Agrarian Law Case DigestsStephanie Q. Dandal18 July 2015Daez v. CA

Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by the respondent farmers Soriente et al. The problem arose when the land was subjected to the OLT pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474. Thus, the land was transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on December 9, 1980.

On May 31, 1981, private respondents made an affidavit under duress stating they are not tenants but hired workers. Hence, Daez apllied for exemption of OLT claiming her land is untenanted and the cancellation of the CLTs. (not majorly related to the topic)In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential landsin Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.

DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:

Denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.

DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Disregarded the affidavit of the farmers under duress.

Court of AppealsSustained the decision of both DAR secretaries

Supreme CourtDenied their prayers and sustained the decisions

Main Issue Related to our topicExemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

DAR Regional DirectorMarch 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.

DAR SecretaryAffirmed the decision of the regional director. Appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

Office of the PresidentRuled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectare of land. Still denied the application of the children. Hence the appeal in CA.

Court of AppealsReversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.

Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land

Held: Petitioner Daez has the right to retain the 4.1685 hectare land pursuant to her right of retention under 6657. The decision of the Office of the President is reinstated.

Ratio:Read Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657Paez was denied the right to choose what she wants to retain.

THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB,petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL SISON,respondents.Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding an order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had issued certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of their shares if they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of rice or corn land.

Certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case which revealed that the landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently, the acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had been issued to the petitioners-tenants. However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the landholdings be included in the Operation Land Transfer.Petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer was denied. Motion for reconsideration was denied as well.After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order was issued on September 7, 1988 by Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands, since they are not owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has the authority to cancel certificates issues?RULING:Petitioners contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretarys administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.

LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. TERESITA V. SALVADOR, RESPONDENT.Facts: Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.In their Answer petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court remanded the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the parties' submission of their respective position papers and other supporting evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship.ISSUE: WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE SUBJECT LANDRULING: Agricultural tenancy relationshipdoes not exist in the instant case.

Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.

As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent's predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary.

Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. The affidavits of petitioners' neighbors declaring that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.

The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Ruling:

Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.

Roxas and Co., Inc. v. CAFacts: Petitioner Roxas and Co. Is a corporation that owns 3 haciendas in Batangas, which the government wishes to acquire under the Comprehensive Agrarian Law (CARL). Before the effectivity of the law, the petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to EO 229, which served as guidelines to the comprehensive agrarian program. The two other haciendasBanilad and Palicowere placed under compulsory acquisition by the DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Hacienda Banilad and PalicoDAR sent invitations to Roxas and Co in order to discuss the results of the DAR investigation, finding both Banilad and Palico qualified under the CARP. For Hacienda Palico, DAR sent a letter of acquisition to Roxas and Co at their offices in Manila, while for Hacienda Banilad, DAR addressed the notices to Jaime Pimintel, caretaker of the said hacienda. It was petitioner Pimintel who attended all the proceedings regarding the two haciendas. Hence, during trial, Roxas and Co claimed that they were not informed of the acquisition proceedings on their two haciendas.

DAR then opened a trust account in favor of petitioner Roxas and Co. These trust accounts were replaced by DAR with cash and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds. Meanwhile, petitioner Roxas applied for the conversion of the haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. Despite this, DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two haciendas. It then issued and distributed certificate of land ownership awards (CLOA) to farmer beneficiaries.

Hacianda CaylawayAlthough Hacienda Caylaway was initially offered for sale to the government, Roxas and Co sent a letter to DAR secretary withdrawing its offer. According to Roxas, the reclassification of Caylaway from agricultural to non agricultural was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. Also, the municipality of Nasugbu where the haciendas are located had been declared a tourist zone. Roxas also argued that the land is not suitable for agricultural purposes.

DAR secretary denied Roxas withdrawal of his VOS. According to the secretary, the withdrawal can only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of soil for agriculture, slope of the lad is over 180 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.

Despite the denial of the withdrawal of the VOS, petitioner still filed an application for conversion with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), which submitted the case to the Secretary of DAR for resolution. The DAR secretary dismissed the case.Roxas and Co went to the CA on appeal. CA dismissed appeal claiming that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issues:

1. WON the court can take cognizance of petitioners petition despite failure to exhaust administrative remedies2. WON acquisition proceedings against the petitioners were valid3. WON the court can rule on whether the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non agricultural

Ruling:

1. Yes. Petitioners action falls under the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies sine there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for the petitioners at this point. The CLOAs were already issued despite the fact that there was no just compensation.2. Acquisition proceedings against petitioners violated their right to due process. First, there was an improper service of the Notice of Acquisition. Notices to corporations should be served through their president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners. Jaime Pimintel, to whom the notice was served, was neither of those. Second, there was no notice of coverage, meaning, the parcels of land were not properly identified before they were taken by the DAR. Under the law, the land owner has the right to choose 5 hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon receiving the Notice of Acquisition, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisiton. Third, The CLOAs were issued to farmer beneficiaries without just compensation. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. DARs opening of a trust account in petitioners name does not constitute payment. Even if later, DAR substituted the trust account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure the lack of notice, which still amounts to a violation of the petitioners right to due process.3. Despite all this, the court has not jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of land from agricultural to non agricultural. DARs failure to observe due process does not give the court the power to adjudicate over petitioners application for land conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of approving applications for land conversion. They have the tools and experience needed to evaluate such applications; hence, they are the proper agency with which applications for land use conversion are lodged. DAR should be given a chance to correct their defects with regard to petitioners right to due process. Petitioner dismissed.

Note: Pertinent section although not mentioned in the case is Sec. 20 of the LGC on power of LGU to reclassify land. However, the code also provides that the CARL prevails over LGC provisions.

Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines

Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo,IliganCity. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property. The decision stated thatthe subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said program.However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violatedEventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. ISSUE: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property bought by the ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heirs due process.

RULING: YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law.Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.In addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste wasregistered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Althoughtax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession. Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

I.THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court howeverdid not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted thatthere are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore.Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) toimmediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II.THE ISSUES

(1)Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?(2)Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?(3)Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?(4)Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?(5)Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?(6)THE CRUCIAL ISSUE:Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III.THE RULING

[The CourtPARTIALLY GRANTEDthe motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al.with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI,which option the Court therebyRECALLEDandSET ASIDE. Itreconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, andUNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1.YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws.Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2.NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it wasnot raised at the earliest opportunityand that the resolution thereof isnot the lis motaof the case. Moreover, the issue has been renderedmoot and academicsince SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3.NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the areato be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR,it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding thatthe 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4.YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation,the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case.The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5.NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from theissuanceandregistrationof the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point isthe issuance of the EP or CLOA, andnot the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6.YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs.Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares.Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao

Facts: The DUMLAOS were co-owners of a 32 hectare ricelands in Nueva Vizcaya which was placed under OLT by virtue of PD27 (note that actual date of taking was not stated.)

The DAR made a preliminary valuation on 16 hectares (2 lots) and payments were made to the DUMLAOs by Landbank. The DUMLAOs filed a complaint before the RTC to determine just compensation, and requested the appointment of 3 commissioners to make the determination.

The DAR moved to dismiss claiming that the RTC does not have jurisdiction. The RTC eventually recognized the case and ordered payment at 6,912.50 per hectare for one lot & to follow the amount provided for in the Land Valuation Summary and Farmers Undertaking for the other lot. The DUMLAOs was claiming market value of 109,000 per hectare.The DUMLAOs appealed to the CA which ruled in their favor, which noted that the time of taking was not certain. The CA held that after the passage of RA No. 6657, the formula relative to valuation under PD No. 27 no longer applies.

Under PD 27 and EO No. 228, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands is: 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.

Under the CARL, it is provide:Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

ISSUE: Which law should be followed to determine just compensation

Ruling: (1) The just compensation due to respondents should be determined under the provisions of RA No. 6657.The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although the property was acquired under PD No. 27. The latter law, being thelatestlaw in agrarian reform, should control, as held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo.

Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides Sec. 7. Priorities. The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years.

This demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.

DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time makes it inequitable to follow the guidelines provided by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228.Hence, RA No. 6657 should apply.

NOTE HOWEVER that the CAs act of setting just compensation in the amount ofP109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise of this judicial function, had it followed the mandatory formula prescribed by RA No. 6657.However, the appellate court merely chose the lower of two (2) values specified by the commissioner as basis for determining just compensation, namely: (a)P109,000.00 per hectare as themarket valueof first class unirrigated rice land in the Municipality of Villaverde; and (b)P60.00 per square meter as thezonal valueof the land in otherbarangaysin Villaverde.

This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the formula provided by RA No. 6657 under Section 17, as implemented through DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) - LV= (CNIx 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1), where: LV = Land Value CNI = Capitalized Net Income CS = Comparable Sales MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

(2) The taking of the properties for the purpose of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the date of issuance of emancipation patents.

The nature of the landatthattimedetermines the just compensation to be paid.

(3) The DUMLAOs are entitled to payment of just compensation on their entire landholdings covered by Operation Land Transfer, except for the five hectares of retention area each of them are entitled to (RIGHT OF RETENTION).The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature.TheDARs land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party.In the exercise of its functions, the courts still have the final say on what the amount of just compensation will be.

A reading of Section 18of RA No. 6657 shows that it is the courts, not theDAR, which make the final determination of just compensation.

Also, to wait for theDARvaluation despite its unreasonable neglect and delay in processing the four properties claimfolders is to violate the elementary rule that payment of just compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking of property.While the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine in a preliminary manner the amount of just compensation, the circumstances of this case militate against the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO AND MAGIN SORIANO, NAMELY: MARIVEL S. CARANDANG AND JOSEPH SORIANO, Respondents.

Facts: Marivel Carandang and Joseph Soriano are the children of the late Sps. Jorja Rigor- Soriano and Magin Soriano, the owners of the two parcels of land located in Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending that such valuation was too low compared to existing valuations of agricultural lands, the heirs commenced an action for just compensation. They asked that a final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based on Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992 and R.A. No. 6657.

The RTC ordered Land Bank to pay the heirs the amount P1,227,571.10 as just compensation.

Land Bank appealed to the CA. The CA denied the petition.

Hence, Land Bank appealed to the Supreme Court.

During the pendency of the appeal, both parties entered into an agreement re-evaluating the cost of the parcels of land. Thus, Land Bank submitted a manifestation informing the High Court that the parties have already filed their Joint Motion to Approve submitting their Agreement dated November 29, 2012.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present appeal to the Supreme Court should be dismissed?

Ruling:

The appeal should be closed and terminated.

CIVIL LAW: compromise; contract

The Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Art. 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation.

As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. A review of the terms of the Agreement, indicates that it is a judicial compromise because the parties intended it to terminate their pending litigation by fully settling their dispute.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.SPOUSES PLACIDO ORILLA and CLARA DY ORILLA,respondents.

Facts: Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of Lot No. 1, 11-12706, situated in Bohol, containing an area of 23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18401. In the latter part of November 1996, the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated November 15, 1996 informing them of the compulsory acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) forP371,154.99 as compensation based on the valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner).Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation. Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation made by the petitioner.After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision which rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant action atP7.00 per square meter. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily indemnify the petitioners their expenses for attorneys fee and contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval of the Court.

After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision dated November 20, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant action atP7.00 per square meter, as only prayed for, which shall earn legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same shall have been fully paid. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily indemnify the petitioners their expenses for attorneys fee and contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval of the Court.On March 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action18forcertiorariand prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. It questioned the propriety of the SAC Order granting the execution pending appeal. Respondents and the presiding judge of the SAC, as nominal party, filed their respective comments on the petition.In its Decision dated July 29, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the assailed SAC Order dated December 21, 2000 granting execution pending appeal was consistent with justice, fairness, and equity, as respondents had been deprived of the use and possession of their property pursuant to RA 6657 and are entitled to be immediately compensated with the amount as determined by the SAC under the principle of "prompt payment" of just compensation.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 5, 2003. Hence, this appealISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, EVEN THOUGH THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT IS SATISFIED BY THE PAYMENT AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE PROVISIONAL COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 16(E) OF RA 6657, UPON SUBMISSION OF THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF "LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, ET AL.," G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6, 1995 AND JULY 5, 1996, AND NOT BY EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC.RULING: In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the grant by the SAC of the motion for execution pending appeal? The answer is a resounding YES.The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.In light of these circumstances, the SAC found that the valuation made by petitioner, and affirmed by the DAR, was unjustly way below the fair valuation of the landholding at the time of its taking by the DAR. The SAC, mindful also of the advanced age of respondents at the time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of just compensation, deemed it proper to grant their motion for execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring "prompt payment" of just compensation.Contrary to the view of petitioner, "prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set by RA 6657.Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. Petitioner DAR maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the Certificate of Deposit by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.

Issue: Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid payment for just compensation

Ruling: It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term deposit.

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts: These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act(R.A. No. 6657and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In1987, President Corazon Aquinoissued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In1987,P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing themechanicsfor its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.ISSUE:1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.Ruling: 1. No. TheAssociation had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law,classificationhas been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the followingrequirements:(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Associationhave not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:Section 16 (f):Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept intraditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO R. TANTOCO, SR., MARIA R. TANTOCO, ZOSIMO TANTOTCO, MARGARITA R. TANTOCO and PACITA R. TANTOCO,petitioners,vs. HON. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, GEN. TRIAS, CAVITE, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE and THE DAR REGION IV DIRECTOR,

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. who died and was substituted by his heirs while this case was still pending before the DARAB Adjudication Board for Region IV, and his co-petitioners, namely, Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita R. Tantoco and Pacita R. Tantoco, were the former owners of a vast track of land with an area of 106.5128 hectares, situated at San Francisco, General Trias, Cavite and previously registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33404 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

At about that time, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was already considering the land in question for compulsory acquisition under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Francisco Tantoco, Sr., for and in his own behalf and in behalves of his co-petitioners, declared the productive nature and agricultural suitability of the land in dispute and at the same time offered the same to the DAR for acquisition under the Voluntary Offer To Sell (VOS) scheme of the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Obviously welcomed by the DAR, the offer was immediately acted upon. Hence, after processing the acquisition of the same 100 hectares under the VOS scheme of Republic Act No. 6657, the DAR issued on August 30, 1993 a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in favor of private respondent Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) of San Francisco, General Trias, Cavite and its 53 members. In turn, on the basis of the same CLOA, the respondent Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. CLOA-1424 in the name of ARBA and its 53 members and accordingly cancelled the Tantocos' TCT No. T-402203.The Tantocos filed their petition for cancellation of TCT N. CLOA-1424 and the reinstatement of their TCT No. T-402203. Impleaded in the same petition as additional respondents are the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite and the DAR Region IV Director.

The land in question is within the on-going industrial estate development site per land use plan of the Municipality of General Trias, Cavite; that it has been planted to sugar and declared as such for taxation purposes. In an Order dated September 1, 1986 of the then Minister of Agrarian Reform Heherson Alvarez, the same land was declared outside of the purview or ambit of Presidential Decree No. 27; that the property is within that portion of Cavite that has been declared as an industrial zone in the CALABARZON area, reason for which the price of real properties thereat has greatly appreciated, "so much so that almost all persons, including owners, investors and farmers became interested, and even pseudo-claimants are speculating to make a windfall profit on whatever real property they could lay their hands on"; that the approval of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law on June 10, 1988, coupled with the knowledge that the area has been declared part of the industrial zone of Cavite, persons unknown to petitioners begun to claim to be tenants or farmholders on said land, when in truth and in fact, petitioners never had any tenant/farmworker thereon, and neither did the petitioners give their consent for anyone to farm the same "which is suitable for sugarcane, residential or industrial purposes and not for rice or corn or other industrial products"

Coupled with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and eventually a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents, particularly ARBA, "from negotiating, selling or otherwise disposing of said land, or any part or portion thereof", the petition prays for a judgment: (a) declaring TCT No. CLOA-1424 as null and void from the beginning and ordering its cancellation; (b) reinstating the petitioners' TCT No. T-402203, or issuing a new title to them; and (c) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect said mandate, plus damages and attorney's fees.

In its Answer, respondents ARBA denied the material allegations of the petition, and averred, among other things, that the subject land is planted to several crops such as rice, corn, bananas, vegetable, etc.; that the farmer-beneficiaries listed in TCT No. T-CLOA-1424 are qualified beneficiaries as provided for in Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657; that due process the coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the land in dispute.

Both the petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) at Quezon City, where their respective recourses were consolidated and docketed as DARAB Case No. 6385.

In time, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and a Submission, to which a corresponding Opposition was interposed by respondent ARBA.Eventually, in its Resolution of September 6, 1999, the DARAB denied petitioners' motions "for lack of merit", saying that "no new matters are adduced by the movants which will warrant a reversal of the board's decisionISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DARAB ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED JULY 1, 1998, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR IN HER DECISION DATED JUNE 17, 1997.

RULING:

NO.

The Court made a thorough review of the evidence on record and found nothing therein to substantiate petitioners' posture. It may well happen, as it normally does, that a piece of evidence may be viewed differently by different fora. Certainly, however, if an appellate agency, like the DARAB, did not adoptin totothe finding of facts made by a subordinate office, and even disagrees with them, more so when, as here, the disagreement is well-explained, We are at loss to understand how grave abuse of discretion, as understood in law and jurisprudence, may be imputed to the latter.Finally, petitioners presently question the legal competence and authority of the four (4) DARAB members who signed and promulgated the assailed decision. It is petitioners' thesis that all four (4) of them are political appointees of former President Fidel V. Ramos. As such, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, allegedly issued by the incumbent President soon after assuming office on June 30, 1998, whereunder all political appointees of the former President were deemed terminated from office, said members had ceased to be such effective July 1, 1998. Prescinding therefrom, petitioners contend that the decision under review which was promulgated on July 1, 1998, "is null and void" for lack of legal authority on the part of the same four (4) DARAB members who signed and promulgated the decision.As indicated below their respective names, DARAB members Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano and Sergio B. Serrano are all Assistant Secretary in the Department of Agrarian Reform, the first being at the same time Vice Chairman of DARAB, while the last two (2) are members of the same Board, while member Artemio A. Adaza, Jr., was then the DAR Undersecretary.In the absence of a showing by the petitioners, and none has been made by them, that the four (4) DARAB members are non-career officials, the challenge on their legal authority to sign and promulgate the assailed decision must simply fall.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner,vs.DARAB, et.al.,respondents

Facts:

The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao.In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. On January 16, 1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.

In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.

Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants (respondents). Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project.

In 1986, the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. The CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.

The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.

ISSUES:1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.

2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.

Ruling:

DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes.

SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL. As to the determination of when and what lands arefound to be necessaryfor use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. The Court declared the decision of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as null and void and hereby orders that they be set aside, with costs against the private respondents.

Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

Facts: Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration

Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively.OnOctober 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.

DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994.The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.

June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.

After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries.Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.

August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.

DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.

Aggrieved DECS filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)NO2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible.Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP.The program shall: cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, allpublicand private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a)All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;(b)All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;(c)All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and(d)All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

Section 3(c): agricultural land- land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

agriculture or agricultural activity- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS.From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the government.There is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.

-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation.Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the landper se,not the income derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

Ruling:

I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption:

c)Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense,school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. x x xx x xx x xIn order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be necessary;and2) the purpose is for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes.The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be necessarycannot be understated. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous.The plain meaning rule orverba legisis applicable.Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case ofCentral Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,wherein we declared the land subject exempt from CARP coverage.However, DECS reliance is misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.1st, in theCMUcase, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proc. No. 476 for the use ofMindanaoAgriculturalCollege(now CMU).In this case, however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.2nd, in theCMUcase, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and campuses.Although a portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a Management and Development Agreement, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and students.The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs.On the other hand, the lands in this case were notactuallyandexclusivelyutilized as school sites and campuses. They were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational but business purposes.Also, it was the income and not the lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools.

II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not qualified beneficiaries.The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:

SECTION 15.Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:(a)names and members of their immediate farm household;(b)owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;(c)location and area of the land they work;(d)crops planted; and(e)their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties.Further, onNovember 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP.Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency.In this case, there was none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy.The objective of the State is that: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The decision datedAugust 30, 2000of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.

Milestone Farms, Petitioner v. Office of the President, Respondent

Facts:

Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock

On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect. In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.

Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.

Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO. DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.

DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation

The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary. Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC. MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone

RTC reversed the decision of MCTC

CA ruled in favor of Milestone

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE:Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP

Ruling:

No.

When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.

As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

LUZ FARMS,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,respondent.

Facts:

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his MemorandumISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith. RULING: The petition is impressed with merit.The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the ConstitutionIt is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

NAPOLEON