Leveraging Oracle Database Partitioning and Hybrid Columnar Compression with Pillar Axiom QoS
Allocation of Data Mining Resources: A system Partitioning and Hybrid Control Architecture
description
Transcript of Allocation of Data Mining Resources: A system Partitioning and Hybrid Control Architecture
Allocation of Data Mining Resources:A system Partitioning and Hybrid
Control Architecture
John James
“Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total”*
* The Art of War by Sun Tzu , Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Page 129
Joint Forces Information Architecture
SystemsSystemsArchitectureArchitecture
TechnicalTechnicalArchitectureArchitecture
OperationalOperationalArchitectureArchitecture
Operational Architecture (OA) is the totalaggregation of missions, functions, tasks,information requirements, and businessrules
Technical Architecture is the “buildingcodes” upon which systems are based
Systems Architecture is the physicalimplementation of the OA, the layout andrelationship of systems andcommunications
JointJointInteroperabilityInteroperability
The Information to be shared: A view of the operational architecture
Entities
Interactions
Actions
Interactions
Entities
TASKSORGANIZATION
The Technical Architecture
The higher levels of the joint force system architecture
The tactical level of the system architecture
State estimation and reactive control
Information Assurance Processes
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
SECURITYSERVICES
TRANSMISSION
STORAGE
PROCESSING
INFORMATIONSTATES
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
AVAILABILITY
AUTHENTICATION
NON-REPUDIATION
PROTECTION
DETECTION
REACTION
SECURITYMAINTENANCE
TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
PEOPLE
SECURITYCOUNTER
MEASURES
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
SECURITYSERVICES
TRANSMISSION
STORAGE
PROCESSING
INFORMATIONSTATES
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
AVAILABILITY
AUTHENTICATION
NON-REPUDIATION
PROTECTION
DETECTION
REACTION
SECURITYMAINTENANCE
TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
PEOPLE
SECURITYCOUNTER
MEASURES
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
SECURITYSERVICES
TRANSMISSION
STORAGE
PROCESSING
INFORMATIONSTATES
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
AVAILABILITY
AUTHENTICATION
NON-REPUDIATION
PROTECTION
DETECTION
REACTION
SECURITYMAINTENANCE
TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
PEOPLE
SECURITYCOUNTER
MEASURES
Information Dominance ProcessesDISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
SECURITYSERVICES
TRANSMISSION
STORAGE
PROCESSING
INFORMATIONSTATES
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
AVAILABILITY
AUTHENTICATION
NON-REPUDIATION
PROTECTION
DETECTION
REACTION
SECURITYMAINTENANCE
TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
PEOPLE
SECURITYCOUNTER
MEASURES
INFORMATIONDO MINANCE
SERVICES
SITUATION-ASSESSMENT SUPPORT
MILITARY-DECISION-MAKING-PROCESS SUPPORT
TRUTH-MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE
CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE
SYSTEM STATE (CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION)
SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
SECURITYSERVICES
TRANSMISSION
STORAGE
PROCESSING
INFORMATIONSTATES
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
AVAILABILITY
AUTHENTICATION
NON-REPUDIATION
PROTECTION
DETECTION
REACTION
SECURITYMAINTENANCE
TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
PEOPLE
SECURITYCOUNTER
MEASURES
INFORMATIONDO MINANCE
SERVICES
SITUATION-ASSESSMENT SUPPORT
MILITARY-DECISION-MAKING-PROCESS SUPPORT
TRUTH-MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
Conjecture for resource allocationConjecture: Intrusion Detection will be more
effective if explicit efforts are made to allocate Intrusion Detection Resources to support efforts to maintain acceptable levels of risk that enterprise knowledge has been compromised
Problem: how do we identify acceptable levels of risk?
Approach: Understand commander’s intent and allocate resources to identify threats to synchronization of execution of functions by units over time that achieve the intent
A joint force operation
(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4DSBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4DSBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4DSBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
(+)
OBJ. FALKIRK
1D 3/67 A( -)CBT
588TH
SBF4DSBF4D
Route Purple
Minefield Single lanebreech
Synchronizing unit operations
Phase Unit
Phase I
Phase II
…
Phase N
Unit 1
Activity of Unit 1 during Phase I
…
…
Activity of Unit 1 during Phase N
Unit 2
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
Unit M
Activity of Unit M during Phase I
…
…
Activity of Unit M during Phase N
Synchronizing unit functions supporting seizing objective Falkirk
Phase Unit
Phase I(move to LOD)
PhaseII(SBF4D)
Phase III(Breech)
Phase IV
(Seize obj)
D/3/67 Armor
Occupy positions along LOD
Move to SBF4D
Suppressive fire on
objective
Pass through minefield to seize
obj
A/3/67 Armor
Occupy positions to feint attack on right
flank
Execute feint attack on right
flank
Execute feint attack on right
flank
Execute feint attack on right
flank
B/3/67 Armor
Occupy positions as battalion reserve
Be prepared to assume main
attack
Be prepared to assume main
attack
Be prepared to assume main
attack
A(-)/588th Engineers
Occupy positions behind D/3/67
Move forward behind D/3/67
Execute single-lane minefield
breech
Suppressive fire on objective from
SBF4D
Artillery Execute Fire Plan Suppressive fire on
objective
Suppressive fire on
objective
On order shift fires behind objective
BATTALION-LEVEL DELIBERATE PLANNING TIMES* (MANUAL BASELINE)
(ONLY BATTALION--ADDITIONAL TIME REQUIRED FOR COMPANY, PLATOON, & SQUAD LEVEL PLANNING)
• WARNING ORDER• COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT• COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS• COLLABORATIVE PLANNING• ORDER PREPARATION• ORDER DISSEMINATION
30 - 60 min1 - 4 hrs1 - 5 hrs1.5 - 2 hrs1 -2 hrs1.5 - 4 hrs
OVERALL ESTIMATE RANGE: 8 - 10 Hours
AVERAGE TIME TAKEN: 9.5 Hours
* Estimates from battalions of 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, October 1999
BATTALION-LEVEL AVERAGE IPB PREPARATION TIMES* (MANUAL BASELINE)
• MODIFIED COMBINED OBSTACLE OVERLAY
• WEATHER PRODUCTS• ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION
ANALYSIS• EVENT TEMPLATE• EVENT MATRIX• DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE• BOS SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX• INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION
MATRIX
2 - 6 hrs
20 min - 1 hr1.5 - 12 hrs
1 -4 hrs1 -2 hrs1.5 - 4 hrs2 - 6 hrs30 mins - 5 hrs
OVERALL ESTIMATE RANGE: 12 - 19 Hours
AVERAGE TIME TAKEN: 15.5 Hours
* Estimates from battalions of 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, October 1999
Discrete and continuous components
GARRISON SUPPORT
G3
G1
G4
SBIS
SCIF
RCAS
VTC
DMS
DDN
GATEWAY
TacticalInternet
Network
BSA
Ft. Bragg
WIN-TJTRS
Digitizing the Battlefield
STEP
Digitizing the Installations First Digitized Corps 2004
95 Installationsby 2005
Warfighter Information Network
Secure Networks
DISN
JCDBJCDBInstallation Information Installation Information
Infrastructure Modernization Infrastructure Modernization ProgramProgram
I3MPI3MP
A modeling framework
XInit is a set of initial states;
RInvfInitVXH ,,,,, where
X is a finite collection of state variables.
CD XXX with DX countable and n
CX , an n-dimensional, real-number vector space;
V is a finite collection of input variables. We assume CD VVV with DV countable and
nCV ;
CXVXf : is a vector field, assumed to be globally Lipschitz in CX and continuous in V;
VXInv is an invariant set;
XVXR 2: is a reset relation.
We refer to Xx as the state of H and to Vv as the input of H.
Summary
• Critical infrastructure processes (such as military operations) have discrete and continuous components
• Understanding complex dynamical processes requires modeling both discrete and continuous components
• Allocation of data mining resources should be done to support meeting enterprise process goals (such as commander’s intent)