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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-

Russia-10-41

New Study on Electronic Warfare. In 2014, and particularly in 2015, a 'second front' emerged in the Middle East

In August 2015, the Russian official news agency TASS quoted United States Army Europe’s (USAREUR) commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, speaking on, among

other topics, the growing robustness of Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities Since 2007, two of Moscow’s priority foreign policy initiatives have been its pivot

to Asia and efforts to secure recognition of its Arctic claims while opening the Russian High North up to large-scale development. In both cases—in the Arctic or the Russian Far East—Moscow can only play the role it wants to attain with the

help of extensive foreign investment. "Post-Soviet Central Asian countries are facing problems caused by old security

challenges and the emergence of completely new threats. These threats may influence the prospects for secular statehood in the region and represent a serious obstacle to modernization.

"In 2014, and particularly in 2015, a 'second front' emerged in the Middle East which has rapidly gained a Central Asian dimension: the Islamic State (ISIS).

"A special threat to Central Asia is posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU), historically the most dangerous terrorist movement in the region... which has joined ISIS.

"Factors contributing to these states' 'fragility' are as follows: first, the large-scale drug traffic along the northern transportation route from Afghanistan to Russia.

"[Another] critical factor threatening the statehood of regional countries is the

existence of personalized 'sultanistic' regimes ingrained in the clan systems that determine the intra-elite network configurations.

"Poverty is the next factor contributing to these states' 'fragility.' Regional countries (especially parts of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana Valley)[11] are characterized by a very high degree of rural

overpopulation aggravated by the shortage of water and fertile soil.

One Year Later: Islamic State Continues to Expand Inside Russia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 73 April 14, 2016 By: Mairbek Vatchagaev

The so-called Islamic State (IS) is increasingly infiltrating Russia, threatening its security (Lenta.ru, June 24, 2015). It has been less than one year since the IS claimed to have a

“province” in the North Caucasus (Polit.ru, June 24, 2015), and now the organization claims to have expanded beyond the “Caucasus Velayat.” The IS went on to establish its own network of cells in Russia. The same process took place in Iraq after 2006, when the

Islamists gradually expanded their influence and became so strong in some areas that they could ignore authorities in Baghdad. In the North Caucasus, the IS based its expansion on

the existing structures of the Caucasus Emirate, which operated since 2007. Moscow quickly realized the danger posed by the IS, and the Russian Supreme Court designated the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front) as terrorist organizations back in November

2014 (RIA Novosti, December 29, 2014). Thus, Russian authorities outlawed the IS prior to its coming to Russia, hoping that the ban would help to ward off the Middle Eastern

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organization.

However, at this point, it can be said already that the preventive measures taken by the Russian government were insufficient and did not change the

Islamic State’s plans with regard to the Caucasus and Russia (Georgianpress.ru, June 26, 2015). The IS recently launched several attacks in the North Caucasus, although their scale was probably far smaller than the organization’s leadership in the Middle East would have

hoped for. In a surprise announcement, the Federal Security Service (FSB) said it detained five IS supporters who were preparing a terrorist attack in the Volgograd region. The

security services confiscated explosives, ammunition and extremist literature from the suspects. According to the FSB, the so-called Pallasovsky Jamaat operated in the town of Pallasovka, in the Volgograd region. Members of the jamaat reportedly recruited local

residents for the war in Syria (TASS, April 8). Pallasovka is a small town of 15,000 residents, located on Russia’s border with

Kazakhstan. The Investigative Department of the FSB launched a criminal investigation on the basis of the Russian Criminal Code statute covering the establishment of illegal armed groups. FSB investigators also invoked the statute mandating the prosecution of

support for terrorist activities. If the charges are confirmed, the suspects could face up to ten years in prison.

It is noteworthy that such a jamaat was established in a small provincial town located in the area along the border between Russia and Kazakhstan. The location of the cell indicates that it was probably tied to networks not only in Russia but also in

Kazakhstan. It is also highly likely the jamaat in Pallasovka had ties to the North Caucasus because many North Caucasians, in particular, Dagestanis and Chechens, migrated to that

part of the Volgograd region in search of employment and settled there. The arrest of the members of the Pallasovka Jamaat highlights other similar incidents, in which IS supporters or sympathizers have been detained in Russia. For example, in

October 2015, authorities in Moscow detained several Chechens who allegedly had ties to the IS. Government officials based their decision to detain the suspects on claims that the

suspects had undergone military training in Syria and spread militant propaganda (Newsru.com, October 13, 2015). The FSB also announced the arrest of seven suspected IS members in one of Russia’s

largest cities, Yekaterinburg. Officials said that the suspects were preparing terrorist attacks in Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Yekaterinburg area, using improvised explosive

devices (IED) (Rg.ru, February 8). A little later, the police detained about 20 individuals accused of having ties to the IS. However, since nearly all of the detained individuals were Turkish citizens, it was probably part of the ongoing anti-Turkish campaign in Russia

(Lenta.ru, March 30). The arrests of IS sympathizers and supporters are also quite frequent in the North Caucasus (Peacekeeper.ru, March, 17), which indicates that Russia is facing a

serious challenge as radicals affiliated with the IS establish cells across the country. Probably due to constant FSB pressure on IS-affiliated radicals in Russia, some Russian citizens are migrating to Ukraine to establish Islamist cells there. Ukrainian authorities

reported that they detained 25 IS members, 19 of whom were Russian citizens (Mignews.com.ua, March 23). According to the Ukrainian security services, Russian IS

sympathizers use Ukraine and Turkey as transit territories for traveling to Syria and back. This evidence suggests that the Islamic State is spreading its influence across

Russia and its neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia, among others. Given the fact

that the IS started to expand its presence in Russia only in the summer of 2015, the Middle Eastern organization has been quite successful, which is partly Russia’s own fault. In

dealing with Muslims, Russia is behaving like a bull in a china shop, which creates more

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opposition among Muslims and more opportunities for IS recruiters. The

process is likely to create greater tensions between the Russian government and the Muslim community down the road.

Russian Expert Community Introduces New Study on Electronic Warfare April 11, 2016 -- Volume 13, Issue 70

In August 2015, the Russian official news agency TASS quoted United States Army Europe’s (USAREUR) commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, speaking on, among

other topics, the growing robustness of Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities (TASS, August 19, 2015). What the US general said undoubtedly provided the Russians with confirmation that their efforts in building robust EW capabilities have borne fruit.

Since late 2015, a number of articles have appeared inside Russia describing advances in EW, and open sources have repeatedly reported on EW equipment being delivered to the

Russian Armed Forces. In this context, the book Radioelektronaya Borba (Electronic Warfare), written by a group of Russian authors under the editorial guidance of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kolesov and Igor Georgivich Nasenkov, is of special interest (Cast.ru,

accessed April 11). The book was published in December 2015, but it seems it was not noted by the broader public until early spring 2016. At that point, however, it attracted an

uncommonly large level of interest for a book on a military subject. This level of attention quickly becomes apparent when reading Radioelektronaya Borba, which offers a broad and detailed insight in the topic of EW from a Russian perspective.

Radioelektronaya Borba is divided into four chapters: “

1. The History of Electronic Warfare,” 2. “2. Electronic Warfare Units, Indigenous Electronic Warfare Industry and

Technology,”

3. “3. The World Market in the Field of Electronic Warfare,” and 4. “4. Use of Electronic Warfare Means in Modern Conflicts.” These are preceded

by an introduction to EW, as well as its definitions and principles, and concludes with some thoughts about the future of EW.

The book describes more than just Russian experiences and systems. US use of EW in a

historical perspective as well as US systems and modern concepts for its development also fill a number of pages. The same goes for French and Chinese views on EW. The chapters

“Electronic Warfare Units, Indigenous Electronic Warfare Industry and Technology” and “The World Market in the Field of Electronic Warfare” in particular give insight into the development of Russian EW systems, including modern ones. In addition, the book

includes short descriptions of each of the Russian companies that currently produce EW equipment.

Chapter four, which describes the use of EW in modern conflicts, begins with Operation Allied Force (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s aerial bombing of Yugoslavia in

1999) and ends with Russian operations in Crimea and Ukraine (since 2014). The book provides little detailed insight into Russia’s use of EW in connection with the February–

March 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ensuing, and still ongoing, war in eastern Ukraine. However, with regard to Crimea, the chapter mentions that Russian units were equipped with Leer-2 mobile technical control, electronic emulation and electronic

countermeasure systems; Lorandit-M radio control and jamming complexes, and Infauna electronic warfare vehicles. The book also remarks that Russian spetsnaz (special forces)

had cut Ukrainian stationary lines of communication with mainland Ukraine. For obvious

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reasons not much is said about the use of EW in connection with the

continuing war in eastern Ukraine; the book only briefly touches upon it: “during the following events in eastern Ukraine, just sporadic use of electronic warfare by

[the warring] parties was noted.” Based on previously published information on this topic from other reliable sources, this passage clearly comes across as an understatement. Nevertheless, the authors highlight the use of EW to disable enemy unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAV)—a first for the post-Soviet space.

Comparing Radioelektronaya Borba with other Russian sources provides further insight into this country’s EW capabilities. In September and October 2015 Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier published a two-part article entitled “Electronic War—Myths and

Truth” (Vpk-news.ru, September 30, 2015; October 7, 2015). Besides describing equipment, one of the articles had a short paragraph about the development of Russian EW

units. According to the article, in 2009, EW centers were organized in each military district, of which the majority were subsequently reorganized into EW brigades, with the exception of the center in Crimea. In addition to these brigades, there is also the 15th EW

Brigade, which is subordinated to the Russian high command, and a number of battalions presumed to be tasked with the protection of essential military and industrial objects.

On the tactical level, a Russian textbook (Yuri Borisovich Torgovanov, Obshaya Taktika, SFU, Krasnoyarsk, 2013) describes the organization of the EW company in the

mechanized and tank brigades. The company consists of about 100 men and is organized into five EW platoons, each with its own specialty. The company´s main tasks are to

counter radio communication, systems for command and control, navigation equipment, and intelligence sensors, as well as to protect friendly units from artillery fire and attacks from the air—i.e. from munitions with proximity fuses. The company shall also carry out

“radiodesinformatsiya” (“radio-disinformation”), something that presumably entails the emission of false signals. According to Obshaya Taktika, EW is an integral and essential

part of current Russian tactics both in attack and defense. Obviously the Russians take the view that EW is a force multiplier that they have and will

continue to invest serious resources into. Indeed, as the closing paragraph of Radioelektronaya Borba states, tomorrow “…electronic warfare will become the part of

the armed struggle that decides the outcome of the battle.” And commenting on Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, one recent foreign study notes, “Key lessons include the necessity for allies to train and prepare for substantial Russian electronic warfare (EW) capability,

with the implication that they may have to operate in a degraded EW/cyber environment with GPS [global positioning system] signals suppressed or unreliable”

(Chathamhouse.org, March 2016). So in light of Russia’s growing EW capabilities, perhaps the time has come for Western militaries to relearn how to utilize a map and a compass, signal flares, and maybe even the use of army buglers at the tactical level. --

Jörgen Elfving

Newly-Formed National Guard Cannot Dispel Putin’s Multiple Insecurities

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 70 April 11, 2016 By: Pavel K. Baev

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The recent release of the “Panama Papers,” which revealed notorious cases of

hidden money flows tied to the global elite, continues to cause a political stir across the world. But in Russia, this scandal was eclipsed by President Vladimir Putin’s

sudden reshuffling of the law enforcement structures. The main element of this bureaucratic coup was the creation of the National Guard on the basis of the Interior Troops. And while loose ideas on reorganizing this 200,000 strong “power structure” had

been floating around the Kremlin corridors since the mid-1990s, there had been no discussion of the dubious rationale for such a shakeup since 2012, so Putin’s decision

came as his trademark surprise (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 7). Various special units (OMON and SOBR) from the Ministry of Interior were also incorporated into the planned National Guard, which thus becomes 400,000 strong (Rbc.ru, April 7). This sizeable army

will be commanded by Victor Zolotov, who for many years was in charge of Putin’s personal security (Gazeta.ru, April 6). No official explanation was provided for the need to

form this new “federal executive body“ (as Putin’s decree defines it), leaving much space for speculation about the motivations for and timing of Putin’s urge to take direct control over the “enforcers” of domestic security (see EDM, April 7).

The main loser in this reshuffle is obviously the interior ministry, which has lost the capacity to wield armed instruments of power—and much of the political influence

coming from such muscle (Rbc.ru, April 5). In compensation, it was given control over the Federal Migration Service and the Federal Drug Control Service; but

these mergers bring more headaches than benefits (Vedomosti, April 6).

Both services are seriously under-resourced and show scant success in performing their tasks. The head of the

latter service, Victor Ivanov, a veteran among Russia’s security services

personnel (siloviki), was tipped to become a deputy to Interior Minister Victor Kolokoltsev. But according to well- informed rumors, he was bluntly refused

(Kommersant, April 7). The emergence of the National Guard, with its privileged access to the Kremlin, is also a

challenge to the Ministry of Defense, which certainly controls greater armed capabilities but has thus been given a clear message that in case of a domestic emergency, its tanks would be subordinated to “Pretorian” commanders. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu

gained much profile due to the swift deployment of “little green men” to Crimea, in March 2014, as well as the perfectly executed intervention in Syria. Therefore, public opinion

awards him the highest degree of trust after Putin (Levada.ru, March 30). Shoigu is an experienced courtier and knows how to demonstrate loyalty, but Putin recognizes him to be his own man with quite a large entourage of devoted followers (particularly in the

Ministry of Emergencies) and solid support in the officer corps. The aging commander- in-chief cannot afford another politician to develop an independent power base. So in part,

the National Guard is supposed to counter-balance Shoigu’s empowerment and to check his ambitions (Kasparov.ru, April 6). Even deeper hidden is the message of Putin’s dissatisfaction with the Federal Security

Service (FSB), which used to be his most favored “power structure” and the main source of cadre for his administration. Former head of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev is the secretary

of the Security Council, which sets the agenda for foreign and domestic policies, and he is

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not known to be Zolotov’s friend (New Times, April 4). The FSB has many

hidden channels for monitoring and controlling the interior ministry, but the National Guard will be outside such supervision (Rbc.ru, April 8). The FSB was the lead

agency in the struggle against terrorism, and its director, Alexander Bortnikov, still heads the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, but Zolotov’s Guard has received its own mandate to operate against terrorist networks (Rbc.ru, April 5). Bureaucratic competition is certain

to be aggravated by personal animosities; and, indeed, leaks about the Zolotov family’s conspicuous lifestyle started immediately after the announcement of his promotion

(Navalny.com, April 8). One particular twist in the complex intrigue around the newly born National Guard involves the long-simmering conflict between the FSB and Chechnya’s maverick master,

Ramzan Kadyrov. The investigation of the murder of Boris Nemtsov, on February 27, 2015, uncovered trail leading to Chechnya. But Kadyrov has resolutely refused to

cooperate, relying not only on his personal access to Putin but also on a particular connection with Zolotov (Svoboda.org, April 9). Putin made it clear to the FSB that Kadyrov was “off limits” and now has ruled that all the para-military Kadyrovtsy gangs

are to formally come under Zolotov’s control (Novaya Gazeta, April 9). This is hardly going to make them any more disciplined or inclined to take orders from the Kremlin, but

it does now make Putin responsible for any future crimes they might commit. And so, as young liberal opposition leader Ilya Yashin argues, Putin is increasingly becoming a hostage in his ties to Kadyrov (Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 25).

In the past several years, the Kadyrovtsy came in handy for Moscow in the war in Donbas and in the intervention in Syria. But their key role in the near future might be to suppress

protest activities inside Russia (Novaya Gazeta, April 6). The National Guard has already started training for the forceful dispersal of street rallies (Moscow Echo, April 9). This is rather striking taking into consideration the fact that the legislative and normative acts for

Zolotov’s “army” have not even been prepared yet, even if the State Duma is ready to approve any paperwork delivered by the Kremlin (Slon.ru, April 7). The political elites

have good reason to expect a rise in discontent caused by economic hardship. And the avalanche of evidence of shameless corruption at the top could turn meek appeals for attention into angry riots (Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 6).

The fear of revolution might appear irrational, but the Kremlin courtiers know how a desperate stance of a small group of liberals could suddenly bring tens of thousands of

protesters into Moscow’s streets. And the elites have no confidence in the opinion polls showing sky-high support for the supreme leader. Putin, meanwhile, apparently concerned about whether his order to use armed force against a new wave of protests would be

followed, has placed his most trusted deputy in the position of power to execute such a command. This has aggrieved many other lieutenants, whose loyalty is a function of

access to power convertible into cash flows. By upsetting this balance of power at the top, Putin likely also upset the balance of his fears; and the specter of a palace coup has grown scarier.

Moscow Plays the Arctic Card in Its Asian Policy

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 72 April 13, 2016 By: Stephen Blank

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(Source: gazprom-neft.com) Since 2007, two of Moscow’s priority foreign policy initiatives have been its pivot to Asia

and efforts to secure recognition of its Arctic claims while opening the Russian High North up to large-scale development. In both cases—in the Arctic or the Russian Far East—Moscow can only play the role it wants to attain with the help of extensive foreign

investment. And it is also true that much of Russia’s Arctic geography lies in continental Asia. Therefore it is not only Russia that is interested in developing the Arctic, but such

rising Asian commercial and military powers as China, Japan, South Korea, and even India and Singapore. Moreover, these Asian countries and others, like Vietnam, have long expressed an interest in Russian energy supplies. These facts have manifested in Russia’s

interactions with potential Asian partners for some time and appeared in the headlines once more in the past few weeks and months.

For years, Moscow has actively sought Asian investment in Arctic energy fields. Since 2013, if not earlier, Moscow has been soliciting investment from India’s Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC). This state-owned enterprise is already invested—as are some

Japanese firms—in natural gas deposits on Sakhalin and also considering further business opportunities in Russia’s Far East and the Arctic. ONGC is specifically considering

acquiring a stake in the Trebs and Titov oil fields in northwest Russia’s Timan-Pechora Basin (Nenets Autonomous Okrug). And the Indian energy giant is also possibly looking

into the Arctic Yamal peninsula (Icwa.in, January 20, 2014). Likewise, China has been

investing in Russian energy firms in the Arctic since 2013 as well (Barents Observer, March 25, 2013). As of 2014, that investment

has picked up with the advent of Western sanctions targeting foreign investment in the

Russian Arctic (see EDM, March 16). Similarly, Vietnam announced its intention to

invest jointly in Arctic energy fields with Russia, in 2014, as part of Moscow’s turn to

Asian sources of finance after the imposition of sanctions (RT, November 26, 2014). But most recently, Moscow has begun embracing regional countries that, hitherto, had

been reluctant to invest with Russia or that had not been approached in the past. Thus, on March 15, 2016, authorities revealed ongoing negotiation between Singapore and Russia about cooperation in Arctic research. And Russian sources clearly hope to expand that

cooperation into the economic and political realms (Arctic.ru, March 15). Even more intriguing have been Russia’s latest overtures to Japan. Notably, as part of its

efforts at normalizing relations with Tokyo, Moscow supported Japan’s membership as an observer in the Arctic Council, in 2013. And as Russia became disenchanted with the level of Chinese investment in 2015, it started looking at Japan as a potential alternative to

China in the energy and Arctic investment spheres. To encourage such bilateral cooperation, last November Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin claimed Russia could meet all of

Japan’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) needs and called on Tokyo to contribute to building an LNG plant in Russia’s Far East (TASS November 6, 2015). Indeed, Japan purchased a record amount of crude oil from Russia in 2015. And by early 2016, as Russia and Japan

strove to normalize their relations (see EDM, January 13), Moscow was holding out as a lure to Tokyo the opportunity to participate with it in big, joint Arctic energy projects.

Namely, on February 29, Kazuko Shiraishi, Japan’s special ambassador for Arctic Affairs,

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gave a press conference in Moscow where he outlined the three priority areas

for bilateral cooperation in the Arctic. Specifically, he listed: 1) research, 2) increasing the capability to support more commerce passing from Asia to Europe along

Russia’s frigid northern coastal waters (the so-called Northern Sea Route—NSR), and 3) Japanese investment in the Yamal and Arctic LNG projects. These areas speak to the growing interest in studying the Arctic in order to exploit it, the viability—in international

eyes—of the NSR as a faster transcontinental trade route, as well as Japan’s own needs to acquire new energy sources (Sputnik News, February 29).

Thus, it must be said that Russia has employed the Arctic card with some success, at least when it comes to potential cooperation with Japan. But the other decisions Moscow has made vis-à-vis Tokyo, notably arming the disputed Kurile Islands and showing greater

support for Beijing, make it all but certain that no Russo-Japanese normalization can be expected this year; nor is President Vladimir Putin likely to make his long-anticipated state

visit to Tokyo in the near future. And those decisions clearly vit iate any prospects of economic cooperation (see EDM, March 30). As such, Moscow has undermined the success it had earlier achieved by its own means. Whether or not this will undercut the

viability of offering Arctic concessions as part of Russia’s “Ostpolitik” remains to be seen. But it is clear that Southeast Asia cannot substitute for Japanese capital and that China will

only offer as little as it can get away with to Russia in return for Moscow’s dependence upon Beijing. What all this means for Russia’s Arctic future is unclear. Nonetheless, after eight years of pivoting to Asia, what exactly does Russia have to show for it?

Regards Cees***

April 13, 2016, Special Dispatch No.6386

A Russian View Of The Islamist Threat To Central Asia On January 19, 2016, the website of the pro-Kremlin think tank

Valdai Club published a report by Andrei Kazantsev, director of the

Analytical Center of the Institute for International Studies in Russia, titled "Central-Asia:

Secular Statehood Challenged by Radical Islam."[1] Kazantsev

wrote that post-Soviet Central Asian countries face a threat from radical Islam that impacts

prospects for secular statehood and represents a serious obstacle

to modernization of the region.

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The following are excerpts from Kazantsev's article:[2]

Afghanistan "Post-Soviet Central Asian countries are facing problems caused by old security

challenges and the emergence of completely new threats. These threats may influence the prospects for secular statehood in the region and represent a serious obstacle to modernization. One of the old security challenges is the situation in neighboring

Afghanistan, where crisis phenomena are continuously aggravated. The most dangerous threat is posed by the concentration of militants in northern Afghanistan (on the border

with Tajikistan,[3] Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)...[4] "As [a] UN Security Council paper stated, 'Afghan security forces estimated in March 2015 that some 6,500 foreign terrorist fighters are active in this country.'[5] There are 200

fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan alone (la ter renamed the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, IMT).[6] According to Russian General Staff estimates, if the

Afghans are also included the total number of terrorist fighters in this country would amount to 50,000.[7] The threat from Afghanistan is not only an ideological alternative to secular statehood in the form of radical Islam, but also has a purely military dimension..."

The Islamic State "In 2014, and particularly in 2015, a 'second front' emerged in the Middle East which has

rapidly gained a Central Asian dimension: the Islamic State (ISIS). First, ISIS is fraught with the threat of faith-motivated terrorism in view of militants' migration potential... 500 militants arrived in Syria and Iraq from Uzbekistan; 360 from Turkmenistan, 350 from

Kyrgyzstan, 250 from Kazakhstan, and 190 from Tajikistan. Obviously, their recruitment would have been impossible without the existence of ISIS 'sleeper cells' in Central Asian

countries and Russia. Militants often travel to Syria and Iraq through Russia. Guest workers in Russia are also recruited. Second, ISIS is a serious ideological challenge to all Islamic states, Central Asian states included, because as a caliphate it claims supremacy in

the entire Muslim world. Specifically, ISIS has listed Central Asia and Afghanistan as Wilayat Khorasan [i.e. a province of the Islamic State]…

"A special threat to Central Asia is posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), historically the most dangerous terrorist movement in the region... which has joined ISIS. At the same time, ISIS banners were raised by Turkmen tribes that inhabit areas bordering

on Turkmenistan (many are descendants of the basmachi who fought the early Soviet government).[8] ISIS is engaged in subversion in the Central Asian hinterland as well.

Kyrgyz and Tajik experts report that ISIS has allocated $70 million for subversion in the region.[9] Security threats to Central Asia from radical Islam in Afghanistan and Middle Eastern countries are being aggravated by numerous negative domestic factors that put the

majority of countries in the region on the list of 'fragile states.' These 'fragile states' may easily become 'failed states' that do not control their own territory. These states are ideal

ground for the entrenchment of radical terrorist groups like ISIS..."

Central Asia

Drug Trafficking, Corruption, Poverty, And "Sultanistic Regimes" "Factors contributing to these states' 'fragility' are as follows: first, the large-scale drug

traffic along the northern transportation route from Afghanistan to Russia. The latter is the world's main consumer of Afghan heroin. Security experts know well that the proceeds from drug trafficking are often used to fund terrorism and religious extremism. The

existence of this link is clear from the Batken war: One of IMU's goals in invading Kyrgyzstan was to create routes for heroin trafficking.[10]

"[Another] important factor contributing to their 'fragility' and the growth of the radical

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Islamic threat is the extremely high rate of corruption in the region... First,

corruption is closely linked with organized crime, especially drug trafficking, the proceeds from which may be used to finance terrorist groups, as we have already

mentioned. Second, it sharply reduces the efficiency of government agencies in the fight against the threat of radical Islam. Third, the high level of corruption and ensuing social inequality are one of the main propaganda points used by radical Islamists, including ISIS,

against existing secular regimes in the region. "Poverty is the next factor contributing to these states' 'fragility.' Regional countries

(especially parts of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana Valley)[11] are characterized by a very high degree of rural overpopulation aggravated by the shortage of water and fertile soil. This leads to unemployment and large numbers of marginalized

young people who are highly susceptible to brainwashing by radical Islamists. The problem is worsened by the degradation of the Soviet-era social support, education, and

healthcare systems... The increase in poverty is occurring against the backdrop of a trend toward socio- economic 'de-modernization.' For example, due to civil war and economic hardships, urban residents in Tajikistan dropped to 26% of the entire population in 2010,

which is comparable with the world's most backward countries. Other manifestations of 'de-modernization' include an exodus of highly-skilled specialists and intellectuals (both

Russian-speaking and ethnic)... "[Another] critical factor threatening the statehood of regional countries is the existence of personalized 'sultanistic' regimes ingrained in the clan systems that determine the intra-

elite network configurations. The two key countries in the region – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – did not experience a single power change in the post-Soviet period and the

existing political institutions in both countries are closely linked with the strong personalities of their presidents. At the same time, by virtue of the age factor, a change of supreme power will be on the agenda in the near future and this may lead to the

exacerbation of inter-clan conflicts within the elites and further destabilization." Clashes Over Water Resources And Conflicts Of Interest

"[Another issue is] serious interstate clashes over water resources between countries in the upper reaches of rivers (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and those in the lower reaches (Uzbekistan, and less so Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). These conflicts are serious

obstacles to cooperation, including the joint struggle against security threats. "[Furthermore,] influential great powers (Russia, the United States, China, the EU, and

Islamic countries) are involved in the competition for influence in the region. Conflicts of interest between them may increase security threats and at best neutralize their efforts to help regional countries cope with various challenges.

"The aforementioned external threats from radical Islam emanating from Afghanistan and Middle Eastern countries, threats that are dramatically enhanced by domestic problems

existing in a number of regional countries, clearly point to some crisis in the secular statehood model that was established in Central Asia in the post-Soviet period. Prospects for overcoming this crisis are different in different countries and are largely determined by

the nature of the relationships between government agencies and Islam..." Islamism In Tajikistan

"After the Central Asian countries gained independence, their elites began to actively support what they considered politically appropriate versions of Islam, in an attempt to create national forms of the religion that would legitimatize existing political systems in

secular states. The situation in Tajikistan is the worst, in terms of instability and the influence of radical Islam. Among the negative factors it is important to note its proximity

to Afghanistan, a very complicated domestic socio-economic situation, and the ongoing

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destructive consequences of the civil war that took place during the first half

of the 1990s. At the same time, the radicalization of society, including of law enforcement, is accelerating.

The US State Department has confirmed that ISIL militant Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov was trained on American soil by Blackwater." The US State Department has confirmed that ISIL militant Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov was trained on American soil by

Blackwater"/ Gulmurod Khalimov, a colonel in the Tajikistani riot police who deserted his unit

and joined ISIS in 2015. "The most blatant incident occurred in 2015, when riot police [officer] Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov deserted his unit and joined ISIS.[12] A military mutiny headed by Deputy

Defense Minister Maj.-Gen. Abdukhalim Nazarzoda occurred in the fall of 2015.[13] The authorities also attributed this to the influence of radical Islam. The central government of

Tajikistan does not seem to exercise strong control over some of its territories such as Gorno Badakhshan [an autonomous region in eastern Tajikistan]. The defense of the Tajik-Afghan border has also weakened following the departure of Russian border guards.

This is dangerous in view of the accelerated destabilization in Afghanistan's border areas.[14] Excesses in the struggle against Islamism may also be conducive to the

dissemination of radical Islam. Such actions as the wide-scale shutdown of

mosques, the introduction of a tough dress code in

opposition to Islamic tradition, and the banning of the moderate Islamic

Revival of Tajikistan party, may consolidate the

radical Islamic underground."[15]

Islamism In

Kyrgyzstan "Kyrgyzstan is also subject to serious threats. One of the specific risks is the country's

geopolitical split into north and south [following its independence in 1991, there is a possibility of a north-south split]. As the Batken war bore out, Kyrgyz government agencies are traditionally weak and were further weakened by two revolutions (2005 and

2010).[16] Radical Islamism presents the greatest threat in the south of Kyrgyzstan, especially within the large Uzbek diaspora. The situation in this area is complicated by an

acute ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks which led to pogroms in 2010."[17]

Islamism In Turkmenistan

The situation in Turkmenistan has traditionally been considered one of the most stable in the region (as the above statehood ratings indicate). Nevertheless, it seriously deteriorated

in 2014-2015, after ISIS penetrated areas adjoining the Afghan-Turkmen border. The negative aspects of Turkmenistan's neutral status are becoming obvious.[18] The country does not have a strong army to protect its borders, nor can it request military aid from

Russia, for instance, as this would contradict the concept of neutrality. The domestic situation leaves much to be desired, too..."

Islamism In Uzbekistan

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"Uzbekistan's standoff with extremist trends in Islam is characterized by

substantial contradictions. On the one hand, the region's strongest extremist groups originated in Uzbekistan. In 1999, IMU staged massive terrorist attacks in

Tashkent. In May 2005, Akromiya (Akromiylar), a radical Islamic group, organized an uprising in Andizhan (Fergana Valley). On the other hand, the state's powerful law enforcement agencies and its generally repressive policy have put the activities of

religious extremists in the country under a measure of control. "Islamic propaganda and terrorist activities are increasing in Uzbekistan against the

backdrop of a worsening socio-economic crisis. Uzbekistan is second after Russia in the post-Soviet space in terms of the number of militants who went to fight in Syria and Iraq. Among other things, the growth of religious extremism in Uzbekistan is a complicated

issue, as it is linked with clan policy. Uzbekistan has a traditional 'division of labor' between regional clans that is nicely expressed in the proverb: 'A resident of Samarkand

rules; a resident of Tashkent counts money, and a resident of the Fergana Valley prays.' This proverb emphasizes Islam's special role in the Fergana Valley and the fact that all key clergymen in Uzbekistan traditionally come from the Fergana Valley. During the post-

Soviet evolution [one of the two most powerful Uzbek clans], the Samarkand clan (the president himself [Islam Karimov] belongs to it) and the Tashkent clan (in charge of the

economy) came to power in Uzbekistan. Many experts believe that the Fergana clan has traditionally used the threat of Islamic extremism to enhance its influence. The

aforementioned inter-clan alignment of political forces is highly important as the

prevailing problem of the inheritance of power may seriously aggravate the inter-clan struggle."

Islamism In Kazakhstan "Kazakhstan is least affected by religious

radicalism owing to the following specific factors: a stable economy (about two-thirds of Central Asia's GDP is

produced in Kazakhstan); a fairly high level of social modernization in the Soviet period; the existence of a large strata of Russian speakers; and the historical tradition of Islam's

dissemination among the Kazakhs. The situation in two regions is critically important in terms of the spread of radical Islam. The influence of Islamic institutions has traditionally been strong in southern Kazakhstan, which is an area with a settled population. Islam's

revival there has been characterized by the emergence of its more radical forms. A no less complicated situation has been taking shape in western Kazakhstan over the past few

years. The intensive industrial development of the region's oil and gas deposits has attracted socially marginalized groups..."

Countering Islamism: The Hanafi School And The Jadid Ideology

A cartoon portraying a Jadid reformer opposingthe traditionalists (Source: Jadid.uz) "Threats to secular statehood in Central Asia are fairly high. However, the region's

countries have the potential to counter them. Historically, Central Asia, as part of the Muslim world was characterized by developed Islamic science... and the high Sufi tradition of Islam including mystical poetry... It is these local cultural traditions of Islam

that are some of the main targets of Islamic radicals, who deny national forms of Muslim religion and culture. Central Asian Sufis (primarily the great Uzbek teacher of the Soviet

era Muhammad-jan Hindustani)[19] actively countered the spread of radical Islam

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(Salafism and Wahhabism). Therefore, it is no surprise that religious

extremism is much less widespread in ancient Central Asian centers of civilization, such as Samarkand and Bukhara, by virtue of the high traditional culture of

the population. "The potential of the traditional legal Hanafi School should not be underestimated either. It is one of the four Orthodox Sunni religious schools of jurisprudence, whereas radical

Islam (Salafism) is linked to the Saudi-adopted Hanbali School in the radical Wahhabi interpretation. The development of traditional Islam and the consolidation of the Hanafi

School for official recognition (which is the case, for instance, in Tajikistan) is a resource for fighting radicalism... "It should also be emphasized that Central Asian states have positive historical experience

in terms of successfully upgrading Islamic ideology, which may well be leveraged in current conditions. The latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century saw the

emergence of the Jadid ideology... It was introduced by Muslim liberal reformers in the regions, who were leaders in the dissemination of such ideas.[20] This is a cultural tradition of development along the strictly secular road, which is typical of the region's

more advanced countries such as Kazakhstan." Countering Islamism: "Soviet Modernization Heritage," An Efficient Market

Economy, And Russia's Role "Soviet modernization heritage also facilitates the preservation of secular statehood. It led to many changes in Central Asia. Many Soviet-established non-Muslim stereotypes of

everyday life (for instance, high literacy and the secular education of the population owing to the system of universal school education, the consumption of alcohol and infrequent

visits to mosques) still make many residents of this region substantially different from their brethren-in-faith in the rest of the Muslim world. "In the post-Soviet period, the efficiency of reforms aimed at building modern institutions

was different in different countries of the region. Kazakhstan has been in the lead in terms of developing a market economy and attracting investment. An efficient market economy

is one of the largest obstacles to the return to archaic Islamic institutions as urged by radicals... It is Kazakhstan that is a kind of a 'bastion of stability' primarily owing to its relative (regional) socio-economic well-being. It ensures the security of Russia's southern

borders, China's western borders and eventually the security of the European Union's eastern borders.

"The assistance of great powers is a major resource in the struggle against radical Islamism in Central Asia. In this context special credit goes to Russia which has key positions in terms of ensuring regional security. The Moscow-backed Collective Security

Treaty Organization is the main protection for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan against possible invasions from Afghan territory and potential ISIS expansion.[21] Russia

is vitally concerned with fighting Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. Its further spread and even possible victory are linked to the growth potential of many cross-border threats (terrorism, drug trafficking, the intensification of uncontrolled migration, etc.). In the

migration context, the security of Russia's several metropolitan areas (Moscow above all) largely depends on the ability of Moscow and the entire international community to render

effective aid to Central Asian countries in countering the growing threat of radical Islamism." Endnotes:

[1] Valdaiclub.com, January 19, 2016.

[2] The original English has been lightly edited for clarity.

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[3] The main phase of the joint command staff exercises involving the units of the armed

forces of Russia and Tajikistan started in March 2016. The command and control units of

Tajikistan's Defense Ministry and Russia's Central Military District as well as motorized rifle, armored and

artillery units, Special Forces, airborne and air assault groups of both countries participated in the drill.

Sputniknews.com, March 14, 2016.

[4] Kommersant.ru, October 8, 2015.

[5] Letter dated May 19, 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions

1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities addressed to the

President of the Security Council. S/2015/358.p.8.

[6] Letter dated 19 May 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions

1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities addressed to the

President of the Security Council. S/2015/358.P. 9.

[7] Kommersant.ru, October 8, 2015.

[8] The Bas machi Revolt was an insurrection against Soviet rule in Central Asia, which started after the

Russian revolution in 1917 and was largely suppressed by 1926.

[9] Kommersant.ru, October 8, 2015.

[10] The Islamic Movement fo r Uzbekistan (IMU) has been blamed by Kirg izstan for the Batken incidents

of 1999 and 2000.

[11] The Fergana Valley, in Central Asia, spreads across eastern Uzbekistan, south of Kyrgyzstan and north

of Tajikistan. In March 2016, tensions rose between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over an elevated territory in

the valley shared by the two countries.

[12] On April 2015, Gulmurod Khalimov joined ISIS in Syria. Khalimov, a former commander of the

special forces of the Tajiki Ministry of Interior, appeared in a propaganda video confirming that he is

fighting for ISIS. On February 2016, his second wife, Humairo Mirova, left for Syria along with their four

children.

[13] On September 2015, former Tajiki deputy defense minister General Abdukhalim Nazarzodawas killed

by Tajiki security forces, after gunmen loyal to Nazarzoda clashed with government forces.

[14] On October 6, 2015, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon met with Russian President Vladimir

Putin to discuss security issues in order to defend the 1,200-kilometer-long border with Afghanistan. In the

meet ing, Rahmon said that the situation in Afghanistan is worsening daily. "Hostilit ies are underway along

over 60 percent of the border. This is very alarming; therefore... I would like to take up specifically matters

of ensuring security in the region," he said. Kremlin.ru, October 6, 2015.

[15] In January 2016, police in Tajikistan shaved the beards off nearly 13,000 men, and 1,700 women

removed their headscarves in a bid to tackle extremism.

[16] The Tulip Revolution, or the First Kyrgyz Revolution, overthrew Kyrgyz president AskarAkayev in

2005. The Second Kyrgyz Revolution ousted Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010.

[17] In the aftermath of the Second Kyrgyz Revolution, ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted

in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The clashes resulted in hundreds of people killed, and in the looting and

destruction of property.

[18] On December 12, 1995, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Resolution on the Permanent

Neutrality of Turkmenistan.

[19] Muhammad-jan Hindustani (1892-1989) was an Uzbeki Muslim scholar. He is considered to be the

father of the Islamic renaissance in Central Asia.

[20] Jadidis m was a movement of Muslim reformers in Central Asia, mainly among the Uzbeks and the

Tajiks, from the first years of the 20th century to the 1920s.

[21] The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was signed on May 15, 1992. Odkb-csto.org/.