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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-AQAP-20

While we are looking somewhere else, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has promised "total war on all crusaders"

Previous: Fighting al-Qaida requires different strategies than that of the current operation, Asiri said, suggesting that such a fight could come later. AQAP has two agendas. One is local, within Yemen's borders, and is all about taking territory, attacking the government, raiding armouries and building a support base among the tribes.

A rival caliphate emerges? Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has begun to partner with local tribes in Yemen’s eastern Hadramawt governorate and is consolidating control over territory. AQAP militants continue to hold parts of al Mukalla city, the capital of Hadramawt, and recently seized Dhabah oil terminal in al Shihr, along with military installations. AQAP has delegated governance to local tribal councils.

By their nature, organizations like AQAP are unpredictable. Strategic surprise is an imperative for terrorist groups. But analyzing data from a group’s recent operations provides telling indicators of its strategic orientation. And in the case of AQAP, such an analysis makes one particular point clear: While airstrikes in Yemen are changing the nature of AQAP’s battlespace, they are not yet fundamentally changing the strategic calculus behind a campaign that took shape and evolved well before the Saudi-led intervention.

Michael Horton, a Yemen expert close to a number of officers at the US Special Operations Command and a consultant to the US and UK governments, told Al-Jazeera America that he was “confounded” by the Saudi operation as it would inevitably allow AQAP to reassert themselves. “These constant reports that the Houthis are working for the Iranians are nonsense, but the view is right out of the neocon playbook,” he said. “The Israelis have been touting this line that we lost Yemen to Iran. That’s absurd. The Houthis don’t need Iranian weapons. They have plenty of their own. And they don’t require military training. They’ve been fighting Al-Qaeda since at least 2012, and they’ve been winning.” “Why are we fighting a movement that’s fighting Al-Qaeda?”

16 April, The defense secretary said that AQAP was taking advantage of "an opportunity in the environment created by the turmoil in Yemen," where Houthi rebels backed by Iran have come under air attack by Saudi Arabia supported by the U.S.

On April 21st, Saudi Arabia announced that it has ended its airstrikes in Yemen because the heavy weapons and ballistic missiles threatening the kingdom have been destroyed. The fighting had appeared to be stalemated for at least the past two weeks. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has freedom of operation in a sizable swath of the country to the east of the Sana-to-Aden axis.

"There are reliable claims out of Yemen that US and Saudi military intelligence have been covertly working with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to undermine the Houthi fighters. Given the close collusion between Israel and the US and Saudi Arabia in other conflict theatres, such as Syria and Lebanon, it would be most probable that the Israeli regime has been doing likewise in Yemen on a stealth basis.

He, Finian Cunningham also said that US and its western allies' policies towards Yemen flatly contradict their claims of supporting democracy and indicate the West's posturing on human rights.

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Jordan's Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh said Al Qaeda has been in Yemen for some time, and cited his earlier statement that this group, Daesh and other extremist groups must be defeated.

What AQAP’s Operations Reveal about Its Strategy in YemenAaron Y. Zelin and Patrick Hoover April 23, 2015 The recent takeover of Yemen’s fifth largest city of al-Mukalla by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) highlights the growing strength of the organization. While AQAP has certainly taken advantage of the more chaotic environment as a consequence of the Houthi’s war in the south and the Saudi air campaign, the group has in fact been gearing up its own overt military campaign since last summer. Therefore, even if there is an eventual ceasefire between the Houthis and the Saudis, AQAP will continue fighting and operating on its own terms.

Background Starting in late July 2014, AQAP made a concerted media effort for the first time to actively report and take credit for its military operations on an almost daily basis. This differed from its past pattern of only commenting on large-scale operations. In part, AQAP did this to bring attention to its new military campaign, two years after it had been kicked out of southern cities by the Yemeni military and local popular committees after governing from the spring of 2011 to the summer of 2012.

As part of this new media effort, AQAP created different Twitter accounts online to push its content, one of them being a news feed called Akhbar Ansar al-Sharia fi Jazira al-‘Arab (Ansar al-Sharia in the Arabian Peninsula News; the name of the feed is derived from a period in 2011 and 2012, when AQAP controlled tracts of territory and adopted the name Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen to circumvent perceptions of toxicity with the AQ brand). This feed has been AQAP’s key mouthpiece for releasing information on its military activities since early August 2014. Through April 21, AQAP has claimed responsibility for 374 attacks, with the vast majority against Houthi (224) and government forces (147).* Therefore, while AQAP has certainly taken advantage of the recent chaos and vacuum created by the Houthi attacks in the south and the Saudi air campaign, the organization had already been involved in a sophisticated military campaign. In many ways, the group is now just exploiting a change in conditions, which will allow them to thrive even more in the same way The Islamic State was able to in Iraq in the lead up to its takeover of Mosul almost a year ago.

AQAP’s OperationsAQAP’s modus operandi is remarkably dynamic. But while the group’s target selection, tactics, and geographic concentration appear fluid, by analyzing its attacks since August particular patterns can be discerned, which themselves offer an opportunity to assess not only the magnitude but also the nature of the threat AQAP poses to security and stability in Yemen.

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AQAP operations in Yemen by governate 1 In August, AQAP undertook 32 attacks, 27 of them against government positions, personnel carriers, and specific individuals. Despite this homogeneity of targets, AQAP displayed a modest ability to hit such targets in different parts of the country, illustrating that prior to the beginning of this campaign it had infrastructure in place to carry out such attacks. On top of conducting 15 operations in the central districts of Hadramout governorate, a vast area encompassing the eastern half of Yemen, AQAP struck six targets in Lahj, a southern governorate bordering Aden, five in the central governorate of Shabwa, and three in the northern governorate of al-Jawf. AQAP operatives also utilized a diverse set of guerilla tactics, including 11 IEDs, eight hit-and-run ambushes, five assassinations, and five offensive assaults, to hit 15 government positions, six government vehicles, and five state officials. September saw the number of AQAP attacks drop from 32 to 12 — the organization’s quietest month between August 2014 and April 2015. However, September is a watershed month in that AQAP targeted Houthis six times, the same number of times the group attacked government forces.

This 50-50 split marks a significant shift from the previous month, when Houthis were targeted only four times compared to the 27 operations against government forces. Additionally, AQAP’s geographic reach continued to expand, including an operation in the Houthi-dominated Sa’da governorate that borders Saudi Arabia and four in Sana’a, one of which targeted the American Embassy. The type of weaponry and targets remained constant in that a variety of ambushes, IEDs, assassinations, and offensive assaults were deployed to hit both government and Houthi forces.

AQAP conducted 43 attacks in October. Approximately 21 operations were undertaken against government forces and 21 against Houthi forces, perpetuating the gradual attention shift from the state to the Houthis. While the group maintained its traditional focus on the lightly-populated east, undertaking 10 attacks in al-Bayda, eight attacks in Hadramout, and six in Shabwa, it also penetrated the densely populated, more urban, interior governorates, such as Dhamar (one operation) Ibb (two), and Sana’a (10). Fixed positions or structures were targeted the most (government positions six times and Houthi positions 10 times), through a combination of VBIEDs and mortar fire followed by a rapid assault by small teams of militants. This “hit-and-assault” tactic was balanced well with the use of 13 reported ambushes and six roadside IEDs on nine government vehicles, three Houthi vehicles, five government units, and five Houthi units. The types of targets of attack are constant with the previous months, but differ in terms of a higher rate (there was more than one attack on the same day 11 times, compared to eight times in August and three in September).

AQAP continued its aggressive approach to fixed positions in November by hitting a total of 24. However, 18 of these assaults were upon Houthi positions, part of a further reorientation that saw 36 of 52 overall attacks target Houthis (18 positions, 10 vehicles, four units, and four individuals). In terms of AQAP order of priorities, the Houthis were number one by November. This pattern is reinforced by the fact that 25 of the total attacks occurred in al-Bayda governorate, 24 of which were in Rada’a district. Rada’a — historically an al-Qaeda-dominated area — is strategically vital for both sides as it sits in between the AQAP-influenced east and Houthi-dominated west. AQAP continued to penetrate Houthi-held territory in Sana’a (five attacks), Dhamar (five), and Ibb (two). Continuing past efforts, AQAP persisted in consolidating control over the eastern governorates, striking predominantly government forces in Hadramout (eight times), Abyan (five), and Shabwa (two). AQAP was beginning to develop an assassination campaign where operatives were able to infiltrate highly-urbanized centers such as Sana’a and Dhamar and assassinate specific Houthi or Houthi-linked figures. At the same, AQAP’s more mobile fighting units were

1 http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/what-aqaps-operations-reveal-about-its-strategy-in-yemen/3/

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clearing already-held territory of Houthi and government personnel carriers and fixed, isolated bases.The sharp emphasis on Rada’a in November was partly due to the Houthi advance that precipitated the withdrawal of AQAP forces from the area. This meant that AQAP could re-concentrate its resources into carrying out its war of attrition strategy from December into 2015. AQAP operations in December were even more sectarian than November, with 34 of 46 attacks against Houthi targets (19 fixed positions, eight individuals, six vehicles, and one unit). In line with popular jihadist belief that Iran and the U.S. are working together to back the Houthis to oppress Sunni Muslims, AQAP operatives attacked the Iranian ambassador to Yemen with an IED, and the al-‘Anad U.S. Air Force base in Lahj governorate.

Notably, the group managed to conduct assassination attempts, ambushes, and surprise IED attacks against both Houthi and government forces in areas with little previous al-Qaeda influence, such as in Sana’a (seven attacks), the governorates of Ibb (four), Dhamar (three), al-Hudaydah (two) in the west, ‘Amran (one) in the north, and Ta’iz (one) in the southwest. AQAP also displayed remarkable operational mobility in attacking different parts of the country simultaneously. For example, on December 2, AQAP conducted operations in five different governorates (al-Hudaydah, ‘Amran, Abyan, Sana’a, and Ibb). Despite the setback in Rada’a in November, AQAP showed remarkable resilience in the number of attacks it managed to conduct, the variety of its targets (21 total fixed positions, 13 individuals, and 12 vehicles), and its geographic scope (11 different governorates). In nominal terms, AQAP was most aggressive in the month of January — recording a total of 62 attacks. Forty-one of these operations were against Houthi targets, 20 of which on vehicles and personnel carriers, eight on fixed positions, seven on stand-alone units, five on individuals, and one on a religious structure — the Zayd Muslah cultural center in Sa’ada. Not surprisingly, 38 of these attacks against Houthis occurred in the Houthi-controlled or influenced governorates of al-Bayda, al-Dali’, Ibb, Sana’a, Dhamar, Sa’ada, and Marib.

In AQAP’s heartland of Hadramout, Shabwa, and Abyan, there were a total of 18 attacks, in which 15 of them were against government forces (nine vehicles, five individuals, five units, and four fixed positions). Whereas in December, 75 percent of attacks on Houthis occurred in Houthi controlled or influenced territory, that figure rose to 93 percent in January. Similarly, the percentage of government-targeted operations in the area in which AQAP is strong rose from 50 percent in December to 83 percent in January.

The pattern of clearing already-held territory of government forces — arguably weaker and more fractured than the Houthi militia — while penetrating and attacking Houthis on their own turf and in disputed zones has taken greater significance as the country inched closer to the current crisis.A number of emerging patterns in AQAP operational activity in the last six months were reversed in February.

First, out of 39 total attacks, 26 were against government targets (11 vehicles, seven individuals, five units, and three fixed positions) and only 15 were aimed at Houthi targets (five units, four individuals, four fixed positions, and two vehicles).

Second, the most widely used type of attack was assassinations, with a total of 13 (only two of which did not succeed). And third, the share of government-targeted operations occurring in AQAP-influenced governorates dropped back to half, with the remaining 13 taking place in Houthi-held governorates.Whereas February saw reversals of emerging patterns in AQAP operations, March represented a return to them. The group again emphasized attacks on Houthis, hitting the militia 44 times (18 fixed positions, 12 vehicles, eight units, and six individuals) out of 53 total operations in March. All Houthi-targeted operations occurred in al-Bayda, Lahj, Sana’a, and Ta’iz. All 41 operations in al-Bayda targeted Houthi forces, drawing parallels to

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November. All five operations in AQAP’s heartland (four in Hadramout and one in Abyan) were against government forces, in line with the pattern that emerged especially in January. In terms of tactics, there was constancy in that offensive assaults (14), infiltration (three), shelling (three), and VBIEDs (two) were often deployed against fixed positions; roadside IEDs (13) against vehicles; and sniper fire (six) and ambushes (two) against specific individual targets and units.In April so far, there have been a total of 27 operations — 12 in al-Bayda, five in Lahj, four in Shabwa, three in Abyan, two in Taiz, and one in al-Hudaydah. AQAP continues to predominantly attack Houthi forces (eight vehicles, eight positions, seven units, and one individual) over government forces (one unit and one individual). This is the highest yet proportion in a pattern that has continued to increasingly prioritize Houthi over government targets, and strongly suggests that not much has changed in AQAP’s strategy since the Saudi campaign started on March 25. Despite only 27 operations, AQAP has deployed nine different types of attack: seven roadside IEDs, three VBIEDs, three bombings, three snipers, three IEDs, two assassinations, two ambushes, two offensive assaults, and one infiltration.

Drawing Conclusions from the Stats By publicizing its attacks in the way that it has, AQAP has given analysts a data set with which to draw important conclusions. To be sure, the numbers remain too small and AQAP remains too dynamic to be able to predict its future orientation based solely on this statistical analysis. But there are discernible trends that should inform our understanding of the group, and its tactics offer potential clues about its evolving strategy. One of the more important trends is the growing number of attacks against Houthis. At the same time, AQAP has increasingly adopted a bifurcated strategy of targeting Houthis in Houthi areas and government targets in areas where AQAP is strongest. Finally, during the period analyzed, the group has demonstrated a consistent diversity of styles of attack, deploying at least eight different attack types in each month. Such a wide variety indicates AQAP’s ability to adapt to the enemy’s form via local support networks regardless of geographic location.

By their nature, organizations like AQAP are unpredictable. Strategic surprise is an imperative for terrorist groups. But analyzing data from a group’s recent operations provides telling indicators of its strategic orientation. And in the case of AQAP, such an analysis makes one particular point clear: While airstrikes in Yemen are changing the nature of AQAP’s battlespace, they are not yet fundamentally changing the strategic calculus behind a campaign that took shape and evolved well before the Saudi-led intervention. *Unfortunately, there is a two week gap at the end of December 2014 and early January 2015 as a consequence of me being on vacation and the account being taken down in the intervening time frame, and therefore the data was lost. Additionally, as a consequence of repeated takedowns of its official account on Twitter, we retain a full archive of all claims on our computers. Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Rena and Sami David Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. He is also a PhD candidate at King’s College London and founder of Jihadology.net Patrick Hoover is a former research intern at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and soon-to-be research assistant at a start-up CVE think tank in Washington D.C.

An exceptional franchise The jihadists gain ground in YemenApr 25th 2015 | CAIRO |

IT HAS been a rough decade for al-Qaeda. America and its regional allies assassinated its top leaders from Yemen to Iraq, and made it harder for the group’s branches to communicate with the central leadership. In 2011 America killed Osama bin Laden, its chief. Since Islamic State (IS) emerged a year later it has outflanked al-Qaeda, attracting more foreign fighters, cash and headlines. But one branch is an exception. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based

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in Yemen, is on the up. In the past month or so it has widened the territory under its control, including a port and an airport. Today’s war in Yemen between the Houthi rebels and the government, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, is helping AQAP.

It expanded after the ousting of Ali Abdullah Saleh from the presidency in 2012, only to be pushed back by an army offensive. But the government’s gains have now been reversed. On April 2nd AQAP freed members of its group from a prison. It took Mukalla, a port on the Gulf of Aden, and its nearby airport. American drone attacks, which previously kept AQAP on the back foot, have almost stopped since the Americans pulled out their intelligence-gathering special forces in the past few weeks.

Wherever it is based, AQAP’s main target remains the “far enemy” in America and Europe. It has not been able to carry out a big attack like 9/11, and few think any al-Qaeda branch could do so again, since the West has become more vigilant. But AQAP claimed the shooting at Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January. Though the group is unlikely to have been involved in the nitty-gritty of planning, at least one of the two gunmen had trained in Yemen. AQAP has had more success in hitting sites in the region, including embassies and tankers. In 2009 it narrowly failed to assassinate Muhammad bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia’s interior minister. More worryingly, it retains sophisticated bomb-making skills. Nasser al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s head, is the deputy leader of the whole organisation. Young and sparky, he and his group remain more popular among jihadists than Ayman Zawahiri, al-Qaeda central’s ageing chief. As IS is pushed back by the American-led coalition, al-Qaeda may come back into its own. Though a group calling itself IS carried out two bombings this year in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, IS has no recognised branch in Yemen. “AQAP is still seen as potent,” says Bruce Riedel, a former CIA man now at Brookings, a think-tank in Washington. America recently increased its reward for information leading to Mr Wuhayshi’s arrest to $10m. That matches the bounty for IS’s chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the world’s foremost terrorist.

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The decision by Saudi Arabia to carry out strikes in Yemen have created more damage than good 2. There was a time not so long back when the al Qaeda was trying to grab credit for any attack that occurred in any part of the world. The al Qaeda which has been beaten down in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan held on to their unit in Yemen where they operated as the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. However, this unit too was showing signs of downfall and then entered the Saudis who have been extremely selective in their target which in turn made the al Qaeda resurgent in the Arabian Peninsula once again. What the Saudis did was target the Houthi camps and weakening them.

There has not been a single instance of the Saudis targeted the al Qaeda camps. These selective strikes only made the Houthis weak on the ground. The areas where the Houthis held their ground has now been taken over by the al Qaeda. The Saudis have focused on air strikes but really did not focus much on holding the land. This vaccum has given the al Qaeda the opportunity to take over the land which was held by the Houthis.

While the Saudis may have proven their point to a large extent to Iran, what they have failed to do is stop the growth of the al Qaeda a terror outfit they had claimed to have fought. There is no back up plan by anyone to stall the rise of the al Qaeda and this kind of resurgence will be dangerous in the future. Moreover the al Qaeda is extremely strong on the ground and with the Sunni tribes in Yemen backing them the organization only gains in strength.

Al Qaeda calls in all its forces. The fact that the al Qaeda is extremely pleased with the indirect help they have got from the Saudis is evident in the fact that they have called in their major fighters into Yemen.

The al Qaeda is almost non-existent in Afghanistan. Contrary to the claim that many have been killed, the fact is that since the past couple of months all the fighters from Afghanistan have been moved into Yemen. A similar trend is being witnessed in Syria and Iraq as well. In Syria and Iraq the al Qaeda has been no match for the ISIS and have literally been beaten down. Many of the fighters from there too have been called into Yemen. However, analysts would say that in the absence of a back up plan by the Saudis, the al Qaeda is sure to gain a lot. However, the next battle on hand the al Qaeda would have to face is with the ISIS which has also come to Yemen in a small way for now.

The Foreign Policy Essay: AQAP at a Crossroads

By Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams Sunday, April 19, 2015

The civil war in Yemen and Saudi-led intervention against the Houthi rebels there have undermined efforts to negotiate a political settlement and are making the country’s already-disastrous humanitarian situation even worse. The chaos, however, seems to have produced one clear winner: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Al Qaeda affiliate with the

2 Oneindia News Read more at: http://www.oneindia.com/feature/yemen-crisis-saudis-just-helped-an-al-qaeda-resurgence-1724107.html

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closest relationship to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the one U.S. officials have long labeled the most dangerous offshoot of the core organization.

AQAP is at a crossroads. The civil war and Saudi intervention offer it many opportunities, but they also pose many pitfalls and could dramatically reorient the organization in ways it has long sought to avoid.What separates AQAP from other Al Qaeda affiliates is its willingness to strike outside Yemen and the regional theater. Since the group formed in 2009, most of its attacks have focused on the Yemeni government. However, U.S. officials have tied it to sophisticated attempts to bomb U.S. airliners in 2009 and 2010, and the group produces Inspire, a stylish English-language online magazine that regularly features anti-Western propaganda, including calls for lone wolves to attack in the United States and instructions for how to make or acquire the weapons to do so. AQAP also took credit for the Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris, and the attackers trained with the group in Yemen. The group appeared to suffer setbacks in 2012 when Yemeni government forces under President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who had recently taken power from Ali Abdullah Saleh, retook several cities and other areas that had served as AQAP strongholds. Similarly, an active U.S. drone campaign kept the group on the run. Now that Hadi’s government has fallen and civil war has engulfed much of the country, counterterrorism efforts against AQAP have eased.

U.S. officials rightly fear that the group will enjoy greater freedom of action: Adam Schiff, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, warned recently that “the pressure has been taken off AQAP.” As The Washington Post reported, the United States pulled its military and intelligence personnel from the country as violence escalated, and our Yemeni counterterrorism partners are now in disarray. The unrelenting torrent of drone strikes that wreaked havoc on the group’s ability to operate has now dwindled to a slow trickle: Reuters reports that the strike last Sunday that killed a top AQAP cleric “was the first reported drone strike against the powerful Yemeni branch of the global militant group since the United States evacuated about 100 special forces troops advising Yemeni forces last month.”

AQAP is making the most of the reversal of fortune. Earlier this month, AQAP conducted a massive prison break freeing many fighters and at least one senior leader, and subsequently took control of the city of Mukalla where the prison is located. The group seized control of the checkpoints at all five entrances to the city as well as the governor’s palace, the central bank, a military base, and several other key local government facilities. This past Thursday, AQAP struck again, taking control of a major airport, the region’s main military base, and an oil terminal on the coast of the Arabian Sea. And on Friday, the group reportedly captured a massive weapons depot, seizing dozens of tanks, Katyusha rocket launchers, and small arms from Yemeni government forces.

But it’s not necessarily springtime for AQAP. The group is now operating amidst an all-out civil war. Although we think of civil wars providing a safe haven for terrorists, in reality war zones are dangerous for terrorists as well as civilians. The warring factions are armed and large, and it will be hard for AQAP to stay neutral, as it must protect its supporters and guard its own areas of operations. Perhaps the biggest challenge for AQAP is the growth of the Islamic State and its potential influence among Yemeni jihadis. How much support the Islamic State enjoys in Yemen is unclear, but the movement’s prominent role in Iraq and Syria and impressive propaganda have excited jihadists around the world, while its embrace of sectarianism seems well-suited for the anti-Houthi struggle in Yemen. Houthis are Shi`i Muslims of the Zaydi sect. Although the Zaydis are often seen as doctrinally closer to Sunni Islam than the Twelver Shi`ism of Iran, in today’s environment no one seems to care. In March, the Islamic State bombed Zaydi mosques in Yemen, helping transform the civil war into a broader sectarian conflict. This challenge will put pressure on AQAP to join the sectarian struggle against the Houthi “apostates” or risk been seen as irrelevant.

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However, the influence of Ayman al-Zawahiri may constrain AQAP from engaging in Islamic State-style sectarian attacks and extreme violence, as has been the case with Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda’s official affiliate in the Syrian civil war. Zawahiri has long urged his affiliates to avoid attacks against Shi`i Muslims and the brutal treatment of civilians in areas under the jihadists’ control—indeed, it was partly his disapproval of such tactics that led him to disavow the Islamic State. And despite the fierce competition between the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra for recruits and resources in Syria, thus far Jabhat al-Nusra has resisted the temptation to up the ante against the Shi`a and the civilian population.

If AQAP chooses to go this route in Yemen—and its statement emphatically denying involvement in the bombing of the Zaydi mosques by the Islamic State and expressly stating that AQAP remains “committed to the guidelines of Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri” suggests for now it will—it may find itself struggling to attract new recruits and to prevent its current members from defecting to the more sectarian—and therefore more compelling—Islamic State. On the other hand, AQAP could see its support among the Yemeni people increase as the Islamic State’s savagery begins to make AQAP look like the “good guys” (or at least the “slightly less bad guys”).

AQAP may even end up fighting the Islamic State and its sympathizers in Yemen , as we saw in Syria when the rivalry between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State exploded into a bloody internecine battle that killed hundreds of fighters on both sides. Historically, such competition between terrorist groups often produces extreme violence, as each group tries to outdo its rivals—and it’s hard to be more violent than the Islamic State. The Charlie Hebdo attacks can be seen in this light, as an attempt by Al Qaeda and its supporters to stay relevant in the competition for leadership of the global jihadist movement. The recent successes of AQAP, along with the gains made in Syria by Jabhat al-Nusra, had led some analysts to declare that, at the moment, “Al Qaeda is beating the Islamic State.”

One key uncertainty is Saudi policy. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia opposes Al Qaeda in general and AQAP in particular, as the latter has targeted Saudi security forces and in 2009 even tried to kill Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, who is now in charge of Saudi military operations in Yemen. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has a history of working with Salafi-jihadist groups and may believe they are the lesser of two evils in the war against the Houthis, whom the Saudis believe are puppets of Tehran, the leading Shi`i power. Tehran has been arming and otherwise assisting the Houthis, but the scale of Iranian involvement remains opaque. The temptation to aid all the Houthis’ enemies, no matter how nasty, will grow should Saudi military operations stagnate.

It is unclear how AQAP is prioritizing its enemy list. It condemned the Islamic State’s bombing of the Zaydi mosques, but not the Saudi intervention. Trying to sit out the civil war is likely to prove impossible, but entering the fray is both politically and militarily risky. U.S. policy too is in disarray. Our hoped-for Yemeni partners over the years—first Saleh and then his successor Hadi—no longer wield even partial control over the country. The Saudi intervention may push back the Houthis, but that may give AQAP and other jihadists even more freedom of operation. Even worse, the Saudi intervention might fail, trapping Riyadh and other regional allies in a quagmire and increasing pressure on the United States to play a greater role in the no-win situation that is Yemen.

Apr 25, 2015 Finian Cunningham: Al-Qaeda in Yemen Assisted by US, Saudi Intel. Operatives

TEHRAN (FNA)- Finian Cunningham, a prominent Irish expert in international affairs, says that US and Saudi intelligence operatives have long been colluding with al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen to stop the advances of the Ansarullah popular fighters.

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"There are reliable claims out of Yemen that US and Saudi military intelligence have been covertly working with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to undermine the Houthi fighters. Given the close collusion between Israel and the US and Saudi Arabia in other conflict theatres, such as Syria and Lebanon, it would be most probable that the Israeli regime has been doing likewise in Yemen on a stealth basis. These elements work hand-in-hand," Cunningham said in an exclusive interview with FNA.He also said that US and its western allies' policies towards Yemen flatly contradict their claims of supporting democracy and indicate the West's posturing on human rights.Finian Cunningham (born 1963) has written extensively on international affairs, with articles published in several languages. He is a Master’s graduate in Agricultural Chemistry and worked as a scientific editor for the Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, England, before pursuing a career in newspaper journalism. He is also a musician and songwriter. For nearly 20 years, he worked as an editor and writer in major news media organizations, including The Mirror, Irish Times and Independent. Originally from Belfast, Ireland, he is now located in East Africa working as a freelance columnist for Press TV and Strategic Culture Foundation (Moscow).

What follows is the full text of the interview:Q: Saudi Arabia began its aerial bombardments on Yemen on March 26 in an attempt to restore power to fugitive president Mansour Hadi. The monarchy declared end to Yemen airstrikes after four weeks of bombing and killing around 2900 innocent people. Meanwhile, the attacks continued despite the fact that Riyadh declared an end to them on Tuesday. Certain regional and western countries including the US have been supplying Riyadh with critical support in air refueling, surveillance and logistics. What lies behind attacking another Middle-Eastern country?A: US and western policy towards Yemen indeed exposes the hypocrisy and duplicity of these states and all their self-righteous fraudulent claims of supporting democracy and human rights. The double-think is glaring when we compare the West’s policy towards Ukraine. In the latter, a democratically elected president, Viktor Yanukoych, and his government were overthrown in an illegal and violent coup in February 2014. Yet Washington and its European allies immediately declared that coup to be a “democratic uprising”, and the western media pumped out the narrative that the ousted president was a “Russian stooge” and deserved to be deposed.

Whereas in Yemen, the dubiously-elected President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi (he was elected in a non-contested poll in 2012) actually served as an American and Saudi “stooge” by continually reneging on a democratic transition for the past three years. Previously, Mansour Hadi served as a vice-president under the dictatorship of Ali Abdullah Saleh who for 30 years was a loyal puppet of Washington and Riyadh until a popular Yemeni uprising in 2011 finally succeeded in making him stand down despite American and Saudi resistance to that democratic mandate. Mansour Hadi was thus very much part of the old keptocratic regime and the Yemeni people wanted rid of him and all his ilk. Hundreds of civilian protesters were killed by the Yemeni armed forces since 2011. Finally, the Houthi popular fighters assumed power by force of arms at the end of 2014 after battling against the repressive regime. Seizing power by force of arms can be a moral and legitimate means if it is against a repressive regime and leads to a more democratic outcome, as the revolutionary people of Iran well know. Mansour Hadi eventually fled the country to seek refuge in his paymaster’s territory of Saudi Arabia. But note the West lionizes this figure as the “legitimate president of Yemen” when in fact Hadi is a discredited, corrupt holdover from a discredited and corrupt regime that ruled over Yemen for 30 years with an iron rod, enriching itself and its cronies while the majority of Yemenis were mired in poverty and deprivation.

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By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

This surely points to a risible contradiction in western policy if the latter is taken at superficial face value. But to many observers, this contradiction is neither new nor surprising. It is very much how the US and its western allies operate in the real world as opposed to the rarefied world of public relations and vain proclamations. Washington and its western minions prefer, promote and protect regimes and dictators who are loyal to their economic and political interests. But if a popular uprising leads to a democratic government that attempts to serve the interests of the people of the country, as opposed to western elite interests, then in that case the West will denounce such a development as undemocratic and will try by every means to thwart it, including launching wars of aggression, subversion and suppression, and economic sanctions.We see this clearly in Bahrain as well where a genuine pro-democracy movement that arose in February 2011 has since been isolated and ignored by western governments who support the Al Khalifa dictatorship in that Persian Gulf state and its Saudi patrons in their brutal suppression of the popular movement. We see this in Yemen currently, where a popular armed resistance to dictatorship has succeeded in getting rid of a despotic, pro-western, pro-Saudi regime, only for the western governments to promptly turn around and give consent and military support to the Saudi-led foreign aggression on that country.Saudi Arabia has invaded Yemen several times in the past, such as in 2009 when it lost some 200 troops in battles with the Northern Yemen based Houthis. Then the Saudis backed off with a bloody nose not to return.The present Saudi-led military strikes are admittedly taking aggression to a higher and more serious level. But again the campaign may peter out, as before. What the Saudis would settle for, in my view, is not so much the national reinstatement of the old regime and the defeat of the Houthis; but rather for the air strikes to turn Yemen into a chaotic, failed state, with the Houthis ruling over Northern Yemen, and the Southern part of the country ruled as a separate entity wracked by al-Qaeda-type extremism. What the Saudis and their western patrons want is for Yemen to not be a strong, unified, democratic, prosperous state. Such an outcome would pose a grave challenge to the western status quo in the region where anti-democratic regal despots lord it over their respective nations, serving western geopolitical interests as a priority. If the Saudis and other members of this so-called bombing coalition, including Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and United Arab Emirates, are reckless enough to invade Yemen with ground troops then, yes, they run the risk of sliding into a military quagmire. The Houthis are well-armed and they are seasoned fighters. A foreign invasion of Yemen will also probably galvanize other sections of the population to take up armed resistance. So any invaders, especially an unimpressive no-record Saudi army, will face very serious dangers and no doubt defeats. That’s why I think the Saudis and their US-backed allies will continue bombing the country and covertly supporting Al Qaeda terror groups on the ground with the objective of turning it into a failed state. That is the Syrian model that the Arab monarchies and their western backers have pursued for the past four years in the Levant. And, of course, such conduct is despicably criminal and warrants prosecution under international law.

Q: Both the Saudi kingdom and the US claim that the ongoing strikes are aimed at restoring democracy to Yemen. What's your take on that?A: It is notable that Washington and London, while supporting the Saudi-led airstrikes on Yemen, are also calling for UN-brokered peace talks. Those talks are not a genuine effort to facilitate democracy in Yemen, but rather are an attempt to restore elements of the old western-serving regime, under the guise of “a compromise”. This kind of “compromising” is what the western powers and the Saudis have been doing ever since the popular uprisings of 2011 threatened to oust their puppets in Sana'a and to instate a new democratic polity, one

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By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

that does not kowtow to the West or the Saudis but serves the needs of the people instead. So, the Saudi-led bombing campaign is one part of the vice; the other part of the vice is the western-exhorted UN “peace talks”. It can be cynically surmised that the bombing campaign will be used to try to force the Houthis to the negotiated table where they will be pressured by the western powers into accepting a shoddy compromise which actually sells the people of Yemen short of their democratic rights.Q: Experts believe that the Israeli regime is also siding with Riyadh in Yemen and in fact is benefiting from the Saudi airstrikes. What do you think?A: For political, public relations, Israel cannot be seen to take an overt role in the western-backed aggression on Yemen. That would inflame public opinion across the 350 million-population Arab region in particular and it would undermine the illusion that the Arab League is acting on behalf of Arab interests by policing Yemen. But certainly on this issue, Israel is on the same strategic side as the West and the Saudis, as it is over Syria, the nuclear impasse with Iran and other issues. There are reliable claims out of Yemen that US and Saudi military intelligence have been covertly working with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to undermine the Houthi fighters. Given the close collusion between Israel and the US and Saudi Arabia in other conflict theatres, such as Syria and Lebanon, it would be most probable that the Israeli regime has been doing likewise in Yemen on a stealth basis. These elements work hand-in-hand.

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