Alba vs. Dela Cruz

1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS BY DUE PUBLICATION. In the original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a party defendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against him as well as all the world.

2. ID.; NATURE AND EFFECT OF PROCEEDINGS "IN REM;" DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem, and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler v. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; see also People v. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126; Mankin v. Chandler, 2 Brock (U. S. Circuit), 125; Brown v. Levee Commission, 50 Miss., 468; 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 605, 611.)

3. ID.; PROCEEDINGS "IN REM" AND "IN PERSONAM," DISTINGUISHED. if the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler v. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

4. ID.; FRAUD; SECTION 38, LAND REGISTRATION ACT; REOPENING, AND MODIFICATION OF DECREES. By fraud is meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the word "fraud" in section is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts intended to deprive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved.

5. ID.; ID.; ID. The question whether any particular transaction shows fraud within the meaning of the word as used in section 38 of the Land Registration Act, will, in each case, be a question of fact.

FACTS:Thepetitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the court, onFeb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.OnJune, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree ofFeb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands.For him,The petitionersdeliberatelyomitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration.He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)He therefore asked arevisionof the case, and that the said decree bemodified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motionreopened the case,and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decisionmodifyingthe former decree byexcludingfrom the same thetwo parcels of landclaimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.The court below held thatthe failureon the part of the petitionersto include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupantof these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that thisconstituted fraudwithin the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.ISSUE:1. Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the same year?2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.HELD:The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is herebyreversedand judgment enteredin favor of the petitionersin conformity with the decree of the lower court ofFebruary 12, 1908.1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been openedonly on the groundthat the said decree had been obtained byfraud.2.The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things,the names and addressesof all occupantsof land and of all adjoining owners, if known.

The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners uncle Jose Grey and this contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts)The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners parents and while he petitioners were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants.Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication to all whom it may concern.Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given] exceptions. It shall beconclusive upon and againstall persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general descriptionto all whom it may concern.As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.NOTES:1. The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.1. Theelement of intention to deprive another of just rightsconstitutes the essential characteristics ofactual as distinguished from legal-fraud1. Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceedingin remdealing with a tangibleresmay be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over theres. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tylervs. Judges,supra.)1. action in rem vs. action in personam:If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action isin personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding isin rem. (Tylervs. Judges,supra.)5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud6. Advantages of the Torrens System:1. It has substituted security for insecurity. 2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days. 3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. 4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the three Rs can transact his own conveyancing. 5. It affords protection against fraud.6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)

Legarda vs Saleeby1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; REGISTRATION OF SAME LAND IN THE NAMES OF TWO DIFFERENT PERSONS. L obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on the 25th of October, 1906. S, on the 25th of March, 1912, obtained a certificate of registration for his land which joined the land theretofore registered by L. The certificate of title issued to S included a narrow strip of the land theretofore registered in the name of L. On the 13th of December, 1912, L presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the adjustment and correction of the error committed in the certificate issued to S, which included said narrow strip of land. Held: That in a case where two certificates of title include or cover the same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part comprised in the earlier certificate. In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who obtained the second certificate. The decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons.

2. ID.; PURPOSE OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. The real purpose of the torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at the time of registrations in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is a judicial proceeding, but it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.

3. ID; ID.; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. The registration under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not give the owner any better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the certificate. He secures his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. If he obtains a certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he really and in fact owns, the certificate should be corrected. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not secure his certificate. Having a fee simple title, and presenting sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of registration. The certificate of registration simply accumulates, in one document, a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title, which the owner, in fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner has. The certificate should not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except to correct errors, in some direct proceedings permitted by law. The title represented by the certificate can not be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.

FACTS:Plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.That there exists and has existed for a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs, on the 2nd day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendants land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.That the land occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiffs are entitled to have the stone wall to be registered in their own nameHELD:While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law.the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties. In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no Persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be discussed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property has been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration

Government of Philippine Islands v. Abural1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The prime purpose of the Torrens System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable.

2. ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The purpose of the offspring of the Torrens System here known as the Cadastral System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is, like the purpose of the Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1 of the Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requiring that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. Many precautions are taken to guard against injustice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision the judgment the decree of the court. The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. For a decree to exist in legal contemplation, it is not necessary to await the preparation of a so-called decree by the Land Registration Office.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice published in the Official Gazette. Trial judge also issued general notice. S asks for the registration in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had. On September 21, 1916, the court in a decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916, the time for an appeal having passed, the court declares the decree final. On July 23, 1917, before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, V and G ask that the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Motion denied by the trial court. Held: That since the judgment of the Court of First Instance of September 21, 1916, has become final, and since no action was taken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.

7. ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. Whether Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare.

8. GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. The General Land Registration Office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 174.)

Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands. Notice of the proceedings were published in the Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all interested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in this municipality, and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases, did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had during September, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued a decree declaring a general default due to lack of parties to the cadastral proceeding and decreed the land "Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of Victoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon."cralaw virtua1aw library

Subsequently, the court declared final the decree and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to the lots adjudged by said decision.

An appeal having has been interposed as to the lots and decree of title was suspended.

Eight months later, but before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez, came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth their right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their "Hacienda Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete ignorance of the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and that the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by counter-motion, asking the court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares. The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory that there being a decree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been made, the court lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically that counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking of evidence.

Counsel for petitioners have not raised the question of fraud as provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor have they asked to be relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the appeal, since if the judgment and the supplemental decree issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance have become final, petitioners may no bring their appeal before this court, because the time for the filing of their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral proceedings did not become final until the formal decree was issued by the Land Registration Office, then it was proper for them to ask for a reopening of the case, and it would, consequently, be just as proper for this court to order the trial court to permit the same.

HELD:The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly stated, to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable. Incontestability of title is the goal. All due precaution must accordingly be taken to guard against injustice to interested individuals who, for some good reason, may not be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at the cost of possible cruelty which may result in exceptional cases, it does become necessary in the interest of the public weal to enforce registration laws. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496) wherein it is said that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. . . . It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern, Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration (Court of First Instance) a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest."

As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.

It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of September 21, 1916, has become final, and that no action was taken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellants.

Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta).The twocombined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued. The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia EastCommercial Centre, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995,ordered the amendment of theTCTs to readthat the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were located inBarrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City. On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC).This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date. On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250,598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and38457, including the improvements thereon (the subject properties).Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like whatits predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid toCainta.Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case.It averred that it had been collecting the real property taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them.Cainta further asseverated thatthe establishment of the boundary monuments wouldshow that the subject properties are withinits metes andbounds.Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a prejudicial question to the resolution of the case.The RTC denied this in an Order datedDecember 4, 1996for lack of merit.Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and location, the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favoured Pasig. On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several oppositions, on the assertion that there were no good reasons to warrant the execution pending appeal. On April 15, 1999, theRTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Executionagainst Sta. Lucia. On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court ofAppeals to assail the RTCs order grantingthe execution.Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was raffled to the First Division of the Court of Appeals, whichon September 22, 2000, ruled in favour ofSta. Lucia. In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings.Elucidating on the legal meaning of a prejudicial question, it held that there can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil.The Court of Appeals further held that the elements oflitis pendentiaAnd forum shopping, as alleged byCainta to be present, were not met.Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.

Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions forCertiorariWiththisCourt.Caintaspetition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856 wasdenied on April 13, 2005for Caintas failure to show any reversible error.Sta.Lucias own petition is the one subject of this decision

Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the resolution ofthe boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta

HELD:Certificates of Title asConclusive Evidence of Location

While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. InDePedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,[34]we proclaimed that:We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it bears stressing that while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title.They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.[35]

InPioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente Coronado,[36]we set aside the lower courts' ruling that the property subject of the case was not situated in the location stated and described in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However, we refused to simply uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the case back to the trial court for the determination of the exact location of the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.[37]

InCity Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,[38]this Court reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property that was outside its territorial jurisdiction,viz:In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such basic principle of law.The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence.[39](Emphasis ours.)

Although it is true that "Pasig" is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within Cainta's boundaries. This only means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated and the location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties' locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area.

The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best determine once and for all the precise metes and bounds of both Pasig's and Cainta's respective territorial jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the extent and reach of each local government's authority, a prerequisite in the proper exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation. This was the conclusion reached by this Court inCity of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,[41]and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we cannot adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case.

REPUBLIC vs SANTOSRespondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land situated in Barangay Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite.The 3 parcels of land were previously owned by one Generosa Asuncion (Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona. rllSometime after the said purchase, the respondents caused the survey and consolidation of the parcels of land. Then it was consolidated.The respondents filed with the RTC an Applicationfor Original Registration of Lot 3. On the same day, the RTC issued an Ordersetting the application for initial hearing and directing the satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The same Order, however, also required the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to submit a report on the status of Lot 3. The DENR Calabarzon Office submitted its Reportto the RTC. The Report relates that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of Indang, Cavite. Later, the respondents submitted a Certificationfrom the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was classified as an "Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the lone oppositionto the respondents application.The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of land making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse" possession of the said parcels "since time immemorial."It is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with their own, that respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among others, the testimonies of Generosa and the representatives of their two (2) other predecessors-in-interest.The said witnesses testified that they have been in possession of their respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to the purchase thereof by the respondents in 1997.The witnesses also confirmed that neither they nor the interest they represent, have any objection to the registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents. In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint Affidavitshe executed with Teresita.In it, Generosa revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously pertaining to her and Teresita were once owned by her father, Mr. Valentin Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner" such lands even "before the outbreak of World War 2." To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also presented various Tax Declarations covering certain areas of Lot 3 the earliest of which dates back to 1948 and covers the portions of the subject lot previously belonging to Generosa and Teresita. rllThe government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public domain and, hence, not subject to private acquisition and registration. The government, however, presented no further evidence to controvert the claim of the respondents. RTC rendered a ruling granting the respondents Application for Original Registration of Lot 3. The government promptly appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC s decision on appeal.ISSUE:W/N the respondents were able to prove with sufficient evidence their claim over the lot 3 in order to overthrow the Regalian Doctrine.HELD:Jura Regalia and the Property Registration DecreeWe start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine.33Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles.34Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title,35must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State.36Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State s imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.37rllBeing an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. It is basic that those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must first establish that it has acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to the original registration of "imperfect" titles to public land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended.38Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical requirements for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to wit:39rbl rl l lbrr1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;.2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership, and;3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

First. The testimonies of respondents predecessors-in-interest and/or their representatives were patently deficient on this point.None of them testified about possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land dating back to 12 June 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said witnesses merely related that they have been in possession of their lands "for over thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by respondents in 1997.

Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the respondents also fall short of proving possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by the respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No. 9412,43was issued only in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously pertaining to Generosa and Teresita. Much worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412 shows no declared improvements on such portion of Lot 3 as of 1948 posing an apparent contradiction to the claims of Generosa and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.Notwithstanding their inability to comply with Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the respondents claim that they were at least able to establish possession and occupation of Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire title over the same via prescription.

In this case, the respondents were not able to present any "express declaration" from the State, attesting to the patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report classifying the subject land as alienable and disposable is not sufficient.57We are, therefore, left with the unfortunate but necessary verdict that the respondent are not entitled to the registration under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.There being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case. We accordingly overturn the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals for not being supported by the evidence at hand.

Yu Chang vs. RepublicFACTS:Petitioners' father, L. Yu Changand the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, through its Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property wherein the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter residential lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter piece of land located in San Juan, Pili. Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the property, erected a residential house and a gasoline station. He also declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration and paid the real property taxes thereon as evidenced by twenty-eight (28) official receipts from February 21, 1951 up to March 10, 1976. When L. Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata Sta. Ana and his seven children inherited the property and succeeded in the possession of the property.

On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciationof their rights over the property was executed by L. Yu Chang's five children, Rafaela, Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in favor of herein petitioners. After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and subdivided into two lots, Pili Cadastre. Petitioners also declared the lots in their names for taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declarationand paid the real property taxes thereon.

On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petitionfor registration of title over the lots under theProperty Registration Decree. In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest "have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100 years"; and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of owners. Hence, they are entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance and registration of title in their names.

In support of their application, petitioners submitted the following documents, to wit:1. Agreement to Exchange Real Property;2. Deed of Transfer and Renunciation;3. Approved Plan of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre;4. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2199;5. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2200;6. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-044 for Lot 2199 Cad. 291; and7. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-043 for Lot 2200 Cad. 291 Pili Cadastre.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Oppositionto the application, alleging,inter alia, that: (1) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of abona fideacquisition of the land; and (3) that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation.

No other parties filed their opposition. Thus, on December 14, 1998, an Order of General Default[15]was issued by the trial court.

ISSUE:W/N

HELD:Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended by PD 1073 provised that: The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose title have not been perfected or completed, may apply to Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a Certificate of title thereof, under the Property Registration Decree.

In order that petitioners application for registration of title my be granted, they must first establish the following:1.That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the Public Domain2.That they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Jose Amunategui vs Director of Forestry provides that: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.

The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.