Airport Security

Airport Security Outline

Major consideration in Terminal planning and design

Who? What? History – Why? How? Airport Security Program “Failure of Imagination”

Terminal Design Objectives

Walking distances Aesthetic design Services Security Cost effectiveness

Flight Interface

Arriving passenger areas Security Departure lounges Corridors Departure Gates

All are important for different reasons, mostly to be more efficient, make more money… But Security is only to protect life/property!

Introduction

Safety vs. Security Safety-freedom from unintentional

danger, etc. Security-freedom from intentional acts

of violence, danger, risk of injury, loss, etc.

Who is/are the problem? Terrorists

Hijackers Suicide bombers

Criminals – Inside/Outside job Disruptive Passengers – intentional and

not

Introduction What is the problem?

Individual attacks to… Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

Nuclear Full nuclear detonation to “dirty” bomb

Biological Chemical Conventional weapons – large explosives

Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)

Mass attacks with military weapons Unconventional weapons – large A/C

flown into targets…

Introduction Why airports?

Vital to a stable economy Important to community operation High density of people – targets Very visible, high profile facilities

History of Airport Security

FAA/TSA regs are written in blood Crash/incidentNew regulations

First hijacking - 1930 Lima, Peru Revolutionaries dropping leaflets

1930s to ‘55 - Several hijackings Eastern Europeans seeking asylum 1st Fatal ‘47 – Romanians killed a crew

1955 First Major Criminal Act Jack Graham blew up A/C, 33 dead Killed his mother for insurance money

Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d)

1960 First Suicide Bomber Again, for a heavy life insurance

payout Political/public demand for baggage

inspection

Flying down to Cuba- 1959 to ‘80s First hijackings to escape Cuba, then… Hijacking to Cuba for money or politics Political/public demand for Pax

screening and hijacker profiling*

1972 – Southern Airways Flight 49 DC-9 diverted LEX, hot refueled, next -

Havana December- LEX Pax/carryon screening

begins

Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d)

1972-Part 107 Fed Aviation Regulations Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage All airports must:

Identify their Air Operations Area (AOA) ID those areas with little/no protection

against unauthorized access due to poor infrastructure

Create their Airport Security Plan to upgrade their facilities to comply with current and future regulations with a timetable and budget estimate

Successfully reduced security incidents

Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d)

1980s International Incidents USA 1985 TWA in Lebanon – Pax murdered 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie Scotland-all

dead Threats to US personnel - gaining

access through foreign security New US Regulations applied to foreign

facilities Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage Reconcile pax/bags or “no go”

1990s - FAA sponsored more research New Equipment to detect

bombs/weapons Upgrade facilities/procedures…then…

History of Airport Security

September 11, 2001 Airport Security world changed “Failure of Imagination” –routine

security

ALL A/C ordered to “Land immediately” @0945 over 4500 A/C IFR + 1000s VFR

LEX tasked to create plan for 30-50 A/C 1215 nothing but Mil A/C - unprecedented

All regs RE:airport sec’ty/air opsTSA responsibility

Airports begin improvised security checklist LEX begins flight ops 1250 September 13 KyANG airmen/soldiers stand guard

History of Airport Security

9/11/2001

History of Airport Security

Aviation & Transportation Security Act Transportation Security Admin (TSA)

created Develop/enforce new guidelines Title 49 CFR – Transportation

All regs RE:airport sec’ty/air opsTSA responsibility

2003 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) TSA/USCG/Customs/INS combined

Airport Security Program

TSA is responsible for Airport Security Main source for planning/design

guidelines

Air Operations Area (AOA) Secure Area Sterile area Security Identification Display

Area (SIDA) Exclusive Area Risk Management/Assessment

Airport Security Program

Security Identification Display Area(SIDA)

Pier/Finger Terminal

Security @Commercial Airports

Passenger Screening Baggage Screening Employee Identification Perimeter Security

Passenger Screening

Major changes/overhaul since 9/11

Since 2003 managed/operated by TSA Prior by Airlines under FAA regulation Significant impacts on planning/design Continuously reviewed and evolving

Facilities/Equipment include: Automatic process: magnetometer,

explosive trace detection, body scanning, biometrics, etc

Manual search procedures/areas Each airport is unique

Passenger Screening

Typical Passenger Screening Layout

Baggage Screening

Since 2003, every bag screened “100% EDS rule”, Explosive Detection

System Like a CT scan

Magnetometer Greatly complicates baggage handling

Usual solution – Automation (LEX) 1st in Lobbies, then moved behind

counters Search areas “blast resistant”

Baggage Screening

Inline Screening

Initial Standalone Screening in lobbies-exposed

Employee Identification

All personnel in the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA): Must have criminal background

check/OK Trained in facilities and security issues Prominently display SIDA badge at all

times

SIDA Facilities/Equipment needs: Secure defined perimeter Automatic electronic controls

Electronically controlled gates, card readers

CCTV, card reader monitoring, personnel

Perimeter Security

Airport Security Plan must have a defined perimeter Perimeter fencing

AC 107 Aviation Security--Airports Controlled access gates

Kept to a minimum Security lighting PSO patrols

NOT routine

Vulnerability Assessment

Important for planning and design ID where security enhancements are

needed Intro security issues early in design

Wide range of threats/vulnerabilities Threat-anything that may cause harm Vulnerability-anything the bad guys

can take advantage of to carry out a threat

Cannot completely eliminate Play out scenarios Implement protective

measures/procedures

Vulnerability Assessment

Flow diagram

Special Design Issues TSA controls most Security

Design… TSA used to post links on website for

design Mark Day – Must have need to know &

get OK

Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation Glazing and screens Structure – harden columns, blast

walls, etc. Mimimize “progressive collapse”

Blast Analysis Plan (BAP)

Public Facilities Limit concealment points, entry control

points Harden emergency systems

Special Design Issues Security Facilities

Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, TSA areas, road barriers, vehicle inspection areas, etc

Joint Military Facilities Coordinating force protection with TSA

Avoid “Security Theater” Countermeasures to provide the

“feeling” of security…but do little or nothing to achieve it Sometimes perception is beneficial but… Actual benefits very debatable

Special Construction Issues

All personnel get criminal background checks before access approval

Security during construction Workers can’t go sightseeing! Areas

off-limits!

Security of classified equipment Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, etc. TSA screening areas Only cleared workers handle the

installation

Special Security Issues

Presidential/US VIP visit Secure Ramp/buildings/ Detailed access to your info Shut down

airspace/terminal/roads/comm

Foreign VIP visit Queen of England Emir of UAE and family

Con Air Federal/International prisoner

exchange

Security at GA Airports

TSA has not required the same level of security effort at GA airports…but…

Encourage GA airports to develop their own security initiatives Like Commercial Airports Awareness programs Reporting methods Develop security plans similar to

commercial

Future Security Changing/Increasing

securityNorm Keep up with TSA/FAA regulation

changes Airport/perimeter security technology

changes

Cannot completely eliminate threats Continuous vulnerability assessment

Watch the news Criminals/terrorists are copycats AND

innovators Scare du jour (disease, terrorism)

Europe warning - five A/C bombings for Xmas

Failure of Imagination

Airport Security

Questions?

Airport Security

References, Links• http://www.bluegrassairport.com/• http://www.faa.gov/• http://www.boeing.com/boeing/• http://www.aaae.org/• R. Horonjeff, F. McKelvey. Planning & Design of Airports. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2010• TSA. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction. 2006• R. Souleyrette. CE 633 Lectures• John Cassel, majordadjohn@msn.com• Mark Day, MDay@bluegrassairport.com• * -

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