Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaeda-30- Bab-el-Mandab-2

A big Syrian/Iranian/Russian push has started in northern Syria The big mystery is its goal. If Putin’s offense in Syria succeeds enough to breath the life into Assad’s regime, Syria’s agony will be extended for years. Far from being something Obama can watch from afar, it has the potential to break open NATO’s southern flank like a can-opener and deliver up the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, into the hands of America’s mortal enemies.

However ONLY looking at Russia is short sighted; there is at least to say a Triple or quadruple Threat

"You have the Sinai Peninsula sitting between the border of Israel and the Egyptian state," “We aren’t just speaking hot air — we are getting closer to you from every place, from

Sinai and from Damascus and more.

C just thinks about this for a moment, the growing triple threat to the world economy corridor. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and it is a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait is located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Most exports from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline also pass through Bab el-Mandeb.

Al Qaida in the South; Remember what Abu-Mus‘ab al-Suri, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim had to say regarding the importance of “There are (5) important naval straits in the globe … .in his Dec 2004 published manifesto…..The Call for Global Islamic Resistance. If the al-Qaeda franchise were to seize control of Yemen's second largest city, such a dangerous development would certainly create new security dilemmas for locals already enduring a grave humanitarian crisis. It could also pose a serious threat to international traders if jihadist terrorist groups were to usurp control of both the Yemeni and African sides of the narrow Bab-el-Mandab (the gates of hell, the name of the strait between Djibouti Yemen) -one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea -.

ISIS/DAESH Centre; Sinai and Suez. As ISIS expands its influence in the Middle East and if its calls on Palestinians to kill Israeli Jews gain any traction, it could cause havoc on Israel's borders; especially to the south. "You have the Sinai Peninsula sitting between the border of Israel and the Egyptian state," says Braniff. "These are 2 countries where the peace treaty forms the basis of stability in the Middle East." The Sinai Peninsula is among the latest ISIS targets where

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 14 01/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


ISIS is linking up with several lesser-known extremists with the ultimate goal of establishing a caliphate. "You have the Sinai Peninsula sitting between the border of Israel and the Egyptian state," “We aren’t just speaking hot air — we are getting closer to you from every place, from Sinai and from Damascus and more

Russia in the North establishing a foot holds in Syria. Russia’s military intervention in Syria is serving as a broader announcement of Moscow’s renewed determination to hold sway in the Middle East. But beyond the immediate outcome of the civil war there, Nato military chiefs are now viewing it as a wider strategic play by Vladimir Putin’s Russia to challenge the west closer to home. According to a senior Nato civilian official, the Mediterranean “is a contested space again”. Russia’s renewed presence could be highly disruptive: it opens up Nato’s entire southern border to Russian provocation while threatening to restrict the “freedom of navigation” that allows Nato to quickly and easily deploy military assets.

And lets not forget further South; Iran Navy; specially the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz.

But also Pirates: From December 1, there will be relief for ship-owners who have been paying

exorbitant "war-risk" insurance premiums for ships transiting across the piracy-prone Arabian Sea. Now, in an acknowledgement of the success of the Indian Navy and coast guard in checking piracy along the Indian coastline, it will no longer be designated a "high-risk area" (HRA). Since 2010, the HRA has extended from the West Asian and East African coast all the way across the Arabian Sea to India's territorial waters. From December 1, it will extend only halfway across the Arabian Sea, acknowledging the eastern Arabian Sea as piracy-free.

The surge in Southeast Asian attacks comes as the number of incidents in the piracy “hot spot” of the early part of the decade—the Gulf of Aden, near Somalia, which links the Arabian and Red seas—has fallen to zero. Southeast Asian seas, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, are home to key shipping routes.

Historical trends are combining once again to make the Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean linkage the nexus in a dynamic phase of the evolving global strategic architecture. The relationships of states within the region, and the relationships of the regional states to the rest of the world is changing, and will evolve significantly over the coming few years. This Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean region is an indissolubly-linked set of subzones, a reality which has often been inadequately understood from a strategic perspective. The great societies and the historical and modern states at the linkage between Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, are rarely considered in a holistic fashion. Focus on the region has been mainly about crises and superpower competition. The prospect now exists, however, for the region to gradually emerge as a major, integrated economic trading zone; perhaps the next major global marketplace, linking Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. So if I can make one point today it is that all of the elements of this greater strategic theater are intercon-nected, interactive, and collectively are critical to the emerging global balance. What happens around the Eastern Mediterranean littoral and around the Indian Ocean theater impacts the Persian Gulf, Arabia, and the Red Sea/Horn; and vice-versa. If we look just at the littoral states of the Suez-Red Sea-Horn, we see a population base of some 316-million people, and a





combined 2014 GDP estimate of at least $1.5-trillion. And this grouping interacts, of course, with its neighbors in Africa, Europe, and the Indian Ocean basin.In the past two decades or so, in either the heart or the peripheries of the Suez / Red Sea / Horn of Africa region — the nub of the Mediterranean-to-Indian Ocean linkage — we have already witnessed, for example:• The break-up of Ethiopia with the separation of Eritrea;• The break-up of Sudan to create a separate South Sudan; • The de facto break-up of Yemen;• The de facto break-up of Iraq;• The breaking-up of Syria;• The de facto break-up of Libya; and • The return to separate status of what had been the Italian and British Somalilands into Somalia and Somaliland, and the concurrent fracturing of the rump Somalian state. • And there is now speculation as to the possible break-up, or breakdown, in the coming decade or so of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two of the most significant economies in the region. It is within that framework — and before the delineation of the new global strategic architecture b-comes clear — that we are witnessing a dramatic transformation in the band of geography which runs from the Atlantic, across the Mediterranean littorals, and then across the Arabian heartland and Horn of Africa to the Indian Ocean.

This may be the great and urgent dynamic which plays out over the coming one or two decades. It is probably even be more critical, more complex, and less stable — in positive as well as negative terms — than the concurrent transformation of the South China Sea waterways. These strategic scenarios are very much interlinked, because the Indian Ocean is, for much of global trade, the transit space, not the destination. But that, too, is changing. In other words, much of the trade which enters or leaves the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea/Suez sea lane or the Strait of Hormuz, also enters or leaves it through the ASEAN waterways and the South China Sea1. The recent expansion of the Suez Canal also means that the Red Sea/Suez SLOC will become even more significant because its preferred status over the Cape of Good Hope sea route will continue to be compounded.

The nexus within this “Gibraltar to Socotra strategic space,” then, is the Suez/ Red Sea/Horn of Africa region. This is the pivotal junction of global trade and energy, a key component in the question of refugee flows to Europe, and a new determining area of competition between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China. But for the first time in centuries, the regional powers in this region hold considerable power over their own fortunes.Yet this is only the tip of the iceberg; the start of a dynamic century. Neighboring Europe is, for example, undergoing massive transformation, and at least two European Union member states still face significant separatist tendencies: the United Kingdom and Spain.

1 Cees remember the al-Suri plan if the AQSL longer-term strategy: Strategic move in Phase VI; DAR AL HARB to start in 2016. As noted and mentioned in AQ master strategist Abu Mus'ab As-Suri his manifesto; The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, So, the most important enemy targets in detail: Third: The straits and the main sea passages: On the Earth there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Arab-Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3 . The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. -- Most of the Western world's economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages





The EU as a geopolitical entity is also, itself, undergoing unplanned transformation. Strategic transformation is now occurring on a global scale. This will largely be as a result of what seems to be a gradual return to a bipolar world, but that may or may not occur as anticipated, and it almost cer-tainly will not mirror the bipolar world of the last half of the 20th Century.Apart from anything else, the growing importance of the Red Sea/Suez sea lane makes the stability, prosperity, and security of the region — the Suez, the Red Sea, and its littorals on the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa — of concern to every society in the world.

To start with an overview of the threats to the region, and some of the internal, dysfunctional factors, we need to consider the reality that several established states in the region are in that process of cratometa-morphosis: total restructuring.Several key states may not exist in their present or 20th Century form or relative power within a decade: Libya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. There are varying degrees and forms to this change, or restructuring. If Saudi Arabia, for example, was to fracture, the prospect is that Qatar, and possibly the UAE, or even Jordan and Oman, could expand to reclaim some of their former clan areas. And what happens in the Arabian Peninsula affects what happens on the Horn of Africa, and vice-versa, as we recall from the cross-Red Sea Kingdom of Queen Makeda of Saba, some three millennia ago. Of pivotal importance because of its regional reach would be the possible break-up over the coming decade of Turkey, which has historically and currently been active in the Maghreb, Red Sea, and Horn. This, along with possible changes on the Arabian Peninsula, would substantially alter the way in which out-of-region powers (such as Russia, the PRC, and the U.S.) are channeled in their engagement in the area. It would probably lead to the return of Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia as the anchoring poles of the greater Middle East, because they represent actual historical civilizations. Iran and Egypt each have substantial, but not overwhelming, economies; indeed, their economies are not substantially larger than that of Israel, and Israel’s per capita economic wealth dramatically exceeds that of either Egypt or Iran. Ethiopia’s economy, however, is nascent, but growing, and could grow even more rapidly.

What is critical about the revival of Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia is that they represent cohesive civilizational structures which can command a sense of national unity and productivity, but, most importantly, they all function — for the first time in generations — as fully sovereign entities, making strategic decisions based on their own perceptions of national requirements. Both Egypt and Iran are making strategic decisions today largely without reference to other powers

What is emerging, then, in this broad arena from the Maghreb to the Indian Ocean is a bloc of states which share many vital and direct interests: Egypt, Israel, Jordan as a core, and, because of their shared direct or indirect interest in the new, great Eastern Mediterranean energy resources offshore, linking with Cyprus and Greece.

These represent the Western end of a the framework, with absolutely vital interests in protecting the Eastern Mediterranean and by default the entrance to the Suez Canal/Red Sea, quite apart from their secondary interest in supporting the global trade links which utilize the Canal and Red Sea. It is conceivable that Lebanon and Syria, and possibly even Turkey, could have shared interests with this core bloc of Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, but for a variety of reasons they are at present peripheral to the bloc.

Egypt, Israel, and Jordan — all Red Sea (and therefore Indian Ocean) littoral states — are engaged as well in the Eastern end of the equation through shared vital interests with Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Dji-bouti. There are other regional states which have interests: Sudan and South Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, Somaliland, and Somalia. Oman, although outside the Red Sea, nonetheless also has a significant stake in the stability of the





Red Sea littoral.Yemen, the Sudans, Eritrea, Yemen, Somaliland, and Somalia have short- and

long-term preoccupations at present which keep them partially or wholly marginalized from the core Red Sea bloc of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. And even Saudi Arabia is itself gravely distracted at present, because of eco-nomic issues and its debilitating involvement in the conflict which threatens to break up Yemen.

Some key states just outside the region are also involved in either helping or destabilizing the Red Sea region: Iran, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kenya.And a number of major external powers — the U.S., France (and the EU generally), the People’s Republic of China, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, and Russia — are also engaged in the protection or projection of their own interests into the Red Sea / Horn of Africa region. Indeed, the 30-nation Combined Maritime Force (CMF), based in Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf, has enabled a significant number of maritime states to express their involvement in the security of the region, through participation in the combined task forces, particularly CTF-150 on counter-terrorism and maritime security, and CTF-151 on counter-piracy. These have been particularly helpful, for example, in reducing Somalia-based piracy against commercial shipping. Engagement in the anti-piracy work enabled Japan and the PRC — neither of which is in the CMF — to significantly expand their long-term maritime presence in the north-western Indian Ocean.-- By Gregory R. Copley Posted on Tue, 20 October 2015

New questions about the security of that key narrow marine passage have arisen as Yemen descends into chaos from the Houthi militia advances and the response of a Saudi-led coalition military campaign. The conflict also presents opportunities for Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which has initiated attacks against Saudi Arabia and the United States despite robust counter terrorism efforts — now diluted by the withdrawal of American elements and the Houthi advances. Added to the potential threat matrix is the influence of Iran in the Houthi campaign and its long experience in holding the Strait of Hormuz, another strategic chokepoint, at risk. So in addition to the crises within the country of Yemen — military, political and humanitarian — resulting from the Houthi campaign, attention must be paid to the maritime domain. Yemen occupies a strategic location in the primary east-west sea route as noted by the head of US Central Command in 1990, General Norman Schwarzkopf. In testimony to the U.S. Senate he said, “The Red Sea, with the Suez Canal in the north and the Bab el-Mandeb in the south, is one of the most vital sea lines of communication and a critical shipping link between our Pacific and European allies … Since a significant part of USCENTCOM’s forces would deploy by sea, ensuring these waterways remain open to free world shipping must be a key objective.”

And then there is, “The presence of the Israeli regime is temporary,” Iranian Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani assured the Hezbollah-linked Al Ahd news website in an interview on Monday. “Eventually one day this alien forged existence that has been forced into the body of an ancient nation and an historical region will be wiped off the map.” Earlyer this year, commander of the Basij militia of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said that “erasing Israel off the map” is “nonnegotiable. In 2014, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took to Twitter on Sunday (9 November) to map out precisely how to wipe out Israel off the global map.

Russia’s Naval Encirclement of Syria October 27, 2015 -- Volume 12, Issue 194 Recent statements by Russia’s top brass concerning precision-strike capabilities against





“terrorist” targets in Syria, future basing plans and the high-profile use of cruise missiles launched from the Caspian Sea, on October 7, indicate a level of confidence within the military concerning the overall operation. It also appears to suggest a high degree of planning and strategic awareness on the part of the political-military leadership. But to understand the basis of such confidence, one needs a clear grasp of each of these aspects in their context; in fact, the uniting theme relates to the role of the Russian Navy in supporting the operation and its potential use if and when called upon by President Vladimir Putin (Interfax, October 7, 18, 26).Much international attention has focused on the Russian air campaign in Syria. Yet, these air strikes were made possible largely by the supporting supply role of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). In mid-October, Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov, the chief of the Main Operational Directorate, referred to the future plan to form a “massive” air, land and sea military base in Syria. Given the rapid expansion of Russian military facilities, it is likely that this is already underway—either on newly developed bases or through the expansion of existing arrangements in Syria. Moreover, Kartapolov was not likely referring to any one location, as the model for such arrangements already exists in Tajikistan: there, the Russian 201st base is located at three separate sites (Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 18). In Syria, the obvious naval component for such basing plans is Tartus, currently home to the Russian Material-Technical Support facility, often referred to as a logistical depot and clearly under expansion as the operation continues. The Hymeymim airbase in Latakia could also witness further enlargement, and two additional sites near the base may function as supporting infrastructure. Meanwhile, if bilateral agreements are put into place, there could be formal mechanisms to recognize a longer-term need for small numbers of Russian ground forces personnel (Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 18).

On October 7, the Caspian Flotilla launched a cruise missile attack against eleven targets in Syria; four naval platforms were used to launch 26 Kalibr 3M14 cruise missiles, striking at ranges up to 1,500 kilometers away. While such strikes could have been conducted using deployed Russian airpower, these were chosen to demonstrate capability and send strategic messaging to other actors (see EDM, October 26). According to a well-placed Moscow source speaking off the record, this was also calculated as a warning to the Gulf states not to incite jihad against Russia. Nonetheless, it clearly demonstrated part of the theme that the top brass now boast about, that targets in Syria can be struck from multiple locations (Vesti.ru, October 7).The non-export variants of the Kalibr cruise missile family also include a version that is mounted within shipping containers, greatly expanding the options for covertly placing the weapon in discrete locations or concealed on different vessels; if Moscow deems it necessary, such strikes could be launched from the eastern Mediterranean Sea (Fb.ru, May 15). In December, the BSF will receive Kalibr-launch capability, both for the B-237 Rostov-na-Donu Kilo-class submarine and for the two new missile ships, Serpukhov, and Zelenyy Dol (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 23).Prior to commencing the air operation in Syria, the BSF was playing a critical role in supplying the port of Tartus with military supplies; this was stepped up as the dredging work at the port has expanded its capacity. The frequency of BSF supplies reaching Tartus has increased markedly since the air operation began on September 30, though some supplies are still sent using air routes (Rybinsk-once.ru, October 22; Informnapalm.org, September 15). Much of this uses large landing ships from the BSF, but Northern Fleet (NF) and Baltic Fleet (BF) assets have also transited northbound through the Turkish Straits into the Black Sea before exiting fully loaded and heading for Syria. These include the Nikolai Filchenkov, Saratov and Yamal, and the NF vessel Aleksandr Otarkovskiy





(Rybinsk-once.ru, October 22).

The former commander of the BSF, Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov, told the Duma Defense Committee that the fleet can easily be used to blockade the coast of Syria. Komoyedov noted that Russian naval assets in the eastern Mediterranean Sea are sufficient to support the operation, but could be expanded if needed. Senior Russian generals also refer to the formation of a tactical naval group off the Syrian coast, which mainly consists of BSF platforms; but there are also NF and BF units present. In late September, the Moskva guided missile cruiser and flagship of the BSF exited the Turkish Straits bound for the Eastern Mediterranean to participate in naval exercises. Reportedly, the Moskva is the lead ship in the tactical naval group (Vzglyad, October 5).While BSF Ropucha- and Alligator-class large landing ships carry most of the military and logistical supplies to Syria, the tactical naval group reportedly involves anti-submarine assets, submarines, guided missile destroyers, intelligence and signals vessels and other platforms to extend air defense options for deployed forces in Syria. The tactical naval group seems constructed to support and ensure the safe arrival of Russian military supplies to the port of Tartus, while also serving as a warning to other actors to avoid interfering in Russian military operations. As far as strike capability, the possible deployment in the tactical group of the container-mounted cruise missile cannot be ruled out (Fb.ru, May 15).Although the BSF forms the bulk of the tactical naval grouping and utilizes the sea route for military supplies to Syria, other elements of Russia’s Navy are involved: the NF, BF and, as the Caspian strike revealed, so too is the Caspian Flotilla. In this sense, remarks by the top brass concerning strike options and basing plans are more understandable. Moscow has created a de facto military naval blockade of Syria. Its stealth deployment of military assets into the country and launch of the air operation on September 30 was accompanied by the formation of a naval task force partly calibrated to send a signal to other powers to keep out of Russia’s way. Russia’s cruise missile strike capability against targets in Syria exists in the Caspian Sea and remains an option in the Eastern Mediterranean and, shortly, in the BSF. Overall the Russian military operation, unlike one involving heavy land-based equipment, could be sustained over time. If this is the case, Moscow can play a long game in seeking diplomatic solutions to the Syrian civil war that suit its interests. --Roger McDermott

By Richard Adhikari/byline Date Oct 27, 2015 Military and intelligence officials apparently have observed increased Russian sub activity near cables located from the North Sea to Northeast Asia, as well as in waters close to American shores, the paper said. There are concerns that the movements indicate Russia might attack those cables in times of tension or conflict, although American military officials have not commented publicly on the issue. Those worries could be overblown. Cutting the cables at a strategic chokepoint "would hurt the Moscow Stock Exchange as much as it would the New York Stock Exchange," he told TechNewsWorld. Further, "the growing demand of the private sector for bandwidth also includes Russian companies, which is coupled with the demand for more and better undersea cables." There are only a few strategic chokepoints where a cable cut would have devastating consequences for the United States economy, and these will be safeguarded by U.S. naval assets, Gady pointed out. In that respect, the U.S. has the Russians outgunned. The Russian navy "is still relatively small compared to the U.S. Navy, and Russian submarines still lag behind in propulsion technology and the development of diesel-electric submarines, the quietest subs, which makes Russian subs easier to spot," Gady said. Further, Russia would get very little in terms of obtaining a clear military advantage, he suggested, because the U.S. military "can just reroute critical





data via satellites." The Critical Chokepoints

About 99 percent of the world's electronic traffic goes through undersea cables. There are three chokepoints where undersea cables converge, and where a cut could have severe consequences, Gady wrote five years ago. They are in the Luzon Strait, the Suez Canal-Red Sea-Mandab Strait Passage and the Straits of Malacca. Simultaneous cuts in the first two could cut off Hong Kong from New York or London, pretty well killing financial traffic. However, there are other dangers that are more of a threat than attacks by a nation-state, Gady said. Ships' anchors, fishing nets, fishing equipment and natural disasters -- particularly earthquakes -- are more of a threat than a state-sponsored attack on undersea cables. Sharks can cause trouble too -- sharks apparently have bitten through several cables. The deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, the dependency on undersea cables, the growth of Russian naval power, and a new, more aggressive Russian naval doctrine are driving the perception that Russia's threat to U.S. critical information infrastructure is increasing, Gady contended. The U.S. and its allies can protect themselves by getting more cable repair ships, introducing more resiliency into the networks, and speeding up cable cut repairs. "It is bureaucratic red tape rather than Russian subs that often are responsible for prolonged outages," Gady said. "That's the real problem."

Oct 27, 2015 Iranian Destroyer Rescues Oil Tanker amid Pirates' Massive Attacks. The Gulf of Aden - which links the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea - is an important energy corridor, particularly because Persian Gulf oil is shipped to the West via the Suez Canal.

TEHRAN (FNA)- The Navy's Jamaran destroyer rescued an Iranian oil tanker in the international waters after fierce battles with pirates sailing on 7 boats."This morning, 7 pirate boats wanted to attack an Iranian oil tanker but Jamaran destroyer rushed to the scene of the attack after an emergency request by the oil tanker and forced the pirates to flee under its heavy fire power," Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari said on Tuesday. He also said that the Iranian Navy's 36th flotilla of warships which includes Jamaran destroyer and Bushehr logistic warship has started its mission in free and international waters since late September to provide security to the country's cargo ships and display the Islamic Republic's might and power. In relevant remarks in September, Rear Admiral Sayyari stressed that the Iranian Navy would





continue its powerful and continued presence in the international waters, specially the Gulf of Aden, where the country's trade vessels are threatened by pirates. "Naval forces would carry on their mission in the international seas against piracy," Sayyari vowed during his visit to the Southeastern Makran seashore in Sistan and Baluchestan. "Safe presence of Iranian ships in the international waters is due to powerful presence of naval forces in Makran," he added. In August, Army Commander Major General Ataollah Salehi told reporters on the sidelines of delivering a new destroyer to the third naval zone in Bushehr that the naval forces presence will continue and we will be present wherever the country's interests require from the Gulf of Aden to the international waters.Noting that the Army forces are powerfully deployed at air, sea and land borders, he said that today the army is a deterrent to any enemy aggression, specially at the country's sea borders. Salehi emphasized preparedness of the Army to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran's territories, and said, "Today, the enemies of the Islamic Iran are fully aware of the power of our country's Armed Forces and will never dare to attack Iran since a disgraceful defeat is awaiting them." The Iranian Navy has been conducting anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since November 2008, when Somali raiders hijacked the Iranian-chartered cargo ship, MV Delight, off the coast of Yemen. According to UN Security Council resolutions, different countries can send their warships to the Gulf of Aden and coastal waters of Somalia against the pirates and even with prior notice to Somali government enter the territorial waters of that country in pursuit of Somali sea pirates. The Gulf of Aden - which links the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea - is an important energy corridor, particularly because Persian Gulf oil is shipped to the West via the Suez Canal.

Oct 19 2015, Shipping costs in the Middle East are expected to drop when a designated high-risk area, previously prone for Somali pirate attacks, is halved in December. The revision of the BMP4 (Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based





Piracy) — announced last week — will likely see shipping operators cut back on security measures that had run up costs. “It costs a lot of money to adhere to the recommendations [of the BMP4],” Ian Millen, Chief Operating Officer at Dryad Maritime, an international monitoring organisation, told Gulf News by phone from London. The BMP4 has been revised, halving the high-risk area, after two years without a successful hijacking of a large commercial ship and more than a year since shots were fired on a commercial ship.“We just haven’t seen incidents,” London-based Tim Hart, maritime manager at Control Risks, said by phone. The revised area — effective December 1, 2015, will cover the Bab Al Mandab strait, Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea from the coast of Oman and down to Kenya in Africa but no longer the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman or Indian coastline.

NEW DELHI: Pirates of the Arabian Sea versus 52 warships of the Indian Navy -- it took only four years to clean up the waters. But the "high risk" tag of the entire area between Africa and Indian waters took considerably longer to shed - three more years. Starting

from the Gulf of Aden, piracy became rampant in Arabian sea around 2007 with the political instability Somalia. But as they increased their reach to the East Arabian Sea, the entire West coast including the Exclusive Economic Zone of India, an area of the sea which can only be used by India for economic reasons, was declared a high risk area. The navy started its anti-piracy operation in 2008 - deploying warships from across the Gulf of Aden, Maldives and Seychelles Islands all the way to the west coast of India. Floating armouries appeared off the Indian coast and security personnel were stationed on board trade ships. "But although the last piracy attempt was in 2012, the global community had refused to realign the High Risk Area tag," said a senior Defence Ministry official. "Plus, including the entire west coast within the High Risk Area also cast a doubt on the capabilities of the Indian Navy."

Sea crimes are on the rise in Southeast AsiaIt’s early in the evening on Saturday, Aug. 8, and the Singaporean oil tanker “Joaquim” is on its way from the Indonesian port city of Tanjung Pinang to the small Malaysian island





Langkawi, bearing 3,500 metric tons of fuel oil. The shipment never reaches its destination. The Joaquim is attacked by armed pirates in the narrow Malacca Strait. The ship is found the next day, 3,000 metric tons of oil gone, the navigation system and communication equipment smashed, and the crew beaten but alive. Sea crime in Southeast Asia is on the rise, according to shipping groups and governmental organizations. While most attacks aren't like the one on the Joaquim—in which a cargo ship is robbed of its freight—shippers are growing wary about the situation in the region. That’s why they are bolstering antipiracy countermeasures on their vessels and asking governments for an increased response. “This is a significant problem and it seems to be escalating,” said Matt Walje, lead author for Oceans Beyond Piracy’s 2014 State of Piracy report, which estimates the value of the oil stolen in 2015 alone at $5 million. “It poses a potential threat to world commerce.”

Piracy attacks double There have been 124 armed robberies, hijackings and other attacks on ships by Southeast Asia sea criminals in 2015 through Sept. 7, according to data from the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau. Since 2010, attacks on ships in regional waters have more than doubled on a yearly basis, and in 2014 they accounted for nearly six of every 10 sea crimes world-wide, the group said.The surge in Southeast Asian attacks comes as the number of incidents in the piracy “hot spot” of the early part of the decade—the Gulf of Aden, near Somalia, which links the Arabian and Red seas—has fallen to zero.Southeast Asian seas, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, are home to key shipping routes. Nearly half the world’s oil, and much of the energy products imported by China and Japan, go through those waterways, according to Walje. As such, experts say, increased danger for shippers there is raising concerns.Sea crimes in any of the “choke points”— places like the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Malacca can appeal to pirates because they are relatively narrow must-use routes for shippers—are serious threats to trade, according to Robert Gauvin, senior director for counter-piracy policy at the U.S. Coast Guard.“This can affect the transportation of energy and goods, which can be very important to the economies for states in those areas, as well as their international partners, such as the U.S.,” Gauvin said. “The U.S. is very much concerned about issues like [piracy in Southeast Asia] because we feel it affects our national security and it also affects maritime transportation and the global economy.”





Somali piracy was attributed mainly to poverty and civil war in the region. It emerged as a serious threat to global trade and seafarers around the turn of the millennium, when gangs began hijacking ships off the country’s coast and in the Gulf of Aden. In early 2011, 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held for ransom in anchorages off Somali beaches at one time. But experts have struggled to identify the reasons crimes at sea have jumped to a 12-year high in Asia, making the problem harder to tackle. Some say poverty in Southeast Asia, in part caused by overfishing, has strained communities’ incomes; others say gangs that have been active for years are now more organized and effective and are now successfully pulling off more ambitious attacks.In Southeast Asia, pirates are increasingly hijacking ships to steal oil from slow-moving tankers but rarely seek to ransom the crew. They capture tankers, sail them to a mother ship and siphon off the fuel, then release the boats with their equipment smashed and, at times, the crews badly hurt. (Because the crews are generally not ransomed, analysts say, they may be likelier targets for violence than was the case in East Africa.) The oil is sold on the black market. Walje, from Oceans Beyond Piracy, estimates that pirates have stolen

more than 16,000 metric tons of oil products — with an estimated value of $5 million — in Southeast Asia this year. “There’s a really high return on investment in a very short period of time with oil theft,” Walje said. ”When you’re siphoning oil up, you’re able to make millions of dollars quite quickly — as opposed to Somali piracy, where they sometimes had to sit on a vessel for a year or more in order to get multimillion-dollar ransoms.…It’s quite a large capital injection into a criminal enterprise.”

Image Credit Data as of Sept. 11, 2015The shipping industry isn’t currently as concerned about Southeast Asia as it was about the Gulf of Aden, according to Philip Tinsley, maritime security manager at global shipping organization BIMCO — but it is watching the region with a careful eye.Problems complicate solutions for shippers in the regionThe Somali pirates were eventually deterred by the combined efforts of governments, international organizations and shipowners. Governments and international institutions deployed naval forces and coastal patrols, while shippers equipped their vessels with





barbed wire, water cannons and armed guards, also rerouting ships and increasing their speed to make them harder to board. The result was a sharp drop in piracy incidents in the area. So far, according to industry statistics, 2015 has been attack-free. The cost of accomplishing that, however, has been substantial.At the height of the Somali attacks, the annual cost of piracy — including ransom payments, insurance premiums, the cost of stolen goods, vessel-protection measures, rerouting ships around the Cape of Good Hope and naval intervention — was estimated at $7 billion to $12 billion, according to Oceans Beyond Piracy. That fell to $2.3 billion last year, partly because of a drop in ransom payments and lower expenses associated with rerouting and insurance. (Oceans Beyond Piracy doesn't yet have an estimate for Southeast Asia.)But experts say the measures that worked in the Gulf of Aden won’t work in Southeast Asia. Asia’s dense map of territorial waters complicates the use of military vessels, a contrast to the African coast, where they can operate more easily in international seas.“The pirates seem to be fairly adept in finding out where the territorial waters of the different nations start,” Walje said. “That way they can take a vessel in one area and move

to another area, which slows the response from authorities.” The territorial waters also disqualifies the use of armed guards aboard the ships, said Arild Nodland, founder of Bergen Risk Solutions, a Norwegian intelligence firm that specializes in assisting ships through high-risk waters and works with oil and gas shippers including Petroleum Geo-Services PGS, +5.82% Sinopec Group 0386, -1.57% ) subsidiary Addax Petroleum, and Fugro FUR, +0.57% Nodland called armed guards a “critical success factor” in combating piracy.As much as $15,000 or more to safeguard a ship The factors that limit the use of military force and armed guards in the region mean that a solution will likely require a combination of tactics including vessel-protection measures, region-specific training for ship crews, and information sharing. Physically safeguarding a ship usually runs between $5,000 and $15,000, according to Nodland, though projects can cost much more. Shippers can install barbed wire, reinforcing exposed ship doors, build “safe rooms” inside the hull to wait out attacks, and add water cannons and alarms. “If you’re operating in a high-risk environment, you also need to physically harden your ship,” Nodland said.”





More broadly, local governments are stepping up efforts to address piracy before the situation worsens. In Indonesia for example, authorities arrested the alleged mastermind behind one of the highest profile oil-tanker attack — the hijacking of the Orkim Harmony in June — as part of a bid to combat a soaring number of incidents. And in Malaysia, the Maritime Enforcement Agency has set up an airborne special-task and rescue team.And a group called ReCaap, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia, was created in 2004 to promote regional cooperation, share information and intelligence, and convene groups to discuss regional strategies and tactics.But critics say gaps in the regional response remain. Indonesia and Malaysia aren’t involved in ReCaap even as those countries suffer heavily from increased sea crime. And it only works as an information-sharing and analysis center, rather than a direct reporting center that can respond to an attack, Tinsley said.“You need to create a clearer line of communication, so if there is an incident, this is who you report to, so they can do something about it,” he said. A similar operation — the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations — has been helpful in the Gulf of Aden, according to Tinsley, acting as the primary point of contact for commercial ships in case of a pirate attack. That will need to come from Southeast Asian governments, according to the Coast Guard’s Gauvin. (The U.S. is a member of ReCaap; the organization itself didn't respond to multiple requests for an interview.) There appears to be some urgency driving a response, as a July press report said Southeast Asian countries plan a joint operation to fight piracy in the Malacca Strait. Gauvin said the governments need to work together on a system that will help with response, prosecution, and imprisonment of sea criminals in the region for conditions to improve. “There needs to be coordination between local states,” Gauvin said. “It gives them the capability to sit down together and talk about these types of agreements. But it doesn’t happen overnight.”




Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...

Documents

Transcript of Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of...