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AL-HARAKATUL AL-ISLAMIYYAH Essays on the

Abu Sayyaf Group

Third Edition

Rommel C. Banlaoi Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)

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Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group Third Edition By Rommel C. Banlaoi Copyright@2012 By Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi First published in electronic form in 2008. Revised and updated in 2009. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations for scholarly purposes, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recordings and/or otherwise without the prior written permission of the author. You may reach the author at rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com. Published by Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) Quezon City, Philippines www.pipvtr.com Recommended Bibliographic Entry: Rommel C. Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 3rd Edition (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012). Photo used in book cover courtesy of Abu Hamdie ISBN 978-971-93769-1-0

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Also by Professor Rommel Banlaoi Philippine Security in the Age of Terror (2010) Counter-Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia (2009) The Philippines and Australia: Defense and Security Cooperation Against Terrorism (2008) Security Aspects of Philippines-China Relations: Bilateral Issues and Concerns in the Age of Global Terrorism (2007) War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (2004) Electoral Reforms in the Philippines (2006 with Clarita R. Carlos) Political Parties in the Philippines (1996 with Clarita R. Carlos) Elections in the Philippines, (1996 with Clarita R. Carlos) The Amsterdam Treaty and the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (2000) Security Cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the European Union: Lessons Learned (2001) The ASEAN Regional Forum, The South China Disputes and the Functionalist Option (2001)

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For my loving, caring and understanding wife, GRACE QUILITORIO BANLAOI

For my sons,

Rome Melchizedek Q. Banlaoi and Rommel Gian Q. Banlaoi, Jr.

and for my daughter, Ronaiah Gail Q. Banlaoi

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Table of Contents Preface ……………………………………………………………………………….. 7 1. Roots and Evolution …………………………………………………………. 9 2. Leadership Dynamics ……………………………………………………….. 33 3. Bandit or Terrorist? ………………………………………………………….. 52 4. Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism …………………………… 58 5. Youth as Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism ………………….. 67 6. Media and Terrorism ……………………………………………………….. 74 7. Sources of Resilience ……………………………………………………….. 87 8. The Pull of Terrorism ………………………………………………………. 94 9. Terrorism and National Security: Emerging Issues Continuing Trends A Decade After 9/11 …………………………….. 101 10. Current Landscape of Terrorist Threats in the Philippines …. 110 Annexes A. A Brief History of Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah as Narrated by Khadaffy Janjalani ………………..……………… 115 B. Dos Palmas Operation and Hospital Siege in Lamitan as Narrated by Abu Solaiman………………………………. ……….. 124 C. List of Selected Attacks Attributed to ASG .……………………… 130 About PIPVTR ……………………………………………………………………. 135 About the author …………………………………………………………………. 137

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PREFACE

Since 2001, I have written several scholarly papers on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Most of these papers were presented to international conferences or published as journal articles or book chapters either in the Philippines or abroad. I collected all these papers into one volume to offer a book of readings on the ASG in order to benefit students, researchers, academics, journalists, analysts, and policy makers who are interested to understand the intricacies of threats posed by the ASG.

This book was originally published in 2008 as an anthology of four major papers I wrote about the ASG. Original version of these papers have been revised and updated in 2009 to make this anthology more current at that time.

This is the third edition of this book where I added six more relevant chapters that are also originally published elsewhere. If there are some redundant and repetitive portions in this anthology, these are meant to stress the recurring issues and to highlight their continuing significance in the discussions.

I consider this book a “diary” of my intellectual journey as a scholar who is trying hard to fathom the dynamics and complexities of the threats posed by the ASG since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States. It is also a record of my modest accomplishment as a terrorism researcher who has been rigorously hunting for “fugitive” and “elusive” data about the ASG. I prepared this collection to inform my readers, particularly my students, on the many ramifications of the Abu Sayyaf threat and how to effectively deal with this threat in the context of its evolving nature and emerging challenges.

I published this work not to spread the “gospel truth” about the ASG. My sincere intention is to open myself to criticism in order to be “falsified” so that our knowledge on the ASG will grow. As a scholar, I am an avid follower of Karl Popper who popularized the “falsifiability theory” in the Philosophy of Science. Popper said that knowledge could grow if we could falsify existing knowledge like the way Nicolaus Copernicos falsified the knowledge claim of Claudius Ptolemy. If I were “Ptolemy”, I want my readers to be my “Copernicos” who can refute my findings on the ASG.

In this anthology, I discussed myriad of issues about the ASG, which continues to menace Philippine national security, peace and order, and even regional stability. Chapter 1 examines the roots and evolution of the ASG as an organization that has undergone dramatic transformation from mere banditry to genuine terrorism. Chapter 2 describes the leadership dynamics of the ASG to demonstrate that the group is not a homogeneous organization. Chapter 3 discusses in detail the phenomenal transformation of the ASG from a mere bandit group to a genuine terrorist organization in the context of crime-terrorism nexus. Chapter 4 examines the capability of the ASG to conduct piracy and to

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wage maritime terrorism and analyzes the fine line between piracy and terrorism using the ASG as a case study.

Chapters 5 to 10 are additional chapters from the two previous editions of this book. Chapter 5 talks about the youth as both victims and perpetrators of terrorism. In this chapter, I argue that the ASG has juvenile leaders and members engaged in banditry and terrorism. Chapter 6 describes how an ASG-linked group, the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) uses media as a propaganda tool to attract young recruits. Chapter 7 discusses the resilience and staying power of the ASG and how the ASG threat is evolving. Chapter 8 examines how the ASG uses several pull factors to attract new gullible members who provide the group its staying power. Chapter 9 links the issue of terrorism with national security. It examines emerging issues and continuing trends on domestic and international terrorism ten years after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. This chapter also discusses the evolving threat of terrorism posed by the ASG and its link with Al-Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah and other new groups in the Philippines like the Al Khobar Group (AKG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), among others. Chapter 10 describes the current landscape of terrorist threats in the Philippines by focusing on the ASG’s adaptive capability as a non-state armed group.

In this present edition, I am using “Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah” to refer the original name of the ASG. In the original edition, I used “Al Harakatul Al Islamiyyah” (without a dash) because that format is more commonly used in military reports and western literature. Younger followers of the ASG are using “Al Harakatul Islamia” in their propaganda materials. I used all these names interchangeably in this anthology.

There are portions in this anthology that may have been overtaken by events. Readers should consider those portions as part of the historical record. Each chapter must therefore be read in its proper historical context to appreciate its present scholarly value. While I attempt to be as current as possible, this task is difficult because the ASG, as a subject matter of research, is a moving target that is really hard to pursue.

Nonetheless, it is still my ardent hope that through the third edition of this anthology, I will be able to continuously add value to our existing knowledge on the ASG. It is also my sincere desire to see this knowledge being used in the development of a more nuanced public policy that addresses the complex threats posed by the ASG.

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CHAPTER 1

Roots and Evolution*

Introduction

Despite its persistent effort, the Philippine government has been enormously struggling to defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),1 the smallest but the most terrifying violent extremist group in the Philippines.

Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States (US), the Philippine government resolutely labeled the ASG as a mere bunch of bandits.2 Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has even described the group as "a money-crazed gang of criminals" without any ideology.3

After 9/11, however, the ASG callously received the label of being a terrorist group. The US government even listed the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization. The United Nations identified the ASG as one of the major terrorist group operating in Southeast Asia. President Benigno Simeon Aquino III also describes the ASG as both a terrorist group and bandit group. He even orders the Philippine military to “crush” this menace.

To defeat the ASG, the US has extended financial and technical assistance to the Philippine government.4

*Revised and updated version of a paper entitled “Roots and Evolution of a Terrorist Movement in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Experience” originally published in Caroline Ziemke, Satu Limaye, Kondan Oh Hassig and John Hanley, Jr. (eds), Building a CATR Research Agenda: Proceedings of the Third Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2006). This paper was also presented to the Second Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Council of Asian Terrorism Research held at Mount Lavinia Hotel, Colombo, Sri Lanka on 1-3 March 2006. This paper was written with the support of the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The author is grateful to IDA for the kind permission to reprint this paper.

1For an account of the anti-terrorism efforts of the Philippine government, see Eusaquito P.

Manalo, Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group (MA Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004).

2For an elaboration of this point, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From

Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism?”, Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).

3“Who are the Abu Sayyaf” (1 June 2001) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-

pacific/719623.stm.

4For an excellent reader on this topic, see Patricio N. Abinales and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (eds), The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines (Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2008).

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But the ASG’s strong commitment to embrace terrorism to advance its radical Islamist agenda makes it a terrible menace to Philippine internal security. Its confirmed link with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda also makes the ASG a threat to regional and global security.5 It is viewed that the ASG has, in fact, “reemerged as one of the more important terrorist groups confronting the Philippine government, the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia.”6

But how does the ASG start as a terrorist movement and what are the root causes of terrorism in the Philippines?

There are many divergent views to explain the root and evolution of terrorism, in general, and the ASG, in particular.

One explanation is structural.7 It is viewed that the ASG started as terrorist movement because of the failure of the Philippine government to address the structural causes of the on-going internal armed conflicts in the Philippines by Moro rebels that may be rooted to the colonial times. Defeating the ASG, therefore, needs a resolution of the structural causes of internal armed conflicts that continue to breed and perpetuate terrorism.

Another explanation is agential. The ASG started as a terrorist movement because of individuals who firmly believed that terrorism could work, particularly when they wanted immediate actions and results. Terrorism is viewed to be useful for putting the issue of political change on the public agenda.8

This chapter aims to examine the roots and evolution of the ASG as a terrorist movement in the Philippines through structural and agential approaches. It argues that the root causes of terrorism in the Philippines have structural and agential origins.

5For ASG-JI-Al Qaeda link, see Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-

Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003; Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003); and Dirk J. Barreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden’s East Asian Connection (New York: Writers Club Press, 2001). For a critical appraisal of these linkages, see Clive Williams M.G., “The Question of Links Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia” in After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan , eds., (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 83-96.

6Zachary Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (Carlisle, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2005), p. vii. 7To get an structural perspective on the origin of terrorism see Erica Chenoweth, “Terrorism

and Instability: A Structural Study on the Origins of Terror” (Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado, October 2004), p. 3.

8For elaboration of this perspective, see Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist

Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice” in Walter Reich (ed), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998). Also in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), pp. 54-66.

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This chapter also contends that the problem of terrorism in the Philippines can only be fully understood in its proper historical context. In describing how terrorist movement starts, this chapter also aims to demonstrate how the colonial past informs the present struggle of the ASG.

A Brief History of Terrorism in the Philippines and the Evolution of the Abu Sayyaf Struggle

A comprehensive history of terrorism in the Philippine is yet to be written. But the Philippines first experience a terrorist attack in 1949 when Huk9 leader Alexander Viernes and his 200-armed men ambushed former First Lady Aurora Quezon and her entourage while en route to Baler, now part of Quezon province of Luzon.10

If terrorism means “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change”,11 then terrorism in the Philippines may be traced to the Spanish colonial period (16th to 19th centuries) when groups called tulisanes or outlaws would go to the town proper to plunder and ransack the rich Spanish inhabitants. In the town, for example, of Pila, Laguna of Southern Luzon, tulisanes would “swoop down from the mountains in the dead of night to terrorize the inhabitants, loot their houses and kill those who resisted them.”12

During the Spanish times, there were tulisanes who were undoubtedly a

mere bunch of bandits and criminals. But there were also some genuine revolutionary groups arbitrarily dubbed tulisanes by Spanish colonial officials. The Spanish colonial authorities even demonized these rebel groups to suppress dissent and resistance.13

American colonial officials also used the label tulisanes to refer to Filipino

resistant groups. For example, Macario Sacay, a Filipino general in the

9Huk refers to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s Liberation Army), originally

known as Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People’s Anti-Japanese Armed Forces) during the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines.

10Cesar Pobre, “Terrorism: A Historical Perspective”, Historical Bulletin, Vol. 35, (2001-2003), p. 5.

11 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 43. 12Luciano P.R. Santiago, “The Roots of Pila, Laguna: A Secular and Spiritual History of the

Town (900 AD to the Present”, Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, No. 25 (1997), pp. 125-155. See particular section on “The Menace of Tulisanes”.

13See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Quezon City: Foundation for

Nationalist Studies, 1975).

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Philippine-American War, was branded as a tulisan or bandit by American authorities.14

But Jose Rizal, the Philippine national hero, described the tulisanes “the

most respectable men in the country.”15 On the part of Muslim resistance groups, Spanish colonial officials not only called them tulisanes but also Moros to mean “cunning, ruthless, cruel, treacherous savage; a pirate; a raider; and slaver.”16

In its proper historical context, terrorism was “closely associated with the

ideals of virtue and democracy”, particularly during the French Revolution.17 Terrorism retained its revolutionary connotations during the First World War and during the late 1960s and 1970s.18

In the 1980s, however, terrorism became a pejorative term to refer to a

calculated means to destabilize the West.19 Now, terrorism is very hard to define because the meaning and usage of the word have changed in the context of changing times.20

There are at least 109 definitions of terrorism but the “search for an

adequate definition of terrorism is still on.”21 Despite being a buzzword after 9/11, there has been no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism.22

14See Antonio K. Abad, General Macario L. Sakay: Was he a bandit or a patriot? (Manila: J.B. Feliciano & Sons, 1955) and Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and revolution: Popular movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910 ( Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979).

15Floro Quibuyen “The Noli-Fili: Towards A Post-Enlightenment Concept of the Nation” (Paper read in a panel at the 1st National Conference on Literature "Localities of Nationhood: The Nation in Philippine Literature." English Department, Ateneo de Manila University. 11 February 2000). Also at http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde/apsis/aufi/history/nolifili.htm <accessed on 21 Febuary 2006>.

16Peter Gowing, Muslim Filipinos – Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: New Day, 1979), p. 41.

17 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 15.

18 Ibid., pp. 20-26.

19Ibid., p. 27.

20Ibid., p. 28.

21Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Longman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 1.

22Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce Hoffman, Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 2.

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Terrorism means many things for many users. For some, terrorism is a political strategy. For others, however, terrorism is a form of political violence that approximates insurrection, rebellion, anarchy, political protest or revolution.23 Other writers simply dismiss terrorism as a psychological problem.24 One author even describes terrorists as demon lovers.25

The lack of commonly acceptable definition of terrorism makes the writing

of the roots and evolution of terrorism in the Philippines very difficult, unless analyzed in its proper historical, cultural and socio-political contexts. The rise of international terrorism compounds the situation.

Based on the records of the Department of National Defense (DND), the

Philippines first felt the specter of international terrorism in 1985 when notorious leaders of Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines reportedly established linkages with “foreign terrorist groups” like the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).26 On 2 December 1987, Philippine national police operatives discovered ANO cell in Manila leading to the arrest of so-called five Palestinian terrorists with Jordanian passports. On 19 May 1995, combined police and military forces arrested nine LTTE members including its infamous leader Selvarajah Balasingan.27

The Philippine government’s Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) has identified

various terrorist threat groups presently operating in the country. These groups include the Al-Qaeda, the JI, the ASG, the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) and even the New People’s Army (NPA).

Some armed units of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were

labeled as terrorist groups. But the Philippine government refused to officially label the MILF a terrorist group because of the on-going peace process.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) also received the label of

terrorist group. But since the signing of the peace agreement in 1996, the Philippine government ceased the use of this label. Some military officials, however, continue to describe the Nur Misuari Break Away Group (MBG) of the MNLF as a terrorist group. Rodolfo “Boogie” Mendoza, retired intelligence chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), also identified the following groups as

23Juliet Lodge (ed), The Threat of Terrorism (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1988), p. 1.

24Walter Reich (ed), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of

Mind (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

25Robin Morgan, The Demon Lover: The Roots of Terrorism (New York: Washington Square Press, 1989).

26Department of National Defense, The Philippine Campaign Against Terrorism (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2002), p. 3.

27Ibid

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terrorist groups: the Pentagon Gang, the Abu Sofia and the Markazzo Shabab Al-Islamiya.28 This book, however, focuses only on the ASG.

Several authors have already provided good historical accounts of the

ASG.29 None of the aforementioned authors, however, narrated the ASG’s own account of its birth, except Samuel K. Tan of the University of the Philippines who wrote a brief chapter on the ASG in his book, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle.30 Among its original leaders, Jovenal Bruno was believed to have written an unpublished manuscript to document the establishment of the ASG. This manuscript gave a very useful insider’s insights on the origin of the ASG. Though this manuscript remains classified, it is important to note that Bruno traced the history of the ASG from the world Islamic movement. Bruno also expressed admiration to Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Taliban state of Afghanistan. Bruno was one of the most trusted associates of Abdurajak Janjalani for being a committed Muslim convert.

As part of his effort to prove his capacity to lead the ASG, Khadaffy

Janjalani also wrote his own version of the history of the ASG. This is found in Annex A of this book. He calls the ASG as Al-Harakatul Al Islamiyyah. He said that 1993 was the year when the Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah was born.31 It was also in the same year when the ASG conducted its second kidnapping operation. Khadaffy Janjanlani wrote:

1993 was the year when al-Harakatul Islamiyyah was born. This is the time when they decided to get out of the MNLF officially and become as one new group of Mujahideen. Although, the jamaah was established, they’re not known with their new name but as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), where the tag was taken from the Kunya (alias) of Ustadz Abdu-Razzaq Janjalani.

28Rodolfo Mendoza, Jr., Philippine Jihad, Inc. (Quezon City: No identified publisher, 2002).

29Rohan Gunaratna, “The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group”, Janes Intelligence Review (July 2001); Glenda Gloria, “Bearer of the Sword: The Abu Sayyaf Has Nebulous Beginnings and Incoherent Aims”, Mindanao Updates (6 June 2000); and, Mark Turner, “Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1995), pp. 1-19.

30Samuel K. Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1995), p. 94.

31See Khadaffy Janjanlani, “A brief History of al-Harakatul Islamiyyah” at http://www.geocities.com/ghurabah101/ .

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Also in 1993, the group of Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq Janjalani launched their second kidnapping operation. They held the son of one of the prominent businessman in Basilan and again were successfully ransomed.32

Abu Abdu Said was the one who boldly released an official statement to

describe ASG’s own account of its origin. Said was the former Secretary General of the ASG. On 18 November 1994, amidst heavy speculation that the ASG was created by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Said issued a document called Surat Kasabunnal” or “A Voice of Truth”. This document vehemently denounced the view that the AFP or the CIA created the ASG. It argued that the ASG started as a movement called Juma’a Abu Sayyaf. The establishment of this movement was greatly influenced by the arrival in August 1991 of Motor Vessel (M/V) Doulos carrying Christian missionaries to preach in Zamboanga City. These Christian missionaries allegedly “spoke against Islam and called Allah a false God, Prophet Muhammad a liar, and the Qu’ran a man-made book.”33 According to S.K. Tan, “The desire to avenge the insult against the sacred values of Islam started the motive force of the Abu Sayyaf.”34

According to the various intelligence briefings of the AFP, the formation of

the ASG could be traced from the disgruntled members of the MNLF over the dormant secessionist movement in the late 1970s.35 But experts and policy makers were not certain if the ASG referred to a formal organization or just an informal network of like-minded Filipino secessionist leaders and Muslim radicals. It was argued that the ASG was just composed of various autonomous Muslim groups. Thus, the ASG was a mere alliance rather than a formal organization.36

The origin of the ASG was attributed to Abdurajak Janjalani who used the

non-de guerre Abu Sayyaf in most of his writings to honor an Afghan resistance leader and Islamic professor, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The Wahabi theology of Professor Sayyaf greatly influenced Janjalani’s concept of an Islamic state. Janjalani formed a movement that aimed to propagate his fanatical belief of an

32 Ibid.

33Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle, op. cit., p. 94.

34 Ibid. 35These intelligence briefings are classified secret. Thus, details of these reports can not be

used in this paper.

36Peter Kreuzer, “Political Clans and Violence in Southern Philippines”, PRIF Report, no. 71 (2005), p. 28.

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Islamic state in the Southern Philippines. This movement became known as the ASG.

Despite the nebulous origin of the ASG, the military establishment

believed that in 1990, Janjalani formed the Mujahideed Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) to wage jihad against the Philippine government for the establishment of an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines. The Philippine military regarded the MCFF as the forerunner of the ASG. When the MCFF attracted some “hard core” followers in Basilan, Zulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga, it was later called as the ASG.

But according to Noor Umog, one of the key leaders of the ASG now under

witness protection program of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the MCFF was a misnomer. The forerunner of the ASG was the Jamaa Tableegh, an Islamic propagation group established in Basilan in the early 1980s by Abdurajak Janjalani. This group conducted seminars, symposia and small-group discussions to propagate Islam. It was also through this group where Abdurajak delivered some of his Islamic discourses.

Because of charismatic lectures of Abdurajak, the Jamaa Tableegh

received popularity not only in Basilan but also in Zamboanga and Jolo.37 The involvement of some of its followers in anti-government rallies prompted the military to put the group under surveillance. Key followers of Jamaa Tableegh formed the nucleus of the ASG, which Abdurajak Janjalani initially called Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic Movement.

The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) tagged the ASG as a

terrorist organization when it claimed responsibility for the bombing of M/V Doulos in Zamboanga City in 1991. The M/V Doulos was a Christian missionary ship docked at the Zamboanga port.

According to the Southern Command of the AFP, it was in 1991 when the

name ASG was first publicly used by Janjalani in connection with the bombing of M/V Doulos.38 The ASG gained international notoriety on 20 May 1992 when it assassinated Fr. Salvatore Carzedda, an Italian missionary working in Zamboanga City. These two major events prompted some observers to conclude that the ASG was founded sometime in 1991-1992.39

37 Abu Hamdie, “The Abu Sayyaf Group” (undated and unpublished manuscript).

38“Special Report on the Abou Sayaff” (Briefing of MIG9 during the Southern Command

Conference, 19 January 1994).

39Marites D. Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy and Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000) and Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf”, Public Organization Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 388.

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But a more recent study indicated that the ASG first emerged in 1989.40

Based on existing records of the AFP and the PNP, Janjalani renamed the ASG as AHAI in 1994 to receive international funding and support. According to Philippine intelligence reports, the AHAI drew its support from the extremist element in Iran (Hezbollah), Pakistan (Jamaat-Islami and Hizbul-Mujahideen), Afghanistan (Hizb-Islami) Egypt (Al Gamaa-Al-Islamiya), Algeria (Islamic Liberation Front) and Libya (International Harakatul Al-Islamia). The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) was also known to have provided financial support to AHAI.

Because of repeated media reports, the name ASG became more popular

than the AHAI. Western sources, however, tend to use and even interchange both names.41 But original members of the ASG preferred to use AHAI to describe their group. Though Janjalani was a known Mujahideen by its followers, his reputation of being a veteran of Afghan War is now being challenged. There was no evidence showing that he actually fought in the Afghan War.

There was no doubt, however, that he was a charismatic and serious Muslim scholar who, ironically, attended high school in Claret College, a Catholic-run school in the Basilan capital of Isabela. Janjalani also received a very good Islamic education in Saudi Arabia in 1981 and was sent to Ummu I-Qura in Mecca where he seriously studied Islamic jurisprudence for almost three years.42 He was later attracted deeply to the concept of jihad when he conscientiously studied in Pakistan the history and politics of Islamic revolution. Heavily armed with Islamic thoughts, Janjalani went back to his homeland in Basilan in 1984 to preach in various mosques.

While formally establishing the ASG, Janjalani became an avid preacher to

limited audiences in Santa Barbara Madrassah in Zamboanga City in the early 1990s. During his preaching, Janjalani openly released different theological statements and public proclamations revealing his deep grasp of Islamic religion, particularly the Wahabi Islamic theology. Wahabism brands other Muslim sects as heretical. Janjalani delivered at least eight discourses or Khutbah within a

40Eusaquito P. Manalo, Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group (MA

Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004). p. 31.

41See for example, Angel Rabasa, “Southeast Asia: Moderate Tradition and Radical Challenge” in Angel Rabasa, et al. The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica, RAND: Rand, 2004).

42Gloria, p. 2.

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radical framework based on the Quranic concept of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah (the fighting and dying for the cause of Islam).43

To advance his fanatical belief, Janjalani convinced some Muslim leaders

in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi- Tawi, Zamboanga City and General Santos City to join the Juma’a Abu Sayyap movement, now rendered in English as the ASG. Most of his recruits were disgruntled members of the MNLF and the MILF. When Janjalani attended an Islamic course in Tripoli, Libya in 1987, he met like-minded Muslim Filipino students who eventually helped Janjalani to form the ASG. These students had common remorse against the Philippine government based in Manila and against “heretic” leadership of the MNLF and the MILF.

Many scholars and journalists mistranslated ASG to mean “bearer of the

sword”.44 But ASG really means in Arabic, “Father of the Swordsman”.45 The ASG’s own account of its genesis argues that their group respects

freedom of religion.46 They even asserted that in an Islamic state “the rights of Christian will be protected for as long they abide by the laws of the Islamic state.”47 Abuza, however, was correct when he said that the ASG became a more “Islamic terrorist group” after deepening its ties with Al-Qaeda from 1991-1995.48 He was also correct when he claimed that the ASG degenerated as a bandit group from 1995-2001.

After the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, the ASG went into KRAs

spree. In 2000-2001 alone, the ASG was involved in 140 KRA incidents that resulted in the death of 16 victims.49 At the height of the global campaign against terrorism from 2001-2003, the Philippine government was in hot pursuit of the ASG.50 While on the run, Khadafy Janjalani or KJ (Abdurajak’s younger brother and successor) started to revive the ASG’s radical Islamist agenda. But his confirmed death in January 2007 aborted this plan.

43Tan, “The Juma’a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and

Method of Struggle”, p. 3.

44See For example, Turbiville, Jr., pp. 38-47.

45Jose Torres, Jr., Into the Mountain: Hostages by the Abu Sayyaf (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), p. 35.

46Nathan G. Quimpo, “Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who’s Afraid of an Islamic State?”, Public Policy, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October/December 1999), pp. 38-63.

47Ibid.

48Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, op. cit., , pp. 2-11.

49Ibid., p. 8.

50Ibid.

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His reported successor, Yasser Igasan, was believed to have the determination to reinvigorate the Islamist mission of the ASG. But the National Intelligence Coordinating Council (NICA) said that Igasan was not the real successor of KJ. The person who actually replaced KJ was Radullan Sahiron who was known for his criminal acts.

From being a mere bandit group, the ASG had the intention to become an

organization of “freedom fighters” with a strong Islamist agenda. Since the capture and subsequent death of Galib Andang in 2004, the ASG failed to conduct KRAs.51 Instead, the ASG waged a series of high profile terrorist attacks, the most devastating of which, so far, was the blasting of the Super ferry 14 that resulted in the death of 116 persons and the wounding of 300 others. On the eve of Valentines celebration in 2005, the ASG also masterminded three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, Davao City and General Santos City killing at least 10 persons and the wounding of 136 others. But the ASG resumed its KRA activities in 2006.

Until now, the ASG has been involved in many KRAs in Mindanao. Its high

profile victims, as of this writing, included several foreign nationals. The ASG held several foreign nationals in the province of Sulu as hostages. Among them, as of press time, were Swiss national Lorenzo Vinsiguerra, Dutch national Ewold Horn, Australian national Warren Rodwell, Japanese national Toshio Ito, and Indian national Biju Veetil. The ASG demanded a P50-million ransom payment for the release of their two European victims and originally demanded US$2 million for the release of the Australian kidnap victim. Malaysian kidnap victim, Mohammad Nasaruddin Bensaidin, was already released in exchange for a ransom payment of P1.5 million. On 4 June 2012, two Chinese nationals were kidnapped in Sibugay province. On 12 June 2012, a Jordanian journalist named Baker Abdulla Atyani was hostaged by the ASG.

According to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the ASG has strength of less than 400 as of June 2012. The ASG strength remains very small compared to the strength of NPA of around 8,000 and the MILF of around 10,000. But this is exactly the main reason why the ASG resorts to terrorism – it is the weapon of the weak, and it is a very powerful weapon.52

The ASG has already developed the ability to wage maritime terrorism.53

The Super ferry 14 bombing in February 2004 was a clear demonstration of

51Ibid.

52J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, 1978). Also cited in Schmid and Longman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, op. cit., p. 69.

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ASG’s maritime terrorist capability. In July 2005, Philippine intelligence reports revealed that ASG and JI fighters took underwater training in Sandakan, Malaysia to attack maritime targets such as ports and commercial vessels. In 2011, the ASG also attempted to hijack a ferry going to Tubbataha Reef in Palawan province to mount a maritime terrorist attack.

The ASG also planned to embark on suicide terrorism. The Super ferry 14

bombing in 2004 and the 2005 Valentines Day bombings in Makati City, Davao City and General Santos City were originally planned as suicide missions.

Though there has been no recorded incident of suicide terrorism in the

country done by Filipinos, the ASG is aware of the value of suicide terrorism as a favored tactic of radical Muslims pursuing jihad. The first recorded suicide attack in the Philippines occurred in 1991 in the province of Maguindanao. But this attack was a carried out not by a Filipino but by a foreign national.

Local experts and foreign analysts have strongly dismissed the possibility

of suicide terrorism in the Philippines, Muslims in Mindanao, particularly the Tausugs, have a long-held tradition of a suicide attack called locally as “Parang Sabbil”. It is a local interpretation of FISABBILILLAH, which means, “dying for the cause of Allah.”

Muslims in Mindanao carried out Parang Sabbil during the Spanish

colonial rule of the Philippine archipelago. Spanish colonial forces defectively described this practice as “juramentado” to describe a Muslim warrior running hammock against Spanish soldiers. But for the Muslims of Mindanao now called as Moros, Parang Sabbil was a spiritual mission to defend their homeland against oppressors and infidels.

It is currently argued that an ASG-linked group called Awliya Group of

Freedom Fighters is trying to revive the tradition of Parang Sabbil. The Awliya Group was responsible for the “suicide attack” of a Marine detachment in Talipao, Sulu on 25 September 2011.This attack resulted in the death of two soldiers and more than 20 members of the Awliya Group. It is argued that followers of Awliya Group are suicidal. Thus, it is believed that suicide terrorists in the Philippines may come from this group whose followers are also associated with the ASG.

Abdurajak Janjalani’s appeal for martyrdom in one of his lectures also

means endorsement of suicide terrorism. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, key suspects in 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, have reportedly established their base in the Philippines to prepare ASG members in future suicide missions. Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales

53For more discussions on the maritime terrorist capability of the ASG, see Rommel C.

Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80.

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was even quoted as saying, “What we are looking for now is suicide terrorists, not (only) suicide bombers.”54

In relation with suicide terrorism, the ASG also has plans to wage urban

terrorism. The ASG is pursuing this strategy with the RSIM, a group of Muslim converts based primarily in Metro Manila and some provinces in Luzon Island.55 Ahmad Santos (presently in jail) allegedly founded the RSIM with the financial and ideological support of the ASG. The 2005 Valentines Day bombings were demonstration of ASG’s pursuance of urban terrorism.56

Root Causes of Terrorism in the Philippines: A Structure-Agency Analysis

This section examines the root causes of terrorism in the Philippines

through structure-agency analysis. The question of structure and agency has “troubled, concerned and occupied the attentions of very many social scientists over the years.” But “it is only relatively recently that it has been taken up by political scientists and international relations scholars.”57

Structural Analysis

The structural analysis privileges the political context, setting or

environment to explain a certain political phenomenon. Viewed from a structural perspective, terrorism is a product of cultural, social, economic and political structures. 58 There is a problem of terrorism because there are cultural, social, economic and political structures that breed it. In short, there are structural conditions that encourage terrorism.

54Michael Punongbayan, “DOJ to Expose Terrorists’ Financiers, Media Handlers”, The

Philippine Star , 7 November 2005.

55For an analysis of the RSM, Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Rise of Rajah Solaiman Movement: Suicide Terrorism in the Philippines”, IDSS Commentaries (9 October 2006).

56International Crisis Group, Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, Asia Report No. 110 (19 December 2005).

57Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction ( New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 93..

58For an excellent literature, see Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995).

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Among the commonly cited structural conditions that provide fertile grounds for the growth of terrorism are poverty, injustices, political oppression, cultural marginalization, economic deprivation and social exclusion.59 These structural conditions exacerbate grievances that fuel further terrorism.60 Addressing the root of terrorism, therefore, is to alter the structure that produces terrorism.

A structural analysis of the roots of terrorism in the Philippines highlights

the structural roots of conflict in the country, which includes the ethnic make-up of society, distribution of wealth and political representation, to name a few.61 In one of his public proclamation, Abdurajak Janjalani argued that the ASG was born because of “oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims.”62 He stressed that the “clutches of oppression, tyranny and injustice” would continue to justify the existence of the ASG. From this public proclamation, Abdurajak Janjalani was telling his audience that the ASG was a product of a phenomenon with the ultimate goal of establishing “a purely Islamic government whose nature, meaning, emblem and objective are basic to peace.”63

The late MILF founder Hashim Salamat even commented that the creation

of the ASG was not a product of Janjalani’s “evil plan” but was “caused by the oppression and the continuous usurpation of the powers within our homeland.”64 When Abdurajak Janjalani died in a police encounter in Basilan in 1998, Salamat described the ASG founder a “martyr”. Salamat also argued that “As long as the region and the Bangsamoro people are still under the control of the Philippine

59See for example Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Cultural Preconditions for Potential Terrorist Groups: Terrorism and Societal Change” in Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella (eds), Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), pp. 103-117.

60Kristopher K. Robison, Challenges of Political Conflict: A Cross-National Analysis of the Downward Spiral of International Terrorist Violence and Socio-Political Crisis (Dissertation Abstract: The Ohio State University, nd) at http://www.sociology.ohio-state.edu/people/kkr/jobmarket/disabstract.pdf <accessed on 8 February 2006>.

61See International Alert, “Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform:

Broadening the Debate”, Occasional SSR Paper, No. 1 (August 2002), p. 2.

62Abdurajak Janjalani, “In the Name of Allah the Rahman the Raheem” (A public proclamation distributed in the Basilan Island and Zamboanga City, undated). It is believed that the proclamation was written between 1993 and 1994. See Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle, op. cit., p. 94.

63Ibid.

64Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle Against Oppression and Colonialism (Camp Abubakre: Agency for Youth Affairs – MILF, 2001), p. 36.

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government, and oppression continues, we should expect more Abu Sayyaf style of groups to come to existence.”65

From a structural perspective, the root causes of terrorism in the

Philippines can only be fully understood in the context of the Bangsamoro problem. Soliman M. Santos provides an excellent summary of the Bangsamoro problem in which the ASG finds itself, to wit:

This problem is the historical and systematic marginalization and minoritization of the Islamized ethno-linguistic groups, collectively called Moros, in their own homeland in the Mindanao islands, first by colonial powers Spain from the 16th to the 19th Century, then the U.S. during the first half of the 2Oth Century, and more recently by successor Philippine governments dominated by an elite with a Christian-Western orientation since formal independence in 1946. This marked full-fledged Filipino nation-statehood but ironically Philippine independence also sealed the loss of Moro independence because Moroland was incorporated (Moro nationalists would say annexed) into Philippine territory.66

Macapado A. Muslim, a Filipino scholar, identifies ten foundational causes of the Bangsamoro problem. These are:

1. Forcible/illegal annexation of Moroland to the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris in 1898;

2. Military pacification; 3. Imposition of confiscatory land laws; 4. Indioization (or Filipinization) of public administration in Moroland

and the destruction of traditional political institutions; 5. Government-financed/induced land settlement and migration to

Moroland; 6. Land grabbing/conflicts; 7. Cultural inroads against the Moros; 8. Jabidah Massacre in 1968 (during the first Marcos administration); 9. Ilaga (Christian vigilante) and military atrocities in 1970-72 (during the

second Marcos administration); and,

65Ibid.

66Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front” (A

Background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report, 2005), p. 1.

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10. Government neglect and inaction to Moro protests and grievances.67 From these ten foundational issues, he enumerates six key elements of the

Moro problem, which are: 1. Economic marginalization and destitution; 2. Political domination and inferiorization; 3. Physical insecurity; 4. Threatened Moro and Islamic identity; 5. Perception that government is the principal party to blame; and, 6. Perception of hopelessness under the present set-up.68 All Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, regardless of political

persuasion and theological inclination, believe in the Bangsamoro struggle. The term Bangsa comes from the Malay word, which means nation. Spanish colonizers introduced the term Moro when they confused the Muslim people of Mindanao with the “moors” of North of Africa.69 Though the use of the term Bangsamoro to describe the “national identity” of Muslims in the Philippines is being contested, Muslim leaders regard the Bangsamoro struggle as the longest “national liberation movement” in the country covering almost 400 years of violent resistance against Spanish, American, Japanese and even Filipino rule.70 This 400-year history of Moro resistance deeply informs ASG’s current struggle for a separate Islamic state.71 This historical context of confrontation and inequity is deeply embedded in the ASG’s present advocacy.72 This historical

67Macapado Abaton Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent

Autonomy Alternative (Marawi City, Philippines: Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University, 1994) 52-133. Also cited in Ibid., p. 2.

68Ibid.

69See Peter Gowing, Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: Federation of Christian Churches, 1964). Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Globalization and Nation-Building in the Philippines: State Predicaments in Managing Society in the Midst of Diversity”, in Yoichiro Sato (ed), Growth and Governance in Asia (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004) p. 208.

70Samuel K. Tan, “History of the Mindanao Problem” in Amina Rasul, (ed), The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspective on the Mindanao Conflict (Makati City: Asian Institute of Management, 2003) p. 4.

71For elaborate discussion, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Past in Understanding Contemporary Armed Conflicts in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Story” (Paper to be presented to the 19th Conference of International Association of Historians of Asia which will be held in Manila, Philippines, on 22-25 November 2006).

72Charles Donnely, “Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Contextualizing the Abu Sayyaf Group as an Islamist Secessionist Organization” (Paper presented to the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Canberra on 29 June to 2 July 2004.

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context also explains why the Abu Sayyaf has survived despite the death of many of its original leaders.73

From a structural perspective, the ASG is one expression of a broader

movement of the Bangsamoro people “spanning several centuries which refuses to acknowledge the authority of the Philippine state, whether independent or colonial.”74 In fact, there is a view that the Bangsamoro people will never succumb to Filipino rule.75 Thus, when the MNLF entered into peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996, the ASG considered it a betrayal of the four centuries of struggle of the Bangsamoro people.76 It is already known that original ASG members were disgruntled MNLF members who expressed frustration in the Moro revolutionary cause. A study of a Philippine military official once assigned to operate against the ASG underscores:

Abdurajak Janjalani organized the ASG in the early 1990s

with the main thrust to establish an Islamic state in Southern Philippines, breaking away from the traditional struggle fought by the Moro National Liberation Front under Nur Misuari. The inadequacy of Muslim socio-economic reforms under Misuari increased the social grievances of Muslims, which became a source of violence and strife.77

The ASG has also criticized the on-going peace talks between the

Philippine government and the MILF. The ASG has argued that “If this sell-out succeeds, more blood will flow because the young are more determined jihadis. We will soon find out there are more Osama bin Ladens in our midst.”78

Structural analysis of the roots of terrorism in the Philippines also points

to the socio-economic and political conditions that give rise to the ASG. An interview with B.General Orlando Buenaventura, who also wrote a study on the

73Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf”, Public Organization Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 390.

74Ibid.

75Vic Hurley, Swish of the Kriss: The Story of the Moros (Mandaluyong: Catcho Hermanos, 1985), p. 273. Also cited in Ibid., p. 399.

76For a detailed discussion of the author’s view on this topic, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines” in Andrew Tan (ed), Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. London: Edward Elgar Publishing, Limited, 2006).

77Lt. Colonel Benhur C. Paderes, Perceptions on the Abu Sayyaf: Their Implications for National Security (Master in National Security Administration Thesis: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2003), p. 61.

78 Simon Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Time Asia (30 August 2004).

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ASG,79 states that “the ASG problem was initially an offshoot of political, economic, socio-cultural and psychosocial conflicts prevailing in Mindanao.”80 Members of ASG are viewed as unwitting products of the historical, socio-economic and political contexts in which they find themselves. They are helpless individuals with minimal control over their destiny, floundering around in a maelstrom of turbulent currents of the four centuries of Bangsamoro struggle.81 The situation that gives rise to the ASG is marred by poverty, lack of services, inadequate infrastructure and lack of opportunity.82 This situation is aggravated by the fact that the Philippine state has a poor record in the ASG heartland of Mindanao.83 The Moro, which account for only 5% of the total Philippine population, suffers the lowest poverty and highest mortality rates, the least developed economy and minimal institutional government support.84

In Basilan Province alone, which is the ASG’s bailiwick, Muslims own only 25% of the land and the rest are owned by Christian population. This creates the feeling of immense animosity between Muslim and Christians in the area.85 Moros also feel the pain of silent discrimination because of their Islamic beliefs and “different” ways of life. For centuries, Moros also developed the feeling of dispossession by taking away their ancestral domains. Thus, they fight for self-determination to regain their homeland through Moro separatism.86 The confluence of silent discrimination, dispossession of Moro homeland, and four centuries of struggle for Moro sovereignty have inflamed the ASG’s militant activities in pursuit of an independent Islamic state.87

79Orlando G. Buenaventura, The Abu Sayyaf Problem in Mindanao: A Policy Option Paper (Master in National Security Administration Policy Option Paper: National Defense College of the Philippines, 1995).

80 Paderes, Perceptions on the Abu Sayyaf: Their Implications for National Security, op. cit., p. 67.

81This is a paraphrase of Colin Hay, “Structure and Agency” in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science (Hamshire and London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1995), p. 189.

82 Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf”, op. cit., p. 399.

83Ibid.

84Maelin Shipman, “Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information” (Paper presented to College of Health Sciences, Touro University Internationa, 2003). Also available at http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/terroristgroups/AbuSayyafGroup/ABUSAYYAFAnalysis.html <accessed on 22 February 2006>.

85Ibid. 86For an excellent reader, see Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds), Rebels, Warlords

and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000).

87 Shipman, “Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information” , op. cit., p. 4.

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The ASG was cognizant of the structural inequity, injustices and economic

deprivation of the Bangsamoro people. In its public statement issued in November 1994, the ASG declared that its struggle was to seek kaadilan or justice for the Bangsamoro people. In one of his ideological discourses or Khutbahs, Abdurajak Janjalani stressed that “the initial objectives for redress of grievances or attainment of justice ultimately ends in the demand for a purely Islamic state as a surest guarantee of justice and prosperity for Muslims.”88 The ASG even urged other Muslims in the Philippines “to unite and lay aside their differences and feuds.”89 In his undated public proclamation entitled “In the Name of Allah the Rahman the Raheem”, Abdurajak Janjalani even claimed that the ASG was founded “not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle which is against the teaching of Islam, especially the Qu’ran, but to serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and the MNLF whose revolutionary roles and leadership cannot be ignored or usurped.”90

Agential Analysis

Another approach that can explain the root of terrorism in the Philippine is the agential analysis. The agential analysis argues that terrorism is a product of a willful determination of individuals and not the structural environment in which they find themselves. Arguably, there is a problem of terrorism because there are persons who opt to become terrorists because of their strong commitments to a certain political or religious ideology.91

Thus, to understand terrorism is to examine the psychosocial profile of terrorists and the ideology, tactics and weaponry of terrorist organizations.92

The agential approach pays attention to terrorist behavior, motives and intentions to grapple with the issue of terrorism. It regards terrorism as a product of a person’s or a group’s free will, choice and conduct. In other words, terrorism is a result of the actor’s conscious deliberation.

Viewed from an agential perspective, terrorism in the Philippine may be

rooted to Abdurajak Janjalani’s personal profile and ideology. A son of a

88 Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle, op. cit., p. 99 89Ibid., p. 95.

90 Abdurajak Janjalani, “In the Name of Allah the Rahman the Raheem”, op. cit.

91For an earlier work on this view, see Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists:

Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982).

92For an excellent collection of recent studies, see Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella (eds), Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004).

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fisherman, Abdurajak Janjalani had a very humble beginning. Born on 8 November 1953, he grew and was socialized in an environment “where the laws set by men are flouted daily.”93 Though he ironically went to the Catholic-run Claret College for high school in Basilan, he failed, however to finish it. Glenda Gloria, a journalist observing the ASG, wrote that despite Abdurajak Janjalani’s failure to finish secondary school in Basilan, he “wrangled a scholarship from the Saudi Arabian government in 1981. Abdurajak was sent to Ummu I-Qura in Mecca where he studied Islamic jurisprudence for three years.“94 There, Janjalani was attracted deeply to the concept of jihad, which would eventually inform the ideology of the ASG.

In 1984, he returned to Basilan to preach in mosques. In 1988, Janjalani went to Peshawar, Pakistan where he conscientiously studied Iranian Islamic revolution. It was also in Peshawar where Janjalani reportedly met and befriended Osama bin Laden who eventually helped Abdurajak to finance the formation of the ASG.

When Janjalani formed the ASG, his original intention was to create a

group of Muslim Mujahideen committed to Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, a “struggle in the cause of Allah” or “fighting and dying for the cause of Islam”.95 Before Janjalani died in December 1998, he delivered eight radical ideological discourses called Khutbahs, which may be considered as primary sources of Janjalani’ radical Islamic thoughts. These discourses explained Janjalani’s Quranic perspective of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, which he lamented, was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He even denounced the ulama (Muslim scholars) for their little knowledge of the Quran and lamented that most Muslims in the Philippines calling themselves as Moros were not really practicing the true meaning of Islam compared with their counterparts in West Asia. These eight discourses also revealed Janjalani’s deep grasp of Wahabi Islam, which considered other Muslims heretical. The Islamic theology of Wahabism also influenced Janjalani’s radical ideology for the ASG.

From the agential analysis, the ASG would not have been organized were it not for the persistent efforts of Abdurajak Janjalani. The ASG would not have also been formed had it not for the support extended by Bin Laden through his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa who married a Filipina. Bin Laden instructed his Khalifa to go to the Philippines in 1988 to recruit fighters in the Afghan war. But Khalifa’s direct contact in the Philippines was the MILF. So, it was Ramzi Yousef who really deepened the ASG’s ties with Al Qaeda.

93Glenda Gloria, “Bearer of the Sword: The Abu Sayyaf Has Nebulous Beginnings and Incoherent Aims”, Mindanao Updates (6 June 2000).

94Ibid.

95This particular paragraph is based on Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism?”, op. cit.

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Yousef received international notoriety for masterminding the bombing of

World Trade Center in 1993. He was also known for planning in the Philippines the Bojinka plots, believed to be the worst terrorist plots in the country. The Bojinka plots aimed to bomb eleven U.S. jetliners and assassinate Pope John Paul II, who visited Manila in 1995. During his travel to the Philippines via Malaysia, Yousef reportedly stayed in Basilan and trained around 20 ASG fighters under the supervision of Abdurajak Janjalani to mount terrorist attacks in the Philippines.

As early as 1994, in fact, then police Colonel Rodolfo “Boogie” Mendoza revealed a 175-page report on the infiltration of the Philippines by international terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda. Mendoza pioneered the research on Al-Qaeda’s network in Southeast Asia and its funding of the ASG.96 Mendoza stressed that these personalities were responsible for perpetuating terrorism in the Philippines. Terrorism can, therefore, be rooted to the conscious determination of knowledgeable and intentional individuals like Janjalani, Bin Laden, Khalifa and Yousef, among others. To address the root of terrorism is to run after these people.

But it begs the question why the ASG persists after the death of Abdurajak Janjalani? Why terrorism continues to wreak havoc in the Philippines despite the reduction of the strength of the ASG?

The answer lies on the resilience of remaining ASG members who continue

to embrace the group’s Islamist ideology. After the death of Abdurajak, his younger brother, Khadafy, took his

position. But Khadafy did not have the charismatic and assertive leadership of his

older brother. So, the ASG was heavily factionalized when the Khadafy took the position.97 The two major factions were based in Basilan and Sulu acting independently. As of 2002, the Basilan-based faction was composed of ten armed groups while the Sulu-based faction was composed of 16-armed groups. These different armed groups also worked independently. Though Khadafy was the over-all leader, he failed to establish full control and supervision of these two

96 Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of

Operations in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 131.

97Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case” (Paper presented to the international symposium, “The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia” organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 18-20 April 2005). Also in John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemke, eds., Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005).

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major factions and several armed groups associated with the ASG. The Sulu-based faction headed by Commander Robot (Galib Andang) ventured into several KRAs. Though Khadafy was heading the Basilan-based faction, he was overpowered by Abu Sabaya (Aldam Tilao) who also resorted to banditry and kidnapping activities. With Commander Robot and Abu Sabaya running the “real” show, the ASG degenerated into a bandit organization. Commander Robot and Abu Sabaya converted the ASG from a genuine Muslim terrorist organization to what Eric Gutierrez called “entrepreneur of violence.”98

Factionalization and leadership struggle rapidly weakened the ASG. This

provided the AFP the golden opportunity to run after ASG members. Through intensive police and military operations, the Philippine government was able to reduce the ASG strength to almost 70%. From its peak of 1,269 fighters in 2000, the Philippine government reduced the strength of ASG to not more than 350 fighters in mid 2005. This tremendously weakened the ASG. Because of its small size, the Office of the President declared the ASG a spent force. That was before. Though admittedly smaller in number, the ASG was able to win strong local support through “Robin Hood” strategy. When “Robin Hood” appeal fails, the ASG resorts to fear to enforce support.99

Though the membership of the ASG continues to be small at present, it is

venturing into vigorous recruitment activities to recover from the lost of its members who were killed, neutralized and arrested after 9/11. It has various techniques to recruit members. Aside from religious propaganda and agitation, the ASG motivates recruits through financial reward. It also pays local recruits to serve as second and third security layer of their makeshift camps. Some members start their recruitment process by initially befriending potential recruits through ball games or pot (marijuana) sessions. The ASG also utilizes deception to recruit members. ASG leaders allow young Muslims to bring their firearms and take pictures of them and then use the pictures to blackmail them of joining the group.100 The ASG also uses marriages to expand its membership.

At present, the ASG is paying attention to younger and more idealistic

MILF members who regard the on-going peace process with the Philippine government as a sham. ASG leaders think that if the MILF makes peace with the government, they will inherit firebrands in the Southern Philippines. Thus, some ASG commanders are encouraging disgruntled MILF members to join the group.

98Eric Gutierez, “From Ilaga to Abu Sayyaf: New Entrepreneurs in Violence and their Impact

on Local Politics in Mindanao” (Unpublished Manuscript: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2001). Also see his “New Faces of Violence in Mindanao” in Gaerlan and Stankovitch (eds), Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, op. cit., pp. 349-362.

99 Shipman, “Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information” , op. cit., p. 6.

100 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study, op. cit. p. 41.

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MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim even warned that a great deal is needed quickly “before younger Muslims in the region succumb to the greater radicalism of the Abu Sayyaf.”101

In short, from the agential analysis, terrorism in the Philippines persists

because there are individuals who continue to believe that terrorism is powerful weapon to influence an audience in pursuance of an Islamist ideology. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the roots and evolution of terrorist movements in the Philippines focusing on the ASG. It argued that terrorism in the Philippines could only fully understood in its proper historical context. It also presented how a terrorist movement started in the Philippines from a structure-agency analysis. This chapter argued that the emergence of terrorist groups in the Philippines could be rooted to cultural, social, economic and political structures in which they found themselves. In other words, there were structural causes that breed terrorist groups like the ASG. To address the roots of terrorism in the Philippines is to pay attention to its structural origins and to correct the structural infirmities of the Philippine society in which “terrorists” find themselves.

This chapter also demonstrated that aside from structural causes, there

were also agential origins of terrorism in the country. Terrorism could be rooted to the conscious determination of knowledgeable and intentional individuals like Janjalani, Bin Laden, Khalifa and Yousef, among others who embrace and ideology that venerates acts of terrorism. To address the root of terrorism is to run after these people and to kill an ideology that endorses terrorism.

Many studies on terrorism, however, tend to highlight the empirical

debate and theoretical differences between structural and agential approaches (the structure-agency debate). Some scholars prefer a structural explanation while others prefer an agential explanation to understand the roots, causes and emergence of terrorism. A recent approach in political analysis attempts to reconcile the structural and agential explanations and integrate the structure-agency debate to examine political phenomena. This approach is called the strategic-relational approach (SRA).

The SRA aims to marry or reconcile the structural and agential

explanations of political phenomena like terrorism. Instead of viewing structure and agents as two opposite poles or two sides of the same coin, SRA seeks to demonstrate that structure and agency logically entail one another.102 It purports

101 Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” op.cit.

102 Hay, “Structure and Agency”, op. cit., p. 189.

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to offer a dynamic understanding of the important relationship of structure and agency, which refuses to privilege either moment (structure or agency).103

Using SRA to analyze the roots of terrorism may offer us a better way to develop a more informed and more nuanced policy on terrorism.

 

103 Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction , op. cit., p. 134.

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CHAPTER 2 Leadership Dynamics*

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter One, many scholarly studies have already been written about the ASG.104 But these studies describe what the ASG has done and can do rather what the ASG, as a terrorist organization, is really all about.

While we know a lot about the atrocities committed by the ASG, there is a great deal we do not know about its past as well as present complex organizational structure, current leadership dynamics and recent linkages with new terrorist organizations operating in the Philippines, in particular, and Southeast Asia, in general.

This chapter attempts to describe the complex organization set-up of the

ASG, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. It aims to examine its clandestine leadership dynamics in the light of new developments in the nature of terrorist threats in Southeast Asia. This chapter also aims to revisit the discourse on the linkages of ASG with JI and to propel new discussions on the new alliances of ASG with other terrorist groups operating in the Philippines like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and most recently, the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM).

*Revised version of paper entitled “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in

Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case” originally published in John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemski (eds), Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005). This paper was also presented at the international symposium, “The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia” organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism and the U.S. Pacific Command held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 18-20 April 2005. This paper was written with the support of the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA). The author is grateful to IDA for the kind permission to reprint this paper.

104See for example Djanicelle J. Berreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of

Abu Sayyaf, Bin Ladens East Asian Connection (San Jose: Writers Club Press, 2001); Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003) and Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003). For an insightful analysis on the evolution of ASG, see Rohan Gunaratna, “The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group”, Janes Intelligence Review (July 2001). For a very excellent historical analysis, see Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Bearer of the Sword”, Military Review (March/ April 2002), pp. 38- 47. For an analysis of ASG and civil society, see Alfredo Filler, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2002). Also see Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”, CRS Report for Congress (25 January 2002) and Mark Turner, “Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1995), pp. 1-19.

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The Organization of the ASG

When Janjalani formed the ASG, his original vision was to form a highly organized, systematic, and disciplined organization of fanatical secessionist Islamic fighters in the Southern Philippines. 105 Janjalani recruited younger and more passionate Muslim leaders who studied Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Egypt. These young Muslim leaders had common remorse against the MNLF, which entered into peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996. These leaders also shared common anger against the Philippine government based in Manila.

To achieve his vision of a truly organized Muslim resistant group in the

Philippines, Janjalani deliberately made a detailed organization of the ASG.106 He formed the Islamic Executive Council (IEC) composed of fifteen Amirs. Janjalani chaired the IEC to serve as the main planning and execution body of ASG. Under the IEC were two special committees. The first committee was the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group in charged of fund raising and Islamic education. The second committee was the Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee in charged of agitation and propaganda activities.107

The ASG also established a military arm called Mujahideen Al-Sharifullah

whose members came predominantly from disgruntled members of MNLF and the MILF. This military arm had three main units to carryout all terrorist activities of the ASG: the Demolition Team, the Mobile Force Team and the Campaign Propaganda Team. The Demolition Team composed mostly of trained fighters, had the capability to manufacture its own mines and explosives used in the bombing operations of the group. The Mobile Force Team - composed mostly of affiliates of radio clubs, traders, businessmen, shippers, and professionals – was in charged of collaboration and coordination activities of the ASG. The Campaign Propaganda Team – composed of professionals, students, and businessmen – was in charged of gathering vital information necessary to carry out the mission of Mujahideen Al-Sharifullah.108

Figure 1 is the organizational structure of the ASG as originally envisioned

by Janjalani.

105This section is culled from Rommel Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The

Abu Sayyaf Threat”, US Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005).

106 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study (Quezon City: Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, undated).

107To know more about the strategy of the ASG, see Office of the Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Field Handout: Doctrinal Extract for the Abu Sayyaf Group (Headquarters of the Philippine Marine Corps, 21 January 2002).

108Ibid. Also based on various intelligence briefings obtained by the author.

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Figure 1. ASG Organization Envisioned by the A. Janjalani

Fund raising Agitation Islamic propagation Propaganda

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

But the original organizational set-up of ASG was short-lived. When the

combined forces of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the AFP killed Janjalani in a bloody encounter in December 1998 in Lamitan, Basilan, the ASG suffered a severe leadership vacuum. This led to the discontentment of some of its original members. The organization set-up by Janjalani crumbled rapidly with him. The IEC headed by Janjalani also suffered an untimely demise. With no overall Amir at the helm of the organization, the group became a mere network of various armed groups with their own respective Amirs commanding their own respective loyal followers operating mainly in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.

With the death of Abdurajak Janjalani (AJ), remaining leaders, however,

reluctantly selected Khadafy Janjalani (KJ), a younger brother, as his successor in July 1999. But the ASG under KJ had lost its original organization set-up and Islamic theological zeal. Unlike AJ, the younger Janjalani did not have the theological passion of his older brother. Lacking strong ideological guide, most of its members resorted to banditry, piracy, kidnap-for-ransom, and other terrorist activities. The ASG was also heavily factionalized. It was reported, however, that KJ attempted to revive the Islamist agenda of the ASG. But his confirmed death in January 2007 aborted his plan.

ISLAMIC EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group

Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee

Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah

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Leadership Dynamics in the ASG

According to various military reports, the ASG had two major factions operating independently in two major areas in the Southern Philippines: Basilan and Sulu. KJ headed the Basilan-based ASG. Galib Andang, otherwise known as Commander Robot, headed the Sulu-based ASG.

But the Sulu group unexpectedly lost its leader with the capture of

Commander Robot in December 2003. Commander Robot was eventually killed in a bloody jailbreak attempt on 15 March 2005. The Sulo-based ASG is now under the command of Radullan Sahiron.

Other military reports talked of another faction of ASG operating in

Zamboanga City with Hadji Radzpal as the main leader. But Hadji Radzpal was also identified by other intelligence sources as one of the leaders of the Sulu-based faction of the ASG. Local leaders, however, denied the existence of ASG faction in Zamboanga City. The ASG was just using the city for two major purposes: as a target for bombing operation and as a place for “rest and recreation”.

The Basilan-based ASG was composed of 73 members as of 2002. These

members were ASG hard-liners composed of 30 personal followers of Khadafy Janjalani, 30 personal followers of Isnillon Hapilon, and 13 followers of Abu Sabaya. The group of Hapilon was the main security arm of the Basilan-based ASG. The group of Abu Sabaya, on the other hand, joined the group of Khadafy Janjalani in running the daily planning and administrative affairs of the group. The Philippine military claimed that it killed Sabaya and two others in a naval encounter in June 2002. But Sabaya’s body was never found, triggering speculations that he could still be alive despite the AFP’s repeated pronouncements that Sabaya was among those who died and drowned in the waters of Sibuco Bay in Zamboanga del Norte.109

The Sulu-based became a loose organization of Muslim bandits under the

command of late Commander Robot. This faction of ASG was responsible for the kidnapping of 21 tourists spending a vacation in a resort in Sipadan Island of Malaysia on 23 April 2000. The Basilan-based and Sulu-based factions of the ASG were also divided into different groups with their own leaders. As of 2002, the Basilan-based faction was composed of ten armed groups while the Sulu-based faction was composed of 16-armed groups.

109“Sabaya’s Death not the End Abu Sayyaf, says Basilan Bishop”, MindaNews (29 June 2002) at http://www.mindanews.com/2002/07/1st/nws29abu.html <accessed on 30 August 2004>. A very close friend of mine who was a member of the Special Warfare Group (SWAG) who did the actual operation against Abu Sabaya told me that Sabaya was indeed killed in the said battle.

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Table 1 shows the Basilan-based groups of the ASG. Table 2, on the other hand, shows the Sulu-based groups of the ASG.

Table 1. Basilan-Based Faction of the ASG

Name of Group Known Leaders of the Group Ampul Group Mauran Ampu or Abu Mauran Apting Group Abu Apting Danggatil Group Moto Danggantil or Mata Danggatil Hapilon Group Sahiron Hapilon Isnilon Group Isnilon Hapilon Jainuddin Group Nadjalin Jainuddin Janjalani Group Hector Janjalani or Abu Abral Kaw Jaljalis Group Kalaw Jaljalis or Boy Granada Salagin Group Abu Salagin Masiraji Sali Group Hamsiraji Sali Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

Table 2. Sulu-Based Faction of the ASG

Name of Group Known Leaders of the Group Robot Group Galib Andang orCmdr Robot Amil Group Julius Aminulla Amil Asiri Group Basiri Asiri Badja Group Datu Panglima Badja Bauddin Group Salapuddin Bauddin Hayudini Group Nidzmi Hayudinni or Cmdr Takulong Hadji Radzpal Group Hadji Radzpal or Abu Rayhan Irijani Group Mudjahid Irijani Jamal Group Yahiya Jamal or Abu Alvarez Kalim Group Pati Kalim Landi Group Kumander Landi Mali Group Sulaiman Mali Saabdula Group Nadzmi Saabulla or Cmdr Global Sahiron Group Radullah Sahiron Sali Group Hesseim Sali Shariff Group Wahid Shariff Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

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From these factions, there was no doubt that ASG was not a homogenous

organization. Rather, the ASG was a very loose coalition of many groups of radical Muslim leaders and bandits commanding their own loyal followers in the Southern Philippines. These groups had mixed objectives from Islamic fundamentalism to mere banditry. Members of these groups paid allegiance mostly to their respective leaders rather than to ASG doctrines. Not all groups were truly committed to the idea of a separate Islamic state in the Southern Philippines, though there were some groups who were really committed to the cause. Some Muslim bandit groups in the Southern Philippines wanted to be associated with the ASG for prestige, political expediency and economic gains. But the dynamics of these groups shared common feature: they were highly personalistic rather than ideological groups of Muslim radicals.

Based on the various factions, the organizational set-up of the ASG was far from those envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani. Figure 2 was the known organizational structure of the ASG as of 2003.

Figure 2. ASG Organization After the Death of A. Janjalani

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Various documents, 2000-2004.

ASG Linkages with other Terrorist Organizations Operating in the Philippines

The ASG mutated into a very resilient terrorist organization. Despite heavy military operations and loss of its key leaders, it continued to wreak terrorist havocs in the Philippines. The bombing of Super ferry 14 on 27 February 2004 and the three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, General Santos City and Davao City on the eve of Valentines Day celebration in 2005 were just some of the indications that the ASG could still disturb the peace. In the telephone interview pertaining to the Super ferry 14 incidents, ASG spokesperson Abu Solaiman even taunted the Philippine government by saying, “"Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you

ISLAMIC EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Basilan-Based Sulu-Based Zamboanga-Based

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impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people."110

Despite the declining number of ASG operatives due to sustained military

crackdown in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga City, the group was still able to wreak terrorist havocs because of its superb ability to establish strong linkages with other terrorist groups operating in the Philippines. These groups were the JI, the MNLF, the MILF and the RSIM. The ASG also had a creative and sophisticated means to solicit local support, which undoubtedly contributed to its resilience as a terrorist organization.

ASG Linkages with JI

ASG linkages with JI have already been excellently discussed by various authors.111 Although the organizational dynamics of JI and ASG are undergoing dramatic changes in the midst of a changing national and regional security environment, latest developments have indicated that JI-ASG linkage remains in tact and operational.

Intelligence sources revealed that the number of JI members in the

Philippines collaborating with ASG was placed at 33 as of December 2004. The Philippine National Police Intelligence Group even estimated that the number of JI operatives in the Philippines could be placed at 60 as of April 2005.112 Some intelligence sources said that the JI operatives in the Philippines could only be around 30, as of June 2012. These JI operatives were able to exploit local Muslim secessionist rebels in the Philippines by sharing their bomb-making demolition skills.113

110Marco Garrido, “After Madrid, Manila?”, Asia Times (24 April 2004) at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD24Ae01.html <accessed on 28 August 2004>.

111See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 3 (December 2002), pp. 427-465.; Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003) and Rommel C. Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004).

112Interview with Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan, Director of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group, held at Camp Crame, Quezon City on 1 April 2005.

113 Alcuin Papa, “Military: JI Members Still Training Locals”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (18 January 2005).

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In connection with the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings, two Indonesians and a Malaysian allegedly belonging to the JI were arrested by intelligence operatives in Zamboanga City on 23 February 2005. But the arrest of Rohmat alias “Zaki” on 16 March 2005 gave more substantial information about the recent JI-ASG linkages. Zaki, an Indonesian national, confessed to several crimes involving the ASG since 2000, including training members to make bombs in JI-run camps.114 Known as the “ASG the bomb trainer”, Zaki candidly admitted that he trained ASG members in bomb making, particularly the use of mobile phones as detonating devices and the use of toothpaste as bomb paraphernalia.” 115 He also admitted to have coordinated the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings, which resulted in the brutal death of 10 people and the serious wounding of at least 150 others.

ASG Linkages with the MNLF

It is already well-known that most ASG members are disgruntled members of the MNLF. But their links go beyond that. ASG members continue to connive with MNLF members to plant bombs, kidnap people and commit murder.

A police intelligence report revealed that ASG forged alliances with some

gunmen loyal to jailed MNLF leader Nur Misuari.116 Then Chief Police Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) said that alliance between ASG and the MNLF were formed years ago. According to former Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the now defunct Philippine Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), this alliance was on a tactical or operational level.117

Ruland Ullah, a former ASG member and was a state witness to the April

2000 Sipadan hostage crisis, confirmed these observations when he said that ASG hired MNLF fighters to mount terrorist attacks. MNLF members even acted as mercenaries of the ASG for an amount of at least $1,000. MNLF members also

114 “Alleged bombs expert for Jemaah Islamiyah regional network arrested in Philippine”,

Channel News Asia at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/138779/1/.html <accessed on 12 April 2005>.

115Interview with General Marlu Quevedo, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, held at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City on 29 March 2005.

116Jim Gomez, “Filipino Terror Group’s Reach Grown Nationally”, Associated Press (8 March 2005).

117Interview with Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippines Anti-Terrorism Task Force held at Malacanang Palace, Manila on 21 March 2005.

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provided sanctuaries for ASG members when the need arises.118 They also shared fighters to mount terrorist attacks not only in the Southern Philippines but also in Metro Manila.

ASG Linkages with the MILF

Former President Joseph Estrada tried to link the ASG with the MILF. But there was no clear evidence of the link during his time. Thomas McKenna, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and author of Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines,119 even said that "It is certainly possible that some disaffected MILF fighters have gone over to the ASG," but "the ASG may be best viewed as a direct challenge to both the MILF and MNLF, not as an adjunct."120

Recent evidences indicated that the ASG strongly established tactical alliance with the MILF. Although former Secretary of National Defense Eduardo Ermita once argued that MILF members did not show any proof that they helped the ASG,121 new intelligence sources revealed that ASG and MILF members shared fighters in their operations. According to Ullah, “Sometimes the MILF would plant a roadside bomb against soldiers and the Abu Sayyaf would shoot the soldiers wounded in the blast.”122 MILF and ASG members also received joint training with JI operatives, particularly in the area of bomb making. In a paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), it said that “During explosives training, JI teaches the MILF or ASG skills in the making of bombs with cell phones, in the identification of the different types of explosives and paraphernalia like TNT, black powder, PETN, Ammonium Nitrate, C4, Detonating Cords, and Detonators.”123

118 Jomar Canlas, “State Witness Bares MNLF, MILF Links with Abu Sayyaf”, The Manila

Times (28 March 2005).

119 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

120 “Gunning for Glory”, Al-Ahram Weekly Online Issue No.548 (23 - 29 August 2001).

121“They [MILF] have not shown any proof that they have helped”, Newsbreak (10 May 2004).

122“Gunning for Glory”, op. cit.

123A paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on 29 March 2005.

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ASG Linkages with the RSIM

One of the ASG’s newest links is with the Rajah Solaiman Movement or RSIM (otherwise known as Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement or RSIM).

Intelligence documents describe the RSIM as part of the Balik Islam

Movement (Return to Islam Movement) or Fi Sabilillah.124 The RSIM is a clandestine Muslim organization in Manila collaborating with the ASG in waging urban terrorism. The group is named after Rajah Solaiman, the last king of Manila before the Spanish conquest in the 1500s. Most of its members are Muslim converts. Like the ASG, the converts claim that they want to remake the country into an Islamic state.125

It was estimated that the RSIM had at least 70 members in Luzon as of

April 2005. The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), on the other hand, reported that more than 110,000 Filipino converted to Islam as of the first quarter of 2005. Hilarion del Rosario, Jr. (also known as Ahmed Santos) was the identified leader and founder of the RSIM. Santos ran a madrasa or Islamic school in Pangasinan, which was raided by Philippine law enforcement operatives in May 2003.

An intelligence report stated that the RSIM was founded in 2002 to

"Islamize” the whole Philippines based on the belief that before the Spaniards came with Christianity, there were first Muslims in the archipelago.126

Reportedly, the RSIM established a special operations group and a special

action force financed by Saudi Arabian money channeled through various charities in the Philippines. ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani reportedly gave the RSIM the equivalent of about $200,000 for its initial operational activities in Manila, which included the recruitment and conversion of Christians to Islam, then sending them for terrorist training.127

The PNP regarded the International Information Center (IIC), a Muslim

center based in Quiapo, Manila, as front of the RSIM. The Philippine Association

124According to Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippine Anti-Terrorist Task

Force, the difference between the RSM, the Balik Islam Movement and the Fi Sabililah is hard to distinguish.

125Joe Cochrane, “Filipino Authorities Say The Newest Threat To The Country Is A Shadowy Terror Group Made Up Of Radical Muslim Converts”, Newsweek International Edition (17 May 2004) at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4933472/ <accessed on 28 August 2004>.

126“Summary of Report on Rajah Solaiman Movement” (12 April 2004) at http://www.westerndefense.org/articles/PhilippineRepublic/may04.htm <accessed 31 August 2004>.

127Ibid.

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of Muslimah Darul Eeman, Inc. (PAMDAE, Inc.) was also reported to be a front of the ASG to recruit Metro Manila based Islam converts in its fold.128 The following Balik Islam groups also aroused the curiosity of Philippine intelligence units:

Al Maarif Education Center (Baguio City) Da’rul Hijra Foundation, Inc. (Makati City) Islamic Learning Center (Pangasinan)

The blasting of the Super ferry 14 on 26 February 2004 was described as

the handiwork of ASG-RSIM conspiracy. Redento Cain Dellosa, an RSIM member, confessed that he deliberately planted a bomb on Super ferry 14. The Marine Board Inquiry in charge of investigating the Super ferry 14 incident confirmed that the ASG masterminded the explosion with the assistance of RSIM.

Interestingly, ASG links with RSIM also run in the family. Amina Lim Dungon, one of the wives of ASG spokesman Abu Sulaiman, is the sister of Lorraine Lim Dungon, who is a wife of RSIM leader Ahmed Santos. ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani’s wife, Zainad Lim Dungon, is a sister of Amina and Lorraine. These make Sulaiman, Santos and Janjalani not only “brothers-in-arms” but also brothers-in-law.

Some ICC officers were also kin to Fi-Sabilillah and RSIM leaders.129

According to Chief Police Superintendent Mendoza of the PNP, “If you make an extended family tree of top Islamic radicals, you will come out with something like a tightly woven spider’s web.”130

This view was shared with another top police officer that argued that the ties between ASG and RSIM and even MILF and MNLF were “more personal than ideological” because there were “blood ties” and they had “an experience of strife with government.”131

ASG Mass Base

One important strength of the ASG, despite its small number, is its superb ability to solicit local support.

128A paper obtained from the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, 1 March 2005.

129 Inday Espina-Varona, “Brothers in Arms”, Philippine Graphics, Vol. 15, No. 38 (28

February 2005), p. 24.

130Ibid.

131Ibid., p. 25.

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The ASG resorted to kidnapping activities not merely for purposes of committing criminal acts but to use part of its huge ransom money to build-up its manpower and to lure local communities to provide mass support to the organization. When kidnapping activities of the ASG became a lucrative venture, it succeeded in offering monetary compensation to local population to become core members of its mass base support system. 132 Some local government leaders even coddled some ASG members in exchange for monetary payment.133 It was reported that a few local police and military personalities even provided support to the ASG in exchange for a cut of its loot and a share from the ransom money.134 Confronting the ASG Threat: Philippine Anti-Terrorism Strategy and Its Limits

To address the threats of terrorism in the Philippines, the Philippine government formed the Inter-Agency Task Force Against International Terrorism on 24 September 2001 under the direct supervision of the Office of the President.135 This Inter-Agency Task Force aimed to coordinate intelligence operations and to facilitate the identification and neutralization of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines. To freeze the financial assets of international terrorists, the Philippine Congress decisively passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act on 29 September 2001.

President Arroyo also announced on 12 October 2001 its 14-pilar approach to combat terrorism. (See Box 1)

132Department of National Defense, “Info Kit on the Abu Sayyaf Group” (Submitted to the Committee on National Defense and Security of the Philippine Senate on 24 August 2001). 133See International Peace Mission, Basilan: The Next Afghanistan? (Report of the International Peace Mission to Basilan, Philippines 23-27 March 2002), p. 11. Also at http://www.bwf.org/pamayanan/peacemission.html <accessed on 30 August 2004>. 134Madge Kho, “Fighting the Abu Sayyaf: A Pretext for U.S. Intervention In the Philippines” at http://www.philippineupdate.com/madge.htm <accessed on 12 May 2005>. 135 Rommel C. Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004).

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Box 1. 14 Pillars to Combat Terrorism in the Philippines • Designates Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security as the lead anti-terrorism body; • Seeks to undertake consolidate intelligence projects; • Calls on the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police to address terrorist violence; • Holds accountable all public and private organizations abetting terrorism; • Seeks regional consensus. and cooperation especially with Indonesia and Malaysia in the war against

terrorism; • Anticipates legal issues and concerns; • Pursues Christian-Muslim dialog and seeks to promote ecumenism; • Calls for greater vigilance and concrete measures against all possible terrorist supplies, materials and

finances; • Mobilizes disaster coordination efforts in the event of catastrophic attack; • Secures critical infrastructure; • Protects overseas workers and seeks their immediate transfer if needed; • Seeks the integration of the global terrorist threat in the AFP/PNP modernization program; • Asks for media responsibility; and, • Seeks to address the socioeconomic and political roots of “perceived fanaticism and irrational violence.

Source: Memorandum Order No. 37 dated 12 October 2001.

Through the Operation Center of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS)136 the Philippine government formulated the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences as Annex K to the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The Philippine government approved the NISP on 26 November 2001 through Memorandum Order 44. The COCIS was tasked to implement the national anti-terrorism plan by involving all national government agencies, local government units (LGUs), and the private sectors in the campaign.137 But the Philippine government abolished the COCIS in October 2004. The task of managing and implementing the anti-terrorism plan was then transferred to the ATTF, which was originally formed on 24 March 2004 under the COCIS. The ATTF operation was transferred to the Office of the President with the Executive Secretary as the Chair. The ATTF was based in Malacanang

136The Philippine government formed the Cabinet Oversight Committee on International

Security on 19 June 2001 through Executive Order No. 21. It is chaired by the Executive Security with the Secretary of National Defense as Vice-Chair.

137This section is largely based on Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Local Government Response Against Terrorist Threat in the Philippines: Issues and Prospects” (Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th International Conference of the East and Southeast Asia Network for Highly Performing Local Governments organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Local Government Development Foundation, Rendezvous Hotel, Singapore on 2-3 December 2004).

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Palace in Manila. The ATTF aimed to establish an extensive anti-terrorism information system and accelerate intelligence fusion among all intelligence units in the Philippines in the identification of terrorism personalities, cells, groups, and organizations in various LGUs. It also aimed to conduct an extensive information drive at both national and local levels “to prepare the public and all stakeholders to get involved in the national anti-terrorism campaign.”138 With the creation of ATTF, the Philippine government adopted the 16-point counter-terrorism program to operationalize the 14-point anti-terrorism policy of the national government. (See Box 2) But the passage of Human Security Act of 2007, otherwise known as the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Law of 2007, the ATTF was abolished and was replaced by the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) being chaired by the Executive Secretary.

Through its unrelenting efforts to combat terrorism in the Philippines, the Philippine government was able to reduced the strength of the ASG. As stated earlier, ASG strength was reduced to less than 400-armed followers, which could be regarded as an achievement of the Philippine government in the global fight against terrorism.

But the real success of anti-terrorism campaign in the Philippines depends heavily on strength of its intelligence system. Sadly, Philippine government still has a weak intelligence system being a relatively young republic. Although the Philippine government has issued Administrative Order No. 68 on 8 April 2003 to strengthen the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), the government's intelligence capability remains weak.

Former Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Narciso Abaya candidly

acknowledged that the non-sharing of intelligence information by military spy units in the Philippines is hampering the government’s antiterrorism campaign.139 Abaya said that a culture exists among intelligence units in the Philippines to withhold vital intelligence information from other groups and stressed that “I think we have to improve on our intelligence. The trend now is not the need to know but the need to share. That is the emerging trend among intelligence units all over the world.”140 He further lamented, “Sometimes, our intelligence units zealously keep to themselves intelligence information which, if fused with the information of other intelligence units, would give a more

138Inter-Agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force, “Government Response to Terrorism” (undated).

139Karl B. Kaufman, “Weak’ Intel Blamed On Overzealous Spy Units”, The Manila Times (26 March 2004) at http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/mar/26/yehey/top_stories/20040326top6.html <accessed on 30 August 2004>.

140Ibid.

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comprehensive picture of the enemy.”141 This problem in Philippine intelligence system still persists but measures have been undertaken to surmount the problem.

Another nagging concern in the Philippines’ anti-terrorism campaign was

the serious allegation that the military establishment and provincial government were coddling some ASG members. Based on the report of the International Peace Mission that went to Basilan on 23-27 March 2002, “there are consistent credible reports that the military and the provincial government are coddling the Abu Sayyaf.”142 Thus, the Peace Mission argued that a military solution to the ASG threat would “not work to solve the problem.”143

As early as 1994, in fact, there were allegations that some police and fake

police officers were involved in the ASG attempt to smuggle firearms in Zamboanga City from Manila and Iloilo on board the vessel M/V Princess of the Pacific. But the police and the military authorities stressed that connivance with ASG was not being tolerated.

The Philippine military has, in fact, recognized that military solution alone

cannot defeat the ASG. In the After Action Report of the ASG Combat Research and Study Group

of the Training and Doctrine Command of the Philippine Army submitted on 19 September 2001 to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, it stated that:

The ASG problem cannot be solved through military solution alone. It should be approached by complementary and mutually reinforcing efforts by the civil agencies and the military. The government must concretely pursue social, economic and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem. Effective measures must also be undertaken to ensure the welfare and protection of civilians and reducing the impact of the armed conflict on them. These should necessarily include intensified delivery of basic services to conflict areas.144

141Ibid.

142For a complete copy of the report, see Basilan: The Next Afghanistan? (Report of the

International Peace Mission to Basilan, Philippines 23-27 March 2002) at http://www.bwf.org/pamayanan/peacemission.html <accessed on 30 August 2004>.

143Ibid.

144ASG Combat Research and Study Group, “After Action Report” (Submitted to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army on 19 September 2001 by the Training and Doctrine Command of the Philippine Army).

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Box 2. 16-Point Counter-Terrorism Program

• Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the government against terrorism

• Intelligence coordination • Internal focus against terrorism • Accountability and private corporations and personalities • Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook • Legal measures • Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity • Vigilance against the movement of terrorist and their supporters, equipment, weapons,

and funds • Contingency plans • Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructures • Support for overseas Filipino workers • Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National

Police • Media Support • Political, social, and economic measures • Ensuring the accountability of local and national government in cleaning the

government of terrorist and criminal coddlers • Strengthening the peace process

Source: Anti-Terrorism Task Force Accomplishment Report, June 2004.

To surmount the threats posed by ASG and other threats to Philippine

internal security, the Philippine government established, as stated earlier, the COCIS. The COCIS adopted the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” (SHA) as the grand strategy to overcome insurgency problems in the Philippines, including the ASG. The SHA consisted of four major components:

• Political/Legal/Diplomatic • Socio-Economic/Psychosocial • Peace and order/Security, and • Information.145

145Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, National Internal Security Plan (NISP), Version 3. RESTRICTED document. Quotations in this particular section come from this document, unless otherwise stated.

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The political/legal/diplomatic component of the SHA pushed for “political reforms and institutional development to strengthen democratic institutions and empower the citizenry to pursue personal and community growth.” This component aimed to develop and propagate Philippine democracy to “confront the communist ideology” and the Islamic fundamentalist ideology. The cornerstone of this particular component was the peace process based on the “Six Paths to Peace” formula:

• Pursuit of social, economic and political reforms; • Consensus-building and empowerment for peace; • Peaceful, negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups; • Programs for reconciliation, reintegration, and rehabilitation; • Conflict management and protection of civilians caught in armed

conflict; and, • Building and nurturing a climate conducive to peace.

The socio-economic/psychosocial component of the SHA, on the other

hand, aimed to alleviate poverty in the country through the acceleration of development programs of the Philippine government. This component also aimed to develop and strengthen “a spirit of nationhood among the people, which included developing national character/identity without losing cultural integrity.”

The peace and order/security component aimed “to protect the people

from the insurgents and provide a secure environment for national development.” More importantly, this component had the specific goal of denying the insurgents “access to their most important resource – popular support.”

Finally, the information component was the integrating component in the SHA. It referred “to the overall effort to advocate peace, promote public confidence in government and support government efforts to overcome insurgency through tri-media and interpersonal approaches.”

The operational aspect of the SHA was the “Left Hand” and “Right Hand”

approaches. In an interview, President Arroyo explained these approaches in the following words:

How do we address this problem (of) insurgency? Through

the right-hand and left-hand approach. (The) right hand is the full force of the law and the left hand is the hand of reconciliation and the hand of giving support to our poorest brothers so that they won’t be encouraged to join the rebels.146

146Marichu Villanueva, “Palace Announces RP-CPP Peace Talks Resume in Oslo February 10-13”, The Philippine Star (6 February 2004) at http://www.newsflash.org/2003/05/hl/hl019815.htm <accessed on 17 August 2004).

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While the SHA was meant to primarily combat communist insurgency, it

was also applied to address terrorist threats.147 But as stated earlier, the Philippine government abolished COCIS in October 2004. To replace the COCIS in the implementation of SHA in counter-terrorism, the Philippine government transferred the responsibilities to the ATTF.

During the Arroyo government, the ATTF was the main government body

tasked to formulate strategies, policies, plans and measures necessary to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism in the Philippines, particularly those perpetuated by the ASG. But the ATTF was abolished in 2007 with the creation of the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC).

With the abolition of the COCIS and the ATTF, the Philippine government also replaced the SHA with the strategy of “whole-of-government” (WOG) approach against terrorism and insurgency.

Like the SHA, the WOG aimd to address the root causes of security

challenges facing the Philippine state. But the WOG paid greater attention to non-military means to defeat terrorism, which includes job creation in the rural areas, provisions of social services and infrastructure to communities, strengthening good governance at the national and local levels and establishment of an effective local judiciary system.148 The WOG informs the current operation of the ATC.

To date, there has been no study assessing the practical effectiveness of WOG. But based on documents, the WOG contains a lot of flamboyant sound bytes that extol the value of non-military approaches to address the problem of terrorism posed by the ASG and other similar groups.

Conclusion

Despite its small number, the ASG remains as a threat to Philippine national security. Though the ASG has lost some of its important leaders, it has managed to wage terrorist attacks because of its ability forge alliances with other terrorist organizations operating in the Philippines and to solicit mass support. Its new tactics of using front organizations also make the ASG a very resilient terrorist organization in the Philippines.

147Department of National Defense “Talking Points on Abu Sayyaf Group” (17 November

2003). This document explains the use of SHA in countering the ASG.

148Department of National Defense, Defense Planning Guidance, 2008-2013 (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, November 2006), p. 1.

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The Philippine government has waged serious campaigns to address the problem of terrorism in the country. It has made remarkable achievements in neutralizing ASG members and leaders.

But the root of Muslim rebellion, which encourages some Muslim Filipinos to resort to terrorism, has not been satisfactorily addressed by the Philippine government. Though the Philippine government has implemented the strategy of holistic approach to address the problem of Muslim rebellion, the strategy has not been implemented as planned due to budgetary constraints, allegations of corruption in the government, and persistence of violence in the countryside. Even the strategy of “whole-of-government” approach also needs to be implemented on the ground to really attack the root causes of terrorism and insurgency in the Philippines.

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CHAPTER 3 Bandit or Terrorist*

Introduction

Is the ASG a bandit group or a terrorist organization? Does the ASG have an ideology? How strong and capable the ASG is an organization?

This chapter describes the ASG as both a bandit group and as a terrorist

organization in the context of crime-terrorism nexus. This chapter argues there is a growing collusion of terrorist groups and organized criminal syndicates in the Philippines. The ASG connives with ordinary criminal groups to mount kidnap-for-ransom activities to generate income. But a few members of the ASG continue to be engaged in Islamic propagation to pursue their dream of establishing a Islamic state in Mindanao. Ideological Inclination

The ASG’s original ideology was strongly anchored on Janjalani’s religious and political thoughts. ASG followers did not only recognize Janjalani as their leader but also their ideological beacon.149 As an ideologue, Janjalani was well-informed by the historical, religious, economic, political and social conditions in which Muslims in the Philippines find themselves.

At the early stage of world Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 150 Janjalani traveled to different Muslim countries where received training and education in radical Islamic thoughts. He received a very good Islamic education in Saudi Arabia in 1981 and went to Ummu I-Qura in Mecca where he studied Islamic jurisprudence for almost three years. There, Janjalani was attracted deeply to the concept of jihad. Armed with radical Islamic ideology, Janjalani returned to his homeland in Basilan in 1984 to preach initially in various mosques before formally organizing the ASG. In 1988 Janjalani went to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he conscientiously studied the Islamic revolution in

*Revised version of a paper entitled “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to

Genuine Terrorism” originally published in Dalijit Singh and Lorraine Salazar (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 247-262. The original version of this paper was written with the permission and generous support of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

149 Nathan G. Quimpo, “Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who’s Afraid of an

Islamic State?, Public Policy, Vol. III, No. 4 (October/December 1999), p. 50.

150For a detailed discussion on the rise of Muslim radicalism in the Philippines, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines” in Andrew Tan, ed., Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2006).

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Iran. It was also in Peshawar that he reportedly met and befriended Osama bin Laden, who helped him organize the ASG.

When Janjalani formed the ASG, his original intention was to create a

group of Muslim Mujahideen committed to Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, a “struggle in the cause of Allah” or “fighting and dying for the cause of Islam”. Before Janjalani died in December 1998, he delivered eight radical ideological discourses called Khutbahs, which may be considered as primary sources of Janjalani’s radical Islamic thoughts. These discourses explained Janjalani’s Quranic perspective of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, which he lamented, was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He even denounced the ulama (Muslim scholars) for their little knowledge of the Quran and lamented that most Muslims in the Philippines calling themselves, as Moros were not really practicing the true meaning of Islam compared with their counterparts in West Asia. These eight discourses also revealed Janjalani’s deep grasp of Wahabi Islam, which considered other Muslims heretical. The Islamic theology of Wahabism greatly informed Janjalani’s radical ideology.

In his analysis of Philippine society, Janjalani was aware of the injustices

committed against Muslim communities. Thus, he purportedly founded the ASG to vigorously seek kaadilan or justice for Muslims through jihad. For Janjalani, jihad is the highest form of struggle for justice or cause. He classified jihad into two: jihad al-akbar (greater Jihad) and jihad al-asgar (lesser jihad), but did not elaborate. He only argued that they “are the same in Divine assessment but are merely differentiated in human terms and conditions.”151 He contended that the “surest guarantee of justice and prosperity for Muslims” is the establishment of a purely Islamic state that can only be achieved through jihad. Janjalani even urged Muslims in the Philippines to pursue their jihad to the highest level in order to fulfill their paramount duty of martyrdom for the cause of Allah.

Janjalani’s appeal for martyrdom also meant an endorsement of suicide terrorism. Though there was no recorded incident of suicide terrorism in the country at the time, Janjalani was aware of the value of suicide terrorism as a favored tactic of radical Muslims pursuing jihad. Some years later, the bombing of Super ferry 14 on 28 February 2004 was originally planned by the ASG as a suicide mission.152

151Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle., p. 98.

152Because of continuing radicalization of Muslim communities in the Philippines, the

ASG may employ suicide terrorism in the near future. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, key suspects in 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, have reportedly established their base in the Philippines to prepare ASG members in future suicide missions. In his speech to the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines in Manila on 11 August 2005, National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales warned that up to ten Indonesian militants, including Dulmatin and Umar Patek, were on the loose in the Philippines and plotting suicide attacks. Se Joel Francisco Guinto, “10 Indonesian suicide bombers hunted in RP”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (11 August 2005).

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One of Janjalani’s Khutbahs revealed his deep resentment against Christian missionaries in Mindanao, particularly those severely maligning Islam. Janjalani said that the aggressive preaching of Christian missionaries in Mindanao gravely insulted Islam and severely provoked Muslims to respond violently. The bombing of M/V Doulos in August 1991 was ASG’s retaliation against Christian missionaries who used derogatory words against Islam and called Allah a false God.

ASG Strength and Capabilities

The ASG started with no more than 1,000 members in 1991 and rose to almost 1,300 in 1998. According to the Philippines’ Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), ASG strength as of the last quarter of 2005 was no more than 350 members, very close to its figure of 380 during the second quarter of 2005 but far from its August 2005 figure of 250. An undersecretary of the DND estimated the current strength of the ASG to be around 500, close to the military intelligence figure of 409. The Armed Forces of the Philippines reported that the ASG had strength of 380 as of 2008. The ASG strength declined further to less than 350 members in 2009 and not more than 300 members in 2010. But in 2011, the National Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), dubbed as Oplan Bayanihan, said that the ASG reached around 400 members. In the first semester of 2012, the ASG strength was estimated at around 300 armed followers.

Strictly speaking, there is no certainty on the current strength of ASG because its members overlap with some members of the MILF and the Misuari Break Away Group (MBG) of the MNLF. Other ASG members are even associated with the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), a group of Muslim converts in the Philippines believed to be funded by the ASG.

While its exact strength is unclear, what is certain is that the ASG remains

a very small but very lethal armed group of Muslims in the Philippine. Despite its small number, the ASG draws its strength from huge local support. Most ASG members are relatives, friends, classmates and neighbors of local folks. ASG members even buy their foodstuffs from local stores and get “early warning signals” from local communities during military offensives. The Philippine military has admitted that religious and political propaganda, financial compensation and even coercion are the ASG’s primary means of gaining local support in the form of manpower, intelligence and sometime logistics.153

Local support enhanced the capability of the ASG. The AFP reported that

the ASG had the capability to stage “high impact terrorist attacks against civilian targets not only in Basilan and Sulu but also in other parts of the country.” When ASG members fight, they “can pin-down up to a company size unit” and during military engagements, they are capable of “reinforcing beleaguered members in a

153 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study, p. 13.

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short period of time” particularly in areas “near a Muslim village of an MNLF and MILF camps”. There were even some “enterprising Muslims who join the fight purposely to acquire firearms and ammunitions left by government casualties.”

As of the last quarter of 2005, military intelligence estimated around 480 weapons believed to be in ASG’s possession. In previous military encounters, the military seized night vision devices, thermal imager, sniper’s scope, various types of commercial radios, satellite and cellular phones and high speed sea crafts from the ASG.

Military intelligence assessment also indicated that some ASG members already enhanced their bomb making capabilities as a result of joint training with JI members operating or hiding in the Philippines. Before his death in October 2003, Roman Al-Ghozi, known to be the JI’s “the bomb maker”, admitted during interrogation report that he shared his bomb-making expertise with ASG members. Rohmat Abdurrohim, (a.k.a. Zaki), known as the ASG’s “the bomb trainer”, confessed that he trained ASG members in bomb making, particularly the use of mobile phone as detonating device and the use of toothpaste tube as bomb paraphernalia.

Dulmatin and Umar Patek, wanted for the 2002 Bali bombing, reportedly trained some ASG members in bomb attacks. As stated earlier, Dulmatin and Umar Patek also prepared ASG members for future suicide missions. National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales was quoted as saying, “What we are looking for now is suicide terrorists, not (only) suicide bombers.”154

The ASG also developed te capability to use car bombs. Khadaffy Janjalani

boasted that he allowed training in 2004 of a long line of bombers who could hit targets in major cities in the Philippines. The ASG reportedly formed an Urban Squad in 2005 to stage bombing operations in the cities. The ASG also developed the ability to wage maritime terrorist attacks. Almost all ASG members had deep familiarity of the maritime domain having belonged to a family of fisher folks with a long seafaring tradition.155

The Super ferry 14 bombing in February 2004 was a clear demonstration of ASG’s maritime terrorist capability. The group also conducted some maritime training activities in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in June 2005. In July 2005, ASG and JI fighters took underwater training in Sandakan, Malaysia to attack maritime targets such as ports and commercial vessels. In August 2005, military

154Michael Punongbayan, “DOJ to Expose Terrorists’ Financiers, Media Handlers”, The Philippine Star , 7 November 2005.

155For more discussions on the maritime terrorist capability of the ASG, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism” in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea: Piracy at the Age of Terrorism (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2006).

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intelligence disclosed that ASG leaders and some foreign terrorists met in Patikul, Sulu to plan an attack of some beaches in Palawan. This prompted the Philippine government to intensify the security of major ports and beaches in the country preventing any planned maritime terrorist attacks to happen.

Because of its small size, the executive department of the Philippine

government belittled the capability of the ASG by describing the group as a spent force. This strongly insulted the ASG leadership. In his official statement, ASG spokesperson Jainal Sali, (a.k.a. Abu Sulaiman) argued that government officials were “belittling us, but they were exaggerating the problem of terrorism in the country.”156 In a telephone interview pertaining to the Super ferry 14 bombing, Abu Sulaiman also taunted the Philippine government by saying, “"Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people."157

Though the membership of the ASG continues to be small at present, it is

venturing into vigorous recruitment activities to recover from the lost of its members who were killed, neutralized and arrested after 9/11. It has various techniques to recruit members as discussed in Chapter 8 of this book. Aside from religious propaganda and agitation, the ASG motivates recruits through financial reward. It also pays local recruits to serve as second and third security layer of their makeshift camps. Some members start their recruitment process by initially befriending potential recruits through ball games or pot (marijuana) sessions.

The ASG also utilizes deception to recruit members. ASG leaders allow young Muslims to bring their firearms and take pictures of them and then use the pictures to blackmail them of joining the group.158 The ASG also uses marriages to expand its membership.

Reviving Radical Islamism, Returning to Terrorism?

From mere banditry, Khadaffy Janjalani attempted to reinvigorate the ASG to be a “genuine” Islamic Movement, the Al-Hakarakatul Islamiya, which resorts to terrorism as a political weapon. The explosion of Super Ferry 14 was hallmark of terrorism. The bombing of Super Ferry 14, carrying more than 899 passengers, resulted in the death of 116 persons and the wounding of 300 others.

156Cited in Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 11.

157Marco Garrido, “After Madrid, Manila?”, Asia Times, 24 April 2004, at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD24Ae01.html> (accessed on 28 August 2004).

158 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study, p. 41.

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On the eve of Valentines celebration in 2005, the ASG also masterminded

three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, Davao City and General Santos City. The 2005 Valentines Day bombing resulted in the death of at least 10 persons and the wounding of 136 others. Abu Sulaiman said that the three bombings were ASG’s Valentine’s gift to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and warned “we will not stop until we get justice for the countless Muslim lives and properties that you people have destroyed.”

Shortly after the 2005 Valentine’s Day terrorist attacks, detained ASG

members at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City conducted a foiled jailbreak attempt in March 2005. The foiled breakout caused the death of 5 ASG members, including Galib Andang. In August 2005, the ASG waged another terror attack when it bomb the Dona Ramona ferry in Lamitan, Basilan. At least 30 people, including several children, were wounded during the ferry bombing. Two weeks before the bombing, the ASG staged small bombing attacks in Zamboanga City, Koronadal City and Cotabato City in Mindanao. All these bombing incidents in 2005 were hallmarks of terrorism rather than mere banditry.

These bombings indicated that the ASG already transformed itself from a

mere bandit group to a genuine terrorist organization. Khadaffy Janjalani was reported to have attempted to reactivate the Islamic Executive Council (IEC) of the ASG to pursue its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Mindanao. Conclusion

As current trends show, the ASG has exhibited the characteristics of banditry and terrorism. The ASG, therefore, is an example of a non-state armed group where the nexus of banditry and terrorism is found. Acknowledging the banditry-terrorism nexus is essential to have a better understanding of the ASG.

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CHAPTER 4 Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism*

Introduction

This chapter aims to describe the capability of the ASG to conduct piracy and to wage maritime terrorism. It endeavors to analyze the fine line between piracy and terrorism, using the ASG as an example. Specifically, this chapter attempts to address the dual role that ASG members play as both pirates and terrorists in Philippine waters, the use of maritime piracy to fund terrorist operations, and the potential for ASG to transform the knowledge it has gained through piracy into a tool of terrorism. Nexus Between Piracy and Terrorism

In reaction to the growing number of attacks on ships and tankers passing through the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, particularly in the congested Straits of Malacca, Singaporean Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng once opined that pirates roaming the waters of the region should be declared terrorists.159 Minister Wong argued, “we do not know whether it’s pirates or terrorists who occupy the ship so we have to treat them all alike”.160

But describing the nexus of piracy and terrorism is conceptually

problematic because many experts and policy makers are unsure at which point piracy becomes terrorism.

*Revised and updated version of a paper entitled “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of

Maritime Piracy and Terrorism” originally published in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea. Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (New York: Routledge 2007), pp. 121-138 This paper was also presented to the international conference, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Threat and Response” sponsored by the US Department of State Counterterrorism Office and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) held at Traders Hotel, Singapore on 12-13 April 2006.

159Graham Gerald Ong, “Southeast Asian Pirates Bear the Marks of Terrorists”, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Viewpoints (1 January 2004), p. 1 at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/ggojan04.pdf. Also see Agence Prance Presse “Piracy and Equals Terrorism in Troubled Waters: Minister” (21 December 2003) at http://www.singapore-window.org/sw03/031221af.htm <accessed on 26 April 2005>.

160Ibid., p. 3.

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The distinction between piracy and terrorism161 is blurred because “pirates collude with terrorists, terrorists adopt pirate tactics and policymakers eager for public support start labeling every crime as maritime terrorism.”162 Terrorists can also use piracy as a cover for maritime terrorist attacks.

Motives of pirate and terrorist are arguably different from a conventional

perspective. Pirates pursue economic gains while terrorists advance political objectives.163 But it is said that terrorists have developed some capabilities to either adopt pirates’ tactics or “piggyback” on pirates’ raid.164 It is also viewed that maritime terrorists, rather than simply stealing, could either blow up the ship or use it to ram into another vessel or a port facility.165 Terrorist groups even regard seaports and international cruise liners as very attractive terrorist targets because they reside in the nexus of terrorist intent, capability and opportunity.166 Thus, non-traditional security studies see the fine line between piracy and terrorism.

There is no doubt that maritime piracy is becoming a preferred method of

funding for some terrorist groups with strong maritime traditions. This makes the threat of maritime piracy and terrorism overlapping, particularly in the tactics of ship seizures and hijackings. The ASG is among the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia that has demonstrated its capability to use piracy both as a camouflage to wage maritime terrorist attacks and as a means to fund terrorist ventures. The ASG and the Threat of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism

Piracy and maritime terrorism are inherent in the capability of ASG. Most ASG members and followers belong to Muslim families and communities of fishermen with a century-old seafaring tradition. Because ASG members live

161This section is largely based in Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia” in Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (eds), The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005).

162Rubert Herbert-Burns and Lauren Zucker, “Malevolent Tide: Fusion and Overlaps in Piracy and Maritime Terrorism” (Washington DC: Maritime Intelligence Group, 30 July 2004), p. 1.

163Tamara Renee Shie, “Ports in a Storm? The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia “, Issues and Insights, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Pacific Forum CSIS, July 2004), p. 13.

164Patrick Goodenough, “Maritime Security Takes Center Stage in SE Asia”, CNSNews.COM (29 June 2004) at http://www.cnsnews.com/ <Accessed 27 July 2004>.

165Ibid.

166Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna, “Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Crime” in Rohan Gunaratna, ed., Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003), p. 72.

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close to the waters of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, they have gained tremendous familiarity of the maritime environment. In fact, most Muslim Filipinos living in coastal communities are experienced divers. ASG members’ deep knowledge of the maritime domain also gives them ample capability to conduct piracy and wage maritime terrorist attacks.167

Because of its embedded seaborne abilities, ASG’s first terrorist attack

was, in fact, maritime in nature. As mentioned previously, on 24 August 1991 the ASG bombed the M/V Doulous, a Christian missionary ship and a European floating library docked at the Zamboanga port. At that time, the missionaries were holding their farewell program after conducting their evangelization project. Two foreign missionaries were killed and eight others were wounded in the blast.

The ASG waged this particular attack purely for political reasons.

According to Abdurajak Janjalani, the bombing of M/V Doulous was a reaction of the group to the continuing military offensive against Muslims in the Southern Philippines. Janjalani even warned of more future violence to match if not surpass the violence inflicted by the Philippine military on the Muslim people. But the Philippine government was clueless of the maritime terrorist capability of the ASG during this time. Initially, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the Philippine Navy and the PNP Maritime Group did not even regard this incident as an act of maritime terrorism. It was only recently when Philippine authorities realized that the ASG has developed capability to wage maritime terrorism.

Three years after the M/V Doulous attack, ASG Secretary General Abu Abdu Said issued a document in 1994 explaining in detail the objective of the group in bombing the ship. This document denies that the ASG was a creation of the military as alleged by various media reports. It explains that the ASG is an organization of radical Bangsa Moro people to seek kaadilan (justice) for Filipino Muslims through the establishment of separate Islamic state.168 The document also states that the ASG had bombed the ship because foreign Christian missionaries aboard the ship “spoke against Islam” and even called Allah a “false God.” These missionaries also described Prophet Muhammad “a liar” and the Quran a “man-made book.”169 According to University of the Philippines professor Samuel K. Tan, “The desire to avenge the insult against the sacred values of Islam started the motive force of the Abu Sayyaf.”170

167Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat”, US Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80.

168Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle, p. 95.

169Ibid., p. 94.

170Ibid.

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On August 1993, the ASG abducted Mr. Ricardo Tong, a prominent shipyard owner in Zamboanga City. The abduction of Mr. Tong demonstrated that during its infancy stage, the prime target of ASG was the maritime sector. The ASG was more familiar with the maritime rather than with the mountainous terrain. Mr. Tong was released only on 17 January 1995 after paying a ransom of 5 million Philippine pesos (roughly US$ 93,000). The Philippine military considered the kidnapping of Mr. Tong a criminal act because of ransom payments. But it was also a political act because the ASG issued some political demands prior to the said abduction when it kidnapped in April 1993 Luis Biel, a five year old grandson of a bus company owner in Basilan. Among its demands was the removal of all Catholic symbols in Muslim communities and the banning of all foreign fishing vessels in the Sulu and Basilan seas. The ASG continued its terrorist and criminal activities afterwards.

Because of the spate of kidnapping activities of the ASG, Philippine government officials and foreign analysts said that the group already degenerated into a criminal organization. But Khadafy Janjalani attempted to revive the original Islamic agenda of the ASG. The ASG resorted to kidnapping activities not merely to commit crimes but to deliberately raise funds from ransom payments, which the organization used to buy arms and explosives for its terrorist activities. The Philippine law enforcement authorities recorded several arms shipments to Basilan and Sulu to supply ASG with explosives, mortar tubes, high-powered firearms and ammunition.171

With huge ransom money in its possession, the ASG was able to purchase

powerful weapons. ASG’s stock of firearms increased at an annual average rate of 12 percent from 230 in 1994 to 390 in 2000. In 2003, the AFP reported that the ASG possessed at least 300 firearms, not to mention its illegal possession of explosives and communication equipments being used for urban terrorism.

The ASG also used part of its huge ransom money to build up its manpower and to lure local communities into providing mass support to the organization. The ASG succeeded in recruiting some MNLF and MILF leaders and followers to join the group. The most prominent of these leaders was Sakiruddin Bahjin or Commander Ullom who served as Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs of the MNLF Central Committee. MNLF Commanders Radullah Sahiron and Hadji Sulaiman Hadjirul also joined the ASG. With the huge amount of money in its possession as a result of a series of kidnap-for-ransom activities from 1991-2000, the ASG was able to offer monetary compensation to those parts of the local population who opted to become core members of its mass base support system.172 As stated earlier, ASG membership rapidly expanded from less than 100 fighters in 1991 to around 1,269 fighters in December 2000. According

171Ibid. 172Ibid.

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to the Philippine Naval Intelligence Group, most of these fighters possessed a mastery of the maritime domain because they belonged to families of fishermen with a deeply rooted maritime tradition.

Thus even before 11 September 2001, the ASG already developed the

capability to conduct piracy and wage maritime terrorism based on this maritime tradition. In fact, “piracy” has even been embraced in the Southern Philippines as part of the local culture, a “normal” though “illegal” means of making money.

ASG proved its maritime terrorist mettle when it waged another attack on 23 April 2000, kidnapping some 21 tourists, including ten foreigners, from a Malaysian beach resort in Sipadan. These foreigners included three Germans, two Japanese, two Finns, two South Africans and a Lebanese woman. The hostages were eventually taken to Jolo Island of Mindanao. This incident demonstrated ASG’s capability to operate outside its usual maritime turf. It also displayed ASG’s creativity in waging maritime terrorist attacks because some of its members disguised as diving instructor. ASG member Ruland Ullah, who is now a state witness to the Sipadan hostage crisis, successfully disguised as a diving instructor in this Malaysian resort prior to the said incident. An intelligence source revealed that Ullah trained some ASG members in scuba diving prior to the attack. In fact, the Philippine military recently confirmed that ASG members were trained in scuba diving to prepare for possible sea-borne terror attacks not only in the Philippines but also outside of the country.

Based on the interrogation of Gamal Baharan, a captured ASG member involved in the 2005 Valentines Day bombings of three major cities in the Philippines, some ASG members took scuba diving lessons in southwestern Palawan as part of a plot for an attack at sea. Baharan said that the training was in preparation for a JI bombing plot on unspecified targets outside the Philippines that require underwater operation.173 Baharan also said that ASG Amir Khadafy Janjalani and ASG spokesman Abu Solaiman were on top of the maritime training.

The Sipadan hostage drama was a serious maritime terrorist attack with clear political objectives because ASG issued several demands. These demands included recognition of separate Islamic State in the Southern Philippines, an inquiry into the alleged human rights abuses against Filipino Muslims in Sabah and the protection of their ancestral fishing grounds in Mindanao. The Sipadan incident was also considered as an “act of piracy” because the ASG eventually demanded a $2.6 million ransom for the hostages. The ASG even threatened the Philippine government to behead hostages if their demands were not met. Few months after, ASG members kidnapped another three Malaysian nationals in Pasir Beach Resort in Sabah on 30 September 2000 using a speedboat. This incident showed the fine-line between maritime piracy and terrorism.

173See Associated Press, “Terrorist Train for Seaborne Attacks” at http://www.ldslivingonline.com/stories/30_ds_330924.php. <accessed on 27 April 2005>.

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The April 2000 Sipadan kidnapping incident was only resolved in 2001

when the ASG reportedly received a $15 million ransom from the Philippine government. But the payment of ransom money was marred by controversies.174 The September 2000 kidnapping, on the other hand, was resolved when the Philippine government troops in Talipao, Sulu successfully rescued the said three Malaysian national under the operation Trident.

But the maritime terrorist attacks of the ASG did not end there. On 22 May 2001, ASG guerrillas raided the luxurious Pearl Farm beach resort on Samal island of Mindanao. This incident resulted in the killing two resort workers and the wounding of three others. Though no hostages were taken during this attack, the Samal raid demonstrated anew the willingness of ASG to pursue maritime targets. On 28 May 2001, the ASG waged another maritime terror when it abducted three American citizens and seventeen Filipinos while spending a vacation at the Dos Palmas resort in Palawan.

Thus far, the Dos Palmas incident was the most notorious and the most sensationalized attack of the ASG. The incident received international coverage because several of the victims were murdered and beheaded, including an American citizen. The Philippine government declared a no-ransom policy and imposed a news black-out about the incident. But the Dos Palmas incident served as a wake-up call for the United States to get involved in anti-terrorism cooperation with the Philippines.175

Because two American hostages were involved, the US military sent US Army Special Forces to the Philippines to train AFP forces in counter-terrorism. The US Pacific Command even extended US$2 million assistance to the Philippines from its regional security assistance program as a result of the Dos Palmas incident. But when the lives of the two American hostages were put in danger, the US Army special operation forces changed the scope of their mission in the Philippines by facilitating the rescue of American citizens. During a rescue operation mounted by the AFP in 2002, two victims, including an American missionary, Martin Burnham, were killed. His wife, Gracia Burnham, the well-known survivor of the kidnapping incident, later wrote a memoir of her captivity in the hands of the ASG.176

174For an eyewitness account of the issue including the controversial payment of ransom, see Roberto N. Aventajado, 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2004).

175Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”, CRS

Report for Congress (25 January 2002).

176Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill, In the Presence of my Enemies (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2003).

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The Dos Palmas incident convinced the American government that the ASG was a deadly foreign terrorist organization. To increase the capability of the Philippine military to destroy the ASG, American and Filipino forces conducted the controversial joint military exercise called Balikatan 02-1.177 Balikatan, literally meaning “shouldering the load together”, is the largest joint and combined military exercise of Philippine and U.S. forces. The conduct of this exercise is based primarily on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), requiring the two countries to undergo this type of exercise to develop their capacity to resist aggression and to combat common adversaries.

The Philippines and American forces conducted the Balikatan 02-1 primarily in the island province of Basilan, the haven of the ASG. Other troops held their exercises in and near Zamboanga City, the headquarters of Philippine Southern Command. Balikatan 02-1 originally involved 3,800 Philippine military personnel and 660 US Special Forces and support personnel. The US augmented its force five months later with 340 US Navy and Marine construction engineers and 176 Navy and Army engineers to implement some civil engineering projects in support of the exercise.

Admiral Dennis Blair, former Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command (CINCPAC), described Balikatan 02-1 as the “largest military operation against terrorism [outside of Afghanistan].”178 However, at this occasion, the number of American troops was relatively small compared to past Balikatan exercises, which usually involved 1,500 to 3,000 American troops. The conduct of Balikatan 02-1 resulted in the neutralization of many ASG members, including the reported death of notorious ASG spokesman, Abu Sabaya and the eventual capture of Sulu-based ASG leader Galib Andang, also known as Commander Robot. Galib Andang met his untimely death on 16 March 2005 during the foiled jail break incident.

But the neutralization, capture and death of some ASG leaders and members did not prevent the group from continuing its operations. In September 2003, the ASG threatened to hijack some vessels of Sulpicio and WG&A lines passing through Sarangani Bay to generate funds while trying to recover from the severe impact of Balikatan 02-1. According to PCG officials, they received intelligence reports that the ASG planned to attack one of the passenger vessels of WG&A and Sulpicio lines plying the Mindanao route. Hence, the PCG intensified

177Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 2 (August 2002), pp. 294-312 and Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Philippine-American Security Relations and the War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia” in International Relations of the Asia Pacific After 9/11 and China’s Accession to WTO, Wang Xingsheng, ed. (Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 80-95.

178Admiral Dennis C. Blair, "The Campaign Against International Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region" (Remarks to Asia Society Hong Kong Center on 18 April 2002) at <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/blair1802.htm.> [Accessed on 27 April 2002].

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its patrol operations in Sarangani Bay and adjacent coastal areas to thwart any possible hijack attempt by the ASG.

The ASG, however, has a strong determination to pursue its maritime terrorist operation.

An intelligence source reported that during the last quarter of 2003, the

ASG kidnapped four Indonesian nationals and one Filipino in Borneo Paradise Eco-Farm Beach Resort in Lahad Datu, Sabah/Malaysia to raise funds. Reportedly, the hostages were divided into groups and separately brought to Patikul and Indanan in Sulu using speed boats. In April 2004, just two months after the Super ferry 14 incident, the Philippine National Police Maritime Group reported that the ASG hijacked a boat and kidnapped two Malaysian and one Indonesian in the Southern Philippines near Sabah. Their abduction came on the heels of the escape of 23 ASG members from a Basilan jail.

The foregoing cases clearly demonstrated the capability of ASG to conduct piracy and wage maritime terrorism. The ASG has resorted to piracy not merely to commit crimes but to fund itself while at the same time wage maritime terrorism to deliver political messages. The Filipino Coast Guard officials even admitted that the Philippines was seen increasingly under threat of piracy and maritime terrorism posed by the ASG.179 Manila has even been identified as among 26 city ports and anchorages vulnerable to such maritime attacks.180

Though it has been known that the ASG has already developed capability

to wage various terrorist attacks in both the land and maritime domain, we have yet to conduct further research on its capability to use piracy as a tool of terrorism. Based on its records of various maritime attacks, beach resorts were usual targets of the ASG. Though the ASG has threatened to hijack commercial vessels after 9/11, none of these threats were carried out except the bombing of the Super ferry 14 and the seizure of small boats to kidnap Indonesian and Malaysian nationals in April 2004. Though ASG members have undergone training to mount an attack at sea, plots have been foiled by the Philippine law enforcement agencies. Sadly, details of these plots have not been publicly disclosed by law enforcement authorities for further analysis.

179Agence France-Presse, “Philippines Seen Increasingly Under Threat from Maritime Terrorism” (8 September 2003) at http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ao/Qphilippines-apec-attacks.RBWM_DS8.html <accessed on 30 August 2004>.

180Ibid.

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Towards A Maritime Security Strategy to Combat ASG’s Maritime Terrorist Threats

Despite heavy military operations and amidst government pronouncements that the ASG has become a “spent force”, it continues to wreak terrorist havocs in the Philippines. The bombing of Super ferry 14 on 27 February 2004 and the three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, General Santos City and Davao City on eve of Valentines Day celebration in 2005 were recent indications that the ASG is alive and kicking. In the telephone interview pertaining to the Super ferry 14 incident, ASG spokesperson Abu Solaiman even taunted the Philippine government by saying:

“Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people.”181 (underscoring mine) As a result of the 2005 Valentines Day bombing, the PCG increased the

security of major ports in the Philippines. Intelligence operatives in plainclothes were deployed in various ports in the country. The PNP Maritime Group also tightened its security measures in the Visayas and Mindanao following the 2005 Valentines Day bombing. At least six sea marshals were also assigned to ensure the safety of passengers in every ship sailing in Philippine waters. Philippine Marines have also been on foot patrol in various ports since the aftermath of the 2005 Valentines Day bombing. Conclusion

This cha[per initially described the maritime terrorist threat posed by the ASG and its ability to use piracy as a tool for terrorism. From its record of maritime terrorist attacks, this paper observed that most targets of the ASG were beach or coastal resorts. Though it has threatened to hijack commercial vessels, Philippine law enforcement authorities have thwarted these attacks, except the bombing of the Super ferry 14 and the seizure of small boats in April 2004.

Despite the Philippine government’s declaration of the ASG as a spent

force due to intensified military operations and hot pursuits, it continues to wreak terrorist havoc because of its ability to solicit local support and to link with JI, the MILF and the MNLF.

181Marco Garrido, “After Madrid, Manila?”, Asia Times (24 April 2004) at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD24Ae01.html <accessed on 28 August 2004>.

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CHAPTER 5

Youth as Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism*

For statistical purposes, the United Nations defines ‘youth’, as those

persons between 15 to 24 years old, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States.182 The Philippine government defines youth as those who are 15-30 years old.

Many researchers and practitioners dealing with youth studies have

largely focused their attention on the deviant and risk behavior of youth such as juvenile delinquency, drug addiction, and school dropout and, in the case of female youth, teen-age pregnancy. Sadly, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of youth and terrorism. This is a sad reality considering that the young persons are the most vulnerable to the ideas and acts of terrorism. They are even prone to what sociologists and psychologists call “youth violence” or what political scientists generally call political violence in which terrorism belongs.

There is an academic journal that is devoted to the issue of youth and

terrorism. This journal is called Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth being published by IOS Press based in the Netherlands. This journal can serve as a good academic platform in giving us a better understanding of the many ramifications of youth and terrorism not only in Southeast Asia but also in the world.183

However, there has been no single explanation, to date, on why some

youth are engaged in violence and terrorism. What we do know is that the youth is full of exuberance and complex emotions making young people highly prone to various influences that can trigger their aggressive or “rebel” instincts. While many youth have used their exuberance and complex emotions to become great poets, writers, singers, composers, inventors, teachers and leaders, some misguided youth succumb to the negative feeling of rage and alienation that prompt them to join criminal gangs, nuisance fraternities and even terrorist groups.

But when it comes to terrorism, are youth victims or perpetrators?

*Revised version of a speech delivered at the International Conference on Youth and

Terrorism organized by the Ministry of Information in collaboration with the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on Feb 25 to 28, 2009.

182 “Youth and the United Nations” at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/qanda.htm.

183 See Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth at http://www.iospress.nl/

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In my book, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, I argued that the threat

of terrorism in the region predated the gruesome September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. I have also emphasized that before and after 9/11, youth in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, have become aggrieved victims of terrorism. A study has shown that acts of terrorism have profound psychological impacts on youth victims like posttraumatic stress, severe depression, separation anxieties (in the case of the loss of love ones) and others.184

In the Philippines, there is no doubt that youths have become victims and

“perpetrators” of terrorism. Abdurajak Janjalani, the ASG founder, was only in his 20s when he joined the Muslim rebel group in the Philippines and was 26 years old when he formed the ASG in 1989. He originally called this group Al Harakatul Al Islamiyyah, which was joined by a brash of Filipino Muslim youth aging from 16 to 25 years old. Because of his strong charisma and great mastery of Islam, some Muslim Filipino youth in Basilan became so fanatic of Abdurajak enabling him to form an effective cadre of young Muslim fighters not only from his home province of Basilan but also from neighboring provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga. The Islamic thought and political ideas of Abdurajak continue to inspire some Muslim youths in the Southern Philippines.

When Abdurajak died in a police encounter in 1998, his younger brother,

Khadaffy Janjalani took his post as the new ASG Amir. Khadaffy was only 22 years old when he became the successor of his older brother. It was during the leadership of Khadaffy when the ASG ventured into vigorous kidnap-for-ransom activities, the most popular of which is the Sipadan Kidnapping in 2000 involving some 21 tourists, ten of whom were foreigners. Since 2001, the ASG has conducted almost 800 kidnap-for-ransom activities. In 2000-2001 alone, the ASG conducted 140 kidnap-for-ransom activities, the highest recorded in history for one year.

Young and gullible, Khadaffy was effectively manipulated by older ASG

leaders known for many criminal activities. Thus, the ASG became more of a bandit group than a terrorist organization when Khadaffy took over. In 2004, Khadaffy attempted to revive the Islamic militancy of the ASG and in 2005 led some ASG operations that were hallmarks of terrorism rather than banditry. But his efforts were to no avail. Khadaffy died in a military encounter in 2006. He was only 31 years old when he passed away.

At present, Yasser Igasan who was only 21 years old when he joined the

ASG in 1993 is leading the ASG. Igasan is presently endowed with youthful idealism - more militant and aggressive leader who is expected to reinvigorate the religious extremism of the ASG. Igasan’s youthfulness and wide experience in

184 See Jonathan S. Comer and Philip C. Kendall, “Terrorism: The Psychological Impact

on Youth”, Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, Vol. 14, Issue No. 3 (July 2007), pp. 179 – 212.

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community organizing, resource mobilization, serious Islamic training, and strong linkages with likeminded groups in the Philippines and abroad can make him the “reincarnation” of the ASG founder, Abdurajak Janjalani.

If you are monitoring the developments in the Southern Philippines, you

may have heard already of the kidnapping of three employees185 of the ICRC on 15 January 2009. Six teen-agers have been accused of abducting the three victims. These abductors were believed to be under the command of notorious ASG commander Albader Parad, who is now in his early 30s but joined the ASG when he was still in his early 20s. Parad was also responsible for the kidnapping in June 2008 of Ces Drillon, a veteran Filipina journalist covering the Mindanao conflict. On January 13, 2009, the ASG has been reported to have abducted another victim, a Sri-Lankan peace advocate.186

I need to underscore that the ASG started with less than 1,000 members in

1991. The bulk of ASG membership consisted of young Filipino Muslims who were lured to join terrorist organizations because of economic marginalization and silent discrimination. After a spate of kidnapping activities in the mid-1990s, many young Filipino Muslims flocked to the ASG until it reached a membership of almost 1,500 in 2000. After 9/11, the ASG membership rapidly deteriorated to not more than 400, to date, according to government sources.

If the peace process of the Philippine government with the MILF fails,

there are fears that the ASG can lure young Muslim rebels in the Southern Philippines to join the group. MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim already warned as early as 2004 that a great deal is needed to quickly find a lasting solution to the internal armed conflict in Mindanao “before younger Muslims in the region succumb to the greater radicalism of the Abu Sayyaf”.187

I have been visiting the Bicutan Prison in Metro Manila as part of my

initiative to de-radicalize suspected ASG members in jail. There are 133 suspected terrorists in this prison facility. Almost 70% of those in prison in the Bicutan facility belong to age bracket 16-35. Among those in prison, I befriended four young inmates, namely Ahmad Santos, Redento Cain Dellosa, Edzmar Hayudini and Yacub Basug. Who are these people and why it is important for us to discuss them.

Ahmad Santos is the known founder of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic

Movement (RSIM), a radical organization of Filipino Muslim converts more known in the Philippines as Balik-Islam (Muslim returnees). Ahmad was radicalized when he was only 21 years old and founded the RSIM when he was

185 The three victims are Andreas Notter, a 38-year-old Swiss national; Eugenio Vagni, a

62-year-old Italian and Mary Jean Lacaba, a 37-year-old from the Philippines. 186 The Sri-Lankan victim is Omar Jaleel from Nonviolent Peaceforce, an NGO. 187 Simon Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf”, Time Asia, 30 August 2004.

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only 29 years old. The RSIM was accused of masterminding a series bombings in the Philippines, the most dreadful of which was the Super ferry 14 bombing on 27 February 2004.

In the Super ferry 14 bombing, 116 were killed and 300 others were

injured. Thus, the incident was described as “the worst terrorist attack in the country, the fourth worst terrorist attack since September 11, 2001 and Asia’s worst since the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia.”188 I consider the Super ferry 14 bombing as the worst maritime terrorist attack in Southeast Asia after 9/11. The person accused of carrying out the bombing was Redento Cain Dellosa, a Filipino Muslim convert who was only in his mid-20s during the incident.

Edzmar Hayudini and Yacub Basug are accused of being the lead

intelligence officers of the ASG. They were charged of kidnapping, multiple murders and multiple homicides. They have never been convicted to date. They were only in their early 20s when they were radicalized. They reportedly joined the ASG in their early 20s and until they were captured in their later 20s.

So, are youths really victims or perpetrators of terrorism? For me, some misguided youths have become perpetrators of terrorism

because they are victims of difficult circumstances or harsh socio-economic and political conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Muslim Filipino youth in Mindanao belong to the most marginalized sector of the Philippine society. Based on Human Development Report in 2005, all provinces in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) belonged to the lowest human development index, which means that they have the lowest human development status– poor, impoverished, marginalized and vulnerable. Muslim Mindanao also has the lowest growth rate in the country and this affects the quality of life of the youth sector there.

Muslim youths in Mindanao are so economically and political deprived

that they fail to go to school. The out-of-school youth in the Philippines got the highest rate in Mindanao. Results of the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) of the Philippine government showed that about 25 percent of the approximately 1 million children and youth aged 6 to 24 years in the ARMM were out of school. Among the children and youth who belonged to families in the bottom 40% income group in the ARMM, 28.4 percent were out of school.189

According to the International Youth Foundation, Mindanao’s high level of

poverty, impoverished school systems, and unstable social and political situation,

188 “Super Ferry bombing last February a Terrorist Attack” Philippine Star, 12 October

2004. 189For more discussion on this report, see “Out-of-school children and youth highest in

ARMM” at http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2003/pr0375tx.html

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place its young people at particular risk.190 In fact, out of the 138 Muslim detainees at the Bicutan jail that I mentioned earlier, more than half did not finish secondary school while some did not finish elementary school. It even broke my heart when I was administering survey inside the prison that some could not even read or write.

These harsh realities have pushed some young Muslim Filipinos to join

criminal, rebel and terrorist groups. Rather than carrying books and pencils, they carry guns and grenades to make a living. They become child or youth soldiers because they were deprived of the opportunities to study in order to become lawyers, engineers, doctors, teachers and others.191

Based on our study of young ASG members, many unschooled and out-of-

work young Muslims in Mindanao have been recruited by the ASG. Easy cash and weapons lure them.192 They have become “militants for hire” motivated by easy but dirty money. While some ASG members are driven by religious fervor, many of the young people who joined the ASG regarded their membership as their means of livelihood.

It is very interesting, and at the same time alarming, to note that in the

case of the kidnapping of three ICRC employees that I mentioned earlier, the ASG abductors demanded not ransom payments but free education and development projects for impoverished Muslim communities in exchange for the freedom of their victims.193

Despite the sad state of some Filipino youths joining terrorist groups, I am

happy to share that many youths in Mindanao are now actively asserting their rightful role as constructive players in addressing the difficult issues of political violence, terrorism and armed conflicts in the Southern Philippines. To address the problem of youth, terrorism and armed conflict in Mindanao youth leaders coming from the different communities of faith and ethnic traditions all over Mindanao organized in November 2008 the three-day MINDANAO YOUTH PEACE CONFERENCE with its theme “The Muslim, Christian, and Indigenous

190 International Youth Foundation at http://www.iyfnet.org/document.cfm/753

191See Merliza Makinano, “Child Soldiers in the Philippines” (February 2002) at

www.childprotection.org.ph/monthlyfeatures/mar2k2a.rtf

192 See Manny Mogato, “'Ransom from kidnappings may revive Abu Sayyaf', ABS CBN News (11 December 2008) at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/12/11/08/ransom-kidnappings-may-revive-abu-sayyaf.

193 Jim Gomez, “Filipino rebels want investment for hostages, The Associated Press (29 January 2009) at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5h_MqB6cWr9AP8Sq8ZrxRtxQrisOgD960P7VG0.

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Peoples youth leaders: looking back, looking inwards and looking ahead”.194 In this conference, the youth in Mindanao declared, “a peaceful Mindanao means the absence of social inequality, injustices, and environmental problems.”195 They also urged that the vulnerable sectors, “especially the youth, women, and children must be heard, respected, and enjoined in all forms of peace undertakings.”196

The Mindanao Youth Circle has also been organized to develop a united

youth sector for nation building, peace and development.197 There are also the Mindanao Young Leader’s Parliament, (MYLP), the Bangsamoro Youth Leaders Forum (BYLF), Bangsamoro Youth March for Peace Movement (BMYMPM), and the like.

But among the youth organizations in Mindanao, I find the Youth of

Mindanao for Peace the most interesting. It aims “to build bridges of peace and development” in Mindanao.198 This group laments the following:

The youth sector serves as the primary source of new recruits for rebel groups, whether secessionist or revolutionary, and worse, even of terrorist or vigilante groups. Their direct exposure to conflict situations, structural violence and marginalization, intercultural prejudice and antipathy, and discrimination-based violence have more often caused them to join these groups in their war against the state, or at the least had made them sympathize and support the insurgency and terrorist movements as civilians. The absence or lack of avenues and opportunities for the youth sector to participate as working partners of civil society in addressing the Mindanao peace and development problem has brought them to the point of hopelessness, where the only viable course for social transformation is taking up arms and/or using violence to combat the ills and gaps of the present system.

Their idealism is slowly waning because of the frustration on the realities of the Philippine society, realities that should not be allowed to influence their thinking in the first place. How are they to fulfill their social roles if they

194 Mindanao Youth Conference, “Statement of Unity and Solidary of Youth in Mindanao”,

Mindanews (28 November 2008) at http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5547&Itemid=95

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197For more information about the vision, mission and activities of the Mindanao Youth Circle, please visit http://ph.88db.com/ph/Services/Post_Detail.page/Clubs_and_Association/NGO/?PostID=279067

198 Youth of Mindanao for Peace at http://www.geocities.com/kaminkap/about.html

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are trapped in these unfortunate circumstances? Before apathy sets in, society should ensure that the potentials of our youth are developed to the maximum and used for their benefit and the other citizens of the Philippines.

Rarely, is the youth sector provided with an opportunity where their collective suggestions and inputs on alternative solutions in addressing the Mindanao peace and development situation are taken seriously and sincerely considered in high-echelon gatherings of policy makers and opinion formers. This is mainly due to the still-pervading traditional notion or belief that the youth is ill equipped as a sector to act in a proactive and manner and initiate moves in working for peace and development among the peoples of Mindanao.

Efforts of peace building should focus on - and include the participation of - the young for they are the shapers and builders of tomorrow.199

With that note, let me end my talk by reiterating that some youths have become perpetrators of terrorism because they are victims of bitter circumstances and harsh social, economic and political structures that deprive them the opportunities to develop their full potential as partners for peace and development.

But allow me to underscore that the youth is not only our nation’s hope. The youth is the hope of the entire world as they represent the future generation of leaders and citizens who can make our world a better place.

199 Ibid.

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CHAPTER 6 Media and Terrorism*

Introduction On 19 October 2007, a blast ripped through the Glorietta 2 mall in Makati City, the Philippines’ main financial center. The blast resulted in the death of 11 people and the wounding of at least 120 others.

A day after the blast, the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), through its ideological beacon, Sheik Omar Lavilla, claimed responsibility for the said explosion and demanded the release of its Amir, Ahmad Santos.200 The RSIM is a group of Muslim converts having links with the ASG.

Results of police investigation, however, revealed that the blast was an

industrial accident and the so-called claim of RSIM was a mere hoax. Nonetheless, the Glorietta 2 mall explosion has revived public discussion on the RSIM, which is believed to have been disbanded in 2006. One of the major sources of terrorist threats in the Philippines is the RSIM. More known by some analysts as the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) or Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement (RSRM), it is alleged to be a clandestine organization of Muslim converts in Manila collaborating with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and even Al-Qaeda to wage urban jihad in the Philippines. The RSIM was accused of having participated in various bombing incidents in the country, particularly the Davao Airport bombing in March 2003, the Super ferry 14 bombing in February 2004, and the Valentines Day bombing in Makati in 2005.

Though the RSIM is believed to have been deactivated in 2006 as a result of the capture and death of its key leaders, remnants of the RSIM have reportedly joined the ASG. The RSIM has used the media in all its forms to spread its Islamic fundamentalist ideology, publicize its cause and mount some terrorist operations.

*Originally published as “Media and Terrorism in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Movement” in Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, vol. 4, no. 1 (April 2009), pp. 64-75.

200 “Rajah Solaiman group remains in blast suspect list – PNP task force”, GMA News (23 October 2007) at http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/65483/news/nation/rajah-solaiman-group-remains-in-blast-suspect-list-pnp-task-force.

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This paper examines the use of media in terrorism in the Philippines focusing on the RSIM, an ASG-linked group, as a case study. It aims to describe RSIM’s use of the broadcast (radio and television), print (news papers, magazines) and cyber media (internet) to spread its Islamic fundamentalist ideology that frames the terrorist acts of its members. Literature on Media and Terrorism: An Analytical Review Terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman once opined that terrorism and media “are bound together in an inherently symbiotic relationships, each feeding of and exploiting the other for their purposes.”201 Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher commented that media provides terrorists “the oxygen of publicity”.202 It is even viewed that media provides terrorists the useful link with their audience. Frederick Hacker stressed that “if the media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent them.”203 This has prompted a terrorist expert, Walter Lacquer, to conclude, “The media are a terrorist’s best friend.”204

Terrorists regard the media as a weapon of war. Terrorists identify the media as potential supplements to their arsenal. According to Gus Martin, “When terrorists successfully-and violently-manipulate important symbols, relatively weak movements can influence governments and entire societies. Even when a terrorist unit fails to complete its mission, intensive media exposure can lead to a propaganda victory.”205 Many studies linking media and terrorism have concentrated on describing the response of media when terrorist attacks occur. Most of the existing literature “agreed that the relationship between terrorism and the mass media is ‘symbiotic’, in that insurgent terrorist organizations use the media as a conduit for their political message to be heard by the target audience, whilst supplying ‘exciting news’ for the media.”206

201Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia Press, 1998), p. 142.

202Quoted in Ibid., p. 143.

203Cindy C.Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 2000), p. 128.

204Quoted in Ibid.

205Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003), p. 295.

206For excellent references written before 9/11, see Brigitte Nacos, Terrorism and the Media (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) and Philip Schlesinger, Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and collective Identities (London: Sage Publications, 1991).

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But Jonathan R. White provides three different points of view about terrorism and the media.207

The first view regards the media as a quasi-Constitutional force that

critically balances government’s view of terrorist events. But this view is based on the assumption that media is behaving responsibly (responsible journalism). Abraham Miller’s study on terrorism and the media indicates that the media has a self-regulating mechanism that prevents media from interfering with security forces or even from assisting terrorist groups when reporting. The media has “internal codes”, so to speak, “ controlling journalistic excess.”208

The second view considers the media as terrorism’s natural ally.

According to Norman Podhoretz, the media and terrorism had informal collusion because both are in business for mutual benefits.209 Yohan Alexander supported this view when he explained that the media have become the tool of terrorism while terrorism has provided the media an excellent story to report.210 By reporting terrorism incidents, the media carry several messages that favor terrorism propaganda campaigns.

To publicize their cause, terrorists purposely attract media attention and

consequently the general public.211 Terrorists deliberately cultivate relationship with media personalities in order to communicate their grievances. Some terrorist groups even establish aboveground organizations that intentionally promote close relations with media, particularly those members of the press who are hunger for scoops to be the first to report break news.212

The third view, however, contends that while the media may exploit

terrorism to sell a good story, “they rarely convey messages favorable to terrorists.”213

207Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction, third ecdition (Belmont, USA: Wasdsworth Group, 2002), p. 258.

208Ibid. For more details, see Abraham Miller, Terrorism, the Media and the Law (New York: Transnational, 1982), pp. 133-147.

209Ibid. See Norman Podhoretz, “The Subtle Collusion”, Political Communication and Persuasion, Vol. 1 (1981), pp. 84-89.

210Yonah Alexander, “Terrorism, the Media and the Police”, in Henry Van (ed), Terrorism, Political Violence and World Order (Landham, MD: University of America Press, 1984), pp. 135-150.

211Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, p. 281.

212Ibid, p. 291.

213White, Terrorism: An Introduction , p. 258.

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A study made by J. Bowyer Bell 214 and H.H.A Cooper215 pointed out that while terrorists used the media for propaganda purposes, the media focused more on violence that built little sympathy for terrorists. This is supported by another study made by Gabriel Weiman, Michael Kelly and Thomas Mitchell who revealed that media reporting on terrorism violence painted a negative picture of terrorism.216

Mindful of the valuable role of media to publicize its cause of Islamic

Propagation and to spread it propaganda activities, the RSIM has utilized the media in its various operations. The RSIM regarded the media as an indispensable part of its existence in order to get publicity, talk to the general public and thereby create a favorable understanding of their cause. The RSIM even deliberately seek press coverage of their acts to destabilize the enemy of “Islam”, create panic, generate a sense of unrest and amplify fear that the government cannot provide security to its people. The RSIM Use of the Media

The RSIM refers to a very minuscule radical segment of the Balik-Islam

Movement (BIM). It is believed to have been founded by Hilarion del Rosario III, known in his Muslim name as Ahmed Santos, of Anda, Pangasinan, Northern part of the Philippines. Many anecdotal stories state that the RSIM was named after Rajah Solaiman, the last Muslim King of Manila.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) discovered the existence of the

RSIM, then known as RSM, when the PNP Intelligence Group (IG) investigated in November 2001 the activities of Sheikh Omar Fernandez, a preacher of Islamic Studies, Call and Guidance (ISCAG).217

214J. Bowyer Bell, “Terrorists Scripts and Live Action Spectaculars”, Columbia Journalism Review, No. 17 (1978), pp. 47-50.

215H.H.A. Cooper, “Terrorism and the Media” in Yonah Alexander and Seymour Finger (eds), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay, 1977), pp. 140-156.

216Gabriel Weiman, “Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage”, Journal of Communication, No. 33 (1983); Michael Kelly and Thomas N. Mitchell, “Transnational Terrorism and the Western Press Elite”, Political Communication and Persuasion, No. 1 (1981), pp. 269-296. Also see White, p.258.

217Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM): Origin, Militant Activities and Current Threats” (Unpublished research commissioned by IBM Philippines, 14 November 2006), p. 3.

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While Fernandez was conducting Islamic preaching at ISCAG, he was also suspected of providing bomb instructions to Marvin Apolinario Geonzon (alias Abdul Malik Hasan), a Muslim revert218 Fernandez was also discovered to have conducted Islamic teaching in the Fi Sabilillah Dawah and Media Foundation, Inc. (FSDMFI) chapter in Anda, Pangasinan of Central Luzon. It was in Anda when Santos was believed to have formally founded the RSIM.

During his tactical interrogation, Santos admitted to have organized in

2001 a group of 20 radical Muslim reverts to establish a core of Balik-Islam Mujahideen in a makeshift camp in Anda. He originally called this group Haraka or Harakat, which literally means “the movement”. The forerunner of the RSIM is the FSDMFI, which also belonged to a larger movement called Balik-Islam, a Filipino word describing the phenomenon of religious conversion of Filipino-Christians to Muslim faith. Almost all members of the FSDMFI and the RSIM are associated with the BIM.

Ahmad Santos formed the RSIM through the FSDMFI as a tool to

propagate Islam in the Philippines and to mount a vigorous campaign in order to lure Christians to “revert” to Islamic faith. The FSDMFI has, in fact, become the legal media front of the RSIM. It has the main goal of propagating “the true essence of Islam in order to correct the misconceptions about Islam and Muslims.”219 Based on the records obtained from the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the FSDMFI also to pursue the following objectives:

o The creation of a network that would employ TV, radio, and print

media to serve as the propaganda and propagation arm of Salafi Islam

o The creation of Balik Islam communities that will attempt to return to the early stages of Islam when it was yet unadulterated, as well as communities that will embrace Sharia and the Islamic philosophy

o The Islamization of Luzon and the creation of an Islamic movement that intends to establish an Islamic political entity with Ahmad Santos himself as the Amir220

218Based on the debriefing of Marvin Apolinarion Geonzon @ Abdul Malik Hasan, the suspect in the bombing of the Imperial Hotel and the Puericulture Restaurant in Zamboanga City, who was arrested on October 29, 2001.

219Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr. Philippine Jihad, Inc. (Quezon City: Philippine National Police, 2002). Revised and updated version of this book will be published by the Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in 2008.

220 Summary of Information “Evolution of Jihad Fi Luzon Movement” (Quezon City: Philippine National Police, 19 October 2004).

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Ahmad Santos formed the FSDMFI to allegedly served as the legal cover of the RSIM to promote the fundamentalist Islamic ideology of Wahabism commonly practiced by Sunni Muslims. Wahabism provided the ideological condition leading to the formation of the RSIM. Wahabism was traced to the Islamic thought of Abd-al Wahab who preached the “purification” of Islam based on Salafi faith.

The word Salafi means “righteous ancestors of Muslims ” in traditional

Islamic scholarship. Salafism advocates a return to a shari'a-minded orthodoxy that aims to purify Islam from unwarranted accretions, heresies and distortions, which Abd-al Wahab avidly preaches. Thus, Wahabism and Salafism are theologically related. Wahabism and Salafism are systems of belief that are said to have vigorously informed the radical Islamic thoughts of Osama in Laden and other radical Muslim personalities. They fight for the jihad, seeking to re-create the Muslim ummah and shariat to build an Islamic community worldwide.221

With the FSDMFI, Santos started preaching Islamic purification to Balik-

Islam community. Santos had radio programs aired over DWBL from 9:30 to 10:30 pm every Saturday to propagate his views. In his radio program, Santos delivered lectures in the airwaves emphasizing the need to Islamize initially the whole of Luzon and eventually the entire Philippines. Even in his oral lecture during prayer meetings, he even agitated his audience with video clips of Muslims being oppressed, massacred and butchered in different parts of the world.222 With the charismatic lecture of Santos, an informant from the Balik-Islam community claimed that two to three persons everyday revert back to Islam at the FSDMI. The media facilities of the FSDMI were deliberately utilized based on the belief of its followers that “Jihad in Islam is striving in the way of Allah by pen, tongue, hand, media and if inevitable, with arms.”223 (underscoring mine)

Aside from radio, the RSIM also utilized the print media to propagate militant Islam. The RSIM used the FSDMI to regularly publish the “Pahayagan”, rendered in English as “Newspaper.” Santos admitted that the “Pahayagan” made him known in the Balik Islam community not only in the Philippines but also in the Middle East where he used to be employed as an overseas worker. The “Pahayagan” also broadened the network of Santos with the print media community. Santos even recruited some members of the media to convert to Islam. In fact, at the time of his arrest in October 2005, Santos was known to have served as the Chief of the ASG Media Bureau.

221Angel, Rabasa, et.al, The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004).

222 Based on revelations from a member of the FSDMFI interviewed on July 2005.

223 Rodolfo B. Mendoza Jr, Radical Fundamentalist Balik-Islam Movement in the Philippines (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, forthcoming in 2008).

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The RSIM also encouraged the use of Internet for Islamic propagation. In one of his preaching, Santos said, “If you do not have money, you can motivate people for the Jihad verbally and through the internet and other means of media propaganda.”224 The RSIM supported the hosting of Balik Islam website called Jamaa’tu Balik Islam: Reverts to Islam of the Philippines at http://jamaatubalikislam.jeeran.com/ to convey the message of establishing a true Islamic community in the Philippines. The website is maintained by a certain Mike Al-Ghazi who has been identified by the police authorities as one of the key leaders of the RSIM. In one of his writings in the website, Al-Ghazi gave high importance to the role of media to promote Muslim unity. Al-Ghazi wrote:

With Afghanistan and now Iraq and the Philippines crisis, present a unique opportunity to proceed towards the long-cherished goal of Muslim unity. An overwhelming majority of the Muslim states views the issue a grave one and favors some immediate action. The Muslim world must provide representation to Mujahideen in the various international bodies, supply resources to Mujahideen and build continue support for them through international media.225

Indeed, the RSIM has deliberately utilized the various types of media for

Islamic propagation. What begs the question is: does media aid RSIM for Islamic propagation and terrorist activities? Does the media convey messages favorable to the RSIM? Does media publicize the cause of RSIM?

The 2003 Davao City Bombing The RSIM was said to have committed its first major act of political

violence in March 2003 during the bombing of the Davao International Airport, which killed 21 people and injured 148 others.226 The Philippine government suspected the MILF to be behind the blast but the MILF leadership denied the accusation. RSIM members, Ibrahim Kessel and Abdul Karim Ayeras, actually conducted the said bombing operations. The bombing of Davao Airport was a joint operation of the MILF and the RSIM. It was regarded as an “after-training” test for Kessel and Ayeras who just finished bomb training in an MILF camp.

224Ibid.

225Mike Al-Ghazi, “War Against the Muslim” at http://jamaatubalikislam.jeeran.com/war_against_muslims.htm. Accessed on 31 October 2007.

226Earlier, Balik-Islam personalities now associated with the RSM were involved in the Rizal Day bombing of December 2000 where twenty-two people were killed and hundred others were injured.

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Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo strongly condemned the Davao bombing as “a brazen act of terrorism which shall not go unpunished." But the government was not fully informed that the RSIM masterminded the incident. Even the media did not have clue that the Davao bombing was the handywork of the RSIM. Media coverage of the 2003 Davao bombing revealed its low awareness at that time about the existence of the RSIM. But the media gave strong publicity to the incident that pleased the perpetrators. The RSIM intentionally did not reveal its identity during the Davao bombing in order not to disrupt its Islamic propagation and conversion activities. Santos was even operating openly in the Balik-Islam front. He re-organized the Balik Islam Unity Congress (BIUC) to mobilize the Muslim converts in the country. Iesa Javier originally founded the BIUC in 2000 at the Darul Hijra Foundation in Baguio City. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa was said to have been informed about the BIUC through telephone conversation.227 Police authorities regarded the BIUC as a large legal front organization of the RSIM.

Based on intelligence documents received by the Philippine Institute for

Political Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), the RSIM was indeed responsible for the 2003 Davao bombing. According to an informant associated with the RSIM, the following were sequences of events leading to the bombing:228

• It was in October 2002 that a plan was conceived to conduct

terrorist operations in airports and piers in the country; • In December 2002, Ibrahim “Boyet” Kessel, Ricardo “Abdul Karim”

Ayeras and a certain Mona and Mentang left for Davao City. Ayeras and Kessel were sent by Sheikh Omar Lavilla to undergo training in bomb-making under Mentang who is a member of the MILF;

• The bombing of Davao Airport was a joint operation of the MILF and the RSIM and this was carried out in March 2003. Ibrahim Kessel, Abdul Karim Ayeras, and Mona returned to Manila after the bombing; and,

• The successful bombing operations at the Davao City Airport earned Ibrahim Kessel and Abdul Karim Ayeras PhP 75,000.00 each which was given to them by Sheikh Omar Lavilla. The money was taken from the Sadaqah of Muhammad Ansari. Mona earned her reward from the operations through the Philippine Association of Muslimah Dar Al Eeman Inc.

227Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr. Radical Fundamentalist Balik-Islam Movement in the Philippines, p. 35.

228Revelations of a Balik Islam personality given during the first week of January 2006.

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The government blamed the MILF for the incident because the blast carried an MILF trademark. The blast carried the trademark of the MILF because RSIM operatives were trained by MILF instructors. In January 2002, Ahmad Santos started the Jihad training of RSIM members in MILF camps. MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu told media on October 29, 2005229 that Ahmad Santos introduced himself in early 2000 as a crusading news reporter to penetrate Camp Abubakar, then the main headquarters of the MILF. Santos also told the leaders of the MILF that he is a Muslim convert to make the MILF comfortable. Kabalu admitted that he “personally met the Ahmad Santos. Eid Kabalu said that Santos managed to embed himself within the MILF community and he later met contacts to meet the late ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani.

The 2004 Super ferry 14 Bombing: The Launching of the RSIM

The bombing of Super ferry 14 on 27 February 2004 resulted in the gruesome death of 116 people and the serious wounding of at least 300 others. This tragic incident in Philippine water apparently converted the Super ferry 14 into a dreadful floating inferno. It was also the most violent man-made disaster in Philippine waters since 11 September 2001 and the worst terrorist attack in Asia since the 2002 Bali bombing.

The post-blast investigation conducted by the PNP showed that an

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) placed at the Tourist section of the Super ferry 14 caused the Super ferry 14 explosion. Police investigation also revealed that RSIM operatives carried out the Super ferry 14 bombing. The main suspect was Redendo Cain “Habil” Dellosa who was one of those arrested in Anda, Pangasinan in May 2002 for illegal possession of firearms and explosives.

But Dellosa posted bail and went into hiding until he was arrested and put

to jail in March 2004 in connection with the ferry bombing and other criminal charges. Dellosa was the “Passenger 51” identified by Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman in radio interviews.

Though Dellosa denied his involvement in the Super ferry 14 incident,

Walter Villanueva, an alleged member of the RSIM, admitted in his sworn statement on 7 September 2004 that Dellosa was indeed the “Passenger 51” mentioned by Khadaffy and Abu Solaiman and reported in print and broadcast

229 News article “Arrested RSM leader infiltrated MILF in 2000” October 29,2005. The Daily Tribune. http://www.tribune.net.ph

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media. Villanueva admitted the following to the Criminal and Investigation Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP:230

• That Habil Dellosa ( Redendo Cain Dellosa) was a fellow Balik Islam who became Villanueva’s acquaintance as early as July 2003 when they prayed together at the FSDMFI at Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City every Friday;

• That on or about February 25, 2004 at around 7:30 PM, Villanueva received a text message from Habil Dellosa asking permission to sleep over at his house in Project 8, Quezon City as the latter was planning to go to Mindanao the following day;

• Villanueva agreed that Dellosa could sleep over at his house but the latter asked to be fetched at a Jollibee outlet in the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Kalentong Street in Mandaluyong City. The two met at the said place and arrived at Villanueva’s house at around 12:45 AM of February 26, 2004;

• Upon arriving at the house, Villanueva noticed that Dellosa carried a big carton box with a TV inside. Dellosa opened the TV set and attached two wires inside. When Villanueva asked him what he was doing, Dellosa just answered that he planned to put the TV inside the Super ferry 14;

• At around 4:45AM of February 26, 2004 Villanueva woke up and roused Dellosa from his sleep for their morning prayers and breakfast. Dellosa again attached two additional wires to the TV set and placed it inside the carton box. Villanueva said that he even assisted in sealing the box with packing tape and it was at this juncture that Dellosa revealed that the TV was loaded with TNT;

• Before he was about to leave, Dellosa showed Villanueva a boarding ticket for Super ferry 14 in the name of “Arnulfo Alvarado”. Dellosa left for the pier on board a taxicab;

• At around 9:00 AM of February 26, 2004, Villanueva received a text message from Dellosa informing him that he was already at the pier. At about 11:30 AM, Villanueva again received a text message from Dellosa informing him to go home to Sta. Ana, Manila to change the time setting of the TV bomb as the Super ferry 14 would not leave port until later that night. At around 10:00 PM Villanueva received another text message from Dellosa saying that the TV bomb was on board the Super ferry 14 and that he should wait for the news the following day;

• Around 6:00 AM of February 27, 2004, Villanueva received a phone call from Dellosa telling him that the Super ferry 14 exploded.

230Case File “Super Ferry 14 Incident” Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. PNP 2004.

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On March 29, 2004, Redento Dellosa was arrested and put to jail in connection with the Super ferry 14 bombing and other criminal charges. Delllosa admitted that he was the Passenger 51 who used the name “Arnulfo Alvarado” to bring to board an improvised explosive device. On 10 October 2004, the Marine Board Inquiry tasked to investigate the Super ferry 14 explosion submitted a report to President Arroyo. This report confirmed that based on the confession of Dellosa, the RSIM/ASG conspiracy had indeed deliberately planted the bomb that sank ferry. Dellosa admitted during investigation that he placed around eight pounds of TNT in a television set that he carried onto the ferry.

Media coverage of the 2004 Super ferry 14 bombing gave popularity to the previously unknown RSIM. Prior to the Super ferry 14 bombing, the general public and even the international community had very little knowledge of the RSIM. The Super ferry 14 bombing was a milestone in the history of RSIM for it received a lot of international and domestic media attention.

The media brought the RSIM in the mainstream of discussions on terrorism. Even the media conveyed the message of the RSIM not to tag their members as terrorists.

In one media interview, Ahmad Santos stressed, “we are not terrorists and don’t coddle terrorists” explaining that the group’s main objective is to unite and solidify reverts (as Balik-Islam members are called) as a fulcrum and pillar for other Muslim brothers.”231

Malik Alimuddin and Gappal Bannah Confessions: The 2005 Valentines Day Bombing

A Philippine intelligence report in November 2005 raised concern about

the collusion between media and terrorist personalities. Though some sectors of the media community vehemently condemned the allegation of the military, there were testimonies from the suspected terrorists affirming the collusion between terrorists and members of the press.

The testimonies of Malik Alimuddin alias "Malik" and Gappal Bannah

alias "Boy Negro" were examples. Both were Abu Sayyaf members turned state witnesses. Malik and Boy Negro were arrested for the 2005 Valentines Day bombing, which resulted in the death of ten persons and wounding of 136 others. Both supported the military intelligence report of collusion between some terror groups and the media. They even admitted the link among the RSIM, the ASG and some members of the Philippine press.

231Julmunir I. Jannaral , “Islam Converts Vilified by AFP”, Manila Times (8 April 2004) at http://www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2004/apr/08/20040408spe1.html. Accessed on 30 October 2007.

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Boy Negro underscored in his sworn statements that the RSIM and the

ASG got assistance from their media contacts to “get good press in their propaganda war against the government”232 Boy Negro elaborated, “Many members of the media in Mindanao and from Manila help us, from the newspapers, television and radio. The same members of the media get a cut from the money that the ASG gets from their kidnapping activities. That is why Janjalani boasts about his closeness to the press because of their contacts.”233

Malik, who admitted to have aided the RSIM in carrying out the 2005

Valentines Day bombing, corroborated the allegation of Boy Negro when the former confessed, “There are members of the media and of the police who protect the RSM and ASG. The supporters from the media help out the RSM and ASG if they get caught.”234 Malik said that without the support of the media, it would be harder for them to operate and to propagandize. In other words, the media not only publicized the cause of RSIM but also gave protection to the some RSIM personalities.

The Julius Babao Case235

Another case involving the media and the RSIM was the controversial story of Julius Babao, the anchor of the primetime news program “TV Patrol World” at ABS-CBN Channel 2, the largest television network company in the Philippines. Admiral Tirso Danga, then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, accused him for posting the bail of RSIM member Dawud Santos amounting to P200,000.00 last April 26, 2005. This accusation was based on the report of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) submitted to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who shared the report as an off-the-record statement to newspaper columnist, Ramon Tulfo.

According to ISAFP report, Babao allegedly guaranteed the bail and used his influence as a member of the press to act as a "guarantor" for Dawud Santos. Babao reportedly entered into this arrangement to a scoop breaking news on the RSIM.

232“2 ex-terrorists link journalists, cops to Sayyaf” in Sun Star Network Online (16 November 2005) at http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/net/2005/11/16/2.ex.terrorists.link.journalists.cops.to.sayyaf.html.. Accessed on 30 October 2007.

233Ibid.

234 Ibid.

235Some portions of this section was written by Diane Junio, Chief Research Analyst of the Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Also appeared in Mendoza , Radical Fundamentalist Balik-Islam Movement in the Philippine, op cit.

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Babao and the ABS-CBN management denied the allegations. Babao explained that he only met Dawud Santos to introduce him to a computer expert who facilitated his release. Dawud Santos later claimed in a media interview that Babao merely acted as “reference” with the surety company. The ABS-CBN Company even cleared Babao in its internal investigation. Based on its 11-page report, the ABS-CBN stressed, “We find the evidence shows there is absolutely no truth to the charges against Babao: he neither posted nor guaranteed bail for Dawud Santos.”

Conclusion The RSIM and the media had symbiotic relationship. The RSIM provided the media a good story to report while the media provided the RSIM an outlet to publicize its cause. There was also allegation that the RSIM had collusion with media personalities. Even Ahmad Santos was a member of the press when he founded the RSIM. The RSIM intentionally used the media to spread its Islamic fundamentalist ideology and mount some terrorist operations. At present, the RSIM is organizationally decimated and functionally inactive.

But the media revived public interests on the RSIM when it linked the RSIM with the Makati Blast on 19 October 2007. Results of investigation revealed that the Makati Blast was an industrial accident and that RSIM involvement was a hoax.

It has to be pointed out, however, that though the RSIM is presently dormant, it still has the capacity to be active if its remaining followers are able to solicit overseas funds to support their operations.

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CHAPTER 7 Sources of Resilience*

Since the launching of the global war on terrorism in the aftermath of the

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Philippines has been engaged in a prolonged military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Key ASG leaders have been killed in this battle, while others have been imprisoned for various crimes associated with terrorism. Despite these successes, authorities have not been able to eliminate the ASG completely, and the group remains a threat to Philippine internal security. Even after losing key field commanders, the ASG is still able to replenish its membership primarily from affected and influenced villages in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi (BASULTA) in the southern Philippines.

After providing a brief background of the ASG, this article examines the sources of the ASG’s resilience in the face of government and international pressure. It argues that the ASG is a product of complex tensions in the southern Philippines, where criminal, political and militant groups at times collaborate to achieve shared goals. It also shows the limits of countering terrorism in the southern Philippines.

A Deeper Look at the Founding of the ASG

Analysts traditionally trace the evolution of the ASG to Abdurajak Janjalani, who reportedly founded the group in the early 1990s. While there is no doubt that the ASG’s original ideological foundation is attributed to the political and religious ideas of Abdurajak, what he actually organized was a group called al-Harakatul al-Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic Movement, whose original members were drawn from his followers in Jamaa Tableegh, an Islamic propagation group that he formed in Basilan in the early 1980s.236Abdurajak officially declared the creation of AHAI in 1989 to pursue Jihad Fi Sabilillah, defined as “fighting and dying for the cause of Islam.”237 Yet it was only in 1993 when AHAI formally organized with Abdurajak as the Amir.238

*Originally published by the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point in CTC Sentinel

(3 May 2010). Electronic version is at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-sources-of-the-abu-sayyaf’s-resilience-in-the-southern-philippines.

236 For a more detailed history, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group and Terrorism in the Southern Philippines Seven Years After 9/11: Threat and Response,” Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, September 2008.

237 Ibid.

238 Ibid.

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Since the formal launch of AHAI in 1989, Abdurajak delivered several Khutbahs or sermons and released several fatwa using the nom-de-guerre “Abu Sayyaf,” in honor of Afghan resistance fighter Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.239 While Abdurajak idolized this Afghan leader, the suggestion that Abdurajak was an Afghan war veteran is still a subject for verification.240 Some living Filipino Afghan war veterans, for example, have challenged the claim that Abdurajak actually fought in the Afghan war—arguing instead that it was his younger brother, Hector, who participated in the conflict.241

Abdurajak’s Khutbahs and fatwa became popular not only in Basilan but also in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga City. His popularity caught the ire of police and military authorities because Abdurajak was associated with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a group that declared jihad against the Philippine government. Since Abdurajak used the pen name “Abu Sayyaf,” the military described his followers as a group of Abu Sayyaf, which was popularized in media as the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG.

The popularity of this group spread widely in Mindanao and was locally known as Juma’a Abu Sayyaf. In August 1991, Abdurajak publicly used the name ASG in connection with the bombing of the MV Doulos, a Christian missionary ship docked at the Zamboanga City port.242

From Islamic Movement to a Bandit Group

From an Islamic movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ASG received the label of a bandit group from the Philippine government for partaking in several bombing, extortion and kidnap-for-ransom activities. Although the ASG received initial funding from al-Qa`ida in the mid-1990s through the activities of Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, external funding was cut off when Philippine authorities discovered Khalifa’s clandestine operations in the

239 Ibid.

240 Personal interview, Noor Umog, former member of the Abu Sayyaf Group, April 8,

2010.

241There is need to conduct research on the life and stories of Filipino Muslim veterans of the Afghan war. Some have died, some have been imprisoned but there are still remaining veterans all over Mindanao. There are a few staying in Muslim communities in Manila trying to make a living peacefully.

242 “Abu Sayyaf Kidnappings, Bombings and Other Attacks,” GMANews.tv, August 23, 2007.

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country.243

To mobilize resources, the ASG resorted to a kidnap-for-ransom spree in the late 1990s. The ASG’s most publicized kidnap-for-ransom activities were the March 2000 attacks in elementary schools in Basilan,244 the April 2000 attack at the Sipadan resort of Malaysia245 and the May 2001 attack at the Dos Palmas resort of Palawan.246 These attacks prompted the Philippine government to describe the ASG as a group of bandits interested in moneymaking through kidnapping activities.

As a result of limited foreign funding since 9/11, the ASG has relied on kidnapping activities as its major source of funding—this continues today.247 Other sources of its funding come from extortion activities (disguised as zakat, or alms giving), counterfeiting of goods, illegal drug sales or serving as bodyguards for local politicians.248

From a Bandit Group to a Terrorist Group

The aftermath of 9/11, however, resulted in the redesignation of the ASG from a bandit group to a terrorist group. The United States listed the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization, justifying the deployment of U.S. troops to the southern Philippines to assist and train the Philippine military in countering the threat.

243 The discovery is fully described in the report, “The Islamic Fundamentalist/Extremist Movements in the Philippines and their Links with International Terrorist Organizations,” December 1994, produced by the Special Investigation Group-Intelligence Command of the Philippine National Police headed by Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr.

244For an excellent account, see Jose Torres Jr., Into the Mountains: Hostaged by the Abu

Sayyaf (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001).

245 For first-hand accounts of this incident, see Roberto N. Aventajado, 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf (Pasig City: Anvil, 2004) and Werner Wallert, Hostage Terror: Abducted by the Abu Sayyaf (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2009).

246 For a gripping account of her tragedy in this attack, see Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2003).

247 Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr., “The Evolution of Terrorist Financing in the Philippines,” presented at the International Conference in Countering the Financing of Terrorism at the Sulu Hotel, Philippines on July 7-8, 2008; Personal interview, Major General Benjamin Dolorfino, Commander of the Western Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, March 25, 2010.

248Personal interview, Rear Admiral Alexander Pama, Commander of Naval Forces Western Mindanao of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, March 24, 2010.

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Since 9/11, the ASG has engaged in a series of terrorist activities such as the Davao International Airport bombing in March 2003 that killed 21 people, the Super ferry 14 bombing in February 2004 that killed 116 people and the Valentine’s Day bombing in February 2005 that killed 20 people.249 During this period, the ASG engaged in several bombing activities that were hallmarks of terrorism rather than banditry.250

ASG’s bomb-making skills were acquired through joint training with Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives in the southern Philippines. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, alleged masterminds of the 2002 Bali bombing, have been identified by Philippine intelligence authorities as key trainers of the ASG on the manufacture and use of improvised explosive devices.251 Dulmatin and Umar Patek reportedly trained some ASG members with members of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

From Terrorist Group to Bandit Group Again

When the Philippine military waged Oplan Ultimatum in August 2006 as a counterterrorism offensive to eliminate the ASG, it led to the demise of key ASG leaders, particularly Khadaffy Janjalani and Jainal Antel Sali, Jr. (also known as Abu Solaiman). The success of Oplan Ultimatum led to the drastic decline of ASG membership to an estimated 200 members at the conclusion of the campaign in 2007.252 Yet the ASG was able to recover its membership when it mounted a series of kidnapping activities in 2008. This allowed the group to amass money, which attracted Muslim youth to join the spree.

The massive kidnapping activities of the ASG started in June 2008 with the abduction of well-known Filipina journalist, Ces Drilon, and her cameraman. This was followed by the kidnappings of three workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in January 2009 and two Chinese nationals in November 2009.253 In between those dates, several local residents were kidnapped, with one local teacher in Jolo beheaded in November 2009. Indeed,

249 For details on these attacks, see Enrico Antonio La Vina and Lilita Balane, “Timeline: The Abu Sayyaf Atrocities,” Newsbreak Online, March 31, 2009.

250 For detailed analysis, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism,” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Salazar eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 247-264.

251 Dulmatin was killed in Indonesia on March 9, 2010. Umar Patek is believed to have left the Philippines, but there are reports that he is still in Jolo, Sulu in the southern Philippines.

252 Rodolfo B. Mendoza, “Updates on Terrorist Organizations in the Philippines,” lecture delivered at the Brunei Darussalam Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, December 3, 2009.

253 “Teacher Beheaded in Philippines,” BBC, November 9, 2009.

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the ASG degenerated into a bandit group again.

With money in their pockets resulting from several ransom payments, the ASG was able to accommodate younger recruits not interested in ideology, but in guns and money. Muslim parents in impoverished villages of BASULTA even volunteered their sons to join the ASG in exchange for a monthly supply of rice and financial support to the family of around $200.254 Some fathers even reportedly traded their sons for guns.255 There were cases where young recruits joined the ASG as a status symbol against ordinary gangs in their communities. Some entered the ASG as a result of “pot” (marijuana) sessions with members.256 There are a few who joined the ASG to exact revenge for the deaths of their loved ones killed by police or military forces. There are also members who joined the ASG due to clan conflicts (known as rido), which is prevalent in Mindanao.257

Sources of ASG Resilience

As of April 2010, the ASG has an estimated 445 members, 79% of whom are 30-years-old and younger.258 According to the Philippine government, Sulu represents the largest membership of 200 followed by 130 in Basilan, 90 in Zamboanga City, 20 in Tawi-Tawi and five in Marawi City.259 The ASG has become a resilient group because it is able to replenish its membership from affected and influenced villages in BASULTA through material inducements. In Sulu alone, 46% or 115 of its total 251 villages are affected by the ASG.260 In Basilan, 25% of its 187 villages are affected by ASG.261 In other words, the ASG has a reservoir of new recruits that provide the group its staying power.

254 Personal interview, senior intelligence officer, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, March 25, 2010.

255Ibid.

256Ibid.

257 Wilfredo Magno Torres III ed., Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao (Makati City: The Asia Foundation, 2007).

258 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Evolving Threats of Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” lecture presented at the 4th Asia Pacific Program for Senior National Security Officers organized by the Center for Excellence in National Security, Singapore, April 13, 2010. For the estimates on ASG cadre, see Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Armed Forces of the Philippines, March 2010.

259 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Armed Forces of the Philippines, March 2010.

260 Ibid.

261Ibid.

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Aside from this reservoir, ASG leaders have also mastered the skills of conniving with ordinary criminal groups in their operational areas to mount kidnapping and other criminal activities. The ASG has recognized field commanders who are known bandits in the community. ASG commander Alpader Parad, who was killed in February 2010, was a known kidnapper rather than an ideological leader in Sulu. Other field commanders of the ASG are also leaders of notorious criminal gangs in BASULTA who are engaged in piracy, arms smuggling, drugs trafficking and counterfeiting of goods.

Furthermore, some ASG field commanders are protected by local politicians who also benefit from the illegal activities of the group—using ASG members as part of their private militias.262 Although the Philippine government has established a commission to dismantle private armies, it remains to be seen if the commission can fulfill its mandate. According to the Philippine National Police, there are more than 130 private armies in the entire country, in addition to rebel groups moonlighting as partisan armed militias of local politicians.263 ASG members who are not part of the private army of a local politician offer their services as “thugs for hire,” particularly during election seasons.

In other words, the ASG has become an entrepreneur of violence with more of its members interested in pursuing money rather than a violent, Islamist ideology. While other commanders still have the illusion of waging jihad to establish an Islamic state in the southern Philippines, these individuals are a minority, usually those who studied in Islamic schools in the Philippines and abroad. Individuals such as Yasser Igasan, Khair Mundos and Isnilon Hapilon fit the description of ideological leaders.

Yet Igasan, who is rumored to be the nominal Amir of the ASG, remains a jihadist but lacks loyal armed followers to promote his mission. Mundos, who is leading the ASG in Basilan, also lacks followers who are committed jihadists. Most of Mundos’ followers are bandits who are not interested in pursuing jihad. Hapilon, who is leading some of the group in Sulu, is overpowered by other ASG field commanders who are more interested in money generation. It is believed that the current over-all operational commander of the is Radullan Sahiron whose armed followers are engaged in many criminal activities.

In short, the majority of ASG members are not motivated by the promise of an Islamic state or the virtue of jihad, but by the allure of money and power

262 Local politicians allegedly received commissions from ransom payments and proceeds

from illicit trafficking of arms and drugs. This idea was also articulated by National Security Adviser and Acting Defense Secretary Norberto Gonzales. Also see Jocelyn Uy, “Abu Sayyaf Men Maybe Moonlighting at Private Armies—Defense Execs,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 15, 2010.

263 Jesus A. Versosa, “The PNP’s Role in Upholding the Law Against Private Armed Groups,” Philippine National Police, January 27, 2010.

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that comes from the barrel of a gun.

The ASG, therefore, has become a resilient group because its existence is enmeshed in a complex situation in the southern Philippines where rebels and terrorists connive with ordinary bandits, who collude with local politicians. All these various interests perpetrate violence on an island marred by more than 400 years of ethnic conflict, banditry and rebellion.

Limits of Countering Terrorism in the Philippines

With this grim reality of violence in the southern Philippines, counterterrorism measures largely based on the use of military muscle will not put an end to the ASG. Military offensives and other variants of Oplan Ultimatum can kill ASG members, but not end the ASG as a resilient group.

The ASG is a symbol of the complexities of armed violence in the southern Philippines that interact with issues of banditry, terrorism, rebellion, separatism, clan conflict, ethnic conflict and warlordism. The continuous entry of foreign jihadists to the southern Philippines only compounds these issues, as radical foreigners subvert the minds of the locals, imbuing them with a violent Islamist ideology. Moreover, they also train local fighters in sophisticated bomb-making skills. Only effective governance can limit ethnic conflict, banditry and rebellion. A strong civilian government sincere in nation building is needed to finally put an end to the ASG by resolving the ethnic and political disputes plaguing the region.

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CHAPTER 8 The Pull of Terrorism*

Introduction

All terrorist organizations have many ways to pull others to their side. They have magnets to attract members, especially young recruits, to join their groups.

But the processes by which young persons are pulled to enter terrorist

organizations are not yet widely understood in the academe, policy-making world, the media and the broader public. Though existing scholarly literatures on terrorism have already identified several pull factors of terrorism.264 None of these factors, however, may be applied generally to all terrorist organizations because behaviors of terrorist groups vary from country to country.265 Some terrorist groups may have shared common experiences that cut across national boundaries. But vigorous social science investigations indicate that behaviors of terrorist organizations differ in historical context, socio-cultural milieu, politico-economic setting, specific intentions, exact targets, and even particular tactics.266 Thus, grappling with the pull of terrorist is better understood in case-to-case basis.

This paper is an attempt to describe the processes by which young persons

are pulled to join terrorist groups. Using the Philippines as a case study, this study examines the ASG, a terrorist organization operating largely in the Southern Philippines. This paper concentrates on ASG’s recruitment methods and strategies in order to pull the youth to become involved in terrorist activities.

This paper contends that there are ideational and material factors that pull

the youth to join the ASG. A nuanced understanding of these ideational and

*Also published in Youth and Terrorism: A Selection of Articles (Kuala Lumpur:

Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2011), pp. 39-50. This is also a revised and shortened version of a paper delivered at the International Symposium on the Dynamics of Youth and Terrorism organized by the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Royale Chulan Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 8 May 2011.

264C. Sobek, and A. Braithwaite, “Victim of Success: American Dominance and Terrorism”, Conflict Management and Peace Science Volume 22 (2005), pp. 135-148.

265Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2002). Literature Review of Existing Terroris

Behavior Modeling. CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies. 266Paul Davis K. and Kim Cragin. Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces

Together. CA: RAND, 2009. Also see Bonnie Cordes, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen with Gail Bass, Daniel Relles, William Sater, Mario Juncosa, William Fowler and Geraldine Petty (1985). A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups. CA: RAND.

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material pull factors are essential for a comprehensive grasp of the ASG threat and for the formulation of a policy that aims to counter the threat posed by this terrorist group.

The Pull Factors of Terrorism

There are many factors that pull young people to terrorist groups. These pull factors can be ideational and material that are mutually reinforcing. Ideational factors may be in the form of ideology endorsed by a certain religious belief, philosophical perspective or cultural outlook. Material factors, on the hand, may be in the form of monetary inducement, logistical assistance, perks and other financial benefits. These pull factors are best utilized with an effective recruitment strategy being pursued by a terrorist group to increase its membership and to keep the organization alive.

Ideational Pull A particular study on terrorism has shown that the major pull factor that

draws young persons towards terrorist acts is ideology.267 Ideology is deemed to be the main ideational pull mechanism “that makes possible the translation of discontent into specific political goals” of young individuals being lured to join terrorist groups.268 It is posited that ideologies are “important organizers of experience and act as moral codes and motivations for actions” of young recruits.269 It is further argued that in the assessment of the perceived benefits of, and motivations for, terrorist acts of the youth; deeply understanding the virulent ideology of terrorist groups is essential. Ideology provides meaning to the emptiness felt by young people and defines their “reasons for existence”. One study even asserts ideology is a great pull of terrorist in attracting young people, to wit:

The young people don’t know why they exist…they suffer

from an emptiness of meaning…[hu]man is more than ensemble of material needs, that he is in truth and spiritual being, which means he has essential spiritual needs, which are even not approximately recognized nor understood, let alone satisfied…the atmosphere in which today’s terrorists have grown up…they feel powerless.270

267Jeremy Ginges, “Deterring the Terrorist: A Psychological Evaluation of Different

Strategies for Deterring Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence. Volume 19, Number 1 (1997), pp. 170-185.

268Ibid.

269Ibid.

270Ibid. Also see O. Billig, “The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrade”, Political Psychology Volume 6, Number 1 (1985), pp. 29-46.

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Profiles of youth joining terrorist organizations through ideological motivations are mostly students, young professionals and learned individuals recruited from schools, universities and working places. Ideology is a pull factor in the radicalization of small but significant minority of this type of young persons dissatisfied with the society in which they inevitably found themselves.271 Radical ideology introduces the youth to violent ideas that eventually lead them to enter terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.

Material Pull While ideology is indeed a pull factor of terrorist, there are young recruits

who are induced to join terrorist groups not because of ideology but largely due to material considerations. Young persons succumbing to this pull are mostly out-of-school youth in depressed areas or impoverished communities where poverty is pervasive and the rate of illiteracy is high. This type of young persons are induced to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism through the lure of money, arms, and material needs of their families and love-ones. Using the material pull, terrorist groups buy the loyalties of their young recruits through tangible inducements in the form of money, perks, arms and other concrete benefits. Terrorist groups buy loyalties of young members to perform various tasks: combatants, bombers, lookouts, mules, or simply errand persons.272

The Pull of Recruitment Though a terrorist organization has an ideology and material resources to

entice young people to join, a well- planned recruitment strategy is also a crucial pull. Without a systematic recruitment strategy, a terrorist group cannot efficiently and even automatically pull the youth to its side.

Recruitment strategies of terrorist groups can be classified into two:

benign strategy and coercive strategy. A benign strategy utilizes persuasive tools to entice recruits to join a

terrorist group. This kind of recruitment strategy allows terrorist organizations to actively reach out the youth by visiting them in schools, youth camps, refugee areas, boarding houses and even amusement places.273 Terrorist organizations deliberately spot young persons and radicalize them through the convincing power of ideology or, in most cases, through material inducements, if the ideological indoctrination fails.

271European Commission’s Experts Group on Violent Radicalization. Radicalization

Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism (Brussels: European Commission, 2008).

272 Homeland Security Institute. Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by International Terrorist Groups (VA: US Department of Education, 2009).

273Ibid.

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A coercive strategy, on the other hand, uses “threat” and “fear” factors to pull young persons to join terrorist groups. This is the case where young persons are forced into membership either by threatening to kill them and their families. There are cases where young persons are kidnapped and forced them to commit terrorist acts against their will.274 There are also cases where young sisters of persons associated with terrorist groups are forced to marry young men to be new members. Terrorist groups resort to this coercive recruitment strategy as a desperate measure to keep the organization alive, particularly in the context of dwindling membership.

The Abu Sayyaf Case The ASG is an excellent case in the Philippines to examine the processes by which young persons are pulled to enter terrorist organizations.

ASG’s Ideological Pull Abdurajak Janjalani recruited many followers in Zamboanga City, Basilan,

Sulo and Tawi-Tawi (ZAMBASULTA) because of his powerful sermons or Khutbahs that express his mastery of Salafi faith or Wahabi ideology. Janjalani used Salafism and Wahabism to analyze the state of Islam in Mindanao and the situation of Muslim people in the Southern Philippines. Janjalani was able to pull young Muslims in Mindanao to join his through the power of Wahabi ideology that he preached in various mosques.

From initial followers of almost 100 in Basilan in 1989, it grew to almost

300 in 1990 when disgruntled members of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Sulo and Tawi-Tawi joined him. Janjalani, who was once a member of the MNLF, also convinced young MNLF followers to join him until his group reached a membership of almost 1,000 in 1991. It was during this year when Janjalani’s group mounted its first terrorist attack: the 1991 bombing of M/V Doulous, a Christian-owned ship propagating Christian faith. Janjalani claimed responsibility for this bombing using the name “Abu Sayyaf Group”. This got the ire of the Philippine military and police that erroneously described the group as Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighter (MCFF) in several intelligence reports.

Janjalani was able to win the hearts and minds of former MNLF fighters

and other young Moro because he offered an alternative ideology that effectively touched the sentiments and aspirations of Muslims in Mindanao. In his inner-circle, he recruited younger and more passionate Muslim leaders who studied Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Egypt. These young Muslim leaders had common remorse against the MNLF, which entered into peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996. These leaders also shared common anger against the so-called Christian-dominated Philippine government based in what they called “Imperial Manila”.

274Ibid.

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Because of significant number of followers already, Janjalani named his

group in 1993 into Al- Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic Movement. Within this movement, Janjalani formed a consultative group called Majilis Shura, which officially proclaimed the foundation of AHAI in 1994 during its First Assembly.

On 18 November 1994, amidst heavy speculation that the ASG was created

by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Abu Abdu Said, then spokesman of the group, issued a document called Surat Kasabunnal” or “A Voice of Truth”. This document vehemently denounced the view that the AFP or the CIA created the ASG. It argued that the ASG started as a movement called Juma’a Abu Sayyaf.

By 1998, the ASG reached a membership of around 1,300. But the

momentum of increasing membership was cut short when Abdurajak Janjalani was killed in a firefight with the police in Lamitan, Basilan in December 1998. But before he died, Janjalani delivered eight radical ideological discourses called Khutbahs, which may be considered as primary sources of Janjalani’s radical Islamic ideology. These discourses explained Janjalani’s Quranic perspective of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, which he lamented, was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He even denounced the ulama (Muslim scholars) for their little knowledge of the Quran and lamented that most Muslims in the Philippines calling themselves, as Moros were not really practicing the true meaning of Islam compared with their counterparts in West Asia.

These eight discourses also revealed Janjalani’s deep grasp of Wahabi

Islam, which considered other Muslims heretical. The Islamic theology of Wahabism greatly informed Janjalani’s radical ideology, which attracted young Moros to follow him. His death, however, marked the waning of the ideological luster of the ASG.

ASG’s Material Pull With no ideological beacon to unify the group, the ASG became

factionalized. Some factions degenerated into bandit groups engaged in predatory activities like kidnap-for-ransom activities (KRA), smuggling operations of arms and drugs, and extortion activities. Lacking ideology to win the hearts and minds of members, ASG leaders in the post-Abdurajak period resorted to material inducements to buy loyalties and recruit new members.

Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother who replaced the founder, did not

have the ideological zeal of the older brother. Being young and gullible, Khadaffy was even manipulated by more criminally minded ASG commanders like Galib Andang (Commander Robot) and Abu Sabaya. The bandit factions of the ASG led by Commander Robot and Abu Sabaya ruled the ASG. Though Khadaffy

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attempted to revive the Islamist agenda of the ASG by concentrating on ideological propagation, his tragic death in 2006 failed to realize his goal.

During the leadership of Khadaffy, the ASG went into KRA spree. The

biggest KRA project of the ASG was the Sipadan Kidnapping in 2000 led by Commander Robot. The Sipadan Kidnapping incident involved a ransom of US$25 million offered by Libyan President Muammar Khadaffy who called the amount a “development aid”. With huge money involved, young impoverished Moros lined-up for membership in the ASG. Some parents even volunteered their sons to work for ASG with the expectation of financial payment.

In 2000, the ASG reached a membership of more than 1,500 according to

military estimates. But insiders claimed that ASG followers during this period were so huge that the group could not account them anymore. In fact, the ASG acted like a “Robinhood” distributing part of its loot to local communities. Thus, the ASG was able to get local support from their influenced and affected communities that in turn gave the group “early warning signals” and even barricades during military offensives. New younger members are even paid to work for ASG as second and third security layers for their makeshift camps. Parents of young ASG members were even issued a monthly supply of rice and a monthly financial honorarium ranging from US$100 to US$500. Through material inducements, the ASG was able pull members despite the lack of ideological agitation or religious propaganda.

ASG’s Recruitment Pull To keep the organization alive, the ASG implemented a combination of

benign and coercive recruitment strategy. Its benign recruitment method was ideological propaganda through Islamic propagation. This method was effective during the time of Abdurajak Janjalani. After his death, the ASG continued its benign recruitment scheme through material inducements discussed above.

As a result of intensified military operations, membership of the ASG

started to decline sharply. From the highest peak of more than 1,500 members in 2000, the ASG membership was reduced to less than 500 in 2005. To recover, the ASG resorted to coercive methods of recruitment. ASG commanders resorted to scare tactics like threatening to kill members and their families. Some ASG commanders even used deception to recruit members, e.g. having young Muslims carry their firearms and taking pictures of them, then using the pictures to blackmail the kids into joining the group. Forced marriages were even utilized to find new recruits. Though there were anecdotal stories of some young persons being kidnapped to force them to join the ASG, these cases have not been properly documented and vigorously studied.

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Conclusion

Like other terrorist groups in the world, the ASG is an adaptive group that uses a variety of methods in order to recruit young members and sustain the life of the organization. In fact, the ASG is a very resilient organization whose life depends on the use of many survival methods in order to replenish its membership. In other words, the ASG is an adaptive adversary. As further explained by the Homeland Security Institute:

Terrorist groups are adaptive adversaries who use a variety

of tools and tactics to reach potential recruits and supporters, which too often include young persons. Groups systematically prey upon the vulnerabilities of youth in various contexts, offering a range of incentives that are intended to make membership in the group attractive. In some cases, young persons have also been forcibly recruited or deceived into participating in terrorist activities. Indeed, terrorist organizations have pull factors to attract members.

These pull factors may be in the form of ideology or through material inducements. Ideational and material pull factors are best utilized with an effective recruitment strategy that can be benign or coercive.

In the case of the ASG, the employment of different pull factors is context bound. During its earlier period under the leadership of Abdurajak, the power of ideology convinced members to join the group. But in the post-Abdurajak period, particularly under Khadaffy, the ASG resorted to material inducement to attract members.

At present, there is an attempt to revive the ideological appeal of the ASG under Yasser Igasan who is currently the Head of ASG’s Sharia Court. But the majority of ASG commanders at present have degenerated into banditry. Under this current situation, the pull factors of ASG will largely emanate from the use of money to attract followers. Crafting a counter-terrorism policy must be informed by this present reality.

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CHAPTER 9 Terrorism and National Security:

Emerging Issues and Continuing Trends A Decade After 9/11*

A decade after September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorism

continues to pose an enormous threat not only to Philippine national security but also to regional stability and world peace.275

This virulent threat is becoming more and more dynamic and is continuously evolving into a highly complex and uncompromising form that makes the threat even harder to prevent, if not to totally eliminate.

It has been said that 9/11 gave terrorism its new ugly face.

Ten years after 9/11, we now learned that terrorists have the ability to face-lift and change its already nasty image. It has the proclivity to innovate in order to survive the harsh environment of counter terrorism. Like a chameleon, terrorists can blend with their surroundings to evade arrest and pursue their clandestine operations.

The changing face of terrorism continues to pose a tremendous challenge for global, regional and national counter terrorism, particularly if law enforcement authorities have a static view and traditional understanding of the whole gamut of problems associated with this menace.

Globally, Al-Qaeda remains to be the main international terrorist group with worldwide influence.

However, the July 22, 2011 terrorist attacks on Norway that killed 76 persons have aptly demonstrated that Al Qaeda, which promotes Islamic Fundamentalism, does not have the monopoly of terrorism. Even a “lone wolf” embracing Christian Fundamentalism can also commit hideous terrorist acts.

Through the decisive counter-terrorism efforts of the United States supported by its allies and partners in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), Al-Qaeda’s original global infrastructure has been practically crippled. Its complex and carefully woven global network has been utterly discovered, effectively disrupted and some even totally paralyzed.

*This chapter is also published in IAG Policy Review (September 2011).

275This chapter is based on the speech delivered by the author at the 5th National Convention of the

Philippine Society for Industrial Security, Inc. held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City on 9 September 2011.

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Al Qaeda founder, Osama bin Laden, is already dead. In fact, almost two-thirds of the original leaders and members of Al-Qaeda have been neutralized to date as a result of GWOT. Its central leadership has practically crumbled and its regional affiliates and adherents successfully dispersed.

After ten years of vigorously waging the war on terror, Al-Qaeda is no longer a strong notorious force as it used to be.

Al Qaeda is now having difficulties mounting another catastrophic attacks beyond its main areas of operations in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. With this, American President Barrack Obama, in his introduction to the current U.S. Counter Terrorism Strategy, proudly declares that Al Qaeda has been put “on the path to defeat”.

But that is not the reason for the whole world to be complacent.

While Al Qaeda has no doubt weakened ten years after 9/11, it is not yet a spent force. Al Qaeda may have been seriously wounded in battle, but it is not yet dead. It still gets its life support from remaining followers and inspired adherents worldwide.

Thus, there is still a need for us to be more anxious because Al Qaeda is still a wicked force to contend with. As stressed by US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, “We have made serious inroads in weakening al Qaeda. [But] there's more to be done. There are these nodes now in Yemen, in Somalia and other areas that we have to continue to go after."

The 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism prepared by the US State Department admits that Al Qaeda continues to pose a threat.

There is no doubt that Al Qaeda still has the malevolent intent and growing capabilities to wreak terrorist havocs. Some, if not many, of its regional affiliates and global adherents are still alive and ready to make trouble. Almost 500 Al Qaeda-linked and Al Qaeda-inspired commanders - with their own associate members worldwide numbering around 10,000 - are still active to disturb peace and undermine global, regional and Philippine national security.

In Pakistan alone, there are still around 300 fierce Al Qaeda fighters associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In Afghanistan, around 100 hardcore Al Qaeda operatives are still active and still getting support from Talibans. Even in the United States, there are at least 40 Americans who have traveled to Somalia to join the Al Qaeda inspired Al Shabab.

It is also important to note that some Moro rebels have also been reportedly affiliated with Al Shabab (locally known as Markasos Shabab). There are also reports of an undetermined number of Al Qaeda-inspired personalities staying in the Philippines.

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Hence, there is a need for us to face the grim reality that ideology of Al

Qaedaism lives on even after the death of Osama bin Laden.

The violent extremist ideology of Al Qaeda still resonates to like-minded groups worldwide such as Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Army of Great Britain, the Eastern Turkistan Movement of Xinjiang (China), the Al-Harakatul-Al Islamiya of the Philippines, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi of Pakistan, the Harkatul Jehadul Islami operating in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, and Jemaah Islamiyah of Indonesia, among many others.

Remaining masterminds of terror associated with Al Qaeda have proven to be very resilient, keenly observant and highly elusive.

Though Al Qaeda may have already lost its steam as a result of the series of democratic uprisings in the Arab world, it can still morph into a newer face under the leadership of Ayman Al Zawahiri whose brand of Islam contains the key ingredients for violent extremism. Al Zawahiri has even released a video last August 2011 urging Al Qaeda followers worldwide to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden.

Through the use of Internet and Islamic propagation activities, Al Qaeda still has the commitment to promote religious intolerance, particularly to young and gullible Muslim population worldwide. It can still inspire and instigate sectarian violence in conflict-affected areas of the world with disgruntled Muslim population that includes the Philippines. In fact, Al-Qaeda is producing a magazine called Inspire to spread its violent extremist ideology worldwide.

At present, Al Qaeda is already weak as a group.

But it can still throw its remaining weight around because Al Qaeda is still relatively influential as a movement.

As a movement, Al Qaeda has become a “complex adaptive system” that has the survival instinct to evolve by adjusting to its “constantly changing” environment. While Al Qaeda celebrates its victories, it also learns from its mistakes. As a complex adaptive movement, Al Qaeda now operates through what Seth Jones calls five tiers: central al Qaeda, affiliated groups, allied groups, allied networks, and inspired individuals.

Al Qaeda is still determined to destroy America and other Western targets.

Based on the seized documents of Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of his death, Al Qaeda planned to attack oil tankers to create economic chaos in the West. The US also warned of possible Al-Qaeda attacks in the mainland using a small plane. India has recently unearthed Al Qaeda plans to attack its major cities through its commander, Ilyas Kashmiri. Even in China, the Al Qaeda

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linked East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), based in Xinjiang Province where Uyghur separatists are active, and is also planning future attacks.

In Egypt, the home country of the new Al Qaeda chief Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda has re-established a cell in Sinai to plan attacks, particularly against police stations. In Spain, an Islamic militant with a Moroccan descent was arrested for propagating violent extremism and for endorsing terrorist attacks on Western targets.

In mounting attacks, Al Qaeda has already mastered the use of suicide terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen - with a strong possibility of exporting these skills to the Philippines. Al Qaeda’s use of indiscriminate bombings of vulnerable targets has made terrorism its new repulsive face. The use of these skills continues to inform the present and future activities of its affiliates, adherents and followers around the world.

Worst, Al Qaeda is developing new explosives to wreak havoc.

Al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen have produced a new chemical bomb made of poison ricin, a white powdery toxin that if annihilated in malls, airports or subways is very lethal. Al Qaeda operatives in the United Kingdom have also created a new version of a liquid bomb, an improved version of the nitroglycerin explosive invented by Ramsey Yousef while in the Philippines in 1994.

In other words, Al Qaeda has weakened organizationally.

But the security threat it poses has not been totally eliminated.

Al Qaeda is battered, but it is still breathing and moving. It still ha s the great illusion of creating a Pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the Islamic world that includes Southeast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has also weakened a decade after 9/11. Most of its key operatives have also been killed and arrested, particularly those responsible in the 2002 Bali bombing and other subsequent bombings in Indonesia and the Philippines. Some of its members have left terrorism behind as a result of serious rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

Like Al Qaeda, JI organizational set-up is already in utter disarray. Its original Mantiqi structure is practically demolished. In fact, JI has already lost its original luster and is now heavily factionalized.

However, terror threats in Southeast Asia persist because around 700 remaining JI members are still active in Java, Indonesia and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.

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Currently, JI is rapidly evolving into a new venomous form.

In Indonesia, for example, personalities recently accused of terrorist acts

have ceased to identify themselves with JI. They have been identified with another group called Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) legally established by Abu Bakar Bashir who is also known to be a JI leader.

Among the known JI personalities in Indonesia, we need to pay attention to Aris Sumarsono.

Sumarsono is a JI military chief and a protégé of Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI. He is believed to have helped prepare the bombs used in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.

Sumarsono is being rumored now to have already replaced Omar Patek who became the main link of Al Qaeda with JI. He was reported to have visited the Philippines and established links with the ASG and other Moro rebels. Sumarsono is also believed to have established links with Basit Usman, a master bomber operating in Central Mindanao.

Al Qaeda and JI influences have reached the Philippines through the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and some Muslim armed groups associated with Al Khobar Group (AKG) and the so-called Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

It is already a public knowledge that as early as the 1990s, Al Qaeda presence in the Philippines was already established through the activities of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa who is the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Ramsey Yousef, the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, went to the Philippines in 1994 to hide and design the Bojinka Plot, which aimed to bomb the twin tower of New York City using 11 jetliners.

Khalik Sheid Mohammad, identified as the principal architect of 9/11 bombings, was also in the Philippines in 1995 to work with Yousef in designing the Bojinka Plot and the twin plots to assassinate Pope John Paul II and US President Bill Clinton. But the person that revealed Al Qaeda operations in the Philippines was Abdul Hakim Murad who was arrested in the Philippines in 1995 for his participation in the Bojinka Plot.

JI presence in the Philippines was also established in the late 1990s in Central Mindanao through a training camp in Mt. Cararao.

The 2000 Rizal Day Bombings were attributed to JI. Father Rahman Al Ghozi, JI principal bomb maker operating in the Philippines, confessed that he provided the necessary explosives for the 2000 Rizal Day Bombings. Nasir Abbas, a former JI instructor and now working for the Indonesian government

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on de-radicalization programs, admitted that he belonged to the JI Mantiqi 3 in the Philippines, which planned the 2000 Rizal Day Bombing.

In Mindanao, JI has become more of a trademark to describe foreign military jihadists entering the Philippines to preach the gospel of violent extremism. Locally, Abu Sayyaf calls them Java men if they are Indonesians.

Among the Moro armed groups in the Philippines, JI links with the ASG is more robust and active at present. Three high profile JI personalities, namely Marwan (Malaysian), Mauwiyah (Singaporean) and Qayyim (Indonesian) are still working or seeking refuge with ASG commanders. Other “low-profile” JI personalities operating in the Philippines have the following aliases: Sanusi, Bahar, Abu Jihad, Usman, Mustaqueem and Hamdan.

It is estimated that around 30 JI personalities are still in the Philippines hiding in Sulo, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi with ASG followers. Some are said to be operating in Central Mindanao together with Al Khobar, the so-called MILF-SOG and some personalities allegedly identified with the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF) now called Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) of Umbra Kato.

Speaking on BIFM, this new armed group can make the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF problematic. With a current estimated strength of more than 1,000 armed followers (Kato has a self-proclaimed number of 5,000) pursuing an armed struggle to advance the Bangsamoro right for self-determination, the BIFM can make peace in Mindanao very elusive.

The BIFM has become a residual armed Moro group that is a party to the complex conflict in Mindanao but not a party to the now intractable peace process. BIFM reported ties with some personalities associated with the Misuari’s Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), JI, the so-called MILF-SOG and other armed groups complicate the already complex armed violence in the Southern Philippines.

Philippine law enforcement authorities tagged JI-MILF-SOG behind the August 2, 2011 bombing in Cotabato City that killed a person and wounding of 10 others. The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) used in the January 25, 2011 Makati bus bombing, on the other hand, carried the JI-Al Khobar-MILF-ASG signature called by explosive experts as the “Bandung device”.

The ASG is one of the groups suspected to be responsible for the Makati bus bombing that killed five persons and wounded at least 14 others.

The ASG, however, is already a very tiny group of less than 100-armed followers. Though the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has estimated the strength of the ASG to be around 400, followers of ASG are, in fact, difficult to

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estimate because of its links with various armed groups associated with local bandits, warlords, local politicians and even followers of the MILF and the MNLF.

ASG’s encounter with the Philippine Marines in Patikul, Sulo on July 28, 2011 (that led to the death of 7 and wounding of 21 Marines) has demonstrated that the ASG, though already weakened, is also not yet, strictly speaking, a spent force like its idol, Al Qaeda. The instruction of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III to crush the ASG is a tantamount admission that the ASG is still a very potent force to contend with.

Though the ASG continues to be a miniscule group compared with the strength of the AFP, it can still inflict tremendous damages against military forces not only because of ASG's mastery of the terrain but also because of ASG's new precarious combatants who are aggressively young and brutally bred in war.

Military forces are trained to fight the ASG. But new ASG combatants live to fight and they fight to live. There is now a new ASG whose followers are younger, more exuberant, more perilous and more enterprising.

The new ASG has become a loose network of a few Moro rebels operating with many young Muslim mercenaries who have become established bandits and hardened criminals engaged in extortions, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. Some ASG adherents are protected by local warlords and corrupt public officials who are entrepreneurs of violence in Mindanao.

As a result, the ASG has become so resilient. It gets its staying power from the predatory politics and violent economies of Mindanao that create individuals to embrace violent extremism and terrorism.

In short, terrorism emanating largely from ASG and its cohorts continue to pose serious threats to Philippine national security because terrorism is evolving to a form we never knew before.

Al Qaeda’s violent extremist ideology that endorses acts of terrorism still resonates to Muslim Filipinos who are disgruntled with the situation or not satisfied with their current socio-economic, political and personal conditions. This ideology is being used to justify barbaric acts of ASG for socio-economic, political and personal reasons. Remaining leaders of ASG prey on young and illiterate Muslim Filipinos to commit acts of terrorism.

The 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism laments that the Philippines continues to be one of the world’s terrorist safe havens despite the fact that terrorist acts in the country have declined in 2010.

While the global war on terror has given us a better understanding of terrorist threats ten years after 9/11, the present threat we face is dynamic and

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has the ability to metamorphose into something else in order to survive. Some threats have regrettably mutated into a more terrifying form with their growing nexus with crimes, banditry, clan conflicts, warlordism, and other expressions of armed violence.

The current terrorist threats we face, particularly in the Philippines, are deeply enmeshed with a host of many other issues associated with internal armed conflicts, private armed violence, warlordism, rido or clan warfare, personal vendetta, and ordinary crimes.

To confront the threat of terrorism, the Philippines passed in 2007 the Human Security Act, which serves as the country’s anti-terrorism law. But the government is currently facing difficulties in implementing this law.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also passed in 2007 the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. But ASEAN also has a problem enforcing this convention.

The more nuanced approach to address terrorist threats is found in the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006. This strategy promotes the four measures of counter terrorism, to wit:

• Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism • Measures to prevent and combat terrorism • Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to

strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard • Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as

the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism

All these measures point to the inconvenient truth that terrorist threats cannot be addressed by the military or law enforcement authorities alone. Terrorist threats are deeply rooted in many complex issues that are beyond the capacities of law enforcement authorities to handle.

Thus, addressing terrorist threats requires a whole-of-government approach.

But the government cannot do it alone. It requires the support of the whole society. The whole-of-government approach in sync with the whole-of-society approach can lead to the whole-of-nation approach to combat terrorism.

But terrorism has a regional dimension needing a whole-of-region approach.

Implementing these approaches are easier said than done.

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But it is important to say these in order to raise our awareness on the need to develop an innovative approach to confront a national security threat we call terrorism.

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CHAPTER 10 Current Landscape of Terrorist Threats

in the Philippines*

A day before the feast of the Black Nazarene, no less than President Benigno Simeon Aquino III publicly announced a bombing plot from local terrorist groups.276

The President strongly warned devotees about “the risk in attending the procession” and urged believers “to exercise the maximum vigilance and discipline leading up to, and during, the procession." The government even declared the whole of Metro Manila under full alert status on January 9 at the height of the Black Nazarene rite, deployed thousands of police with bomb detection squads, and suspended mobile phone services as part of counter-terrorism measures.

After a peaceful 22-hour procession, Malacañang “lifted” the “full alert status” on January 10 as no bombing incident happened.

But police and defense establishments say that Metro Manila is still in “high alert status” because the city is still under terror threats. Six to 9 suspected terrorist bombers are reportedly still at large and law enforcement authorities are currently tracking them down.

Among the suspected terrorists who aimed to disrupt the Black Nazarene procession, the defense department specifically identified the following bombers associated with known dissident terrorist groups in the country: Montasser Esmael Ali (alias Guiday Montassir) from the so-called Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Sheikh Omar Samunsang (alias Omar Abella) from the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), and Jamil Sali of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). These groups are suspected to have established links with the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda.

The Philippines faces a continuing threat of terrorism. The US State Department even laments that the Philippines continues to be one of the world’s safe havens for terrorists, despite the country’s numerous achievements in counter-terrorism a decade after September 11, 2011 (9/11).

*Updated version of a paper published in Rappler (12 January 2012) at

http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/824-current-landscape-of-terrorist-threats.

276 The Black Nazarene procession is practiced in the Philippines every January 9 of the year.

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There are still active groups with the intent and capabilities to wreak terrorist havoc in the country. A decade after the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks, these groups have not been totally eliminated. They have, in fact, evolved and have become more resilient, adaptive, innovative and enterprising.

The ASG

The Abu Sayyaf is the main symbol of terrorism in the Philippines. Its ties with Al-Qaeda and JI have been strongly established.

The ASG masterminded several landmark terrorist bombings in the Philippines like the Zamboanga City bombing of 2002, the Davao City Airport bombing of 2003, the Super ferry bombing of February 2004 and the Valentines Day bombing of 2005.

The ASG is also being suspected of having participated in the January 25, 2011 bus bombing in Makati City. Aside from bombing operations, the ASG is also notorious for numerous kidnap-for-ransom activities such as the Sipadan kidnapping of 2000, the Pearl Farm Beach Resort kidnapping of 2001, the Ces Drillon kidnapping of 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) kidnapping of 2009, and many others.

The ASG is believed to be currently holding Warren Richard Rodwell, an Australian national kidnapped on December 5, 2011 in Zamboanga Sibugay. Rodwell was transferred to Basilan and is currently in Sulu in the hands of new and young ASG commanders.

There is no doubt that ASG has suffered numerous setbacks from the loss of its senior leaders including Abdurajak Janjalani (the founder), Edwin Angeles (the right-hand man), Khadaffy Janjalani (the successor), Galib Andang (Commander Robot), Aldam Tilao (Abu Sabaya), Alhamser Limbong (Commander Kosovo), and Jainal Antel Sali (Abu Solaiman), among many others.

However, the ASG is a resilient group with the ability to replenish its ranks by luring young, gullible and impoverished individuals to join the “club.” Moreover, the ASG is implementing a combination of benign and coercive recruitment strategies to sustain the life of the organization.

Problems of gangsterism, warlordism, landlordism, clan feuding and violent adventurism also contribute to the staying power of the ASG.

The ASG is believed to be headed now by a veteran ASG commander, Radullan Sahiron. Though Yassir Igasan was initially rumored to have succeeded Khadafy Janjalani, Igasan is the current head of the ASG’s Sharia Court. Both Sahiron and Igasan are based in Sulu along with other commanders like Jumdal Gumbahali (Dr. Abu) and Hajan Sawadjaan.

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In Basilan, the known ASG commanders are Khair Mundos, Puruji Indama, and Isnilon Hapilon. However, Hapilon has reportedly died on December 20, 2011 and has been replaced by a young commander named Nadzmir Alih.

But recent information says that Hapilon is still alive and mentoring Commander Alih. Based on the research conducted by the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), Nadzmir Alih is 36 years old, medium built, 5” 4 ‘ in height, with fair complexion and good looking. He was born in Basilan and known to be an adopted son of Abdurajak Janjalani, the founder of the ASG. Alih has presently two wives: one from Sulu and one from Zamboanga City. His wives from Sulu and Zamboanga City gave Nadzmir Alih wide network with armed groups in the two areas. In Sulu, Alih is said to be close with Yassir Igasan. In fact, PIPVTR learned that Alih is currently taking over the leadership of Igasan who is reportedly sick, according to a PIPVTR source. In Basilan, Alih is known to be a protégé of Isnilon Hapilon, one of the top original commanders of the ASG.

Being an adopted son of Abdurajak Janjalani, a protégé of Isnilon Hapilon, and a close associate of Yassir Igasan, Nadzmir Alih is being considered by the ASG as its aspiring Amir. He has good credentials having taken up Islamic studies in Libya and Pakistan. He was even rumored to have attended college courses at the University of the Philippines in Baguio City and Ateneo de Cebu. Allegedly, Commander Ali was holding the Australian kidnap victim and was responsible for the hostage taking of Al Baker Atyani, the Jordanian journalist.

Because the ASG is now known for its kidnap-for-ransom activities, the group has been described to be a mere bandit group.

Indeed, the ASG is largely composed now of “lawless elements” engaged in banditry and many criminal acts. But there are still a significant few who remain ideological with links with Salafi-Jihadist movements abroad. The US State Department regards the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization.

The ASG frequently operates in Zambasulta area (Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi). But the ASG has the fetish to attack Manila. For this purpose, the ASG has a twin-organization in Manila called the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM).

The RSIM

Founded in 2001 allegedly by Ahmad Santos, the RSIM is a clandestine organization of a radical element of Muslim converts or Balik Islam. Since Santos was arrested in 2005, the RSIM has been declared virtually dead.

The RSIM is believed to be headed now by Khalil Pareja, Santos’ brother-in-law. Pareja was also arrested in 2009 but was eventually released from jail in 2010. Pareja was accused of plotting a terror attack during the 2006 Summit of

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the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cebu City. Pareja hails from Cebu City. It is now believed that Pareja is reviving the RSIM to mount terror attacks in Manila.

It must be recalled that the RSIM was accused of carrying out the Super ferry bombing in 2004 and participated in the Valentines Day bombing in Makati City in 2005. The RSIM was also identified to be the mastermind of a foiled terror attack on January 9, 2005 during the Black Nazarene procession.

Aside from its link with ASG, the RSIM is also believed to have established links with JI, Al-Qaeda and the so-called MILF-SOG. As such, the RSIM is also regarded as a foreign terrorist organization by the US State Department. The US Treasury Department has listed the RSIM as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” group.

Other groups

Aside from the ASG and the RSIM, there are other armed groups in Mindanao with the capabilities to make bombs and wreak terrorist havocs.

The so-called MILF-SOG is well known in Central Mindanao for masterminding many bombing activities in the area. Though the MILF vehemently denies the existence of the MILF-SOG, the police and the military establishments believe that the MILF-SOG is being headed by Basit Usman, a bomb-making expert with a price on his head worth US$1 million from the US Rewards for Justice Program.

Aside from its links with the ASG, JI and Al-Qaeda, Usman is also allegedly linked with Al-Khobar Group (AKG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM).

The AKG is notorious in Central Mindanao for its bus extortion activities. Though its key leaders have been arrested and locked in jail, there are followers who continue to use the name to mount extortion operations in Koronadal City, Kidapawan City, Tacurong City and even in General Santos City.

The BIFM, on the other hand, is founded by Ameril Umbra Kato, a former commander of the 105th Base Command of the MILF. The BIFM is presently accused of planting several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in several towns of Maguindanao, particularly in Cotabato City. Though Kato was reported to have died last December 2011, credible sources say that Kato is alive and kicking.

Because of the ongoing peace talks with the MILF, it is not prudent and proper to describe the MILF as a terrorist group.

But there are personalities associated with the MILF who are accused of terroristic acts.

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Even the MNLF is officially not described by the Philippine government as a terrorist group because of the 1996 Peace Agreement. But there are MNLF “rouge personalities” who have also been accused of terrorist acts, particularly those associated with the so-called Nur Misuari Break Away Group (MBG).

The MBG is believed to be supporting the cause of an emerging armed group in Mindanao called the Awliya Group of Freedom Fighters. Operating mainly in Sulu, the Awliya Group was identified to be the principal group behind the suicide attack of a military detachment in Talipao, Sulu on September 25, 2011.

Common grievances

All groups identified above have already developed the superb capability to make bombs. They share not only common grievances and followers, they also share bomb-making skills. These skills are not only being shared among radical Muslim groups. Bomb-making skills have been shared with members of the New People’s Army operating in Mindanao.

All these groups may have differences in strategic intentions. But they share common tactical skills in making bombs made usually of 81 mm mortars and triggered by a mobile phone.

Bomb experts call it a “Bandung device”, which is also being used in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Southern Thailand and elsewhere in the world with groups embracing violent extremism.

Unless we address the underlying conditions that encourage these groups to embrace violent extremism, the Philippines will always face the threat of terrorism.

Unless we convince these groups to embrace peace and leave the use of violence, the Philippines will be, regrettably, in constant fear of terrorist threats.

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ANNEX A

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AL-HARAKATUL ISLAMIYYAH

As narrated by

Qadhafy Abu Bakr Janjalani

Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq Abubakar Janjalani went back home on 1983 from a four (4) year Islamic Special Course at the Umm'ul Qura University in Makka, Saudi Arabia. He went back straight to his home town in Tabuk, Isabela, Basilan. And he began his da'wah mission in a Madrassah in that place. His mission, call the Muslims in his home town to go to Jihad Fi Sabilillah...

He used to visit Moro National Liberation Front's (MNLF) camp to share his knowledge and invite the fighters to go back to the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Last Prophet Muhammad (saw). Since most of the so called Mujahideen of the MNLF that time are not aware about the Fiqh'ul Jihad. The young Abdur-Razzaq was able to organized some young Mujahideen to become daee' inside the front. Their mission, is to reeducate the Mujahideen about the right aqeedah of Islam about Jihad Fi Sabilillah and the purpose of it...

And because of their eagerness to practice what they preach, the young Guru and his students pushed themselves to launch their first operation. Although that during that time they're still inside the front (MNLF).

Armed with "barong" (a small bladed weapon like sword, use by Moros in Sulu region) and a flying feathered iron, they went to the city to seize firearms from a group of military men who are guarding a hospital. They prepared drinks mixed with sleeping pills for the soldiers and let one tricycle driver deliver it for the military, saying it is from an officer who is celebrating his birthday. They drank it and fell asleep. After making sure all the soldiers are "down", they immediately went to the place. But, as they approached the place, they noticed the mercury light which was located near the hospital was off. Not knowing that the said light was automatic, they thought that their mission was messed up - so they aborted and withdrew. And learned later on that those soldiers were still sleeping up to the following morning. Their first mission has failed.

But the Guru and his students didn't stop with that failure. As a matter of fact, that was just the beginning. They started collecting firearms by buying in the black market, using their own money,

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from sadaqah and zakat from concerned Muslim brothers and sisters. They also started buying explosives such as hand grenades.

In 1986, Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq went to Libya by virtue of a Scholarship to pursue his studies. Actually, the young Guru wants to stay in the country to continue on his mission in giving lectures on Jihad Fi Sabilillah. But, it's a request from his father that he should grab that scholarship and become a doctorate in Islamic Studies, someday, insha-Allah... So, he did studied in one of the university in Tripoli and took up the four (4) year course in Da'wah.

He went back home in 1991 after the completion of his studies in the College of Da'wah. He then, continued his mission in calling the brothers to go to Jihad Fi Sabilillah. And this makes his father upset because what his father wanted him to do is to manage the newly built Madrassah beside their home in Tabuk. But the Guru wants to share his knowledge to all the brothers. There are times that when he leads the prayer his father will not pray with him inside the masjid, because of the "cold war" between them...

Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq started to visit provinces like Zamboanga, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Gen. Santos City and other nearby places to continue his works on da'wah, calling the Muslims to join the Jihad Fi Sabilillah. As he traveled, he also solicited funds, sadaqah and zakat from the concerned Muslim brothers to buy firearms and later on distributes it to selected MNLF fighters.

But, once Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq asked his students if there are changes inside the front, his students answered no. Knowing that most of the top leaders of the MNLF that time are "communist" by doctrine, so he organized again all his students to set a group of Mukhlis (Sincere) Mujahideen in the Way of Allah (swt).

In 1992, they established the Camp Madinah in Brgy. Kapayawan, Isabela, Basilan. One of the brothers who joined them is Radullan Sahiron who went home from Sabah after hearing that there's a Guru who really wages Jihad against the Mushrikeen, and eleven (11) others from Sulu and the rests are the students from Basilan.

Again, they continued collecting firearms, but this time - it's for their own group. They bought some of their weapons at the black market, seized from the military and policemen, and others are obtained through credit. And in the span of one (1) year, they reached the number of sixty (60) Mujahideen operating in Basilan, Gen. Santos and in Davao.

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The First Kidnapping Operation

In that same year, 1992, the group of Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq launched their first kidnapping operation. This happened in Davao City, they took one known businesswoman and was successfully ransomed. The ransom money was then used to buy more firearms for the group and others were distributed among the Mujahideen.

The Birth of Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah

1993 was the year when Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah was born. This is the time when they decided to get out of the MNLF officially and become as one new group of Mujahideen. Although, the jamaah was established, they're were not known with their new name but as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), where the tag was taken from the Kunya (alias) of Ustadz Abdu-Razzaq Janjalani.

Also in 1993, the group of Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq Janjalani launched their second kidnapping operation. They held the son of one of the prominent businessman in Basilan and again was successfully ransomed.

After the released of the hostage, the military launched their operation against the mujahideen. And this is the first time they used their OV-10 Bronco bomber plane. The fierce fighting lasted for one week and leave one Shahid (martyred) on the part of the group. Contrary to what the AFP-Southern Command claimed that they killed 49 freedom fighters. Allahu Akbar!!! After that long bombing week, the mujahideen still managed to withdraw, and went to Sulu.

And as the group stayed in Sulu, the "Guru" Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq Janjalani continued in his work as a daee' - calling and awakening the Muslims to join Jihad Fi Sabilillah, to raise the Deen of Allah (swt) and fight the Mushrikeen.

Also in this same year, they launched another kidnapping operation and held one American missionary and linguist. This American linguist is a translator, who translated the Bible from English to Samal dialect - made specially for the Badjao tribe, many of whom are muslims!!!

By this time, they're not asking for money. They demanded the withdrawal of all foreign fishing vessels in the Sulu Sea, others are political in nature and an educational program for Muslim Youths.

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Right after the released of the American missionary, again the military launched their assault against the mujahideen. But, Alhamdulillah, they managed to withdraw going to other municipalities.

SOME IMPORTANT DATES AND OPERATIONS OF THE Al-HARAKATUL Al-ISLAMIYYAH

May 4, 1994 Basilan: Kidnapping of Fr. Cirilo Nacorda and nineteen (19) teachers and a driver. They also held sixteen (16) mushrikeen males, excuted fifteen (15), one survived and escaped.

February 28, 1995 Jolo: The day when Qaddafy Abubakar Janjalani, the brother of Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq was arrested together with some six (6) other mujahideen in Jolo, Sulu.

April 4, 1995 Ipil, Zamboanga: The group seized Ipil, Zamboanga.

December 18, 1998: The Day when Ustadz Abdur Razzaq was Martyred (Shahid).

June 1999: Establishment of Camp Ustadz Abdur-Razzaq in Puno Mahadje ("Big Mountain"), Basilan.

May 27, 2001: The group launched the Dos Palmas Operation to Palawan.

June 2, 2001: The Hospital Siege in Lamitan, Basilan.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

1. HOW DID YOU KNOW YOUR JIHAD IS LEGITIMATE IN THE LIGHT OF ISLAM? 2. WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah KILLS THIER FELLOW MUSLIMS? 3. WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah PRACTICE KIDNAPPING? 4. WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah KILLS INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND NOT ONLY MILITARY? 5. WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah WON'T GO TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS? 6. WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah RAPES THEIR (WOMEN) HOSTAGES?

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7. ACCORDING TO THE NEWS, THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah ARE A BUNCH OF DRUG ADDICTS, IS THIS TRUE?

HOW DID YOU KNOW YOUR JIHAD IS LEGITIMATE IN THE LIGHT OF ISLAM?

• The legitimacy of our Jihad is purely based on the teachings of the Noble Qur'an and in the Sunnah of the Last Messenger Muhammad (saw) - from the Aqeedah of al-Walaa'-u-wal-Baraa' to the Aqeedah of Jihad Fi Sabilillah that was practiced by the Last Prophet Muhammad (saw) and his noble companions.

• As our Dhalil (Basis) - Allah (swt) said:

"And fight in the Way of Allah (swt) and know that Allah is All-Hearer, All-Knower". Surah al-Baqarah 244

"Fight those who (1) believe not in Allah (swt), (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah (swt) and His Messenger (saw), (4) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (ie. Islam) among the people of Scriptures (Jews and Christians), until they pay the Jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued." Surah At-Tawbah 29

"And fight them until there is no more FITNAH (disbelief and ploytheism, i.e. worshipping others besides Allah), and the religion (worship) will all be for Allah Alone [in the whole of the world]...." Surah An-Anfal 39

"Then fight in the Cause of Allah (swt), you are not tasked (held responsible) except for yourself, and incite the believers (to fight along with you), it may be that Allah (swt) will restrain the evil might of the disbelievers. And Allah (swt) is Stronger in might and Stronger in punishing". Surah An-Nisaa' 84

"Fight against them so that Allah (swt) will punish them by your hands and disgrace them and give you victory over them and heal the breasts of a believing people". Surah at-Tawbah 14

"March forth, whether you are light (being healthy, young and wealthy) or heavy (being ill, old and poor), and strive hard with your wealth and your lives in the Cause of Allah (swt). This is better for you, if you but know.". Surah at-Tawbah 41

... and many more verses from the Noble Qura'an and from the ahadith of the Last Messenger Muhammad (saw)...

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WHY Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah KILLS THEIR FELLOW MUSLIMS?

• We don't kill MUSLIMS but rather we kill people who claimed themselves to be Muslims. They are called MURTADIN. This kind of people - we see them praying five times a day, performing all Islamic rites, but working with the enemy and with the Shaytan Forces against the Muslims, especially fighting Mujahideen. They submitted themselves to the Shaytan Philippine Government, which is not Allah's government. Allah (swt) said in His Noble Book:

"And whosoever does not judge by what Allah (swt) has revealed, such are the Kafirun... such are the Dhalimun... such are the Fasiqun..." Surah al-Maidah 44, 45, 47

"Fight those who (1) believe not in Allah (swt), (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah (swt) and His Messenger (saw)..." Surah at-Tawbah 29

• Surah at-Tawbah 29 clearly states to fight those who forbid not that which has been forbidden by Allah (swt) and His Messenger (saw) - IT IS FORBIDDEN BY ALLAH (SWT) - THAT BELIEVERS SHOULD MAKE HIS ENEMY AS THEIR AWLIYAA' AND WHAT MORE IF SUBMITTING TO THEIR MAN-MADE LAWS. • These verses tells us who are the enemies of Islam, and enough for us the Words of Allah (swt) as a basis for all our actions...

WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah WON'T ACCEPT ANY PEACE NEGOTIATION?

• There are some differences among Islamic Scholars about this issue. There are some who says that we can go to peace negotiations like the Treaty of Hudhaibiyah and some scholars said never go to any peace negotiations. There are also some scholars who said that we can make peace negotiations with the Kuffar if the Muslims are really weak.

"We can have peace negotiations with the Kuffar, only if - it will be an advantage to the Muslim Ummah. But this kind of negotiation has its CONDITIONS, as follows:

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1. It should not be included in the Treaty, that a part of any Muslim land can be taken by the Kuffar even a span of a hand. (Nihayatul Muhtaj Vol. 8 Page 58) 2. If JIHAD is Fardu Ayn - there should not be any kind of Peace Treaty. Like, if the Kuffar enters the Muslim territories, then JIHAD is Fardu Ayn. (Fathul Ali Vol. 1, Page 982) 3. If there's a condition in the Treaty that will result in the Laws of Allah (swt) can not be implemented - then the Treaty is VOID. 4. If there's a condition in the Treaty that will result in the Muslims to be in an inferior position, then the Treaty is VOID. (based on a hadith from the Book I'la as-Sunnan, Vol. 12 Page 8) 5. If there's a condition in the Treaty that will violate any Islamic Law, then the Treaty is VOID. 6. The Treaty should not contain any condition(s) that will allow any symbols, signs or practices of disbelief [KUFUR - i.e. churches, sending of missionaries, propagation of any religion, ETC.]

(FROM THE BOOK ad-DHIFA' AN ARADHIL MUSLIMIN ("Defence of Muslim Lands") BY SHAHID DR. ABDULLAH AZZAM).

WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah KILLS CIVILIANS AND NOT ONLY MILITARY?

• Allah (swt) said in His Noble Qur'an:

"Fight those who (1) believe not in Allah (swt), (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah (swt) and His Messenger (saw), (4) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (ie. Islam) among the people of Scriptures (Jews and Christians), until they pay the Jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued." Surah At-Tawbah 29

This is just one of the many verses from the Noble Qur'an that we can use as basis for our actions. The military and the civilians that support them are one and the same.

WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah PRACTICE KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM?

• First, we would like to make it clear that our kidnapping operations are not for personal interests or just to gain money for personal use. Let it be known to everyone that we are on war against the forces of Shaytan in the Philippines, its allies and supporters. And whatever we gain (ie. ghanaim) from this war is to be use for our future operations, and in buying more war materials

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and of course, in maintaining our fighters' supplies and other neccessities.

"And make ready against them all you can of POWER, including steeds of WAR (tanks, planes, missiles, artillery) to TERRORIZE the enemy of ALLAH and your enemy, and others besides whom, you may not know but whom ALLAH does know. And whatever you shall spend Fi Sabilillah shall be repaid unto you, and you shall not be treated unjustly". Surah al-Anfal 60

Second, as followers of Prophet Muhammad (saw), we based our actions on the Noble Qur'an and in his (saw) Sunnah. Allah (swt) said:

"So, when you meet (in fight - JIhad Fi Sabilillah) those who disbelieve, smite (their) necks till when you have killed and wounded many of them, then bind a bond firmly (on them, ie. take them as captives). Thereafter (is the time) either for generosity (ie. free them without ransom) or ransom (according to what benefits Islam), until war lays down its burden...." Surah Muhammad

Those whom we kidnapped are clear supporters of our ENEMY (they symphatized and support the PHILIPPINE KUFFAR GOVERNMENT by paying their taxes.)

And as they say; their GOVERNMENT is of the PEOPLE, by the PEOPLE, and for the PEOPLE. Therefore, their people as a whole is the GOVERNMENT. So, we can kidnap anybody from among them.

WHY THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah RAPES THEIR (WOMEN) HOSTAGES?

• Again, we would like to emphasize that we are on war against the disbelievers as what Allah (swt) commanded us believers in Surah At-Tawbah 29. And using the word RAPE is only to discredit our Mujahideen - so as the Muslims will not support our Jihad against the Kuffar. And if we capture any women from them, it's for us - either we free them with or without ransom or make them as Sabiya [plural Sabaya (i.e. concubine)]. As basis, Allah (swt) said:

"And if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphan girls then marry (other) women of your choice, two or three, or four; but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one or that your right hand

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possess. That is nearer to prevent you from doing injustice". Surah An-Nisaa' 3

"Also (forbidden are) women already married, except those whom your right hand posses. Thus has Allah ordained for you..." Surah An-Nisaa' 24

ACCORDING TO THE NEWS, THE Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah ARE A BUNCH OF DRUG ADDICTS, IS THIS TRUE?

• Of course it's not true, and this accusation is only to discredit the credibility of our mujahideen. Islam does not allow this kind of practice. As a matter of fact, it's Haram for us to take anything that intoxicates our mind and body even smoking cigarettes. Allah (swt) says in His Noble Qur'an:

"O you who believe! Intoxicants (all kinds of alcoholic drinks) and gambling and Al-Ansab [animals that are sacrificed (slaughtered) on altars and for the idols] and Azlam (arrows for seeking luck or decision) are abominations of Shaytan's handiwork. So avoid (strictly all) that (abominations) in order that you may be successful." Al-Maidah 90

"And we say; Allahu A'lam (Allah Knows Best)..."

Source: http://www.geocities.com/ghurabah101/

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ANNEX B

THE DOS PALMAS

OPERATION &

THE HOSPITAL SIEGE IN LAMITAN

As narrated by

Abu Sulayman

May 27, 2001 - The Mujahideen departed to Dos Palmas in Palawan, a private beach resort 300 nautical miles travel from the Southern Islands. They left right after Salatu'l Dhuhur and arrived in the target area before dawn. So far, this is the most well-planned operation of the Harakatul Islamiyyah.

Upon reaching the beach resort, they immediately executed their plan. They were seen by the guard posted in front of the dock. They approached him and pretended to be government military men. Then they disarmed the shocked security guard. They also made the said guard called his colleague and told that there are military men in the beach. Same thing happen, they also disarmed the responding guard.

They made their next move. Divided into many groups, they entered the cottages and took 17 hostages and one cook from the restaurant. Within 15 minutes, they accomplished their mission and took the total of 20 hostages. They got also some ghanaim in that operation.

[The day before this, some of the would-be hostages joked on the beach. They said, "What if, the Abu Sayyaf arrive and kidnap us?", someone answered, "It is hard for them to reach this area because this is already very far from their area". - this was narrated by the hostages to the mujahideen during their captivity].

They rushed to the high seas after taking all the hostages. Then the Mujahideen chorus in saying Takbirat (saying Allahu Akbar) loudly many times. Only at this point that the hostages realized who their captors were.

They remained for a couple of days in the high seas and were able to capture 10 fishermen. Though they're considered as captives, the group promised them that they will not be harmed if only they will follow instructions and give them their supplies. While sailing, one

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of the hostages talked to them and said that he can pay ransom for his release.

May 31, 2001, Midnight. After 4 days in the high seas, they arrived in the coastal area of Basilan. And they received a report that there are some government troops near that place. That time they're staying at one mountain of Tuburan town.

June 1, 2001. Early morning, 2 Platoons of Taghut Forces climbed the mountain and there they saw some mujahideen and some hostages taking a bath in a river. And because of this, they fired at the mujahideen and a gun battle ensued. The mujahideen forces used their 60mm mortar. And the forces of Shaytan responded with their 105 mm howitzers, but they hit their own men. The fierce fighting lasted for almost 2 hours. There were more than 10 killed on the part of the Kuffar Forces and many are wounded. Mujahideen has one wounded, Kosovo, with no casualty, (masha-Allah).

After the battle against the forces of Taghut, the Mujahideen decided to withdraw to take a rest.

Before Isha, the group took hold of a vehicle to ride going to Lamitan town. One platoon (around 30) from the mujahideen and the seventeen (17) hostages rode the vehicle, while the remaining forty (40) mujahideen will go on foot towards Lamitan town. But before they departed, they beheaded first the 2 security guards and the cook. And they moved on.

The Hospital Siege in Lamitan

As their vehicle entered the town proper close to midnight, they passed by a military checkpoint of the Kuffar. The sentry was caught by surprise, and Abu Ahmad (a.k.a. Abu Sabaya) shouted "We're the men of the Governor, this is an emergency and we have to bring somebody to a hospital". Before the soldiers could react, they immediately left the place and continued on their travel.

Midnight, they arrived at the Dr. Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan.

As they arrived in the said hospital, they were seen by the security on duty and ran away. The group entered the hospital and took 4 medical staff; 2 nurses, a midwife and 1 male utility crew. Some of them went to the neighboring church and the convent. But the priest and his militiaman-bodyguard escaped away after the later fired at them. They were not also able to find the nuns in the

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convent. But they took some ghanaim from the hospital and in the convent but most are from the church.

They gathered in the hospital and then stayed there. After an hour, a jeepney full of policemen responded after hearing the gun fire. But they were blocked by some of the mujahideen who are posted outside the hospital. The mujahideen force fired their M203 grenade launchers and their 90RR at the approaching policemen. They didn't able to damage the vehicle but the policemen ran away.

After half an hour, soldiers arrived with their APC's. As the forces of Taghut approach the place, they were also firing their 50 cal heavy machine gun at the same time hitting some houses near the hospital. The fierce fighting between the Mujahideen and the forces of Shaytan started.

2 AM, two vehicles full of elite special forces from the Philippine Army arrived. They stopped right in front of the church. They are not aware that there are 5 mujahideen in the church's terrace who are searching for the priest. Seeing this, the mujahideen abruptly fired at the forces of Shaytan using their two (2) M203 grenade launchers, two (2) M14 and one (1) M16 rifles. The enemy were almost wipe-out, Allahu Akbar!!!.

Before Salatul Fajr, the remaining forty (40) mujahideen who walked towards the town reached their target - the house of a rich Chinese businessman, in the center of the town. As they were trying to find a way to get inside the compound, they were approached by a retired military colonel whose a resident of that place - thinking that they were government forces. They immediately killed him on the spot. But some militiamen returned fire at them and hit their guide, causing him to be martyred. And because of this, they don't know what to do - they decided to withdraw outside of the town. Leaving the first platoon inside the hospital all by themselves.

At the heat of the battle, some brothers are negotiating with the relatives of the hostages about their ransoms. The first one that talked to them at the high seas was being ransomed by his relatives. He was released from the hospital. They also released 2 more captives, a boy and a woman without ransom for humanitarian reasons.

The said male hostage was released midday and when he was out of the hospital he went to the government authority and told them who's inside the hospital. Hearing this information from one

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of the main hostages, they doubled the intensity of their operation against the mujahideen until afternoon.

The forces of Taghut didn't want to miss their chance, they fired their guns here and there - targeting even the church's tower, bell and the statue of Virgin Mary thinking that those are snipers.

Before Asr, the group made a mishuarah (consultation), and some proposed to make a withdrawal and bring their hostages at gun point. But some of them hesitated to withdraw that time because they said the forces of Taghut can see them where they're heading. So, they moved their scheduled withdrawal just before Maghrib so that they can use the darkness of the night as cover. So they waited and busied themselves in saying Dhikr and made Sabr.

After Salatul Asr, the mujahideen heard some loud Takbirs (i.e.. Allahu Akbar!) not far from the hospital. While hearing the Takbirs, they also heard continuous rapid gun fires. Because of this, they thought that the brothers who withdrawed that dawn returned to back them up. So, they shouted Takbirs also inside the hospital. Some mujahideen decided to go out to look what's going on outside. They brought their 90RR, they went out. They were surprised seeing no more forces of Taghut outside. [According to the military report which leaked later on, the Philippine forces were being attacked by thousands of 'mujahideen' who are wearing white robes and long beard, Allahu Akbar!.]

"(Remember) when you sought help of your Lord and He answered you (saying); "I will help you with a thousand angels each behind the other (following one another) in succession." Surah al-Anfal 9

And to make sure, they even went out to the main highway and there they saw one APC steering backwards from their position. Kosovo saw an opportunity, aimed the 90RR and fired at the said APC. The APC was hit at its side and smoked then it stopped. One officer and a military crew were killed inside the APC. After this, they went back inside the hospital.

They informed their companions about the situation outside. They told the other mujahideens that there were no longer military outside and that they can now execute their plan. So they did.

They passed through a small door at the back of the hospital and walked away immediately. But, as they walked a couple of meters away from the hospital, they were rained by gunfire from the front and their sides. There are still some soldiers and militiamen

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left after that what they called 'attack' by a thousand mujahideen reinforcement. Because of this, some of the hostages and mujahideen were wounded. So, they decided to left some wounded hostages and those who have relatives with them - so that they can find ransom to those who were left behind with the mujahideen.

They continued their withdrawal. And as they walked away, they used their M60 light machine gun and M203 grenade launchers to 'clear' their way.

They walked till midnight. They reached the boundary going to the next town where they rest and slept. After Salatul Fajr, they continued their withdrawal until they reached the next town. Where they considered it safe.

This hide and seek war between the Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah and the Philippine Taghut forces lasted up to one (1) year. And within this year, countless fierce fighting happened in different part of the island province of Basilan. But regardless of these incidents, they managed to take ransom from the local hostages. And some of the women were made Sabaya by the mujahideen. One American hostage was also beheaded as a gift to the celebration of the Kuffar Independence Day.

This operation later on reached Zamboanga del Norte where the Philippine Taghut forces exerted their full efforts to save the remaining hostages from the mujahideen - a nurse (who became a practicing Muslim while being held as hostage) and the American couple. But this effort resulted in the death of the male American and the local nurse from the bullets of the Philippine Taghut forces. The female american received some wounds and was rescued.

After few days, the remaining Mujahideen decided to go back to Sulu to rejoin the main group. So, they contacted for a boat to pick them up. Not knowing, the boat operator was arrested a few days before. So he was sent together with a civilian agent to pick them up bringing with them a tracking device.

When the scheduled time came and picked them up. They start sailing towards Sulu, not knowing the patrol and speed boats of the Kuffar are already following them. Then a fierce sea battle ensued that resulted the Mujahideen's boat capsizing and the martyrdom of the several Mujahideen including Abu Ahmad (a.k.a. Abu Sabaya, Aldam Tilao in real life), and the wounding and capture of some them.

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[During his life time, Abu Sabaya (Aldam Tilao), used to tell his comrades - to hide his body when he ever become a Shahid so that the enemy of Islam can not rejoice of his supposed death and make his body as a trophy that can be presented in the public. And up to this day, the forces of Philippine Taghut didn't able to find his body including the two (2) brothers who were missing with him. They were only able to retrieved his back-pack with his personal belonging inside (sattelite phone, sunglass, driver's license, cal.45 pistol). Allah (swt) granted his Dua', Masha-Allah]

The Hikmah (wisdom) of this operation: This was made because Palawan became the center of tourism in the Philippines that brought a lot of Fitnah for the Muslim Ummah in the region. This operation resulted in bad effects on the economy of the Philippine Taghut Govenment that cost them Billions of Pesos of loses in revenues. Alhamdulillah.

Source: http://www.geocities.com/ghurabah101/

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ANNEX C List of Selected Attacks Attributed to ASG

2000-2011

2000

• April 23 - ASG gunmen raid the Malaysian diving resort of Sipadan, off Borneo, and flee across the sea border to their Jolo island stronghold with 10 Western tourists and 11 resort workers.

• May 27 - The kidnappers issue political demands including a separate Muslim state, an inquiry into alleged human rights abuses in Sabah and the restoration of fishing rights. They later demand cash multimillion-dollar ransoms.

• July 1 - Filipino television evangelist Wilde Almeda of the Jesus Miracle Crusade (JMC) and 12 of his "prayer warriors" visit the ASG lair. A German journalist is seized the following day.

• July 9 - A three-member French television crew was abducted. • August 27 - French, South African and German hostages are freed. • August 28 - American Muslim convert Jeffrey Schilling is abducted. • September 9 - Finnish, German and French hostages are freed. • September 10 - ASG raids Pandanan island near Sipadan and seizes three

Malaysians. • September 16 - The government troops launch military assault against

ASG in Jolo. Two kidnapped French journalists escape during the fighting. • October 2 - JMC Evangelist "Wilde Almeda" and 12 "prayer warriors" are

released by volunteer. • October 25 - Troops rescue the three Malaysians seized in Pandanan.

2001

• April 12 - Jeffrey Schilling is rescued, leaving Filipino scuba diving instructor, Roland Ullah, in the gunmen's hands.

• May 22 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf gunmen raid the luxurious Pearl Farm beach resort on Samal island in southern Philippines, killing two resort workers wounding three others, but no hostages were taken.

• May 28 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf gunmen raid the Dos Palmas resort off the western Philippines island of Palawan and seize 20 hostages including a US couple and former Manila Times owner Reghis Romero. Arroyo rules out ransom and orders the military to go after the kidnappers.

• May 29 - Malacañang imposes a news blackout in Basilan province where the Abu Sayyaf are reported to have gone.

• May 30 - US State Department Spokesman Philip Reeker calls for the "swift, safe and unconditional release of all the hostages." An Olympus camera and an ATM card of one the hostages are found in Cagayan de

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Tawi-Tawi island. Pictures of Abu Sayyaf leaders are released to media by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

• May 31 - The military fails to locate the bandits and the hostages despite search and rescue operations in Jolo, Basilan and Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi.

• June 1 - Military troops engage Abu Sayyaf bandits in Tuburan town in Basilan. ASG spokesman Abu Sabaya threatens to behead two of the hostages.

• June 2 - Abu Sayyaf invaded Lamitan town and seize the Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital and the Saint Peter's church. Soldiers surround the bandits and engage them in a day-long firefight. Several hostages, including businessman Reghis Romero, were able to escape. Witnesses say the bandits escape from Lamitan at around 5:30 in the afternoon, taking four medical personnel from the hospital.

• June 3 - Soldiers recover the bodies of hostages Sonny Dacquer and Armando Bayona in Barangay Bulanting. They were beheaded.

• June 4 - Military officials ask for a state of emergency in Basilan. President Arroyo turns the request down.

• June 5 - At least 16 soldiers are reported killed and 44 others wounded during a firefight between government troops and Abu Sayyaf bandits in Mount Sinangkapan in Tuburan town. President Arroyo promises P5 million to the family of retired Col. Fernando Bajet for killing ASG chieftain Abu Sulayman, alias Kumander Yusuf on June 2, 2000. ASG leaders contact a government designated intermediary for possible negotiations.

• June 6 - ASG leader Abu Sabaya tells Radio Mindanao Network that US hostage Martin Burnham sustained a gunshot wound on the back during a recent exchange of gunfire.

2002

• July 21 - A provincial governor and three others were wounded when fighters of the Abu Sayyaf ambushed them in the southern Philippines, the military said.

• August - Six Filipino Jehovah's Witnesses were kidnapped and two of them were beheaded.[33]

• October - One American serviceman was killed and another seriously injured by a bomb blast in Zamboanga City. [34]

2003

• February 12 - The Philippines expelled an Iraqi diplomat, accusing the envoy of having ties to the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Second Secretary Husham Husain has been given 48 hours to leave the country, according to a statement by Philippine Foreign Secretary Blas Ople. The government said it had intelligence that the Iraqi diplomat has ties to the Islamic extremist group. The decision was taken more than a month before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

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• March 5 - Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the bombing of Davao International Airport in the southern Philippines, killing 21 and injuring 148.[35]

2004

• February 24 - A bomb explodes on Super ferry 14 off the coast of Manila, causing it to sink and killing 116 people. This attack is the worst terrorist attack at sea.

• April 9 - A key leader of the Islamic terrorist group Abu Sayyaf was killed, along with five of his men, during a firefight with government troops on a southern Philippine island. Hamsiraji Sali and his men were killed when a platoon of the Philippine army's elite Scout Rangers, who had been on the terrorists' trail, attacked them around midday on the island of Basilan, an Abu Sayyaf stronghold about 885 kilometers, or 550 miles, south of the capital, Manila. Four government soldiers, including a commanding officer, were injured.

• April 10 - Around 50 prisoners including many suspected members of the Abu Sayyaf escaped from jail in the southern Philippines, the officials said. Three of the escaped prisoners were later killed and three others have since been recaptured, while three jail guards were wounded in the incident on the island of Basilan. They still did not have a full headcount of those who escaped, but local army commander Colonel Raymundo Ferrer said 53 of the 137 prisoners in the jail on the outskirts of Isabela Cityhad had broken out.[36]

2005

• November 17 - A prominent leader of the Islamist group Abu Sayyaf, Jatib Usman, has been killed in ongoing clashes between rebels and the military. Usman was confronted in the most southeastern province of Tawi-Tawi, an island region which is close to the Borneo coast of Malaysia.[37]

2006

• February 3 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf gunmen knocked on door in a farm in Patikul, Mindanao, and opened fire after asking residents if they were Christian. Six people are confirmed dead, including a nine-month baby girl, and five others are seriously wounded.

• March 20 - Declassified documents seized from Saddam Hussein’s government were said to have revealed that Al-Qaeda agents financed by Saddam entered the Philippines through the country’s southern backdoor.[38]

• September 19 - A Filipino Marine officer was killed after the government forces encountered a large group of Abu Sayyaf terrorists earlier day in the outskirts of Patikul town in Sulu, southern Philippines, a military official

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reported. Five Marine soldiers also were wounded in the clash with some 80 terrorists believed to be led by Abu Sayyaf leader Radullan Sahiron, alias commander Putol, one of the top terrorist leader based in Sulu province, said the spokesman.

2007

• January 17 - A top Abu Sayyaf leader , Jainal Antel Sali Jr., aka Abu Sulaiman — is killed "in a fierce gun battle with army special forces" on Jolo.[39]

• July 11 - Eight Filipino government soldiers were killed, nine others injured and six missing following a fierce clash with Abu Sayyaf rebels backed by armed villagers in the southern island province of Basilan, according to a military source.

• August - The military said it lost 26 soldiers and killed around 30 militants in three days of fighting on the volatile island of Jolo, in the beginning of month. The heaviest toll occurred after militants ambushed a military convoy. [40]

2008

• January 17 - Abu Sayyaf militants raided a convent in the remote southern Philippine island province of Tawi-Tawi and killed a Catholic missionary during a kidnapping attempt.[41]

• February 14 - Failed assassination plot of the President of the Philippines, Gloria Arroyo.

• June 8 - ABS-CBN Journalist Ces Drilon and her TV Crew kidnapped. 10 days later they were released after families paid a portion of the ransom.

2009 • January 15 - Three Red Cross officials, Swiss Andreas Notter, Filipino

Mary Jane Lacaba and Italian Eugenio Vagni were kidnapped. Andreas Notter and Mary Jane Lacaba were released four months later. Eugenio Vagni is released six months later on July 12 (Manila time).

• April 14 - Abu Sayyaf soldiers have executed one of two hostages they took during a raid on a Christian community in Lamitan City in Basilan on Good Friday, the military said. The body of Cosme Aballes was recovered Sunday by Marines who are pursuing the bandits. The bandits were with members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and of kidnap for ransom groups. Aballes and Ernan Chavez were taken by at least 40 Abu Sayyaf, rogue M.I.L.F. rebels and KFR elements when they raided Sitio Arco in Lamitan City. On their way out, the kidnappers shot dead a resident, Jacinto Clemente. The kidnappers are still holding Chavez, Estrella said the bandits raided Sitio Arco to disrupt the Christian activities during the Lenten season and to extort. Marines are pursuing the kidnappers in the outskirts of Lamitan City. Including Chavez, Estrella said, the Abu Sayyaf

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is holding seven hostages in Basilan, including three teachers kidnapped in Zamboanga in January.

• May 18 - Abu Sayyaf gunmen in Basilan beheaded a 61-year-old man who was abducted from this city about three weeks before, the police said.

• July 12 - The Italian Red Cross hostage, Eugenio Vagni, was released. • August 12 - A group of Abu Sayyaf soldiers and members of the M.I.L.F.

ambush a group of A.F.P. (Armed Forces of the Philippines) soldiers as they conducted a clearing operation in the mountains of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan. 23 A.F.P. soldiers were killed in the engagement, 20 of which were members of the Philippine Marines Corps. In addition, 31 Abu Sayyaf soldiers were killed in an initial body count. The figure is likely to rise.

• September 21- A.F.P. overrun a camp in the south belonging to the Abu Sayyaf, killing nearly 20 militants, the authorities said. 5 A.F.P. were wounded.

• September 29 - Two United States soldiers are killed in Jolo, near the town of Indanan, by Abu Sayyaf soldiers.

• October 14 - An Irish priest is kidnapped from outside his home near Pagadian city in Mindanao. He was released on November 11, 2009.

• November 9 - A school teacher in Jolo was captured on October 19 and beheaded by Abu Sayyaf soldiers.

• November 10 - Abu Sayyaf soldiers captures several Chinese and Filipino nationals in Basilan.

2010 • January 21 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf militants detonated a bomb near the

house of a Basilan province mayor. One teenager was injured. • February 21 - One Abu Sayyaf senior leaders, Albader Parad, has been

killed.February 27 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf militants killed one militiaman and 12 civilians in Maluso.

• March 16 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf militants killed a police officer in Zamboanga.

2011 • January 12 - four traveling merchants and a guide were killed and one

wounded when suspected Abu Sayyaf militants ambushed them in Basilan. • January 18 - One soldier was killed when government forces clashed with

Abu Sayyaf militants in the province of Basilan. Source: Wikipedia

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The PIPVTR is an independent academic research institute and think-tank duly registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission. The institute aims to conduct rigorous research and investigative studies on the underlying factors or root causes of political violence and terrorism in the Philippines and abroad. It also aims to study various responses to threats of political violence and terrorism in the Philippines and examines the implications of these threats for local peace and development, national security, regional stabiliy and global order.

The PIPVTR establishes networks with likeminded institutions in the Philippines and abroad in order to exchange research findings, publications and experts. Through its research outputs and activities, the institute intends to enrich existing scholarly literature on political violence and terrorism. More importantly, the PIPVTR intends to provide valuable inputs to policy-making in order to enable government to develop a more effective counter-terrorism response. It also offers regular threat assessment reports and security briefings to private firms, foreign embassies and concerned non-governmental organizations on the topic. The PIPVTR has organized the following events: Round Table Discussion on Youth and Terrorism, co-organized by the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), PIPVTR Seminar Room, Quezon City, 30 March 2011.

Round Table Discussion on Understanding Violent Religious Radicalization: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, organized with the Head of the Center for Excellence on National Security (CENS) of the S. Rajarantnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University (NTU), PIPVTR Seminar Room, Quezon City, 28 March 2011.

Round Table Discussion on Mainstreaming the Indigenous Peoples Issues and Concerns in the National Agenda, co-organized by the Institute for Autonomy and Governance and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Electronic Library, 2nd floor, AIM Conference Center, corner Benavidez and Trazierra Streets, Makati City. 11 March 11, 2011.

Round Table Discussion on Terrorism: Threat to Tourism and Public Safety, co-organized by the Asian Institute of Tourism (AIT) and Center for Political and Democratic Reforms, Inc. (CPDRI), AIT Seminar Room, Quezon City, 22 February 2011.

International Forum on Asia Pacific Security, co-organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses (ISA), Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research

PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH

2nd Floor, CPDRI Room, Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines

Telephone +632 9946972 Fax: +632 4333870 Website: www.pipvtr.com

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(CATR) and the Asia Pacific Security Forum (APSF), held at Dusit Thani Hotel, Makati City, 29 October 2010.

10th Bi-Annual Conference of the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR), New World Hotel, 27-28 October 2010.

Round Table Discussion on PNOY’s Policy on the Peace Process, PIPVTR Seminar Room, Quezon City. 22 September 2010.

Round Table Discussion on Media Reporting of Terrorism and the Abu Sayyaf Threat: Scoop and Scope, Aguinaldo Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 29 July 2010.

Round Table Discussion on Crime-Terrorism Nexus, Lakambini Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 26 May 2010.

Round Table Discussion on The Future of Philippine Communist Movement, Main Restaurant, co-organized by the Civil Relations Service (CRS) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (APF), AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 22 April 2010.

Round Table Discussion on The GRP-MILF Peace Process: The Continuing Search for A Negotiated Solution to a Deep-Rooted Armed Conflicts, co-organized by the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Aguinaldo Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 5 February 2010.

Round Table Discussion on Kalayaan Island Group and Baselines Controversies in the South China Sea, co-organized by the Yuchengco Center and the Center for Archipelagic Maritime Security Studies, Aguinaldo Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 23 October 2009.

Round Table Discussion on the Roles of CAFGUs and CVOs in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the Philippines, co-organized by the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Aguinaldo Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 9 October 2009.

Round Table Discussion on Counter Terrorism and National Security, Aguinaldo Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 16 September 2009.

Round Table Discussion on “Achievements and Challenges of Counter Terrorism in the Philippines Seven Years After 9/11”, Aguinaldo Conference Room, AFPCOC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 24 October 2008.

International Workshop on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, coorganized by World Check International and the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) held at Sulo Hotel, 7-8 July 2008.

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About the Author

Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and Head of its Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies. He is a recipient of Albani Peace Prize Award (Peace Education) in 2011. He currently teaches at the Department of International Studies of Miriam College, Philippines. He worked as professor of political science at the National Defense College of the Philippines (where he became Vice President), assistant professor in international studies at De La Salle University, instructor in political science at the University of the Philippines (Los Banos), and University Research Associate at the University of the Philippines (Diliman), where he took his BA, MA and PhD (ABD status) all in Political Science. He also became an Executive Director of Strategic and Integrative Studies Center (SISC), Director for Research of World Citi Colleges (WCC) and Founding Center Director of the Mayor's Development Center (MDC) of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP). He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University.

An author of a terrorism trilogy: Philippine Security in the Age of Terror (2010), Counter-Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia (2009) and War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (2004), Prof. Banlaoi has also authored at least 75 journal articles and book chapters published in the Philippines and abroad on regional security issues, Philippine foreign and defense policy, Philippine electoral politics, terrorism, and the peace process. Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)