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Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-39-Caliphate- Khorasan-5

 Afghanistan's unstable security situation could be set to worsen with fears growing that Taliban defections to a small but growing ISIS franchise group may lead to further violence.  Following the Taliban's official confirmation of Mullah Omar's death, fears have started to grow that a ISIS franchise has the potential to pose a serious challenge to the jihadi group in Afganistan. ISIS's Khorasan branch (wilayat al-Khorasan) remains a small group of militants but it could now receive significant financial backing from ISIS with signs of Taliban instability.

Saturday, a Taliban spokesman told the BBC Mullah Mansour had not been appointed "by all Taliban", as not all members of the Afghan Taliban's Supreme Council had been consulted over his election. The council would hold a meeting in a few days to elect a new leader, spokesman Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, who is also Mullah Omar's brother, added. The Taliban's new emir is Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. His top two deputies are Moulavi Haibatullah Akhunzada and Siraj Haqqani. Both Mansour and Haqqani are allied with al Qaeda.

Islamic State spokesperson Abu Muhammad al Adnani announced the creation of Wilayat Khurasan - literally Khurasan Province in early 2015. These developments suggest that the Islamic State has found a receptive social and political environment in which to gain a foothold in the AfPak region, where several Taliban and al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups, both violent and non-violent, already have similar sectarian and caliphate-centric worldviews. -- C: Widespread confusion ensued. The press wondered aloud, “What is the Khorasan group?” It is a “new” terrorist organization, some reported. It is an “al Qaeda offshoot,” others claimed. All of the following descriptors were used of the group: “little-known,” “shadowy,” “mysterious,” “previously unknown.” And now in a possible effort to sail on the winds of the Khorasan group and attributing to the confusion Daesh (ISIS) is running a group with a near similar name Wilayat Khurasan. - C: Khurasan has historic significance in Islamic predictions, as I mentioned in previous papers. - You have heard of the Khorasan group before. It is, to put it simply, al Qaeda. Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of al Qaeda, ordered trusted operatives from Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, and North Africa to relocate to Syria. Some of the al Qaeda operatives involved are so notorious that US counterterrorism officials have tracked them, off and on, for more than a decade. Wilayat Khurasan is a naming used for a new province of Daesh it would like to establish in the Afg/Pak region: foremost it piggy backs on the previous mystery (AQ) groups, and adds to the confusion not at least to desperate groups on the ground that fall into the trap set by Daesh. -- The (AQ) Khorasan group, as first disclosed in September by The Associated Press, is comprised of veteran al-Qaeda operatives within the Nusra Front, the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate fighting the government of President Bashar Assad

Islamic State claims camp in Pakistan’s tribal areasBY BILL ROGGIO AND CALEB WEISS | August 3rd, 2015 | One photo of the purported camp in Pakistan

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A social media account linked to the Islamic State recently tweeted out two photos purporting to show a training camp in Pakistan’s northwest tribal areas. The images cannot be independently confirmed by The Long War Journal, however, the Islamic State’s Wilayat Khorasan [Khorasan Province], which operates in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is known to operate training camps right across the border in

Afghanistan.In one tweet, the Islamic State supporter said that a “Caravan of Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan.” It is not clear if the camp is located in North or South Waziristan, but the photos show the fighters in a heavily mountainous area, within a compound on the mountainside. The banner shown in the photos reads “Shahid Hakeemullah Mehsud camp, Islamic State.”The references to Baitullah Mehsud, the founder of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Hakeemullah Mehsud, the group’s previous emir, indicates that the Islamic State fighters in Waziristan likely defected from the Mehsud branch of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Both Baitullah and Hakeemullah were killed in US drone strikes.While the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province has absorbed disaffected members of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, it has yet to establish a permanent presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas. If the images released by the Islamic State supporter are legitimate, then the Khorasan province now has a foothold in Waziristan, the epicenter of al Qaeda’s base of support in Pakistan. The Islamic State has been in competition with al Qaeda for the mantle of leadership in the global jihad, and the establishment of the Khorasan Province is a direct threat to both al Qaeda and the Taliban.

C:  It is not the first that Daesh (ISIS) tries to sail on the AQ and others winds and although the dead of Omar is reported to create some turmoil – as usual in these environments - within a likely strategic move is previous to his dead set in motion, in a likely – but significant move we could argue if the next is the prelude of the strategic TB/ AQSL countermove, a look back:   16th of Aries 1375 AH (solar) i.e. 4th April 1996 AD is a momentous day in the history of our Muslim people. Nearly two decades ago on this same faithful day, one thousand and five hundred scholars, dignitaries and Jihadi leaders of Afghanistan approved Mullah Mohammad Umar ‘Mujahid’ as the leader of the Islamic Emirate, gave an oath of allegiance to him and conferred the title of ‘Amir-ul-Momineen’ on him i.e. leader of the pious believers.

In 1996 AD, when he was conferred with the title of ‘Ameer-ul-Momineen’ (i.e. the head of the pious believers), instead of showing excitement or jubilation, he bitterly wept as his shoulder sheet was completely soaked with his tears. At the end of that historical meeting, he told the Ulama present: “You are the inheritors of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and you have thrown a heavy responsibility upon my shoulders. In reality, you will be held responsible for my steadfastness as well as deviation from it. O our teachers and respected

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scholars! If I could not discharge this huge responsibility of the Muslim masses in a proper way or deviate from it, you will have to guide me towards the right path in the light of your knowledge. If the Taliban do make mistakes in the implementation of Sharia and you do not guide them knowingly, you will have to bear the responsibility on the Day of Judgment.” He is severely opposed to all heresy or heterodox opinions. He never likes sectional, ideological and factional differences among the Muslims. He always recommends and insists on Islamic and ideological unity and co-operations to his followers and all other Muslims as the ideological unification among the Muslims is the utmost demand of this crucial time. Following the path of our pious predecessors and leading scholars in the light of Quran and Hadith (i.e. the traditions of our Holy Prophet, peace be upon him) is considered the only path of salvation by him for the Muslim Umma. --- Afghan Taliban publish Mullah Omar biography C: the TB release of the biography of their leader and ‘Amir-ul-Momineen’has great significance. Foremost it could be seen as a silent claim, notification to those in doubt on the lead position within the Ummah, and as a direct countering the self declared (Daesh/ISIS) Caliph Ibrahim. The bio makes clear that Mullah Omar was , - contrary to Baghdadi who had a very small group around approved him -, given by one thousand and five hundred scholars, dignitaries and Jihadi leaders of Afghanistan the title and position of Amir-ul-Momineen’ i.e. leader of the pious believers. Afghanistan two decades ago was the centre place of the Muslim awakening and uprising and leading by that time. It is therefore of my opinion that although not direct mentioned this could well be the strategic indication that Mullah Omar is the rightfully owner of the title: Amir-ul-Momineen’i.e. the Muslim Ummah’s caliph. This silent calim brings

--"Whoever gave the pledge of allegiance to a man without consulting the Muslims, then he should not be given the pledge nor the one who gave him the pledge, lest they both should get killed" (reported by Imam al-Bukhari in his "Sahih")

See my : Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 4-1- TB-24- The cloak of the caliph

When oath of allegiance has been taken for two caliphs, kill the one for whom the oath was taken later. Hadith, Book 19, Number 4568: Narrated AbuSa'id al-Khudri: The Messenger of Allah said.

The Khorasan group, as first disclosed in September by The Associated Press, is comprised of veteran al-Qaeda operatives within the Nusra Front, the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate fighting the government of President Bashar Assad. Instead of battling Assad, Khorasan operatives are focused on planning attacks against the West, in part by fashioning nonmetallic bombs to place on airplanes and recruiting terrorists with Western passports who can slip past security, U.S. officials have said.

As long as many of the key Khorasan figures remain alive, the threat is undiminished, the officials say, because the militants were sent to Syria for the specific reason of attacking the United States and Europe.

Looking closely at the developments in the post-American/Nato drawdown, one gets an impression that Al-Khorasan has been launched by global vested interests to replace al-Qaeda for prolonging a more perfidious battle and violent terrorism in and around Afghanistan whose logical spillover will impact Pakistan, China and the periphery.  

Hence the challenge before Pakistan, Afghanistan and China as well as Iran and Central Asian countries with Russian influence, would be to ensure that there is no spillover into their territories from extra regional players.

There’s an article from the National Review written by Andrew McCarthy stating that the al-Qaeda (AQ) cell known as the Khorasan Group (KG) “doesn’t exist.” We

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disagree with that on the grounds that many of our staff have served in Afghanistan’s RC-E battle space and have personally been involved in intelligence operations regarding this organization.

C -- ”You’ll see that even as far back as 2009, the Khorasan Group had been involved in planning for attacks against Europe and the US, as seen in Long War Journal’s piece on AQ’s “Shadow Army,” or “Lashkar al-Zil,” which is part of the “Khorasan” umbrella”. --

‘Wilayat Khurasan’: Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 7April 3, 2015 By: Animesh Roul

Islamic State spokesperson Abu Muhammad al Adnani announced the creation of Wilayat Khurasan in early 2015 (screengrab).

Amid a series of government denials from Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the presence of the Islamic State militant group in these countries and its ongoing outreach activities there, its expansion was corroborated by none other than the Islamic State’s spokesperson, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, on January 26, 2015 (The Nation [Lahore] September 5, 2014; Dawn [Karachi], November 11, 2014; Pajhwok,

February 5). Al-Adnani, who is believed to be in Iraq or Syria, formally announced the establishment of Wilayat Khurasan (literally Khurasan Province, hereafter IS Khurasan), a reference to a historical region broadly centering on Afghanistan and Pakistan. This claim was made, in an audio statement entitled “Say, ‘Die In Your Rage,’” which was released by al-Furqan media foundation, one of the Islamic State’s media arms. [1] He also endorsed a former Taliban commander, Hafiz Saeed Khan, as its governor (wali) in the same speech. Khan had previously pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of the Islamic State, along with a network of other disgruntled Taliban commanders and foot soldiers. Previously, on January 10, in an indication of their growing extremism, Khan and his followers had released a video pledging allegiance to IS which also featured the beheading of a captive Pakistani soldier (Dunya News TV [Lahore] January 12). This was considered to be the Islamic State’s first violent action against the Pakistani state. Since then, two senior commanders of IS Khurasan have been killed in NATO-led actions in Afghanistan. The first to be eliminated, on February 9 in the Kajaki district of Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, was Abdul Rauf Khadim, the “deputy governor” of Khorasan (Express Tribune [Karachi], February 10). Khadim had previously rejected the Afghan Taliban movement under Mullah Omar for being too moderate and had preached Salafism in Afghanistan. A few weeks later, his successor, Hafiz Wahidi, was killed by Afghan national security forces in Helmand, along with nine other fellow Islamic State militants (Khaama Press, March 16). In response to these setbacks, IS Khurasan’s shura (leadership council), for now dominated by Pakistani Taliban members, quickly issued threats to avenge Khadim, eulogizing the slain leader. The 12-minute long homage video, released by “Khurasan Media” on March 17, featured a statement from Hafiz Saeed Khan entitled “Departure of Shaykh Khadim and Revenge is Coming.” [2] Sooner afterwards, on March 20, a deadly VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive device) attack on a Shi’a mosque in Karachi killed at least two people and left many injured. The attack was reportedly claimed by IS Khurasan?. [3]

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Afghanistan: Islamic Emirate vs. Caliphate ; These developments suggest that the Islamic State has found a conducive social and political environment in which to gain a foothold in the AfPak region, where several Taliban and al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups, both violent and non-violent, already have similar sectarian and caliphate-centric worldviews. Underlining this, before his death in February’s drone strike, Khadim was reportedly actively engaged in recruiting Afghan fighters for the Islamic State, mostly in the country’s Helmand region (IBTimes, January 14). This recruitment drive and open campaigning for IS apparently led to direct confrontations with the followers of local Taliban warlord Abdul Rahim Akhund, a supporter of Mullah Omar’s self-declared “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” At one point, as a result of these tensions, Khadim was even briefly apprehended for his pro-Islamic State activities along with his 45 followers by supporters of Mullah Omar (Afghan Zariza, February 1). In addition, Islamic State flags have been seen hoisted in Afghanistan’s Ghazni and Nimroz provinces, following which large numbers of Taliban fighters reportedly switched allegiance from Mullah Omar to al-Baghdadi (Khaama Press, February 1). Dabiq, the official Islamic State publication, further listed a number of alleged strongholds of support, including Nuristan, Kunar, Kandahar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Wardak, Kunduz, Logar and Nangarhar. [4] Furthermore, in January, information about an Islamic State training center in Afghanistan’s Farah province raised speculation about increasing Islamic State activities there (Pajhwok, January 14). Furthermore, other armed confrontations between the Islamic State and the Taliban underscores the increasing clout of IS Khurasan, especially in Charakh in Logar province where IS Khurasan militants killed Abdul Ghani, a senior Taliban commander loyal to Mullah Omar, and wounded his three associates in February (Pajhwok, February 2). That Islamic State influence is quickly gaining ground in Afghanistan, the current seat of famed Taliban Emirate led by Mullah Omar, is not necessarily surprising. For instance, al-Baghdadi’s public questioning of the spiritual and political credibility of the Taliban’s supreme leader, and description of him as “fool” and “illiterate warlord,” has certainly found some resonance in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have not been able to decisively consolidate their position after decades of struggle (Khaama Press, January 29). Footprints in Pakistan ; Before its existence was formally announced, IS Khurasan’s presence was felt across Pakistan in the form of occasional unfurling of the black flag, graffiti on the walls supporting the Caliphate and the appearance of Islamic State stickers, mostly in Karachi, Lahore and the Punjab city of Taxila in late 2014 (Dawn [Karachi], November 13, 2014; Dawn [Karachi], November 30, 2014). At around the same time, the provincial government of Balochistan uncovered massive Islamic State recruitment drives in Hangu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the Kurram tribal agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It also reportedly discovered secret official communications between long-established Pakistani militant Salafist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamat (ASWJ) and the Islamic State, which showed the groups planning attacks on military installations and government buildings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and on the region’s Shi’a minority (Dawn [Karachi], November 8, 2014). In addition, this January, the Pakistani security services arrested Yousaf al-Salafi, a Syrian of Pakistani origin, and his local associate Hafiz Tayyab in Lahore for allegedly recruiting youths and sending them abroad for jihad. Al-Salafi was reportedly involved in an Islamic State recruitment campaign and was charging the group about $600 for every person he recruited (Express Tribune [Karachi], January 28). In addition, leaflets and propaganda materials in support of the Islamic State have been distributed in several parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and South Waziristan. There have also been verbal endorsements from pro-Taliban clerics like Maulana Abdul Aziz, chief of

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Islamabad’s Red Mosque (Lal Masjid), which was the epicenter of anti-government violence in July 2007. However, the most brazen support came from women students and teachers of the Jamia-e-Hafsa madrassa, which is part of the Red Mosque and led by the principal of the seminary, Umme Hassan, who is Abdul Aziz’s wife (Kashmir Observer, December 8, 2014; Express Tribune [Karachi], December 14, 2014). The students of Jamia-e-Hafsa offered an oath of fealty to al-Baghdadi in late November of last year, and invited al-Baghdadi to “avenge” the 2007 Pakistan army raid and loss of life at the then-besieged Red Mosque. However, Umme Hassan maintained that they still considered Mullah Omar of the Afghan Taliban as their supreme leader. It should be noted that the Lal Masjid has been at the forefront in supporting al-Qaeda and Taliban causes in the region for over a decade. These developments suggest that similar oaths of allegiance from sectarian militant groups like Ansar ul-Khilafa wal Jihad (formerly, Tehrik-e-Khilafat Jihad) and Jundullah in support of the Islamic State and al-Baghdadi have made it relatively easy for the Islamic State to find traction and a foothold in Pakistan. These militant groups also remain active. For instance, in January, Ansar ul-Khilafa wal Jihad claimed responsibility for killing security personnel in Karachi, Multan and Hyderabad (ARY News, January 22). Jundullah meanwhile claimed responsibility for targeting Shi’a mosques across the country, including the deadly Shikarpur imambargah blast on January 30 (Dawn [Karachi], January 31). This indicates that it would likely be relatively easy for the Islamic State members working with these groups to begin conducting attacks of their own in Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, as with Afghanistan, Dabiq, has claimed that the Islamic State has influence in a number of places in Pakistan, including in Peshawar, Swat, Marwat, Kuki Khel, Tor Dara, Dir, Hangu, Bajaur, Orakzai, Kurram and Waziristan, although some of these claims should probably be seen as propaganda. [5]

Outlook ; The Islamic State’s formation of “Wilayat Khurasan” and its endorsement by the organization’s central leadership reveals at least two changing aspects of militant Islamism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Firstly, it shows militants rejecting al-Qaeda and Taliban, and secondly, for the first time in decades, it involves militants clearly rejecting Mullah Omar himself, the spiritual leader of most of the Deobandi-inspired militant groups in the region, and even openly challenging of him over his (alleged) lack of authority and lack of visible achievements in comparison to al Baghdadi and the Islamic State in the Middle East region. On the other hand, the emergence of IS Khurasan, combined with Pakistan’s ongoing anti-militant Operation Zarb-e-Azb, have encouraged fragmented Taliban units to unite once again under the Pakistani Taliban’s umbrella group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This was evidenced in mid-March when the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat ul-Ahrar (TTP-JA), a powerful splinter group of TTP, and independent militant group Tehrik-e-Lashkar-e-Islam (TLeI), led by Mangal Bagh, called for a united Taliban conglomerate to fight the Pakistani state, including the army and the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence. [6] Even though such a scenario seems distant at present, these anti-state objectives, which are partly shared by both the IS Khurasan and TTP groups, suggest a potential merging point between these two powerful jihadist movements in due course. Animesh Roul is the Executive Director of Research at the New Delhi-based Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict (SSPC). Notes 1. The full text (English Translation) of the Adnani Statement, released by al-Hayat Media Center, another Islamic State-linked jihadist media outlet, can be found here, https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2015/01/26/audio-statement-by-is-spokesman-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-say-die-in-your-rage/. 2. The video “The Departure of Shaykh Khadim, and Revenge is Coming,” which is in Pashto, can be found here: https://archive.org/details/KhadimPashto_201503. 3. Author's communication with an Islamabad-based journalist. Also see IS Khurasan’s statement on the March 20 Mosque attack (in Urdu), https://www.mnbr.info/vb/showthread.php?t=85734?. 4. “Dabiq: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy,” No. 7, p.34.

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5. Ibid. 6. See the group’s press release, “TTP-JA: Unity of Mujahideen of Pakistan,” http://worldanalysis.net/14/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ttpja.png.

Files:

TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue7_01.pdf

16 March, US unsure whether bombing has hurt al-Qaeda group in Syria - The U.S. military has hit as many as 17 separate targets connected to a shadowy al-Qaeda cell in Syria known as the Khorasan group, U.S. officials say, as part of a little-discussed air campaign aimed at disrupting the group's capacity to plot attacks against Western aviation.U.S. intelligence analysts disagree about whether the attacks have significantly diminished the group's capabilities, according to the officials, showing how difficult it has been to develop a clear picture of what is happening on the ground in Syria. American officials briefed on the matter agree that the air attacks have forced militants into hiding and made their use of cellphones, email or other modern communications extremely risky. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss classified assessments. There is some disagreement about how much the airstrikes have undermined the group's ability to pose an imminent threat, U.S. officials say. Some U.S. officials say the military believes the strikes have lowered the threat, while the CIA and other intelligence agencies emphasize that the group remains as capable as ever of attacking the West.

The Khorasan group, as first disclosed in September by The Associated Press, is comprised of veteran al-Qaeda operatives within the Nusra Front, the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate fighting the government of President Bashar Assad. Instead of battling Assad, Khorasan operatives are focused on planning attacks against the West, in part by fashioning nonmetallic bombs to place on airplanes and recruiting terrorists with Western passports who can slip past security, U.S. officials have said. Intelligence about Khorasan group plotting led the Transportation Security Administration in July to ban uncharged electronic devices on certain flights originating in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The U.S. first attacked the group 10 days after the AP story, with dozens of Tomahawk missiles fired off U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea targeting eight Khorasan sites. Army Lt. Gen. William Mayville, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the time that the attacks were ordered because the group was "nearing the execution phase of an attack either in Europe or the homeland." Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said they disrupted the group's plotting, but he did not know for how long. FBI Director James Comey said he believed the plots had not been stopped and that the Khorasan group's threat to the U.S. was undiminished. Other intelligence officials embraced Comey's view. Since then, the U.S. military has disclosed six other sets of strikes against the group, most recently on March 8, when bombers struck "a large tactical unit and destroyed four buildings and three tents," the military said. A strike in late February hit a Khorasan headquarters. It's unclear whether group leaders were killed in the strikes. American officials have not said who has been hit." Although coalition airstrikes have killed a number of senior Khorasan group members, the group almost certainly will maintain the intent to continue plotting against Western interests unless completely destroyed," Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers on Feb. 20.Two U.S. officials familiar with the military's view said they believe the strikes have affected the group and reduced the imminent threat of an attack. One reason, an official said: The absence of intelligence that would lead the U.S. to believe the Khorasan group is actively planning a strike, unlike the clear indications intelligence officials were seeing before the start

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of the bombing campaign last year. U.S. officials familiar with assessments by civilian intelligence agencies do not dispute that, but they interpret it differently. As long as many of the key Khorasan figures remain alive, the threat is undiminished, the officials say, because the militants were sent to Syria for the specific reason of attacking the United States and Europe. U.S. officials now believe that an important member of the group, David Drugeon, survived a November airstrike. The French-born Drugeon is believed to be knowledgeable about explosives, U.S. officials have said. Some experts believe the group is led by Muhsin al-Fadhli, a Kuwaiti long wanted by the U.S. government. He was reported killed in a September attack, but U.S. officials now say they are not sure whether he is dead or alive. (***) - See more at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/16/us-unsure-whether-bombing-has-hurt-al-Qaeda-group-syria.html#sthash.PoDSLvOl.dpuf

Al-Khorasan launched to replace al-Qaeda?  Mian Saifur Rehman Friday, March 06, 2015 Looking closely at the developments in the post-American/Nato drawdown, one gets an impression that Al-Khorasan has been launched by global vested interests to replace al-Qaeda for prolonging a more perfidious battle and violent terrorism in and around Afghanistan whose logical spillover will impact Pakistan, China and the periphery.   These views were expressed by academicians and analysts Muhammad Saeed and Muhammad Hafeez while talking with The News.

 The two analysts went on to explain Al-Khorasan and said, “This (al-Khorasan) is an IS outfit for Afghanistan and the adjoining region. Coincidentally, with the impending drawdown of American forces in Afghanistan, the IS has also ‘announced’ its organisational structure in Afghanistan by naming this extension as al-Khorasan (Khorasan theoretically includes Iran and Central Asia, in addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan), although its commitment is confined at present to certain Arab and African countries. Of course this proclamation suffices to mean more nuisance in the region.

 In view of this imminent but predictably overplayed threat of IS arrival and the anticipated antagonist posture towards Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, these three countries have showed their willingness to carry out active and defensive counter-terrorism cooperation with the international community under principles of UN charter and other basic norms governing international relations to preserve regional as well as global peace, stability and security. The three have in fact embarked upon an arduous journey but objective of the journey is to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan and its surroundings.

 China, in this particular case, has shown extra concern for the security environment in the region with greater focus on Pakistan’s solidarity and stability. Beijing, through its foreign ministry, has consistently maintained at regional and international channels that Pakistan has remained the major victim of terrorism. America has also most of the time acknowledged the contribution of Pakistan for playing an imperative role as a non-NATO ally in war on terror yet has frequently been pushing the country for doing more to a level of bitterness. As regards the Chinese leadership at all levels, it possesses the logical wisdom about subsistence and root

causes of extremism and terrorism in the region as well as within their territory. It is because of this reason that they have adopted a reasonable standpoint of showing concerns with Pakistan as well as other countries with a sincere view to overcome the issue. Pakistan in turn has

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constantly responded to China with the same esteem to defeat violent extremism in its true perspective.” The analysts are also quite concerned about the reports (which though still fall short of complete confirmation) about fresh recruitment and positioning especially in the wake of several radicals taking a liking for the sprouting IS particularly in the liberal Western countries as well as from other former European colonies, as is evident from the increased incidents in certain European countries to include France. They opine, “The kind of jihad marketing that the stage-managed IS has done in other regions of West’s interest would attract many more unerringly similar to the CIA’s operation of hoarding them together after recruitment for pouring into Afghanistan during Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan down the history. Drum beating of IS footprints in Pakistan and Afghanistan is on the increase and likely to catch further impetus in the Indian as well as Western media. In this context Indian and British newspapers while quoting Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim of Afghan spy agency and British journalist John Cantlie, have even mentioned incidents substantiating the presence and recruitment spree of ‘black flags flying IS’ in far-flung areas like Gilgit-Baltistan of Pakistan and Helmand of Afghanistan. Control over or fomenting trouble in Gilgit-Baltistan, which is immediate neighbour of China and also means of critical access to the water resources, precious gems and trans-Asian trade between Pakistan, China and Central Asia besides access to warm waters, by such radicals will be beneficial for extra regional players rather than regional countries. Hence the challenge before Pakistan, Afghanistan and China as well as Iran and Central Asian countries with Russian influence, would be to ensure that there is no spillover into their territories from extra regional players. Interestingly in the same context EU foreign ministers have recently pledged to counter “radical Muslims” returning from Syria and Iraq with a better strategy at home and abroad. This ministerial level meeting was to lay the groundwork for a string of meetings that culminated into an EU leaders’ summit during mid February 2015 in Brussels that has set out the EU strategy to deal with what they term “the Muslim (not specifically IS) extremism”. Indian and Israeli inclusion in the EU’s strategy was also an integral part while the US was overarching.  China, Pakistan and other countries including Russia and certain non-aligned countries across the globe must anticipate radical changes in the US and EU policies specific to bilateral agreements on extradition treaties or exchange of criminals in foreseeable future. These efforts in most of the cases may be aimed at extraditing legally or exporting illegally the radicals and criminals to disturb the countries of interest in line with the “improved strategy” to deal with ‘Muslim radicals’ and terrorism. More attacks, preferably lone wolf, on EU countries and more caricature type arm twists to perpetuate the breeding ground for radicals may also be expected in future.  Against the backdrop of newly emerging reconciliation and peace and security initiatives collectively started by Pakistan, China and Afghanistan, the current Afghan unity government led by President Ashraf Ghani, without compromising on the core interests of his country, has arranged arrest and handing over of several Uighur militants from China’s west in recognition of the sincere peace and reconciliation efforts of China in addition to seeking tangible cooperation for rebuilding Afghanistan that has repeatedly been ravaged for the last several decades.

 On Tuesday, Sept. 23, 2014 the US government announced that a new bombing campaign was under way in Syria. The Obama administration had been building the case for airstrikes for weeks. The president and his surrogates repeatedly highlighted the threat posed by the Islamic State (often called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL), which has

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captured large swaths of territory across Iraq and Syria. Unexpectedly, the administration announced that American missiles had also struck something called the “Khorasan group1,” which was in the final stages of planning attacks in the West. The group may even have been close to striking inside the United States.

ABOVE, MUHSIN AL FADHLI; BELOW, A SEPTEMBER 23 BOMBING RUNNEWSCOMWidespread confusion ensued. The press wondered aloud, “What is the Khorasan group?” It is a “new” terrorist organization, some reported. It is an “al Qaeda offshoot,” others claimed. All of the following descriptors were used of the group: “little-known,” “shadowy,” “mysterious,” “previously unknown.” But you have heard of the Khorasan group before. It is, to put it simply, al Qaeda. Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of al Qaeda, ordered trusted operatives from Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, and North Africa to relocate to Syria. Some of the al Qaeda operatives involved are so notorious that US counterterrorism officials have tracked them, off and on, for more than a decade.

Early Nov 2014, “They’re kind of like the links to al-Qaeda as we know it," Rick Nelson, a former head of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Mashable. “Al-Qaeda core, even if they’ve been pretty much decimated, they’re still the 'A' team. They have the most experience, they have significant ties, they have capable bomb-makers.” The United States has said it has targeted the "Khorasan Group" in Syria, which it describes as a grouping of al Qaeda veterans under the protection of Nusra Front. Most analysts and activists do not differentiate between the groups in this way. Abu Yusuf al-Turki of al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, was said by the United States to have belonged to the so-called Khorasan Group, an allegedly secret al Qaeda cell that was planning attacks on Western targets. However, video and other reports from pro-jihadi groups described. Turki not as a shadowy figure but as an elite sniper who ran a sniper training facility in Aleppo province. A Turkey-based pro-Jabhat al-Nusra website, Ummet-i Islam, said that al-Turki had previously fought in Afghanistan.

The History and Capabilities of The Khorasan Group, September 28, 2014 by lburt ISIS Study Group, Sep. 27, 2014:

There’s an article from the National Review written by Andrew McCarthy stating that the al-Qaeda (AQ) cell known as the Khorasan Group (KG) “doesn’t exist.” We disagree with that on the grounds that many of our staff have served in Afghanistan’s RC-E battle space and have personally been involved in intelligence operations regarding this organization. Hundreds of other 35-series personnel and 18Fs have deployed to this part of Afghanistan and

have been tracking the group since they first started to pop up in reporting in 2010 – not 2013 as Mr. McCarthy alleged.

The Khorasan Group Does Not Exist2 - This group is very much real, although their numbers are small with reporting that suggest their strength is between 50-100 personnel. KG started out as an intelligence apparatus for AQSL (Al Qaeda Senior Leadership) tasked with identifying individuals in the local populace suspected of being an asset for western intelligence services – even individuals within the AQ and Taliban ranks have been targeted if they were deemed “suspect.” This is made possible through the deep ties they’ve cultivated

1 CRS Insights, The "Khorasan Group" in Syria http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IN10155.pdf2 http://www.nationalreview.com/article/388990/khorosan-group-does-not-exist-andrew-c-mccarthy

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with the local tribes on both the Afghan and Pakistani sides of the border. It’s been implied that they may have a separate HUMINT network in the Middle East from members of the group that are of Arab ethnicity. They eventually evolved into a special operations entity that refined IED TTPs (Techniques, Tactics and Procedures) for use in complex attacks.

In fact, they reportedly trained the Taliban on the construction and implementation of 200-400 lbs explosive devices. That’s one of the reasons the Taliban (and Haqqani Network) became more effective in the P2K region, (Paktiya, Paktika and Khost Provinces) which was one of the primary areas KG operates in. Nangahar and Konar are other areas that have seen reporting of KG activity. They’re greatest success has come in the form of performing a supporting role in joint operations with other jihadist groups such as the Haqqani Network (HQN) and Taliban (to include Pakistani Taliban or “TTP” [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan]-not to be confused with Tactics, Techniques and Procedures). Despite the reporting we’ve seen throughout RC-E (Regional Command-East), the group was never very successful in their attempts at launching high-profile attacks themselves. Even with the assassinations, most of the incidents proved to have been the work of others. They’re a great support element, but as the main attraction? Not so much. Indeed, we’ve been seeing open source reporting for some time on them over the years, although sporadic. It comes down to the American MSM not paying attention until the US government finally started talking about them sending personnel to Syria. Another thing to consider is that this particular AQ cell are supposed to be the “executioners,” so it shouldn’t surprise anybody that they’re not into propaganda videos.

Truth is they’ve been sending personnel to Syria since last year for the purpose of assisting al-Nusra in identifying potential defectors to the Islamic State (IS) or western intelligence assets. They’re secondary task was to assist in the training of al-Nusra personnel on the above-mentioned TTPs in IEDs and executing complex attacks. At no time was this cell ever “absorbed” into al-Nusra. They remain to this day a separate entity that reports to the senior leadership in Pakistan. It’s also important to note that this small cell is currently spread thin throughout Syria and the AF/PAK region. They’re in Syria to help identify the intelligence leaks and potential defectors to IS. In the AF/PAK region, they’re tasked with countering IS efforts at establishing a foothold in South Asia – which is AQSL’s back yard. The fact that the KG contingent sent to Syria is also reported to have experienced some defections themselves to IS has only further degraded their capabilities.

The recent AQIS (Al Qaeda in South Asia) hijacking of the Pakistani warship – which in itself was an extremely bold operation – is an indicator of resources and personnel being stretched thin. AQ remains a viable threat to the American people, but KG is primarily a threat to US military personnel stationed in Iraq or Afghanistan. As stated previously, this group is not an “imminent threat” to the American people living inside the US. All the over hyping of the group that’s coming out of the Obama administration is the result of lazy analysis, failure to listen to the analysts on the ground and for simply being in over their heads. Remember, most of the people placed in DoS (Department of State) and in key positions in the Intelligence Community don’t have much experience outside of academia or whatever politically appointed position they had previously.

US Government: Syria-based al-Qaeda Cell Bigger Threat Than ISIS

September 14, 2014 / ISIS Study Group / Very interesting reporting that has come out recently where the US government states that an al-Qaeda (AQ) cell known as the “Khorasan

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Group” is a bigger threat to US national security than the Islamic State (IS). The Khorasan Group is an AQ faction consisting of veteran fighters who saw action in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and Iraq (to name a few) that were sent to Syria to reinforce Jabhat al-Nusra in their campaign against the Assad regime in addition to bolstering the recruitment of westerners for OPs in their homelands. What’s interesting here is that despite the US government’s claims, the Khorasan Group isn’t “new,” and had been around for several years. In fact, a few of our staff had tracked this entity during their time in Afghanistan, and quite honestly the group wasn’t particularly effective. This is not to say they’re not a threat, but to say they’re a “more imminent threat” to US national security compared to IS is dangerously naive and speaks volumes on the general lack of expertise found in the national Security Council and three-letter agencies in the counter-terrorism arena. U.S. officials - 3: Al-Qaeda’s Syrian cell more of a threat than ISIS Indeed, the group has been very active over the years, but wasn’t particularly so in Afghanistan. Still, the group’s technical prowess in IED construction and assassination operations is widely considered to be among the most feared in the Sunni jihadist community. With that said, the group had actually experienced a split earlier in the year with a number of the organization pledging the bayat to Baghdadi and IS – which is something the US government officials such as Marie Harf should be tracking. But they’re not. The “Khorasan” is a region that encompasses large areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran and India. The Swat Valley, where the Taliban has a strong presence, is considered part of this region. This region is considered by jihadis to be the place where they will inflict the first defeat against their enemies in the Muslim version of “armageddon.” The final battle is to take place in the Levant, you know – Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Mention of “Khorasan” has been increasing in AQ’s propaganda since 2009. You’ll see that even as far back as 2009, the Khorasan Group had been involved in planning for attacks against Europe and the US, as seen in Long War Journal’s piece on AQ’s “Shadow Army,” or “Lashkar al-Zil,” which is part of the “Khorasan” umbrella.

Regards Cees.

Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan

March 19, 2015 Author(s): Don Rassler In March 2014, nine members of al-Qa`ida, who were active with the group in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, defected to the group that now calls itself the “Islamic State.”[1] The defections took place months before the Islamic State formally announced its Caliphate and at that time little public attention was given to the shift in allegiances of those al-Qa`ida men, despite one of them being the brother of famed jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.[2] The defections, at the time, seemed more like an outlier, but in hindsight they were an early sign of broader developments affecting Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s militant landscapes. The Islamic State’s formal declaration of its “Khorasan” chapter in January 2015 is another indicator of the changes that are taking place. These changes are being pushed by what currently appears to be a fairly loosely configured, but noteworthy, network of groups and individuals who are trying to alter the direction of South and Central Asia’s multiple jihads. This article provides an overview, to the extent possible given the evolving and dynamic nature of this problem set, of the network of actors who are currently supporting the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK) in Afghanistan and Pakistan and are present there.[3] It concludes with an analysis of the opportunities and limitations that are likely to affect the actions and survivability of ISK over the short- to mid-term.

3 http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_26528393/u-s-officials-al-qaedas-syrian-cell-more

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The Early Development of the Islamic State in Khorasan NetworkDefining the ISK network is a difficult task. The network is dynamic and changes occur weekly, if not more frequently. The creation, spread, and development of the ISK network is also clouded in rumor and speculation, fanned by informational wars being waged by Islamic State supporters, the Afghan and Pakistani government, and their respective agents. The number of militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the diversity of their agendas, and the shifting and at times unclear nature of their allegiances often obscures things even further. Thus, what follows is an attempt to describe the contours of the ISK network in Afghanistan and Pakistan as it currently exists. It does not claim to be comprehensive.

The Recognized A useful starting point are those individuals and groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan who have publicly pledged bay`a to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State’s self-described “Caliph,” and whose pledge has been officially recognized by the Islamic State. The individual appointed in January 2015 as ISK’s leader is Hafiz Khan Saeed, a former Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) commander responsible for that group’s operations in Orakzai, an agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that is very close to the important city of Peshawar.[4] After the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, Khan Saeed was also considered a front-runner–along with Maulana Fazlullah, then the TTP head for Malakand–to replace the deceased TTP leader. Fazlullah, as is well known, won out and assumed the TTP’s leadership position in November 2013. Close to one year later, in October 2014, Khan Saeed and four other prominent TTP commanders, as well as the group’s main spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, left TTP and pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State.

The other commanders who did so at the time were “Hafiz Quran Daulat, TTP chief in Kurram Agency; Gul Zaman, TTP chief in Khyber Agency; Mufti Hassan, TTP chief in Peshawar; and Khalid Mansoor, the TTP chief in the Hangu district.”[5] These were significant losses for the TTP, and a win for the Islamic State, as in one fell swoop al-Baghdadi’s group gained the allegiance of the individuals the TTP had designated to control the central FATA, a strategic block of land that stretches from the settled city of Peshawar to the Khyber pass and the immediate areas surrounding it.

Then on January 10, 2015, presaging things to come, these six individuals appeared in a video where they again pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This time they were also joined by an expanded network of individuals, all of whom pledged bay`a to the Islamic State’s leader. This group included Saad Emirati, a former Taliban commander allegedly active in Afghanistan’s Logar Province; Ubaidah al-Peshwari, leader of the al-Tawhid and Jihad Group in Peshawar; the Deputy to Sheikh Abd al-Qadir al-Khorasani;[6] Sheikh Muhsin, a commander from Afghanistan’s Kunar province; Talha, a commander from Lakki Marwat; and Omar al-Mansur, from Pakistan’s infamous Lal Masjid (Red Mosque).[7]

According to the statement, an even broader network of groups–which ranges from the Qambar Khel tribe in Khyber and the Hudhayfah group in Dir to Qari Harun’s group in Kunar province–have also pledged their support for Hafiz Khan Saeed and his position as the Amir of the mujahideen of Khorasan.[8] Less than one week after the release of the video, the ranks of Khan Saeed’s group in Pakistan were also bolstered by “50 hardcore militants of the Amr Bil Maroof group, led by Commanders Haya Khan and Waheed Khan,” from Khyber joining.[9] Then on January 26 the Islamic State’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, released a statement in which he formally announced the creation of ISK with Hafiz Khan Saeed serving as its leader. Unfortunately, despite these pronouncements and recent arrests of several alleged Islamic State members in Lahore, and the death of another one in Karachi, not much is known about ISK’s activities in Pakistan or its capabilities.[10] The same can be said for the linkages between ISK elements in Pakistan and the Islamic State, as well as South Asian foreign fighters who are operating on behalf of al-Baghdadi’s group in Syria and Iraq.

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ISK also claims a presence in Afghanistan–even if small and somewhat developmental–in what analysts are describing as a toe-hold for the group in the country.[11] The leadership of ISK’s Afghanistan cell consists of a handful of commanders, some of whom, like Saad Emirati, have known operational experience, but who also appear to have never really fit in with the Taliban or were ousted from it. The individual initially assigned as ISK’s deputy leader in the Khorasan region was former Guantanamo Bay detainee Abdul Rauf Khadim, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in southern Afghanistan shortly after the Islamic State announced ISK’s formation.[12]

There is limited information about ISK’s presence in other parts of Afghanistan. Another former Guantanamo detainee, Abdul Rahim Muslimdost, is reportedly serving as a representative of the group in Kunar and Nuristan, but other accounts suggest that Muslimdost is only based in Pakistan.[13] ISK itself claims that it also has a presence in Kunar, Nuristan, Logar and Nangahar provinces through individual commanders loyal to its group, although it is unclear how active or large these groups are, or what kind of capabilities they have. There also appears to be an Islamic State-linked group active in Farah province, led by two brothers, Abdul Malek and Abdul Razeq.[14] As noted by researcher Borhan Osman, the challenges ISK has faced in setting up shop in Afghanistan are best reflected by the fact that “so far no influential personalities, with an actual presence on the ground, have emerged in the east,” a presence which will be key to bridging the Afghan and Pakistani components of ISK’s network.[15] That isn’t to say that there aren’t potential opportunities or that this will not change. One interesting note also raised by Borhan Osman is that: “According to an aide to [Abdul Rauf] Khadem, Mansur Dadullah, the brother of the fearsome Taleban commander Mullah Dadullah, had also pledged allegiance to Saeed Khan and had been in contact with the late Khadem. Mansur, who inherited his brother’s network after the killing of Dadullah in 2007, was dismissed by the Afghan Taleban’s leadership for his defiance soon after he succeeded his brother.”[16] If this claim is true, and Mansur Dadullah were to openly side with ISK, it would give their Afghan efforts added steam.

The Extenders: Other Pledges and Noteworthy Expressions of SupportThe ranks of the ISK network are bolstered by a second category of groups and individuals who have also publicly pledged bay`a to al-Baghdadi, but whose bay`a has yet to be officially acknowledged or accepted by the Islamic State’s leadership. At this point these entities are best understood as self-affiliated actors who extend the reach, influence and capabilities of the Islamic State.

Ansar-ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad. The first Pakistan-based organization to publically pledge bay`a to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi after he announced the creation of the Caliphate is Ansar-ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad (Helpers of the Caliphate and Jihad, or AKWJ). The group, which was formerly known as Tehrik-e-Khilafat-o-Jihad (Movement for the Caliphate and Jihad), initially pledged bay`a to al-Baghdadi in July 2014, and then did so again that September.[17] This second pledge was then followed in January 2015 by a public bay`a pledge which AKWJ offered to ISK leader Hafiz Khan Saeed.[18] While not much is known about the group, it claims to have conducted a number of small-scale operations in Hyderabad and Karachi since at least May 2014. These attacks targeted police and prison officials, a lawyer defending an alleged blasphemer, and Shi`a mosques.[19] According to AKWJ, its recent round of operations in Fall 2014 were designed “for the purpose of helping the caliphate, but…also to avenge the killings of hundreds of mujahideen who were taken out of their prisons and torture cells in the darkness of the night in recent days and killed under the false pretense of having been killed in fake police encounters, in various areas of Karachi and Khyber Agency….”[20]

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A November 2012 video released by AKWJ hints at more things to come, as the video privileges a quote made by Islamic State spokesperson al-Adnani, in which he calls upon Muslims to act individually and to “dedicate your efforts to killing an American or a French infidel, or any of their ‘allies.’”[21] While it is possible these claims could be just bluster or propagandistic opportunism, AKWJ’s decision to highlight this statement could also be a hint that this small but active group could expand its target set in the near future, most likely by targeting foreigners in Pakistan.

Pakistani Jundullah. A second Pakistan-based entity that has reportedly pledged public bay`a to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the TTP splinter group Jundullah.[22] Details about the alleged bay`a are slim. Despite the existence of several Pakistani press articles on Jundullah’s pledge, the author was only able to find an unofficial statement released on November 19, 2014 by Shumukh forum member Muhib Hakimullah Mehsud, which claims that Jundullah has officially pledged itself to al-Baghdadi.[23] A Pakistani press article released one week earlier referenced a statement made by Jundullah’s spokesman, claiming that an Islamic State delegation recently met with Jundullah leaders in Baluchistan province to discuss ways to “unite various Pakistani militant groups.”[24] These reports have not been confirmed elsewhere and, like AKWJ’s pledge, the bay`a offered by Jundullah has yet to be publicly acknowledged by the the Islamic State.  While Jundullah does not appear to be a strong actor, the group has targeted Shi`a shrines in Sindh and polio workers in Quetta, illustrating that Jundullah possesses some limited capabilities and geographic reach.[25]

Representatives of Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa. The creation of ISK has been given an additional symbolic boost by controversial cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz, the leader of Pakistan’s infamous Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and the brother of Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who died at the complex in 2007 after it was raided by the Pakistani military.[26] The Lal Masjid complex, which includes a female seminary named Jamia Hafsa, is highly symbolic for many of Pakistan’s jihadist groups. The Pakistani government’s operation to gain control of the facility is viewed by entities like the TTP as a central, if not the central, turning point in their war against the state.[27] Since 2007 Lal Masjid has become an iconic symbol for many local jihadists of Pakistan’s overreach and, given the stand made by those holed up at that facility, of resistance. As a result, the facility has been used by many Pakistan-based militants as a central image around which to craft their anti-state propaganda.

All of that is to say that the symbol of Lal Masjid, at least as a key jihadist reference point, matters–and that the activity of its leader, Abdul Aziz, matters to TTP-affiliated networks as well. When asked about his views on the Islamic State in an interview during the summer of 2014, Abdul Aziz offered the following: “We want a caliphate across the whole world, including Pakistan. The caliphate is the solution to the problems [sic]. These arab mujahideen have started the process of creating a caliphate, and we think this is good news for the Muslim Ummah. God willing, if their order continues, we will see it flourish all over the world.”[28] This statement was followed in November 2014 when a collection of female students from Jamia Hafsa released a video supportive of the Islamic State, which Abdul Aziz has publically defended.[29] While Abdul Aziz himself is not a barometer of change, he is a key touch point on the dynamics of Sunni militancy in Pakistan, and so his public embrace of the Islamic State is an important indicator.

Groups Playing the Middle ISK is also benefiting from another category of groups who have not publicly pledged bay`a to al-Baghdadi, but whose key members are openly supportive of the Islamic State and appear to be taking steps to provide indirect support to the Islamic State’s agenda. These types of groups are typified by Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA), a TTP splinter faction which announced in mid March 2015 that it plans to re-merge with the main TTP faction led by Mullah Fazlullah.[30] While JuA has not pledged bay`a to al-Baghdadi,

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and Fazlullah’s faction has remained outwardly loyal to Mullah Omar, the behavior of JuA is best characterized as being both hedging and opportunistic.[31] As the group has been walking a fine line between maintaining the status quo (i.e. support for Mullah Omar), while also praising the Islamic State and mirroring its messaging and content.

The title of the group’s English language magazine Ihya-e-Khilafat, and its content reflects how the group has been positioning itself. The most recent (2nd issue) of Ihya-e-Khilafat features several articles that reference the creation of a Caliphate, including one that calls for the spread of the Caliphate to Pakistan. Perhaps most telling though is the language used in that issue’s opening editorial, which states: “On the other hand good news have started to come…. Caliphate had [sic] been announced in Iraq and Syria under the leadership of Khalifah Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi HA and brave mujahidin of Islamic Emirate led by Mullah Muhammad Omar HA are giving strong blows to the fleeing Crusaders and local hirelings.”[32] Here JuA has made an editorial decision to identify Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph, while not using a similar honorific title – Emir al-Mu’minin – to describe Mullah Omar.[33] It is also worth noting that the editor of Ihya-e-Khilafat is believed to be a former member of Pakistan’s military who, before joining JuA, tried to join the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.[34]

Sunni Sectarian Outfits    Lastly, there have also been rumors and unconfirmed speculation about the potential allegiance of other groups, particularly Pakistan’s sectarian outfits, which are predominantly anti-Shi`a in orientation. For example, according to a militant with knowledge of Islamic State negotiations with Pakistani militant groups, “All anti-Shi`a groups in Pakistan will welcome and support the Islamic State in Pakistan, though most of them will not announce it openly due to their allegiance to Mullah Omar.”[35] Further, a report reportedly sent to Islamabad by the Home and Tribal Affairs Department of Baluchistan, claims that “Daish [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State] has offered some elements of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wai Jamat (ASWJ) to join hands in Pakistan.”[36] At this point these reports are just rumors. Given the sectarian orientation of the Islamic State, there is likely synergy and shared interest between the Islamic State, LeJ, SSP and ASWJ. But just because they have shared interests does not mean that they will openly collaborate.

Conclusion: Obstacles and Opportunities The two primary challenges that ISK faces over the short-term is surviving and maintaining momentum, as the visibility and popularity the group currently enjoys will not have staying power unless it is able to make gains and be more than just a talking head. Operations a steady supply of resources will be necessary to keep the movement alive and motivated, but the potential long-term staying power of the group lies in the ideological domain, and its ability to convince others that those who currently “own” Asia’s jihads are corrupt. There are many significant obstacles on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border that plague ISK’s path–and provide opportunities that might aid its success.

West of the Durand Line in Afghanistan, ISK faces a less fractured militant landscape, and a military entity, the Afghan Taliban, that actually holds territory and has institutional experience governing. The Afghan Taliban has faced threats from ISK-like defectors, who were disgruntled by their dealings with the Taliban’s leadership and the lack of progress. And it apparently has dealt with them rather swiftly.[37] Further, if the Afghan Taliban has proven anything over the last decade, it is that it is resilient, is militarily effective, has operational staying power, and can withstand exogenous shocks. All of that means that it is going to take more than just a relatively small ISK network, which up until this point has remained untested, to go militarily toe-to-toe with the Taliban for any extended period of time. There is also the issue of whether certain segments of Afghan’s public will even support an entity as radical and brutal as ISK, which seems unlikely. In addition, as the targeting and recent death

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of ISK Deputy Abdul Rauf Khadim illustrates, the continued presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will likely complicate ISK’s staying power in Afghanistan.

All of this has led many analysts to speculate or conclude that ISK’s chances of making in-roads in Afghanistan and eventually out-competing the Taliban are slim to none. This is certainly the safe bet to make. Yet, such a view does little to account for the wild card factor and it is predicated on several unknowns. For example, while the Afghan Taliban is good at publically projecting a united front, not much is known about who within the Taliban is also disgruntled, frustrated by progress, and might also desire something new. There are also the issues and questions that Islamic State supporters have raised about the state of Mullah Omar, and concerns about his life status and ability to publically lead; concerns which are also shared by the author. Thus, while the Afghan Taliban’s grip on the Afghan jihad seems firm, ISK has been smart to sow speculation about the Taliban’s own leader and to try and puncture the invincibility of the Taliban by attacking the central figure or symbol that ties that movement together. The Afghan Taliban will need to respond with clear evidence to these charges, as if it does not, ISK might have planted the seeds of that movement’s unraveling, or at least evolution. As the newcomer, ISK in Afghanistan faces an uphill road and the odds are not in its favor. But, just as it might be easy to write ISK in Afghanistan off, what we do not know is how quickly momentum and allegiances might shift.

East of the Durand Line, ISK faces a different Pakistani military than the one that existed in 2007, when the TTP was formally announced. Given what it has suffered, what it appears to have learned from its more recent dealings with the TTP, and how ISK’s supporters are trying to undercut and delegitimize Pakistan’s more reliable jihadi proxies, the Pakistani military is more inclined and has more incentives to go after ISK leaders, and to do so quickly. The Pakistani military’s primary challenges, however, will be overcoming some perpetual problems. Specifically, how it conducts operations in the tribal areas and in bridging the gap between the Army’s ability to “clear” an area to responsibly “hold” it over time, and do so in a way that is viewed as acceptable to locals without fostering additional anti-state activity. These are tall orders and over the mid-term could created additional opportunities for ISK to exploit, and to revive and to interject new life blood into their movement.

Second, the Pakistani public also appears to be in a different position than it was several years ago, as the recent Peshawar school massacre has illustrated the brutality of the TTP. One strategy that ISK could employ to deal with this issue, and to consolidate and broaden their support base, will be to conduct attacks that aim to deepen the divide between classes in Pakistan, and between those that live in the FATA and other areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with those that live in Pakistan’s more “settled” areas (i.e. Punjab, Sindh, etc.). One should remember that stoking class divisions was a key part of the TTP’s strategy during its heyday in Swat.[38]

Unless ISK takes a less antagonistic and more measured approach, a third challenging issue the group might need to deal with is the capabilities and influence of Pakistan’s old jihadist guard, groups, as typified by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harakat ul-Mujahidin, who have long had deep ties to the State. While there might not be open warfare between ISK and the old guard, Pakistan’s institutional jihadists will likely either be pushed or have their own incentives to subvert or limit ISK’s growth and development, even if only done indirectly or behind the scenes. A key indicator of change will be whether, and to what extent, ISK is able to gain a presence in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the main powerbase of Pakistan’s institutional jihadis.

While a lot of attention has been focused on the development of ISK as an organization, the broader and more lasting challenge for Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s jihadist landscapes is more about how and in what direction the emergence of ISK pushes other militant groups in

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the region. If the ISK movement is to survive and gain strength, that direction will likely be more sectarian, anti-state and more bold. In the short-term the group will also likely make a number of predictable plays, such as making attempts to: attack military outposts and international borders (even just for symbolic affect); seize, hold and control territory, and apply Sharia there; kidnap Westerners; and target Shi`a and other minorities.[39] With the help of the Islamic State, ISK will also likely up its media game, and with the use of future releases it will likely attempt to shift the narratives that have long driven the Afghan and Kashmir jihads in its favor.

Don Rassler is the Director of Strategic Initiatives at the Combating Terrorism Center and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.   The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.[1] This group included: Abu `Ubayda al-Lubnani, Abu al-Muhannad al-Urduni, Abu Jarir al-Shimali (Abu Tha’ir), Abu al-Huda al-Sudani, `Abd-al-`Aziz al-Maqdisi, `Abdullah al-Banjabi, Abu Younis al-Kurdim, Abu `A’isha al-Qurtubi, and Abu Mus`ab al-Tadamuni, March 2014, CTC Library.[2] For additional background see “An Interview with the Mujahid Brother Salah-al-Din al-Maqdisi,” Al Battar Media Establishment, April 24, 2014.[3] First, for analytical clarity and to bound complexity, the author has decided to limit his analysis of the development of ISK to Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a stronger emphasis placed on the latter. The author recognizes that the term “Khorasan” extends beyond the physical boundaries of these two countries. However, the author prefers to provide more precision with respect to these two countries, vice covering more geographic ground. Thus, the influence of the Islamic State in Central Asia and India are beyond the scope of this article. Second, this author also made an intentional decision to focus his analysis on the network of individuals and groups whose home base is either Afghanistan and Pakistan, and not on the dynamics associated with the flow of foreign fighters to and from either Afghanistan and Pakistan to Syria and Iraq. These two issues are clearly connected, but – due to length limitations – are also beyond the scope of this article.[4] “Say Die in Your Rage: An Address by the Spokesman for the Islamic State the Mujahid Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami,” January 26, 2015; for some background on the TTP’s activity in Orakzai see Raheel Khan, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Orakzai,” New America Foundation, September 2010; Tayyab Ali Shah, “Pakistan’s Challenges in Orakzai,” CTC Sentinel, 3:7 (2010).[5] Amir Mir, “Pakistan Now has a Native Daesh Amir,” The News, January 13, 2015.[6] Approximately two weeks after the establishment of the Islamic State in late June 2014, the Abtal al-Islam Establishment – which is led by Sheikh Abd al-Qadir al-Khorasani, initially pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, and did so independently. See “Alleged TTP Faction Official and Abtalul Islam Media Pledge to IS,” SITE, July 11, 2014.[7] “Pledge of Allegiance by Amirs of the Mujahidin in Khurasan to the Amir of the Believers, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, May God Protect Him,” January 10, 2015; for background on the commanders / individuals who are reported to be active in Afghanistan see Borhan Osman, “The Shadows of ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan: What threat does it hold?”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 12, 2015.[8] “Pledge of Allegiance by Amirs of the Mujahidin in Khurasan to the Amir of the Believers, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, May God Protect Him”; for a complete review see “Islamic State Appoints Leaders of ‘Khorasan Province,’ Issues Veiled Threat to Afghan Taliban,” Long War Journal,  January 27, 2015.[9] The full name of the Amr Bil Maroof group is Amar Bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkir (Suppression of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue). For background on this issue see Amir Mir, “50 Amr Bil Maroof militants join Daish,” The News, January 20, 2015.[10] Mubasher Bukhari, “Pakistan Arrests Local ISIS Commander,” Al-Arabiya, January 21, 2015; An article about the arrest of four individuals who were allegedly acting in support of the Islamic State by a newspaper in Bangladesh claims that the group’s ring leader had ties to a militant named “Sajjad” who – before his death in a police crackdown – reportedly served as an the Islamic State leader in Karachi. See “4 IS Militants on 5 Day Remand,” The Daily Star, January 19, 2015.[11] Borhan Osman, “The Shadows of ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan: What threat does it hold?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 12, 2015.[12]  “Say Die in Your Rage: An Address by the Spokesman for the Islamic State the Mujahid Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami,”; see also Ari Shapiro, Leila Fadel and Philip Reeves, “How ISIS had Expanded Beyond its Syrian Stronghold,” NPR, February 18, 2015.[13] Borhan Osman, “The Shadows of ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan: What threat does it hold?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 12, 2015.[14] Ibid.

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By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

[15] Ibid.[16] Ibid.[17] Tehrik-e-Khilafat-o-Jihad video, July 14, 2014; Tehrik-e-Khilafat-o-Jihad video September 17, 2014.[18] CTC Library, January 30, 2015.[19] For background on AKWJ’s claimed attacks see “The Lies and True Reality of Usama Mahmood, Spokesman of Al-Qa’ida in the (Indian) Subcontinent”, Ansar-ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad video, January 4, 2014.[20] “Statement from Ansar-ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad congratulating those whose pledge of allegiance to the Caliph of the Muslims has been accepted, and an ardent appeal to target the armies of the apostate tyrannical forces in order to support the caliphate,” Ansar-ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad video, November 22, 2014.[21] Ibid.[22] Some analysts refer to this group as the Ahmed Marwat group. The group should not be confused with the Iranian Jundullah movement, which was active in the late 2000s before the capture and death of its leader. For background on Iranian Jundullah see Audun Kolstad Wiig, “Islamist Opposition in the Islamic Republic: Jundullah and the Spread of Extremist Deobandism in Iran,” FFI report, July 2, 2009.[23] The posting was titled: “Glad Tidings: A New Bay`a to the Islamic State”; see also “Jundullah Vows Allegiance to the Islamic State,” Reuters, November 18, 2014.[24] “IS Visits Militants in Baluchistan: Jundullah Spokesman,” Dawn, November 12, 2014.[25] See Aamir Iqbal, “Suicide Blast Targets Shikarpur Imambargah,” Newsweek Pakistan, January 30, 2015; Haseeb Bhatti and Shakeel Qarar, “TTP Claims Attack on Rawalpindi Imambargah, Three Killed,” Dawn, February 19, 2015; “Jundullah claims responsibility for attack on polio workers in Quetta,” Express Tribune, November 28, 2014; For background on attacks on polio workers see Animesh Roul, “The Pakistani Taliban’s Campaign Against Polio Vaccination,” CTC Sentinel 7:8 (2014).[26] For background on the Lal Masjid operation and the Ghazi brothers see Qandeel Siddique, The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban,” FFI report, October 8, 2008; Hassan Abbas, “The Road to Lal Masjid and its Aftermath,” Terrorism Monitor  4:2 (2007); “The Lal Masjid Report,” Express Tribune, April 28, 2013; on the development of the Punjabi Taliban see Mujahid Hussain, Punjabi Taliban: Driving Extremism in Pakistan (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012).[27] For example see “An Interview of Respected Ameer Omar Khalid Khorasani with Ihya-e-Khilafat,” Ihya-e-Khilafat, October 2014, pg. 36.[28] Interview with Maulana Abdul Aziz, Bab ul-Islam, July 28, 2014.[29] Although this video claims to be on behalf of the female students of Jamia Hafsa writ large, it is not known how representative this pledge of support is. “Message From the University of Hafsa To All Mujahideen,” as posted by Twitter user @MehrAdeeb.[30] Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Islamist Groups, Lashkar-i-Islam Merge into the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan,” Long War Journal, March 12, 2015.[31] For example, when asked, before the group’s recent re-merger with Fazlullah’s TTP faction, about whether JuA will join the Islamic State JuA’s spokesman had the following to say: “We will see whether we can fight better for the cause on our own or by joining IS… if the offer is serious, the matter will be decided by our political shura.” Ali Akbar, “From TTP to IS: Pakistan’s Terror Landscape Evolves,” Dawn, no date; for background on Fazlullah’s position see Tahir Khan, Pakistani Taliban Only Loyal to Mullah Omar, Says TTP Spokesperson,” Express Tribune, October 6, 2014.[32] “Editorial,” Ihya-e-Khilafat, October 2014, pg. 2.[33] This could have just been an editorial oversight, but given JuA’s choice of articles it could have also been intentional, and it suggests that the newly remerged TTP could leverage JuA’s plays in these areas and take a more nuanced position on the Islamic State.[34] Amir Mir, “Jamaatul Ahrar Video to be Probed,” The News, October 20, 2014.[35] “Jundullah Vows Allegiance to the Islamic State,” Reuters, November 18, 2014.[36] “IS Visits Militants in Baluchistan: Jundullah Spokesman,” Dawn, November 12, 2014.[37] The case of Mullah Dadullah Lang is a case in point.[38] See Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Taliban Exploit Class Rifts in Pakistan,” New York Times, April 16, 2009.[39] JuA’s recent attack against Pakistan’s Wagah border crossing with India, which killed over 50 people, could be mirrored by ISK and a sign of future attacks to come; for a view into the Islamic State’s potential plans see also “IS Visits Militants in Baluchistan: Jundullah Spokesman.”

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