Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-Yemen-15

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-Yemen-15Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the early winner in Yemen. -- Bruce Riedel

….Muhammed's Army may eventually come home to Mecca."….

Operation "Decisive Storm" in Yemen, and the reports of warming Saudi-Turkish relations that preceded it, sparked hopes among opponents of the Assad regime in Syria that a similar operation could be carried out in that country. l-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been quick to exploit the resulting power vacuum and the ongoing conflict, as it did during and following the Arab Spring uprisings both in Yemen and elsewhere in the region.

• Conflicting reports, 03 May 2015 Saudi Arabia denies deployment of ground troops in Aden, Denial comes after reports of a limited deployment of special Arab forces in the Yemeni port city to fight Houthis.

N. Mozes and E. Ezrahi* Operation "Decisive Storm" in Yemen, and the reports of warming Saudi-Turkish relations that preceded it, sparked hopes among opponents of the Assad regime in Syria that a similar operation could be carried out in that country. These hopes were in line with reports in Western and Arab media about the possibility of such a joint Saudi-Turkish-Qatari operation against the regime in Syria. However, others consider these hopes to be in vain, both because the Yemen operation did not accomplish its goals and because Egypt is opposed to such a move.As events in the country increasingly make clear, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been quick to exploit the resulting power vacuum and the ongoing conflict, as it did during and following the Arab Spring uprisings both in Yemen and elsewhere in the region.

• The UN Security Council is paying “lip service” to Yemen’s humanitarian needs – that is the accusation voiced by Russian UN envoy Vitaly Churkin following Friday’s meeting, where Russia’s proposal for a humanitarian pause in hostilities was left in limbo. "If you cannot agree to a simple statement what can you agree on… They pay lip service, they say ‘things are very bad, but what can we do about it.” “This really shows an amazing indecision and I think lack of understanding of how things are evolving,” the Russian envoy added.

• "But Birmahle is only civilians, with no [ISIS] positions and no clashes," Abdel Rahman continued. US-led airstrikes have killed 52 Syrian civilians in one day, a monitoring group reports. There was fighting in the vicinity, but the strike allegedly failed to kill even a single Islamist fighter. "Airstrikes by the coalition early on Friday on the village of Birmahle in Aleppo province killed 52 civilians," the head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

• Remember: 18 Apr 2015 - UK welcomes Saudi Arabia's $274m donation to the flash UN humanitarian appeal for Yemen, to provide urgently needed aid to Yemeni

The forces in Yemen which Saudi Arabia is arming can turn jihadi, Baraka says, as they have some “traditional, Whabis, Islamic leanings,” which is the “main ideological, Islamic foundation for Al Qaeda.”

• al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been quick to exploit the resulting power vacuum and the ongoing conflict, as it did during and following the Arab Spring uprisings both in Yemen and elsewhere in the region.

Saudi Arabia denies deployment of ground troops in Aden, Denial comes after reports of a limited deployment of special Arab forces in the Yemeni port city to fight Houthis. 03 May 2015 . Dozens of Arab special forces soldiers arrived in the Yemeni port city of Aden on Sunday to bolster the anti-Houthi forces amid a fierce offensive by the Shia rebels and their allies, sources told Al Jazeera. Saudi Arabia denied that a ground operation was under way by the anti-Houthi coalition it leads, but declined to comment on Sunday on the presence of

Cees: Intel to rent of 14 03/05/2015


special forces - a topic Riyadh has consistently refused to address in the more than one-month-old conflict. In Aden, Ali al-Ahmadi, the spokesman for the Southern Popular Resistance, a group defending the southern port city against an advance by the Iranian-allied Houthis, told Reuters news agency that the fighters battling the rebels around Aden airport are Yemenis, not Arab special forces troops deployed by the Saudi-led coalition. A Saudi spokesperson has also issued a denial. He confirmed, however, that the Arab coalition remained engaged in the fight in the Arabian Peninsula nation. "There are no foreign forces in Aden but coalition continues to help fight against the Houthi militia," Brigadier General Ahmed al-Asiri said in a statement.

Kofi Annan, who was UN Secretary General between 1997 and 2006; The fragile state Iraq is now in is directly linked to the US-led invasion of 2003, which happened without a UN Security Council mandate, Kofi Annan, who was UN Secretary General between 1997 and 2006, told RT. “You cannot disassociate the situation in Iraq today from the US intervention of 2003. Because not only did the intervention take place, but they dismantled the Iraqi Army, which was the tool of Saddam to maintain law and order,” Annan said in Oksana Boyko’s Worlds Apart show.

Kofi Annan, “The civil service, the Baathist Party were all [dismantled]. So the structures and state institutions vanished overnight, creating a very serious vacuum, which has led to where we are today. So I don't think anybody can argue with that. The link is clear,” he added. Annan said careful analysis of what a military intervention could achieve and what harm it may do is necessary before taking a step in that direction. “You have to start on the basis that you should do no harm. You shouldn't do more harm than is necessary. So you have to assess the situation to see will the intervention help, would it have a positive aspect, or would it do more harm. And if you analyze it and you were to conclude that the results would be much more disastrous, then what's the point of intervention? What would the people gain? What are you offering them, if it's going to make their situation worse? And how do you explain to the world why you intervened?” he explained. Not being a pacifist, Annan says sometimes using force is necessary, but it’s mostly more useful as a threat that forces negotiation than as a solution in its own right.

Kofi Annan, “Sometimes the threat of potential use of force is much more effective than actual use of force. When the other side knows that you have the capacity and you may use it, the attitude is different,” he said, adding that his own negotiation experience as a leader with no military force at his disposal was quite enlightening. “But if the Secretary-General, the individual, is saying, look, be careful, you have to do the right thing otherwise you may



provoke a reaction that will be much more brutal than the conversation I'm having with you, is something quite different. So, for me it's the threat rather than actually jumping in to intervention,” he explained. Unfortunately now international politics is degrading in a sense that some players don’t seek negotiation with their opponents. May, 1.

April 30, Saudi troops have repelled a major attack on their border by Houthi rebels from Yemen, Saudi state media says. In a statement issued by the Saudi Defense Ministry, Riyadh claims that the country’s ground forces “repelled an attack carried out by groups of Huthi militias and their supporters” in the border sector of Najran. The Houthis reportedly tried to capture border and control posts in Najran when Saudi forces engaged the attackers with “direct and indirect fire”. The Saudi Air Force also came to the rescue, targeting the rebels’ military hardware. “With the grace of God, our gallant forces managed to defeat the hostile evil elements,” the Saudi Press Agency wrote Air strikes carried out by a Saudi-led coalition have targeted the Shia Muslim rebels since late March. But this is the first major assault on Saudi territory since the strikes began. The Saudi reports say "dozens" of rebels were killed. A statement by the Saudi Press Agency, SPA, said the attack happened on its southern border, near the Saudi town of Najran on Thursday. Identifying the attackers as Houthi rebels and groups allied to them, SPA said Saudi ground exchanged fire with them and called in air strikes. Although the first stage of the Saudi operation in Yemen, aimed at destroying first priority targets from the air, has recently ended, Riyadh continues to control Yemeni airspace. Saudi actions that have hampered the delivery of vital aid to the country are a “very serious violation” of international standards, said Farhan Haq Deputy Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General according to TASS. This is a country where half the population are considered food-insecure, meaning that many families do not know where their next meal will come from,” said Purnima Kashyap, WFP representative.

AQAP Surges in Yemen as War Rages Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 9May 1, 2015 By: Brian M. Perkins The Shi’a Houthi rebels’ advance on Yemen’s capital Sana’a from late 2014 was a slow burning conflict that led to the resignation of President Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi on January 22, which prompted chaos in Sana’a and has since spread to much of the rest of the country (Yemen Times, January 22). Meanwhile, a fissure developed within the Yemeni military as former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, backed by key army units, emerged as key Houthi ally, likely to facilitate an intended future power grab by himself, his family and supporters. In response to these developments, on March 25, Saudi Arabia, fearful of an “Iranian-backed” Shi’a regime coming to power, organized a coalition of 10 nations to conduct an air campaign against the Houthis (al-Jazeera, March 26). As events in the country increasingly make clear, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been quick to exploit the resulting power vacuum and the ongoing conflict, as it did during and following the Arab Spring uprisings both in Yemen and elsewhere in the region. This article will explore AQAP’s recent actions in various locations in Yemen, analyze the group’s emerging strategy and suggest how the group is likely to evolve as Yemen’s ongoing civil war develops.

Paving the Way While AQAP is undoubtedly exploiting the fresh tumult in Yemen, it was an elaborate campaign by the group in 2014 that laid the foundation for its current success. In particular, the group during 2014 become more adept at reaching out to local tribes for support, notably through their new nom de guerre Ansar al-Shari’a. In addition, the widespread distribution of recent attacks has highlighted that AQAP’s potency now extends beyond their former rural bastions in the south and east, striking as far as Sana’a and Hodeidah (Middle East Eye, September 29, 2014; Yemen Observer, December 21, 2014). The



majority of operations in their heartlands during 2014 were against military and government targets, with an emphasis on military bases suspected of cooperating with U.S. drone operations. The outlying attacks meanwhile targeted their Houthi adversaries as well as the national military. In 2013 and 2014, AQAP made its largest gains in Shabwa, Abyan and Hadramawt governorates but tactically retreated from all but the latter during 2014 due to U.S. drone strikes and Yemeni military operations.

Today AQAP is using this same operational model to capitalize on the growing chaos in Yemen. In particular, in recent weeks, AQAP has consolidated their control in parts of Hadramawt and also bolstered their ranks in Marib, Abyan and Shabwa through coopting local tribes and heading off the Houthis before they advance into AQAP strongholds. Notably, the multisided battlespace created by the Houthi advances into Yemen’s central highlands and towards Aden provided AQAP the cover needed to conduct one-off assaults on the Houthis in al-Bayda, Lahj, Ibb and Taiz (al-Mashhad, April 9; SITE, April 19). Although most of these attacks have not led to significant territorial gains, they underline the group’s ability to operate with near-impunity through much of the country. However, their maneuverability in these provinces will likely be limited to bombings and assaults using small five to ten man cells as the militias loyal to Hadi and Saudi jets continue to engage Houthi positions. Amplifying the problems posed by AQAP’s resurgence, is that developments come after the United States hastily evacuated all embassy personnel from Sana’a on February 10 in response to the Houthi seizure of the city, following which U.S. special operations forces, including advisors at al-Anad air base near Aden in southern Yemen, were ordered out of the country on March 22 as the Houthis advanced southwards (Yemen Times, March 23). The withdrawal of U.S. troops from al-Anad critically diminished the U.S. intelligence footprint within the region at a key moment. Indeed, it is now clear that the disruption of U.S. and Yemeni military operations as a result of the Houthis’ advance, coupled with Saudi-led airstrikes, have collectively created a major opportunity for AQAP to broaden and expand its operations.

Marib, Abyan and Shabwa Fighting between various groups has been steady in the oil-rich province of Marib since the fall of 2014 (Yemen Times, November 11, 2014). The Murad, Obaidah and Bani Dabian tribes of Marib mounted a stiff resistance against attempts to advance into the province by both the Houthis and AQAP. However, the tribes have been steadily losing ground to the Houthis, particularly in Sirwah where Houthi fighters have seized the 312th Military Brigade Base (Yemen Times, February 2; Barakish, April 24). Meanwhile, AQAP fighters, along with members of Islah (Yemen’s largest Islamist party, which derives from the Muslim Brotherhood), are reportedly still positioned at the nearby Hailan Mountain and are engaging the Houthis intermittently (Yemen Observer, April 18). It is unclear at present if AQAP and Islah are working in unison, or if they merely share a common enemy. Meanwhile, in Abyan, a traditional stronghold for Sunni extremist groups in southern Yemen, hundreds of AQAP fighters, led by Abyan’s field commander Jalal Baleedi, reportedly aligned with the pro-Hadi 111th Infantry Brigade and the local pro-Hadi popular committees to seal off Houthi supply lines from Aden and Shabwa (Yemen Times, April 8). Saudi jets have consistently struck Abyan since late March causing casualties on both sides (Yemen Times, March 31; FARS News Agency, April 19). Continued airstrikes against AQAP may see the group redeploy to the battlefront in Shabwa.

AQAP’s recent operations in Shabwa have so far consisted of attacks on embattled military bases as well as bombings and direct fighting, involving heavy artillery, against Houthi forces and militias loyal to Saleh. In one notable attack, AQAP seized control of the pro-Saleh army’s 19th Infantry Brigade’s base in the Bihan area of Shabwa on February 12 after conducting a several hours-long complex assault with IED’s and automatic weapons.



Tribal militias, thought to be affiliated with AQAP, also seized the 2nd Infantry Brigade base in Ataq on April 14 (Yemen Times, April 14). Five days later, an unconfirmed U.S. drone strike reportedly killed at least three suspected AQAP members in a supply vehicle in Shabwa’s Saeed District, suggesting U.S. efforts against the group are ongoing, despite the disruption caused by the evacuation of the embassy and the al-Anad base (al-Arabiya, April 20). At this time, however, it is unclear which side maintains the upper hand in Shabwa, but AQAP is seemingly well equipped to continue the fight. In addition, AQAP conducted an offensive in al-Houta in Yemen’s southern Lahij governorate in mid-March (Yemen Times, March 23).

Hadramawt AQAP’s control over the previously mentioned regions is highly contested. However,the group is operating nearly unopposed in much of Hadramawt, where the Yemeni military has offered little resistance and local tribes seemingly view AQAP’s presence as advantageous, even if only temporarily. In their largest attack, AQAP fighters launched a coordinated assault on Hadramawt’s capital al-Mukalla on April 2. Dozens of fighters armed with automatic rifles and RPGs freed over 200 inmates from the central prison, including prominent AQAP leader and its former amir of Abyan, Khaled Batarfi. The fighters proceeded to storm the provincial security headquarters, police stations, administrative offices and the central bank, capturing a large cache of weapons and money (Yemen Times, April 6). AQAP reportedly signed an agreement with the Council of Sunni Scholars, a tribal alliance comprised of members of the Hadramawt Tribes Confederacy, agreeing to hand over control of the city to the tribal alliance (News al-Youm, April 11). The Council of Sunni Scholars may have conceded to AQAP knowing its tribal fighters were out-gunned and would be unable to repel a Houthi advance in the province. Following the al-Mukalla attack, on April 16, a group of fighters calling themselves the “Sons of Hadramawt,” likely members of AQAP, seized al-Shihr oil terminal, al-Rayan Airport and the bases of the 190th Air Defense Brigade head and 27th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Middle East Eye, April 17). In an apparent attempt to subdue local concerns, AQAP organized a large public rally on the beach in al-Mukalla, which was attended by at least several hundred people. During the rally, a spokesperson said the group’s seizure of the bank and other state facilities was righteous because it was in the name of jihad against the hostile Houthis (Hadarem, April 17). It appears that this helped AQAP to secure the city’s support, or at least cooperation or acquiensence; the situation in and around al-Mukalla still appeared calm on April 25 when residents took photos while participating in a community-based cleaning initiative and workers prepared to receive a vital fuel delivery (Mukalla Star, April 25).

Tribal Bargaining Yemen is commonly characterized as a country starkly divided along tribal lines, but allegiances are up for grabs, particularly during uncertain times. Yemen’s hyper-local sub-tribes are not as structured, political or self-sufficient as the most powerful families from larger multi-tribe confederations such as the Hashid or Bakil, which are major national power brokers. As such, the sub-tribes are particularly prone to forging opportunistic alliances in an attempt to secure the brightest future for their fellow tribesmen. Tribal allegiances are patronage-based, and with the government no longer capable of providing concessions, the tribes will look to new sources. The Sunni-Shi’a divide in Yemen is not profound enough to elicit universal or sustained Sunni tribal resistance to the Zaydi Shi’a Houthis. Nor is it enough to guarantee Sunni support of AQAP in a battle between the two; tribes will ultimately make decisions based on short-term benefits, and will not hesitate to change positions. For example, the Murad, Obaidah and Jedaan tribes signed a ceasefire agreement with the Houthis on November 24, which ensured the protection of the Marib tribesmen and state facilities. The agreement was nullified five days later when the tribes announced the formation of the “Sons of Marib Alliance” to protect Marib from the Houthis and AQAP (Yemen Times, December 2, 2014). As a result of this situation, the Houthis and



AQAP will continuously strive to purchase the goodwill of strategically placed tribes to facilitate their broader goals; in particular, each side will play on the current plight of the region and amplify the threat posed by their rival. For instance, in consequence, AQAP will seek to intensify the sectarian divide to galvanize support against the “rafidah,” an offensive term for Shi’a; meanwhile, tribes aligned with the losing side of a battle may pursue surreptitious ceasefire agreements with their opposition to secure their tribes’ livelihood.

Outlook AQAP underscored their ambitions in January when the group claimed responsibility for the high-profile attack on the office of Parisian satirical magazine Charlie Hedbo (al-Jazeera, January 14). Despite this, the exact nature of the relationship between AQAP and the Kouachi brothers, who perpetrated the attack, remains ambiguous. However, in February 2013, Charlie Hebdo’s editor was on a hit list published in the tenth issue of AQAP’s slick English language online magazine, Inspire. [1] This underlines what differentiates AQAP from their domestic rivals; the desire and capacity to strike Western targets. The war could provide AQAP with the operational mobility necessary to plot further attacks on the West, the U.S.-backed Saudi air campaign—even if directed against the Houthis—may only fuel the desire to strike U.S. interests. Although some analysts might contend that the battlespace is too crowded to plot external operations, the group’s newfound havens in Hadramawt and the uncontested regions of al-Jawf, in the north of Yemen near the Saudi border, could still prove to be adequate staging grounds. Although many of the strategic alliances galvanized by the civil war will unravel if the conflict subsides, a resolution will not immediately erase the gains they facilitated; the fog of Yemen’s civil war will endure for the near future, regardless of which regime takes power. It is also likely that the duration of the war will ultimately determine the extent of AQAP’s expansion. If AQAP remains a less than primary target for both domestic and foreign actors through a prolonged and rapidly internationalizing conflict, the group will potentially carve out massive swaths of territory. Furthermore, AQAP’s strength will potentially surge if the Saudi-led coalition successfully weakens the Houthis in regions being contested by AQAP. The group’s ongoing seizure of military bases and critical infrastructure will also bolster its operations further by providing it with weapons, vehicles and funding. Strategic and symbolic victories will help foster support from marginalized tribes, particularly across the south and east. Meanwhile, the rapidly changing operational picture and lack of ground-based intelligence assets will continue to hinder U.S. counter-terrorism operations, particularly as regional intelligence and naval assets are instead diverted into aiding Saudi efforts or subverting Iranian activities. Sporadic drone strikes will likely continue to undercut AQAP operations, but will likely be ineffectual in preventing its strategic-level growth. The group is meanwhile likely to benefit from increasing hostilities between the Houthis and tribal alliances in areas such as Marib, while the humanitarian impact of the conflict will also allow AQAP to pursue support from marginalized tribes in the war-torn regions. Given that further instability in Yemen is likely and that also such instability will almost certainly further fuel AQAP’s expansion, there appear few scenarios in which AQAP will not emerge as a primary beneficiary of Yemen’s ongoing descent into chaos. Brian M. Perkins is an International Security Analyst and freelance journalist specializing in terrorism and sectarian violence. Note 1. Charlie Hebdo’s editor Stephane Charbonnier, along with several other European journalists and cartoonists, were featured on a “Wanted Dead or Alive” poster in the tenth issue of Inspire, which is published by AQAP’s media wing al-Malahem Media.

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TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue9_03.pdf

May 1, 2015 Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1156

As Saudi-Turkish-Qatari Relations Improve, Possibility Of 'Decisive Storm'-Type Operation In Syria Emerges

By: N. Mozes and E. Ezrahi* Operation "Decisive Storm" in Yemen, and the reports of warming Saudi-Turkish relations that preceded it, sparked hopes among opponents of the Assad regime in Syria that a similar operation could be carried out in that country. These hopes were in line with reports in Western and Arab media about the possibility of such a joint Saudi-Turkish-Qatari operation against the regime in Syria. However, others consider these hopes to be in vain, both because the Yemen operation did not accomplish its goals and because Egypt is opposed to such a move.

At the same time, the various opposition factions in the Idlib area in northwest Syria have won a series of strategic victories in the past month, most notably taking over the city of Jisr Al-Shughour and the Al-Qarmid army base. The main player in these triumphs, which followed a long period of difficulties and defeat, is Jaish Al-Fatah ("The Army of Conquest") – a coalition of opposition factions formed in March 2015 comprising Al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) and other factions, both Islamist and moderate. These victories have led both regime and opposition elements to believe that the Syrian version of Operation Decisive Storm is already being carried out by Syrian opposition forces which receive aid from Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The opposition's victories in northern Syria and the reports of a potential joint Saudi-Turkish operation in the country are of great concern to the Assad regime, which dispatched its defense minister to Iran to discuss "steps towards strategic cooperation between the two armies, in order to deal with regional threats."[1] Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu'allem accused Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar of being behind the military escalation of "armed terrorist groups" in most of the regions, but particularly in Idlib.[2] In a statement to the UN Security Council, the Syrian Foreign Ministry called for a halt to Turkey's direct aggression against Syria and for punishing its perpetrators and supporters.[3]

It is possible that the reports of a joint Saudi-Turkish-Qatari military operation in Syria, and the opposition forces' recent intensive efforts on the ground, are aimed at pushing the Syrian regime towards accepting terms that are more favorable to the opposition and its supporters in the political process that is currently being drawn up under the sponsorship of UN Special Envoy for Syria Steffan de Mistura.

This paper will review the reports indicating a possible future Saudi-Turkish-Qatari military operation in Syria, as well as the possibility that the recent rebel victories were the result of covert aid by these countries:

Efforts To Form Sunni Alliance Against Assad Regime

Even before the death of Saudi King 'Abdallah, the kingdom began efforts to form a Sunni alliance whose members would rise above their disagreements to operate against their common enemy, Iran. Following the king's death, his successor, King Salman, continued


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these efforts with Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt; their most noticeable outcome so far has been the Arab coalition that launched Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis in Yemen, aimed at letting Iran know in no uncertain terms that it must cease its meddling in the Arab world.[4]

It was reported on April 12, 2015 that Saudi Arabia and Turkey were, with Qatari mediation, discussing the establishment of a military alliance to topple the Assad regime, which would include Turkish ground troops and the Saudi Air Force. The report also assessed that this operation would be launched only after the May 13, 2015 Camp David summit between President Obama and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders. It added that these talks were preceded by an agreement between the countries for increased aid to the Syrian opposition, and for expanded collaboration on security issues; also, that Turkey and Qatar had signed a security agreement on intelligence and military collaboration and on possibly stationing Turkish troops on Qatari soil and vice versa.[5]

The following day, leading Saudi writer Jamal Khashoggi, formerly editor of the official daily Al-Watan, confirmed this report, tweeting that Turkey and Saudi Arabia had agreed to carry out a joint military operation in Syria, but adding: "In principle, th[is] report is true, but the details are not accurate. The plan is [still] in the process of formulation..."[6]

Prominent Saudi cleric Salman Al-'Odeh also assessed that an operation in Syria was forthcoming. On April 26, 2015, he tweeted: "Wait for a quality operation related to Syria in the coming days!"[7]

However, several hours later he clarified that the operation was to be a humanitarian mission.

The official Saudi daily Al-Watan stated, "The Iranian occupation of Syria will not continue. Even if the equation based on sectarian war and on dragging all the terrorist organizations into [Syria]... has lasted all these years, it will soon change... It is true that the political options for the near future are not encouraging... but the Syrians will surely rid themselves of all forms of terrorism, sectarianism, and militias."[8]

National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces president Khaled Khoja said that the improved Saudi-Turkish relations would impact events in Syria, and expressed hope for the emergence of a new regional axis for fighting the Syrian regime. He said: "The Saudi-Turkish rapprochement increases the new acceleration in the revolution, giving us greater confidence that a new axis is being formed."[9]

The Al-Shara' journal, which belongs to the forces of Syrian regime opponent and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, stated that a Decisive Storm-like operation against the Assad regime was already underway. It reported that the April 24, 2015 bombing of Hizbullah positions in Al-Qalamoun, Lebanon – where, he said, there were long-range missiles that threatened Arab countries – was carried out as part of this operation.[10]

Syrian Regime-Affiliated Daily: Decisive Storm Already A Reality In Northern Syria, As Manifest In Bitter Battles Between Rebels, Regime

Some believe that the recent Saudi-Turkish rapprochement and understandings are concerned with aiding the armed Syrian opposition forces, and not necessarily with a joint Saudi-Turkish military operation. For example, on April 20, 2015, Jamal Khashoggi tweeted that Jaish Al-










Islam[11] commander Zahran 'Alloush's visit to Turkey "has removed the final obstacle to Saudi-Turkish-Qatari collaboration in Syria."[12]

On April 27, 2015, following rebel victories in Syria, Khashoggi tweeted: "A great crisis will soon rock Lebanon. Tens of thousands of Alawites will flee towards Lebanon, which will be forced to close its borders. Hizbullah will apply pressure for the borders to be opened, while other forces will oppose this."

The following day, Khashoggi tweeted a photo of what he called "the beginning of the great escape [from Syria]."[13]

Others also maintain that the Saudi-Turkish understandings are already being actualized on the ground in Syria, in the form of the opposition's strategic military victories in recent months, particularly in Idlib in northern Syria. Thus, the daily Al-Safir, which is close to the Syrian regime, stated that the operation in Jisr Al-Shughour in Idlib province was a manifestation of "an established Qatari-Turkish-Saudi alliance in northern Syria... There is no need to ask whether Decisive Storm and the Saudi attack on Yemen would lead to similar action in Syria or not, because Decisive Storm is already a reality in northern Syria." The paper added that the formulation of the plan for the attack on northern Syria began in March 2015, and that the details were finalized when Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Naif visited Turkey on April 6, 2015.[14]

There are those in the National Coalition who likewise see the opposition forces' achievements in northern Syria as a manifestation of the Saudi-Turkish understandings. Thus, Syrian oppositionists told the liberal website Elaph about high-level Saudi-Turkish coordination in all domains, and said that the two sides were working towards a negotiated solution in Syria, which can only be achieved through military pressure on the regime. In their opinion, the recent opposition victories were one of the fruits of the Saudi-Turkish rapprochement, and Syrians would reap the benefits of this within six months.[15]

Decisive Storm also sparked hopes among the fighting forces on the ground. A high-ranking Free Syrian Army (FSA) officer told the London-based Qatari daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid that the fighting factions were preparing for a widespread military operation in Dera'a, southern Syria, after receiving promises that there would be Arab aerial support, or that at the very least the FSA would be equipped with anti-aircraft missiles.[16]









Syrian Regime Concerned

These reports and signs that a Decisive Storm-type operation is currently underway, or will soon be, have caused great concern in the Syrian regime, especially in light of recent strategic opposition victories and in light of the fact that Saudi Arabia did not merely issue threats on the Yemen issue, but followed through on them. A video published by the Saudi Al-Arabiya TV channel shows high-ranking military commander Suheil Al-Hassan, known as "the Tiger," speaking on the phone with President Assad and asking him to dispatch weapons to 800 of his troops so they can return to their posts, from which they had retreated.[17] Another expression of te regime's concern was Syrian Defense Minister Fahd Jassem Al-Freij's "unannounced" visit to Tehran on April 28, 2015. The Syrian daily Al-Watan, which is close to the regime, wrote, "The visit is taking place in the shadow of increasing Saudi hints at an attack on Syria similar to Decisive Storm."[18] At a Tehran press conference, Al-Freij said that Damascus and Tehran had agreed on "future steps in the war against the terrorists."[19] At a meeting with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Dehghan, the two ministers stressed that "Syria, Iran, and the resistance axis will not allow the enemies to attain their goals in the region and harm Syria and its steadfastness." He added that Iran would continue its unlimited support for and strategic relations with Syria and "will not allow anyone to harm the security, stability, and unity of the Syrian state."[20]

Al-Freij meeting in Tehran with Ali Shamkhani (Source: SANA News Agency, Syria, April 29, 2015)

In fact, the Syrian regime explicitly holds Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar responsible for the oppositionist military operation in northern Syria, as manifested in its recent diplomatic attack on them. An announcement by the Syrian Foreign Ministry to the UN Security Council stated: "Attacks by armed groups on areas in Idlib and other cities, with the support of the Turkish military, constitute a direct attack on Syria by Turkey." The regime demanded that the Security Council halt the attack, punish its perpetrators and supporters, and take steps against the Turkish government.[21] During a Syrian government meeting, Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu'allem said that "Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are responsible for the military escalation by armed terrorist organizations in most areas, especially Idlib, via the support they provide, that has Zionist-American sponsorship."[22]

Difficulties Of Yemen Operation, Egypt's Objections Reduce Chances Of Overt Decisive Storm-Type Operation In Syria









Some think that there is no basis for the assessments that Saudi Arabia and Turkey would carry out an overt Decisive Storm-type operation in Syria, because of the difficulties Saudi Arabia encountered in Yemen, and also because Egypt objects to such a move. This is not the first time that Al-Sisi's Egypt has taken a stance on the Syrian crisis that diverges from that of its Saudi ally. Egypt also opposed the international coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. Unlike the Saudis, Egypt has not defined Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad as illegitimate, and has stressed that it supports neither side. In fact, in recent months, there have been increasing signs that Egypt is working to promote a solution to the crisis that will include the Assad regime, as indicated by Mundhir Khaddam, an official in the oppositionist Syrian National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, who said: "Egypt cannot agree to a Decisive Storm against Syria... The Egyptian regime has told us and others that no solution in Syria can be possible without the [Assad] regime's involvement."[23]

* N. Mozes and E. Ezrahi are research fellows at MEMRI.

Endnotes: [1] Al-Watan (Syria), April 29, 2015.[2] Champress.net, April 28, 2015.[3] Syria-news.com, April 28, 2015.[4] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1149, The Formation Of A Sunni Arab Military Coalition – An Historic Shift In Facing Iranian Expansionism, March 30, 2015.[5] Huffingtonpost.com, April 12, 2015.[6] Twitter.com/Jkhashoggi, April 13, 2015.[7] Twitter.com/salman_alodah, April 26, 2015.[8] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), April 28, 2015.[9] Al-Hayat (London), April 28, 2015.[10] Al-Shara' (Lebanon), April 28, 2015.[11] A Salafi group and member of the Islamic Front, which mainly operates in the Damascus area and is considered one of the largest Islamist organizations combating the Assad regime.[12] Twitter.com/Jkhashoggi, April 20, 2015.[13] Twitter.com/Jkhashoggi, April 28, 2015.[14] Al-Safir (Lebanon), April 27, 2015.[15] Elaph.com, April 27, 2015.[16] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), April 28, 2015.[17] Alarabiya.net, April 30, 2015.[18] Al-Watan (Syria), April 29, 2015.[19] Tasnimnews.com, April 29, 2015.[20] Al-Watan (Syria), April 29, 2015.[21] Syria-news.com, April 28, 2015.[22] Champress.net, April 28, 2015.[23] Al-Watan (Syria), April 27, 2015.

Saudi Arabia training tribal ground force in Yemen – reportBuilding instability and forces to deal with at a later time. Nothing learned from history, C The forces in Yemen which Saudi Arabia is arming can turn jihadi, Baraka says, as they have some “traditional, Whabis, Islamic leanings,” which is the “main ideological, Islamic foundation for Al Qaeda.”

Published time: April 30, 2015 In order to break the stalemate in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has reportedly started training hundreds of Yemeni tribesmen to fight the Houthis on the ground, while Riyadh continues its bombardment campaign. “You cannot win a war against the Houthis


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from the air – you need to send ground forces in, but now there's a program to train tribal fighters on the border,” a Doha-based military source familiar with the matter told Reuters. According to another Yemeni official source, some 300 fighters have already managed to return to Yemen after getting Saudi training. They were allegedly send the Sirwah district in the central Marib province to battle Houthis in the area. According to the source the newly trained unit managed to push the rebels back. Saudi Arabia’s coalition spokesman failed to either confirm or deny the reports. “We always confirm that we are helping the resistance and the popular groups, the loyal army ... but we cannot go into details on where, how, how much,”Brigadier Ahmed Asseri said. The training received by the Yemeni tribesmen in Saudi Arabia allegedly includes light weapons and tactical advice knowledge. According to another Reuters source, the Kingdom plans to boost deployment of such units to fight the Houthis resistance. Rhiayad is reportedly gathering all tribal leaders loyal to the ousted president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who fled to Saudi Arabia, to unite their tribal forces against those of the Houthis. “Saudi Arabia wants to unite tribal leaders in this meeting but the feeling is that there's not much hope for that,” a Yemeni source in Riyadh told Reuters. Apparently the tribal delegations seem more concerned battling the jihadi elements in Yemen in addition to the Houthi opposition. “The Saudis have decided that they are going to intensify the unstable situation by providing arms to an oppositional group, a group that has been traditionally oppositional to the Houthis,” Ajamu Baraka, Middle East expert told RT. On the ground in Yemen, the Shiite Houthi fighting force and army units loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh are in control of central and southern areas. The fighting is ongoing on a number of major fronts. In Aden, the Houthis are engaging tribesmen who are supported by Saudi-led air forces. In Yemen’s third largest city, Taiz, Houthis are fighting the Sunni Islamist fighters. The Houthis and their allies have been also fighting both Islamists and local tribesman in Marib and in Shabwa provinces. The forces in Yemen which Saudi Arabia is arming can turn jihadi, Baraka says, as they have some “traditional, Whabis, Islamic leanings,” which is the “main ideological, Islamic foundation for Al Qaeda.” “The only force that is gaining as a consequence of this conflict is in fact Al-Qaeda,” he went on to stress. Meanwhile, the airstrikes continued throughout the country on Wednesday, targeting Houthi forces in Aden, Saada, Hajja, Taiz, Ibb and Bayda. The fighting in Yemen continues despite all sides of the conflict being willing to hold peace talks. “The Saudis have an objective which is connected to the interest of Israel which is basically to perpetuate the narrative that Houthis are the proxy force of Iran,” Baraka said, adding that such policy also suits Washington. Since the Saudi-led bombings started on March 26, more than 1,000 people, including an estimated 551 civilians have been killed, the United Nations said last week. UNICEF said at least 115 children were among the dead.

Yemeni air force MiG-21 fighters and a Mil Mi-17 helicopter are seen at an air base near Sanaa International Airport, March 28, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

Yemen air force falls into grip of Houthis

C: this is our worst nightmare, extremist getting control over regular military equipment and their manning, trick them into obeying orders.. Start thinking what AQSL plans; taking control over complete standing armies. It is not a pipedream anymore…



Author: Farea al-Muslimi Posted April 29, 2015 Two military aircraft took off on March 25 from Sanaa’s al-Daylami air base, which is under Houthi control, to launch an attack on the Yemeni president’s residence in the al-Maasheeq district of Aden. Hours after the operation, the Saudi-led military intervention began with multiple attacks that announced the start of Operation Decisive Storm. Though the operation officially came to an end 25 days later, airstrikes are continuing. The Yemeni air force, established in 1934, is the oldest military unit in Yemen. This is the first time, however, that the air force has been involved in a direct political conflict, and it is also the first time a party other than the Yemeni state has called on it. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his opponents relied on different forces in conflict situations in the past. The involvement of the Yemeni air force was not the only thing that provoked direct military intervention by Saudi Arabia. The fall of the most organized and efficient Yemeni military force into Houthi hands put millions of dollars of US military aid for the air force at their direct disposal. How did this happen, and what are the consequences of the fall of the Yemeni air force into the hands of militias?

Al-Monitor learned that in the days after President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s escape from the Houthis in Sanaa to Aden, the Houthis ordered the leader of the Yemeni air force, Maj. Gen. Rashid al-Jund, and his chief of staff Abdul Malik al-Zuhairi to prepare to launch different attacks on Marib governorate and on Hadi’s residence in Aden. In early March, the air force refused to obey the Houthis’ commands, saying that it only takes orders in these matters from the president or the minister of defense and that there was no military reason to take such a step. Consequently, the Houthis tightened the noose on the air force and brought in a leader who supports them: Brig. Gen. Khader Salem. They also forbade the former leaders, Jund and Zuhairi, from entering the base. This step was perhaps the most significant change in the balance of power in favor of the Houthis among the armed Yemeni parties and between them and the government. Air force members (especially pilots) undergo stringent and essential military training. Therefore, the Houthis could not use favoritism and loyalties to employ their pilots, as they did with those in other positions — when heads of the army and navy announced their loyalty to the Houthis in different governorates — because such tasks need specialized skills. They could not exploit the air force as easily as they wished. Most pilots refused to take orders from the Houthi leaders to launch military attacks on the president’s residence in Aden. Therefore, the Houthis had to use the carrot-and-stick approach. Air force sources told Al-Monitor that the first air raid by fighter planes from al-Dulaimi air base in Sanaa cost the Houthis more than 100 Glock guns and thousands of dollars paid to pilots to execute the operation.

The Houthis’ control over the air force did not happen overnight. It was the result of a series of careful attempts to control what was left of the army. Since they took over Sanaa in September 2014, the Houthis tightened the noose on military units affiliated with their longtime enemies, such as the 1st Armored Division once led by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. However, during the fall of Sanaa, the Houthis avoided involving other military forces, especially those that have been trained well, such as the air force. Instead, they sought influence in these military units by imposing on Hadi after the signing of the peace agreement in September to appoint their own. Under pressure from the Houthis, Hadi issued a Dec. 27 military decision to appoint several of their leaders — including one of their previous field leaders, Zakaria al-Shami — to Yemen’s armed forces. Al-Monitor learned that when the Houthis later wanted to use helicopters to film their religious rituals from the air, they received an official memorandum from Shami permitting military planes to fly. In the past, the command had refused this type of request, but Shami’s appointment as deputy commander in chief allowed him to give such orders.



The Houthis did not stand alone in their enmity with the Yemeni air force, which was the only force that gave the state the upper hand. Other Yemeni parties — such as Saleh and al-Qaeda, which had exerted a certain influence that did not reach the air force — were also at odds with it. In the past few years, up until mid-February, Yemen's air force was the only military unit that engaged in a direct war with al-Qaeda, which carried out assassinations claiming the lives of dozens of air force leaders and pilots. For instance, four air force helicopters crashed in Sanaa since the new leadership took power in 2012. Former air force Cmdr. Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar had refused to hand over control without international brokerage, which UN envoy Jamal Benomar handled in April of that year. In 2013, Ahmar told Al-Saeedah that his forces conducted over 800 aerial reconnaissance flights from Al-Anad air base in 2011-12, when al-Qaeda was in control of Abyan governorate in the south. In June 2012, during a visit by Al-Monitor to Brigade 21 Mika in Abyan, which remained in al-Qaeda’s control for almost a year, several soldiers said that the only air supplies they received were those dropped by Yemeni pilots. The aid dropped by the Saudi air force — which did not officially participate in the war against al-Qaeda — missed its target and fell in the hands of al-Qaeda, despite the advanced technology of the Saudi planes. The Houthis pushed the Yemeni air force into the current political conflict in Yemen, and this has not only led to military intervention but also damaged this military unit and its air bases and aircraft. For years, Saudi Arabia and the United States provided millions of dollars for the battle against al-Qaeda, which now no longer faces opposition from any other military unit with the collapse of the Yemeni air force. Al-Qaeda has given free rein to its members and operations to control highly significant regions, without any resistance. The takeover of Hadhramaut governorate on April 3 stands witness to this.


Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-Yemen-15

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