Alexandra ZinckRuhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Leipzig

Seminar Biology, Neurology, Sociology: New Perspectives in the Study of Humans

Umeå University, June 17-18, 2010

Emotions and Freedom of Mind

The significance of freedom of will

• Subjective elementary experience of freedom

• Ethics: Taking of moral responsibility for action

• Self-concept of a self-determined subject within a causally determined world– freedom of action (Hume, Hobbes)– freedom of will (Moore)

• Need for (i) untangling current findings in physics and (ii) conceptual work

Outline

1. Background in Physics

2. Contemporary accounts of freedom of will

- Incompatibilism

- Compatibilism

3. Criticism and adjustment of concepts

4. Freedom of mind and emotions: dealing with uncertainty

1. Background in Physics: non-relativistic vs relativistic quantum-mechanics“the idea that processes are determined, is just found on the fringe of physics [..everything is probability]”

- only probabilities of results of experiments are measurable: the wave resembles the probability of encountering electrons at a certain area, constituting different patterns of probability distributions (Copenhagen-Interpretation, Bohr)

- We are restricted in our knowledge, the electrons actually have a determined position (Bohm)

- Non-relativistic quantum-mechanics are outdated by relativistic quantum-mechanics by addition of relativity theory: measures, prior regarded as absolute, are now regarded as relative to a 4-dimensional space time reference system

- For non-relativistic quantum-mechanics: it is not clear whether there exists a deterministic interpretation or not- Indetermination (physically): not determined, not decidable, only

probabilities (no arbitrariness!)- Physics do not make a statement on determination or chance or

indetermination

2. Contemporary accounts focusing on physical determinism post Newtonian mechanics

Determinism (physical, causal, psychological): for every event of the future it holds that it is causally necessitated by precedent events and the laws of nature.

1. IncompatibilismLibertarianism: As freedom of will exists, the thesis of determinism is false.Determinism: If the thesis of determinism is right, then there is no freedom of will.

2. Compatibilism: freedom of will is possible in a world determined by causal natural laws

Incompatibilism: Libertarianism

• Eccles and Popper (1982, 1994): the will is an aspect of the self-conscious mind that is not material

• Mental processes modify quantum-mechanical processes and so activate the neocortex

• Variation: a decision or will is free if it is based on non-determined neuronal processes (e.g. by quantum jump)

Criticism: • How can the “pure mind” modify quantum-mechanical processes?• Dualism and the problem of mental causation (Kim 1998)• Coincidence is brought into the story by quantum-mechanical

indeterminism: this is not what we need for freedom of will.• Kane (1996): How can the role of coincidence and the demand on

rationality be reconciled?

Incompatibilism: Determination by neurons

Roth (2001)Freedom of will is an illusion, an epiphenomenon without causal

relevance. We have a will but it is not free. (444)Subjectively experienced freedom of will is an illusion. The feeling of

freedom only results after limbic structures and functions have determined the course of action. (453)

Libet (1983), Haggard and Eimer (1999)Activation potential setting off the action is already developed in the brain

before we are conscious of our decision to act.

Singer (2004, 2007) Brain as Subject: “neural wirings determine us. We should stop speaking

of freedom.”

Criticism: contrary to experience; mereological fallacy (Bennett & Hacker 2003); dualistic concept of subject

1. Suggestion: Identity theory for mental and neurological processes

Compatibilism and its variants:The idea of freedom and conditionality

Decisions for actions always depend on external preconditions of a subject in the world (and these make them the decisions of a certain person)

• Autobiographical experience, dispositions, personality traits, motives, current context, emotional state

• Without a relation to these prevailing conditions, decisions for certain actions are meaningless, as they are not justifiable reactions within a context

Compatibilists‘ thesis: determination as condition for free action: freedom and determinism as essential conditionality of actions are compatible.

• Freedom of will (Bieri 2001, 80): „Freedom of will consists in its being conditionality in a certain way: by our thinking and deciding“.

• Concept of minimal personal freedom (Pauen 2004)• Freedom of will and the concept of a person (Frankfurt 1971)

Determination by rational deliberation and judgment

“Agents will freely only if their willings are not in part explicable by episodes of external manipulation

which bypass their critical and deliberative faculties” (Mele 1995)

• Decision: will is brought into accordance with one’s rational deliberation and assessment of alternatives for an action and assessment of reasons for an action. In accordance to the best judgment, an intention to act is developed. This is executed if not stopped by external conditions

„Wille ist die Kausalität der Vernunft, das Vermögen, der Vorstellung gewisser Gesetze gemäß sich selbst zum Handeln zu bestimmen.“ (Metaphysik der Sitten)

„Willensfreiheit ist die Unabhängigkeit der Willkür von der Nötigung durch Antriebe der Sinnlichkeit“ (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) (Kant)

- Freedom of will as counter-concept to internal compulsions and not as a counter-concept to determinism.

- Unfreedom: Inability to bring one’s will into accordance with the judgment that has been made by rational deliberation.

Criticism 1: Weak concept of freedom: closer to “weak will” (Acrasia)

Criticism: Missing alternativityThe will is free by conforming to the most rational alternative

• Precondition of freedom of will: freedom of rational judgment• Focus: is the process of rational determination and judgment “free”?

Under the assumption of determinism, are there alternatives to these cognitive processes?

• Rational cognitive decision processes are determined by:

(a) preconditions (external) that go into the decision(b) internal conditions of cognition: properties, dispositions, autobiographical development of the person, contextual parameters, computational capacities (intelligence, attention, memory, learning)

• Under the conditions of determinism it thus also holds for cognitive processes that they can only run differently under the same starting conditions if there are different influencing factors later on: the same cognitive process result in the same decision.

3. CriticismRational conscious cognition is not a sufficient criterion for freedom of will

1. Acknowledging determinism, the concept of rational conscious cognition is not a sufficient criterion to base freedom of will upon. Compatibilism does not succeed.

2. Empirical research suggests that conscious rational cognitive processes are not independent or solely pivotal for decisions.

3. Determination of the subject by neuronal processes presupposes either unnecessary dualism, or complete physical determinism.

4. Contemporary physics suggest neither determinism nor indeterminism.

5. Need of adjustment of the concept of “freedom of will”

- “modern stoic” framework of “freedom of mind”

4. Dealing with uncertainty The idea of free will is incoherent (Strawson 1986) or inconsistent with a world very much like our own (Pereboom 2001)

1. Range of rational cognition uncertainty with regard to freedom

of will2. Physics: determinism or indeterminism- Limitations of the introduced approaches of compatibilism and

incompatibilism responding to either interpretation

Focus on- Concept of cognition (unconscious processes; emotion)- Adjustment to the concept of uncertainty:

Scepticism is justified concerning both

-> Introduction of a new concept of self-determination according to a conscious self-image for which limitations are constitutive

Uncertainty with regard to conscious rational deliberation: function of emotion for decision and self

Capacity of deciding has been defined too strongly based on rational (conscious) cognition.- function of emotion in cognition- function of unconscious processes- heuristics- Somatic Marker Theory (Damasio 1994): emotional evaluation is

essential for cognitive possessing and decision-making- Emotion, memory, learning (Cahil et al. 1994, Erk et. al 2002)

Emotions: - essential part of cognitive processing in general, for motivation

and action of a person- Constitutive for self-consciousness (self-and other-representation)

Concept of subject: includes unity of emotional and other cognitive processes

Levels of emotional involvement for self-image as self-determined subject

• Concept of subject: including emotion and cognition on different levels

• Basic: feeling of agency contributing to feeling of self-determined subject (self-concept)– motivation for action– Socially relevant: regarding other subjects as autonomous and

responsible in interaction (other-concept)• Complex: emotional reactance to uncertainty on all levels and to

possible internal and external restrictions (e.g. frustration, insecurity, incredulity, fear, denial; relief?)

• Integrated in general self-concept and –experience: more realistic self-image including limitations and abstaining from image as the superior and rising-above everything omnipotent rational self

Strategy: Self-image self-conscious of limitations

• Realistic self-image in a world in which we cannot gain certainty and full insight into self and world

• Self-conscious reflection of own (mental) states (emotions, beliefs, perceptions, reasoning strategies): better knowledge about own properties, capacities, dispositions, status in world, action-relevant motives, dispositions, consequences of action

• Self-conscious reflection: more information, decisions more appropriate

• Development of a critical self-image as action- and decision-relevant – Allows conscious self-attribution of actions under consideration of

the accepted action-relevant motives and consequences– Within this frame: weak concept of responsibility and self-

determination (“moral responsibility for an action requires only that the agent acted freely, not that the action proceeded from a free will” (Frankfurt 1971))

– Exceptions: extreme situations in which decision does not comply with own criteria any longer

Conclusions and Challenge:Freedom of Mind

• Moderate concept of possibility of freedom of will and moderate concept of self-determination, essentially incorporating the limitations of knowledge about whether humans have freedom of will.

• For both determination and indetermination, it may hold:• Responsibility can be taken for actions according to critical and self-

conscious self-image

• “Modern stoicism”: overcoming destructive emotions in situation of uncertainty leading to freedom of mind

Thank you for your attention!