1.AMERICANAIDTOPAKISTANIS DOOMEDTOFAIL THEPARADOXICALATTITUDESOFTHEU.S.POLICYELITETOWARDSAID CONDITIONALITYANDITSIMPACT AliciaMollaun alicia.mollaun@anu.edu.au

2. U.S.AidtoPakistan 2001 2002 2010 MilitaryAid 0 US$1.7billion US$2.5billion EconomicAid US$46million US$228million US$1.9billion Total US$46million US$1.9billion US$4.4billion 3. U.S.AidtoPakistan Today,economicandmilitaryaidheavilycondiEoned MilitaryandeconomicaidcondiEonedonPakistanmeeEng securityoutcomesincludingon: DismantlingsuppliernetworksrelaEngtotheacquisiEonof nuclearweapons-relatedmaterials; Ceasingsupportforterroristandextremistgroups; PrevenEngAQ,TalibanandLeTfromoperaEnginPakistan; StrengtheningCTandAMLlaws;and EnsuringthesecurityforcesofPakistanarenotmateriallyand substanEallysubverEngthepoliEcalorjudicialprocessesof Pakistan. U.S.alsocondiEonsaidtoachieveeconomicreform 4. ResearchGapandQuestion BreadthofliteratureoneconomiccondiEonality(poliEcal economy,developmenteconomicsandpoliEcalscience). Gap:securitycondiEonality,securitycondiEonsoneconomic aid;elitea[tudes(donorandrecipient)towardscondiEons. Fewin-depthcasestudies. Thisresearch: CasestudyU.S.aidtoPakistanpost9/11 Elitea[tudestowardseconomicandsecuritycondiEonality Elitea[tudestowardseconomiccondiEonalityandeconomic reform Elitea[tudestowardsaidandforeignpolicyleverage. 5. ResearchDesign 38policyeliteinterviewedinWashingtonD.C.andNewYork inMarch2012. Policyelite: Academics:Georgetown,JHU,Columbia,NYU Think-tanks:Brookings,AtlanEcCouncil,NewAmerica,CGD,AEI Bureaucrats:State,USAID,SenateandHouseForeignAairs IFIs:WorldBank,IMF Semi-StructuredInterviews. AlsointerviewingPakistani elite 6. Attitudestowards conditionality A6tudestowardssecurityandeconomic condi?onality NumberofResponses (%) AgreeSecurity AgreeEconomic 17(59%) AgreeSecurity DisagreeEconomic 4(14%) DisagreeSecurity AgreeEconomic 1(3%) DisagreeSecurity DisagreeEconomic 5(17%) AgreeEconomic SilentonSecurity 1(3%) Disagree-Economic SilentonSecurity 1(3%) AgreeSecurity SilentonEconomic 0 DisagreeSecurity SilentonEconomic 0 SampleSize=29 7. Attitudestowards conditionality WhydotheelitesupportcondiEons? (a)ConcernsaboutPakistan (b)DomesEcpoliEcsintheU.S. Butwhataboutthatminoritythatdon'tsupportcondiEons? (a)Itdoesn'twork (b)Itiscounter-producEve(anirritant). 8. Attitudestowardsconditions andeconomicreform NumberofResponses(%) CondiEonalitycanachieveeconomic reform 7(35%) CondiEonalitycannotachieve economicreform 13(65%) 9. Attitudestowardsconditions andeconomicreform CondiEonsdontachieveeconomicreform.Why? (a)Pakistanactuallyhasmoreleverage Pakistansimportancevis--viswaronterrorandwarinAfghanistan (b)Pakistan'sproblemstoodeep-rooted poliEcal,vestedinterests However,theminoritybelievethatcondiEonscanachieve economicreform. SuccessofmulElateralaidcondiEonalityratherthanbilateral condiEons 10. Attitudestowardsaidand foreignpolicyleverage Majoritybelieveaidcantachieveleverageoverforeignpolicy.Why? (a)credibilityofU.S.demands (b)conicEnggoals (c)thesizeoftheU.S.aidprogram (d)Pakistanvs.U.S.leverage (e)trust (f)strategiccalculus Numberofresponses(%) Aidcanachieveforeignpolicyleverage 5(17%) Aidcanachieveforeignpolicyleverage (buttheU.S.haslostitsleverage) 10(33%) Aidcannotachieveforeignpolicy leverage 15(50%) 11. Attitudestowardsaidand foreignpolicyleverage Minorityarguethataidcouldachieveleverage: (a)throughmilitaryaidduringPakistansmilitaryrule immediatelyaqer9/11 (b)throughprovisionofmilitaryequipment. BUTwithPakistansciviliangovernment,itismuchmoredicult toachieveaidthrougheithereconomicormilitaryassistance. 12. TheParadox Condi?onal approachworks Condi?onal approachdoes notwork Total Support condiEonal approach 11 12 23 Donotsupport condiEonal approach 4 2 6 Total 15 14 29 13. TheParadox TheU.S.elitesupportacondiEonalapproachbutdontthink itworks. 14. Whydoconditionspersist? Forsignalingreasons DomesEc InternaEonal(Pakistan) Domes?c: CondiEonsforU.S.audiencemakesaidtoPakistanmorepoliEcallypalatablein theU.S. Interna?onal(Pakistan): U.S.long-termcommitmenttoPakistan U.S.focusoncivilianissues,notjustsecurity/strategicissues Problems U.S.isnotcredibleinitscondiEons U.S.doesnttrustPakistan Giventheneedforsignaling,andtheU.SstrategicneedforPakistans cooperaEon,condiEonalaidisgiven DespitenegaEvepercepEonsoftheuElityofcondiEonality 15. Conclusion AcademicstudiesskepEcalofcondiEonality,yetitsEllpersists. ThisparadoxisexempliedintheviewsoftheU.S.elite towardstheimposiEonofcondiEonalityonAmericanaid. ThisresearchshedslightonwhycondiEonalitypersists AidmaybecondiEonalfordomesEcpoliEcalreasons CondiEonalityhasasignalingrole AidhastobegivenaidhastobecondiEonal AidremainscondiEonalevenifcondiEonsdontinuence OngoingresearchwillexplorethepercepEonsofthePakistani elitetowardscondiEonality 16. Q&A