Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (born 1929) is aScottish[1] philosopher primarily known for his contri-bution to moral and political philosophy but known alsofor his work in history of philosophy and theology. Heis Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Contempo-rary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP)at LondonMetropolitan University, and an Emeritus Pro-fessor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.During his lengthy academic career, he also taught atBrandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt Uni-versity, and Boston University. Macintyre’s After Virtue(1981) is widely recognised as one of the most impor-tant works of Anglophone political philosophy in the 20thcentury.[2]

1 Biography

MacIntyre was born on 12 January 1929 in Glasgow, toJohn and Emily (Chalmers) MacIntyre. He was edu-cated at Queen Mary College, London, and has a Mas-ter of Arts from the University of Manchester and fromthe University of Oxford. He began his teaching ca-reer in 1951 at Manchester University.[3] He taught atthe University of Leeds, the University of Essex andthe University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, be-fore moving to the US in around 1969. MacIntyre hasbeen something of an intellectual nomad, having taughtat many universities in the US. He has held the followingpositions:

• Professor of History and Ideas, Brandeis University(1969 or 1970),

• Dean of the College of Arts and Professor of Phi-losophy, Boston University (1972),

• Henry Luce Professor, Wellesley College (1980),

• W. Alton Jones Professor, Vanderbilt University(1982),

• Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame(1985),

• Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University(1985),

• Visiting scholar, Whitney Humanities Center, YaleUniversity (1988),

• McMahon-Hank Professor of Philosophy, NotreDame (1989), and

• Arts & Sciences Professor of Philosophy, DukeUniversity (1995–1997).

He has also been a visiting professor at Princeton Univer-sity, and is a former president of the American Philosoph-ical Association. In 2010, he was awarded the AquinasMedal by the American Catholic Philosophical Associa-tion.From 2000 he was the Rev. John A. O'Brien Senior Re-search Professor in the Department of Philosophy (emer-itus since 2010) at the University of Notre Dame, IndianaUSA. He is also Professor Emerit and Emeritus at DukeUniversity. In April 2005 he was elected to the AmericanPhilosophical Society, and in July 2010 became SeniorResearch Fellow at London Metropolitan University'sCentre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethicsand Politics.He has been married 3 times. From 1953 to 1963 he wasmarried to Ann Peri, with whom he had two daughters.From 1963 to 1977 he was married to Susan Willans,with whom he had a son and daughter. Since 1977 he hasbeen married to philosopher Lynn Joy, who is also on thePhilosophy faculty at Notre Dame.

2 Philosophical approach

MacIntyre’s approach to moral philosophy has a numberof complex strains that inform it. Although his projectis largely characterised by an attempt to revive an Aris-totelian conception of moral philosophy as sustained bythe virtues, he nevertheless describes his own account ofthis attempt as a “peculiarly modern understanding” ofthe task.[4]

This “peculiarly modern understanding” largely concernsMacIntyre’s approach to moral disputes. Unlike someanalytic philosophers who try to generate moral con-sensus on the basis of an ideal of rationality, MacIn-tyre presents a historical narration of the development ofethics to illuminate the modern problem of “incommen-surable” moral notions—i.e., notions whose value can notbe reduced to a common measure. Following Hegel andCollingwood he offers a “philosophical history” (whichhe distinguishes from both analytical and phenomenolog-ical approaches to philosophy) in which he concedes fromthe beginning that “there are no neutral standards avail-able by appeal to which any rational agent whatsoevercould determine” the conclusions of moral philosophy.[5]

1

2 3 MAJOR WRITINGS

Indeed, one of MacIntyre’s major points in his most fa-mous work, After Virtue, is that the failed attempt byvarious Enlightenment thinkers to furnish a final univer-sal account of moral rationality led to the rejection ofmoral rationality altogether by subsequent thinkers suchas Charles Stevenson, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Friedrich Ni-etzsche. On MacIntyre’s account, it is especially Niet-zsche’s utter repudiation of the possibility of moral ratio-nality that is the outcome of the Enlightenment’s mistakenquest for a final and definitive argument that will settlemoral disputes into perpetuity by power of a calculativereason alone and without use of teleology.[6]

By contrast, MacIntyre is concerned with reclaiming var-ious forms of moral rationality and argumentation thatclaim neither ultimate finality nor incorrigible certainty(the mistaken project of the Enlightenment), but nev-ertheless do not simply bottom out into relativistic oremotivist denials of any moral rationality whatsoever (ac-cording to him, the mistaken conclusion of Nietzsche,Sartre, and Stevenson). He does this by returning to thetradition of Aristotelian ethics with its teleological ac-count of the good and moral persons, which was origi-nally rejected by the Enlightenment and which reacheda fuller articulation in the medieval writings of ThomasAquinas. This Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, he pro-poses, presents “the best theory so far,” both of howthings are and how we ought to act.More generally, according to MacIntyre, it is the casethat moral disputes always take place within and betweenrival traditions of thought that make recourse to a storeof ideas, presuppositions, types of arguments and sharedunderstandings and approaches that have been inheritedfrom the past. Thus even though there is no definitiveway for one tradition in moral philosophy to vanquishand exclude the possibility of another, nevertheless op-posing views can call one another into question by vari-ous means including issues of internal coherence, imag-inative reconstruction of dilemmas, epistemic crisis, andfruitfulness.[7]

3 Major writings

3.1 After Virtue (1981)

Main article: After Virtue

Probably his most widely read work, After Virtue waswritten when MacIntyre was already in his fifties. Up un-til that time, MacIntyre had been a relatively influentialanalytic philosopher of a Marxist bent whose inquiriesinto moral philosophy had been conducted in a “piece-meal way, focusing first on this problem and then on that,in a mode characteristic of much analytic philosophy.”[8]However, after reading the works of Thomas Kuhn andImre Lakatos on philosophy of science and epistemology,

MacIntyre was inspired to change the entire directionof his thought, tearing up the manuscript he had beenworking on and deciding to view the problems of modernmoral and political philosophy “not from the standpointof liberal modernity, but instead from the standpoint of... Aristotelian moral and political practice.”[9]

In general terms, the task of After Virtue is to accountboth for the dysfunctional quality of moral discoursewithin modern society and rehabilitate what MacIntyretakes to be a forgotten alternative in the teleological ratio-nality of Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre’s thoughtis revolutionary as it articulates a politics of self-defencefor local communities that aspire to protect their practicesand sustain their way of life from corrosive effects of thecapitalist economy.[10]

3.2 Whose Justice? Which Rationality?(1988)

Main article: Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

MacIntyre’s second major work of his mature periodtakes up the problem of giving an account of philosoph-ical rationality within the context of his notion of “tra-ditions,” which had still remained under-theorized in Af-ter Virtue. Specifically, MacIntyre argues that rival andlargely incompatible conceptions of justice are the out-come of rival and largely incompatible forms of practi-cal rationality. These competing forms of practical ra-tionality and their attendant ideas of justice are in turnthe result of “socially embodied traditions of rationalinquiry.”[11] AlthoughMacIntyre’s treatment of traditionsis quite complex he does give a relatively concise def-inition: “A tradition is an argument extended throughtime in which certain fundamental agreements are de-fined and redefined” in terms of both internal and externaldebates.[12]

Much of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is there-fore engaged in the task of not only giving the reader ex-amples of actual rival traditions and the different waysthey can split apart, integrate, or defeat one another (e.g.Aristotelian, Augustinian, Thomist, Humean) but alsowith substantiating how practical rationality and a con-ception of justice help constitute those traditions. Mac-Intyre argues that despite their incommensurability thereare various ways in which alien traditions might engageone another rationally – most especially via a form of im-manent critique which makes use of empathetic imagina-tion to then put the rival tradition into “epistemic crisis”but also by being able to solve shared or analogous prob-lems and dilemmas fromwithin one’s own tradition whichremain insoluble from the rival approach.[13]

MacIntyre’s account also defends three further theses:first, that all rational human inquiry is conducted whetherknowingly or not from within a tradition; second, that theincommensurable conceptual schemes of rival traditions

3

do not entail either relativism or perspectivism; third, thatalthough the arguments of the book are themselves at-tempts at universally valid insights they are neverthelessgiven from within a particular tradition (that of ThomistAristotelianism) and that this need not imply any philo-sophical inconsistency.

3.3 Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry(1990)

Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry was first presentedby MacIntyre as part of the Gifford lecture series at theUniversity of Edinburgh in 1988 and is considered bymany the third part in a trilogy of philosophical argu-mentation that commenced with After Virtue. As its ti-tle implies, MacIntyre’s aim in this book is to examinethree major rival traditions of moral inquiry on the in-tellectual scene today (encyclopaedic, genealogical andtraditional) which each in turn was given defence froma canonical piece published in the late nineteenth cen-tury (the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica,Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals and Pope Leo XIII'sAeterni Patris, respectively). MacIntyre’s book ultimatelyconducts a complex series of both interior and exteriorcritiques of the encyclopaedic and genealogical positionsin an attempt to vindicate philosophical Thomism as themost persuasive form of moral inquiry currently on offer.His critique in chapter IX of Nietzsche's and Foucault'sgenealogical mode as implicitly committed to an eman-cipatory and continuous notion of self which they cannotaccount for on their own terms has been of particular in-fluence.

3.4 Dependent Rational Animals (1999)

While After Virtue attempted to give an account of thevirtues exclusively by recourse to social practices and theunderstanding of individual selves in light of “quests”and “traditions,” Dependent Rational Animals was a self-conscious effort by MacIntyre to ground virtues in an ac-count of biology. MacIntyre writes the following of thisshift in the Preface to the book: “Although there is indeedgood reason to repudiate important elements in Aristo-tle’s biology, I now judge that I was in error in supposingan ethics independent of biology to be possible.”[14]

More specifically, Dependent Rational Animals tries tomake a holistic case on the basis of our best currentknowledge (as opposed to an ahistorical, foundationalclaim) that “human vulnerability and disability” are the“central features of human life” and that Thomistic“virtues of dependency” are needed for individual humanbeings to flourish in their passage from stages of infancyto adulthood and old age.[9] As MacIntyre puts it:

“It is most often to others that we owe oursurvival, let alone our flourishing ... It will be a

central thesis of this book that the virtues thatwe need, if we are to develop from our ani-mal condition into that of independent rationalagents, and the virtues that we need, if we are toconfront and respond to vulnerability and dis-ability both in ourselves and in others, belongto one and the same set of virtues, the distinc-tive virtues of dependent rational animals”[15]

Engaging with scientific texts on human biology as wellas works of philosophical anthropology, MacIntyre iden-tifies the human species as existing on a continuous scaleof both intelligence and dependency with other animalssuch as dolphins. One of his main goals is to underminewhat he sees as the fiction of the disembodied, indepen-dent reasoner who determines ethical and moral ques-tions autonomously and what he calls the “illusion of self-sufficiency” that runs throughmuch ofWestern ethics cul-minating in Nietzsche's Übermensch.[16] In its place hetries to show that our embodied dependencies are a defini-tive characteristic of our species and reveal the need forcertain kinds of virtuous dispositions if we are ever toflourish into independent reasoners capable of weighingthe intellectual intricacies of moral philosophy in the firstplace.

4 Virtue ethics

MacIntyre is a key figure in the recent surge of interestin virtue ethics, which identifies the central question ofmorality as having to do with the habits and knowledgeconcerning how to live a good life. His approach seeksto demonstrate that good judgment emanates from goodcharacter. Being a good person is not about seeking tofollow formal rules. In elaborating this approach, MacIn-tyre understands himself to be reworking the Aristotelianidea of an ethical teleology.MacIntyre emphasises the importance of moralgoods defined in respect to a community engagedin a 'practice'—which he calls 'internal goods’ or'goods of excellence'—rather than focusing onpractice-independent obligation of a moral agent(deontological ethics) or the consequences of a partic-ular act (utilitarianism). Before its recent resurgence,virtue ethics in European/American academia had beenprimarily associated with pre-modern philosophers(e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas). MacIntyre hasargued that Aquinas' synthesis of Augustinianism withAristotelianism is more insightful than modern moraltheories by focusing upon the telos ('end', or completion)of a social practice and of a human life, within thecontext of which the morality of acts may be evaluated.His seminal work in the area of virtue ethics can befound in his 1981 book, After Virtue.MacIntyre intends the idea of virtue to supplement, ratherthan replace, moral rules. Indeed, he describes certain

4 7 BIBLIOGRAPHY

moral rules as 'exceptionless’ or unconditional. MacIn-tyre considers his work to be outside “virtue ethics” dueto his affirmation of virtues as embedded in specific, his-torically grounded, social practices.[17]

5 Politics

Politically, MacIntyre’s ethics informs a defence of theAristotelian 'goods of excellence' internal to practicesagainst the modern pursuit of 'external goods’, such asmoney, power, and status, that are characteristic of rule-based, utilitarian, Weberian modern institutions. He hasbeen described as a 'revolutionary Aristotelian' becauseof his attempt to combine historical insights from hisMarxist past with those of Aquinas and Aristotle afterhis conversion to Catholicism. For him, liberalism andpostmodern consumerism not only justify capitalism butsustain and inform it over the long term. At the sametime, he says, “Marxists have always fallen back into rel-atively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utili-tarianism” and criticises Marxism as just another formof radical individualism, saying about Marxists, “as theymove towards power they always tend to become We-berians.” It is this reality of modern individualism in allits forms that gives MacIntyre’s critique its urgency andpower. Informed by this critique, Aristotelianism losesits sense of elitist complacency; moral excellence ceasesto be part of a particular, historical practice in ancientGreece and becomes a universal quality of those who un-derstand that good judgment emanates from good charac-ter. It has been argued that MacIntyre’s thought is unableto provide a coherent and effective model for a justifiableand politically stable political order, due to its neglect ofpolitical theology.[18]

6 Religion

MacIntyre converted to Roman Catholicism in the early1980s, and now does his work against the backgroundof what he calls an "Augustinian Thomist approach tomoral philosophy.”[19] In an interview with Prospect,MacIntyre explains that his conversion to Catholicism oc-curred in his fifties as a “result of being convinced ofThomism while attempting to disabuse his students of itsauthenticity.”[20] Also, in his book Whose Justice, WhichRationality? there is a section towards the end that is per-haps autobiographical when he explains how one is cho-sen by a tradition and may reflect his own conversion toRoman Catholicism.[21] Parallel recent developments inthe methods of philosophical research, which carry reso-nances with MacIntyre’s take on Thomism are witnessedwith a modern approach to Avicennism (the historicallegacies that were built upon the philosophy of Avicenna;Ibn Sina) as embodied in the works of Nader El-Bizri inconnection with Islam, even though the orientation is phe-

nomenological instead of being analytic, and the focus ison ontology rather than moral philosophy.Fuller accounts of MacIntyre’s view of the relationshipbetween philosophy and religion in general and Thomismand Catholicism in particular can be found in his essays“Philosophy recalled to its tasks” and “Truth as a good”(both found in the collection The Tasks of Philosophy) aswell as in the survey of the Catholic philosophical tradi-tion he gives in God, Philosophy and Universities.[22]

7 Bibliography

• 1953. Marxism: An Interpretation. London: SCMPress, 1953.

• 1955 (edited with Antony Flew). New Essays inPhilosophical Theology. London: SCM Press.

• 1966 A Short History of Ethics. London and NewYork: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Second edition1998.

• 2004 (1958). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Anal-ysis, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

• 1959. Difficulties in Christian Belief. London: SCMPress.

• 1965. Hume’s Ethical Writings. (ed.) New York:Collier.

• 1967. Secularization and Moral Change. TheRiddell Memorial Lectures. Oxford UniversityPress.

• 1969 (with Paul Ricoeur). The Religious Signifi-cance of Atheism. New York: Columbia UniversityPress.

• 1970. Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and aPolemic. New York: The Viking Press.

• 1970. Marcuse. London: Fontana Modern Masters.

• 1971. Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays onIdeology and Philosophy. London: Duckworth.

• 2007 (1981). After Virtue, 3rd ed. University ofNotre Dame Press.

• 2002 (with Anthony Rudd and John Davenport).Kierkegaard After Macintyre: Essays on Freedom,Narrative, and Virtue. Chicago: Open Court

• 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. Univer-sity of Notre Dame Press.

• 1990. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. TheGifford Lectures. University of Notre Dame Press.

5

• 1990. First Principles, Final Ends, and Contempo-rary Philosophical Issues. Milwaukee: MarquetteUniversity Press.

• 1995. Marxism and Christianity, London: Duck-worth, 2nd ed.

• 1998. The MacIntyre Reader Knight, Kelvin, ed.University of Notre Dame Press.

• 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why HumanBeings Need the Virtues. Chicago: Open Court.

• 2005. Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

• 2006. The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays,Volume 1. Cambridge University Press.

• 2006. Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, Volume2. Cambridge University Press.

• 2008 (Blackledge, P. & Davidson, N., eds.), Alas-dair MacIntyre’s Early Marxist Writings: Essays andArticles 1953–1974, Leiden: Brill.

• 2009. God, philosophy, universities: A Selective His-tory of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition . Row-man & Littlefield.

• 2009. Living Ethics. Excerpt, “The Nature of TheVirtues”. Minch & Weigel.

• “The End of Education: The Fragmentation of theAmerican University,” Commonweal, 20 October2006 / Volume CXXXIII, Number 18.

8 See also

• Virtue Ethics

• Aristotelian ethics

• Communitarianism

• Modernity

• Rationality

• John F. X. Knasas

• American philosophy

• List of American philosophers

9 References[1] Kelvin Knight, TheMacIntyre Reader, Notre Dame Press,

1998, “Interview with Giovanna Borradori,” pp. 255–56

[2] Lackey, 1999, What Are the Modern Classics? TheBaruch Poll of Great Philosophy in the Twentieth Cen-tury, The Philosophical Forum, Vol.30, Issue.4

[3] Hauerwas, Stanley (October 2007). “The Virtues of Alas-dair MacIntyre”. First Things. Retrieved 16 June 2014.

[4] After Virtue, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre DamePress, 3rd edn, 2007) xii.

[5] After Virtue, 3, xiii.

[6] After Virtue, 257

[7] After Virtue, xii–xiii

[8] The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) viii

[9] Ibid.

[10] Paul Blackledge; Kelvin Knight (15 June 2011). Virtueand Politics: Alasdair MacIntyre’s Revolutionary Aris-totelianism. University of Notre Dame Press. p. 31. ISBN978-0-268-02225-9. Retrieved 21 December 2012.

[11] “Précis of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?" in Mac-Intyre Reader, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-versity of Notre Dame Press, 1998) 107.

[12] Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN:University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 12.

[13] Ibid., 361–362.

[14] Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Carus Publishing,1999) x,

[15] Ibid., 1, 5

[16] Ibid., 127

[17] MacIntyre, “On having survived the academic moral phi-losophy of the twentieth century”, lecture of March 2009

[18] Thaddeus J. Kozinski (2010). The Political Problem ofReligious Pluralism: And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It.Lexington Books. p. 13. ISBN 978-0-7391-4168-7. Re-trieved 18 April 2013.

[19] Solomon, David. “Lecture 9: After Virtue”, InternationalCatholic University: Twentieth-century ethics

[20] http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/10/alasdair-macintyre-on-money/

[21] See pages 393–395 of “Whose Justice, Which Rational-ity?" 1988.

[22] The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); God, Philos-ophy and Universities (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Little-field Publishers, 2009)

6 11 EXTERNAL LINKS

10 Further reading

• D'Andrea, Thomas D., Tradition, Rationality andVirtue: The Thought of Alasdair Macintyre, Burling-ton, VT: Ashgate, 2006.

• Bielskis, Andrius, Towards a Post-Modern Un-derstanding of the Political: From Genealogy toHermeneutics, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrame-Macmillan, 2005.

• Horton, John, and Susan Mendus (eds.), After Mac-Intyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of AlasdairMacIntyre, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.

• Knight, Kelvin, Aristotelian Philosophy: Ethics andPolitics from Aristotle to MacIntyre, Cambridge:Polity Press, 2007.

• Knight, Kelvin, and Paul Blackledge (eds.), Rev-olutionary Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance andUtopia, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2008.

• Lutz, Christopher Stephen, Reading Alasdair Mac-Intyre’s After Virtue, New York: Continuum, 2012.

• Lutz, Christopher Stephen, Tradition in the Ethicsof Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, andPhilosophy, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield,2004.

• Murphy, Mark C. (ed.), Alasdair MacIntyre, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

• Myers, Jesse, “Towards Virtue: Alasdair MacIntyreand the Recovery of the Virtues”, 2009

• Nicholas, Jeffery L. Reason, Tradition, and theGood: MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Reasonand Frankfurt School Critical Theory, UNDP 2012.

• Perreau-Saussine, Emile : Alasdair MacIntyre: unebiographie intellectuelle, Paris: Presses Universi-taires de France, 2005.

• Seung, T. K., Intuition and Construction: The Foun-dation of Normative Theory, New Haven: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1993. See chapter six: “AristotelianRevival”.

• Skinner, Quentin. “The Republican Ideal of Politi-cal Liberty”,Machiavelli and Republicanism, editedby Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Vi-roli; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990,pp. 293–309 (critique of MacIntyre’s After Virtue)

10.1 Interviews with MacIntyre

• 'The Illusion of Self-Sufficiency' in A. VoorhoeveConversations on Ethics (Oxford University Press,2009).

• “Nietzsche or Aristotle?" in Giovanna Borradori,The American philosopher: Conversations withQuine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty,Cavell, MacIntyre, Kuhn (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1994) 137–152.

11 External links• Bibliographies of MacIntyre by:

• Scott Moore, Baylor University.• William Hughes at the Wayback Machine(archived 6 September 2007), University ofGuelph.

• Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studiesin Ethics and Politics (CASEP)

• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

• Clayton, Edward. "Political Philosophy ofAlasdair MacIntyre"

• Lutz, Christopher. "Alasdair Chalmers Mac-Intyre (overview)"

• International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry.

• Schwein, Mark R. (1991) "Alasdair MacIntyre’sUniversity", First Things. Review of Three RivalVersions of Moral Inquiry.

• Cowling, Maurice (1994) "Alasdair MacIntyre, Re-ligion & the University," The New Criterion 12:6.

• Oakes, Edward T. (1996) The Achievement of Alas-dair MacIntyre," First Things

• Times Literary Supplement: "Review of SelectedEssays Vols. I & II" – by Constantine Sandis.

• Hauerwas, Stanley (2007) The Virtues of AlasdairMacIntyre," First Things

• MacIntyre, Alasdair (2004) The Only Vote WorthCasting in November

• Dahlstrom, Daniel O. (2012) “Independence andthe Virtuous Community,” critique of MacIntyre’s“Dependent Rational Animals” (1999) in ReasonPapers: A Journal of Interdisciplinary NormativeStudies 34.2, October 2012, pp. 70–83

11.1 Online videos of MacIntyre givinglectures

• “A Culture of Death” – Notre Dame Center forEthics and Culture, Fall 2000

• “Catholic Instead of What?" – Notre Dame Centerfor Ethics and Culture, Fall 2012

11.1 Online videos of MacIntyre giving lectures 7

• “What Makes a Painting Religious?" – Notre DameCenter for Ethics and Culture, Fall 2004

• “On having survived the academic moral philosophyof the twentieth century” (scroll down) – Lecture atUniversity College, Dublin, 2009

• “Newman’s Idea of a University” – Lecture at theLas Casas Institute, Oxford U, 2009

• “Ends and Endings” – Lecture delivered at TheCatholic University of America for the series “TheIssue of Truth – In Honor of Robert Sokolowski”

• “Philosophical Education Against ContemporaryCulture” – Lecture at Duquesne University, 2010

• “Intolerance, Censorship, and Other Requirementsof Rationality” – Lecture at London MetropolitanUniversity, 2010

• “Ends and Endings” – Lecture at Catholic Univer-sity, 2009

8 12 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

12 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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