Notes on: Review 3rd model: Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The American Political Science Review 63, 3:689‐718 

 Prepared by Ariadna73    Page 1 of 2 

To use this model, the analyst displays the perceptions, motivations, position, power and maneuvers of the principal players

Each leader pulls to his own end Contrast with Model I: Several actors instead of an unitary actor Power is shared

How it applies to the Cuban crisis Analytic paradigm

I Basic unit of analysis: Policy as a political outcome Happenings are results from compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among government officials National behavior can be conceived as outcomes of wittgensteinian games

II Organizational concepts A. Players in Positions (men in jobs)

Positions define what players may and must do Players are also people

B. Parochial Priorities Perceptions and Issues C. Interests, Stakes and Power (The three elements of power)

Bargaining advantages Skill Will

D. The problem and the problems Each solution to a smaller problem affects the bigger problem

E. Action channels F. Actions as politics

The context of shared power determines the mechanisms of choice Players end up using strategies to "make the government do whet is right"

G. Streams of outcomes Understanding of the outcome requires that it be disaggregated All the little streams of outcomes feed up the bigger outcome

III Dominant inference pattern The action of the nation is the outcome of the bargainings between sub-organizations

IV. General propositions 1. Action and intention

Cannot presuppose intention Sometimes the result (action) is the sum of different courses and no-one's intention

2. Where you stand depends on where you sit It is easy to predict the responses if you know the positions of the actors

3. Chiefs and indians Different chiefs must build a coalition of the relevant powers There are fights against indians (departments)

Notes on: Review 3rd model: Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The American Political Science Review 63, 3:689‐718 

 Prepared by Ariadna73    Page 2 of 2 

Issue looking down: Options = How to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties The issue looking sideways is commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition The issue looking upwards is confidence: how to give the boss confidence

V. Specific propositions 1. Deterrence

Which players can decide an attack? Though model I, an attack is not realistic because it would be a suicide and governments don't commit suicide Questions considered

Could any member of the government solve his problem by attack What stream of outcomes might lead to an attack? How might miscalculation and confusion generate foul-ups that yield attack as an outcome?

The US Blockade of Cuba: A third Cut The politics of discovery

Discovery of the missiles and when it happened can be explained by a series of bargaining games Cuba was Kennedy's Achiles's heel He was campaigning, and wanted to solve the Cuba problem soon

The politics of issues Khrushchev had caught the US "with the pants down" Kennedy was angry with Khrushchev "He can't do that to me!"

Doing nothing or taking a diplomatic approach would not solve Kennedy's problem There was a lot of advising and they wanted to show the president how the russian guy was provoking him

The politics of choice Initially, the President wanted the surgical air strike Fortuitous coincidences prevented the air strike

McNamara's vision of holocaust Robert Kennedy didn't want his brother to become a "Tojo" (another Pearl Harbor maker) McNamara had time to convince Robert of the blockade because the President traveled on campaign activities. A coalition was made and they advised the President This coalition gave the President a moment to pause and consider why other guys wanted the attack Inaccurate information was given to the President: they told him that a surgical air strike was not possible and that was false

Further investigation: Why no-one probed this estimate during the first week? Why the so-called "experts" so conveniently made a mistake in appreciation? With a strong coalition and the President in it, the blockade was the way to go