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Dan K®arreman and Mats Alvesson Knowledge-Intensive Firm

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Cages in Tandem: ManagementControl, Social Identity, andIdentification in a Knowledge-Intensive Firm

Dan Karreman and Mats AlvessonLund University, Sweden

Abstract. Developments in organization studies downplay the role ofbureaucracy in favour of more flexible arrangements and forms of organ-izational control, including socio-ideological control. Corporate cultureand regulated social identities are assumed to provide means for theintegration and orchestration of work. Knowledge-intensive firms, whichtypically draw heavily upon socio-ideological modes of control, are oftensingled out as organizational forms that use social identity and thecorporatization of the self as a mode for managerial control. In thisarticle we explore and discuss social identity and identification in a largeIT/management consultancy firm with a strong presence of socio-ideological or normative control, but also with strong bureaucratic fea-tures. Structural forms of control—formal HRM procedures andperformance pressures are considered in relation to socio-ideologicalcontrol. We identify organizational and individual consequences of iden-tification in a context of social, structural, and cultural ‘closures’ andcontradictions, including the tendency to create an ‘iron cage of sub-jectivity’. Key words. identity; knowledge work; management control;professional service firms

Vocabularies and research practices in organization theory have longsuggested that organizations are best understood if viewed as object-like.Conventional wisdom typically pictures organizations as entities (e.g.machines, organisms, and political systems) with given properties(structures, strategies, technologies) (Barley and Kunda, 2001). Much

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intellectual effort has been spent developing an understanding of organ-izations as systemic wholes, an understanding mainly driven by mechan-istic and/or biological metaphors (Morgan, 1986).

These images have been productive. Judging from contemporaryresearch publications they still are, at least in the sense that they are usedby researchers to produce knowledge on and about organizations. How-ever, recent developments in organizational analysis indicate a shift froman entity understanding of organizational activity into something differ-ent. The current interest in organizational culture (Kunda, 1992; Martin,1992; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992; Alvesson, 1995), identity, image, andreputation (Asforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994; Czarniawska,1997; Academy of Management Review special issue, 2000), and organi-zational discourse (Keenoy et al., 1997; Grant et al., 1998; Fournier, 1998;Alvesson and Karreman, 2000) hints at a shift from understandingorganizational activity in material and substantive ways to constructingorganizational activitity as increasingly occuring in the imaginary realm(Alvesson, 1990; Deetz, 1992; Barley and Kunda, 2001).

This development can be understood as a reflection of empiricalchanges in contemporary organizations. Socio-economic changes—suchas the expansion of the service sector, the rise and expansion of so-calledknowledge work, the shift towards a consumer economy—have contrib-uted to create a situation where society, the context of all organizationalactivity, is claimed to have changed fundamentally. These changes haveallowed new organizational forms and new organizational practices toemerge.

Management practices, in particular, are likely to have been trans-formed. In the bureaucratic, industrial mode managerial activity is typic-ally focused on designing and supervising work processes that minimizethe (intellectual) effort and skill necessary for the worker to carry out hisor her work. In this sense, Taylorism summarizes the managerial ethos, inits focus on constructing work procedures constrained to the point whereworkers can do only the correct thing in an economic way.

It can be argued that the idea of management is closely connected withthe rise and ubiquity of the bureaucratic phenomenon (McIntyre, 1984;Jackall, 1988). In other words, it draws upon phenomena such as verticaldivision of labor, hierarchy, and the formalization and standardization ofwork processes (Mintzberg, 1983; Wright, 1996). Management andbureaucracy rest on the idea that work can be divided between those whowork and those who plan, organize, coordinate, and control work.Managerial activities typically focus on designing and supervising workprocesses that minimize the effort and skill necessary for the worker tocarry out his or her work.

However, as traditional industrial work diminishes in organizations,and other forms of work rise in frequency and importance, managerial

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intervention employs other modes of operation. Consider for example theprofessional organization—in Etzioni’s (1964) terminology—which oper-ates under circumstances where it might be difficult or even counter-productive to organize and control behavior. According to Etzioni, amongothers, management targets behavior indirectly, through norms andvalues, in such organizations. This is accomplished through managerialpractices that Etzioni labels, and Kunda elaborates, as normative control:‘the attempt to elicit and direct the required efforts of members bycontrolling the underlying experience, thoughts, and feelings that guidetheir actions’ (Kunda, 1992: 11).

Most work situations contain elements of worker autonomy, whichmanagement ceaselessly attempts to coopt and colonize in the name ofthe corporate good. As Bendix (1956) put it: ‘beyond what commands caneffect and supervision can control, beyond what incentives can induceand penalties prevent, there exists an exercise of discretion . . . whichmanagers of economic enterprises seek to enlist for the achievement ofmanagerial ends’ (cited in Kunda, 1992: 12). Research suggests that newforms of control rarely substitute existing forms. Rather, they emerge as acomplementary control structure that is added to and supplementsexisting forms (cf. Van Maanen and Kunda, 1989).

The recent interest in identity, and social identity in particular, inorganizational theory is thus, among other things, motivated from acontrol point of view. Identity, it is claimed, provides a means for theintegration and orchestration of work. Knowledge-intensive firms, whichtypically draw heavily upon cultural-ideological modes of control, arespecifically singled out as organizational forms that use social identityand the corporatization of the self as a mode for managerial control (cf.Alvesson, 1995, Kunda, 1992). This paper, drawing on an empirical studyof a large IT/management consultancy firm, points at the dynamicsbetween management control, aiming at social closure through structuralmeans, and normative control, with an emphasis on the articulation anddevelopment of social identities.

In this paper we will explore and discuss the relationship between‘substantive’—socio-structural or bureaucratic—forms of control andcultural-ideological or normative control in the firm studied. HRM sys-tems and practices interact with (other) forms of normative control inproducing powerful and coherent forms of inputs to identity formation.Structural forms of control—standardized work methodologies, divisionof labour, formal HRM procedures—will then be considered in relation tonormative control. In particular, we will identify and discuss organiza-tional and individual consequences of social identity and identificationin a context of social, structural, and cultural ‘closures’ and contra-dictions, including tendencies to create an ‘iron cage of subjectivity’. We

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also examine variation and deviation from the normalization and com-pliance of such an iron cage.

On Modes of Managerial ControlManagement is heavily associated with the exercise of control. Althoughmanagers do other things, the exercise of control is a dominant part of themanager’s job (Mintzberg, 1989). Management control typically includesan apparatus for specifying, monitoring, and evaluating individual andcollective action. Management control is predominantly an activity car-ried out by a powerful social group that orchestrates and exercisesdefinitional and executive authority over other social groups within anorganization. This mode of management claims a particular and scarceform of expertise. It is fundamentally self-contained, socially cohesive,and managerialist (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Deetz, 1992).

In this article we will use the label socio-ideological control forattempts to control worker beliefs and technocratic control for attemptsto directly control worker behavior (cf. Alvesson and Karreman, 2001b).In the technocratic type, management works primarily with plans,arrangements, and systems focusing behavior and/or measurable outputs.Consider for example Mintzberg’s (1983) attempt to synthesize the vari-ous coordination mechanisms (as he labeled them) identified in researchon organizational structure. The five mechanisms, as described by Min-tzberg, explicitly target behavior: by various forms of standardization ofwork (procedures, outputs, skills), by direct supervision, or by mutualadjustment. It is clear, however, that the limits of organizational controlhardly rest with ‘behavioral’ means. Mintzberg’s classification appears tobe exhaustive, but only because it introduces mechanisms or types ofcontrol that can account for control that transgresses standardization anddirect supervision. The locus of control is moved from the outside of theworker to the inside: to consensual approval (mutual adjustment). How-ever, since consent is achieved through social processes, this under-standing leaves out—and mystifies—the extent of managerial attempts toinfluence and control the production of consent. In particular, thisunderstanding of control leaves out the fact that much managerial work isgeared towards enacting a particular form of organizational experience(Alvesson, 1995; Deetz, 1992; Mumby, 1988; Smircich and Morgan,1982).

As noted above, we will label managerial efforts to manage suchexperiences and accounts—beliefs, meaning, norms, and interpretations—as socio-ideological forms of control. This form of control targets socialrelations, emotions, identity formation, and ideology. It is especiallysignificant in complex and uncertain organizational situations thatdemand a high degree of decentralization. Here bureaucracy, almost bydefinition, fails. The fact that management cannot control behavior oroutput does not mean, however, that it gives up the intention to control.


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Several concepts have, as noted above, been suggested in the literature toanalyse and understand how such control is exercised: clan (Ouchi,1979), normative control (Etzioni, 1964; Kunda, 1992), concertive control(Barker, 1993), ideology (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988; Mumby, 1988), andidentity regulation (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002).

In this article we will take an particular interest in the relationshipbetween management control, social identity, and identification. Sinceboth social identity and identification are socially produced, it is alsopossible to influence and manage them. In this respect they do not differfrom organizational identities, which—as Pratt and Foreman (2000) havepointed out—may be considered as legitimate objects for managerialintervention and control. Although social identities might not be equallylegitimate targets for managerial control, as the sense of self is notnecessarily seen as a socially acceptable concern of managers, it is clearthat social identities function in a way that makes them interesting formanagement to exploit.

Exploring the Imaginary: Social Identity and IdentificationIdentity is a concept that has many meanings and applications inorganizational analysis. It may, for example, refer to the organizationallevel: to organizational identity (e.g. Albert and Whetten, 1985; Chris-tensen, 1995; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1994, Academy of Management spe-cial issue, 2000). It may, on the other hand, refer to individuals or groupsof individuals: on forms of identification and subjectivity (Knights andWillmott, 1985, 1989; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Deetz, 1992). Sometimesthe two levels are connected to each other: organizational identityinforms personal identity or vice versa in these cases (Dutton et al.,1994). In this paper, we will use identity as a bridging concept betweenindividual, group, professional, and organizational levels. In particularwe will focus on social identity on the individual level, in contrast toorganizational and individual identity.

Social identity as a concept can be traced back to the early 1970s. Thecoining of the concept is attributed to the French-British social psycho-logist Henri Tajfel (Hogg and Terry, 2000). The concept of social identityis similar to the concept of role, as it indicates affiliation to a particularsocial group. However, in contrast to the concept of role, social identitiesmust have personal meaning for the individual. As Tajfel puts it: ‘[Socialidentity is] the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to a certain socialgroup together with some emotional and value significance to him of thisgroup membership’ (Tajfel, 1972: 292 in Hogg and Terry, 2000: 122). Inthe modern world individuals have several social identites. We areparents, children, students, teachers, workers, managers, professionals,and so on, depending on occasion and context. Social identities makeexpectations and interactions more manageable and less dependent on


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ongoing negotiation. They provide instruction and direction, and coun-teract uncertainty and fragmentation (Hogg and Terry, 2000; Karremanand Alvesson, 2001).

In addition to being motivated by self-enhancement, social identity pro-cesses are also motivated by a need to reduce subjective uncertainty aboutone’s perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors, and ultimately, one’sself-concept and place within the social world. (Hogg and Terry, 2000:124)

Social identities are acquired through various processes of identification.Identification draws heavily on people’s tendency to classify themselvesand others into various social categories (Pratt, 2000). These categoriesserve two functions: (a) as cognitive tools for ordering the social environ-ment, and (b) as a means of reflexive identification. Social categories arethus devices for making sense of both the social environment and theself’s location in it—one’s identity in relation to the social environment athand. Processes of identification are a key theme in our analysis, and wereturn to and develop the issue later in the paper.

The concept of social identity and identification demonstrates andunderscores the importance of social categorization. It points out that weas human beings use socially available distinctions—categories—todefine our identities, and that our self-definitions vary depending on thecategorizations available. It suggests that we, peculiar as it might seem,distinguish ourselves and connect to other people through sharing thesame categories for self-identification and, thus, simultaneously expressdistinctiveness and sameness.

To sum up: a social identity points at an affiliation with a social group.It confirms the affiliation, and also charges the affiliation with emotionalsignificance and personal meaning. Social identity is acquired throughprocesses of identification that, due to their social nature, it is possible toinfluence and affect. Social identity has particular relevance for organiza-tional activities due to the fact that it provides clues for action, inter-pretation, and conduct. In this capacity, social identity may provideguidelines for organizational action, that is, potentially operate as adevice for the exercise of managerial control.

We will proceed by exploring the world of work in a global con-sultancy firm. First, we will focus on structural and material conditions.Second, we will outline the imaginary aspects of work and its sig-nificance. Third, we will discuss the interplay between the material andimaginary dimension. Allow us to start with a note on method and a briefintroduction of the firm.

MethodThe field work aimed to arrive at a rich, in-depth illumination of the casecompany. Essentially, the study had an ethnographic approach. It con-sisted of interviews as well as observations of a variety of organizational


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gatherings. These included participating in a project group at workduring two full days (including half a night), observations of trainingsessions, competence group meetings and the annual meeting for man-agers, and externally, at a presention of the company to students. We alsostudied manuals for giving feedback, project methodology, and so on. Tosum up, the study draws upon the three modes of data generationavailable for qualitative research: ‘asking questions’, ‘hanging around’,and ‘reading texts’ (Dingwall, 1997).

We conducted 52 interviews with 45 individuals. People from all partsof the organization were interviewed: the CEO, partners, consultants atvarious levels of seniority, support staff, newly recruited organizationalmembers, and so on. Our interviewees ranged from job applicants to ex-employees, although most of the interviewees were working in thecompany. Participant observation, contact with ex-students from ourdepartment working in the company, and repeat interviews with peoplewho appeared distanced from the company, were tactics used in order toget a rich and nuanced picture of the organization.

Fieldwork was conducted through an open and emergent approach(Alvesson and Deetz,, 2000). Specific research questions were formulatedand reformulated throughout the fieldwork, giving space for empiricalmaterial to affect the research process and results. Analytically, the papersets out from an interpretivist perspective. A central assumption is thatdata are unable to speak alone and must be spoken for. Data presentationthus cannot be separated from interpretation. In this sense the empiricalmaterial has not been codified, but viewed as text. Thus, we have tried togo beyond the ‘surface’ and look for the less obvious in our inter-pretations, with a particular sensitivity towards the possibility of vari-ation and contradiction, and its meanings and consequences (cf.Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000).

The fairly open approach means that we were not restricted to a rigidinterview protocol. Instead, we based interview questions on commonthemes, which were consequently adapted to the stage in the researchprocess and the particular developments of each interview, related to theinterviewee’s specific work situation, seniority, and experiences. Thedevelopment of our understanding of the field thus affected our lines ofinquiry. After an exploratory phase, findings and understandings fromour first 15–20 interviews were organized in emergent themes that wereused as input in new interviews, both in terms of questions asked andwhom to talk to. In this way we were able to refine our graduallydeveloping understanding of the themes that emerged, without providingexcessive a priori closure to fieldwork practices.

The Two Cages of Work: The Case of Big ConsultingBig Consulting is a multinational consulting company. Financially, BigConsulting is a success story. It is has grown rapidly, is highly profitable,


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and is consequently perceived as an attractive employer, capable ofrecruiting bright and ambitious people. Big Consulting essentially oper-ates as a partnership.

Organizational activity at Big is regulated by a highly peculiar mix ofstandard operating procedures and seemingly organic improvisation. Onone hand, work is often carried out on an industrial scale, where projectsmay occupy hundreds of consultants working with fairly standard prob-lems and providing fairly standardized services. On the other hand, somework is almost exclusively carried out in teams, which typically organizetheir work in a highly fluid, organic, and improvisational manner.

The company seemingly relies heavily on bureaucratic modes of organ-izing: division of labor, hierarchy, and standardization. However, effortsto coordinate and regulate work is not restricted to the behavioraldimension. Organizational members often refer to ‘the strong and intenseculture’ which is viewed as a valuable organizational resource, in partic-ular for facilitating coordination and cooperation. Thus, organizationalactivity is significantly regulated and shaped by ideational and normativeelements. Below, we will proceed with an analysis of the minutes ofbehavioral as well as ideational pressures towards uniformity and con-formity.

The Structural Cage: Pressures Towards Behavioral UniformityIn this section we will focus on regulations, mechanisms and proceduresthat target behavior, rather than mental and ideational aspects of work.The structural dimension—the technocratic forms of control—at Big ischaracterized by hierarchy, continuous evaluation, standardized workprocedures, and career paths.

Hierarchy. Hierarchy is highly visible at Big. The hierarchical steps expressnot only status and power, but are also assumed to express competenceand experience. The steps include analysts, consultants, managers, andpartners. The hierarchy is further elaborated by the practice of designat-ing total number of years at the position as a marker of seniority.Consequently, a consultant is not only a consultant: he or she is also a C2or C3, meaning consultant with two or three years’ experience as aconsultant, respectively. The exact position is frequently taken veryseriously within the company.

All work activities in connection with external customers are organ-ized around the concept of the team. This means that junior consultantsalways work in constellations with more senior consultants, and also thata fairly clear-cut division of labor, both vertically and horizontally, is putin play. Organizational member roles are typically explicit, particularlyin project teams. Teams are constructed in a way that makes eachmember’s part in the division of labor clear. Although activity in theteams is fluid and organic, even vague, responsibilities, duties, andexpectations are not:


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‘You typically have a clearly defined role when you enter a project. Yourtasks are described, deliverables defined, and you pretty much administeryour own work based on this relatively tightly specified package.’ (Con-sultant)

Role expectation follows one’s status in the hierarchy. There are deliber-ate efforts to match overall hierarchical status with status in particularprojects. Seniors treat their location as strong indicators of their compe-tence. A person who has been on a particular level for two years isgenerally viewed as more competent than one who has been there oneyear. Informants report that junior people carefully monitor their positionin the company’s promotion/differentiation system. Hierarchy is care-fully fine-tuned from above as well as below.

Organizational members at the lower levels typically describe thehierarchical differences between themselves and the partners as anabyss:

‘We have a well defined hierarchy. And you are extremely small topartners. They are at the top and you have no idea of what they are doing—perhaps they are selling or cashing in the profit or whatever, I don’t know.I don’t have the faintest clue about what they do in their everydaybusiness.’ (Consultant)

This may sound like the relationship between the junior clerk and theCEO of a very large company, but as there is one partner for every 30–40employees, there is no difference in education, and the time-spanbetween most juniors and partners is only 10–15 years’ service, theexperience of hierarchy is worth noting.

More senior organizational members claim that hierarchy loosens itsgrip as one gets promoted. However, among experienced people, whohave learnt the ropes and therefore may exercise more discretion anddegrees of freedom, the hierarchy is still perceived as strong.

HRM procedures: continuous evaluation. The employees at Big are underconstant performance evaluation. Evaluation and feedback are fairlystrictly formalized. Evaluation is organized in two main processes. First,employees are evaluated in relation to their individual development.This process is labelled c-mapping (c stands for career) and is carried outthree to four times every year. The employee’s nearest boss, usually theleader of the project on which the employee currently works, primarilyevaluates the employee. Employees are expected to drive this process to ahigh degree themselves. They are expected to articulate new targets fordevelopment after they have received feedback from the project leader.The feedback, on the other hand, is expected to be constructive and tohelp the employee to identify strengths and weaknesses. The general ideais that everybody should be evaluated in similar ways and according tosimilar criteria. Thus, there are several tools available—policy docu-ments, forms, and standardized software—to ensure that everybody istreated in a fair and unbiased way.


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‘You have the c-maps, which is our tool for formal feedback. Ideally youstart by determining the criteria, together with your project leader. Andthere are five common criteria, such as creating trust, adding value, and soon. And then you typically have more specific criteria. Am I a betterprogrammer than expected? Am I better on communicating than expected?There are standard levels. And that’s well-defined in the instrument, howan analyst is expected to perform, a consultant and so on. And then youpick three or four criteria and then you set the expectations: in threemonths you should have done this and this. And then the project leaderwrites a brief summary after the three months, with your contribution.Typically it also includes comments on your strengths and weaknesses.This is put together into a file that is sent to HR and stored there. And thenyou have the annual review, counselling, where your development plan isdeveloped and evaluated.’ (Consultant)

Second, employees are ranked by their superiors in a process labelledbanding. Banding occurs once a year. The employee is ranked in category1, 2 or 3. Band 1 is reserved for top performers. Category 2 is regarded asacceptable performance. Band 3 is a warning signal. Banding is importantbecause it directly influences compensation: salary influences, careerdevelopment, and perks.

Standardized work procedures. Work is standardized in a variety of ways atBig. First, financial control is tight and elaborate. Project managers putmuch effort into economic plans and budgets. Budgets are monitored andreviewed in a systematic fashion.

Second, work processes are standardized in work methodologies.There exists a unified package of methods that consultants are expectedto use in projects. The use of standardized methodology is perceived as acompetitive advantage within Big Consulting. However, as will be expli-cated below, the methodology itself is hardly what confers the advantage;it is rather the way it organizes the effort, and, in particular, the waystandardized methodologies enforce the task orientation, with a strongfocus on delivery on time. Since the company mainly employs graduatesfrom business schools and technical universities, it usually starts withhighly adaptable employees who have no difficulty in adopting a uniformway of doing things. Due to the variation of projects, the methodology isnot expected to be used as a prescription. It is rather viewed as aresource, but as a resource that is prescribed to be used, one way oranother, in projects.

‘As a manager you learn how to manage projects: to get an idea, a task, andslice it in manageable portions that make it workable, and to proceedregardless, although there are uncertainties.’ (Senior manager)

Third, Big has invested heavily in systems for knowledge management.Knowledge management is primarily seen as a way of taking advantage ofthe scale and scope of the accumulated experiences generated within thefirm. Another key aspect is to diminish the importance of the individualand of personal experience. The idea is that ideas and experience


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developed in one project can be recycled and reused with minimaladaptation in other projects. The premise is that experience can becodified and rationalized in a way that suits database storage andretrieval.

Career paths. The firm is a career company. Initial advancement is expected tobe swift for the individual. As mentioned above, there are four basiclevels: analyst, consultant, manager, and partner. New personnel typi-cally start as analysts. Employees are expected to advance within 12–18months as analysts and within two to four years as consultants. After theconsultant level, advancement becomes more difficult, and only a care-fully chosen few ever make it to the partner level. The partner-to-employee ratio was 1–50 for a fairly long time, but has recently beenadjusted to 1–20, making the partner level a somewhat more realisticoption for employees.

Advancement in the career softens the impact of the tight grip byhierarchy often perceived by newcomers. There are several techniquesand tactics available for making hierarchy a resource, rather than aconstraint:

‘As a manager you pretty much define your own roles. You have a richnetwork, you take part in selling the tasks, and you have influence on acompletely different level. But as a consultant and an analyst, you arepretty much placed on particular projects. And certain people are muchbetter than others at navigating such structures, and have it their wayanyway.’ (Manager)

The career path in the company is sometimes perceived as a trap:

‘I have three years left to partner and it is starting to feel real. On the otherhand, when you have made it to the partner level, then it’s all about stayinghere for life. We’ll see how things develop. Three years is simply too longa planning horizon. The company needs to work to retain its personnelevery year. You can’t lock yourself in and suffer for three years. If you justmake people stay on the promise of a lot of money in three years, the onlything you do is promote bad behaviour . . . It’s enough to stay three yearsto make it look good on the CV. That’s why I don’t believe in long-termlock-up mechanisms. You need to reward your personnel. Continuously.’(Manager)

In general the career path is explicit and accepted. However, there is awidely shared feeling that the way the career structure is constructedmay be obsolete and out of touch with the realities of working life, asindicated by the excerpt above.

The Mental Cage: Identification and Pressures Towards IdeationalConformity

Structural arrangements at Big for regulating organizational activity mayappear both elaborate and tight. However, organizational structures neveroperate on their own, according to a mechanical logic. They are put in


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operation and produce effects through the meanings, orientations, andactions of participants. The cultural context is always significant. Some-times it is in harmony and close affiliation with the structural level,sometimes it is not (Fombrun, 1986). Discrepancies and cracks are notuncommon. The operation of formal structures is frequently open andcan lead to a variety of different impacts: strict formal procedures may befollowed using loose actions. Sometimes they are even decoupled frompractice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In order to understand the ‘structuralcage’, it is necessary to investigate how it is reinforced with a particular,shared and elaborate belief, meaning, and value system. In the sense thatthis system exercises strong control, it may be perceived as a mental cage,made up by cultural material. In a way, the belief system is a part—andperhaps a subset—of the organizational culture at Big. However, we wishto refrain from a complete and detailed description of the culture, partlydue to space limitations and partly because many aspects, howeverinteresting they may be, are not necessary for the present argument.

In this section we will take a closer look at the composition of thebelief system and the ideational elements that feed and support it. Wewill argue that these elements consist of ideas about the comfort of ‘we’,of self-descriptions as ‘anonymous suits’, of loyalty and commitment,and of subordination and obedience.

The comfort of ‘we’. Consultants who work on the clients’ premises often faceproblems in their particular work identity as external, temporary, and(sometimes) questioned. Specifically, they are not really affiliated to theparticular place where they work, and are thus unable fully to expresstheir social identity. Hence, sources of identification are fewer, and as aconsequence more important, and possibly more intense.

Sometimes identification becomes covert and suppressed. Since con-sultants sometimes work in environments where the Big identity andimage is perceived as provocative, they have to acquire the capacity tohide their affiliation from co-workers in other companies, the clientcompany in particular.

‘I think about it a lot because I had some trouble at the beginning of mycareer. I started in a project, feeling happy and thinking that ‘here I amconsulting’ and it misfired. I am very cautious nowadays in a newcompany. I am cautious even in an old client company if there are peopleI haven’t met. It’s about dress code. No uniforms and that stuff. It’s allabout blending with the crowd. Sometimes I don’t even tell people thatI am from Big. I tell them what project I am working on, but not morethan that, because there is so much prejudice and it is just too much tohandle. I remember a project a year ago on commuters; a guy from theproject sat down beside me and started to bullshit about the Big con-sultants. Eventually I told him that I also belonged to Big. That put anend to that conversation. Sometimes it is a bit hard that the client’s peopleare suspicious, which happens fairly often, and you don’t know why.’(Manager)


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Thus, the ‘we-feeling’ of social identity in belonging to Big has two sides:one provide the comfort and security of belonging to an elite corporationwith members that are just like you, and another potentially provokes co-workers. As a consequence, the Big belief system demands that indi-viduals are capable of relaxing and rejoicing in their Big identity andsimultaneously capable of effortlessly hiding it from the external world.

One prominent feature in social identities and processes of identifica-tion is their capacity to provide comfort and security. Social identityconnects the individual to an imaginary collective. This is of course animportant feature when working on the client’s premises, or, as ourinformant puts it, when entering the battle zone:

‘Sometimes I feel that one wants to be different [from the client’s person-nel]. It’s striking that when I eat lunch, I nearly always do it with other BigConsulting consultants. We keep together and it is tacitly understood thatit feels safe and comforting out there in the battle zone. One can breatheand perhaps bullshit a bit. In a way, it maintains the we-and-them spiritand makes one stick with the Big Consulting identity.’ (Manager)

Such interaction is important since it both enhances and elaborates the‘we-ness’ of a particular social identity. Social identities are normallysubtly stated, worked upon, and elaborated in the context of doing work(Karreman and Alvesson, 2001).

Homogenization. Interestingly, the base for identity work at Big is not onlycommunal but also collective. There is a strong tendency for people toconform and develop similar appearences. In the company individualityand creativity are downplayed. Instead, there is an emphasis on coopera-tion and conformity, collective and routine:

‘We are sometimes called “undertakers” because we all have dark suits.Dark suits, briefcases and a bit stiff . . . And we enter as a group. We are notthat individually oriented. We behave as a group because that’s the way wework. We always work in teams but it is not because there is no individualexcellence. It’s a necessary ingredient, but it is like a football team. You canhave many good individuals but if they don’t cooperate nothing good willhappen. And that’s how it becomes a winning team. That’s anothercharacteristic, or part of our image.’ (Partner)

As a consequence of the heavy emphasis on group work and standardiza-tion of methodologies, the individual is typically rather insignificant, atleast as an organizational resource. The project team is emphasized. Onone level the individual is highly visible in the organization: it is theindividual who is evaluated, rewarded and punished. But on anotherlevel, the individual is hardly visible at all. Instead, the individual isviewed as expendable:

‘There is a tradition at Big of viewing individuals as perfectly inter-changeable. If there is a project where a resource is needed, and a resourceexists, then you will move the free resource to the project and you areexpected to work there. As a consequence, you may end up working with


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things that you have explicitly requested to not work with because youdon’t see any potential for development there, as has happened to me acouple of times.’ (Consultant)

Conformity and homogeneity are widely observed and part of the imageof the firm. As such they underscore the serious, competent, and reliableaspects of the organizational identity. They also underscore the image ofdullness, group-think, low creativity, and low innovation capacity. Some-times people in the company refer to themselves ironically as ‘mormons’,referring to their dark suits and homogeneous appearence.

On identification. Identification seems to happen fast and with little or noresistance. Newly recruited members, for example, are keen to suggestfriends who could make a contribution to Big. Perhaps the most inter-esting feature is the attractiveness of the identity as an employee:

‘They are instantly loyal to the firm. They really want to work here andwhen they enter the firm they instantly start to recommend people. I thinkthat people identify tremendously with the firm. They shop at NK [anupmarket Swedish shopping mall] just to get the right look. And they loveit. God, how they love it, being a Big consultant and being part of the firm.And I think that sometimes it is shallow and just about the externalattributes . . . But this identity of being young and very successful—God,identification is very fast in comparison to other places . . . They’ll eventake their mobile phones on their vacations. And they ring and ask if theycan do an [recruitment] interview. And they think it is great if I ring themand ask them to do an interview, even if they are on vacation.’ (Admin-istrative assistant)

Part of the attraction lies in the fact that the elite status of membership isenforced and underscored in most Big contexts. The idea of an elite isjustified and reinforced through up-market recruitment, relatively longperiods of training, good opportunities to develop competence, coopera-tion with bright people, high wages, and career prospects (either withinor outside the company).

As one of our informants noted, since everybody is part of what isperceived as the elite, striving for being best of the best may be testing,difficult and exhausting. In particular, it is difficult to prove in a satisfy-ing manner:

‘It is very hard to be the best in an organization like ours. You have to worka lot. That means that you are probably not the best. You are good, but notthe best. That’s a problem. Because if everybody knows that I work veryhard, then I get a lot of money, and that will push people until they gettired and quit.’ (Manager)

As indicated in the excerpt, quality (being best) is substituted for—or,perhaps better, operationalized into—quantity (working longest hours).Instant loyalty, identification, presumed elite status, and ambition thusprovide the Big belief system with a tolerance, even inclination, for longworking hours. In this context, working long hours is understood as


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demonstrating one’s capacity. It is typically not defined or understoodas exploitation.

Subordination and obedience. Most organization members work as under-lings, with narrowly defined individual responsibility and limited discre-tion. Big mainly recruits young and inexperienced people, who form thebulk of the large-scale projects. They are typically willing to subordinatethemselves to the systems and structures of the work methodology. Thishigh degree of compliance is related to the initial uncertainty felt bynewcomers. Additionally, junior employees are more likely to be excitedby their relative exposure to top management, rather than concerned overhow little impact they actually have. Eventually, as the career progresses,members develop more degrees of freedom:

‘In my first project I had no idea what made this [client] company tick. Atthat time I was more enrolled as a soldier to do my tasks and report whenfinished. It’s different now, because I know more about the client, itshistory and our history together. I know them.’ (Manager)

However, subordination and obedience are not mainly accomplishedthrough intense symbolic bombardment and an elaborate dramaturgy ofthe powerful. They are not even primarily secured by recruiting young,similar-minded and receptive people directly from universities. Suchelements may facilitate subordination and obedience, but they are notsufficient to directly secure it. Subordination is rather accomplished bythe combination of being explicitly voluntary, and mentally perceivedand interpreted as temporary. Since the belief system at work at Big isconstructed to interpret career advancement as self-evident and natural,all members are invited to take the partner’s point of view. In fact, thecareer system creates a situation where all hierarchical positions exceptthe partner position are temporary. In fact, within the partner categorythere is also careful social differentiation and a variety of career levels.

Discussion: Soft Iron Cage and Hard Mental Cage?For a long time, organizations were stereotypically understood asbureaucracies, with very slightly refined and tightened structural cages.For the last 30 years, this stereotype has been complemented and to acertain extent substituted with another cliche—that organizations arebecoming increasingly network based, organic, and flexible, and mainlyknit together through bonds in the imaginary realm: values, ideas, mutualadjustment, community feelings or identity. However, our case points ina third direction: organizations where both structural and imaginaryaspects are elaborate and consequential. This phenomenon/kind oforganization is not entirely new to organizational analysis. For example,Van Maanen and Kunda (1989) observed that the managed organizationalculture they investigated did not substitute other forms of control, assuggested by most of the early literature on organizational culture.


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Rather, in their case normative—socio-ideological—control operated asan additional and complementary layer of control.

However, drawing on our empirical findings, we will suggest thattechnocratic and socio-ideological forms of control have a more complexrelationship, in particular in knowledge-intensive firms/professionalservice organizations. In this sense, our argument has similarities toCourpasson’s (2000) concept of soft bureaucracy. Our argument doeshowever differ somewhat from Courpasson, who claims that certainseemingly post-bureaucratic organizational practices, such as decentral-ization, are better understood as confirming the bureaucratic logic, ratherthan breaking away from it. We argue that in our case the bureacraticlogic is also affected in the interplay between the control forms. Ratherthan viewing the imaginary, such as organizational and social identitiesand organizational cultures, as additional or a separate extension to thesubstantive/structural/material dimension, socio-ideological and techno-cratic forms of control build upon and feed each other in these kinds ofcompanies (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001b).

Big is in many respects not dissimilar from the machine bureaucracyideal-type (Mintzberg, 1983). There are elaborated systems, structures,and procedures for everything from the recycling of knowledge to assess-ments and feedback provision. Technocratic control is highly elaborate.The iron cage metaphor has its benefits in understanding Big. However,the nature of the task calls for much flexibility and the exercise ofprofessional judgement. Bureaucracy has its limits and leaves only par-tial imprints on behaviour. Work procedures are standardized but aregenerally loosely coupled to tasks. Several standardized work proceduresare typically suggested for the same task, and individual consultants areexpected to exercise their judgement in actual implementation, givingthem plenty of discretion. The intangible and interactive nature ofadvanced service production, for example, makes it necessary to includethe client in the selection of work procedures, which inevitably intro-duces uncertainties beyond the company’s control, thus limiting thespace for tightly coupled standardization. There are thus elements ofadhocracy in the organization.

Although organizational members acknowledge the bureaucratic‘nature’ of many aspects of work at Big, it is clear that structural featuresare typically viewed as dispositional, rather than deterministic. The ironcage is thus rather soft, or perhaps a mix of strict and flexible elements. Itprovides support and guidelines that consultants apply according toindividual judgement. They do not determine action, at least not in anystraightforward manner. Ultimately, the fact that core work processes inthe team are exercised in a organic and flexible fashion puts an effectivelimit on the influence of structural modes of operations, from a produc-tion point of view.


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The Obsession to Deliver: Task Orientation and SubordinationBig may be understood as a large and effective production machine in thesense that people are well synchronized, hardworking, reliable, andaccomplish predictable results. The capacity to deliver is very high.Elements of machine bureaucracy are instrumental here, but we are nottalking of companies offering mass-market services or manufacturingstandard components. The orientations of people are crucial here and theconsequences of bureaucracy are contingent upon the work orientationsand judgements of employees. As a high degree of homogeneity andcompliance attunes the orientations of the workforce with the machineelements in the structures, we may here talk of a mental cage, supple-menting the iron cage.

The close interplay between the cages is clearly visible in the phenom-enon of a very strict work ethic, in particular in relation to the delivery ofresults. Work is a serious business at Big and the task at hand is always infocus. Work procedures and management styles are typically gearedtowards giving the task top priority. The company is known for itsdelivery culture and commitment to keeping deadlines at all costs. Thisfocus on the task is typically viewed as a strength, since it contributes toBig’s reputation as a reliable and trustworthy business partner thatdelivers what is promised:

‘Irrespective of what kind of internal issues have been planned and bookedfor a long time—if we are needed at the client’s place this is what guidesus. And this may create internal hell, to put it frankly, but this priority isvery strong.’ (Associate partner)

This delivery orientation is to some extent produced through facilitatingarrangements such as standardized work procedures, and controllingmeans such as careful monitoring of budgets and progress, but this is farfrom sufficient to explain the persistence, coherence, and level of pene-tration of this orientation, suggesting the metaphor of a mental cage. Thiscollective mentality means focus and discipline but also a somewhatnarrow competence, reflecting the downside of a tight system:

‘Customers see us as providers of competence but also as resources inpushing for change. They know that we go in there with high motivation, awillingness to work hard. They also expect us to contribute with newthoughts and ideas. But somehow it feels as if not many of them expect usto come as the real experts and contribute with the fantastic, brilliant ideasthat will revolutionize the world . . . This is more a matter of working hardand producing sufficiently good ideas and drive and seeing that thingschange for the client. It is increasingly a matter of getting things straight.’(Partner)

Subordination and obedience are, of course, partly effects of structuralrelations such as the partnership system and the formal structure, but arefurther facilitated by the sheer intensity of the symbolic and ideationalinfluence to which organizational members are exposed. In general,


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employees experience the company as demanding, involving the entireperson:

‘The strong culture is one of our advantages. It’s intense. It’s the intensitythat makes it special. And that’s very positive if you like to live in anintense environment and very negative if you dislike it. You are forced toparticipate. Yes, forced is the word. You are forced to participate inprojects and a lot of other formations. Everything is extremely intense. Ifyou can’t stand it, it’s very stressful. And that stress isn’t positive, it’snegative. It can lead to burnout.’ (Analyst)

There is thus a variety of demands on behaviour as well as mentalinvolvement and a high degree of responsiveness to the corporate envir-onment. Hierarchy, particularly the way it is dramatized and presented,further advances the importance of subordination and obedience:

‘The career pyramid is absolutely central. It expresses the logic for pre-cisely how everything works. You know this almost before you enter thefirm. In the recruitment process there is a lot of talk about “we are apyramid, we work that way, we are hierarchical for sure, but that’s the waywe operate”, and that creates a sense of security because you know exactlywhere you are, and that everybody has the opportunity to move up in thepyramid.’ (Senior manager)

This experience is not a direct effect of formal hierarchy, or purecompetence, or behavioural issues, but reflects the ideas and beliefsabout career steps and progress in human development, and the strongsymbolism of being a partner. The relationship between seniors andjuniors is not a simple result of how the company is built, but is as mucha matter of people constructing corporate reality in a ladder-like fashion,mentally producing and reinforcing hierarchy in ways that are fairlyuncommon these days, at least in professional organizations and amongorganizations with a limited age span—in Big, there are few people over45 years old.

Having demonstrated the partial powers of bureaucracy and techno-cratic controls, and the social constructions leading to the mental cage,let us now explore how this is produced. We then examine the role ofidentity and how bureaucracy—in particular hierarchy and careersteps—regulates it. Finally, we provide a preliminary explanation of theemergence of the interplay between control forms as observed in our casestudy.

Framing Identification Through Behavioral Control SystemsPerhaps the most interesting aspect of how structural control feeds intothe imaginary domain, at least in the context of this paper, is howtechnocratic systems of control contribute to and facilitate identification.According to Pratt, identification, defined as when ‘an individual’s beliefabout his or her organization becomes self-referential or self-defining’(Pratt, 2000: 457), is created through consecutive processes of sense-breaking and sensegiving.


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Sensebreaking processes actively create void/deficit of meaning. In thissense, sensebreaking is the reversal of sensemaking. Whereas sensemaking—the processes of meaning creation—is grounded in identity construc-tion (Weick, 1995), sensebreaking is, according to Pratt, grounded inidentity destruction:

[S]ensebreaking involves a fundamental questioning of who one is whenone’s sense of self is challenged. Sensebreaking is similar but more specificthan other terms used in describing human change, such as dissonancereduction . . . or unfreezing . . . in that the main purpose of sensebreakingis to disrupt an individual’s sense of self to create a meaning void that mustbe filled. (Pratt, 2000: 464)

Pratt identified one primary sensebreaking practice in the organization hestudied, a practice labelled dream building. Dream building involves thearticulation of and commitment to personal and sales goals. According toPratt, dream building creates a meaning void by linking identity to (lackof) possessions, motivating by encouraging comparisons between currentand ideal identities, and through perpetuating the tension betweencurrent and ideal identities.

It can be argued, in a similar vein, that at least two structural controlpractices operate as sensebreaking processes at Big. However, the mean-ing void is not constructed by linking identity to material possessions inthis context. At Big, identity is strongly related to success. The meaningvoid is not constructed by stimulating fantasies about luxury lifestyles,although this element may play an indirect role, as pay increases aresignificant at Big. It is rather constructed by actively choosing organiza-tion members already motivated by and used to relative success,acknowledging their elite potential and then putting them in at theminimum level in terms of status, prestige, and acknowledged success.The organizational bureaucracy, with strong hierarchical differentiation,emphasis on titles, formal career steps, and a wealth of HRM procedures,underlines social positioning and its dependence on how formal struc-tures and procedures work. Identity is, then, tightly related to socialposition. Individuals in Big are carefully placing themselves and othersin terms of formal positions.

The career system at Big operates in a manner that provides someinstant gratification for hard, routine, and repetitive work typicallycarried out in a highly formatted way and with few degrees of freedom.However, it effectively puts most rewards on hold, with a promise thateventually, if you as a member work hard enough, are smart enough, anddon’t make peers and superiors uncomfortable, you will be rewardedlavishly later on, in terms of both material compensation and personalautonomy. The elite image, the campus atmosphere, and the relativelyhigh salaries are some important ways in which Big furnishes instantgratification and offers a taste of what might be to come. The relativelytransparent career structure provides a predictable path for the individ-ual, which makes it possible for him or her to create checks and balances:


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hard work and subordination now, bonuses, status, and autonomy later.Future rewards and anticipated identities thus form a joint career/self-project: people define themselves partly through their expected trajector-ies and forthcoming success (Grey, 1994).

Sensebreaking is further maintained and sustained through the wayhierarchy and career paths operate in this context. The hierarchy may saysomething about the power structure. It might even say something aboutlevels of competence, as claimed by organizational members (Alvessonand Karreman, 2001a). However, without a doubt, it says somethingabout organizational success as defined locally (culturally). Since virtu-ally all organizational members seem to take part in organizationalactivities on the premise that they are potential partners, and are activelyencouraged to think so, hierarchical position becomes important as agauge of one’s relative success. Thus, when organizational members pullrank through what the outsider perceives as mindless and hair-splittingcomparisons of relative seniority, it is very much about evidence ofsuperior organizational success. Hierarchical differences maintain themotivation through designating role models for underlings to use tochannel their aspirations. The motivation is further maintained throughestablishing prescribed career paths that provide points of entry forevaluating current development status, that is, whether the individual ison his or her way towards his or her ideal self or if corrective action isnecessary.

The elaborate character of hierarchical differences, and the career pathsthus constructed, maintain the void over time. Each hierarchical step isbut a temporary success, which until the partnership level is reached willalways be transformed into new aspirations and identity deficits, sincepartnership is the ultimate goal. Thus, hierarchical differentiation oper-ates, in this context, as a perpetuator of motivation: a rather perplexingfact, considering that hierarchical differences generally are expected toproduce alienation rather than motivation. In the case of Big, we certainlysee signs of frustration among juniors, and senior actors also bemoan thelack of flexibility and creativity, but the motivation effect of hierarchyand promotion is stronger.

Sensebreaking is an important part of managed identification, since itcreates a demand for identity work and identity material. However,sensebreaking can, according to Pratt, only initialize identification. Itcannot bring it to an end. Identification is put to an end by variousprocesses of sensemaking (Weick, 1995; Pratt, 2000). Following Pratt, wewill focus on processes where sense is provided rather than spontan-eously created. Such processes are typically labelled sensegiving (Gioiaand Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994; Pratt, 2000).

Sensegiving occurs when certain groups or individuals are ‘attemptingto influence the sensemaking process . . . toward a preferred redefinitionof organizational reality’ (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991: 442). Pratt (2000)identified one primary practice of sensegiving in his case study: positive


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programming. The practice is basically an elaborated version of positivethinking, where organizational members are trained in filling their mindswith positive and uplifting thoughts. In concrete terms, the practiceincluded creating a relationship with a mentor (positive role model),creating relationship barriers to people who might be critical or sceptical,and enacting and perpetuating such barriers.

The dominant sensegiving practices at Big cannot be boiled down toone dominant practice, as in Pratt’s study. Rather, there are at least threepractices and elements that in combination provide sensegiving in a waysimilar to Pratt’s example. Again, it is key parts of the structural systemsof control that operate as sensegiving practices. Perhaps the most import-ant part is played by the systems for continuous evaluation. Thesesystems operate as sensegiving practices in two significant ways. First,they are designed to evaluate not only how individuals perform, but alsohow they are as people (have drive and ambition, create trust, want todevelop, and so on). Thus, the feedback system provides cues not only onhow to behave but also on how to be, and, perhaps even more sig-nificantly, what to become. In this way the feedback system both providesidentity material and gauges the relative development. Second, thefeedback system operates in a fashion that is in many ways similar to thepractice of positive programming. This is partly because it is designed ina way that plays up positive and constructive feedback and plays downnegative and potentially destructive feedback. Perhaps more signifi-cantly, the feedback system provides an officially appointed mentor, theso-called counsellor: an officially sanctioned role model, ally, careersupervisor, and organizational therapist in one neat package.

Pratt argues that there are four possible outcomes of identification:positive identification, non-identification, dis-identification, and ambiva-lent identification. Positive identification means that identification isachieved and hence successful. The other form outcomes are to someextent identification failures, with ambivalent identification standinghalfway between success and failure. The way things are at Big, only twooutcomes are possible, at least over time: positive and ambivalent identi-fication. The combined effect of the structural and mental cages makesnon- and dis-identification implausible. The way the career paths, team-work and feedback systems work and link together will virtually guaran-tee that non-identification and dis-identification will eventually lead topoor performance evaluations, sanctions from project team members,lack of promotion and, in the end, to being nicely but firmly asked toleave the firm. Although these structural means for producing at least abehavior and a manifested attitude that exhibit a strong commitment towork are powerful, they also are dependent on a strong support for this.Working hours and performances perceived as below average will bedriven out through bureaucratic means of control, but the average ispartly produced through work identities and cultural norms that themajority of the employees share and voluntarily act upon.


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The Hybridization of Control Forms as a Cultural ProcessWe do not think that there is any clearcut, simple, and mechanicalexplanation for the way control forms interact and interplay in our casestudy. The interplay between—or hybridization of—the control forms is asocial process, and not an algorithm or a program. Social processes aretypically over-determined; social phenomena can usually be explained ascaused by many things, independent of each other. However, we willattempt a preliminary explanation which accounts for what we think arethe most important elements behind the hybridization.

The emergence of the interaction between the control forms has sig-nificant historical roots. Big started out as a division within an organiza-tion that operated as an accountancy firm. Accountancy is a highlyregulated area, thus providing external pressures towards bureaucratiza-tion. In this sense, technocratic forms of control at Big can be understoodas a heritage: as something that it inherited from its parent company andthat has become an institutionalized and taken-for-granted practice.

However, over time Big has entered business areas where bureaucraticpractices have been perceived as problematic. In particular, the speed oftechnological development and the complexity of products in the ITsector have made total reliance on bureaucratic protocol unviable. In themanagement consulting field, the emergence of the perception of thebureaucratic form as inefficient and outdated is likely to have exercisedpressure towards the incorporation of post-bureaucratic control forms. AsBig has entered new business areas, and old business areas have changed,new and old control forms have continually been tried and tested. Sincetechnocratic forms of control are part of the heritage, they have been ableto persist, as long as they do not prove too much of a disadvantage.

To put it briefly, the emergence of interaction between the controlforms is an ironic reversal of justification: bureaucratic practices are keptbecause of their links to the organizational culture—to heritage andtradition—and socio-ideological forms of control are introduced becauseof external pressures and their perceived efficiencies. However, as ouranalysis shows, technocratic forms of control have not been completelyritualized. Instead, some have been re-interpreted and re-enacted in waysthat produce control effects partly in the behavioural domain (as onewould expect), and partly in the normative domain, as demonstratedabove.

It is important to point out the role of history in understanding how thehybridization has emerged. The intricate relationship between the con-trol forms is a product of taken-for-granted practices (culture), environ-mental changes and pressures (external contingencies), processes ofimagination, trial and error, and, above all, time. In this sense, thehybridization of control forms at Big is an example of ‘true’ culturalchange—aspect-rich and inert but yet dynamic—and thus a sharp con-trast to the shallow engineered efforts towards cultural change frequently


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initiated in contemporary organizations. The Big change is anchored inspecific social practices more than in symbolic leadership behaviour(vision statements, explicit references to values, and workshops com-municating these on a fairly abstract level, too easily detached fromeveryday life).

ConclusionIn this article we have explored two layers of control in a knowledge-intensive firm: technocratic and socio-ideological layers. While techno-cratic control mainly circles around the use of bureaucracy andperformance measures, socio-ideological control addresses values, mean-ings, and ideas, including identities. In exploring the technocratic layerof control we have analysed structural arrangements: in our case hier-archy, regulated career paths, feedback procedures, and work method-ologies. In exploring the socio-ideological layer of control, we havefocused on social identity and identification, which for our particularcase study has been analysed as consisting of ideas of social positioning,career orientations, subordination and obedience, loyalty and commit-ment, the comfort of ‘we’, and homogenization of selves.

We have emphasized the interplay of forms of control. Technocraticcontrol focuses the behavioral level, but bureaucracy also exercises asocio-ideological influence (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001b). We inter-pret the bureaucratic structures of Big partly as a means to providemeaning and identification—a vehicle for creating and maintainingshared understanding and shared identities. Structural similarities—thesame manuals, work methodologies, career steps, and hierarchiesthroughout the entire corporate group—facilitate the development of ashared universe and stimulate a shared identity. HRM practices andhierarchical structures are important for the definition of the temporaryidentities of individuals and reinforce their identity projects. Thus, thetechnocratic and socio-ideological layers of control do not so muchcomplement or supplement, as feed upon and inform each other.

It could be argued that the limits to the technocratic forms of controlindicate a softening of the ‘iron cage of bureaucracy’, as flexibility anddegrees of freedom for organizational members are called for in this kindof organization. We contend that the structural cage, so to speak, at leastappears to be less fixed and rigid at Big than is commonly associated withbureaucracy, thus avoiding some of the well-known pitfalls of the organ-izational form. However, more significantly, we claim that the interplaybetween technocratic and socio-ideological control at Big in reality alsotightens the cage. Big’s iron cage might be softer and less restrictive, but itinteracts with a mental cage of subjectivity, and the combined effectscover greater terrain, thus regulating and influencing a broad spectrum oforganizational members’ activities, feelings, thinking, and self-understandings.


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The real test of whether the cage is tightened or loosened seems todepend on to what extent organizational members actually identify withthe belief system. A crucial element in the mental cage is thus the degreeof identification with the company and its career options. It may seemhard to accept that people are so easily influenced that they quickly andseemingly wholeheartedly accept a quite specific belief system and tietheir identities so strongly with corporate membership and career steps.It should be borne in mind that the organizational members perceive theimage of the company as positive and prestigious, which increases theinclination to identification (Dutton et al., 1994). However, it is moreimportant to distinguish between the psychological and the sociologicaldimensions of a particular identification: respectively, internalization,and temporary identification with a group or a company. Social forces arecontinuously in operation and are very important. They reinforce theencouragement and monitoring of a particular identity orientation andpositioning. Technocratic control arrangements, and group orientationsand expectations, provide strong pressures for people to adopt a socialidentity in a particular context. As so much of the work is group based,and there are intensive HRM arrangements for monitoring and evaluatingpeople, the social pressure on identity is strong—even though identity isonly indirectly accessible for regulation (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002).This is particularly significant as people work very long hours and thespace for non-work related sources of identity confirmation is limited.The long working week is an effect of technocratic control, in particularcareful monitoring of work progress, margins, and deadlines, but perhapsespecially an expression of the work mentality that characterizes thecompany. (We recognize an element of tautology here: embryonic workidentities bring with them an inclination to work long hours, which inturn maintains and reinforces fixed work identities.) In the case of Big,technocratic and socio-ideological control collaborates to saturate workcontexts with specific identity material, thus achieving social penetra-tion. As long as organizational members operate within the constraints ofBig’s technocratic forms of control, monitored by superiors, peers andformal evaluation procedures, the psychological penetration of identi-fication, although important for the individual, is less important from theorganization’s point of view.

To conclude, we have proposed an understanding of control in ‘mod-ern bureaucracies’ or ‘post-bureaucracies’ as an interplay between aloosened form of structural iron cage and a fairly strict mental cage ofsubjectivity. Bureaucracy steps back from its strict, behavior-directivecapacities and widens the space for behavioral discretion. At the sametime, its loosened behavioral grip is redirected to involving strongerclaims on people’s subjectivity: loosened behavioral control is compen-sated by tightened control of subjectivity. The nature and relative sig-nificance of the iron cage in at least some contemporary organizationsneed to be reconsidered. More attention needs to be paid to the interplay


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with a mental cage, tightening people’s orientations and allowing for aparticular form of bureaucratically governed flexibility and conditionaldiscretion. As with all identity production, everyday cultural processesinfluence the orientations that are crucial for these organizational fea-tures where slightly senior peers and superiors communicate a particularmentality to newcomers. However, our case study suggests—in contrastto much of the literature on corporate culture which views culture andbureaucracy as a different, alternative form of control (e.g. Ouchi,1979)—that the mental cage is partly produced by organizational andHRM systems and procedures, and is thus to some extent an outcome ofbureaucracy. The close interplay between two cages of control is thus animportant subject of further study—at least in companies similar to theone we have studied, possibly also more generally.

NoteThe authors would like to thank David Courpasson, Jannis Kallinikos, Mike Reed,Maxine Robertson and EGOS 2001: ‘The odyssey of bureaucracy’ sub-themeparticipants for comments on earlier drafts of the article.

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Dan Karreman is a lecturer at Lund University, Sweden. He is currently engaged inresearch on discourse and organization, knowledge work and knowledge-intensive firms. Address: Department of Business Administration, Lund Uni-versity, Box 7080, SE-22007 Lund, Sweden. [email: [email protected]]

Mats Alvesson is Professor of Business Administration at the School of Economics andManagement, Lund University. He is currently leading several research projects,of which one deals with issues of work, identity, and leadership in knowledge-intensive organizations. He has published extensively in many internationaljournals and published several books on organizational culture, leadership,gender, critical theory and method. His most recent books are UnderstandingOrganizational Culture (Sage, 2002) and Postmodernism and Social Research(Open University Press, 2002). Address: Department of Business Administration,Lund University, Box 7080, SE-22007 Lund, Sweden. [email: [email protected]]


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