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SUFRiME HEAIXtUARTSiS A T.T.TED POMESS EOROFE PARIS, FRANCE

120 Copy No,

SHAPE/231/56 28 September 1956 AG 1223/2 PP SUBJECT : Force Posture Allied Conmand Europe 1960/62 _ _ 1 BSf f t TO : The Chairman - J JlV ,

The Starding Group ^ ' Washington 25, D. C.

- W v Some months ago, I directed the SHAPE staff to examine the next

decade in terms of probable military developments and to determine the changes in our defensive posture which might be required thereby. My intention had been to transmit the overall results late in 1957 but, in view of the great Interest expressed by the Council, a study for the period 1960/62 was accelerated so that it could be sent to you at the earliest possible moment0 The study from which we have derived the

Command Europe 1960/62 " is, there-fare, neither as complete nocr as precise as would result from the normal planning cycle. However, I have confidence in the broad conclusions of the paper.

Our 1960/62 study has added weight to our belief in the soundness of the principles of MC48. However, the magnitude of the nuclear capability assumed in this study and the extremely broad organizational base over which this capabilitywould be distributed represents far more than normal growth of previousJy accepted plans or principles. It constitutes, in fact, a new concept. , It provides a force pattern to moot a fundamental characteristic of a war of that period, i.e., the fact that large scale employment of nuclear weapons would campr«6« the «satire scope of a general War0 Under such conditions, we do not visualise organised military operations for more than thirty days. Thic precise dictates an increased emphasis on forces-in-being capable of participating in the decisive initial phase. Similarly, there is an clcitionel requirement for deployment in depth,' dispersion, and ijieXXDJ,xxcy to Keep pace viuu aevcxu^màûus Xu weapons systems.

*

A major reduction In our estimate of the forces which would be capable of providing a reasonable defense-of NATO Europe was made possible by the adoption, in December 1954» of MG48, which, for the first time, envisaged the integration of a full nuclear capability Into all forces. The period 1960/62 will witness no developments which provide any military basis for further reductions of comparable magni-tude In the over-all scale of forces currently planned. However, the military structure presented In the attached study does provide for certain significant reductions in pre sent, f or ce s, particularly in air force units, heavy anti-aircraft artillery wilts, and reserve ground and naval forces.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that, although these new force goals have been derived as a resultTof studies of military considerations, we have worked within the broad parameters established Iy the economic facts of NATO life«; These force goals, therefore, do not represent ideal requirements. They represent, rather, a level of forces established on a minima adequate basis. It will «be recognized that any statement of foroes required for- the future accomplishment of a military mission can never be exact. However, it is my conviction

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that Any appreciable short-fall IA achieving the goale set forth in this study might involve dangerous risks to our security«

In accordance vith your directions, I am sending oopies of this study to the several Ministries of Defense. I shall now proceed vith the preparation of supporting studies which will serve as a basis for the detailed Implementation measures required.

n

1 Inclosure: SHAPE 23Q, 28 Sep 1956

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DTSTFLIBUTIQM I

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SHAPE/230/56 1 2 0 IG I223/2 PP Copy Ho

FCRCE PXTERE ALLIED COMMAKD EUSOFE

1960/62

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FORCE POSTURE ALLIED COMMAND EOROPE 1960/62

28 SeptanOMr 1956 PART I

ATM

1« Ibe aim is to evolve the force posture for Allied Command Europe for the period 1960/62*

TIME PgiIOD CONSIDERED

2. Factors which may affect the force posture during the next ten years have been considered. This has been done so that the posture evolved for 1960/62 vill be suited to the requirements of the future.

FUTURE TRENDS

3. FrcM i960 onwards both sides vill have adequate stockpiles of nuclear weapons. From now until 1966 a family of missiles of all types, with ranges up to a maximum of 1,500 miles, will be integra-ted progressively into the forces of both sides. Missiles of greater ranges, although well advanced in development, and operational in limited numbers, will not have become a primary means of delivery. The adaption of missiles and of other delivery means to carry nu-clear warheads will increase the firepower of ground, naval and air m sapon sys U Û Ë U Ô .

4. Nuclear sufficiency and the consequent threat of widespread destruction in general war will discourage the Soviets from resorting to such a war. This will apply only zo long as the Allies are fully prepared lo fight a general war, a factor of primary importance in determining the force structure.

Soviet reluctance to embark on a general war, or to initiate overt acts which may lead to a general war, will probably result In the choice of "cold war" as a preferred Soviet tactic. Allied Com-mand Europe can assist cold war operations by providing an environ-ment of military security and confidence. In particular, the main-tenance of adequate forces-in-being, properly positioned and fully trained, would constitute convincing evidence that any local aggres-sion on a scale less than that likely to lead to general war, can be Contained, and hence would be unprofitable. The broad problem of meeting possible economic and political pressures must rest with individual governments.

THE THREAT

6. Should a war develop It will probably start with a massive nuclear offensive by the Soviets« This attack will be quickly moun-ted and primarily designed to neutralize the Allied nuclear delivery systems« There will almost certainly be accompanying land, sea and air campaigns to isolate and seize NATO Europe, The obvious need for the Soviets tc achieve a high degree of surprise will limit the forces which can be employed at the outset; In particular it will limit the pre-D-Day deployment of submarines and of ground forces« The Soviet threat is described in more detail at Enclosure to PART I« GStSuAL WAR I» 1,11 U f I. ^ t

7« In case of general war, the defense of Allied Cnwmand

This document consists of 34 pages.

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Europe vith numerically inferior fCroesp depends 3qpon an immediate exploitation of our nuclear Capaoility9 whether or not the Scnriets employ atomic weapons. The AUies9 in the initial and decisive phase, would need to conduct a series of over-lapping mutually dependent campaigns of maximum intensity and minimum duration«, The objective of these campaigns would be to defend the populations9 territoriesp vital sea areas and offensive striking power of KATO7 whilst launch-ing an lmaedlate nuclear retaliatory campaign designed to neutralize the opponent's military capability, initially through the destruc-tion of his nuclear delivery systems« The need to achieve the maxi-mai concentration of nuclear attack, along with its associated devastationj> would compress major organised armed conflict in a period not likely to exceed one month * the first few days of which would be characterized Iy the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange» Additioiially9 the destruction resulting fron large scale use of nuclear weapons by both sides would seriously impede subsequent mobilization, troop movements, communications and logistical support* Thm second and final phase of the war would involve reorganization, rehabilitation and limited operations leading to a termination of hostilities« The character and duration ef these operations cannot be predicted with any assurance of accuracy0 lbider these condi-tions the war divides itself logically into two main phases g

a« Phase I 3 a period of violent organized fighting, not exceeding 30 days 9 the first few days of which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuelear exchange«

he Phase Ils a period of WOTganlsaticss P re supply and Iimi ed military opérations leading to a conclus ion of ths var0 A large scale invasion of the Soviet lblom is not envisaged« SAGEIR'S MISSION

S9 Tom essential elements of SAGEIEIS mission ares

a* To assist in deterring aggression«

bo To assist in maintaining confidence in Europe by provid-ing an environnent of military Seeurlty0

c. To defend the peoples and territories of MTO Europep if t stacked* REQUIREMEtTES

9« The primary task of the military forces of Allied Gonraand Europe is to deter aggression« The military establishment accom-plishes this task lay providing visible evidence of the Allied capa-bility and manifest readiness to employ all measures, lnduling nuclear weapons t to resist aggression. The deterrent »ast be such that the Sorrlets will always believe that resort to general war will certainly lead to the destruction of the DSSR0 It must also oon-vinoe the Soviets that tftey cannot attain even limited objectives*

10. Should the deterrent fall, the task is to deffcad KATO Europe To aeeoaplish this task In a situation where an aggressor would have the Initiative, SAGEIRfS forcms most be able s

a« To obtain minim» possible waning of attack and to sustain the least possible damage tram the Initial VXmim

b. To apply Immediately offensiv» nuclear firepower to destroy the <mmj within the sphere of responsibility of Allied Conmamd Europe.

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quickly land, sea and air

11« Five mutually supporting elements and conditions are essen-tial. They are:

a. Strategic and tactical intelligence systems capable of detecting impending attack.

b. An active and passive air defense, including associa-ted early warning systems.

c. Muclear strike forces, at a high state of readiness.

I. A strong SHIELD of land, sea and air forces*

e. Ready reserves which could be deployed quickly to reinforce an area.

12. The SHIELD of land, sea and air forces must be in such strength and so deployed that there can be no hope In an aggressor tS mind of limited gain or favorable compromise. The SHIELD must raise the stakes to a point where an aggressor, who decides to attack, faces the devastating consequences of total nuclear war« In the event of war, the SHIELD, in conjunction with other forces, must defend the peoples and territories of SATO Europe; to do so under conditions of surprise attack the SHIELD forces must adopt a forward strategy.

13. SAGE®'s ready reserves are required in order to add flexi-bility and depth to his SHIELD forces. First echelon reserve forces stationed in Europe must be capable of rapid mobilization and imme-diate deployment thereafter as re infer cements to M-Day units. (Second echelon forces, though used during first phase operations primarily to assist In litems.! ssoirriiy and control, must be prepared to undertake limited offensive and clean-up operations during the second phase.) In addition, those forces stationed in peacetime outside the continent of Europe, but assigned or earmarked for SACEUR, constitute a strategic reserve which should be capable of earliest practicable deployment to any selected sector of SACEUR's area.

14. Certain selected units of SACEUR*s forces should be trained for the additional mission of acting as a highly mobile reserve force, capable of immediate movement in peace or war to any threatened area within SACEUR's responsibility. The deterrent value of such a force would be enhanced if its components can be drawn froci two or more different national forces.

FORCB POSTURE

15. In developing the pattern of NATO military strength for general war in this period, priority was given to forces in being, capable of effectively contributing to success in the initial phase. Other forces are required to contribute to subsequent operations, but, in view of the importance of the initial phase, and taking into account the limited resources which it is anticipated will be available, the build-up of these forces must be given a lower priority. '

16« The force posture for 1960/62, required by the concept outlined above, is in PART II of this paper. The principal chan-ges required for this period are listed bslovj

c. To deploy and to manoeuvre power to meet any form of enemy attack«

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SHAPE/230/56 AG 1223/2 PP

a. Land J'oroes (1) A deployment forward, and In depth of D-Day forces,

particularly in Central Europe,

(2) Increased atomic integration and flexibility 0 (3) The elimination of 3rd echelon forces»

b# Air Forces (Including Air Defense Forces)

(1) An increased nuclear strike capability.

(2) A reduction of conventional strike forces*

(3) A large reduction in heavy anti-aircraft units*

(4) A substantial augmentation of the surface-to-air missile component of the air defense for ce s ü

(5) A slight increase in the all-weather interceptor force«

(6) A considerable reduction in interceptor day fighters *

(7) A large augmentation of reconnaissance forces,

c. Naval Forces

(1) An increase in D-Day availability of striking forces0

(2) A redeployment of D-Day forces to assure adequate control of front-line areas«

(3) A reduction in numbers of certain types of ships.

(4) Elimination of most categories of post-D-Day forces0 TRANSITION

17o The force posture recommended for the period 1960/62 is an entity composed of many mutually supporting elements,, The adoption of this posture must, therefore, be carefully phased over the inter-vening years so that major weaknesses are avoided during transition* This phasing is described in PART IIo

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THE SOVIET THREAT

196C/62

ASSUMPTIONS

I0 The following assessment of the military forces which can he directed against Allied Command Europe in general rar is based on two assumptions:

a« That the requirement to achieve strategic surprise would preclude any general Soviet mobilization measures prior to D-Day0

b» That Allied employment of high yield nuclear weapons would disrupt mobilization and would greatly curtail any major post D-Day movement of forces from the USSR to forward areas« This applies particularly to land and tactical air force» and to a lesser degree to naval forces.

NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE

2» The Soviets will possess sufficient warheads and delivery systems to attack all worthwhile targets in NATO with nuclear weapon»»

U-Xtu um,u

3o The ground forces which immediately threaten Allied Command Europe are;

a« Against Northern Norway: 5 Soviet Divisions >1 Against Central Europe:

(including Denmark)

Aorftinet Southern Europe

Against Allied Command Europef generally:

2k Soviet Divisions 9 Czech Divisions

11 Soviet Divisions (7 in Tranecaucasuè) 9 Hungarian Divisions 9 Bulgarian Divisions

8 Soviet Airborne Divisions

e« All the above divisions will have been trained for tactical nuclear warfare. The Soviet divisions will be equipped with and supported by nuclear ground delivery systems comparable in type and scale to those of the Allies; additionally, 50$ of the Satellite divisions will be so con-stituted»

f« Forces listed in a. through d. above are those which may be permanently stationed in forward areas during the period under consideration. This is at best an estimate and the force totala could be affected by the following con-siderations:

(1) Even under a surprise assumption, If the Soviets hare predetermined well in advance their tise of attack, forward forces could

Enclosure to PART I

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be augmented under the guise of national manoeuvres, rotation of replacement classes, or civil disturbances in Satellite areas»

(2) After the outbreak of hostilities readied units, moving rapidly by night, could pro-vide additional reinforcement before the effects of the atomic attack have been fully realisedo

(3) Under this hypothesis we must consider that the Soviets have the capability of threa-tening Allied Command Europe in the early stages of hostilities with a total of ten divisions against Northern Command,, 65 against Central Command» bO against Southern Command«

AIR Uo In order to gain surprise, in the 1960/62 period, the

USSR would probably choose to initiate hostilities with air and missile attacks without pre-deployment«, Steps to put their air and missile forces in readiness would be so limited that it is unlikely they would provide any positive indi-cation of intention to attack at a particular time« It is, therefore, quite probable that the first warning of Soviet attack might be enemy offensive action« The Soviets will rely on manned bomber aircraft supplemented by missiles, both with a nuclear capability, but the ratio of manned bomber-aircraft to missiles will be decreasing towards the end of the period« In 1962 the Soviets can be expected to have a strategic jet bomber force of 500 heavy and 700 medium bombera* a proportion of which will have supersonic capabili-ties* In Western USSR and the Satellite area the Soviets will have sosae 2 5 0 light Jet bombers, seme 1,150 jet ground attack aircraft and approximately 8,500 jet fighters, a pro-portion uf which will be capable of s p ^ d a of Mach 2 05 and ckititudes in the order of 70,000 fee to It is estimated that about 5>000 of these fighters will remain in the USSR in a defensive role* The remaining 3*500 fighters are capable of deployment forward as tactical strike fighters. A large proportion of these latter aircraft will perform a fighter bombers capable of carrying tactical atomic weapons, conven-tional bombs or rockets« A proportion will also be capable of speeds of Hach 2*5» In addition, the European Satellites will have some 5»500 aircraft of which some 65¾ will be jet fighters and jet light bomberso

SEA 5« a» The Soviet capability for extensive submarine

operations will constitute the principal Soviet Naval threat0 The magnitude of the threat is reflected in the following estimates, which aggregate 10-20 times the underwater force available to Germany in 1939:

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Long Range (many capable of firing 500-800 missiles or torpedoes with nuclear warheads)

È

Medium Hange 100-200

Short Range 100 bo A limited number of the long range submarines

could be deployed before D-Day without jeopardizing Surprise0

C0 A proportion of the Soviet forcep which might include the whole of the short range fleet9 will be employed in Allied Command Europe waters both in the nuclear offensive and in ant1-shipping roles0

do The timely dispersal of the submarine fleet would prevent its mass destruction by the Allied nuclear counter«» offensive and it would cciio Litute a continuing menace until the conclusion of the war0

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FCECE FROSTDRE ALLIED COMMAMD EUROPE

1960/62

PART I I

This part consists of three Enclosuress

Enclosure 1. Land Force Fosture9 Allied Coimmiad Europe

Appendia A0 Pattern of Land Forces Allied Command Europe

Appendix B- Transition Period 1957-1962 Central Command

Enclosure 2» Air Farce Posture, Allied Command Europe

Appendix Aa Aircraft, Missile and Anti-

Air craft Requirements

Appendix B- Breakdown of Offensive Forces

Enclosure 3• Naval Force Posture, Allied Command Europe

Appendix Aa Pattern of Naval Forces Allied Command Europe Appendix B« Table of Comparison

Forces are NATO and National

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LAND FORCE POSTURE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

1960/62

ROLE OF LAND FORCES

10 Land Forces ii* Allied Command Europe will perform the following functions^

a® They constitute a major component of the SHIELDo Deployed in physical contact with the Iron Curtain, land forces provide concrete evidence of the capability and deter-mination to resist aggression0 In this deterrent role they prevent any quick seizure of territory, thus confronting the enemy with the necessity of attacking in strength for even limited Objectives0 Furthermore, the timely manoeuvre of land foreSS9 particularly of reserves, provides an oppor-tunity to exert an effect in countering an enemy threat or restoring a deteriorating political situation©

Iio In the event of aggression, the SHIELD forces must play a vital role in the Allied Strategy0 It is their assignment to defend NATO Europe against enemy surface attack. The success of this mission is essential, not only to prevent the overrunning of NATO territory and defend the populace, but also to secure the base area from which will be projected the offensive effort* The land force role is particularly vitnl in the opening stages of conflict while facing numeri-cally superior enemy land fcrces and during the period the Allies are delivering the nmclear counter-offensive® Land forces must be capable of destroying enemy forces in eloee < combato

ASSUMPTIONS

Sy 1562, a proportion of larid force divisions in Allied Command Europe will De equipped with an organic nuclear Capability0

3o By 1962 missiles of greater range, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, will have replaced to a signifi-cant degree, artillery weapons which are at present used by Armies and Corps«

PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THE POSTURE OF LAND FORCES

ho Land forces must be capable of participating in a full scale nuclear war, should it come* This calls for ground forces in sufficient strength to defend the territory of Allied Conrand Europe in conjunction with other forceso These ground forces should be composed ofs

ao M-Day forces deployed close to the Iron Curtain to act as a Screen0 Their main tasks will be:

(1) To provide information of attack.

(2) To call down nuclear fire on the enemy at the earliest possible moment»

Enclosure 1 to PART II

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SHAPE/230/56 AO 1223/2 PP C O S M I C T O P S E C R E T

b. M-Day forces deployed ind^pth, rhich must:

(1) Be capable of fighting for a period of 30 days, with limited control from higher ] echelons and with limited logistic support« 1

(2) Contain a high proportion of organic nuclear delivery systems. This parti-cularly applies to ground forces deployed in the critical land approaches.

(3) Be able to detect the enemy and destroy him by organic and on call nuclear firepower®

(U) Be able to destroy in close quarter fighting such enemy which survive nuclear attacko

c» First echelon forces capable of completing a rapid mobilization and reaching deployment areas in a minimum of time. These forces will provide Subordinate Commanders with reserves to reinforce or sustainfbrward units.

d. Second echelon forces. Certain NATO nations possess partially trained post M-Day forces (other than 1st echelon forces) to fulfill national tasks. A proportion of these are earmarked for SACEUR and are referred to as 2nd echelon forceso In war they will mainly be needed during Phase I on the home front« In Phase II, however, they will be required by SACEUR to take part in subsequent operations*»

e« Strategic Reservestt National forces maintained outside the Continent of Europe should be earmarked for use in Allied Command Europe as a strategic reserve.

• «

5. Mobility

Oround forces will be employed in a defensive role* The shock Irsji Dreviouslv developed ^ r i «r»rre seels manoeuvring of ground forces will be, in the main, provided by nuclear firepower« However, mobility remains necessary and in particular is required for the following tasks:

a« To deploy to battle stations« b® To manoeuvre and protect organic nuclear delivery

systems* c* To carry out limited exploitation«

d. To provide flexibility of reserves«

LAND FORCE STRUCTURE

6« A pattern of land forces for the period 1960/62 Is at Appendix A«

7« Northern CMimand The planned ground force levels of Northern Command

must be attained and maintained* This envisages reorgani-zation and redeployment of existing forces« In addition, a nuclear capability must be integrated into the land forces in

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Northern Norway and into the Danish land forces which guard the entrances to the Baltic® These measures are essential if the tasks assigned to Northern Command are to be carried out«

8 0 Central Command

a* Deployment«, The strength anä deployment of the land forces of Central Command in particular, are affected by two new factors. Under previous concepts, such as the 1957 Capabilities Plan, 2nd echelon forces were employed to give depth to the battle position0 However, it is estimated Uiat rnalor organized land fighting would not exceed 30 days; it isunlikely, therefore, that 2nd echelon forces will play any significant part in such operations» Consequently, if the majority of M-Day forces remain deployed forward on or near the Iran Curtain, there will be no depth to the position« By 1962 the ground forces will be equipped with more organic nuclear delivery systems; this will increase both firepower and range. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that Corps frontages can be increased.

There is, therefore, a requirement and a capabil-ity to redeploy M-Day forces to give depth to the concept of forward strategy in Central Command.

O9 This need for redeployment and other factors previously discussed call for the following:

(1; Screen Forces. (M-Day), Screen forces on the scale cf one ox1 more light regiments per Corps depending on the terrain. They will be at immediate x-eadiness and under Corps command.

(2) Muin Position. (M-Day). The 30 divisions planned for Central Command should be

j vary in strength between two and four j divisions and will be organized on a

national basis. Forward Corps should be at six hours notice to reach battle positions.

(3) Reserves« (M-Day and Post M-Day). CINCENTfS reserves in general war will initially have to come from his assigned M-Day forces. The eight Ist echelon divisions will pro-vide additional reserves, when mobilized, but may be limited in effectiveness due to enemy bombardment. They should, however, be capable of reinforcing or sustaining forward units. The 2nd echelon divisions will be required to assist in maintaining control on the home front during the period of maximum damage« In Phase II they will provide the main source of reinforcement.

c. Command Arrangements.

(1) Extensive studies of the command organiza-tion in the Center made over the past three or four years have indicated that it should be possible to reduce the organization by

i • i I i * c

Corps will

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one echelon of command. The Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe is deemed capable of exercising control of four armies and other

1 assigned forces« This indicated that Array Group Headquarters could be eliminated,

(2) 1 The headquarters of the four NATO armies will need integrated staffs on which all contribut-ing nationalities should be represented®

9» Southern Command a« The planned ground force levels of Southern Command

are the minimum to provide an effective deterrent and to fight, if necessary <> These force levels must be attained and maintain-ed« In addition, a nuclear capability must be integrated into the land forces of Greece, Italy and Turkey to strengthen the defenses of the land approaches to these countries. In Turkey this capability is required both on the Eastern front and for the forces guarding the entrance to the Black Sea.

bo The adoption of a forward strategy and adequate pre-stocking should considerably reduce the requirement for convoy operations in the Mediterranean in the early days.

IO0 Transition Period Appendix B gives, in broad Outline9 transition to the

I96O/62 force Structure0 It only deals with Central Commandsy as the major changes are involved in that r-egion0

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C O S V I C T O P S B C B E T

PATTgES OF UMP PDRCES ALLIED OOIgtASD KOBOf

1960/68

!• The figures given are for major unit® only* Balaneed combat and service support elements Tfill be required*

NORTH

No change from current recommended planning goals, itfiioh aret i

a* Dertmaric

Divisions

b* Norway

Division 0¾

M-Cby 3/3*

Ist Eoh

4/3

,1?

2

Brigade Groups 1-1/3 3-4/3 * Includes 2 W v HQ's*

2nd Eeh

I-2/3

15^ ;

4-2/¾

V-\

Tr s

CENTER

-3* To conpare order of magnitude, Arrnu&l RevieTr planning goals for 1956 and 1958 are sho-wn* (Forces outside the Continent are shown under SACEUR»s Strategic Reserve)*

M-Day Divisions Ist Echelon 2nd Echelon

1 T n c n QU/ OÜ 195b 1958 1960/63 1956 1956 1960/62

IG-Vfe1*28-5/3 30 ft Tn-o /1 rv A f ^ G / O

ïfc Does not reflect the German contribution of 12 Divisions*

SOUTH OA 'i

4* No change from current recommended planning goals, which are» \

-Day Divs Ist Eoh 2nd Boh

a« Greece

b* Italy

c* Turkey

4-1/¾ 2

5-4/¾ 5-1/2

i/b (us)*

10-0/¾ S

6-12/¾ 3

0

z

*This refers to the SfiTAF -which id 11 be required until Italian forces possess an effective integrated atomic capability.

Appendix A to Enclosure 1

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SAGEOR'S STRATEGIC RESERVE

NATO nations outside the continent of Europe vill maintain for-

ces to fulfill purely national Coomiiteents4 In event of general

war against the Soviet Blocj the most important assignment for these

foroes would undoubtedly be as a stratégie reserve for Western

Europe» Therefore, forces on the general pattern of those visualized

in the Annual Review planning goals for 1958 (5-2/3 divisions) should

be earmarked for augmentation of SACEUR' s forces in event of general

var0

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SEÀPE/230/56 AG I233/2 PP

TRANSITION PERIOD 1957-1968

CENTRAL OOHMAND • • • — • — • f

1957

a« Riasa in 5 German divisions (not combat effective)*

1958

a» Hiase in 6 German Divisions (not combat effective)»

b* Start reorganization into four NATO Armi es o

Initiate headquarters realignment*

1959

a« Phase in 1 German Division*

b* All German land force contribution becomes combat effective«

Complete headquarters realignment*

d* Continue reorganization into four NATO Armies*

1960

a* Complete reorganization into four NATO Amies*

b* Complete all measures necessary to arrive at 1960/196£ Force Posture*

Appendix 0 to Enclosure 1

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AIH FOBCB POSTURE ALLIED CCMKAKD BUHOPB ( Inoludlng Air Defense Forces)

1960/63

HOLE OF AIR FORCES

!• The air forces of Allied Command Europe -will perform the following f mie ti ons Î

a* In time of peace, carry out the deterrent role by maintaining the capability of launching an immediate and massive nuclear counteroffen-sive*

bo Should the deterrent fail, the primary role of the air forces is to latuich a nuclear count eroffensive against the enemy air and missile delivery capability within SACEUR's zone of responsibility* This offensive must be conducted at maximum intensity* Air forces must also conduct inter-diction operations and operations in support of ground and naval forces*

c* Establish an air defense, in conjunction with appropriate sur-face forces, to include early warning and alert systems*

ASSUMPTIONS

2o ITuclear DgIivery Capability* Fjrom 19ou uuwaiù It will bö poôolblô for all KATO strike aircraft to have the capability of delivering nuclear weapons® Howevers the delivery of nuclear -weapons will not be the primary task of all such aircraft*

3« Advent of Missiles* By i960 it will be possible to provide NATO nations th both s ur fa ce -to -surf a oe and surface-to-air missiles in sub-^ J-^ l_J . 1 LJ J_* ^ _ C w i a V A « j. '^ucvJ l V i T - - '

4® Air Defense* Warning and control systems, as presently planned, will be fully operative by 1960 and planned deployment of air forces com-pleted* Heavy anti-aircraft artillery will be relatively ineffective* All interceptor day fighters and all-weather fighters will be equipped with air-to-air missiles*

5* Advanced Warning* Through 1962, it is unlikely that the Allies will have the capability of achieving advanced warning of an impending attack* Hence, the first intimation of aggression may oome from the heavy penetration of our early warning screen or the crossing of a frontier*

6o Lightweight Strike Fighter* The Lightweight Strike Fighter will be operationally successful and adopted for use by appropriate NATO countries*

7» Air Transport* Since air transport is primarily a national re-sponsibility, this paper does not consider transport aircraft*

PRINCJFLES AHD FACTORS AFFECTIKG THE POSTURE CP AIR FORCTS

6* In the absence cf specific planning data, it has been necessary to calculate force requirements based on certain general principles* Therefore, these calculations represent more au order of magnitude than an exact determination of requirements*

Enclosure 2 to Part II

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SHAPE/23 O/öS AG 1223/3 PP

9® NATO1S deterrent strategy and the defense of Allied Coraraand Europe require the exploitation of nuclear destructive power through a swift and massive counteroffensive* The air forces of this command play an important part in ttiis strategy» Thus any Allied air force structure in the forsee-able future must strongly emphasize offensive striking power and must include a proper balance of missiles and aircraft* Unfortunately» geography dictates that such a force must be located in areas not far removed from the enemy air threat* Hence our whole pattern of forces must take into account our ability to absorb an initial surprise attack and strike back effectively«

10» The strength of the offensive forces remaining after an initial surprise attack will be directly proportional to the success of our defen-sive measures* The superiority of offensive weapons of the present and near future tends to militate against the perfection of active air defense» For the foreseeable future, it appears that passive defense measures will have a value for a given amount of resources equal to that obtainable through active defense measures* There are, however, certain factors com-mon to both* One of these is the early warning and control network vdth its associated communications* Such elements, which will have a continuing application to the future, should receive first priority in any proportion-ment of air defense effort* The continuing improvement of offensive weapons also «nphasizes the importance of introducing surface-to-air missiles into the air defense system as quickly as practicable*

11* It is not presently possible to establish any replacement ratio to apply to such changes as the introduction of missiles and the phasing down of manned aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, or to the increase in nuclear delivery units and reduction of non-nuclear delivery units* Nevertheless, there can be some compensating reductions in forces within the bounds of good judgment in recognition of the increasing; numbers and improving quality of surface-to-air missiles and nuclear delivery systems*

12* The time period 1960/62 is particularly critical for air forces. Ine introduction of intermediate range missiles in quantity urould have a revolutionary effect on the character of the air forces- Similarly* if steady progress is made in the surfaoe-to-air program, as anticipated, it may well be advisable to establish during this period a missile defense system requiring large numbers of surface-to-air missile units* Dependence on interceptor day fighters will vary inversely with the reliability and availability of missiles* The time of changeover cannot be pinpointed exactly* The force tabs shown at Appendices A and B are an indication of the trend in this transitory period*

METHODOLOGY

13* Counteroffensive strike forces were calculated based on a prob-able enemy target system which included counter-air, interdiction and surface support targets* Necessary allowances were made for losses to enemy action and other operational factors* Particular emphasis was placed on the capability to destroy the enemy nuclear delivery system in the first critical days of hostilities* This dictated a requirement for a large num-

. ber of sorties in the first attacks* This fact, coupled with the suita-bility to missile attack of a large number of oounter-air targets, estab-lished the need for a balance between manned aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles* The creation of a tend c capable air forces NATO-wide permits an expansion in atomic delivery forces and a reduction in the total number of bomber forces*

TIMINC-

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S5AE5/230/56 AG I223 /2 PP

14« Reconnaissance forces are augnenteâ to give adequate coverage for the increased weapons delivery forces, particularly missiles, and to provide necessary surveillance cf anticipated new targets*

15* Air defense requirements necessitate an increase in the number of surface-to-air missiles* Since adequate information on operational charac-teristics and availabilities has been provided only on "first family* su rf a ce -to -ai r missiles, i*e*. NIKE I? these weapons arô programmed only in limited quantities for point defense, training and morale purposes as differentiated from the establishment of a large-scale fixed system* Com-pensating reductions are made in day fighters and heavy anti-aircraft artil-lery* A slight increase is made in all-weather fighters to achieve a proper proportion Ydth the day fighter forces, thus providing a balanced round-the-clock air defense system* Likewise, a slight increase is made in light anti-aircraft to provide protection against aircraft attacking at low altitude*

16* Forces are shown by areas and represent pure area requirements as differentiated from national allocations* For example, offensive atomic forces in the South could be provided entirely by indigenous nations or portions of this force could be furnished by the United States* *

SUBSEQUENT STUDIES

17* The command organization required for air force units in 1960/62 should be the subject of a separate study* The most vital organizational questions still requiring investigation areï

a* Strengthening of the centralized control ^rooodure for theater-wide air activities*

b* Closer integration of Allied air defense operations*

A* Thq «oWtnftnd relationship of air defense and attack forces®.

d* The ordination appropriate air ana ground operations if a level of command is abolished in ground forces, as proposed in Enclosure I to Part II.

e* Coordination of close support operations*

18* Air transport for M T O forces, as differentiated from national requirements, needs further investigation*

SUMMARY

19* The net effect of the program set forth In this study is to reduce greatly non-atomic fighter bomber units as a result of the large increase in air atomic delivery capability, both missile and aircraft, throughout the theater* Air defense will enter the necessary transition period toward increasing reliance on the defensive missile* The large out in day fighter strength is acceptable to assist in this change* Obsolete heavy anti-aircraft is drastically reduced* The air defense structure will have better balance, but the number of missiles introduced should be recognized as providing necessary training and a psychological boost rather than any significant Improvement in the ability to defend against air attack* The introduction of the lightweight fighter in the Center and South improves air-ground sup-port, particularly in the early days of hostilities when other aircraft are engaged elsewhere* The 5056 Increase in reconnaissance will provide the necessary surveillance in an era in which accurate and timely target infor-mation and damage assessment will be vital.

XS C O S K I C T O P s R a B ß T

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SHAPS/SS 0/5 6 AG I223/2 PP

20* ït would have been desirable to add more forces in the North if the area could support them- To overcome a portion of this problem three squadrons of aircraft are allocated to Center and earmarked for movement to North in the event of hostilities* In the South, additional support and reconnaissance forces are provided to compensate for the disadvantages of distance and terrain in that region* The number of atomic capable squadrons in the South includes equivalent of four squadrons provided by two US carriers*

CONCLUSIONS

21* The size and composition of air forces, and array units associated with air defense, in 1960/62 should be as indicated in Appendix A# (Force goals for 1956 and 1958 are shown for comparison*) Appendix B is a more detailed explanation of offensive forces*

19

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SHAPE/230)/56 AO 1223/2

C O S M I C T O P S ;E C R S T

AIBCRAJTfl MISSILE, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT RKQl" IBEMBN TS FOR 1960/62 (By Squadrons except as noted)

OFFfiNS HVE

FORCBS

DKTKNSI7¾

FORCES

Light Bomber ^Bigbter Bomber Surface to Surface JÜ8SÜÄS Hecoim

Interceptor Day Fighters

. NORTH z

QJ

12

« J 8

Q)

1Q,

19^0-1962

8 (b)

GSNTSB

S r 26

All-Weather Fighter Sorfaoe to/Q\ H r MlaalleB Hesry &A Artillery Lieht AA Artillery

3.

10

19

10

11* L

16

El

56

jSL T

•25 loi 67 Cd)

18

(So)

o i l 62 Ii) 33

( 1 )

i*6

75

total goala for 1956 and 1958 reajectively, for notea aee next page.

Appendix A to lneloaure 2. C O S M I C T O P

20

S X C R X T

•' SOUTH ' TOTALS CHAWXS * 1960-1962

fô6 S 8 1960-1962 1956

(a) \ l f 1960-1962

1956 f . ?

0 0 26 25

61 (b)

30 (•>

26 (b)

96 111 95 (b)

-2? -1*1

6 0 0 3 3 5 10 /7 /5

>»0 (J)

5 6 W 13 27 37 55

/28 /18

>»0 (J)

12 15 (k)

12 69 80 55 -11* -25

36 Oo )

3 6 (B)

9 21* kz 50 /26 / 8

2® 0 0 i* 0) 6 tn B /27 /21

33 33 6 73 bn 89 bn

16 bn -57 -73

80^ it6 37 1(6 112 bn 126 bn

ll* bn

f32 /18

960/62 and Aircraft SfuaArons & •40

SSL CBAS&XS

Gaided Misailea /26

Aatl-Alreraft -25 -55

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3HÂPEJ/230/56 - AG 1223/2 PP C O S M I C :T O P S E C R E T

NOTES: (a)

(b (e (4 ( •

(f (g

(h (i (J (k (1 (» (» (o

All force goals are 1955 AR goals for 1956 and 1958 e*pt Gciraoiy. No Gentian Air Poroe units are Included in th* 1956 colunn since none will be operational this year» Gerroan 195Sfcrce goals of 48 squadrons, as oited in 1956 AR repty? included In 1958 columns throughout ö Forces of Portugal are not JludetU No distinction between Fighter Bombers and Light Bcmtxs because of Increased capability of T/B In 1960/62. I/B squadrons include: 13 UK; 7 US (3d AF - 3, 12thP - 3, rotational - l); 5 Franoe. F/B squadrons include: 21 US (3d AF - 6, 12th AP - l| rotational - 3)? 6 Belgium; 10 France; 6 Nettorlands; 24- Germany, F/B squadrons inolude: 8 US (rotational - 4, équivaut in naval air aboard 2 CVA1S - 4); 8 Italy; 6 Greece; 12 Turkey»

r Reconnaissance squadrons include: 1 Belgium; 3 Fraift; 1 Netherlands; 8 US; 7 UK; 9 Gertnany .

»

Includes one tactical reconnaissance squadron which uld dej loy to Northein Command in wartime. Reconnaissance squadrons include: 3 Italy; 1 Greecj 2 Turkey» IDF squadrons include: 12 Belgium; 8 Canada; 6 Fnce; 6 Netherlands; 5 US; 19 UK; 6 Germany»

s Incluies one IDF squadron idiioh would deploy 1;o Nortlrn CommwcL in wartime«

i IDP squadrons inolude: 6 Italy; 3 Greece; 6 Turkf. AWC squadrons include: 3 Belgium; 4 Canada; 3 Fraje; 3 Netherlands; 7 US; 4 UK; 9 Germany.

i

Includes one AWX squadron which would deploy to Nortorrx Command in wartime. i AWX squadrons Include: 3 Italy; 1 Greeoe; 2 Turkey As and when the availability of surface-to-air mlssta» of significantly improved characteristics can be determined, the requirements shown in these tables are susceptible o considerable upward revision«

21

C O S M I î T O P S E C R E T

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CO Î25 O P3 P «t! O CO PP v '

4 O cd SO CTv v.- ' r—î &q P4 &q O CO ^

CO W M-r O (¾ O O

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pq

Al O en CM cvi -— c-\ SCO CVl !< -H W rVi CO 5¾

W o e s SvS »-H CO pel t-i

O 3 0

O W 53 O § * S < « CO O w

O4 g O W O S g «

« M ^ 8-< u: a: e> o hH H1H ^ p h EH W W W 3 t—t »-H m t~l et CO

CVÎ

CVJ

O pq S « > -SÎ i

O O

! î *

t"

a cd rf CM -ad Ä O CO CO O £ O e«

EH O »H •-i ' S « V A

O PQ < Ot O

O CVi

N O

CM

rv

« »

CVJ

o

CVl

O W

3

EH W P4 o W CO

Ok O CVJ CM

C\ O

J

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Ä CO O O

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C O S M I C T O P S E C R E T

NAVAL FORCE PPS TORE ALLIED COMMAND ECRQPE 1960/62

SHAFE/230/56 AG I223/2 PP

ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES

1. Naval forces in Allied Command Etrope vill perform the fol* loving functions:

a. Naval forces constitute the sea component of the SHIELD. As a deterrent they can, vithout violating national boundaries, demon-strate a capability and determination to resist in full force.

b. Naval forces form a protective barrier denying the use of the seas to the enemy and exploiting them to the maximum advantage of the Allies.

c. In the event of aggression they make a significant con-tribution to the nuclear counter offensive vith special emphasis against Soviet naval potential, particularly submarines and their base They co-operate vith land and air forces to control the Baltic and Black Sea Straits. They conduct operations in support of the land/air battle.

d. Throughout the period of htetilities they conduct an offensive against the Soviet submarine threat in order to protect maritime lines of communication and prevent the Isolation of NATO Europe fron Its source of supply of men, food and material. AQqTTMPTTOWC

2. a. In Allied navies urface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles vill have started to replace guns and aircraft by i960 m a progress vill continue in the following four or five years.

b. Nuclear propulsion vill be in Iisiteu operational use by i960 and could be veil advanced vithin the following four or five years.

c. Improved submarine detection systems are being developed and progress vill continue during the 196o/ô2 era. PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THE POSTURE

3. The majority of naval forces must be D-Day forces since as a part of the deterrent they are required in peace to demonstrate their capability of dominating the sea areas of Allied Command Europe and, should the deterrent fail, they must exploit this domination in var.

*

Naval forces are specifically required to carry out the folloving broad tasks as part of the deterrent:

a. To maintain strike forces at a high degree of readiness.

b. To provide a maritime shield (as defined In Part I, paragraphs 11(d) and 12).

c. To augment other Allied vaming means*

Enclosure 3 to Part II 23

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5. As the war at sea is one warr the posture of the navies of Allied Command Europe cannot be divorced from that of the navies of the other Supreme Comiaanders0 This is accentuated, for example, in the North and the Baltic where the operations of SACLANT, CIN-CHAN and the naval operations of SACEUR are interdépendant.

6. Modern naval weapons and weapon systems favor offensive over defensive operations» Future naval force postures should reflect this development.

FORCE STRUCTURE

7. Striking Forces. These offensive forces are required for:

a» The nuclear counteroffensive with special emphasis against Soviet naval potential, particularly submarines and their bases.

bo Support of the land/air battle«

c. Interdiction of Soviet sea IDC0 8. In the light of modern weapon developments these are tasks

in which the Navies will be able to play an increasingly important part. In this period a strike fleet will be required on each of tine southern and northern flanks,, With the introduction of multi-jet seaplanes and missiles launched from submarines and surface ships, additional striking methods will become available. Strik-ing forces are essential for the early stages of war and are still required in the later stages of war to assist in the nuclear domina-tion of dUoe enemy»

9* Shield Forces. These consist of High Seas Patrol Forces and Local Forces.

a. High Seas Patrol Forces. These will be required fors

(1) Anti-sufc&arine operations. Forces will be required for these tasks in all phases 6

(2) Protection of vital troop and supply movements.

(3) The subsequent task of the safe passage of re-supply shipping.

bo Local Forces.

(1) As front line forces these are required on D-Day to play their part In joint operations required for control of the Turkiah and Baltic Straits and for the control of the Arctic passage between North Cape and Spitzbergen and the adjacent coastal water s o These areas must be held by local forces in association with modern detection equipment and controlled minefields, which must be ready in peaoetime for instant activation. These forces vill remain essential throughout the war.

(2) Local forces are further required for the main-tenance of LOC in the approaches to terminals behind the front line, particularly In the mine

24

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SHAPE/230/56 AG 1223/2 PP

countermeasure role. This will be primarily a requirement of the later stages of a war,

10« AmphibjLowe Fsrcss0 Thcsa are a part of the Strategic Re-serve e

NAVAL .FORCE PATTHtM

Ilo A detailed pattern of Naval forces is at Appendix A*

12. This pattern has been developed on a practical basis. No attempt has been made to indicate ideal forces f since these lie outside practicabilities«

13o In general, the numbers of ships shown can only be considered as an indication of trend and order of magnitude. Exact numbers should be the subject of further studies taking Into account detailed knowledge of improved technical developments (especially in A/S killing and detection capability) and of national contributions and capabilities. These numbers have been developed without reference to SACLANT or CINCHAN,

STRimG FORCES L4„ Time has not permitted the development of a clear rela-

tionship between the requirements for land-based aircraft and the tasks which confront the naval air element in the Mediterranean. Determination of a proper balance will require additional study. Pending the examination, we are not altering our recommendation to phase forward two attack carriers p previously recommended in SHAPE comments on the UC reply to A R Q 0

Front Line0 Shield forces must be deployed to front line areas iü peacetime where they increase their deterrent value and where, in war, they can be fully effective at H-Hour0

16a Anti-Suliaarine0 Future developments will enable detection of enemy submarines to be made at longer ranges, but the requirement for destruction remains0 There will be a reduction in the require-ment in the first days of war to escort large scale movements by sea; however, positive control of the seas is required from the start, and a strong anti-submarine force is Vital0

17o Crtiisers, The present Southern Cruiser Force (other than those with the Strike Fleet) will not be required In Allied Command Europe for their present anti-aircraft role and can be deployed else-where.

13» Submarines. There will be a phased change from the exis-ting requirement for conventional submarines to submarines with increased offensive capability ready and deployed for employment on D-Dey.

19* Light Fleet Carriers. The Light Fleet Carriers have been shown as withdrawn from their A/S role in Allied ConmaDd Europe for similar use elsewhere, but cannot be phased out until the maritime air requirement has been met and sutmarine detection equipment improved,,

20, Mine Warfarea There is a reduction in importance of of-fensive mine warfare and a reduction in the mine clearance tasks in the early stages. In the interest of economy, certain of these

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U U b M X U T O P S E C R E T

SHAPE/230/56 AG 1223/2 PP I

forces could be reserve units. The conséquent reduction in mine clearance forces, however, cannot be implemented until a policy of pooling these forces has been implemented*

21. Rhine River Patrol. No forces have been provided for the Rhine Rifor Patrol.

26 . c.

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PATTERN OF NAVAL FORCES ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE — I ^ ^ ^ M — H ^ - — P — • • — • — ^ —• » — * — — IW

J ^ /" - / r — iyou/o2

1« The pattern of naval forces includes national as well as NATO forces. ThiB ie not an effort to pre-judge the assignment or disposition of national elements but since all unite will be contributing to the united war effort the force must be viewed as a whole to establish a rational pattern« It is expected that certain forces can perform both a NATO and a national function«,

2. In view of the long and uncertain time necessary to introduce major changes in ships and naval equipment, it has been necessary to relate the figures in the general period 1960/62 onwards©

3. Forces have been divided geographically between the North and South and no consideration has been givento Command arrangements*

M ouïr Vf. V « « i , All forces arc indicated as D-Dav forces_ certain forces, minesweepers as an example, could be reserve cl^ments.

5* A table of comparisons is at Appendix B

6* SOUTH as S fTPTy j m Foncss

( 1 ) Southern Strike Fleet

h Attack Carriers 1 ASW Carrier 5 Cruisers

32 Destroyer Type 2 Picket Submarines

10 Missile Submarines

Tasks

Initial: -Deterrent. -The nuclear counter-offensive against Soviet naval and amphibious poten-t i a l

-Further support of the land/air battle.

Subsequent: -Maintain nuclear domination©

-Support of the land areas during the re-supply and reorgani-zation phase.

-The submarines could be redeployed with the Shield Forces if necessary.

b. SHIELD FORCES (High Seas Patrol and Local Forces)

O ) Submarine Force

15 Attack Submarines Initial: In the Black Sea: - Deterrent.

Appendix A to Enclosure 3

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Tasks

-Interdiction of enemy LOC.

-Attack on enemy naval and amphi-bious forces®

Subsequent: -Assist in control of Black Sea«

5 Submarines Initial: In ttie Mediterranean: -Anti-submarine role.

(2) Anti-submarine Porce

Shore Installations:

Subsequent: -Anti-submarine role

Improved detection equipment

-Gibraltar Straits and approaches,,

-Sicilian Straitse -Otranto Straits, -Black Sea»

Aircraft?

70 Maritime A/C (C3 IIOTtI

-A/S search and A + + « Ijf-<3 oa JV •

( 3 )

(4)

o/^xps:

5k Anti-submarine ships

Local Porces (Turkish Straits)

10 Destroyer Types 22 Past Patrol Boats

12 Patrol Craft 8 Minelayers

Defenses

Local Forces (Other Area s)

Patrol Craft

•To form A/S patrol groups«

-Deterrent0 •Attacks on Soviet naval and amphi-bious force« threa-tening the Turkish Straits* •Deterrent» •To assist in the control of the Turkish Straits0

•Control of inshore waters»

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(5) Mine Countcrmcasure Force

8 Minesweepers

100 Minesweepers

Ta sk 8

Initial: -To keep a mine cleared passage through the Sicilian Straits for the Striking Fleet.

Subsequent: -As required for general mine clear-ing. in the Mediter-ranean. These forces must be available for de-ployment to any area in the South.

These minesweepers augmented by local mine-watching organizations and additional mine countermeasures equipment.

(6) Underway Replenishment Groups will be required whose number cannot be assessed at this stage.

7. NORTH a« STRIKING FORCES

(1) Northern Strike Fleet Tasks

2 Attack Carriers 2 Cruisers

16 Destroyer Type 16 Missile Submarines 2 Picket Submarines

T —. -S J- - - "1 j.lix oiai -Deterrent. -The nuclear counter-offensive against Soviet naval and amphibious poten-tial.

-Support of the land/ air battle.

Subsequent: -Maintain Allied nuclear domination.

-Support of the land areas during Phase II.

-The submarines could be redeployed with the Shield Forces if necessary.

NOTE: Forces required for these SACEUR tasks are provided by SACLANT.

b. SHIELD FORCES (High Seas PatrOl and Local Forces)

(1 ) Submarine Force

16 Attack Submarines Initial: (10 Baltic -Deterrent.

6 North) -Interdiction of enetry LOC .

C O S M I C T O P S E C R K T 29

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Tasks

(2) Anti-submarine Force

2k Anti-submarine ships

3k Maritime A/C (Northern waters)

10 Naval A/C (Baltic)

(3) Local Forces

2k Destroyer- Type 60 Fast Patrol Boats 50 Naval A/C (Strikes

and recces.)

10 Patrol Craft 1 Fast Minelayer 8 Minelayers

Fixed underwater defenses*

6 Patrol Craft 6 Minelayers

Fixed underwater defenses«

(U) Mine Countermeasure Forces

55 Minesweepers

-Attack on enemy naval and amphi-bious forces«

-Assist in the con-trol of the gap between North Cape and Spitzbergen«

Subsequent: -Assist in control of the Northern European Waters0

~A/S role«

-A/S search attack©

and

-Deterrent« •Attacks on naval and amphibious forces« -Interdiction of Soviet LOC« •In the Baltic sup-port left flank Central Etirupe -Assist in control of Baltic Straits«

-Deterrent« -Defensive mining operations in Baltic Straits« -Surveillance of Baltic Straits«

-Defensive mining in N« Norway« •Surveillance of coastal waters in Northern Norway«

Initial: -Tc keep the Baltic Straits open«

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Tasks

Subsequent: -As required for general mine clear-ing (including Ger-man North Sea)o

These minesweepers augmented by local mine-watching organizations and additional mine c oun terme a sures equipme nt 0

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CCMPAHISQff ItBIg

FOKCES ARE NATO AND NATIONAL

- 1 TODAI B

1960/62 COMPARISON 1960/62 and

SOUTH HORTH TOTAL SOUTH NORTH TOTAL Today D-Cay

Today D/30

Attack Carriers

2 (4)

0 2 (4)

4 0 4 A 0

i-W Carriers 0 © 0 1 0 1 A A

Light Fleet Carriers

1 (3)

0 1 (3)

0 0 0 -1 -3

bruisers 11 (13)

0 11 (13)

5 0 5 -6 -8

Destroyer 46 (56)

15 (16)

61 (72)

42 24 66 /5 -6

A /c O V» « I 68

(105) 18 (48)

86 :i53) 54 24 78 -75

. . m 1 > • • •

Maritime A/C (Med & Baltic)

78 (96)

64 (64)

142 (160)

70 60 130 -12 -30

Maritime A/C Northern Waters

0 0 0 0 54 54 /54 /54'

Submarines 46 (49)

16 (19)

62 (68)

32 16 48 -U -£0

Fast Minelayers

0 (1)

0 0 (1)

0 0 0 -1

Coastal Minelagrers

8 (8)

10 (27)

18 (35)

8 14 22 A -13

MlnesweepOTS WO (136)

77 (106)

145 (242)

108 55 163 /18 -79

F.P.B. 15 (31) (79)

70 (110)

22 60 82 /12 -28

NOTES

1. Coliuin A figures show D(D/30) forces for end 1956 based on the AR(56) replies in conjunction with SGM 1-56* It includes:

a« The Gecrnan Naral Forces which will not be available as D-Dfly forces until i960.

b. Tbe total naval forces (i.e., SATO earmarked and National) of nations whose Naval unite vill be

32 Appendix B to Enclosure 3

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SHAPE/230/56 AO I223/2 PP

effectively present in AGE waters, e.g,, Greece, Italy, Denmark,

c. The NATO earmarked forces for the Mediterranean of nations sow of whose National Forces may be outside ACE waters, e.g., France, DK, ÜB.

2, It has not been possible to give figures for 1953, as com-plete figures for this year are not available.

3, Faroes for the Northern Strike Fleet are provided by SACLANT and have not been included in the Table,

4, No allowances have been made for refits or repairs 5« Direct comparisons between ool ans À and B are misleading

without taking combat effectiveness into account. Many ships in colimn A are fast becoming obsolescent, whereas a high degree of effectiveness is assumed for all ships in column B.

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