Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaeda-38

Has DAESH made 'al-Qaeda-type' mistake by attacking West?

If Islamic State had simply stuck to its Middle Eastern battles, it likely would have avoided a major Western military escalation.

Did Al Qaeda lure them in the old trap? The Swarm Terrorist Incidents in France, a look back. Beirut, Also the Site of Deadly Attacks, Feels Forgotten.

The DAESH terror attacks against France on November 13 were the worst acts of violence that the nation suffered since the end of World War II. The attacks, which involved coordinated (suicide) bombings, automatic machine guns shootings, and hostage-taking, ultimately left 129 people dead and many more seriously wounded. The terror attacks in France followed other attacks claimed by DEASH; bombings on a funeral procession in Baghdad, Iraq on the same day and twin bombings in Beirut, Lebanon the night before. DAESH’s Egyptian franchise is currently the most likely suspect in the potential bombing of a Russian passenger plane over the Sinai Peninsula that killed 224 people. These attacks have been both deadly and highly sophisticated. But in the long run, they may ultimately play into the hands of DAESH's primary jihadist competitor: al Qaeda.

French president Francois Hollande has said that he will meet with President Obama and Russian President Putin in an effort "to join our forces" in further operations against ISIS.

A French returnee has reportedly told the authorities that Syria was a “terrorist factory” where individuals were being trained to attack Europe in the near future.

The pool of ISIL supporters in France has grown beyond the surveillance capacity of any security service.

The fact that international attention is so focused on DAESH actually means that al Qaeda could emerge with the better position globally.

Al Qaeda has attempted to build local support, establish safe-havens, and position itself in ways that could protect it from anti-ISIS states. This strategy has worked in Syria and Yemen, but it has even broader implications.

Comment. It is likely that Al Qaeda has already planned on the decimation of DAESH and is already maneuvering to fill the void and get the remnants of DAESH into its Orbit.

To be sure, the attacks meant different things in Paris and Beirut. Paris saw it as a bolt from the blue, the worst attack in the city in decades,

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

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while to Beirut the bombing was the fulfillment of a never entirely absent fear that another outbreak of violence may come.

The compassion gap is even more evident when it comes to the situation in Syria itself, where death tolls comparable to the 129 so far in the Paris attacks are far from rare and, during the worst periods, were virtually daily occurrences.

The fact that international attention is so focused on DAESH actually means that al Qaeda could emerge with the better position globally. The fight against DAESH has attracted global intelligence and security resources while making Al Qaeda appear to be the less urgent threat. The politics of the fight against DAESH — in which rival jihadist groups have sometimes limited DAESH's ground-level spread — may also favor Al Qaeda in the long run.

"DAESH has clearly complicated efforts to fight al Qaeda," J.M. Berger, a nonresident fellow at Brookings.

Syria in particular, the DAESH threat has helped align some of the objectives of Al Qaeda and the broader international community. Syrian Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra has fought against DAESH since top al Qaeda leadership formally disavowed any connection to the Islamic State in February 0f 2014. "In Syria, al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra is deeply embedded with the rebels fighting Assad, and when we have targeted them in the past, it has created discontent with the moderate rebels we wish to support." In Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has consolidated its control of large segments of the country, while creating a safe haven for some of Al Qaeda's core leadership. AQAP is believed to be the Al Qaeda branch with the greatest external attack capability, and was responsible for carrying out the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January. As in Syria, the complexities of the multi-sided war in Yemen, in which multiple foreign-sponsored factions are battling for control, has played into al Qaeda's hands. Although DAESH has tried to establish cells in the country, AQAP has arguably benefited from the conflict more than any other jihadist group. "Our ability to hit AQAP right now is very much complicated by the many moving parts in Yemen, so this may ultimately work to their benefit," Berger said.

Al Qaeda has attempted to build local support, establish safe-havens, and position itself in ways that could protect it from anti-ISIS states. This strategy has worked in Syria and Yemen, but it has even broader implications.

According to Berger, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri wants to put in place "more limited rules of engagement" for the global terrorist network. This





included minimizing attacks on non-Sunni Muslims and not attacking religious minorities in Muslim countries as long as those groups did not seek to attack al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's end-goals are every bit as extreme as DAESH's, but the group recognizes the benefit of exhibiting a degree of tactical restraint at this particular moment. It is simply too early to say whether al Qaeda will attempt its own series of attacks in order to compete with DAESH on the global stage. But if al Qaeda continues its policy of insidious growth, it may end up becoming an unlikely beneficiary of the Paris attack, an event with the potential to entrench conditions to which Al Qaeda has already adapted.

Islamic State/DAESH made a likely grave strategic error by attacking the heart of Western civilization in Paris, which undoubtedly will provoke a fierce Western military response that could devastate the group. If Islamic State had simply stuck to its Middle Eastern battles, it likely would have avoided a major Western military escalation. Jihadist groups are not as disciplined and pragmatic as other Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, its Palestinian branch Hamas, or Turkey’s AKP-led government, all of which condemned the Paris attacks. However, they all, for example, have no problem with the targeting of Israeli civilians by Hamas. Their ultimate goal of building a caliphate to conquer the world may be the same as that of Islamic State or al-Qaida, but their methods to reach it are more complex and play along with the existing international order.

Comment. It is likely that Al Qaeda has already planned on the decimation of DAESH and is already maneuvering to fill the void and get the remnants of DAESH into its Orbit.

The Israeli terrorism expert Karmon i cited the claimed Islamic State bombing of a Russian passenger jet in Egypt last month, which shows that the group is coordinating between people on the ground and its stronghold in Iraq and Syria. The Israeli terrorism expert attributes the attack against the West as a sign that the group is under growing pressure on its home base, not only by the US coalition and by the Shi’ite axis, but also increasingly by Russia and even Turkey, which has been closing its border and making arrests. As for the competition between Islamic State and al-Qaeda, he points out that this can be seen clearly in Yemen, where al-Qaeda has been cooperating with the Saudi regime, while Islamic State has been carrying out attacks on its own.

Jean-Pierre Filiu, professor of Middle East studies at Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs and a long-time French diplomat who served in Arab countries, wrote in the European Politico website on Sunday Nov 15: “The jihadi leadership in Raqqa is hoping to precipitate a Western ground offensive in Syria that would be as disastrous as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the very





invasion that fed what would become the ‘Islamic State.’”

The long-term strategy of Islamic State is bound to lead to a massive effort to destroy the group, which may not eliminate it, but will cripple its ability to function and retain command and control of its cells throughout the world. Who is most likely in place to fill the void?

This view jibes with a report released on Monday by Matthew Henman, head of IHS Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Center, and Anna Boyd, head of Middle East Analysis at IHS Country Risk. “The Islamic State aims to provoke an intensification of coalition operations against it, in support of its narrative of an apocalyptic confrontation, and to use terrorist attacks outside Syria and Iraq to compensate for the pressure of sanctions and conventional force on its ability to retain its territorial control over a quasi-state caliphate,” they wrote. However, the long-term strategy of Islamic State is bound to lead to a massive effort to destroy the group, which may not eliminate it, but will cripple its ability to function and retain command and control of its cells throughout the world. While Islamic State might believe that provoking a Western invasion could help its image and bog down the West in another Middle Eastern war, this would a losing wager for the group.

A look back prior to the Nov 13 Paris attack: The Swarm Terrorist Incidents in France ii - iii

Prior to the Nov 13 attack. The terrorist threat from Sunni jihadists connected to France presents multiple challenges to the French authorities due to the number of distinct entities involved and the volume of events generated by their activities. The threat comes from returning foreign fighters, supporters of the Islamic State/DAESH, individuals loosely connected to the group and persons with an on-going engagement in jihadist activity pre-dating the Syria conflict and the rise of the Islamic State. If the January 2015 Paris attacks are treated as separate incidents—given the attackers claimed their attacks for different terrorist entities—since September 2012, there have been public reports of 17 plots and attacks in France: see end notes. Back than of the 17 above events, three were successful: the two January 2015 Paris attacks and the June 2015 beheading in Lyon. Another five attacks were partially successful as the perpetrators carried out an attack and either wounded or killed persons, but they did not attack their primary target. Of the 17, the French authorities disrupted 52.9 percent (9) of the plots prior to any kind of execution, while 29.4 percent (5) of the plots were partially completed, and a further 17.6 percent (3) have been successful. To date six returnees have been involved in plots, an approximate ratio of 1 to 40 returning fighters engaging in attacks for a returnee population of 250 in France or a 1 in 86 ratio for the current in-country





contingent. [3] Based on the number of French fighters currently in Syria and Iraq (about 520), this suggests the possibility of another six plots emerging from the present foreign fighter contingent. [4]

The proportion of returnee involved in attacks in the dataset (below) suggests a peak in 2013-2014, and then an absence of their involvement until late summer 2015. The drivers of the attack tempo are not entirely clear, but there has been an acceleration following Islamic State spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s call for attacks, with ten of the 17 events occurring post September 2014. [5]

A French returnee has reportedly told the authorities that Syria was a “terrorist factory” where individuals were being trained to attack Europe in the near future, and it has also been reported that returnees would attack not in their countries of origin, but elsewhere to lessen the risk of detection upon return (Le Monde, October 20).

Given that there is approximately a 3 to 1 ratio of sympathizer events versus returnee attacks, there could also potentially be at least another 18 events generated by the non-traveling population given the current plot and attack tempo.

Obviously, terrorist attack cycles are not linear, but the current surge in events suggests that more incidents are likely; most could emerge from the non-traveling population, and the authorities will not successfully disrupt all of the eventual plots.

The threat is also durable in terms of the length of time it is likely to take for the threat to fully manifest and then exhaust itself. For example, by comparison, individuals involved in foreign fighter networks linked to the first Iraq conflict remained engaged for nearly a decade before executing their attacks (Caderol, May 16). The same may be true for the current Syrian conflict.

The forgotten attack: Evolution of Sunni Jihadism in Lebanon Since 2011 iv - v

North Lebanon emerged not only as a vast recruiting pool, but also as an effective staging area for Lebanese jihadists crossing into Syria.

With clearer objectives, Salafist-Jihadists began to behave more in unison, coalescing around the perception that destabilizing Lebanon directly contributes to the weakening of Hezbollah, and thus, al-Assad.





Since the Syrian civil war began in early 2011, the conflict has reignited sectarian tensions in neighboring Lebanon, transforming parts of the country into flashpoints of violence and operational spaces for militant groups. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Sunni jihadists, as well as a variety of secular militants, recruited, trained and plotted in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, using them as a springboard for attacks elsewhere in the region. However, this changed when Sunni jihadist group Fatah al-Islam (FI) attempted to turn north Lebanon—which includes various impoverished, Salafist-influenced Sunni-majority areas where hatred of the Syrian regime has been brewing for decades—into a so-called Islamic emirate in 2007. Despite its defeat at the hands of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in a 111-day battle at the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian camp near Tripoli that summer, FI’s actions marked the point when Lebanon became a battleground for jihadists, rather than simply a launching pad for attacks elsewhere. This set a precedent for subsequent Sunni jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the Islamic State, and Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), to threaten Lebanon’s territorial integrity and delicate sectarian balance.

According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, an estimated 900 Lebanese citizens have fought or are currently fighting for Sunni militant groups in Syria and Iraq. [1] This reflects that since the summer of 2011, north Lebanon emerged not only as a vast recruiting pool, but also as an effective staging area for Lebanese jihadists crossing into Syria. Supported financially by local Salafist leaders, these jihadists fought for either FI, Jamaat Jund al-Sham (JJS) or smaller groups. FI, in particular, fought battles against the Syrian government in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, al-Qusair and Homs. [2] However, with most of its leadership decimated by September 2012, FI’s rank-and-file subsequently merged with other groups, including JJS.

Historically a Palestinian extremist group based in Ain al-Helwah, JJS reemerged in late 2012, as a major recruiter of Lebanese Sunni militants. A key step in this process occurred on December 23, 2012, when former FI fighter Khaled Mahmoud al-Dandashi (a.k.a. Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir) declared himself the “amir” of the newly-formed JJS at the medieval fortress Krak des Chevaliers that overlooks Qalaat al-Hosn, a village near Homs. [3] Al-Dandashi thereafter leveraged familial and personal connections in both Lebanon and Syria to recruit hundreds of followers (al-Hayat, August 21, 2013). He also had agents who had served with him in FI embedded in the Salafist recruiting networks of the Sunni-majority Bab al-Tabbaneh district in Tripoli, which is the scene of frequent clashes against local Alawite Shi’a Muslims. Al-Dandashi remained at Krak des Chevaliers until his death in March 2014, prompting the return of 300 JJS fighters and their families back to north Lebanon (Daily Star [Beirut], March 22, 2014).





Throughout the first two years of the conflict, jihadists such as al-Dandashi focused primarily on using Lebanon as a transit point for recruits, cash and weapons.

However, in 2013, the strategic direction of the Salafist-Jihadist community shifted away from fighting the forces of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria toward fighting Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, which they regarded as Hezbollah’s “proxy,” in Lebanon. With clearer objectives, Salafist-Jihadists began to behave more in unison, coalescing around the perception that destabilizing Lebanon directly contributes to the weakening of Hezbollah, and thus, al-Assad. Sunni jihadists sought to do this by tainting Hezbollah’s legitimacy and labeling the group as an Iranian tool.Throughout the spring of 2014, Syrian opposition groups suffered defeats in western Syria, particularly in and around al-Qusayr, Qalamoun Nabak and Yabroud. This forced the retreat of hundreds of JN and Islamic State fighters into Lebanon, and particularly into Bekaa’s Baalbek district. Prior to the rebel influx, the Sunni and Syrian-majority camp of Arsal in the Bekaa Valley had served as a gateway for the covert transport and provision of resources and reinforcements for rebels in western Syria. However, after the influx, the camp became a safe haven for militants, allowing them to recruit Syrian refugees and launch attacks on Hezbollah and LAF positions across the northern Bekaa Valley.

From December 2013 to March 2014, JN conducted 11 attacks, targeting Hezbollah positions in Hermel, Brital, Nabi Shayth and Nabi Uthman with at least 27 Grad rockets and four martyrdom operations. [4] JN cooperated with the Marwan Hadid Brigades, the Gaza Strip-based wing of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), in two of these operations. Established in 2009 as an official al-Qaeda affiliate, AAB is a decentralized network of local militant groupings active in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine, all of which are responsible for a number of attacks against Israeli and Western targets.

The increasing isolation of Arsal due to military pressure from Hezbollah and the LAF encouraged greater cooperation between jihadist groups.

This inter-jihadist collaboration continued and increased in late October 2014, when the LAF busted an Islamic State-affiliated cell in Asoun and arrested its leader Ahmad Mikati, sparking a series of retaliatory attacks from Islamic State and JN militants.

Meanwhile, in Lebanon, from July 2013 to February 2014, with assistance from JN elements, AAB and Islamic State operatives claimed a total of six attacks in south Beirut. In one of the most significant of these, in November 2013, AAB conducted a double suicide bombing of the Iranian Embassy, killing 23 and injuring at least 160. [6] About three months later, AAB launched another





double suicide bombing on the Iranian cultural center, killing at least five and wounding more than 100. [7] The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the bomb attacks on January 4, 2014, in the capital’s Haret Hreik suburb and on June 15 at the Duroy Hotel (Daily Star [Beirut], January 2, 2014). [8]These operations represent another example of tangible teamwork between the Islamic State, AAB, JN, JJS and FI.

On January 25, 2014, Abu Sayyaf al-Anbari, a former FI commander, released a video announcing the establishment of an Islamic State franchise in Lebanon (al-Arabiya, January 25, 2014). After the clashes in north Lebanon in October 2014, Salafist-Jihadists suffered a number of setbacks in 2015, including the assassination of JN leader Usama Mansur Abu Umar in April, and the arrests of al-Assir in August, Islamic State recruiter Omar Ghannoum on August 25, and Ibrahim al-Atrash in September. Al-Atrash, along with JN’s Qalamoun amir Malek Abu al-Talleh, formed and armed JN units in Arsal, and also participated in the kidnapping of LAF and policemen during the August battle (Naharnet, September 16).

Conclusion; The future of Salafist-Jihadist movements in Lebanon will largely be determined by the ongoing conflict in Syria and Lebanese domestic politics. The recent Russian military intervention in Syria may diminish the burden on Hezbollah and instead allow it to consolidate and extend its defensive ring from the northeastern Lebanese border to the Homs-Damascus corridor. This prospect could spell trouble for the thousands of Sunni fighters entrenched in Lebanon’s al-Nabek and al-Zabadani districts—key staging zones for operations in eastern Lebanon. Another overlooked but key factor is Lebanon’s domestic political situation. The Lebanese government lacks a president and remains highly-fragmented, dysfunctional and incapable of building fully-functioning, impartial non-sectarian institutions. The lack of credible, moderate Sunni leadership means that some Sunnis will continue to perceive jihadist groups as the most effective defenders of the community.

While an increase in Hezbollah’s capabilities and a refocusing of the group on Lebanon may prove disastrous for jihadist groups, it may also harden Sunni militants’ resolve to adapt and survive. Secondly, the Lebanese government shows no signs of becoming significantly more capable to govern, which means that the current conditions in the country, which have allowed jihadists to gain strength and influence, will continue. Despite the government’s recent operational success against jihadist plots, the pattern of fighters coalescing into new, emerging groups continues to underline the influential role of personal connections—most of which have roots in al-Qaeda (including the former al-Qaeda in Iraq group)—in fostering inter-jihadist collaboration and resiliency, which is correspondingly difficult to disrupt. If these groups continue to





centralize under fewer banners, as seems the current trend, Lebanon’s Salafist-Jihadist movements will potentially come to pose a greater threat to the country’s fragile political state and delicate sectarian balance in the coming months and years.

Beirut, Also the Site of Deadly Attacks, Feels Forgotten vi BEIRUT, Lebanon —a double suicide attack in Beirut on Thursday, Nov 12 killed at least 40 people, and much like the scores who died a day later in Paris, they were killed at random, in a bustling urban area, while going about their normal evening business. The consecutive rampages, both claimed by the Islamic State, inspired feelings of shared, even global vulnerability — especially in Lebanon, where many expressed shock that such chaos had reached France, a country they regarded as far safer than their own. But for some in Beirut, that solidarity was mixed with anguish over the fact that just one of the stricken cities — Paris — received a global outpouring of sympathy akin to the one lavished on the United States after the 9/11 attacks.

Elie Fares, a Lebanese doctor, wrote on his blog. “When my people died, they did not send the world into mourning. Their death was but an irrelevant fleck along the international news cycle, something that happens in those parts of the world.”

The implication, numerous Lebanese commentators complained, was that Arab lives mattered less. Either that, or that their country — relatively calm despite the war next door — was perceived as a place where carnage is the norm, an undifferentiated corner of a basket-case region.

Attacks in Paris, In fact, while Beirut was once synonymous with violence, when it went through a grinding civil war a generation ago, this was the deadliest suicide bombing to hit the city since that conflict ended in 1990. Lebanon has weathered waves of political assassinations, street skirmishes and wars; Israeli airstrikes leveled whole apartment blocks in 2006. But it had been a year of relative calm.

How ISIS Expanded Its Threat, The Islamic State emerged from a group of militants in Iraq to take over large portions of Iraq and Syria, and now threatens other countries in Europe and elsewhere.

(A reminder of the muddled perceptions came last week, when Jeb Bush, the Republican presidential candidate, declared that “if you’re a Christian, increasingly in Lebanon, or Iraq or Syria, you’re gonna be beheaded.” That was news to Lebanon’s Christians, who hold significant political power.)





The disparity in reactions highlighted a sense in the region of being left alone to bear the brunt of Syria’s deadly four-year war, which has sent more than four million refugees fleeing, mostly to neighboring countries like Lebanon. For the Lebanese, the government has been little help, plagued as it is with gridlock and corruption that have engendered electricity and water shortages and, most recently, a collapse of garbage collection. Many in the region — both supporters and opponents of the Syrian government — say they have long warned the international powers that, if left unaddressed, the conflict would eventually spill into the West. To be sure, the attacks meant different things in Paris and Beirut. Paris saw it as a bolt from the blue, the worst attack in the city in decades, while to Beirut the bombing was the fulfillment of a never entirely absent fear that another outbreak of violence may come. Some blamed news coverage for the perception that Beirut is still an active war zone. But the phrase also risks portraying a busy civilian, residential and commercial district as a justifiable military target.

Paris Bloodshed May Be the Latest of Many ISIS Attacks Around the World. At least a dozen countries have had attacks since the Islamic State, or ISIS, began to pursue a global strategy in the summer of 2014.

The compassion gap is even more evident when it comes to the situation in Syria itself, where death tolls comparable to the 129 so far in the Paris attacks are far from rare and, during the worst periods, were virtually daily occurrences.

“Imagine if what happened in Paris would happen there on a daily basis for five years,” said Nour Kabbach, who fled the heavy bombardment of her home city of Aleppo, Syria, several years ago and now works in humanitarian aid in Beirut.

“Now imagine all that happening without global sympathy for innocent lost lives, with no special media updates by the minute, and without the support of every world leader condemning the violence,” she wrote on Facebook. Finally, she said, ask yourself what it would be like to have to explain to your child why an attack in “another pretty city like yours” got worldwide attention and your own did not.

A Growing problem and concern for many western states that neglected their defence.

The pool of ISIL supporters in France has grown beyond the surveillance capacity of any security service vii

November 17, 2015 Reports that France was warned by the United States and Iraq before Friday’s Paris attacks that an ISIL assault was imminent have





prompted many to ask how security services could have missed the plot. Such incredulity was heightened by the fact that a number of those involved were on the radar of French authorities as radicals and potential threats — with at least one charged in a terrorism-related case.Such a scenario might seem unthinkable in the U.S.and other western countries, but the reality is that neither France nor its European Union partners have the forces, assets, funding or legal provisions to take sweeping preventive measures — often based on sketchy intelligence — that the U.S. can. And fail-safe operational monitoring of the sheer number of potential threats on European soil, in the form of sympathizers with groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), many of whom have traveled to Syria and spent time with the group, is beyond the capacity of any security service.

That much was effectively acknowledged on Monday by French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, who said in an interview with broadcaster RTL that France was aware that attacks were being plotted before Friday’s strikes and warned that others are likely being prepared.

And the scale of the problem confronting EU member states is far larger, with roughly 6,000 Europeans having traveled to Syria to join armed groups — nearly 2,000 from France alone. Meanwhile, Europe is both geographically closer and more readily accessible to flows of ISIL operatives in and out of areas controlled by the group. And the ease with which these operatives can move among European nations and the different jurisdictions of various security services exacerbate the problem. Some of those blamed for Friday’s attacks, for example, appeared to have moved frequently between France and Belgium.The emergence of ISIL, which has raised its flag over huge stretches of territory in Syria and Iraq that are relatively easily accessible from Turkey, has dramatically altered the challenge facing European security services whose primary problem was once Al-Qaeda. That’s because Osama bin Laden’s group preferred to operate from the shadows as a more professional elite force, whereas ISIL is far more accessible to young would-be radicals traveling from the West. “There’s no reason for a French or European young person to go to Waziristan for training with Al-Qaeda. One hundred percent of those people are joining Islamic State in Syria or Iraq,” a senior French counterterrorism official said in an interview in September. The likelihood of France’s coming under attack by homegrown extremists was probably just a matter of time, he warned. “[ISIL] is the only game in town anymore. But even subsequent efforts to boost the financing of intelligence and police forces have hardly matched the spiking numbers of ISIL-allied radicals and the threat they pose.

French official said. “You can’t watch everyone. We’re swamped.”





Suggestions in the media implying incompetence or error rather than the overwhelming of human capacities are particularly cruel for France’s – and all western - counterterrorism forces, whose track record for the past two decades has been nearly spotless. That the French security system’s good fortune would eventually fail may have been inevitable in the face of the expanding threat. France will be hoping that Friday was a case of ISIL’s being lucky just once.

Comment. Just a few days prior to the Paris and Beirut attacks, President Obama said that the Islamic State is “ contained ” in Iraq and Syria, but the group’s attacks in Paris soon afterward showed that it poses a greater threat to the West than ever. The Islamic State is executing a global strategy to defend its territory in Iraq and Syria, foster affiliates in other Muslim-majority areas, and encourage and direct terrorist attacks in the wider world. It has exported its brutality and military methods to groups in Libya, Egypt, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Now it is using tactical skills acquired on Middle Eastern battlefields to provoke an anti-Muslim backlash that will generate even more recruits within Western societies. (This is my fear, that we act out emotion and not a strategy with potential to succeed. Without a strategy, there is no point—it would just be a reaction and useless waste of treasure.) At what point does such a growing river of gore justify risking American lives? Hillary Clinton, “It cannot be an American fight.” Former NATO commander James Stavrides and Ohio Gov. John Kasich, a leading establishment figure in the Republican presidential field, urged NATO to take charge of the anti-Islamic State campaign. The Islamic State itself has taken tens of thousands of innocent lives in the region, and now hundreds more civilian lives in Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and France.

The Islamic State’s strategy is to polarize Western society —to “destroy the grayzone,” as it says in its publications.

The idea is elaborated in one of the Islamic State’s favorite strategy manuals, The Management of Savagery. The book, written during the first year of the Iraq War, outlines a plan for reestablishing the global Islamic empire or caliphate. The anonymous author, who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Bakr Naji, advocates attacking civilians in enemy lands to deter their governments from interfering in jihadi state-building projects or to provoke them into overreacting and thus exhausting themselves. The usual Islamic restrictions on warfare should be suspended, he argues, so the jihadis can fight fire with fire.

We have only recently grown accustomed to thinking of the Islamic State as an actual state, much less a state sponsor of terrorism. (Creeping normalcy facilitated by political correctness has blinded us).

The Islamic State has brazenly claimed the attacks, even if intelligence services cannot yet be sure it actually directed them. Nevertheless, there’s no doubting that the Islamic State wants its powerful foreign enemies to know that it can inflict heavy losses on their civilian populations.





It’s almost more worrisome if it turns out that the Islamic State didn’t direct these attacks. Independent cells and affiliates with the ability to cause so much devastation will be harder to stop because they are not receiving instructions that can be intercepted. (This is the plan and the vision)

The atrocities in Paris are only the most recent instances of this accelerating campaign. Since January, European citizens fighting with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have provided online and material support to lethal operations in Paris,Copenhagen and near Lyon, France, as well as attempted attacks in London, Barcelona and near Brussels. Islamic State fighters are likely responsible for destroying the Russian airliner over the Sinai. These attacks are not random, nor are they aimed primarily at affecting Western policy in the Middle East. They are, rather, part of a militarily capable organization’s campaign to mobilize extremist actors already in Europe and to recruit new ones. (Indeed. The objective - - to gain more support for their ideology.)

The Islamic State has lost a quarter of its territory over the past year. The glacial pace has been harshly criticized, but it has the virtue of giving enemies of the Islamic State time to absorb newly liberated cities without having to take charge of the entire territory all at once. (interesting observation. On the flip side it allows IS more time to cleanse and indoctrinate populations and prepare defense belts.)

Comment. The strategy is explicit. The Islamic State explained after the January attacks on Charlie Hebdo magazine that such attacks “compel the Crusaders to actively destroy the grayzone themselves. Muslims in the West will quickly find themselves between one of two choices, they either apostatize . . . or they [emigrate] to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution from the Crusader governments and citizens.” The group calculates that a small number of attackers can profoundly shift the way that European society views its 44 million Muslim members and, as a result, the way European Muslims view themselves. Through this provocation, it seeks to set conditions for an apocalyptic war with the West. Most urgently, however, Europe and the United States must accept the reality that protracted sectarian warfare in the Middle East is a clear and present danger to their safety and security at home. Despite the Islamic State’s adherence to the global jihadi ideology of al Qaeda, which urges attacks on the West, it has spent most of its money on state-building in the Middle East and North Africa, with occasional pauses to terrorize neighbors like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The international community could take some small comfort from the Islamic State’s domestic focus — better it spend its money on infrastructure than on financing terrorist plots abroad. The near-term prospects for the end of Islamic State attacks abroad are dim. As its government collapses in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State will continue to lash out at its far





enemies.

In September of last year, at the apogee of ISIS’s foreign recruitment surge, he says the influx of foreigners amazed even those welcoming them in. “We had like 3,000 foreign fighters who arrived every day to join ISIS. I mean, every day. And now we don’t have even like 50 or 60.” This sudden shortfall has led to a careful rethinking by ISIS high command of how inhabitants outside of Syria and Iraq can best serve the cause. “The most important thing,” Abu Khaled said, “is that they are trying to make sleeper cells all over the world.” The ISIS leadership has “asked people to stay in their countries and fight there, kill citizens, blow up buildings, whatever they can do. You don’t have to come.” To the source: For all the attention paid to ISIS, relatively little is known about its inner workings. But a man claiming to be a member of the so-called Islamic State’s security services has stepped forward to provide that inside view. Abu Khaled had worked with hundreds of foreign recruits to the ISIS banner, some of whom already had traveled back to their home countries as part of the group’s effort to sow clandestine agents among its enemies.

From this account, it sounds like IS/DAESH has made a specific shift to build transnational attack capabilities; rather than 3,000 fighters flowing to the “caliphate”, perhaps now many are just staying home and preparing in their home countries or fighting in local conflicts. It sounds like IS in Syria/Iraq is being weakened; however, don’t focus on only IS, but the whole extremist phenomenon, it continues to grow and spread. If IS/DAESH folded-up its flag and fighters moved over to AQ, would this be a victory?

Multiple sources used.




i Ely Karmon, senior researcher at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya’s Institute for Policy and Strategy, told The Jerusalem Post that it appears Islamic State has changed its strategy.

ii Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 21 October 30, 2015 By: Timothy Holman

iii If the January 2015 Paris attacks are treated as separate incidents—given the attackers claimed their attacks for different terrorist entities—since September 2012, there have been public reports of 17 plots and attacks in France:1. In September 2012, French authorities investigated the Cannes-Torcy group over members’ involvement in a grenade attack on a Jewish grocery. The investigation led to the discovery of explosives and the killing of one of the members in Strasbourg (Le Figaro, July 5, 2013; Le Figaro, March 26, 2014).2. In March 2013, French authorities arrested three males in the Marignane area in possession of 50 grams of the explosive acetone peroxide, precursor chemicals for another 600 grams and firearms (Le Monde, March 11, 2013). The three were active on social media and had sent a threatening letter to the White House (Le Parisien, March 11, 2013).3. In October 2013, Lyes Darani, a returnee from Syria, was arrested in Lille on suspicion of preparing a possible suicide attack (La Voix du Nord, November 3, 2014).4. In February 2014, Ibrahim Boudina, linked to the Cannes-Torcy group, was arrested in Nice, and was allegedly planning an attack using explosives against the city’s carnival. He had spent 15 months in Syria, first with Jabhat al-Nusra and then with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS—the previous name of the Islamic State) (Le Figaro, March 26, 2014; L'Express, June 26, 2014).5. In May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche, an ISIS-affiliated returnee, was arrested in Marseilles following his attack in Brussels. He reportedly told his hostages that he wanted to carry out an attack in Paris (Libération, September 28, 2014).6. In July 2014, the French arrested another Islamic State-linked returnee, Mohamed Ouharani. It is believed that he was initially tasked with carrying out an attack in Lebanon; however, he desisted and instead returned to France, where he began to try and identify Shi’a-related targets (TF1, April 23).7. In August 2014, two adolescent females allegedly intending to join the Islamic State were arrested in Lyon; press reports said they expressed interest in attacking a synagogue with firearms. One was reported to have had access to weapons (TF1, April 23; Le Télégramme, May 3).8. In September 2014, a group was disrupted in Lyon. Numerous firearms were recovered, and the authorities were concerned they were on the point of carrying out an attack (AFP, September 19, 2014).9. In December 2014, Bertrand Nzohabonayo, attacked and wounded police officers in Joué-lès-Tours with a knife. He is reported to have cried “Allah Akbar,” although some witnesses dispute this account (AFP, December 20, 2014). The prosecutor chose to investigate it as a terrorist incident, and Dabiq, the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine, cited Nzohabonayo as an example to follow. [1]10. In January 2015, Cherif and Said Kouachi carried out an attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine, claiming their act for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Le Monde, February 17). The brothers were linked with an Iraq war-era network, as well as a group involved in planning a prison break in 2010 that included Amedy Coulibaly (Le Figaro, March 1).11. Shortly after the Kouachis initiated their attack, Amedy Coulibaly carried out a series of attacks and stated that he was acting for the Islamic State (Le Monde, February 17). The attack was executed using firearms. Coulibaly’s wife and a number of individuals associated with his wider network left France prior to the attacks; some were arrested en route, while others successfully joined the Islamic State (Le Parisien-Aujourd'hui en France, May 16).12. In February 2015, Moussa Coulibaly (no relation to Amedy), who had tried to travel to Turkey and is suspected of wanting to enter Syria or Iraq, attacked three soldiers near a Jewish community center in Nice (Le Monde, February 5, Le Monde, February 9).13. In April 2015, Sid Ahmed Ghlam was arrested after having contacted the police because of a gunshot wound. He was covered in blood and is a suspect in the murder of a female, although the motive for the killing remains unclear. He is suspected of being in the process of planning an attack against a church in the Paris region. He appears to have been in contact with Islamic State-affiliated entities. He had travelled to Turkey for a week in February 2015, but the purpose of this visit remains unclear (Le Figaro, June 25; Le Monde, August 3).14. In June 2015, Yassine Salhi beheaded his employer and then attempted to ram the main gate of a gas storage facility south of Lyon with his car. He sent pictures via Whatsapp to Syria. The Islamic State mentioned the attack in Dabiq’s tenth issue. [2] Salhi is alleged to have told the police that he tried to cover the murder of his employer as a terrorist incident (AFP, June 29).15. In July 2015, French authorities arrested four persons, charging three for their involvement in planning to carry out an attack against a military target in the south of France. At least one of the individuals had intended to travel to Syria, but had been unable to do so. The authorities said he had been encouraged by a member of the Islamic State in Syria to conduct an attack in France (Parquet du Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, July 17).16. In August 2015, passengers on a train between Amsterdam and Paris neutralized a Moroccan national, Ayoub al-Khazzani, as he attempted to use an AK-47. The individual denies attempting to carry out a terrorist attack and says he was trying to commit a robbery. He was previously the subject of exchanges of information between Spain, France and

Belgium and had been entered into information systems as a suspect (EuroNews, August 25).17. In September 2015, the French press reported that an individual had been arrested by the authorities on August 11, and that he had spent one week in Raqqa, Syria, where he had been instructed to carry out an attack to kill as many persons as possible. The reports suggested that a possible target was a concert venue (Le Monde, September 18).Of the 17 above events, three were successful: the two January 2015 Paris attacks and the June 2015 beheading in Lyon. Another five attacks were partially successful as the perpetrators carried out an attack and either wounded or killed persons, but they did not attack their primary target. Of the above, the French authorities disrupted 52.9 percent (9) of the plots prior to any kind of execution, while 29.4 percent (5) of the plots were partially completed, and a further 17.6 percent (3) have been successful.To date six returnees have been involved in plots, an approximate ratio of 1 to 40 returning fighters engaging in attacks for a returnee population of 250 in France or a 1 in 86 ratio for the current in-country contingent. [3] Based on the number of French fighters currently in Syria and Iraq (about 520), this suggests the possibility of another six plots emerging from the present foreign fighter contingent. [4]The proportion of returnee involved in attacks in this dataset suggests a peak in 2013-2014, and then an absence of their involvement until late summer 2015. The drivers of the attack tempo are not entirely clear, but there has been an acceleration following Islamic State spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s call for attacks, with ten of the 17 events occurring post September 2014. [5] The most recent events—conducted by Ghlam, al-Khazzani and Reda—appear to have indications of direction from the Islamic State. For instance, Ghlam is reported to have links to an Islamic State-affiliated cluster of French foreign fighters with connections to the Artigat group. This suggests the presence of a nascent external operations capacity among the French Islamic State adherents in Iraq. A French returnee has also reportedly told the authorities that Syria was a “terrorist factory” where individuals were being trained to attack Europe in the near future, and it has also been reported that returnees would attack not in their countries of origin, but elsewhere to lessen the risk of detection upon return (Le Monde, October 20).Given that there is approximately a 3 to 1 ratio of sympathizer events versus returnee attacks, there could also potentially be at least another 18 events generated by the non-traveling population given the current plot and attack tempo. Based on the past two years, French authorities could be expected to disrupt ten of these plots; however, precedents suggest that three could be successful and a further five partially executed. Obviously, terrorist attack cycles are not linear, but the current surge in events suggests that more incidents are likely; most could emerge from the non-traveling population, and the authorities will not successfully disrupt all of the eventual plots. The threat is also durable in terms of the length of time it is likely to take for the threat to fully manifest and then exhaust itself. For example, by comparison, individuals involved in foreign fighter networks linked to the first Iraq conflict remained engaged for nearly a decade before executing their attacks (Caderol, May 16). The same may be true for the current Syrian conflict.Timothy Holman is a Ph.D. candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.Notes1. See page 4, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-622.pdf.2. See https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-1022.pdf.3. The returnee figure has been used to calculate the ratio as opposed to the sum of fighters present, deceased or returned, as the fighters currently in place may not all return and the deceased fighters will obviously not return. For the returnee figure, see: Le Monde, “Pas de risque zéro pour l'antiterrorisme,” August 3, http://www.sen360.com/sport/en-france-pas-de-risque-zero-pour-l-antiterrorisme-320211.html.4. Figures from French Ministry of the Interior via Jean Charles-Brisard, October 14, https://twitter.com/JcBrisard/status/654194866705068032.5. Silber, Mitchell D. 2015, “Crowdsourced Jihad: a New Framework for Understanding ISIS Plots Against the West,” The Cipher Brief, July 9, 2015, http://thecipherbrief.com/articles/crowdsourced-jihad-new-framework-understanding-isis-plots-against-west. The article has subsequently been taken down.

Files: TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue21_01.pdf

iv Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 21October 30, 2015 By: Patrick Hoover

v Patrick Hoover is a Research Associate at the Program on Extremism at the George Washington University.Notes1. See http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.2. Please see http://jihadology.net/2012/07/18/new-statement-from-fata%E1%B8%A5-al-islam-killed-thirty-of-the-soldiers-of-the-rawafi%E1%B8%8D-kufr-in-fondness-in-rural-aleppo/; http://jihadology.net/2012/07/23/new-statement-from-fata%e1%b8%a5-al-islam-about-the-ambush-of-the-army-of-the-alawi-nu%e1%b9%a3ayris-in-the-village-of-al-qas%e1%b9%adal/; http://jihadology.net/2012/07/29/new-statement-from-fata%E1%B8%A5-al-islam-pride-of-the-mujahidin-and-the-dead-of-the-martyrs/.3. Please see http://jihadology.net/2012/12/23/%E1%B9%A3ada-ash-sham-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-video-message-and-statement-from-jund-ash-sham-announcement-on-the-founding-of-jamaat-jund-ash-sham-fi-

rif-%E1%B8%A5om/.4. Please see http://jihadology.net/2013/12/19/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-targeting-the-strongholds-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-irani-with-ten-grad-rockets-in-the-hermel-region-of-lebanon/; http://jihadology.net/2014/01/16/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-martyrdom-operation-upon-the-stronghold-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-irani-in-the-hermel/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/02/new-statement-from-the-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-raid-of-bombing-the-stronghold-of-%e1%b8%a5izb-iran-in-the-hermel/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/01/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-a-second-martyrdom-operation-upon-the-stronghold-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-iran-in-the-hermel/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/19/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-five-grad-rockets-on-the-regions-of-brital-and-al-nabi-shayth/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/22/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-blessed-martyrdom-operation-in-the-hermel-region/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/03/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-a-number-of-grad-rockets-upon-the-brital-region/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/05/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-three-grad-rockets-upon-the-region-of-al-nabi-shayth/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/08/al-awzai-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-statement-from-the-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-targeting-the-hermel-region-with-six-grad-rockets-in-conjunction-with/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/13/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-three-grad-rockets-upon-the-region-of-al-nabi-shayth-2/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/16/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-blessed-martyrdom-operation-on-the-stronghold-of-the-dreaded-%E1%B8%A5izb-iran-in-the-region-of-al-nabi-uthman/.5. The video, which has since been taken down, was available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tQB-pJEBOOg.6. Please see http://jihadology.net/2013/12/26/new-video-message-from-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-siraj-al-din-zurayqat-about-the-raid-of-the-iranian-embassy-in-beirut/.7. Please see http://jihadology.net/2014/03/07/al-awzai-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-statement-from-the-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-on-the-raid-of-the-iranian-cultural-center-in-beirut/.8. Please see http://jihadology.net/2014/06/26/new-statement-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-the-first-raid-in-lebanon/.

Files: TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue21_03.pdf

vi By ANNE BARNARDNOV. 15, 2015

vii by Bruce Crumley

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