Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-57

Isis terrorists are “moving in migrant flows” and “hiding in plain sight” all over the world in tactics that should lead Britain to think about how it “manages identity”, the chief of the defence staff has said.In comments that could reignite the debate around identity cards, Sir Stuart Peach said he was “worried” about the global reach of IS militants, who deliberately destroy their identity documents to travel illegally into other countries where they could carry out attacks.The most senior officer in the armed forces said IS, also known as Daesh, represents the closest danger and a “call to action” going beyond UK and coalition air strikes in Syria and Iraq.

A recent ISIS propaganda video shows how relaying directions via a drone can further increase the effectiveness of SVBIEDs — suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. In the clip — itself filmed from a drone — a suicide vehicle is seen driving towards a Humvee. At the last moment though, it drives around the vehicle to detonate closer to a larger grouping of military vehicles.The video shows that the suicide bomber was in close communication with the drone pilot, says Charlie Winter, an ISIS expert at the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. Studying ISIS propaganda videos like this has led Winter to conclude that drones are being used to guide the bombers as well as film their results. Drones have emerged recently as a crucial and lethal part of the group’s defensive strategy. Beyond their tactical value, analysts also see drones as a further example of the group’s adaptability, suggesting that further new developments may await the Iraqi armed forces as they penetrate deeper into the heart of the so-called caliphate.

The West failed to predict the emergence of al Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa (C: Disagree. More accurate would be: The West did not pay attention to its analysts). It was blindsided by ISIS's sweep across Syria and Iraq, a blow that changed the map of the Middle East, at least temporarily. Both movements skillfully continue to evolve—and surprise. They have produced dozens of franchises, expanding the threat globally. A new U.S. administration faces daunting tests in navigating violent extremism and the related policy problems. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace on December 12 for a discussion with two panels of experts who will explore future trends in extremism and outline comprehensive policy responses.Movements, leaders, targets, tactics and arenas of operation have all proliferated in ways unimagined in 2001. The growing challenges have spurred new interest in broader strategies – to defuse current crises, stem proliferation of extremist ideologies and avoid future shocks. The obstacles in crafting a viable and sustainable policy are many: Limited resources, poor coordination, competing political interests and complex strategic factors.

Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Germany denies his government funds extremist groupsSaudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar are supporting extremist Islamic groups in Germany, according to a leaked intelligence report.A brief seen by the Süddeutsche Zeitung and broadcasters NDR and WDR raised concern over a reported increase in support for fundamentalist Salafism in Germany, warning that the ideology already has 10,000 followers and is growing.

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent of 10

01/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


The report, by Germany’s BfV domestic intelligence agency and Federal Intelligence Service (BND) reportedly accused Gulf groups of funding mosques, religious schools, hardline preachers and conversion or “dawah” groups to spread the ideology.Missionary movements were part of a “long-running strategy to exert influence” by the three states, it found, naming the Saudi Muslim World League, Sheikh Eid Bin Mohammad al-Thani Charitable Association and Kuwaiti Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), which has been banned by the US and Russia for allegedly supporting al-Qaeda.The report said all three organisations were “closely connected with government offices in their home countries”. The BND and BfV have not confirmed the accuracy of leaked excerpts but sources told Deutsche Welle that some members of the security community believe it was internally leaked to pressure the German government into stopping controversial arms sales to Saudi Arabia.The country’s ambassador to Germany, Awwas Alawwad, rejected accusations of supporting Salafism, saying his government does not build mosques or export imams and has “no connection with German Salafism”. He added that the Muslim World League was not a Saudi government organisation and discontinued activities in Germany in 2013.

"A new school of Islam from Saudi Arabia is transforming South Asia's religious landscape. Wahhabism, a fundamental Sunni school of Islam originating in Saudi Arabia, entered South Asia in the late 1970s. With public and private Saudi funding, Wahhabism has steadily gained influence among Muslim communities throughout the region. As a result, the nature of South Asian Islam has significantly changed in the last three decades. The result has been an increase in Islamist violence in Pakistan, Indian Kashmir, and Bangladesh." — Georgetown Security Studies Review, 2014.

BY BILL ROGGIO | December 13th, 2016 The Islamic State claimed credit for the Dec. 11 bombing in the women’s section at the main Coptic church in Cairo, Egypt. The attack, which killed 24 Christians, is the latest against Egypt’s Coptic Church.The Islamic State identified the suicide bomber as “Abu Abdullah al-Masri,” according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which translated the group’s Arabic-language statement.Al Masri “plunged amidst the gathering of Crusaders and detonated his explosive belt, killing and wounding…80 of them.” Press reports indicate that 24 civilians, including 22 women, were killed and 49 more were wounded in the blast, which took place during Sunday Mass.Additionally, the Islamic State threatened further attacks in its “war on polytheism,” meaning Christians and Jews, in Egypt and elsewhere.“Let all the disbelievers and apostates in Egypt and everywhere know that our war on polytheism is ongoing, and that the State of the Caliphate – with permission from Allah the Almighty – will continue to spill their blood and grill their bodies, so that there is no sedition and the religion is all for Allah,” the jihadist group stated, according to SITE.Upon guidance issued by the Ministry of War in the Islamic State of Iraq in support for our downtrodden Muslim sisters that are held captive in the Muslim land of Egypt and after accurate planning and selection, an angry group of righteous jihadists attacked a filthy den of polytheism,” according to a statement that was released shortly after the attack and obtained by FDD’s Long War Journal. “This den has been frequently used by the Christians of Iraq to fight Islam and support those who are fighting it. With the grace of God, the group was able to hold captive all those in the den and take over all its entrances.”

A senior Hamas official said that the terror group has built a so-called “real army” to fight Israel and that it has become the leading manufacturer of missiles in the Arab world.


01/05/2023



Fathi Hammad, a member of the group’s political bureau and a former interior minister in Gaza, said Hamas “has made a resolute decision to remain steadfast and wage jihad, as the only means to liberate Palestine,” according to the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) which picked up a media interview he gave on Al-Aqsa TV on December 8. Hammad called Israel’s 2005 Disengagement from the Gaza Strip a liberation “under the watch of Hamas,” thanks to its “Jihad [holy war].”

The future of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) is in doubt at it is in danger of losing the Sunni-dominated twin cities of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. Despite these developments, the decentralised threat from ISIS remains present and may expand through the proliferation of terrorist ideology from the returnees. Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS has been able to control large territories and run a de facto state for more than two years. Having proclaimed a Caliphate and sustained it for more than two years, ISIS diehards are likely to motivate like-minded groups to continue with the struggle, especially following the humanitarian crisis that is likely to follow with a Shia-led offensive against the two largely Sunni cities.

Implications for Southeast Asian JihadistsFor Southeast Asia, the eventual fall of the two cities will not mark the end of ISIS or its threat to the region. A decentralised ISIS could be no less dangerous as it could open up multiple fronts in many countries. Unlike Al Qaeda which has no territories or ‘provinces’, ISIS has an epicentre in the Levant and various ‘provinces’ and enclaves worldwide including in Southeast Asia. While holding on to Mosul and Raqqa has been important for ISIS, their loss is unlikely to terminate its struggle to establish a global Islamic Caliphate. While Iraq and Syria have been the epicentres of ISIS since June 2014, the loss of two cities could result in new centres of gravity. They could pose a greater security threat as the West is less likely to commit forces to counter it especially in Asia and Africa. This would simply mean the export of ISIS struggle from the Levant to the rest of the world, especially the Khorasan and Southeast Asia. ISIS is also likely to launch the next phase of its offensive against its enemies. It could attack soft and hard targets worldwide, especially countries belonging to the coalition forces. A weakened and decentralised ISIS would result in less predictability, and these countries would need to be ready for such a landscape of insecurity. As ISIS has already succeeded in spawning radical networks in the region, the likely loss of Mosul and Raqqa would raise Southeast Asian insecurity on two fronts.

First, Southeast Asian jihadists returning home from the battlefield, numbering more than 1,000 to date, could pose a serious threat to regional security. This could result in attacks in states such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar and even Singapore. Hence, while the ‘war against ISIS’ has largely focussed on Syria and Iraq, the end of Mosul and Raqqa as ISIS’s strongholds could open new fronts in the region, thereby endangering regional security.

Low-level Insurgency?Southeast Asian jihadists operating in Mosul and Raqqa, including leaders such as Bahrumsyah, the Emir of Katibah Nusantara and Bahrun Naim from Indonesia and Wanndy from Malaysia, could still order attacks in Southeast Asia. The attacks could source forces either from the ISIS Philippines in Mindanao under the leadership of Hapilon, the Maute group in Butig, or through the returnee foot-soldiers in the region. Also, the attacks need not be simply by nationals of individual states but could also be through jihadi networks developed in Syria and Iraq that could include radicalised Uighurs, Rohingyas and others who may find expediency in the cause of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.

The threat could be in the form of a low-level insurgency or dangerous terrorist attacks which these operationally-ready returnees – who are well-trained, with battlefield experience, and adept in


01/05/2023



use of modern weapon systems and military organisation – will be able to carry out. While the returnees’ ‘lone wolf’ or packs of ‘lone wolves’ attacks can be expected, there could also be attacks by organised small groups, as were carried out during the Paris attacks in November 2015, or in the Puchong (Malaysia) grenade blast in June 2016.

Returnees and Ideological ProliferationThe other major impact of the returnees or ‘escapees’ from Mosul and Raqqa is the importing of a more radical and strident form of Sunni Islam to their respective societies. Defeating ISIS is not just a military battle but also a political, economic and ideological struggle. How Southeast Asian societies cope with the returnees will be an equally important challenge, especially in managing the radical ideas these individuals hold. The revival of the ideological concepts, such as a “caliphate” or sectarian enmity should not be dismissed.A failure to deal with this ideological threat could lead to the returnees’ ability to inspire radicalism at home and breed a new generation of radicals, as had happened following the return of jihadists from the Afghanistan battlefield in the 1980s. This would mean that to deal with dangerous, violence-sanctioning ideas, states would have to develop effective counter and de-radicalisation programmes. Rather than be euphoric at the conquest of Mosul and Raqqa, in Southeast Asia the appropriate response should be extra vigilance and resilience as the next phase of ISIS threat could wreak havoc to the peace, stability and inter-religious harmony in the region.

RAND Commentary: Crime and Terror in Europe: Where the Nexus Is Alive and WellCertain academic (PDF) and policy circles are engaged in an ongoing debate over the existence of what has been dubbed the “crime-terror nexus.” The term refers to the intersection of crime and terror, and the idea that a relationship between criminals and terrorists exists to the extent that a nexus has been established, although it can take one of several forms — temporary marriage of convenience, one-off encounter or lasting partnership.Some scholars assert that the notion of such a nexus is overblown, while others suggest it is best to conceptualise crime and terrorism on a continuum (PDF), or sliding scale, where groups move back and forth over time, ebbing and flowing between ideological and profit motives.And while healthy skepticism is necessary, especially when considering this nexus on a truly global level, it does appear to be a major threat (PDF) in one part of the world in particular — Europe, where terrorists and criminals now recruit from the same milieu (PDF).The connection between crime and terror is not new.When Edwin Bakker researched jihadi terrorists in Europe (PDF), he concluded that about a quarter of the terrorists sampled in the 2006 study had a criminal record. Many had committed crimes but had not served a sentence of any kind.

The so-called Islamic State (IS), more than any other group — including al Qaeda — has found a way to tap into the mind of the criminal-cum-terrorist who is on a mission to conduct jihad against the West and retains the capability to execute the logistical component of an attack, enabled in no small part by longstanding ties to the criminal underworld in Europe.Many terrorists have been involved in various forms of criminality before becoming jihadists, including Abdelhamid Abaaoud, leader of the fall 2015 Paris attacks, and Ahmed Coulibaly, a key figure in the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris earlier that same year. Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, the terrorist who killed 84 people in July by driving a truck through a crowd on Bastille Day in Nice, France, also had a history of petty crime.

A more recent study by the Henry Jackson Society, focused strictly on IS, found that 22 percent of those linked to more than 30 IS-related plots in the West between July 2014 and August 2015 had a previous criminal record or contact with law enforcement. The most common felonies among the nearly 60 individuals were related to drugs.Of 47 cases of jihadi-inspired violence carried out in the West (including Europe) between the


01/05/2023



beginning of 2012 and mid-2016, half of the attackers had a criminal past, terrorism expert Sam Mullins noted in analysis published in the CTC Sentinel, the journal of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

The threat in Europe is more parochial in nature than in the Middle East, North Africa or South Asia. In some ways, it is perhaps less like an actual nexus and more like what some have called the “terrorist appropriation of criminal activities.” In a sense, it is do-it-yourself (DIY) organised crime. The nexus is more about groups like ETA, Hezbollah or Irish Republican Army offshoots working with traffickers and smugglers, while what we are seeing in Europe is the emergence of a true hybrid. There is also concern that Europeans returning from Syria could re-enter their countries of origin and again become involved in terrorism and organised crime.European jihadis are the best positioned to take advantage of this trend, as many are former criminals who maintain connections to the illicit economy and both local and regional black markets. They have also been somewhat innovative in terms of financing their attacks. Terrorists have learned that small sums of money collected over time through somewhat banal criminal activities can be effective, even reliable, sources of funding. Funding through fraud (mortgage, credit card, value-added tax), petty theft, small-time armed robberies and loan defaults have provided monetary support for terrorist plots across Europe.

The second-most common method of funding was illicit trade, according to a Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report that analysed funding sources for 40 different jihadi cells involved in planning attacks against European targets. The illicit trade included drugs, cars, forged documents and weapons. The researchers suspected that proceeds from drug trafficking were used to fund various attacks across the European continent, including the Madrid train bombing (2004), Mohammed Merah's rampage in France (2012), an attack at a kosher supermarket in Paris (2012), and various attacks planned on the Madrid National Court (2004), as well as others by the Hofstad Group in Holland (2004), and another by a Swedish cell (2010).

One of the major consequences of the crime-terror nexus in Europe is that, in order to have a chance at successfully countering attacks carried out by small cells of criminal-jihadists, European nations must work together to share information and intelligence on suspects that may be based in one country but whose network spans several others. What seems like a minor drug arrest in Italy could in reality be a fundraising scheme with connections to a broader plot in France. Preventing attacks requires local police forces to work closely with state and European Union officials, better integrating grass roots intelligence with profiles and backgrounds of individuals who have been identified as foreign terrorist fighters, especially those seeking to return to Europe. This will prove to be a major challenge, as many local police departments are already plagued by a shortage of resources.

One major concern for European law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials is that just as the threat from a crime-terror nexus in Europe is growing, the forces of anti-globalism are strengthening. Encapsulated by Brexit, the move toward hardened borders, increased nationalism and an anti-immigration sentiment — much of it fueled by the threat of terrorism — could do more to harm counter-terrorism efforts in the long run. If the recent vote in Italy has a negative impact on the economies of EU nations, that would further limit the amount of money available for counter-terrorism. Moreover, 2017 could bring a further wave of populist, anti-globalisation political leaders to power throughout the EU.

The fall 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the attacks last spring in Brussels — a city with 19 separate administrative police districts that operate independently from one another — revealed that the EU already suffers from a dearth of information-sharing and intelligence cooperation both between and within national borders. A continued trend away from the idea of a federal Europe could make the situation even worse. If the divisions between countries within the EU widen, it might be hard to retain Europol in its current form, something that could seriously further undermine the


01/05/2023



coordination of national law enforcement. The issue of cooperation between European law enforcement and intelligence agencies is critical to counter-terrorism on the continent, especially considering several of the attackers involved in the November 2015 Paris attacks travelled from Syria to Turkey to Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Germany, before moving on toward France.

The clearest implication for EU security policy is the need to become more effective at building the capacity of states to combat organised crime and criminal violence. This can be accomplished through focusing security cooperation efforts in vulnerable countries on ministerial capacity, institution building, and defence reform, all of which are foundational to other forms of capacity, like border control and anti-corruption efforts. However, these are also the imperatives most likely to suffer from increased nationalism, a move away from integration and the further fraying of ties between EU nations across the continent.

As IS continues to suffer defeats on the battlefield, there is greater potential for what FBI Director James Comey has dubbed a “terrorist diaspora,” which he believes will occur when scores of foreign fighters leave the Middle East and attempt to return to the West. IS may have deployed hundreds of operatives into the European Union already, according to some reports, ensuring an effective “international terrorist strike capability” for the better part of the next decade. The post-IS diaspora is likely to have more connections to the European underworld than ever.

The culmination of a returning wave of foreign fighters to Europe just as political divisions between EU countries are worsening suggests a significant and grave challenge for law-enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies. These entities, already stretched thin, must attempt to address and prevent threats posed by groups that operate in the shadows. The work of these agencies has increasingly focused on addressing the return of foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria and other jihadist hotspots throughout the globe. When these fighters are part of an extensive network of criminals and radicals with roots in such places as Molenbeek, Belgium; the Liselby district of Fredrikstad, Norway; or the banlieues of Paris, the transnational threat becomes a lot closer to home.

The Muslim Brotherhood now has branches or associated groups in most of the major European countries, pre-eminently Germany, France and the UK, writes Tarek DahrougThe political geography of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe has evolved markedly since the establishment of the Islamic Centre in Geneva in 1961, the first Brotherhood institution in Europe.In the first phase, the Brotherhood used Europe as a jumping off point for its attack on Arab regimes, focusing on expansion in three main countries, France, Germany, and the UK, because of historical, geographical, and political factors and because they are the largest three European countries in terms of territory and population. They were also centres for Muslim populations coming from Arab and Islamic countries as a result of their cultural and colonial influence.The Muslim Brotherhood used its institutional presence in these three countries in order to build a network of alliances with entities representing the world’s major Islamic blocs. It opened up to Turkish Islam, heavily represented in Germany, and even more successfully exploited the large North African communities in France as a way into North Africa itself, a major region of the Arab and Islamic world.This was helped by the fact that several North African Islamist movements loyal or close to the Brotherhood had opened their own offices in France and Belgium, including the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, the Moroccan Adl Wal-Ihsane, and other influential Islamist parties in North Africa. The Brotherhood presence in these three major European countries also let it expand institutionally into smaller countries in their orbit, such as Belgium from France, Ireland from Britain, and Switzerland from Germany.The 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of the second generation of Muslim Brotherhood institutions


01/05/2023



through horizontal expansion in Europe. The international Brotherhood organisation harnessed the new waves of Arab Muslim immigration to Europe as the second generation of European Muslims was itself emerging. An umbrella group, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, was formed as the façade of the international Muslim Brotherhood and as a way of gathering all the Brotherhood associations and Islamist groups in Europe, including more than 500 organisations inside and outside the EU states and unofficial entities working within this framework.There is also now an unofficial parallel network of individuals belonging to the Brotherhood but outside this organisational framework. These people run smaller associations that operate outside the Brotherhood’s religious and preaching framework, with the goal of making Europeans more sympathetic to Brotherhood ideas by marketing them in a secular package that defends democracy and human rights. These associations include Brotherhood media entities in the UK working in education, culture, and youth issues and focus on the integration of Muslims in Europe.The Islamic Cultural Centre in Geneva itself was established with Gulf funding in 1961 by Said Ramadan, son-in-law of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna. It represented the institutional nucleus of the Brotherhood in Europe and embraced Muslim scholars sympathetic to the Brotherhood, including Indians like Mohamed Hamidullah and Abu Al-Hassan Al-Nadawi. To strengthen the Brotherhood’s presence in Europe, Ramadan also established and wrote the charter for the World Islamic University in 1961.This institution, the first transcontinental Islamic organisation, had branches in many European capitals and operated for a time to support nascent Brotherhood associations and federations in Europe.The Munich Mosque Committee headed by Ramadan in 1963 was the first major breakthrough for the institutional presence of the Brotherhood in Europe, as the then West Germany became a new centre for Brotherhood activity. In 1973 after the mosque was completed, the committee transformed itself into a major organisation representing German Muslims known as the Islamic German Foundation (IGD).While Ramadan made efforts to establish a Brotherhood institutional base in West Germany and Switzerland, his comrade Mohamed Hamidullah established the first Brotherhood organisation in France in 1963, the Muslim Students’ Association in Paris. This group brought together Brotherhood youth and fellow travellers, including Hassan Al-Turabi, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr (later first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, and Faisal Mawlawi, head of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood who took over the running of the group in 1968.It also included several leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, including Said Al-Bouti and Essam Al-Attar who later broke with the association to form the Bilal Mosque Association in Aachen in West Germany, later a major centre of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.The 1970s and 1980s saw new institutional advances for the Brotherhood in Europe, as the second wave of the organisation’s elements headed to Europe in the wake of their clashes with the Arab regimes. There was an exponential increase in the number of European branches of Islamist parties and organisations from the Arab world, first and foremost among them the Muslim Brotherhood.A group of political exiles and Brotherhood student leaders broke with the Muslim Students’ Association in France in 1979 to establish the Islamic Group in France, which in 1983 became the Federation of Islamic Organisations in France. Ghannouchi laid out the structure of the organisation, its political strategy, and its ideology, making it an institutional pillar of the Brotherhood in France as it has continued to be to the present day. In the early 1990s, the council of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, with its Salafi-Brotherhood feeders, was established in France, Germany, and several other European countries. The Algerian Muslim Brotherhood Association was also established in France, adopting an ideology similar to that of the international Brotherhood.


01/05/2023



At the same time, the Brotherhood deepened its cooperation with non-Arab Islamist currents, particularly a Turkish group, Milli Gorus, which took Germany as the centre of its operations following the dissolution of the Turkish Welfare Party in the 1970s. The Brotherhood also strengthened its ties with Pakistani Islamists represented by the Pakistani Islamic Group based in the UK since the 1950s. The ideological links between the latter group and the Brotherhood had been formed in the wake of the Second World War by Islamist ideologues Sayed Qotb and Abul-Ela Al-Maududi.Thanks to these developments, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to draw on its institutional reserves in several European capitals to establish a multinational Islamist movement under its leadership to oppose the Arab regimes. In doing so, the Brotherhood political geography in Europe relied on the group’s hard core as the engine for its political and preaching activities, largely the federations and associations active in the three main European states of France, Germany, and the UK, the latter being the most vigorous in taking on successive Egyptian regimes.

Germany, France and the UK: The Brotherhood spread through Germany from the Munich Mosque, and it relied on three primary tools: the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, the IGD, the voice of German Muslims that controls some 60 Islamic centres across the country and is led by Egyptian Brotherhood figure Ibrahim Al-Zayat, the son-in-law of Sabri Erbakan, the leader of Milli Gorus, and Milli Gorus itself, which controls large segments of the Turkish community in Germany.Milli Gorus’s Islamist ideology is a Turkish-inflected version of Political Islam, and it has close ties with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A new association was also recently established, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), representing a union between Milli Gorus and the Brotherhood-affiliated IGD.In France, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in France has been able to bring in more than 250 mosques and Islamic associations under its umbrella using North African Brotherhood cadres, particularly Tunisians, in order to do so. This has allowed it to extend its influence over a considerable segment of French Muslims in many of the country’s cities and surrounding suburbs, giving it the upper hand in the Representative Assembly of French Muslims in successive elections.Members of the federation enjoy excellent relations with the French authorities thanks to their opposition to the Salafi current. As a result, it plays a role in local and legislative election campaigns because of the influence it wields over a substantial number of Muslim votes in numerous French cities.Seeking to diversify institutionally, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in France has established schools to turn out an Islamic elite in France, the best known being the Kindi, Razi, and Ibn Rushd schools. According to 2012 data, the Federation owns five of the ten Islamic educational institutions in France.The Brotherhood in France controls several other educational institutions affiliated ideologically to it, such as the Centre for Research and Studies of Islam, the European Institute for Human Sciences (which trains preachers and imams in Europe), the Institute for Islamic World Studies, the French branch of the UK-based World Institute for Islamic Thought, the Al-Shatbi Centre, and the Ibn Sina Institute, which trains imams for the city of Lille in northern France and was established in 2006 with Qatari funding. In addition, businesses owned by leaders of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in France control the halal meat market in the country and have a monopoly on exports to several Arab Gulf countries.In the UK, unlike in Germany and France, the Muslim Brotherhood was not the institutional pioneer and was preceded by the Pakistani Islamic Group, which represents Political Islam in South Asia, active in the country since the 1950s. However, in 1997 Arab Muslim Brotherhood affiliates founded the Muslim Association of Britain in the UK headed by Kamal Al-Helbawi as the culmination of their


01/05/2023



activity in the country in the 1970s and 80s. This aimed to become the official spokesman for British Muslims and to mobilise against Arab and Islamic regimes with which the Brotherhood had clashed by influencing British decision-makers and public opinion.The association used MP George Galloway as a British voice opposed to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example. It also used him to champion Palestinian rights during a packed demonstration in London in 2002 in support of the Palestinian cause. It has also made alliances with prominent British personalities, such as former London mayor Ken Livingstone.Brotherhood activity in the UK is based on structures and institutions run by cadres from various ethnic backgrounds, but all of them hailing from countries like Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine that were formerly under British influence. In addition to the Muslim Association of Britain, these entities include Muslim Welfare, Interpal (accused by the US Treasury of funding terrorism), the Palestinian Return Centre, the Mashriq Centre for Media Services, and the Centre for International Political Studies in London.The UK has also been a platform for Egyptian Brotherhood members to attack successive Egyptian regimes. Essam Al-Haddad established Islamic Relief in London, for example, with branches around the world, while Maha Al-Qazzaz, the sister of Khaled Al-Qazzaz, an advisor to ousted former president Mohamed Morsi, was formerly the Brotherhood spokesman in Britain. She was replaced by Abdallah Al-Haddad, the son of Essam, who works at the World Media Service established by Brotherhood member Mohamed Ghanem in 1993 and operating the Website Ikhwan Web.Egyptian Brotherhood figures in the UK have strong ties with Egyptians for Democracy run by Maha Azzam, head of the pro-Erdogan Egyptian Revolutionary Council, which also includes non-Brotherhood cadres. This group is weak, however, and the activities it organises in the British parliament are not well attended. There is also the law firm led by Lord Ken Macdonald that lobbies against the Egyptian regime among British decision-makers and in some European capitals.Brotherhood leaders in the UK control 13 organisations in London alone through three Egyptian leaders, Essam Al-Haddad, Ibrahim Mounir, and Ibrahim Al-Zayat, who previously headed the IGD. These organisations have transferred funds from outside of the UK for investment in commercial enterprises, real estate companies, and textile factories in particular. Egyptian Brotherhood leaders own numerous companies based in the British Virgin Islands that finance the group’s activities.Horizontal expansion: The Islamist ideologue Youssef Al-Qaradawi’s 1990 book The Priorities for the Islamic Movements in the Coming Phase has functioned as a kind of constitution for Brotherhood movements in the West since the early 1990s. Al-Qaradawi calls for abandoning violence and the use of preaching, dialogue, and other peaceful means to forge a middle way between extremism and secularism. The most important part of the book is his discussion of Muslims in the West, the expected increase in the Muslim population in the West due to higher immigration to western countries, and the dangers of the Muslim minority’s assimilation in these western societies. In the light of this, Al-Qaradawi has promoted the idea of a separate community of western Muslims, which he has termed the “Muslim ghetto” in the West.Al-Qaradawi’s Brotherhood constitution in the West has acted as a political project aimed at building on the reserves accumulated by the group through its federations and national bodies in the major European countries of France, Germany, and the UK. In 1989, the Brotherhood established the nucleus for its horizontal expansion on the European continent by establishing the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, which took the UK as its temporary headquarters. The Federation is the forward face of all Brotherhood and Brotherhood-sympathising organisations, entities, and associations across Europe. Functioning as the diplomatic representative of the Brotherhood, it employs a political discourse that focuses on democracy and human rights.The Federation has created a group of subsidiary organisations similar to specialised UN agencies, such as the European Trust, which collects funds for Brotherhood associations, and the European


01/05/2023



Institute for Human Sciences, based in France with branches in the UK, which trains about 200 imams and preachers every year who go on to lead Brotherhood-affiliated mosques in Europe.In 1996, the federation established the European Youth Forum and other student organisations with Gulf funding to be the voice of European Muslim youth. The forum includes 37 officially affiliated associations and has representation in the European Parliament and the European Commission, the latter financing several of these associations’ activities. In 2006, it established the European Forum for Muslim Women in Brussels composed of 14 organisations from Belgium, France, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Bosnia.As it increased the number of organisations under its umbrella, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe moved its headquarters to Brussels in 1997 to be close to the EU institutions. This has made it easier to find European funding for the associations’ activities, to lobby on Islamic issues like Palestine, Iraq, and Kashmir, and to lobby against the Arab regimes among the European institutions. The federation is extremely active, and although its headquarters are in Brussels it has branches in Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and the UK that administer youth, educational, and media portfolios.It has also adopted a strategy of expanding outside the borders of the EU. In addition to associations operating in 18 EU member states, the federation has opened branches in nine other non-EU states: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. It funds its activities through members’ subscriptions, whether from associations, national federations, or Brotherhood-affiliated individuals, as well as through grants and donations from figures like Youssef Nada and pro-Brotherhood Gulf supporters who regularly contribute to its activities.The most important activity of the federation has been its attempt to take control of fatwas, or religious rulings, in Europe. It established the European Council for Research and Fatwas headed by Youssef Al-Qaradawi in Dublin in 1996 as a primary arm of Brotherhood expansion in Europe. Although the council has denied its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, it is in fact the official framework for the expression of Sunni Islam for ideological currents within the international Brotherhood and sympathetic movements.Much like a forum, the council brings together fatwa scholars from around the Islamic world, and it has allowed the Brotherhood and allied movements to tighten their spiritual control over European Muslims.


01/05/2023


Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...

Documents

Transcript of Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...