Alexander y Beggs - Disguising Personal Inventories - A Situated Identity Strategy.pdf

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Disguising Personal Inventories: A Situated Identity StrategyAuthor(s): C. Norman Alexander, Jr. and John J. BeggsSource: Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 192-200Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786729 .

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Social Psychology Quarterly1986, Vol. 49, No. 2, 192-200

Disguising Personal Inventories:A Situated Identity Strategy

C. NORMANALEXANDER,JR.JOHN J. BEGGSUniversity of Illinois at ChicagoThe problems associated with disguise in scale construction are approached from theperspective of situated identity theory. Procedures are proposed to determine empirically thecommunicable meaning of scale-item responses, to measure precisely the dimensions alongwhich responses are potentially reactive. The utility of the approach is assessed in a series ofstudies employing various response formats for Machiavellian scale items. Contrary toconclusions suggested by previous research employing groups of items, the data reveal that asimple, forced-choice format provides maximum disguise and minimal bias-but only if theseforced-choice items are embedded among other items of extraneous content. The possibilitiesfor extension of the approach are discussed.

When respondents become aware of howothers are likely to interpret their answers toself-report measures, there is substantial riskof reactive bias. They can alter responses toconvey whatever message they care to send.This is why researchers often try to disguisescales. Existing methods of identifying disguiseare relatively loose and informal, however, un-related to a coherent theoretical perspective.The conceptual grounding of a systematicmethod for dealing with response reactivity isthe goal of this paper. It is approached withinthe framework of situated identity formation.Situated identity theory postulates that theaction choices in a social field always createattributions about the kind of actor a person isin the context. Social acts both arouse the sali-ence of dimensions that are typically used tocharacterize persons and produce evaluationsalong those dimensions. When observers whotake a particular observational perspectivesimilarly evaluate an actor along consensuallyrelevant dimensions, action has created asituated identity (Alexander and Wiley, 1981).Based on these dispositional categories,people expect a delimited range of generaltypes of actions in various circumstances.Furthermore, they interpret peripheral behav-iors along dimensions relevant to the setting.At any given choice point, the situated iden-tities that would be produced by each choicecan be imaginatively constructed and a deci-sion made as to which alternative would best

This researchwas supportedby funds from theDepartmentof Sociology and the Office of SocialScience Research,Universityof Illinoisat Chicago.We wish to thankSibylleAllendorf, Lucy LauandMary Ann Smaniafor their work on this project.Requests for reprintsmay be sent to C. NormanAlexander,Jr., Department f Sociology, Box 4348,Universityof Illinoisat Chicago,Chicago,IL 60680.

express the dispositional qualitiesimputed tothe actor. These decisions become normativeexpectations, predicting ikely behavior underthe circumstances.AlexanderandRudd (1984)suggest that this is the basic process by whichpeople make predictions from one complexsituationalactivity to another.It is furtherassumedthat the individualactorengagesinthe samebasicprocessto direct andmonitor his or her own actions. If actionis tohave social meaning, t must be anchored n thecommon cultural definition of contextual re-sponses. Such anchoragedoes not mean thatall acts are interpretedsimilarly by actors orobservers, since the phenomenologicalcon-texts or observationalperspectivesmay differ.It does mean, however,thatthe activitywillbesocially intelligiblewhen the appropriate ym-bolic framework s adopted.It also means thatif a consensual definitionof the act does existamong observerswho are similar o the actor,it is highly probable that their interpretationwill be recognizedandtaken account of by theactor.

SITUATED IDENTITIES AND SCALE RESPONSESFor present purposes, the self-report re-sponses thatareemployedin manysocialpsy-chological measures are conceived as socialacts. This conception is impliedby the logicthat governs our construction and use ofscales: The scores achievedby item endorse-

ments are used to differentiaterespondentsalong a continuum,and this necessitates as-sumingthat item-stimulimeaningsbe consen-sually valued (at least ordinally)across re-spondents. Consequently, scale-item re-sponses should result in consensual situatedidentity ormation-if ourassumptionsare cor-rect.192


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DISGUISING PERSONAL INVENTORIES 193Situated identity formation from item re-sponses leads to potentialreactivity:Respon-dents should clearly see the images their an-swers project. This does not make reactivitybiases inevitablenordisguiseimpossible;how-ever. Infact, it gives us measurable riteria ordefining the extent to which an item or scaleshowseither. We can specify the requirementsof an ideal, nonreactivemeasure in situatedidentity terms-an ideal measure elicits re-sponses that do not produce situated dentitieswhich differ along any dispositional dimen-sions that respondents ind relevantor impor-tant to impressionformation.Social psychologicalmeasures that are notsupposed to relate directlyto the dispositionaldimensions that comprise situated identities

may aim for this ideal straightforwardly. orinstance, mostattitudescales wouldregardanysystematicsituated dentitydifferencesas bias,because attitudes are not usually defined inself-concept terms. Scales that measureper-sonality characteristics, however, such asAuthoritarianism (e.g., dogmatic/open-minded) or Self-monitoring (e.g., other-directed/inner-directed)may separatesituatedidentitydimensions into those that are irrele-vant to the traitor syndromeof interest(hence,potentiallybiasing)and those that are centralto it (inwhichcase we speakof disguise).Sincebias anddisguiseareequivalentlymeasuredbydifferentialratings along situated identity di-mensions, thisdistinction s primarilymade fordescriptive convenience. In this paper, weshall focus on problemsof disguise.Theresearchernterested nmeasuring omepersonality characteristicshould first specifythe situated identity dimensions associated,both positively andnegatively,with thatchar-acteristic. An item or a set of items will alwaysbe evaluatedalongthese dimensionsto see ifdifferentresponsesproducedifferentratings.Ifthey do not, the scale can be considereddis-guised. To evaluate items in terms of thetheoreticallyrelevant dimensions that definethe concept being measured, the researcherpresents the items, differentiallyendorsedbystimuluspersons to portraythem as scoringfrom high to low on the scale. In effect, wefollow the proceduresdetailed by Alexanderand Knight(1971) with different scale scoresconsideredas the differentresponse alterna-tives in the administration ituation. This ishow we shall appraise Machiavellianismre-sponses in the followingstudies.

THE MACHIAVELLIAN SCALEThe Machiavellian r MACHscale was con-structed to measure a personality trait thatChristieand Geis describe as characteristicof

'operators'who are "lackingin interpersonalaffect, low in concern with conventionalmorality, devoid of gross psychopathologyand have low ideological commitment."(Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 4).The scale was initially a Likert type withsingle statementsendorsedor rejected by re-spondents.However, this version provedto behighly correlatedwith measuresof social de-sirability.To eliminate his, the scale's authorsopted for a forced-choice format, matchingeach MACH statement with a nonMACHstatementjudged to be of equal social de-sirability.They found this format unsatisfac-tory because some respondents objected tobeingforced to choose betweentwo undesira-ble alternatives,relating he anecdote of a stu-

dent who felt thathe was beingaskedwhetherhe preferredo rapehis motheror ax his father.To soften the choice dilemmasa third state-ment was added, eithermuchhigheror lowerin social desirabilitythan the MACH and itsmatch. Respondents were asked to selectwhich item was most like them and whichleast. Apparently, his quietedrespondentob-jections, and the authorsalso claimed that it"disguised"the scale. This refined version ofthe original cale was named"MACHV," andit was generally accepted for most furtherwork.We beginwith the findingsof AlexanderandRudd(1984)pertaining o disguiseof the scale.They presented respondentswith a stimulusperson's answers to a ten-item set ofMachiavelliantems and asked them to evalu-ate thepersonalonga set of dimensionsrelatedto Machiavellianism e.g., manipulativeness,dishonestyand so on). Followingthis, respon-dents estimatedhow the stimuluspersonwouldanswerthe remaining en items on the scale.Respondents were divided into six differentgroups. Halfsaw a stimuluspersonwitha Highscore and half saw one with a Low score.Cross-cuttingthis manipulationwas the re-sponse formatof the items used. One-third e-ceived and responded o Likert-type tems, an-other third o forced-choice tems,andthe finalthirdto MACH V, multiplechoice items.They foundthat respondentsformed highlydifferentiated ituated identity impressionsofthe High and Low scoring stimulus personsand were able to predict their remaining enresponses accurately with a Likert format.There was moderate differentiationand pre-dictive success with the forced-choice format,but insignificantdifferences with MACH V.This would seem to indicate that MACH Vachieved disguise. The employmentof wholesets of items for impression ormationand re-sponse estimation,however, has the post hocdisadvantageof telling us about scales that


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194 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLYhave already been constructed. While this canbe very useful for some purposes, it is nothelpful if we are setting out to construct a newscale. We need to know what information theresponses convey to a single item. Thus, asingle statement was selected from the MACHscale to explore the discriminations producedby different item formats. The particularstatement selected was used because it was atthe median of the distribution of items accord-ing to social desirability and because it wasmost nearly equal in social desirability to thelargest number of Machiavellian and matchingstatements in the total scale.

METHODQuestionnaires were filled out anonymouslyby students from large, introductory sociologyclasses during regular weekly meetings of theirsmaller (25-30) discussion groups. All studentsattended a large, urban university with a veryheterogeneous "commuter" population. Eachquestionnaire contained the following mate-rials, in order of presentation: (1) The stimulusitem, endorsed by an alleged respondent in aproMACH or nonMACH direction; (2) Eigh-teen items from the MACH scale, to be en-dorsed as respondents estimated the stimulusperson would have endorsed them; and (3) Alist of 44 bipolar adjectives' on which respon-dents rated the alleged stimulus person andfrom which they selected the seven pairs theyconsidered most relevant and important in de-scribing the person.All scale items in the immediately followingstudies contained the same MACH statement.The positively worded statement had a socialdesirability rating of 2.8 on a scale of 1 to 5:

1 We classified adjective dimensions into thosecentralor irrelevant o Machiavellianism.The cen-trallyrelevant adjectivesare concerned/indifferent,considerate/inconsiderate, dependable/undepend-able, easy-going/ambitious,thical/unethical, rank/secretive, generous/selfish, guileless/manipulative,honest/dishonest, dealistic/cynical,moral/immoral,open/shrewd, sensitive/insensitive, sincere/insin-cere, suspicious/trusting, trustworthy/untrust-worthy, warm/cold. Peripherallyrelevant dimen-sions are compliant/noncompliant,onsistent/incon-sistent, cooperative/competitive, decisive/inde-cisive, emotional/logical, exceptional/ordinary,flawless/blameworthy,riendly/unfriendly,magina-tive/unimaginative, individualistic/conforming,kind/unkind, ikeable/unlikeable,mature/immature,modest/boastful,moralistic/tolerant,assive/aggres-sive, positive/negative, practical/impractical,pre-dictable/unpredictable, ational/irrational,ealistic/unrealistic, secure/insecure, self-confident/self-doubting, self-praising/self-critical, submissive/dominant,sympathetic/hostile nd weak/strong.

"The best way to handle people is to tellthem what they want to hear."This statement was presented in the Likert,forced-choiceor MACH V response format.The Likertformat nvolves only the statementas a stimulus. The forced-choice format pre-sents the MACH statement with its equallydesirable nonMACH alternative,and MACHV adds a bufferstatementthatdiffers in socialdesirability. The matching nonMACH usedhere and in the original scale was:

"People aregettingso lazy and self-indulgentthat it is bad for our country."In the originalMACH V scale, these state-ments appearwith a buffer statement of highsocial desirability(4.35):"It would be a good thing if people werekinder to others less fortunatethan them-selves."

Two endorsementpatternswere used to givethe MACH V stimulus person a proMACHscore. Half were shown acceptingthe highlydesirable buffer and rejecting the matchingstatement, while the other half were seen toaccept the MACH statement and reject itsequally desirablematch. To get a nonMACHscore, the stimuluspersonacceptedthe desir-ablebufferandrejectedthe MACH statement.Respondents were asked to estimate thestimulusperson's answers to eighteen items,six each in the Likert (MACH LIK), ForcedChoice (MACH FC) and MACH V formats.Across formats response direction was bal-anced:Inorder o score zero oreighteenontheMACH scale, equal numbersof MACH state-mentswould haveto be endorsedandrejected.To find out what scores respondentsesti-mated for stimulus persons, all estimationalitems were scored simply pro- or nonMACH.The Likert format combined Strongly Agreewith Agree and Strongly Disagree with Dis-agree. Positively worded MACH V items arescoredproMACHf: (a)the Mach statement snot rejected when the buffer statement ishigherin social desirability,or (b) the MACHstatement s acceptedwhenthe buffer s lower.Negatively worded MACH items are scoredproMACH f: (a) the MACH statement is re-jected when the buffer is higher, or (b) theMACH statement is not accepted when thebufferis lower.Next, respondents confronted 44 bipolaradjectivedimensionsthat were selected fromtwo groups of adjective pairs related toMachiavellian and Social Approval traits(CrowneandMarlowe, 1964).Social Approvaltraitswere includedfor a futurestudy of itembias requiring he potentialto choose traitdi-


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DISGUISING PERSONAL INVENTORIES 195mensions peripheral to Machiavellianism.They are not relevantfor ourpresentconcernswith disguise. Subjects ratedthe stimulusper-son on each bipolaradjectivedimensionusinga rating scale that rangedfrom one to nine.They were then asked to select the seven ad-jective pairs they found most important ormost relevant in describingthe stimulus per-son. Since comparisons will be made acrossresponse categories both within and betweenitems, we shall use a single scale of situatedidentityratings,consistingof all centraldimen-sions scoredpositivelyinthe MACHdirection.

RESULTSThere are several basic questions we must

ask. Do responses to the MACH item in eachresponse format produce differentiatedsituated identities along the central dimen-sions? Does the association of distinctivesituated identities with response alternativespermit observer-respondents o develop ex-pectations about how stimulus persons arelikelyto answerother MACH tems?Are theseexpectations contingent on the response for-mats of the items being estimated?To answerthese questions, Table 1 presents the situatedidentity ratings along central MACH dimen-sions. Table 2 shows the estimated MACHscores by response formats of stimulus per-sons.These data will be examined in relation tothe findings of Alexander and Rudd (1984).First, the situated identityratings,comparingproMACHwithnonMACHresponsesfromthestimulus person. Table 1 shows distinctivesituated identities emerging with both re-sponses in the MACH LIK andMACHV, butnot in the MACH FC item format. This re-verses the resultsthatresponses to a set of tenitems in the MACHFC andMACH V formatsproduced for Alexander and Rudd (1984).Their stimulus persons were given dif-ferentiated situated identity ratings from re-sponses to MACH FC, but not to MACHV.Turning o estimations of the stimulus per-son's answers to the Machiavelliantems, wesee that different response patterns are pre-dicted from proMACH and nonMACH re-

sponses to the Likert and MACH V stimulusitem, but not from forced-choice responses.This is not what we would expect from theAlexanderandRudd(1984) indings.However,differencesin accuracyby formatof the pre-dicteditems aregenerallyas expected;they aremost pronouncedfor the Likert and least forthe multiple-responsetem versions.Whatare we to make of these results? Ourtheoreticalperspective conceives of the pre-dictive task as a two-stageprocess. Observersmustfirst encode information onveyed by thestimulus person's response(s) into situatedidentitydimensions; henthey must decode theresponse alternativesassociatedwith each es-timational tem along similardimensions;andfinally, by matching the original impressionwiththose associatedwithpotentialresponses,they select the closest fit. It is reasonable toexpect some information o be lost and someerror to be introduced at each stage of thetranslationprocess. Information oss and errorshould increaseas the complexityof the taskincreases,which it does as we move from theLikert to the forced-choice to the multiplere-sponse format.Thislineof reasoningmayplausiblyaccountfor some of the variance n the AlexanderandRudd (1984)findings, since their respondentswerefacedwith ten multiple-response timulusitems andthe consequenttimepressure to ab-sorbthe responseinformation. t may also ex-plain why the estimations decrease in dif-ferentiationas ourrespondents ryto figureouthow the stimulus person would endorse alleighteenitems presented. It cannot, however,account for the clear-cutfailure of the singleMACH FC stimulus to produce either dif-ferential mpressions(Table 1) or discriminantpredictions(Table2). Nor does it explainwhya single MACH V stimulus item should be"better" than ten such items in conveyingsituated dentity mpressionsandin facilitatingresponsepredictions.First, let us be sure that we have a legitimateproblem, rather than some artifactualresultdue to this single item's peculiarities. In anearlierstudy,Alexanderand Rudd(1981) den-tified two items in a forced-choiceformat thatproduced strong differentiationsin situated

Table 1. Situated dentityRatingsof ProMACH ndNonMACHStimulusPersonsby Stimulus-Item ormatSignificance

Stimulus-Item Item EndorsementPattern of DifferenceFormat ProMACH n) NonMACH(n) 1-tail -testMACH LIK 5.40 (15) 4.13(18) p =.011MACH FC 5.71 (18) 4.98 (16) p= .059MACH V 4.38 (28) 2.68 (17) p


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196 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLYTable 2. Percentage of MACH Responses Estimated for Pro- and NonMACH Stimulus Persons-byStimulus- and Response-Item VersionsaStimulus-item MACH Response-items FormatVersion Score MACH LIK MACH FC MACH V Total (n)MACH LIK PRO 77.8 68.9 67.8 71.5 (15)p=.002 p=.023 p= .083 p=.002NON 43.5 52.8 57.4 51.2 (18)MACH FC PRO 58.3 58.8 59.3 58.8 (18)p=.460 pp=.410 p=.310 p=.500NON 57.3 57.3 62.0 58.9 (16)MACH V PRO 45.8 53.8 49.7 49.8 (28)p=.002 p


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DISGUISING PERSONAL INVENTORIES 197If peoplerespondprimarilyaccording o thesocialdesirability ankingsof these statements,most MACH scores will be achievedby failingto take any action toward the MACH state-ment. It is plausible that an object toward

whichno action is takenbecomesless salient ntheperceptual ield. Fortheobserveras wellasthe respondent,a stimulus that does not eliciteither positive or negative response shouldhave less impact.If thisis correct,thenMACHscores attained by disregarding theMACH statementswill index a lower level ofMachiavellianismhan MACH LIK items re-quiringdirect, decisive action with regardtothe MACH statement.Onemightthinkthatthis wouldaffectabouthalf the items on the MACH V scale, but itactuallycharacterizes75 percentof the items.The reason for this lies in the relative socialdesirability of positively and negativelywordedMACHstatements.Positivelywordedstatements, expressing Machiavellian senti-ments, tend to be socially disapproved,whilenegatively worded ones tend to express so-ciallydesirableattitudes.The buffersfor theseitems were apparentlyselected more or lessrandomly,becauseundesirablebufferstend toaccompanynegatively worded MACH state-ments (seven of nine in the MACH V scale)and desirable ones are combined with posi-tively wordedMACHS(eight of eleven).Thus, the respondentwho is sensitive to so-cial desirability values-the one for whomMACHV was constructed n the firstplace-obtains a highscore on MACHV by not beingantiMACHon 75 percent of the scale. Thosewho would firmly assert their adherence toMACH values on these 15 items must violatethe dictates of socialdesirabilityn orderto doso. We couldpredict,fromtheJonesandDavistheoryof correspondentnferences(1965),thatoptingfor the less desirablealternativewouldproduce more extreme inferences about thatperson. In effect, observers see the person'sintense Machiavellianismovercomingthe im-pliednegativeevaluationsfromchoosing a so-cially undesirablealternative.To create a proMACH response for thesingleMACH V responsein the presentstudy,halfof the stimuluspersonswere portrayedasendorsing he highlydesirablebuffer,ignoringthe MACHstatementandrejecting he match-ing statement.This patternof responsescorre-spondsto the social desirabilityorderingof thestatements.The otherhalfof stimuluspersonswere seen to endorse the MACH statement,ignorethe socially desirablebufferand rejectthe matchingstatement to obtaina proMACHscore. These persons thus violated the socialdesirabilityordering o endorse a relativelyun-desirable MACH statement. As the above

analysis indicates, we should examine thesetwo types of response patternsseparately.Also, to show fully the effects of MACHVitem construction,we created a new MACHVitem by replacing he socially desirablebufferwith a buffer item lower than the MACH andits match in social desirability.The new buffer(rated 1.70 on the social desirability scale,compared with a 4.35 ratingfor the originalbuffer)stated:

"The construction of such monumentalworks as the Egyptian pyramidswas worththe enslavement of the workers who builtthem."For each item, the stimuluspersonis presentedas endorsing, eavingunmarked r rejecting heMACH statement; esponsesto the nonMACHitems are determinedby their relative socialdesirabilityvalues.

RESULTSTable4 presents the situated dentityratingsby endorsementpatternsfor both versions ofthis item. Table5 contains the estimatesof thestimulusperson'sanswers(percentproMACH)to the MACH V items. Since they closely par-allel one another,the data from these two ta-

bles can be consideredsimultaneously.The most striking inding,evidencedin boththe situated identity ratingsand the responseestimations, is that the major differencesareproducedby endorsing he MACH item. Com-pared to either rejectingit or leaving it un-marked,positive actiontowarda statementhasthe definitive impact on observers. It is alsoevident thatendorsing he MACH statement npreference o a moredesirahlebufferstatementyields much stronger Machiavellianimputa-tions than the same endorsement when thebuffer is less socially desirable.We are now in a positionto explainwhy ourresults differed from those reportedwith en-dorsements of ten items by Alexander andRudd (1984). They constructed endorsementpatterns for their MACH V stimuluspersonsthat correspondedto the most frequentlyob-served response patterns-those that did notviolate the social desirabilityordering-at thesame time balancing he numberof times thatthe MACH statement was either endorsed/rejected or ignored. Thus, most of their itemendorsements were either nondiscriminatory(as exemplified by the unmarked versus re-jected comparisons with a highly desirablebuffer)orminimallydiscriminatoryaswiththechosen versus unmarkedcomparisonwith anundesirablebuffer). Also, approximatelyonehalfof the scaleis wordedsuch that the MACHstatementmust be rejected to obtaina MACH


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198 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLYTable 4. Situated dentityRatingsof StimulusPersonsby EndorsementPatternsof Two MACHV Versionsof MACHItemaItem Endorsement: Social Desirabilityof BufferStatementMachiavelliantem Is High (n) Low (n)Circled 5.90 (14) 6.17 (16)p


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DISGUISING PERSONAL INVENTORIES 199Table 6. Situated Identity Ratings of Stimulus Persons and Estimates of Their Machiavellian Responses-byEndorsement of Two Forced-Choice Items and Number of Extraneous Items PresentedaExtraneous MACH Estimated SituatedItems (#) Endorsement Percent MACH (n) Identity Rating (n)TWO PRO 57.1 (18) 4.73 (18)p=.006 p=.023NON 45.4 (25) 3.83 (25)FOUR PRO 57.1 (26) 5.09 (26)p =.003 p


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200 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLYdress options of extreme social desirability.Second, the statements that comprise the"'matching" and "buffer" items in theMachiavellianscale, althoughempiricallyex-traneous o Machiavellianism,re neverthelessroughly similar o MACH items in "flavor"or"tone." They were selected by the scale's au-thors from the pool of statementsinitially as-sembledfor inclusionin the scale, but elimi-nated during the first stages of Likert "scaleanalysis." Thus, the lack of discriminationfound here may not be reproducedwhen asingle choice is made between alternativesas-sociated withvery different,quiteindependentdispositionaldimensions.Alexanderand Wiley(1981, p. 284) reportedresultsfrom an unpub-lished study using some everyday situationsinvolving distinctive choices between alterna-tives of moderateandequal social desirability(e.g., betweenbeinghonest or friendly).Somechoices did create differentsituated identitiesthat permittedobservers to formexpectationsabout future choices involvingsimilaralterna-tives.In presenting hese results, we have focusedon theirimportance or the issues surroundingreactivityin the self-reportmeasures that areso critical for the data of our discipline. Wewantto stress, however,therelevance of thesefindings for the broaderconcerns of daily lifethat are also the province of situatedidentitytheory. Responsesto a scale itemare theoreti-cally similar to choices among alternativesduringordinaryoccasions of social interaction.Everyday encounters are analogous to scalesin the sense thatthey involverepeatedchoicescenteredaround he same or similar"themes"that the situation makes salient. In fact,situatedidentity theory assumes that a situa-tion obtains its uniquecharacterpreciselybe-cause it repeatedlymakes salient roughlythesame configuration f situatedidentitydimen-

sions to characterizeaction choices involvingdifferentmanifest content. In everyday life,actors and observersare able to perceive andadopt Goffmanian"lines" of action becausethese separate, specific acts are obviouslyas-sociated with consensually defined personae.Such transparentconsistency across actionalternatives s an asset for smoothinteraction,but it becomes a liability for our attemptstoobtain unbiased, nonreactive measures ofinternalstates.

REFERENCESAlexander, C. Norman and GordonKnight. 1971."SituatedIdentitiesand Social PsychologicalEx-perimentation." ociometry34:65-82.Alexander, C. Norman and Joel Rudd. 1981.

"Situated dentitiesand ResponseVariables."Pp.83-103 in Impression Management Theory andSocial Psychological Research, edited by J. T.Tedeschi. New York: AcademicPress.. 1984. "PredictingBehaviorsfrom SituatedIdentities." Social Psychology Quarterly47:172-77.Alexander, C. Norman and Mary G. Wiley. 1981."Situated Activity and Identity Formation."Pp.269-89 in Social Psychology: Sociological Per-spectives, editedby M. Rosenbergand R. Turner.New York: Basic Books.Crowne, DouglasP. and David Marlowe. 1964.TheApproval Motive. New York: Wiley.Christie, Richard and Florence L. Geis. 1970.Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Aca-demic Press.Jones, EdwardE. and KeithE. Davis. 1965. "FromActs to Dispositions:The AttributionProcess inPerson Perception."Pp. 220-66 in Advances inExperimental Social Psychology (Vol. 2) edited byL. Berkowitz.New York: Academic Press.Kelley, HaroldH. 1971."Attribution n Social In-teraction." Pp. 1-26 in Attribution: Perceiving theCauses of Behavior edited by E. E. Jones, D. E.Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. ValinsandB. Weiner.Morristown,NJ: GeneralLearningPress.

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