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Agricultural safeguardsGATT, old agricultural (SSG) and new mechanism (SSM)

CORRECTED: 5 AUGUST 2008

The talks among ministers meeting in Geneva from 21 July 2008 broke down on 29 July overthe special safeguard mechanism (SSM). What exactly is the problem?

The problem is not about protecting poor farmers in general that is already covered bywhat has been agreed on the formula for developing countries to cut tariffs; smaller or no cutsfor special products; different treatment for small and vulnerable economies, recent newmembers and special cases such as Bolivia; and exemptions for least-developed countries. It isnot even about the SSM itself. This is about one particular circumstance.

The SSM problem: blocked over a disputed zone

Much of the special safeguard mechanism has already been agreed. The SSM would allowdeveloping countries to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with import surges and price falls. The

blockage in the July 2008 talks was only about import surges, and a particular instance of that.

Agreed already: that developing countries will have an SSM; more or less how big the importincrease would be to trigger the temporary tariff rise, and how high the rise should be in general.

The blockage: the situation where the SSM raises tariffs above commitments countries made inthe 198694 Uruguay Round the pre-Doha Round bound rates. In the case of newmembers, that means commitments made in their membership agreements.

So, essentially, the blockage was about the SSM reaching into a disputed zone: above pre-Dohabound rates.

Who blocked?

The blockage is often described as one between the US versus India and China. This is only

partly true. All three are major trading countries with importing and exporting concerns.

But they were also among the small group of seven delegations trying to reach an initial

settlement Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, the US before taking the

issue to larger groups and eventually the full membership. The blockage was within that

group of seven. Other countries outside were also concerned, including other members of

the G-33, and some exporting developing countries.

Two philosophies: A number of countries have opposed breaching the pre-Doha Round

commitments, while others insist it has to be allowed. In the 10 July draft agriculture text,

the possibility of breaching these commitments is in square brackets (ie, indicating no

agreement), except for least-developed countries. This reflects two different and

unresolved views about what the SSM is for:

The SSM as protection for poor and very vulnerable farmers: according to this view,

the SSM should be freer and easier to use, with smaller triggers and bigger tariff increases.

This is related to the argument that prices are depressed because of large subsidies in rich

countries. Advocates: G-33 and its allies.

The SSM as a time-bound means to help liberalization (used only within

liberalization): according to this view, the SSMs use should be more restricted, and

related to cutting tariffs from pre-Doha Round levels. That would mean no tariff increase

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above those levels, the SSM must not be triggered by normal fluctuations in price or

normal trade expansion, and it should be limited to the period of liberalization. This is

related to the arguments that poor farmers need to export in order to escape poverty, andthat the pre-Doha Round commitments were a negotiated compromise balance of rights and

obligations, which should not be touched. Advocates: Latin American, Southeast Asian and other

countries in the Cairns Group but not in the G-33; US. Developing countries among these say it isnot a North-South issue but has an impact on South-South trade.

Compromise?

Draft texts and numbers that were discussed (principally the 10 July draft agriculturalmodalities and changes to it) attempted a compromise between two opposing positions.The numbers most discussed would apply to developing countries not to small andvulnerable economies or least-developed countries, which have their own more liberaltreatment. The SSM would allow the tariff to go above the pre-Doha Round commitments

but it would be constrained by setting additional criteria:

a minimum increase in imports before this could happen (the additional triggers of 15%,

40% etc, which are not in the 10 July draft)

limiting how high the tariff could rise above the Pre-Doha rate (15% of the post-Dohabound rate or 15 percentage points, whichever is higher, in the 10 July draft)

how many products could breach the pre-Doha tariff levels in a year (eg, 2.5% ofproducts)The blockage was about how large the numbers should be.

Flexibility versus normal trade growth: The question underlying the blockage was whetheran additional trigger is needed to constrain the instances when the SSM would raise thetariff above the pre-Doha rate and if so how large it should be. One view was that at mostit should be low. The opposing view was that normal trade growth, and not a genuine

surge, could trigger the tariff increase.