So,whilethesenotionsno longerpresentapriori fixedconceptualgrid, theagencyofhumansandnon‐humanactorstakescenterstage.IndepartingfromdisciplinaryritualsinIR,thispoints,atthesametime,tothelimitationsofthisstudy:wehadtodrawon,byandlarge,sourcesfromotherdisciplines;thestudyremainsafuzzyandopen‐endedundertaking; it invites the consternation of those, who wish for parsimony andtheoreticalsimplicity.Notwithstanding these limitations, our approach to the case of Meiji Japan providesfascinatingmaterialstoimprovetheconceptualizationofwhatitmeanstospeakabout“risingpowers”.Thisredefinitionmustbe,firstofall,basedonathickdescription.Forthis purpose,we have employed two analytical tools: first, the foundational collector“assemblages”; second, the theoretical model “creative destruction”. Exploring theascent of Japan in that manner points to the interlinked and mutually reinforcingprocesses of assembling a modern state and a colonial empire. Pushed through by

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various actors, this revolution destroyed the assemblage of the shogunate whilecreating theMeiji state.This revolution remade Japanwithin roughly thirtyyears intoAsia’s first regional power that defeated both the Chinese Qing Empire and CzaristRussiatosubsequentlyexpandingitscontrolovervastterritories,people,andresourcesintheAsianpacificregionbetween1895and1945.Theabilityofaleaders,theinfluenceof ideologies, and later even “social pathologies” (Conroy 1966:345) rendered thisdevelopmentacollectiveprocess,highlycontingentandcontroversialattimes.Yet,itismisleading to treat these “social” aspects isolated. As this study has tried to show,Japan’s rise evolved through massive reconfigurations and displacements of existingtimeframesandmaterialartifactsaswell.Technological infrastructures, scientificpracticesandengineeringwerecentral thisco‐evolution.However,neitherwerescienceandtechnologymerelyinstrumentaltostatecontrol,norhavetheydeterminedtheriseofJapan.Againsttechnologicaldeterminism,thehistoryofcolonialexpansionandstate formation, rather, showsthat technologieshad, similar to human actors, relational effects on the processes of assembling.Analyzingthepracticesandscriptsof“internationalsystems”(seeRingmar2012)isthusonlyone ingredient that isnecessary tocapture“empowering”.Toexplainwhy Japanwas able, as the only semi‐colonized country, to rise to great power status requiresmorethana“social”or“ideational”account.Especially,therevolutionarycharacterofthis process poses serious challenges to explanatory models of modernization andinternational power shifts. In the case of Meiji Japan, it makes no sense to simplyassumearelativechange inresourcesorcapacitiesamongblackbox‐statesasrealismandneo‐realismdoes.Constructivism,orat leastWendt’sthreefoldmodelofanarchy,similarly can’t capture the hybrid process of identity formation. Furthermore, Japan’s“success”cannotbeexplainedthroughanemulationmodelofinstitutional,commercial,and technological imports, for the Meiji revolution constitutes neither a top‐downimplementation,noracopy‐and‐pastphenomenon.A centralaspectofempowerment is theconnection toglobal technologicalnetworks.The innovatorsof theMejiassemblageclosely linked theiremergingactor‐network totechnologicalnetworksof theEuropean imperialpowers.Thismeantnotonly Japan’saccess to themodern infrastructures that stabilized time and enabled transportationand communication. It also included the replacement of practices as well as thereconstruction of the built environments, which embodied the Tokugawa period(Westney 1987). Innovators from all strata of the old feudal order have collectivelyassembledMeijiJapan:therailwaylines,thesynchronizationoftime,theroadsystemsand factories, the shintō state religion, the electrification, the standing army, theconcretebuildings,theobjectivesciences,tojustnameafew.Reassembling“time”wasa particularly arduous and creative task. While the Meiji government adopted thestandardized “world time”, the national time was synchronized and normalizedaccordingtoaschemaof24hourswithequalduration.Withtherapidspreadofclocksandwatches—JapanesewatchmanufacturersbecamefirstclassinnovatorsafterWorldWar II—and with the acceleration through railways and industrial production, the

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Japanesealteredtheirtimeconsciousnessradically.Thistimerevolutionalsocomprisedthe introduction of the basic scheme of the Gregorian calendar, though the MeijigovernmentproducedthemythicalfoundationofJapanastheoverarchingframeoftheMeijihistory.TheriseofMeijiJapanexemplifiestheintimaterelationshipbetweenhybridizationandempowerment. Time was modernized and mythologized—if this constitutes anopposition at all—at the same time. Consider that this assembling resulted in theintelligibleand immediate connectionofanallegedlyunbroken lineof theTennō ruleoverthecountry18—celebratedwithpompandcircumstanceatits2,600anniversaryin1940(Ruoff2010)—withtheconductofphysics,biology,orengineeringthatledtotheoneofthemostformidablehigh‐technologyweaponarsenalsamongtheWorldWarIIparticipants(Grunden2005).Insum,ifwejustdescribetheimportofinstitutions,laws,and organizational “learning” from the West, we would purify the seeminglyincongruent entanglements of sciences, myths, and technological artifacts thataccompaniedJapan’sascent. Inconstructionnewknowledgeordersandtimeregimes,the numerous actors, who have assembled Japan’s modern state and its colonialempire, did not care for our conceptually neat delimitations of inside/outside andmaterial/social.Forexample,theinnovationsinsciences,administrations,education,ormedicine were stabilized through global networks of knowledge and expertise.Empowerment, on the one hand, required entering the club of “civilized” nations—namely plugging in the technological infrastructures, practices, and discourses of theEuropean imperial powers. Part of this kind of “western learning”, apparently, wasmimickingtheEuropeanimperialposture, forexample, informofextraterritorial legalzones. This would have been impossible without major innovations on the Japaneseside.As thepractice of sakoku had connected the Tokugawaassemblagemainlywiththe East Asian region (between 1630 and 1850) the character of its foreign relationswere different from both European imperialism and the Westphalian order (Suzuki2003).AssemblingtheMeijistateandthecolonialempirecomeswasnotjustdonebymeansof imitation. From the very beginning, they were highly ingenious in remaking the—scientific,political,andtechnological—practices,whichtheyhadadoptedfromabroad(Kublin 1959). For instance, while the first generation of seismology changed basiccategories and methods of the entire field (Clancey 2006), Japanese art specialistestablished a category of “oriental” to put Korean ceramics andAinu artifacts on parwithEuropeanartworks(Brand2000).Ontheotherhand,stateformationandcolonialexpansionwerehighlycontingentandcontested.Inevitable,thisconstructionofanewreality,whichiselsewherenamed“theformationofamodernstate”,involvedcreativedestruction, as it were, leading to multiple controversies and conflicts. These radical

18Yet,theJapanesegovernmentrestrictedarcheologicalresearchattheisland.Severalarcheologistswentintojailorsawtheirworksbannedbecausetheirdatacontestedtheconstructionofthisofficial“history”.Theyshowedthatitwasnothingthanaboldmythicalclaim(seeLedyard1975).

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innovations were possible, at all, because the interests, identities, and goals of theJapanese have radically altered in the course of the Meiji revolution. Crucially, thisrevolutiondestroyedthefeudalstructureoftheTokugawaperiodagainstwhichmanysamuraipursueda fierce resistance (Ikegami1995,Branham1994,Westney1987).19While technologies ofmodern governance, that forcibly revolutionized the life of thecolonial subjects, were often tried out at the margins prior to be introduced in themainland, theassimilationdesigns towardspeople inFormosa,KoreaandManchukuomade the Japanese identity controversial itself (Askew 2001). But, notwithstandinghybridization,theevolutionofthe“Meijiassemblage”ledtemporarilystablecategoriesoftime,space,identity,andbuiltenvironments.Figure2.Anabstractmodelofassemblinginfivedimensions

Source:theaurthors.Thisleadstoadifficultquestion:howisitpossibletobringallthishybridconnections,controversies, and agencies in one textual account? Figure two tries to depict how anewrealityemergeswhenacollectivegetsstabilized.Inordertoenableadescription,this figure suggests distinguishing between five common sense dimensions of reality.Afteranassemblagehasevolvedthroughaphaseoftranslation,acertainmodeofthesedimensionsisstabilizedthatismutuallyembedded,coordinated,andreinforcing.Yet,itis important to stress that thisdistinction is analyticalonly. So, a relativisticapproach

19Variousdisadvantagedindividualsandgroupsrespondedtothesetranslationsviolentlycarryingoutassassinations,violentattacks,andupheavals.

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explores theevolutionofassemblages throughtheshifts/revolutions it theregimesoftime, the circulation of objects, the built environments, the order or knowledge, andwith regard to identity. Similarly, what is usually taken as fixed or predeterminednotions such as borders, units, actorhood, domains, and fields become researchquestions.Assuch,ourpost‐CartesianapproachtoJapan’sriseofferskeyadvantages.Ituncovers themultiplicity of agencies that embody and enable empowerment. Yet, italsomakesvisiblewhatotherwisewouldjustseemas“noise”againstthebackgroundofunshakableconceptualclarity.ConsidertheexampleoftheRyūkyūislands(Okinawa)inthecontextofJapan’srise.Toput the Ryūkyū people on the map requires interrogating the history of their“autonomy”. This, though, is impossible bymeans of the clear‐cut presuppositions of“national states” or an “international system”. Already in the Tokugawa period theirstatues was in a border zone in between theMing/Ching and the Tokugawa Tributesystems.AstheMeijigovernmenthasnationalizedtheOkinawaandHokkaido islands,enforcingitsauthorityandtryingto“japanize”itspopulation,thisregulationofborderzones is often separated from thehistoriographyof Japanese imperialism (e.g. Kublin1959:73ff). Furthermore, as the people ofOkinawa today contest both the control ofthecentralgovernmentandthepresenceofUStroopsandweaponarsenals,and,giventhediminishedauthorityoftheJapanesegovernment,thesovereignstatusoftheislandstillisanempiricalquestion.20Despitethisexampleappearsmessyandelusive,suchisthekindofempiricalstuffthatmightleadtotrulypromisingattemptsoftheorizinginIR.Furthermore, thecaseof Japan’s rise ties intopost‐Cartesian researchaboutdifferentvarieties of legal, spatial, security, and technological assemblages (Sassen 2000,Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, Ong and Collier 2005, Barry 2001). Historiansincreasinglystressthecomplexglobalinteractiondynamicsandinterrelationsthathaveexistedforcenturies—longbeforewecametospeakabout“globalization”.Ofcourse,thiswouldhavebeennonewstoscholarssuchasKarlMarx(Dyer‐Witheford1999).Butrecent studies tackle globalhistory to theeffect emphasizing theextent towhich the“modern world” emerged from myriads of transnational, transcultural, andtranscontinentalrelations(Bayly2003,Galison2006).ThecrucialpointforIR,though,isthatourempiricalknowledgeaboutthenexusoftheemergenceofthemodernstatesand the expansion of colonial empires at the one side, and the advent of modernsciencesandtechnologiesattheotherside,completelydiscreditsabunchofcommonIRnotions; including the unitary‐actor assumptions, the like‐unit models, the agency‐structure schemes, the levels of analysis premises, and, more generally, logo‐centricconceptualbias.Inotherwords,withoutdroppingthiskindofpremisesthatareusuallytakenforgranted in IRwecouldnotmakesenseofJapan’srise inthefirstplace. If IRwould take serious the insights of other disciplines about its core subjectmatters, itwould redraw its map. Particularly, the useless delusion of an anarchical world of

20Fortheambiguousandcontroversialstatuesofauthority,identityandterritoryinOkinawaseeInoue,PurvesandSelden1998,Allen2002,Inoue2007,Yonetani2004.

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sovereign states would have to give way for an account of various assemblages,collectives, and actor‐networks. While this sheds new light on historical forms ofimperialism(seeDuara2006),itdoes,moreseriously,offeramethodtoexaminesomeof the central contemporary puzzles: for example, what exactly is the nature of thepowerdiscrepancythatputEuropeintothedriverseatofglobalpoliticsfor150years?Asthemodernsciencesandtechnologiescreatedanewrealitywhatdoesfollowifthe“great divergence” by now is really narrowing? What parameters are consequentlypropertoassessthepresumedemergenceof“stateassemblages”suchasChina,Brazil,orIndia?

6. TowardsarelativisticapproachtoworldpoliticsPrecisely becausewe seem to know somuch about the rise of Japan in the late 19thcentury this puzzle presents an ideal vantage point to scrutinize the limitations ofexisting IR theories. Against the static notions of Cartesian IR theories, a relativisticapproach inquires the agencies of constructing, assembling, reframing, reconfiguring,connecting, objectifying, and qualifying that embody and enact Meiji Japan’semergence.Closelyzoominginattheempiricaldetailsofourpuzzleillustratesthekeyrole ofmodern sciences, engineering, and technological infrastructures.Moreover, aswehavetriedtothoroughlyhistoricizehowvariousdimensionsofrealityhaveevolved,the significance of contingent regimes of time, spatial formations, rebuilt materialenvironments, and shifting subjectivities for describing “rising power” becomes clear.Importantly,wehavenot“deconstructed”thesedimensions.Thispaper,rather,showsthat Japan’s rise involvedthecollectiveconstructionofanentirenewreality.Yet,onemightask,isthisrelevantbeyondtheperhapsuniquecaseofthetransformationoftheTokugawashogunateintoMeijiJapan’s?Or,conversely,whichresearchagendafollowsfromarelativisticapproach?Withoutdoubt,thesehistorical insightsarehighlyrelevantforcontemporaryresearch.First of all, the pervasiveness of technological infrastructures, scientific practices, andthecirculationofartificialobjects,hastremendouslyincreasedsinceJapan’srisebeganmorethan150yearsago.So,today,everystateassemblagehoweversmallorremoteislinkedwithprocessesofassembling,initiatedbyforinstancetechnologicalinnovations.Theevolvingnetworkofmodernstatesrestsonamaterial“underbelly”that is largelyunknown.Thisincludesforinstancemapsandcartography,theprintingpressandnewspapers;navigationalinstruments,time‐pieces,clocks,underseacables,communicationsnetworks, et cetera; furthermore, the circulation of new scientific methods andcollected“things”(Branch2011,Barrera‐Osorio2010,Anderson1996,Alonso1994). Ifthestateconstitutesalargeassemblage(PassothandRowland2010),thanthequestionis how has the material extension of complex material infrastructures changes, forexample, its territorial organization, the citizens’ subjectivities, and the forms ofgovernance (Swyngedouw2008,Carrol2006)?As technological innovationrelentlesslyevolve, what shifts in power and authority within state assemblages are observable?

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While new collectives are assembled through innovations such as themobile phone,renewable energy technologies, seabed drilling, nanotechnologies, the World WideWeb,socialmedia,anddigitaltechnologies,howdoesthisreconfiguretheevolutionof“stateassemblages”?TotheextenttowhichtheriseofMeijiJapanilluminateswhatittakestoemergeasagreatpower, italsopoints to theexistentialmeaningofmoderndevelopment. In thislight, we might reframe the puzzle of the global power shift that led to the “greatdivergence”. This implies, then, exploring the construction of time, subjectivities, andbuilt environments, especially during the 19th and early 20th century. Arguably thecreation of standard time explains to a large extent how the power differentialsbetween European empires and other political assemblages could so rapidly alterbetween 1800 and 1850. Although historians began this research it remains largelyunclearhowtheconstructionofsynchronizedandstandardizedtimeregimesisrelatedtotheexpansionofimperialempires(Galison2006,Kern2003,WinseckandRobertM.Pike2007).Whatagencieswere involved in these innovationalprocesses?Which roleplaid“objectivescience”instabilizingimperialoutreach(Macloed1993,Pyenson1993)?What are the obligatory passage points in these assemblages, and where lie theirsilences (Watts 1983)? The meaning of “great divergence”, consequently, becomesmuch more radical. It refers to more than just a number of “institutional” and“technical” factors. Highlighting creative destruction instead renders tangible thefundamental chasms between emerging, often incommensurable, realities, which areinvisibletoCartesianIRtheories,butexperiencedbymanypeoplearoundtheworld.21

To be sure, empirically, this field is a beast and IR might become a misnomer: thehomely distinctions, categories, and domains vaporize because “states” inevitably arerevealedasensembles,whichareconsistingofvarioushumanandnonhumanagenciesand also intractably linked to other actor‐networks. Apparently, this renders thecontainermodelsofconstructivistandrealist IRtheoriesunsuitable.Buttracingactor‐networks also call into question the fixation with the inside/outside frame, which iseither implicitly assumed or challenged in IR (cf. Walker 1993). If we compare theTokugawa period and the emergence of the Meiji state, we find all successive“Japanese” assemblages were evolving, controversial, mediated, interconnected, andhybrid.Thus,whenmemakeourcasespeakbacktoIRitamountstoadoubleirony.Theearlier history of Japan gets often concealed to the effect that the allegedly isolatedTokugawastatecouldfigureasposterpersonformodernsovereignty.Meanwhile,theEuropeannations,whichareinasortofcontra‐factualclaimdeemedtorepresentthe“international society”of sovereign states, crushed theallegedTokugawa isolationbydisavowing all norms of “modern sovereignty”. This mythological mind‐set seriouslyhampers the integration of insights from other disciplines about globalinterconnectedness and incommensurability. We believe that approaches to IR must

21Theseconflictingrealities,tobesure,reemergeinWesternresearch:forinstance,atthenexusofunderdevelopmentandso‐called“environmentalconflict”(seeDalby2002,Duffield2006).

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either truly follow the meandering global material‐human connections in both itsconceptualization and its empirical puzzles or, by and large, remain irrelevant.Consequently, this interrogation implies certain empirical benchmarks for theories ofworldpolitics.Ifframeworksdonotorganicallyincorporatethesenon‐humanagencieswithin theirconceptualandmethodologicaldesigns theyareunduly reductionist;and,ultimately, meaningless. In contrast, the “power shifts” at the nexus of science,engineering, technology, and modern state formation constitute a central researchconcernforIR.Inaddition,studyingtheformationofmodernstates,anissuethattodayhardlyhaslostits preeminence, leads to a somewhatdifficult question: how should a post‐Cartesiantextualaccountdealwith“translated”vocabulary?Atthispoint,Ravina’snoteespeciallyappliestoIR:

“The polysemy of Tokugawa discourse makes clarity in translation aproblematic virtue. However vexing ambiguities of "country," to translatekuni as a province, domain, or a country, depending on context, is totranslate Tokugawa thought into modern, post‐Restoration thought.Althoughtheresultisincreasedclarity,thisisadubiousvirtue,sincethislackof clarity was a salient aspect of Tokugawa political texts. In clarifyingTokugawa political language we therefore run the risk of effacing thecomplexities of the early modern political order. More seriously, theinterjection of such "clarity" antedates the transformation of politicallanguagewithaccompaniedtheMeijiRestorationandtreatsthenationstateasanontologicallyprivilegedinstitution,existingeveninaworldwhichhadnowordstodescribeit.”(Ravina1995:1007)

The conceptual parsimony and the terminological clarity that underpins Cartesian IRtheories conceal themultiplicity of reality. Conversely, usingmultiple terms equals agrainofsandinthegearofreductionism.For,ifweemploythemyriadsofcontroversialvocabularies, than the sterilemodelword of the “interactions among unitary actors”vanishes; themythological view, in which great powers like “China”, “Japan”, or the“US”arelockedintoaperennialrivalry,becomesabsurd;thenarrativethat“sovereignnations”seeminglyinteractagainstastableanduniformbackgroundof“time”,“space”,“subjectivities”, “material artifacts”, and “build environments” crumbles. StudyingJapan’semergencethroughthelensofassemblages,rather,indicatesthesignificanceofshifts in these dimensions of reality for how people and things act in concert that is“power”.Thechallengethenliesindescribingtheincommensurabilitiesofacontingentworld—a world that has never been modern. Our texts therefore should avoid theterminological purifying that underpins both Cartesian IR and methodologicalnationalism.Analyzing Japan’s rise highlights crucial advantages of a relativistic approach: first, itentails accessing and connecting a much larger and richer reservoir of data and

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empiricalmaterials.IRgreatlybenefitsfromtheirenormousinsightsandknowledgeofits neighboring disciplines about common subject matters. Second, foundationalcollectors lead us embracing different puzzles and new theoretical frameworks.“Assemblage” as it is used here to examine Japan’s rise is but one option. Third, itimpliesrephrasinggenericvocabularyandourconceptualgraspof“power”,“state”,and“agency”.Toimprovethetheoreticalcomprehensionandthemethodologicalaccesstoworldpolitics,wemustempiricallyredefine,inparticular,theconceptofpower.Japan’srise illuminates that power resembles, as itwere, the coordinated collective actionofnumeroushumanandnon‐humanactors.Fourth,arelativisticapproachsuggestsaclearmethodologyforthefusinghistoryandIRasmanydemand(LittleandBuzan2001):toexplore, for example, the rise of great powers, we must treat the externalizeddimensions of Cartesian theories such as time, space, or build environments, asempirical questions. For this purpose, science studies and anthropology offer soundconceptual frameworks for IR scholars, who wish to symmetrically comprehend themingle of materials, practices, and discourses that characterizes world politicalphenomena.Moreover,asANT,inparticular,opensupahugeunchartedpost‐Cartesianlandscapeof questions andpuzzles, this allows for a serious dialoguewith disciplinessuchaspost‐ColonialStudies,STS,Sociology,AreaStudies,andGeography.Finally,arelativisticresearchapproachisunderpinnedbyan“explorativerealist”meta‐theory. While deliberately avoiding compartmentalization—theoretical, analytical,disciplinary, it involves the commitment to empirically testing. Post‐Cartesianapproaches strive formaking visible themultitude of agencies and actors at all costsinstead of imposing orthodox conceptual grids and typological orders. The respectivemethodology is still in its early stages. It could be described asmorphology of sorts,comprising the combination of fieldwork, genealogy, and cartography. In sum, theaddedvalueofapost‐CartesianIRliesinextendingthekindsofquestionsandpuzzles,which we should explore. In this vein, detailed field research—foregroundingethnographicmethods—isoneoftheoutstandingandenduringstrengthsthattheANT‐agenda. In conclusion, employing a relativistic approach to large‐scale historicaldevelopments, as this paper has set out, is superior to realist or constructivistapproaches. By applying an uncompromisingly relativist framework to an somewhattraditional puzzle this paper calls for a serious conversation about how we cantranscend—asadiscipline—theCartesianparadigm.

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