[4 LR 19] EN BANCAM NO 90-5-2373 JULY 12, 1990IN RE: ATTY. EMILIANO P. JURADO, JR. a.k.a. EMIL JURADO

Gentlemen,

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated July 12, 1990.

Adm Matter No. 90-5-2373 (In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr. a.k.a. Emil Jurado).

The front page of the Sunday, May 27, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, a national daily, carried the banner headline: Rebellion complex does not exist SC. And below it in smaller type, State back to Square One in cases vs. Enrile, et. al. The lead article appeared in the following page under the sub-head High Tribunal reaffirms Hernandez Doctrine with 14-1 vote and the by-line of Emil Jurado, Manila Standard Columnist and reported, pertinently, that according to well-placed sources at the Supreme Court, in a decision penned by Associate Justice Narvasa ** to be announced tomorrow for immediate promulgation ** the court had ** upheld a long standing precedent known as the Hernandez Doctrine ** (and) reaffirmed that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and other common offenses does not exist ** (and) * (b)y a vote of 14 to one ** denied the governments motion (sic) to repeal the doctrine. It added that said majority included Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and that the lone opposition vote was Justice Leo Medialeas.

Mr. Jurados regular column on page 10 of the same issue which was titled SC decision knocks out govt lawyers. And began with the word SCOOP in bold, reiterated the above-quoted highlights of his page 2 report. If those details and the photographs accompanying the report were not indication enough, mention therein of the names of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, ex-Assemblyman Homobono Adaza and lawyer Rafael Recto, among others, made clear what the main subject of those news items was: a supposed decision awaiting immediate promulgation on one or another of the cases then pending in this Court that challenged the validity of criminal informations charging various persons with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder in connection with the failed coup attempt of December, 1989.

The Monday, May 28, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard was headlined High Cort ruling hailed. The lead Article by Amante E. Bigornia on page 2 reported that the ruling had been hailed by unnamed legal luminaries and added further supposed details about its adoption which the writer attributed to the papers equally anonymous sources. In his column on page 9 of the same issue, Mr. Jurado elaborated in his earlier report as follows:

The Supreme Court is expected to promulgate today or tomorrow its decision upholding the Hernandez doctrine that the complex crime of rebellion with murder or frustrated murder does not exist. The decision will be released as soon as it is signed by Justice Manuel (sic) Gancayco and Justice Irene Cortes, who were expected to arrive from abroad over the weekend. The two had earlier signified their intention to uphold the Hernandez doctrine.

I must however, make certain clarifications about the Standard exclusive yesterday on the Supreme Court decision. The High Court voted 14-0 (not 14-1, as reported yesterday). As explained by my unimpeachable source, who is not connected in any way with the Supreme Court, Associate Justice Leo Medialea, who was reported to have cast the dissenting vote, had in fact inhibited himself from the process. Medialeas son is a junior partner of the PECABAR Law Office, the firm of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, who is charged with this complex crime.

One Justice, who concurred in the decision abstained in the case of the Panlilios because he is related to them and was their lawyer at one time.The decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa, whose father the late Judge Gregorio Narvasa, decided in the 50s that the complex crime of rebellion does not exist.

While headlines and news about the matter continued to greet Manila Standard readers on Tuesday, May 29, 1990, the tenor of these had materially changed. The headlines now proclaimed that Cory (referring to the President) awaits SC ruling and Tribunal still deliberating rebellion complex issue. The news inside was no longer about a decision already reached or a ruling made. It reported a statement of the Chief Justice, made through Assistance Clerk of Court Luz Puno, that there was no such decision and that the matter was still under deliberation. For the first time in three days, Mr. Jurados subject was silent on the subject.

The sequence of events is revealing. Having stood by their news story of two days, Mr. Jurado and his newspaper had already began to backtrack, as it were, by the third, confronted, no doubt, with the hard fact that it was not and could not be, substantiated.

On that same Tuesday, the Court en banc issued a Resolution branding as false the news reports of May 27, 1990, declaring that as of that day, no decision or resolution on the subject of said reports have been signed, either by the supposed ponente or any other member of the Court, and requiring Mr. Emil Jurado (full name Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr: hereafter, respondent only), a member of the bar as well as a journalist, to explain within five (5) days why he should not be dealt with administratively ** for publishing obviously false statements relative to the Courts action on a pending proceeding or otherwise indulging in speculation or conjecture, or airing illicit information about the same.

By the fourth day, nothing was left but excuses. In his column in the Wednesday, May 30, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, respondent acknowledge having received the show-cause Resolution and sought to justify the questioned news items as legitimate reporting duly verified [4 LR 20] by both himself and his editor-in-chief and approved for publication of the latter. The same issued featured an editorial which relevantly:

a) Admitted that breaking the story of the alleged decision before its promulgation went against the usual practice of awaiting the Courts pronouncement thereof; b) Admitted, also, awareness of the principle underlying such practice: ** that premature disclosure and discussion may affect the Supreme Courts deliberation on the matter; c) Sought to justify such action on the peoples right to know about decisions with ** momentous effect on many prominent people ** (and) important implications for the political process o this country;d) Expressed the editors feeling that no violation of such principle against premature disclosure of the Courts decisions had been committed; ande) Clearly implied that the decision to publish the report as a news story under respondents by-line, instead of as an item in his column, had meant to evoke a reaction from the Court which would have ignored a column item as opinion or gossip.

It is now of public knowledge that respondents claimed reliance on unimpeachable sources had been totally misplaced. At the time of publication of the reports in question, no ruling or decision on any of what have become widely known by the misnomer rebellion complex cases had issued or was about to issue. No action or pronouncement of the Court had given any intimation that a ruling on the merits on any of them was in the offing. As a matter of fact, said cases were still under deliberation, and the members of the Court had yet to reach that agreement or consensus upon which alone a formal ruling or judgment could follow. Quite apart from the consideration that a decision or resolution of the Court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation[footnoteRef:1] and none had to that time been promulgated, it was also a fact that no decision or resolution of the tenor and character reported had been signed, either by the supposed writer thereof, or by any other member of the Court. [1: Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage 152 SCRA 80 (1987); Ago vs. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530 (1962) ]

Only on July 5, 1990 did the Court promulgate its Decision in G.R. Nos. 92163 (Enrile vs. Salazar, et. al.) and 92164 (Sps. Panlilio vs. De Leon, et. al.) upholding the Hernandez ruling[footnoteRef:2] in the rebellion cases filed against the petitioners herein. Its contents, by showing up the many inaccuracies in Mr. Jurados earlier accounts, attest to the falsity of his report of its existence on or before May 27, 1990. Thus, insofar as concerned the question of wheter or not the Hernandez ruling remains binding precedent, it was not a 14-0 nor a 14-1, but a 12-1 decision, two members of the Court being on leave. The member first reported as having dissented (Medialea, J.) did not in fact do so. He concurred with the majority in G.R. No. 92164 and abstained from voting in G.R. 92163. It was the Chief Justice who filed a dissent on that principal issue. No member abstained in G.R. No. 92164 by reason of either blood or past professional relationship with the petitioners therein. Of the 12 member majority, six (6) issued or concurred in separate opinions which, without affecting their concurrence on the main ruling upholding Hernandez, expressed dissent on, or reservations about, some points raised and discussed in the majority opinion. The fact that so many members of the court found need to express their own views underscores, independently of any disavowals on the part of the Court or its officers, the improbability of any consensus having been reached much more, of a decision having been written or signed at the time of the news reports in question. [2: 99 Phil. 515 (1956)]

Under date of June 1, 1990, respondent filed a Compliance with the show-cause Resolution which, while assuming responsibility for the publication of the news reports of May 27, 1990 above referred to and offering his apologies to the Court ** if ** (he had) in some way, actually hampered the administration of justice, or obstructed the orderly workings of the Court, ** pleads in justification freedom of the press as well as the right of the public to information on matters of public concern, both he avers, being guaranteed by the Constitution.

What said Compliance makes immediately apparent is the wide variance between the plain import of the news reports in question and that the of the information upon which respondent admittedly based the same. Said reports which according to respondent were drafted, in part at least and in for inclusion in his column, two days before they were actually published[footnoteRef:3] - invariably advert to the supposed ruling in the past tense, i.e., as a fait accompli, a decision already reached, putting into writing and signed, thus (t)he Supreme Court has upheld a long standing legal precedent known as the Hernandez doctrine **; (b)y a vote of 14 to one, the Tribunal already denied the governments motion to repeal the doctrine **; and (t)he ** decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa and concurred in by 13 other justices.: Bit, also by his own account, the information upon which he based those reports was merely to the effect that ** the Supreme Court deliberations clearly pointed to an overwhelming majority for upholding the Hernandez doctrine ** and indicated ** the existence of a trend towards (such) a consensus among the members of the Court.[footnoteRef:4] While such information might have inspired speculation about a possible ruling, it simply did not warrant making, much less publishing as news, a conclusion that a decision on the matter had already been written and signed. [3: Compliance, p. 2, par. 1] [4: Id., also pp. 4-5 par. 1]

Thus, said reports, insofar as they assumed to chronicle an actual state of facts, were not only objectively false, even in the context of what respondent claimed had come to his knowledge, they were also grossly exaggerated and, at best, speculative. If all that respondent had obtained from his unidentified sources was information had reached a consensus, or that there was a trend towards a consensus, for upholding the Hernandez ruling and it is notable that even as he claims that his editors had checked out said information prior to publication and obtained further details confirming its accuracy, he neglects to mention any of those detains its evolution into straight news that a ruling had in fact been written and signed [4 LR 21] and was about to be promulgated cannot be defended on the ground of either truth or honest error.

Neither does it merit belief that respondents editors had seriously applied themselves to checking independently the capacity of information about a supposed ruling before proposing to respondent and/or authorizing its publication. The implicit admission in the editorial of May 30, 1990 that the reports were published as straight news, not as comment or gossip, in order to provoke a reaction from the Court clearly suggests that it was the Court that was expected to confirm or verify the story, that expectation itself providing the justification for its publication; there would otherwise be no reason for such action had respondents editors attempted more than a desultory check or verification of said story. It further suggests that the Court, ** jealous of its inner workings **, has to be prodded into announcing or promulgating its decisions already made, however important, far-reaching or urgent, the questions resolved and unmindful of the right of the people to be informed thereof. The notion must be speedily rejected and laid to rest, being wholly false and denigrative of the collective sense of duty of the members of this Court.

Nothing so far stated, however, should be taken as in any manner implying that objective truth or good faith will exonerate respondent here. The really relevant question being whether the report and comments in questions, regardless of their truth and of the motives or purposes behind their publication, are protected by the constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.[footnoteRef:5] There is no dispute of the existence and fundamental character of these guarantees. But equally fundamental, needing no express statement or sanction in statute or charter because inherent in the very nature of the judicial power and indispensable to the free and untrammeled exercise by the courts of their traditional functions, is the principle of confidentiality of all actuations of, or records or proceedings before, a Court in a pending action which are not essentially public in character. Such principal the Court holds to be equally firmly established by immemorial tradition and to inhere in the judicial power that is vested by the Constitution in this Court and in the lower courts established by law.[footnoteRef:6] Awareness of such principle is in fact acknowledge, expressly by respondents editors in their May 30, 1990 editorial as already pointed out, and at least implicitly by respondent himself, if indeed he is not chargeable with such knowledge as a lawyers. As far as the proceedings in this Court are concerned, these confidential matters include, among others, raffling of cases, deliberation and discussions of the en banc or the divisions, drafts of decisions and resolutions embodying conclusions reached and dispositions agreed upon by the members in consultation. [5: ART III, SECS. 4 and 7, Constitution] [6: ART VIII, SEC. 1, Constitution]

Nor is the tension or confrontation resulting from the interplay of these adversarial principles a new or recent development. It is as old as their common history, a long-standing subject of judicial inquiry, and the weight of jurisprudence thereby developed clearly supports the view that a publication relating to judicial action in a pending case which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable as contempt.

In American Law, it is regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which should be kept private, as, for example, the secrets of the jury room.

A person charged with contempt of court in making utterances or publishing writings which clearly constitute a contempt may not ordinarily escape liability therefor by invoking the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with the abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will subject the abuse to punishment for contempt of court[footnoteRef:7] [7: 17 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 58-59]

As a general rule, a publication tending to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass or obstruct the courts in the administration of justice in matters pending before them constitutes contempt. This rule applies to any publication which has a tendency to prejudice or prevent fair and impartial action in a cause under judicial investigation, whether by threats or other forms of intimidation, or by reflections on the court, counsel, parties, or witnesses, with respect to the cause. To constitute contempt, the publication need not be made in the place where the court is held; circulation in or about such place is sufficient.

Except as otherwise provided by statute, it is not necessary to show that the publication actually obstructed, impeded, or embarrassed the administration of justice, although it must appear that its tendency was of that character. However, neither inherent tendency or reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice in an action then before a court for consideration is enough to justify a restriction of free expression; the publication must have been made under such circumstances as would be calculated to imperil the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process, not remotely or probably, but immediately, and it must constitute a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, which danger must be serious and substantial.* * *A cause is pending within the rule relating to contempt from the moment an indictment is returned to the court, or from the beginning of the action. A cause remains pending so long as there is still something for the court to do therein, the doing of which may be embarrassed, impeded, or obstructed by the complained of publication. This a cause is pending when it is still open to modification, appeal, or rehearing and until the judgment is rendered and the remittur issued, and a cause is still pending within the meaning of the rule, although an order has been made dismissing the action on the payment of the fees.[4 LR 22] * * *Divulging judicial secrets constitutes an interference with the proper functioning of the courts and the administration of justice.[footnoteRef:8] [8: 17 CJS, pp. 81-87]

In US vs. Sullens[footnoteRef:9] where the editor of a newspaper published an article commenting adversely to the prosecution upon certain criminal proceedings pending in court at the time of publication, forecast an acquittal of the defendants, it was held: [9: 17 CJS, pp. 81-87]

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have corrective rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and taken care of at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt *** * *This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. But such a case as this has never before occurred in the history of the state so far as I know, and it is hoped will never occur again.

And in Burns vs. State[footnoteRef:10]: [10: (1929) 36 Fed. (2nd) 230, 238-239]

Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press. It is not infrequent that proceedings in courts of England in an important criminal case are highly commended by the press of this country and comparison with procedure in the latter unjustly made unfavorable thereto, without appreciating the very things which attract favorite mention are promoted by restrictions upon personal liberty which do not exist here at all, or are sparingly enforce. Such an occurrence during an important criminal trial after retirement of the jury to deliberate upon their verdict, as publication in a newspaper of the secrets of the jury room would, in the mother country, be visited by prompt and severe punishment as contempt of court. That incidents of like treatment of offenders may be found in the decisions of courts in this country, is well illustrated by State vs. Howell.[footnoteRef:11] Here, the duty to abstain from such abuses is just as great as elsewhere. Here, the sense of duty incident to good citizenship and public condemnation of such abuses ought to be sufficient to prevent such occurrences. Moreover, trial courts should be alive to the importance of protecting jurors from such interference during the course of a trial particularly after the retirement to deliberate upon their verdict, in important criminal cases. [11: 80 Conn. 668-69 Atl 1057, 125 Am. St. Rep. 141.]

Closer to home, in In Re: Lozano and Quevedo, which involved contempt proceedings against the editor and writer of a newspaper which published an inaccurate account of a closed-door investigation of a Judge of First Instance, this Court, after surveying earlier American cases[footnoteRef:12] and quoting with approval from some, notably Sullen and Burns, supra, held the respondents in contempt, saying: [12: Scott vs. Scott (1912), Am Ann Cas., 1912-b, 504; State of Iowa vs. Dunham (1858), 6 Iowa 245; Re: Shortbridge (1893), 99 CAL, 526; 2 1 L.R.A. 755; Ex. Parte Foster (1903), 60 L.R.A., 631]

The rule is well established than newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in the administration of justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera (6 R.C.L.) pp. 508-515).* * *The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Liberal Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizen must be preserved in all its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of the unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.

Upon similar considerations, contempt rulings were handed down by the Court in In Re: Parazo[footnoteRef:13], where a reporter had refused to divulge the sources of a published account written by his of alleged leakage in the bar examinations, and in In Re: Sotto[footnoteRef:14], where the respondent in a published article criticizing the Courts decision in Parazo, not only called said decision erroneous, but portrayed its members, or the majority of them, as incompetent, narrow-minded blunderers capable of deliberate injustice, and threatened to present a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Court and reducing its membership. [13: G.R. No. L-2581 (1948)] [14: 82 Phil. 595 (1949)]

And, more recently, in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Raul M. Gonzalez[footnoteRef:15], Respondent Gonzalez is entitled [4 LR 23] to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that the freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. For the protection and maintenance of the freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for the delivery of justice, which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frank further put it: [15: G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578, February 1, 1989 Per Curiam Resolution]

*** A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press. Concurring in Pennekamp vs. Florida.[footnoteRef:16] [16: 328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 (1946)]

It is quite evident that in the particular circumstances of this case and upon authority of the cited precedents, respondent cannot shield himself from culpability by invoking the freedoms of the press and of information. There can be no doubt that his published report and comments on a non-existent decision tended directly to embarrass the court and obstruct its proper functioning, putting it to what should have been the unnecessary task of defending or proving the integrity of its proceedings. Even assuming that he had learned, correctly but surreptitiously through unauthorized leaks, of a voting trend in favor of upholding the Hernandez doctrine, or of deliberations pointing to such a trend, or even of a draft decision or resolution of the terms and tenor reported, premature revelation thereof placed the Court in disrepute as an inept and incompetent guardian of its own confidential proceedings or, worse, offered the temptation to rewrite the decision in order to avoid such odium. These, considering that as the highest tribunal in the land, the Court is and should serve as the model and exemplar for all lower courts to emulate, constituted a clear and present danger to the orderly and impartial administration of justice.

While he and his editors concede that it is the right and the duty of the Court to protect the integrity of its proceedings, respondent would plead what he mistakenly perceives to be a higher duly on his part, as a member of the press, to inform the public on matters of general interest. This hoary argument finds its answer in the authorities already cited and what has been stated about press freedom giving no license to breach the confidentiality of pending judicial proceedings. No useful purpose is promoted, no professional or civic obligation is served, by publishing information that is of its very character confidential and should be kept so, before it is announced by the appropriate authority. Another simpler answer is that there is no duty to publish false information. A newsman owes the public no duty that he does not owe first to the truth.

Respondent cannot even pretend that he acted in good faith. He lays claim to having been a full-time journalist for the last forty years. With that wealth of journalistic experience, to say nothing of his legal education, and the conceded necessity of checking the accuracy of his sources, he was inexcusably remiss in neglecting the most obvious and direct way of verifying whether or not there was already a ruling or decision such as the information given him may, in his belief, have portended a simple inquiry with the Clerk of the Court which, as the Court stated in its show-cause Resolution, would have yielded the information that none had yet issued or been promulgated.

Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in his capacity as a member of the bar, not as a journalist. This distinction is meaningless, since as the matter stands, he has failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there is no question of the Courts authority to call him to task either as a newsman or as a lawyer. What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the Court judges them only as those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his actions cannot be put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a persons acts are determined by and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge, training and experience. In the case of the respondent in particular, the Court will take judicial notice of the frequent appearance in his regular columns of comments and observations utilizing legal language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a journalist, be calls upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers and enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot honestly assert that in exercising his profession as a journalist, he does not somehow, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor perhaps even possible to come to any fair, informed, and intelligent judgment of respondents actuations by divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well as a newspaperman, even supposing which is not the case that he may thereby be found without accountability in this matter.

To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even where the Court to lend ear to his plea that his actions be judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law profession of which he is also a member. Withal, it has not escaped the attention of the Court that his Compliance, despite its strong, even passionate, plea for exculpation does not hesitate to own and beg indulgence for fault on his own part, if any be found, and in his own words, to place him at the Courts mercy. And while the objectionable may, by implication, have cast doubt on the integrity of the Courts proceed- [4 LR 24] -ings, they attribute no official or personal impropriety to any member of the Court. These should be considered in mitigation of the imposable discipline or penalty.

WHEREFORE, and upon all of the forgoing considerations, respondent is imposed a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), upon payment of which within a period of FIVE (5) DAYS, from notice thereof, the matter will be considered CLOSED. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into his personal record with the office of the Bar Confidant.

Medialea, J. took no part.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) DANIEL T. MARTINEZClerk of Court

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018