AIR WARo COLGE

No. M-M'~C86-049

Lfl

1% ~PARALLELS IN~ COFLI1CT

THE AM~ERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE VIETNAM

WAR

DTIC

By LT COL ROBERT p. DALY, MAR I 11987

I D

jM LLW A13t VopCE BASE, A"L HIMIIB

lLO

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THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITYPRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHEDTO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANTNUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOTREPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

1 '

AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

PARALLELS IN CONFLICT

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE VIETNAM WAR

by

Robert P. Daly, IILieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Dr. Joe Strange

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

MAY 1986

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAP rEF

DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER.............. . .. .. .. . ....

ABSTRACT....................... . . . ... . . .. .. . ....

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH..................

IINTRODUCTION..........................................

ii THE FABYANIC MODEL

Society and Leadership............ .. .. .....

Force Structure and Doctrine....... . .. ...... 1

Policy.................... 6

Threat and Targetry............ . . .. .. . ...

III STRATEGIES

The American Revolution.......... ... .. .... 2

The Vietnam War.................. . . .. .. .. .....

TV CONCLUSION..................... .. . . ... . .. .. .. .....

APPENDIX: The Fabvanic Model........ . .. .. . ...

REFERENCES................... . . ... . ... .. . ...

Accesion For

NTIS CRAMtDTIC TAB 5Unariows:ced

B.............

v Di-.,t: lb ifion i

Availailihty Codies

Avail ardlorDist Special

DI SCLA I MER-ABSTA I NER

This research report reoresents the views of the author ant

does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War

College or the Department of the Air Force.

This document is the property of the United States govern-

ment and is not to be reproduced in whole or in Part without

ermission of the commandant, Air War College. Maxwell Air Fore

'Base, Alabama.

:1

.,a

AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Conflicts in Parallel--The American Revolution and t=_.-Vietnam War

AUTHOR: Robert P. Dalv, II, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

-Research uses the Fabyanic Model to assess why British ant

United States military strategies were remarkably,' similar :n the

American Revolution and the Vietnam War respectively. and wh,

each "suoerpower" was defeated by a numerically and qualtiativelv

inferior force. Comparative analysis shows that both British an _

)merican leaders failed to appreciate the true nature :f the -=n-

flicts. did not establish clear or reasonable national :e-

ives, and each nation pursued a flawed military strategy of limi-

ted force. Report concludes that when faced with revolutionar,,

_-vil wars, military commanders should advocate military force

only when the political situation will support a decisive mil:-

tar'v campaign early in the conflict.

!N

lJ~a i:

3IOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Daly, II. (B.S.. US Air Force

Academy, M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology) has always had

a strong interest in the Revolutionary War period and the originz

of the American military. He has served with the Military Air-

lift Command, Air Force Systems Command, and is a graduate o4 the

USAF Test Pilot School. His most recent assignment was at the

Pentagon as an action officer in the Office of Lei!atie

'.iaison, Secretary of the Air Force. Lt Col Daly I= a disting-

uished graduate of Squadron Officer's School and completed Ai:-

Command and Staff College by seminar. Lt Cal Dalv is a graduate

of the Air War College. class of 1986.

4NV

CONFLICTS IN PARALLEL

THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

A recent speaker at the Air War College said: "Before vou

advise your President to go to war, make sure it's a good war. "

The reference was to the Vietnam War with the implication being

that it was a "bad war" and that, in retrospect, the United

States fought a war that was unwinnable. A similar sentiment wa-

'ater echoed in the same forum by a former Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. The United States. clearly superior in every el-

ement of national power, could not prevent the Communist takeover

of South Vietnam--whv? What made Vietnam a "bad war"'

Contemoorary views on the Vietnam War are bv no means Uni-

fied on this subiect. But on one thought all writers and histo -

tans are in agreement--that the Vietnam War experience was a tra-

gedy of epic proportion which changed the very fabric of American

ocietv including how Americans view the role of the United

States in the world. American leadership was never able to come

to arips with the realities of the war until it was too late--

until a neootiated retreat was Our only rational recourse.

'-agic as that war was to the American osvche, it was not a

uniaue conflict in our history. Vietnam was not an aberration ,

modern times but, in a broad context, had a precedent in histo-

wy--the American Revolution. During the American Revolution. ar

19th Century Superpower was defeated by a numerically and nuali-

tativelv inferior force. Like the United Statec. Great Britain.

too. had its own "bad war." But in that war. the revolutionar:es

were Americans. and the Americans wor.

A comoarative analysis of the American Revoltution and the

Vietnam War reveals that the two conflicts were remarkably sim_-

Iar. Both British and American leaders failed to appreciate the

true nature of their respective conflicts; both failed to estat-

lish clear or reasonable national objectives; and, most Impor-

tantly, in the absence of clear national objectives. each natior

Pursued a military strategy predicated on the use of limited

force. These fatal flaws doomed each strategy to defeat. Rare.,

=an the use of limited force achieve military solutions to social

conflicts when the latter have matured into full scale revolu-

tions. This brief review of history may dispel the popular notion

that 2' years ago Vietn.am was 'something new. somethina that

ould not be foreseen." In the realm of armed conflict, the

Vietnam War did ostensbilv usher in some "new ideas." But these

"new ideas" were merely new twists to some old themes which the

United States, a nation and people spawned by revolution. shoulc

have understood.

The United States as a nation is still struggling to comore-

hend the role of military force in dealing with modern revci!L-

tions. Certainly no consensus exists. By contrast, at the Air War

College. the role of military force in dealing with revolution-

-ceives little attention. So little that. durino the numerous

oresentations on military history and strategy, one soeaker re-

Darked that "revolutions are not a topic of much interest here."

Indeed. our very own War of Indeoendenc_ is totally ionored. c_

-iaos had the United States remembered the reasons for Great

Britain's defeat in the War of Indeoendence. and the true soCia'

11RI

-at!-re of the conflict, then we micht have better Lunderstood thes

-ealities o-f k.ietnam.

-he Amneri can Revolution should have taught uLS that conven-

t on a milit.-Ary strateoies based on the use of limited militarv

4orcq will most i kely , prove unsuccessful wh en d e aIi n c vith

combatants whose commitment to the cause is so strong thiat. n.

71'1eer 4-orce of will. they are -able to erode their enm'Cilt

nerser'.ere I n a war of+ attrition. In the words of of-

:1 s ew i tz-

the strength o+ his will is Muchless easy to determine and can only be':aUged approximately by the strength ofthe motive animating it_. 11:-77) Like theo:mol der ina embers, it Consumes th b_ifoundation- o+ the enemy forces. Sirceitneeds time to be ef-fecti,,,9 a stateoftension will develoo while the twc

elements interact. This tension willeither graduall1y relza., if the 1 nsurgen-=' ,/ is suppressed. . . or it will build upto a crisis: a general conflagration=loses in on the enemv.,. driving him outo+ the country be-fore he is -Faced with

tota detruIction. (1:48')

Be-Fore comparing and contrasting the military strateaies_ i ns

two con-flicts, the -Fundamental nat-ure o-f the two wars mL _st L,

understood--what kind of wars were thev?

'he American Revolution was a social and oolitical S'C -

tion and indeed a civil war. since Americans fought American=-.

How do Americans think o-f the Vietnam War--as a social or TCli-

tical revolution. as *a civil war. or as an "unconv.entional"o

"l:onventional" war o-f _Agression orchestrated -and Orosc, te t

the government in Hanoi") The distinction worth noting is that tne

terms "revoluti on" -and "cvlwar" connotate more "whv' t!. e ,4a r

NJas fcoht, whereas the terms "unconventional. " 'con ven t ionalI."

auLer i I11 a. "and "1revolution-ary. " connotate "how" the war waE-

-FOLI[Cht. The manner of 0LLr prosecution of the Vietnam War Ie a d s

one to believe that the United States approached the war orimari-

lv as a technical enterprise and gave insufficient credence to

the social and political origins o-E the conflict. Too late came

"Ie realization that the conflict in Vietnam was and always hamd

been a social and oolitical revolution and a civil war. and not

ZIM0iY an unconventional or conventional war of -Acaression b

North Vietnam. (2:151

A~ re'/olution is a orocess. rather than a sinale event. a~nd

its aoal is redistribution of oolitical and economic oower.

;revolution to be sucsfl he lmnsMust be oresent: 1)

widesoread and hiah levels of discontent with the incumbent ac\'-

erment and its political elites: 2) a strong organization with a

cross section of support; and, 7-) external support. whether it be

dJirect or indirect. All these +actors were cresent dlri.nC the

American Revolution -and the V"etnam War. With this in mind we zar

-now bealn to examine the militarv strateimies of Great Eqritain, and

the United State=.

7HE FABYANIC MODEL

The military strategy employed by a nation in conflict isi

essence a distillation of many variables. In the curriclum '2±

the Air War College. the Fabyani: Model is offered as a trameworl

z asses S mili 1ta:ry/ strateov (sree Ao oen di1x 1 ) by o1 msotan s ~h t

Jiscreet variables which shaoe a nation's militarv strategv: 1,

'arce structure. 2) doctrine. 7) the oercelmved threat. 4) tech-

nol ogy * 5) targetr-.'. and 6. oclic.. ()These s-i;,vri'

Then intecrated into a militarv strategy by 2 _c i et'~s

its leadership. This research paoer Will Use the vni rI a1d.

to assess the miI itary stratazi es of Grea3t EBri taln and the Un: ted:

States d~lri na the Americasn Revol uti on a.nd the YV etram War. eo'

nizina that -A nation's societ-.. and leadership are the mc-tr-/3

t~ h e~te e,, oh t va r1 a b I e - a n - are the rno=- 1+Uen ti a' 17t :

-rMuL 1 ' t f I ~ :1nc 1 ni t -krv = t -a tatev ~h= e,./wi 1 1 te Ji C!us_1 E c

'3OCIETh AND LEPIDERHIc

The A me r ca n 0evolUt Icn o-f+i c Ial1 t be~n g r 1a7 n M

Le,.ingtan. Mass-Achusetts. althouch some zonor nmterd t at

Pevo' _ t -AU 1 ~a11v :-t arted I r 15:: &2 ith fie~~::

i ar i ms, a t Ply, mcu thln Ro c!: . ( 4: 1 1- 12 The 9is :olMnMsS _a I)

Nlorth America from Great Bri tain seekina to niain po1 tI-a1 . ec:-

nomic. and reliliouLS freedoms. Altho~toh thle cclonies rernalne

' z,l t o re9a t 2.ri ta I n -for 155 year = . ~he s eedsa:) =_ oc al T.ertF

hiad been sowin at the time the colonies were founde,:.

~merican society vwa:t h ighi, mobl1e -and fCle, ',b 1l_ =

th 13th century.. The British. orn the ct h-and. were =-

1e and ri-id '=ocietv. Americans_ looked fo.r chnan,- Lwr-,'1 EI-''1-,

interestz were in maintainima the status-anut. The EPr' ti LJ?r5

-: n .( n c 9d of thei r zocial __toer' orit,/ and. atEr the : e4"e-at

the French in 17!S in the Seven Year's War. r-noved wenaith an

=tower -as no EUr.:oean power had sic the Poman Emo'.r _. 4I

Much =f Britain' weal tn anl Mrioso:t' =ame +,-,-,: t 3 -lrtwjt-

and r, ?cOnomi c U CZSS E~ _ m e r .an -- *n _ss. -'-'-

hA.',e a t tr 1bUt e d t ne r- _ or SCMSCt n e L- e r, i Ls :e c~ -" 2: a

lv economic. the real reason was a demand for self-governmenn.

This subtle, but very important distinction, is the reason why

the revolution appealed to all classes of colonial society:

A rich ideology of republican self-government was sweeping the colonies,and the great concern was that continuedBritish rule by an increasingly corruptelite was beginning to pervert even therich British democratic legacy. (4:140

The American colonies were blessed with a gifted assemblage

of civilian and military leaders throughout the conflict. Al-

though American leadership rarely exhibited unanimitv of thought

throughout the war, thus mirroring the highly individualisti- sc-

:ietv of the colonies, it could, however, rely to some degree on

the will of the people to defend their homes. British leaders. or

the other hand, had to rely on mercenaries and the traditional

methods of 18th century Europe to raise and equip an army for Z

war 7,000 miles away. British society never fully accepted the

responsibility for the war and therefore never fielded a torce

dedicated to victory at any cost. (4:97-!52)

The failure of British society to fully unite in support C.

the war was a predictable consequence of the disaffectin

expressed by many in Parliament over the use of force to en+or:s_

the legitimacy of Parliament's rL'e over the colonists. This

opposition was articulated by one of the opposition leaders tc

.Lord North's ministerv, Sir Edmund Burke:

To use it [force) alone could be no morethan a temporary measure, for a 'nationis not to be governed which is permietuall\to be conquered." A government does notrule b\' the forces at its disposal but w,the authority it commands. If Britain were

to win by force of arms alone. the ouiet o-rthe Americans Would be 'nothing bLut themeditation of revenge.' (5:40X')

As the war progressed and escalated in intensity, the English

Parliament increasingly found itself in heated debate over the

ever or owino need for men and material to fight the war. British

and American societies of the 18th century were starkly different

'And it is clear that the British never understood or appreciated

colonial asoa rati ons.

The parallel between the British experience in the Amer'-ca

Revolution and the American e-oerience in Vietnam is viv.-id. Like

the British -Failure to appreciate colonial asoirati.ons. the

Ujnited States never fu-lly appreciated the history and Culture 0-4

Vietnamese society. Vietnam has a long history of violence -an d

conflict and some historians contend that the Vietnamese Culture

has been the most violent culture in Asia. Vietnam has been a

nation in conflict since the earl,. oart of the 16th centur'. As

in the American colonies. the seeds of social unrest had been

nurtured for a long meri od of time-over 45() years-and : M411-t

personal sacrifice,. and struggle had become an acceoted wav. ::-

life in Vietnamese societv. The oeriod of American involvement 1-

Vietnam (105? to 19-75) was only. a continu.ation of an armed ztruc-

gle. rev.olution. and =ivil war which rea-lly, bean I M t h = 1-.4-.

c:entury. American forces, inter~ected after the retreat of the

French. were viewed by the Communist insurgents as merely the

c=urrent enemv in a long history of OCCUoation forces wihStoo-d

in the wav. of establishina a new social order.

Social charge was the prime inaredient in th-e Mobili~ation

of indigenouS Communist forces. Their primary goal was the re-

distribution of wealth and power and the removal of the rulin.

elite. Further, the Communist Vietnamese strongly attacked the

cultures and political legacies of the Eurcoean countries whicr

- ormerly had dominated Indochina. This hatred for the ,-jestern

world was difficult for American leaders to fully aporeci9t-. It

is not "what" the Communist Vietnamese believed, but rather "hcw

strongly" they believed that translated into their commitmet t-:

the cause. The United States could not hope to nM=till in

American troops a will to fight equal to the passion. nurtured nv

450 years of violence, which was frequently displayed by the

Communist Vietnamese forces. By contrast, American -ocietv.. was

democratic. idustrialized. impatient. and was far removed from

the Vietnam War.

The significance of the Vietnam war as it related to nation-

al objectives, society, and interests of the United States became

l!ess and less clear as the conflict continued. American oolitical

leadership. like their British counterparts nearly 7',ID, e =er=

earlier, also wrestled with the legitimacy of the war. Much has

been written on the roots of the American involvement .n Vietnam,

but one thought appears to be universal:

No serious discussion or questioningappears to have taken place of the impor-tance of Southeast Asia to American secur-ity interests, of the correctness of thedire predictions regarding the cunsequencesof the loss of the area, of the probabilityof success in the military struggle. or othe costs of winning the war in Indochina. (6:60T)

As in the American Revolution when British societ\ failed t-

accept fully the responsibility for the war and demonstrated a

B

-ionificant degree of opposition to the conflict, American socie-

tv became less and less supportive of the war as oalitical lead-

ers increasingly failed to articulate clear national security in-

terests in the region. As the war escalated, it began to demanc

too much personal sacrifice from the average American and eventu-

ally large segments of American society publically defied goverr-

ment authority.

!n retrospect. history suggests that the reasons for United

States involvement in the Vietnam War were similar in princiols

to the gradual escalation of political misadventures ,1.2. t

tion, representation issues. etc) which culminated in the coloni-

al rebellion against Great Britain. Over a span of four adminis-

trations beginning with President Truman, seemingl:,, small i-

:aliCtlations imperceptibly pulled the US toward an entancling

situation" from which it eventually could not withdraw. There di,:

not appear to be any "master plan for intervention, nor an'i =evi-

ous intrigue on the part of American presidents," but rather. ar

-:verreaction to involvement based on miSLnderstancing. misin.:r-

mation. and in some cases, lac.: of information. (7:!47'

The United States is often ignorant of full' -tL.,drc'i _trC-

er country's Politics and Culture and, in the case of tnet aT..

a:imost a total failure to investigate and comorehend the fee!:nc-

and aspirations of the majority of the Vietnamese Poo,(.1ati0r..

This lac.. of understanding of the culture of the inaigenouSo:-

ulation was a critical mistake made b', not onl the '!7it_:e

States, but also by Great Britain in the Peolutin. -4c '

It is a striking similaritv that both Great Britain an_ t .

i0

United States expected that a large share of the burden of the

wars would be borne by indigenous forces. Great Britain expected

substantial effort and support in the conduct of the war +rom

those colonists remaining loyal to the crown, and the United

States certainly relied on the South Vietnamese not only to es-

tablish a government supported by the people, but also to field a

credible fighting force capable of defending South Vietnam. How-

ever, the United States failed to appreciate the true character

of the South Vietnamese people which resulted in disastrou=

consequences:

. . the non-Communist Vietnamese werenever able to achieve ideological cohe-

sion, organizational discipline, or poli-tical legitimacy. They were never able tcovercome their differences so as to pro-ject one unified policy that would be ableto win the support of the peasantry. Giventhis, America's hopes for success inVietnam were probably doomed from the be-ginning. (7:149)

In a similar fashion, during the American Revolution, the

British failed to understand the true character of American soci-

ety. Like the French and Americans in Vietnam 20C). years later.

the British were unable to take advantage of their numerical and

pualitative superiority in men and armaments., "it was like trving

to hit a swarm of flies with a hammer." (4:97) While conou.=ring;

territory was relatively easy, the difficulty came in holding it.

This led to the desire to use Loyalist forces (or South Vietna-

mese troops) for occupation thus freeing regular forces for a+-

fensive duties. However, in both wars, regular forces were never

able to rely on indigenous forces to provide adequate control af

captured territory. This was due in large part to low morale.

i t* 1

.oyalist morale during the War of Independence was generall/

low for a variety of reasons. British forces were never able ~

sustain effective offensive operations and USUally! only temporar-

ily, occLupied rebel territory -After capture preferring the relE-

tive sofety of the coastal seaports. During the Course of the

war. British defeats and retreats essentially announced to the

1-oalist fcrces that British power Was unable to support and ,rc,-

tect those who remained loyal from patriot recrimination=-. Wit-

little confidence for their safety and in the _Abilit~v o-- the

British to inflict the ultimate defeat on the colonists. the

Zoval is ts preferred to remain more 'neutral" -Arld never tecamea

seriou~s fighting force.

1ike the British military during the FPevolUtion. after ao

turing rebel held villages-and territory. the American tmilitar.

:)+ten left loyal South Vietnamese to protect themselves scainst

the Viet Cong guerillas. Although the South Vietnamese gavernment

-.-as certainly not "neutral." nlumerous critics cite the-,. aca-,'

l a ck of initiative and commitment to fiahtina Communis m a-

es sen tia1 inaredient in the American defeat. A s e arl 1 i4.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff warnec:

... that Without a stable civiliakngovernment in control and without A Wil-lingness by the k.ietnamese themselves toresist communism. 'no -Amount of ex"ternalpressure and assis-tance can long delay com-plete 'Cmmunist victor. in South Vi etnazm. ' (:'

Another critic wrote:

t he cardinal mistake made In,, theUnited States concerned nat our assesz-ment of our snemies , but of oUr allies.and soeci-Ficallv,. the nature of thie -variouz

Indochinese regimes that the Congr-ess andthe American people were asked to supportthrough the 1960s and early 1970s. (8:772)

The succession of South Vietnamese governments did little to

strengthen and solidify the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese

military. South Vietnamese forces, like the Loyalists in the

American Revolution, were never considered a credible militar'.

force. It was not uncommon for "Cautious aenerals. +earful of

casualties. Cto conduct] ooerations in areas where the VC wer

k:nown not to be."1 (6:702)

It is against this background of discord. laCe- -of ui'

and competing interests. that American and British societ. '

leadership formulated military strategy. The ne>-t twc lariatles

in the Fabyanic Model tc be discussed are 4-orce StrUct'-ure 4-,-1

doctrine.

FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE

At the outbreak of the American Revolution. colonial forces

consisted of an amalgam of provivincial militias and fleets co:m-

posed of farmers.. tradesmen. and sailors whose allegiences wers

to the individual colonies. The colonists had no need +zr -A

standing army since they had received the benefit of the :ti

occupation forces for most of the century. At the Coutbrea: of the

Revolution. British forces numbered around 7.~~~men. man. Iia .ng

seen duty in the Seven Year's War. As the war progressed. :nr

ex cesti of 1C *100X men were eventually sent to North Amer::-a. Mar'

a British officer derived comfort -from this numerical snd I-1a 1-

tative mismatch:

... the native American is an effemi-nate thing. ver uIt: for and very lir-

patient of war. . . a set of upstart

vagabonds, the dregs and scorn of thehuman species. (4:1277

During the course of the war. General Washington recognized

the need for a regular army saying that "regular troops are alone

equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well as for defense and

offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove Il-

lusory and ruinous." (9:177) However, colonial forces were never

a match for the regular British forces under the rules of !Eth

-enturv warfare Since they never exceeded i,:C,000 reuIars. hy

then were the British unable to defeat the numeri-allv inferior

colonial forces?

The British. per 18th century doctrine, looked to engage the

colonial army in a decisive engagement. Although General Howe.

Commander of the British forces in America. realized that thie war

could only be won by such an engagement, he was unable tc Ze

clearly how to make it happen "as the enemy moves with So much

more celerity than we possibly can." (4:9°1) The British militrw

was never able to adapt SUCCe=sfullv to the conditions they ee-

perienced in North America:

The British hidebound by their European

background never improvised sufficientl,Howe. despite his reputation as a leadingproponent of Light Infantry, followed

exactly the art of war of Europe in theeighteenth centUry--the occupation ofposts and cities, constant manoeuvering,

fighting as few major battles, and losingas few men as possible. (4:99)

Blindly confident in traditional doctrine. British :omman,,d-

ers disregarded the tactical and stratelc realiti-_ .-f 'and

warfare on the North American continent, and relied to:- hea,iI

L Samoa

on support from Loyalist forces which failed to materialize ir.

appreciable numbers. Both of these deficiencies contributed to a

major failure in British military operations--the failure to sus-

tain offensive operations throughout the war. This failure can

also be attributed to the reluctance of British commanders tc

expose their troops to hostile fire:

Howe confessed that 'as my opinion has

always been, that the defeat of the rebelregular army is the surest road to peace,

I invariably pursued the most probable means

of forcing its commander to action.' butwith one proviso, under circumstances the

least hazardous to the royal army; for evena victory, attended by a :eavy loss of menon our part, would have given a fatal checI

to the progress of the war, and might haveproved irreprable.' This explains another

British disadvantage. Being predictable is

a cardinal sin in war. (4:98?

Early in the war, the British never felt compelled to t.a4e

the offensive in the belief that the American army would crumble

from lack of commitment and supply. As an example, the Sr.t.sh

believed that the American army which routinely had the bull. of

its membership up for reenlistment at one time. as in December

1776. could not endure. This lack of initiative on the part nz

British early in the war allowed the colonists to gain strength,

confidence, and experience, and most likely was the result Q+ th--,

British underestimating the enemy's capabilities.

The British experience in doctrinal deficiency was repeated

by the American military nearly two centuries later. The American

army was a large standing army principally trained and eqi_.uipped

to defend Western Europe and. essentially, was predisposed to the

tactics of 20th century conventional war as fought in World War

* 14

II. American forces were psychologically ill-prepared to fight a

jungle war against highly motivated, indigenous Communist forces

trained in the art of revolutionary warfare. Like their British

counterparts, United States military doctrine did not support the

realities of the war:

Rather than planning to fight small wars,the defense establishment from the Secretary.

of Defense on down hopes to initmidate po-tential opponents and therefore obviate theneed for fighting. . . The failure to grap-ple with with the difficult task of pr_-viding a doctrine for the employment of forcein a small war is an old one. (I.:22)

Colonel Harry G. Summers, in his book On Strategy: The

Vietnam War in Context, summarizes the doctrinal dilemma faced

by the United States military in Vietnam. Colonel Summers' pre-

mise is that prior to World War IK, military doctrine had fncuse

on the ultimate objective of destruction of the enemy's forces so

as to force him to sue for peace. World War II changed this ul-

timate doctrinal objective to simply forcing the enemy's uncondi-

tional surrender. This perhaps subtle difference could not ac-

commodate the political restraints and problems we faced in Kcrea

after the Chinese intervention. In 1962, the military introdce,_

two fundamental changes to its doctrine which in concert would

eventually prove diastrous in Vietnam: first, that war can te

considered in a "spectrum of war," and two, limited war was rede-

fined to limit the means rather than the objective. According t-

the 1962 doctrinal change, the spectrum of war ranged frcm cold

war,.through limited war, to general war. The former being

peacetime power struggle between nations with the dividng line

between cold war and limited war "neither distinct or absolute.''

15

Erasing the line between war and peacewas to prove a serious flaw. It con-

tributed to our failure to declare war

over Vietnam, as well as the credibilitygap that developed between the govern-ment and the American people. (11:42)

The similarity in force structures and doctrines of the

British and American forces in the two wars is quite apparent. In

both conflicts each superpower had a regular army trained in the

art of the traditional wars of the period and each nation's mili-

tary doctrine, influenced by contemporary national polic,. neces-

sitated prosecution of the war with "limited means." It is this

concept of limited force that needs to be explored in greater

detail. The degree of military force a nation chooses to empcy

in a conflict is a direct consequence of national policv--anothe-

Fabyanic Model variable. National policy and national strategy

when coupled together form the basis for "how" a nation achieves

its national objectives. It is from this combination of national

policy and national strategy that military doctrine results. !rom

what policies did the doctrine of limited use of force evolve?

POLICY

National policies and national objectives are intertwined

since policies support the attainment of objectives. Be-ore dis-

cussing policy, however, a review of the national obiectives =4

the combatants is in order.

The American colonists clearly wanted to establish an inde-

pendent confederation of the colonies although the enact form

and conduct of the government was yet to be determined. In

retrospect, the policies of the Americans in 1775 were rather

16

-~~~~~ ~ - ----

fragile and certainly not a unified concept in the minds of the

separatists. However, the colonies did collectivel, subscribe to

a policy of self-determination and independence with e.xpulsion of

British forces from North America as their primary objective.

Clearly then, Great Britian's ob;ective was to preserve the sta-

tus quo and the Empire such as it was following the Seven Year's

War in 1763:

As late as June 11. 1779, the King re-marked to Lord North that he should

think it the greatest instance amongthe many he had met with of ingratitudeand injustice if it could be supposed

that any man in his dominions 'moreardently desired the restoration of

peace and solid happiness in every partof this Empire' than he did. 'There isno personal sacrifi:e I could not read-

ily yield for so desirable an object.'But, at the same time, no desire to getout of the present difficulties wouldincline him to enter 'into what I lookupon as the destruction of the Empire.' (4:24)

However, while the British objective was relatively clear. the

policy on how to deal with the American situation was very much

in dispute.

Whereas the government and its supporters

found the issue in supremacy of Parliament--

or rather, the colonial rejection of parlia-mentary supremacy--the opposition found the

issue in colonial resistance to discretemeasures taken by the metropolis since

176: and, above all, to measures of tan-ation. . . . Throughout the almost con-tinuoUs dispute on American policy thatraged in the Commons and 1ords from thebeginning of 1774 to the spring of 1775.

it is this difference in understandingthat overshadows all other points at con-troversy. . . . This affinity of histor-ians for the political opposition in Par-liament rests, of course, upon far morethan simply the latter's insistence thatthe dispute might have been settled with-

17

out war. (5:384-385)

Unable to agree,

. . . the record of the North ministerywas clearly open to the charge that itsAmerican policy was marked by inconsist-ency and sheer inadvertence . . . andwas one not only of compromise, but ofcompromise that had been neither wellconceived nor consistently pursued. (5:391)

British policies were alternately firm and appeasing and

stemmed in part from the paradox that the colonists were indeed

British citizens under the protection of the British :onstlt

tion, and that every effort to bring them back into the Empire

should be made. However, the overuse of killing force would cnl,,

alienate them further, thus making long term pacification that

more difficult to achieve. (4:51) This inconsistency plagued

the execution of military operations and contributed to indeci-

sive action on the part of British commanders.

What. then, were the objectives of the United States during

the Vietnam War?' This question is by no means a dead issue. To-

day, ten years following the withdrawal of American troops from

South Vietnam. historians and analysts are still debating wh, the

United States chose to enter into a land war in Asia. As Arthur

*Schlesinger. Jr. said in 19T:

Vietnam is a triumph of the politics ofinadvertence. We have achieved our pre-sent entanglement, not after due and de-liberate conside-ation, but through aseries of smal. decisions. . . . Each stepin the deepening of the American commitmentwas reasonably regarded as the last thatwould be necessary. Yet, in retrospect,each step led only to the ne.t. u-ntil wefind ourselves entrapped today,; in that night-mare of American strategists. a land war inAsia--a war which no President ........

11 %18

desired or intended. The Vietnam stor' i-

a tragedy without Villai1nS. (7: 147 )

Appro ,imately *A decade ago, a poll t--A[ en of US Arm%..,-'

showed that 70) percent of them considered American ctbjectives a

Vietnam to be LUnclear and uncertain, and 91 percenit of them felt

that America should decide what it wanted to accomplish ne-fcre it

chose to commit military forces in fUtt~re conflic-s:

in fact, the United States did pUr=Lte de-fined objectives in Indochina; the trOLttiewas that it kept changing its man-nd as towhat they were. From first to last there=was consistent agreement only/ about wh~atour objective w.as not: we were not fightingto make South Vietnam into a=n American colony .Unfortunately, that as exaz-ctl%,' what a greatman>' people thought we were doing. S:'

Whal1e agreement on specific ob jec tives M-A'.V b e 1

-Achieve, perhaps the broad objective of conntainment M~ ImTI L

nism" is suff+iciently, accurate to begin a d15cussaon on Amera4::kr

policy dUrina the war.

American political leadership was defanately weddedi t:: the

doma.noe theory' frst espouised uinder the Ei sen-how-er -a d M a7Sr'Z

tilon. And if one accepts the "containment" cb ecta .o, te

mnust also acknowledge that the utse of 11ama ted mi 1 atar - : a

by/ necessity a realistic consequLence cf that ob 1,ecz~e The- '::nm-

tainment" objective spawned a political polt- wh-c :ra'-e

dilemma for the American military/ like the dilemma face=d t, the

British military in the American Revolu~tion. United StaIte= po:I

C y in Vietnam was to contain the expansi on cf Communa1 St po--wer an

the region, butt the Uni ted States was not wq-Ii7-g toi- ra5 , -1 -1=,

,,.ja r by/ Using military means to desctro% the BCUrce z-4: the g'-

sion. (11:71) The contaanment' obeca.. thr2:s _7 t

r 'e IP1P

the policy of flexible response and this policy resulted in the

American military doctrine (subsequent to 1962) of limited use of

force, or limited means.

The United States was confident that American forces could,

through a policy of flexible response, demonstrate American re-

solve to keep South Vietnam free of Communist domination by grad-

ually escalating the level of conflict as necessary to counter

the threat. Not only did the military have to adapt to an unpop-

ular policy of flexible response and "gradualism," but also was

expected to support and carryout such nontraditional missions as

coalition warfare, nationbuilding activities, and Vietnamization.

During the course of the war, the United States attempted to

change the social fabric of South Vietnam while simultaneou.si'.

trying to prosecute the war. For the first time in history, the

military's ultimate objective was not the "destruction of the

enemy's armed forces in battle," but rather.

"The fundamental purpose of US militar,,,forces is to preserve, restore, or cre-ate an environment of order or stabilitywithin which the instrumentalities ofgovernment can function effectively undera code of laws.' We had come a long wayfrom the pre-Vietnam war doctrine thatcalled for the 'defeat of an enemy byapplication of military power directly orindirectly against the armed forces whichsupport his political structure.' (11:49)

The similarities between fie American Revolution and the

Vietnam War are remarkable. Both British and American forces

were clearly shackled by governmental policies and military doc-

trines which precldded the effective initiation of o-ffens,.ve -

erations. The British faced the dilemma that general war would

11212 x

never lead to an amiable settlement and leniency would oni, ser,'

to encourage the rebels. The dilemma facing the United States in

Vietnam was perhaps more complicated, but a dilemma originati,.

from the perceived realities of world politics nonetheless. in

both cases, military commanders were effectively Drevented 4ro T

using "sufficient" force against the enemy's center of ars.,t',

EARLY IN THE WAR. Flawed government policies orQCLtuce( f'awe:

doctrine which effectively precluded the use of sch ±crce. hi-

brings us to the last two variables in the Fab.,ani- Ioce-

addressed: the threat and targetry.

THREAT AND TARGETRv

The immediate threat of the colcnial rebellion tz 3r=t

Britain was twofold. First. if the revolution was -

Would signal to other members of the Empire that Great Britain

was fallible, and second. the deoarture of the colonies f-rm tie

Empire would have a severe adverse impact on trade. Fcremcst.

Great Britain's prestige in the world was at staie:

there not being. . . a single instance in

all histor,,, of an, nation surrendering edistant province Voluntarily and of freechnoice. notwithstanding it was greatl, i

their interest to have done it. (4:24'

If the British failed to contain this c.itizen re-sl>:_-r t'er

other colonies might be inclined to ollow S-UIt. LiLe tne_

States during the the l05(s and 196@s. the British had tei owr

'ersion of "containment." containment of colonial cooiti n tc

Parliament's power and preservation of the Emoirs.

What threat did the potential fall.of South .'it 4-m

the United States Like Great Britain. was Ic=_ .

21

_i!

prestige in the world perhaps the main reason that the United

States chose to make a stand in South Vietnam or did the United

States, as leader of the free world, have a duty to intervene?

Did Washington undertake defense of South Vietnam on behalf of

the free world and did American leadership make a conscious

choice that intervention was necessary to ensure international

secLrity and world order? The answer probably lies somewhere in

between the extremes of "saving face" and champion of the free

,/4orld. It is probably fair to conclude that in a broad context.

the United States felt threatened by the perceived expansion ot

monolithic Communism and, like the British 2-)) years earlier. was

unable to comprehend a world which was contrary to its own making

ard control.

In June 1P56. then Senator John F. Kennedy outlined

"America's stake in Vietnam" in a speech which expressed the

sentiments of a broad spectrum of political opinion. K*.ennedy de-

:1ared that Vietnam represented the cornerstone of the free world

Eoutheast Asia and represented a proving ground for democracy

i the region. Most important, however, is that Kenned.' said

:etnam represents a test of American responsibility, determina-

tion. and prestige in Asia:

if it falls victim to any one of theperils that threaten its existence...

then the United States, with some justi-fication will be held responsible; andCur prestige in Asia will sink to a newI ow. (.5:6 QQ 11

2oth Great Britain and the United States considered the

insurgencies to be a threat to their dominance in the world arena

* 2 2 -. °

and that their national interests would be served if the insur-

gencies were defeated. The question, however, must be asked, "was

the threat real, or was it contrived?" As noted previously, in

the case of the American Revolution, history would indicate that

Great Britain could have prevented the war--that the threat was

more contrived than real. By the same token, although only eleven

years ago, post-war events would indicate that in fact Asia has

not become a bastion of anti-West Communism and that perhaps the

United States was guilty of gross national paranoia. Again., we

see a vivid parallel between the two conflicts in that both Great

Britain and the United States perceived threats that history

might indicate were illusory to the national security interests

of the nation.

The last variable in the Fabyanic Model to be discussed will

be targetry. What were the targets, or centers of gravity, upon

.which the success or failure of the rebellions depended?

in the early stages of the Revolution, the American army re-

scrted to harrassment tactics aimed at keeping the British off

balance since, as previuously mentioned. General Washington and

the colonial leaders recognized that the colonial militias were

no match for British regulars. This may have been the first time

"modern" guerilla forces were used in a major conflict. The aims

of the colonial forces were to avoid the climactic battle, with-

draw when outnumbered, and stall for time while the British will

to fight declined and France would enter the war on the side of

the colonies. Contrary to one of the myths of the American Revol-

ution. the citizen soldier did not win the war.

Americans have long believed the "standard patriotic myth-

ology of a determined provinicial free-holding populace marching

arm-in-arm in the struggle to overcome tyranny." (12:211) While

this notion certainly has strong sentimental appeal. unfortunate-

ly it is not true. As previously mentioned, the regular army un-

der the command of General Washington was the center of gravity

in the colonial cause and remained the real British military ob-

jective during the war. However, given the severe limitations on

offensive operations imposed on the British forces, they were

never able to engage the colonial army in the decisive battle

that British commanders desired.

The British were clearly a long way from "home" and under-

stood that the North American and Canadian seaports were essen-

tial to the survival of their forces on the continent. Conse-

quently, they seized and occupied the seaports in New England and

the South. The British successfully occupied these seaports for

most of the war although, as they soon discovered, once they left

the sanctity of their garrisons, the American army and militia

units proved very elusive to engage. In addition, the general

population proved recalcitrant and frequently transformed itself

into bands of guerillas thereby increasing British frustration.

In 1777. unable to close with the colonial armv for a decisive

engagement, the British under the command of Gneral Burgoyne

decided to embark on a bold offensive essentially deviating from

their earlier indirect strategy. This will be discussed in great-

er detail later.

Similar to the British in 1777. the United States military

24

experienced many of the same frustrations during the Vietnam War

in that they were unable to strike at the enemy's center of gra-

vity. (11:80) Like the British before them, the Americans facod

two types of military forces: the Viet Cong guerillas and the

North Vietnamese regular army. Early in the war., the American

military undertook a classic counter insurgency campaign against

the Viet Cong using special forces units. As the war progressed.

and in response to Viet Cong successes, the United States esca-

lated its combat operations in an effort to defeat the Viet Cong

directly and, by 1967, had inserted 16,000 men into South

Vietnam. In the next two years, the United States increased its

troop strength in-country to 2-,C)0 men and began to direct 1-*;

focus to the North. It was not unitl 1964. five years after the

first direct involvement of American forces, that the United

States began seriously to consider the conflict as being more

than just a guerilla war.

Like the British in the American Revolution, the United

States was faced with a guerilla war in the early stages cf the

conflict. However. Unlike the British who recognized after the

initial stages of the war that the American regular army was the

key to defeating the rebellion, the United States never reall',!

accepted the conclusion that more than limited offensive opera-

tions against the Hanoi regime were needed in order to bring the

war to a successful conclusion. To do so was deemed politicall.,

unacceptable due to the risk of provoking ever greater levels of

conflict in the region. Once again, we see a oarallel between the

two conflicts. Both Great Britain and the United States failed to

2 5

engage the rebel centers of gravity--the regular armies--and

during the early years, were preoccupied with a guerilla wa-

which, in reality, proved to be secondary in nature.

This concludes the assessment of the Fabyanic Model. In

light of this assessment, the military strategies of Great

Britain and the United States in the respective conflicts will be

discussed next.

STRATEGIES

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

As Richard Preston and Sydney Wise wrote in Men in Arms:

The American Revolution marks, indeed, animportant transitional step in the historyof warfare. The professional military me-thods of the eighteenth century, which hadcome to be predominant in the Anglo-French

Seven Year's War, were more important in theRevolution than popular legend admits. Atthe same time! the war was a portent for thefuture, pointing toward conflicts quite dif-ferent from those of the dynastic quarrels ofeighteenth century Europe. (0:172)

The British forces in North America were faced with what ma

have been an impossible situation. As a consequence of the vara-

ble relationships illustrated by the Fabyanic Model which existed

at the start of the Revolution. the British initiallv adopted a

deterrent and indirect strategy. It was believed that the cumula-

tire effects of such a strategy would demonstrate to the rebels

that a war with Great Britain was unwinnable. But. as the war es-

calated. it became increasingly clear to the British military,

that direct offensive operations aimed at destro-ying the =olonial

army were necessary if a militar'y victor, was to be achieved. It

was this dichotemy in strategies which characterized British con-

.6

,happ m " ' '1 I" O .. .......

duct of the war. The indirect strategy could not win the war.

and the offensive strategy was a strategy that, given the state

of British military capabilities, was foreordained to defeat.

In view of British doctrine, terrain, hostile civilian pop-

ulace, long lines of supply, lack of support at home, etc.. the

British military were unable to sustain effective offensive oper-

ations. In addition, the extreme caution exhibited by British

commanders hindered aggressive operations necessary to seek and

destroy the enemy. This latter condition, and the prevailing sen-

timent of the British military, was expressed by General Howe:

if I could by any manoeuvre remove anenemy from a very advantageous position.without hazarding consequences of anattack, where the point to be carriedwas not adequate to the loss of men tobe expected from the enterprise, I shouldcertainly adopt that cautionary conduct,in the hopes of meeting my adversary uponmore equal terms. (4:11C)

Given this penchant for caution on the part of the British

military, it is not surprising that the turning point of the war

-esulted from a bold offensive campaign which was a mar-ed je'.a-

tion from their deterrent and indirect strategv. This departure

from their initial strategy illustrates the dual strateg'n dilemma

that plagued British military forces in the colonies. known As

the Saratoga campaign, this operation was a classic example of

the inability of the British to mount and sustain offensive

thrusts into rebel territory.

The idea for the campaign was the brainchild of Major

General John Burgoyne and, in theory, was basicall, a soumd plan.

However, as the analysis of the Fabyanic Model has shown, given

297

British doctrine. force structure. policy, society. etc.. se*era

insurmountable obstacles existed which prevented the British mil-

itary from conducting and sustaining bold offensive ooeration-

against an indigenous rebel army.

The plan called for Burgoyne to lead a strong Anglo-Germar.

force (approximately 6,500 men) from Montreal and, by strikina

from the North along the Richilieu and Hudson Rivers. taks

'!banv. New York. At Albany. Burgoyne was to be met bv Lieutenant

Colonel St. Leger in command of a mixed force -f Brt s'

Hessians. Tories, and Indians, from Oswego on Lake Ontario. These

two forces would then crush all colonial opposition in their matr

Rs they met a British force led by General Howe driving north Up

the Hudson from New York. This campaign would then sever Net.

England from the rest of the colonies. On the drive south to

Albany. General Burgoyne was to capture weakly held Ticonderoga.

However. history shows that the campaign was doomed from the be-

ginning. (1 ':_'7'A-'_55)

A key part of the -lan was for thousands Cf Tris=.

Canadians, and Indians to supplement the regular British +,_)rc-,

This provision of the plan, however, fell far short of e,cecta-

tions and in at least one aspect unaxpectdlv worked aalnst 4-!. ,e

Sritish: 1) only approximately 11100 Tories and 400 Indians were

actually recruited, and 2) the idea of using Indians to fight

against transplanted Englishman was considered immoral b, Encli-h

society and was one of the reasons that English societ. eer.

I- lost favor with the war. in addition. Burgoyne was deterri2ed

to travel with heavy artillery (some 18 artiller mie,-: :

NAM

all and all the traditional trappings of an eighteenth cent r1u

a-rmv. One final item would prove equally disastrous. Informati, n

that Howe's forces were in Pennsvlvania. and would not be ava1-

able for the drive north to Albany. was casually diarecarded b

Burgoyne believing that London would surely make General Howe'

forces available for the most imoortant camoaign of the war.

Undermanned, overburdened and in the face of declining_ sp2Trt

-nm home. in Julv 17' , General Burgoyn,- left Montreal sv can,

ths Saratoga camoaign--a -ampaign uoon which the hooes oLr,-

North's administration rested.

The march South through the mountains of New York .--as 9

cruci atl, ngl v slow due to the e;-cessi ye hardware zarrie- t_.- tn..

Sritish and the inhospitable terrain. Although Burgo'vne was S - -

cessful in driving the Americans from Ticonderoga. his lines ,f

-upply were unable to support his army and the Americans ensured

that all supply along his route of march was destroyed.

This supply problem was never satisfact-oily solved by the British: hence thei--elative immobility. 'tethered by/ theirsupplv lines to the coast.' and the contin--_ting stress placed on the Lovalits--t=!eeo the country open behind the fightingtrooos in a terrain where all were oopcseior eauivocally neutral until oroof of abi-it' to retain advantages was shown. ':IK,

The detailed account of General Burgovne s march south 1M

,.jell worth reading. It is an epic story of the Fevo!ution which

clearly illustrates the shortcomings of the British militar', oc-

tu.re in America and the strength of will of the citizen =-c,!fier.

The slow oace of the British allowed the colonial for,=es t:) amas-

: citizen arm/ which overwhelmed the British force. The o-ICnjal

20

. .... ~~~~ ~ " ..... .... "''i ' .. - , ': "'"M MM "@'_ _

forces were able to swel l from 4. 000) to 17. 000 men. O,

October 14. 1777. totally outnumbered and with nc reasonable roo_

of supply, General Burgoyne surrendered near the New York village

of Saratoga.

T he defeat at Saratoga was critical to the British cause for

two primary reasons: it gave the colonies time to train and and

eqLUip a re.ular army of Sufficlent capability to engage the

British for the decisive battle which, b, this time. both -ide

':new would have to occur. and it bro~ught France into the ,-ar on

the side of the Americans. Although the colonial forces were at!e

to score numerous .ictories aaainst the British in the f'irst

,.,ears of the war. thev knew full well that a trained arreml - , m.

and an alliance with France were crucial to final vict r ,

war. Both these objectives were achieved after the _olonia

v'ictory at Saratoga.

With the resources. men. and renewed confidence brcucht t.

the colonial cause by the French. a combined force oz c-lonz.,

.nd French regulars defeated the British at the .-attl-

Yorktown in 1791 and essentially concluded the Ameri,-a'

c'evoluton. Cut off bv French seaDower from their lines =f =--

+l-. faced with increasing casualties and declining supoort bac!

.u England. General Cornwallis surrendered to General lashincton.

THE VIETNAM WA

The analysis of the Fabyanic Model shows that *he Llnited

States faced much the same situation in Vietnam that the _ -i.=

Laced in the American Revolution. ConseQuentlv. American leader-

shio initially,' adopted very much the same militar%. strateg a=

o0

the British. Early in the war (prior to 1964), the United States

attempted to halt Communist expansionism in South Vietnam through

a cumulative deterrent and indirect strategy. When it became

clear that this strategy was failing, and the Communists were

escalating the level of conflict, the United States adopted a

more direct strategy (although limited) designed to bring North

Vietnam to the negotiating table.

To be sure, the Vietnam War was politically more *~mp1e;

than the American Revolution. However. like the British 200 rears

earlier, the United States hoped to deal initially with the in-

surgency with as little use of force as possible. For the first

two years. the United States limited its military role to that of

advisors and special forces units. As the Viet Cong became In-

creasingly more aggressive and successful, the United States

began to focus its efforts on defeating the Viet Cong and grad-

ually increased its military commitment. By the end of !0A=,

16.00C) troops had been deployed to South Vietnam. In 19S4. ii

response to ever increasing Communist aggression. the Unte-d

States chose to begin bombing the North and. like the British 1n

the Revolution, dramatically changed their strategy. Incumbent in

this change of strategy was an increased requirement for mon and

material to meet the demands of intensified air and ground opera-

tions. By the end of 1964, the American military had 2l, 0

troops in-country.

The change to a more direct offensive strategy, principally

the bombing of targets in the North, was undertalen neither to

achieve an unconditional surrender, nor the total destruction of

the enemy's war fighting =apability, but rather was desicned tc

bring the Communists to the negotiating table. Four years later.

this gradual escalation of military force by both sides culminat-

ed in the dramatic battle of Tet. Unlike the British. however,

the American military never tasted significant defeat in the

field. But, nonetheless., Tet 1968 was a significant victory for

the North Vietnamese against the American center of gravit/:

Rather than commending the militaryvictory. Americans were instead hcrri-

fied by the brutality of war. and Tetmarked the beginning of a radicall',, in-tensified antiwar protest. (14:756)

American society and segments of its leadership chose the ra t, ,,

they wished to see. In the face of increasing casualties. OLb 1 '

support for the war declined, and pressure to ietiate ' _-

ed. Three years later, the United States pulled out of Sout!-,

Vietnam.

The United States had won the battles, but lost the war. The

reasons for the defeat are found in the analysis of the Fabvani c

Model and closely parallel the conditions encountered b'. the

British during the Revolution. Essentially. the United States had

failed to adapt tc the tactical, strategic, and political reali-

ties of the war they found in Southeast Asia while completel-, un-

derestimating their enemy's capabilities. By adopting a flexible

response oolicy and a strategy of "gradualism," the United States

disdained the strategic offensive early in the war and. as a re-

sult, any hope of preventing the Communist takeover 0 South

Vietnam. Had the United States not felt politically com-elled to

limit the use of force early in the war then, like the British

e'j0erience in the Ameri.-an Revolution, the outcome of the war

mioht have been very different.

CONCLUS I ON

The analysis of the Fabyanic Model variables clearly shows

that both the British and United States failed to appreciate the

true nature of the American Revolution and Vietnam War resoec-

tivelv. Both wars were revolutionary livil wars which radi~lp! ...

escalated into conflicts approaching the zonventional c -, - -

which were representative of the time. Both wars were true rev,-!-

,Itions and each nation, failing to Full\. comprehend the ene!,,'=_

commitment, was forced to respond gradually to an es,- aat ng

level of intensity/ of conflict dictated by the rebel armies.

The military commanders in both wars were cl- 1 < saddled ,

national policies which resulted in military doctrines incapable

of bringing the conflicts to a successful military ,ConclusiCn.

While military commanders can understand the concept of limited

objectives, the use of limited means to achieve.. these ob , t,- a

lias contrary to the principles of war. The use ,f linited teer

in these wars resulted from the fact that national obect,

were unclear. And. in the absence of clear ob ect._s es . -

tional command authorities inhibited military oQeratins for tear

of reducing negotiating fle.-ibility. The following thcuQht,

while written about the British in the American Revolution, ar.

also applicable to the Vietnam War:

It is a sound ma"im in war to be clear

about one's objective--all the restwill follow, given sufficient resourcesand activity. Until 1778. this was ig-nored by the British who were uncertainabout their main motive. Was it to con-

.1 ,

ciliate, or to subdue, the Americans;negotiated peace or war? This lack ofdetermination meant immediate loss ofinitiative. Too vigorous a policy wouldruin the chance of a settlement whilsttoo lenient handling of the rebels couldonly encourage them. IT SEEMS CLEARTHAT HAD AN ENERGETIC POLICY BEEN FOL-LOWED FROM THE START BY POURING TROOPSAND SUPPLIES TO THE DECISIVE POINTS,BY ISOLATING THE MAIN AREAS OF DIS-SAFFECTION, AND BY DEALING DECISIVELYWITH EACH ONE, THE REBELLION COULD HAVEBEEN CRUSHED BEFORE FRANCE ENTERED THEWAR. THERE WAS NOT IN THESE YEARS ONEOVERRIDING PLAN TO WHICH ALL ELSE WASSUBORDIINATED. THE BRITISH WERE HOPINGTO HEAL AND SETTLE, AS WELL AS TO CON-QUER, AND IMAGINED THAT BY THEIR VERYAPPEARANCE THE REBELLION COULD BE PUTDOWN AS SUDDENLY AS IT HAD BROKEN OUT-- HENCE THEIR NEGLECT OF WHAT SHOULDALWAYS ACCOMPANY THE MAINTENANCE OFTHE OBJECTIVE, SUFFICIENT RESOURCESREADILY AVAILABLE FOR ITS ATTAINMENT. (4:113)

One last parallel between the two wars is significant--i+

only to show that the use of military force was merely a facade

for a national leadership bereft of clear political vision. In

both wars, each nation attempted to negotiate peace while engaged

in offensive operations against the enemy. Again, the followinc

passage was written about the American Revolution, but is ramark-

able in its applicability to the Vietnam War:

To pursue approaches for peace whileusing to their utmost extent the soldiersand ships which were provided were inreality two incompatible aims - AND ITWAS THIS MISCONCEPTION WHICH FRUSTRATEDTHE UNDOUBTED ADVANTAGES WHICH THE BRITISHOPENED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE COLONIES,AND HINDERED THEM IN ACTION AGAINSTTHEIR SMALL, UNORGANISED ENEMY. (4:113)

The principal lesson to be learned from both wars is that when

military force is to be used as an instrument of policy in deal-

34

ing with revolutionary civil wars. the force must be at.e _

swift. If this action is politically untenable, then alter-at,.e

means to the application of military force must be s t

achieve national objectives.

In summary, the American Revolution and the Vietnam War wers

remarkably similar in many ways. In both cases, the primary cause

of each nation's political failure can be traced to a !ac -of ,_vn-

derstanding of the true character of the conflicts. urcle-ar rF-

tional objectives, and military strategies initially cred:_at

on the limited use of force. In the future, when faced with re-

Volutionary civil wars, military commanders should advocate mili-

tary force only when the political situation will sup-Crt E Ie-

1isive military campaign early in the conflict.

... . . .I. . . . . . r ' ., i . ', ! i '- ... , _. . .,

M I L I T A RY S T R A T E G Y

VAR I ABLE RELAT I ONSH I PE

Force Structure

Pol icv Doctrine

k 3_=Oc ety! I Strategy a er hi ,

Targetry Threat

Technology

4-.---T i me - .

.Aopendi , 1

!IST OF REFERENCES

1. Clauswit:. Carl von. On War. Princetor. NJ: _University Fress, 1976.

2. Gates, John M. "Vietnam the Debate Goes On. " Parameters -

4ournal a+ the US Arm\' War Colleae. Carlisle Barracks, C: r-9:1984

. Fabyanic. Dr Tom. "Fundamentals of Military, Strategy."Lecture. Montgomery. Al.: Air War College, August !

-4. Robson. Eric. The American Pe,o!ution In Its ':,1 t-Z! amtMilitary Asoects 1763-178. New Yorl.. New Ycr : W. W. ,rt.2o.. 1966.

=. Tucker. Robert W. and Henarickson, David C. Th .. all - tr'sFirst British Empire - Oriains of the War of Amerizarindeoendence. Baltimore. Md: The John Hopkins Univer-it<,- ...1982.

6. Lewev, Guenter. "The Implications of Barriers to EfficientDefense Rolicy Making. The Roots of the American Invocveren_Vietnam. American Defense Folic,, edited by Feichert _.on F.and Sturm. Steven R. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md: The Jonn Ho-ki+ sUniversity Press. 1982.

'. Kezirian. Richard. American History: Maior ControversiesR.viewd New York. New York: Kendall Hunt Publishng Cc..! 983.

9. Frumkin, David and Chase, James. "What are the Lessons -Vietnam?" Forei. n A-fzir . Vol 6 . No. 4. Spring 1985.

9. Prestcn. Pichard A. and Wise. Sydney F. Men in Arms. AHistor- of Warfare and Its Interrelatianshios with Wester-

- 4th ed. New York. New York: Holt, Finehart. -andWinston. 1979,

1'. Cohen. Eliot A. "Constraints on America's Conduct of SmallWars. " Internaticna! Sec-rit'.'. Fall 1984. Reorinted rom .Study on the Role of Air Power in Low Intensity Conflict. Air WarCollege. Montgomery. Al: 1984

11. Summers. Harry G. On Strateov: The Vietnam War in Context.US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks. Pa: 173?

.2. Martin. James Kirby, and Lender. Mark Edward. A RespectatleArm,,,: The Military Orioins of the ReQublic,. 176:-!7R.Arlington Heights. Ii: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982.

1. American Heritage Series. The Revolution. New Yort. NeYork: American Heritage Publishing Co.. Inc., !0.1.

-7

14. Wheeler, John. "Coming to Grips with Vietnam." foreignAffairs. Vol 6.1. No. 4: Spring 1l?6M

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