Aldrich - 1937 - Some Meanings of 'Vague'

7/28/2019 Aldrich - 1937 - Some Meanings of 'Vague'

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Some Meanings of 'Vague'Author(s): Virgil C. AldrichReviewed work(s):Source: Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 6 (Aug., 1937), pp. 89-95Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis CommitteeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326402 .Accessed: 13/07/2012 11:00

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89SOME MEANINGS OF 'VAGUE'

ByVIRGILC.ALDRICHA POSITIVISTIC investigationof the meanings of a wordresults in a report on how the word is actually used, not onhow it ought to be used. We propose first to make such a reporton some of the meanings of " vague ", and then, in a non-positivistic manner, to consider what sort of vagueness philoso-phers, as truth-seekers, ought not to avoid. Sometimes their(admirable) zeal for clarity and light engenders noontide philoso-phies which either have nothing at all to say about midnight oractually contradict the truth about it.I. A " vague " sensory object : (by " sensory object " hereis meant any uninterpreted sensible quality or combination ofsuch ; there is no objection to calling it a sensum or a perceptumor a thing, provided this definiens is kept in mind.) " Vague "in this connection usually means indeterminate with respect tothe spatial properties shape or position. Such vagueness occursin three typical situations :(a) when the sensory objects are not within the stereoscopiczone of a sense-field containing such a zone. An example in thevisual field is the surface of a tennis ball twenty yards from thepoint of view. At this ultrastereoscopic range, its shape withinits circular outline is indeterminate or vague, relative to thedefinite bulge which the ball is sensed as having when at an arm'slength away. Contrary to the orthodox opinion among epistem-ologists, the distant shape is certainly not flatwith the determinatestereoscopiclatness of, say, a penny at short range.'(b) when the sensory object is within a zone of stereoscopy butnevertheless lacks definite shape and position. For example, afog or haze, or a faintly illuminated object. One sees a mistenveloping him, and such an object is vague in comparison withthe solid, spatially defined fence-posts in the same sense-field.(c) when the sensory object lies in a field of awareness whichcontains no stereoscopic zone at all. A sorrowful emotion, forexample, or a feeling of pity. A sound is on the borderline,since it does at least possess a sort of directionality or sens(French), though absolutely no shape. All these, as measuredby the spatial standardof determinate position or shape, arevague.

1I havediscussed his point in Are ThereVagueSense-Data in Mind, Vol. XLIIINo. 172.


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90 ANALYSIS2. A " vague " symbol : (" symbol " here may be either a

single artificial sensory object significant by convention, or acombination of such forming phrases or sentences.) Symbolicvagueness differs from simple object-vagueness in a number ofrespects, though, in other respects, symbols and sensory objectsmay bevague in the same sense. Let us see how all this is the case.(a) Consider the marks on a shop sign at a distance. Theseare indeed vague symbols, but only qua sensory objects. Theirindeterminacy is strictly similar to that of the distant tennis ball.(b) Now suppose we come across a symbol in manuscriptwhich is either an ' S ' or a ' G ' or an ' I ', or a ' 5 ' or a ' 6 ' or a'9 ', not determinately any one of these alternatives. It is aperfectly clear sensible object, but is vague in the sense that itcannot be specifically classified or named, thanks to its failure toconform to a sensible standard. Thus in the case (a) aboveas well as in this one (b), the symbols are vague because they donot sensiblyconform to a standard sensory object significant byconvention-or to any member of a class of such objects if thesymbol is conceived as a class of similar sensible signs-thoughtheir manner of diverging from the standard is different. Both2a and 2b are considerations about legibility, or about audibilityif the symbols are oral.(c) Next take the case of an " ambiguous " symbol. Such asymbol is vague not because of what it sensibly is, but by virtueof a multiplicity of kinds of referents. " Law " is an example.There are physical and civil laws. The class of civil laws isdistinguished from the class of physical laws by the characteristicthat members of the former are not nullified by instances of non-conformity as are members of the latter. Strictly speaking," law " in these two instances is two symbols, but their sensorysimilarity results in the above sort of ambiguity, which is a speciesof symbolic vagueness.(d) A general term such as " man " is sometimes said to bevague, because it stands for any individual picked at random fromthe class of men. This kind of ambiguity is called systematic.Such terms are vague because they do not definitely refer to justthisorthat memberofa set. Hencethe phrase"vague generalities."(e) A metaphor or any non-literal symbolic representative isvague, by reason of the indirectness of its reference, via images orother objects ; as " weeping " in " weeping willow," or " off-


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SOME MEANINGS OF 'VAGUE' 91

spring " in " Mother Earth's offspring." Hence the phrase" vague metaphors," and the current tendency to eschew themin up-to-date philosophical writings.(f) Symbols are said to be vague when they stand for vaguesensory objects. This is a common meaning of " vague symbol."In this sense, the symbol qua sensory object may be as clear ordeterminate as ever, but, if it denotes a sensory object vague insenses Ib or Ic, it is commonly called vague. Thus a treatise onthe emotions ia a " vague " treatise because its references arevague. The vagueness of poetry is in part also due to its being adescription of vague sensory objects. The average artist findsmost congenial such objects as are not too brittle or fixed asregards shape and position in space.(g) A symbol is vague when it has no ascertainablereferents atall among sensory objects and simply affects the sensibilities ofhim who attends to it. (When it has no " representative " butonly an " emotive " function.) Examples may be found amongpurely musical lyrics, Gertrude Stein's nonsense verses andcertain theological or metaphysical phrases-" the absolutelyunknowable," " the infinite perfection of non-being," etc. Suchphrases are a sort of immaterial chewing-gum which one enjoysmouthing for its pleasant taste, not for its ideational content.Metaphysical chewing-gum-strictly in the sense just indicated-often leaves an unpleasant taste, since it is bad poetry adver-tized as factual statement.

(h) If a symbol is vague in sense 2g, it is vague in another sense,namely, in so far as it has no empirical consequences. Since ithas no empirical denotation at all, it cannot serve as a basis forempirical prediction and verification. There is nothing we can,empirically, do about it. Its acceptance or rejection makes notheoretico-experiential difference. The pragmatic-positivisticestimate of such a symbol or set of symbols is that it is theoretic-ally meaningless. And a meaningless artificial mark is eithernot a symbol at all, or, if it is, it is certainly vague. (In case 2gwe have inspectively vague symbols ; in this case 2hprospectivelyvague ones.)(i) Sometimes a symbol is considered vague, not because itsconstituent symbols fail to denote empirical qualities but because,having such denotation, the whole combination involves a con-dition of verification impossible to fulfil. " If these brown eyes


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92 ANALYSIScould directly see themselves, they would appear green."" There are unsensed sensa." It is noteworthy that thesesymbols are certainly not vague in sense 2g. They are not vaguein the same manner in which the following symbolic set is vague :" If I have a pure, immaterial, substantial soul, it will eventuallyenter the infinite perfection of non-being." The difference isthis, that the impossibility of verification in the case of the sen-tence about the soul is due to the fact that it says nothing,whereas the symbol about unsensed sensa cannot be verifiedbecause it says something which, when proof is wanted, gets usinto a predicament. Confronted by the former symbol, ourproblem is one of meaning. Confronted by the latter, the pro-blem is one of proof. And even if we cannot imagine orconceive how to verify the latter, it certainly has theoretical sensein a manner in which the former has not. This is an importantdistinction between meaning and verifiability.2Summarily, we have listed some meanings of " vague " asqualifying " sensory object " and " symbol." " Vague " hasthree main meanings-there are others not here considered-inconnection with sensory objects, and at least nine relative tosymbols. The first two of these nine meanings have to do withthe symbols qua sensory objects, the remaining seven are deter-mined by reference to the meanings of the symbols. We areready now to face the normative question, which among thesekinds of vagueness ought philosophers not to avoid ? (Accordingto the logical positivists, questions involving "ought " aretheoretically senseless, though they are significant in anothersense. Let us take our question with whatever sense it has, andproceed.)

No philosopher can experientially avoid the vague non-linguistic objects of ordinary awareness, though he may avoidthem in theory. If his business is to give a comprehensivereport on all experience together with an explanatory statementof its varieties, he ought not to avoid its vague data. (Of course,one may be unwilling to assert the antecedent of this implica-tion.) A non-distorting, sympathetic description and explana-tion-not negation--of them is as necessary to a thorough-goingempiricism as an account of clear data. For example, a truly2SeeC. I. Lewis'commenton imaginationas sufficientorempiricalmeaning Exper-ienceandMeaning,Phil.Recv.,934,p. 144.


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SOME MEANINGS OF 'VAGUE' 93empirical treatment of that sustained, integrated, non-spatialsystem of interests and emotions which constitutes the invisiblenerve-fibre of a society or state will not reduce it to an " equiva-lent " spatial system of elements conforming exclusively to thelaws of physics. Certainly, as a purely methodological policyaiming at a theory of clear spatialized data, such " physicalism "(Carnap) is quite legitimate. It is legitimate, furthermore, as apurely linguistic translation. But the assertion that the emotionsare wholly subjective or private, something which cannot bepublicly shared or communicated as ideas can, and that thereforethe psychological language of the emotions should be translatedinto the " intersubjective " universal language of physics, suchan assertion is an unverified theoretical assumption about thenature of emotions or feelings and the expression of a prejudiceagainst vague data. When the language of feeling is translatedinto so-called " equilpollent " physical propositions, somethingtrue is perhaps being said about something clear as a result, butnot about naturallyvague feelings.3Vagueness, then, as pertaining to non-linguistic objects ofexperience (senses Ia, Ib and Ic) ought not to be ignored orviolated by the philosopher. If some sensory object is vague" in the state of nature," let it be recognized and explained assuch. And let no one mistake this as a plea for obscurantism.We want only to abstain from committing the new reductivefallacy, by which non-spatial or spatially ill-defined data arereplaced by spatially definite ones.As to symbolic vagueness, of course it often cannot be avoidedin senses 2a and 2b. But we can and often ought to avoidsymbolic illegibility or inaudibility by the performance of theappropriate physical operations, either by the maker of the symbolor the interpreter.Ambiguity in sense 2c, and the consequent abuses of theambiguous symbol, are obviously to be avoided. " Systematic "ambiguity (2d) is a desideratum and necessary to rationaldiscourse.The vagueness of metaphor (2e) may often stand the philoso-pher in good stead. There is no (discovered) reason in the world

3In fairness o the physicalists, t should be remarkedhat they do aim at replacingvaguesensoryobjectsby clearones. Their predilections not for the clarityof visual(psychological)pace,but for thedeterminacyf physical pace, xpressiblenthe anguageof physicalconstructs.


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94 ANALYSISwhy a philosopher should not sometimes assert a true propositionwhich is also moving. That a symbol may have at once a repre-sentative and an emotive function is frequently overlooked. Astriking metaphor may combine both. (" ' Striking 'metaphor"is itself metaphorical, and says with a theoretic and emotiveforce what " Metaphor which affects the imagination and is alsotrue " says with theoretic force only.) What can be said prosaic-ally can be said poetically and vice versa, though the transforma-tion requires considerable imaginative power. Indeed, thedanger of metaphor is that it provides a chance to focus on theaesthetic resonance it sets up in the caverns of one's experience,to the neglect of the symbol's theoretic content. But the meta-phor is not to blame for that. We must blame the lack of in-tellectual discipline.We would not have indulged in these comments on metaphorif there were no prevalent opinion that a philosophical treatisehas a greater chance of being true if it is the acme of arid prose andliteral symbolic precision, or that there is no such thing asmetaphorical truth.Even though a symbol may be vague in the sense (2f) of denot-ing a vague sensory object, it can at the same time quite clearlymean such a referent or serve unambiguously as its representative.This combination of (objective) vagueness and (symbolic)clarity cannot and ought not, as suggested by previous remarks,to be avoided by the candid investigator. What can be said atall about a vague sensory object need not, fortunately, itself bevague, just as a description of beauty need not, unfortunately,itself be beautiful. For example, the word " vague ", despitewhat it stands for, is not itself a vague word. It very definitelyhas empirical denotation. Much good poetry is bell-cleardescription of objects which are vague as measured by the spatialstandardof determinate position and shape. (Psychology differsfrom poetry in that the former directly describes sensations andfeelings, whereas the latter treats them indirectly by portrayingobjects intended to rouse them.)As to the symbolic vagueness in 2g (and 2h) anyone quaphilosopher should certainly avoid it, and no philosopher dis-agrees with this statement. The disagreement arises as to thecriteriaof theoretic sense and nonsense. Under what conditionsdoes a symbol have a theoretic or representative function ? The


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SOME MEANINGS OF 'VAGUE' 95logical positivists have given their special answer to this question.Possibly there is another answer in the light of which suchsymbols as " the infinite perfection of non-being " turn out tohave theoretic sense or to stand for something objective. Butuntil such a different criterion of significance is much moredefinitely formulated than at present, it seems safer to rec6gnizethe positivistic formulation with, perhaps, some qualifications.Though the philosopher should avoid the vagueness of asymbol which stands for (represents) nothing at all, it is doubtfulthat he should wholly avoid the vagueness (2i) of a symbol whichapparently involves a condition of verification impossible offulfilment. And this for two main reasons : first, though hecan never observe whether the phrase " an existent unsensedpatch of red " has any extension-is true or false-as a whole,he knows what it means via its symbolic constituents which dohave observable denotation in a manner in which the constitu-ents of " the infinite perfection of non-being " do not. And aphilosopher contemplates not only facts but also meanings orpossibilities, even though it be impossible o determine whetherthe latter are anywhere realized. The second reason is that oneis never quite sure what " impossibility of verifiction " is tomean, except perhaps in purely formal or non-empirical usages.Naturally, it is important to understand clearly the criteria of theabstract possibility of verification and to come to some agreementon them. When is a proposition (symbol in our wide sense)possibly verifiable, is a question susceptible of more than oneanswer. (Is possibility of verificationthe sine qua non of theoreticsense, is anotherquestion, not to be confused with the one aboutthe meaning of " possibly verifiable ".)

By these distinctions between various meanings of " vague "we have answered our main question about the kinds of vaguenesswhich philosophers ought not to avoid. The general result mayseem almost a set of truisms. But, nevertheless, since denouncersof vagueness often avoid it wholesale in their philosophizingeven as lovers of vagueness wallow in it wholesale, it is perhapsworth the trouble to distinguish systematically between the babyand the bath, lest we keep both or reject both.The Rice Institute,Houston, Texas.

Aldrich - 1937 - Some Meanings of 'Vague'

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