AFTER THE ELECTION - Home - AAPOR€¦ · its ongoing Afghan Futures series. Design and analysis by...
Transcript of AFTER THE ELECTION - Home - AAPOR€¦ · its ongoing Afghan Futures series. Design and analysis by...
AFGHANISTAN:AFTER THE ELECTION
Annual meeting of theAmerican Association for Public Opinion ResearchHollywood, Florida – May 16, 2015
Gary Langer andGregory Holyk
Matthew Warshaw
Jessica Beaird
BackgroundPre- and post-election national surveys by the Afghan Center forSocio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR-Surveys) as part ofits ongoing Afghan Futures series. Design and analysis by LangerResearch Associates and D3 Systems, Inc.
March 2014Pre-election Poll
November 2014Post-election Poll
April 2014AfghanistanPresidential
Election
June 2014Runoff –
Ghani/Abdullah
September 2014Ghani declaredwinner; strikespower-sharing
accordw/Abdullah
Methodology
oNationwide random sampleso2,643 and 2,051 face-to-face interviewsoConducted in Dari and PashtooAfghan adults 18 and olderoMargin of sampling error
oMarch 10-18 and Nov. 4-12, 2014
+/- 2.5 points for full samples +/- 4 points for pre-election survey’s sample of 1,190 likely voters
46%
45%
35%
32%
8%
11%
AfghanFuturessurvey
Final IECResults
Abdullah Ghani Rasul
Survey estimates closely matched the first-round outcome per the Afghan IndependentElection Commission, with 45/46 percent for Abdullah Abdullah, and 32/35 percent forAshraf Ghani.
Ethnic and regional divisions were by far the strongest individualpredictors of vote preferences.
Abdullah benefitted from higher Tajikturnout in the North, and Hazaras in theCentral region and Kabul.
Ghani was broadly backed by ethnicPashtuns in the South, as well as Uzbeks.
4%
13%
45%
38%Very easy
Somewhat easy
Somewhat difficult
Very difficult
Despite these divisions, a vast majority of Afghans said it would be very or somewhateasy for them to accept someone from an ethnic group other than their own aspresident.
71%said they wouldaccept Abdullah asthe legitimateleader ofAfghanistan.
76%said they wouldaccept Ghani asthe legitimateleader ofAfghanistan.
82%were confidentthe nextpresidentwould unite thecountry.
Post-Election Attitudes
Recap:• Abdullah and Ghani advanced to a runoff• Ghani prevailed; results were disputed• Power-sharing deal emerged: Ghani as president, Abdullah
in the new position of chief executive
44%
55%
Contrary to their expectations, fewer thanhalf of Afghans saw the election as fairand transparent.
March 2014
November 2014
87%
Yet a vast majority approved of thepower-sharing agreement.
Even among those who saw the runoff as fraudulent,
84%
approved of the power-sharing deal, indicating a willingness to tolerate improvisedmeasures in search of stability.
78%accepted Abdullahas the legitimatepresident.
84%accepted Ghanias the legitimatechief executive.
76%were satisfiedwith theoutcome.
Still, fewer were very satisfied with the outcome or expressed high levels of confidencein free elections.
14%
17%
6%
7%
50%
47%
29%
29%
Very/Somewhat unsatisfied Somewhat/Very satisfied
Not at all/Not so confident Somewhat/Very confident
SatisfactionwithElection Outcome
Confidence inFree Elections
48%
61%64%
73%
2013 2014
Afghans shared a growing sense of optimism after the election. Compared with 2013,more rated their overall living conditions positively and said Afghanistan was heading inthe right direction.
Compared with four years previous, Afghans were more likely to say they could afford fueland food and rated their ability to afford things and security from the Taliban positively.
47%
62%
44%
58%
39%
51%
31%
49%
2010 2014
Good security from TalibanGood ability to afford things
Can afford foodCan afford fuel
92%
4%
Current government Taliban
Nine in 10 Afghans continued toprefer the current government overthe Taliban.
12%
53%
United States Taliban
Most continued to blame the Talibanfor Afghanistan's violence.
Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, the majority of Afghans:
71%
60% 60%
Preferred a negotiatedsettlement vs. continued
fighting
Expressed willingness for Talibanmembers to join Afghan securityforces if they lay down their arms
Were unwilling to cedecontrol of some provinces to
the Taliban in a peace deal
Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, the majority of Afghans:
71%
60% 60%
Preferred a negotiatedsettlement vs. continued
fighting
Expressed willingness for Talibanmembers to join Afghan securityforces if they lay down their arms
Were unwilling to cedecontrol of some provinces to
the Taliban in a peace deal
Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, the majority of Afghans:
71%
60% 60%
Preferred a negotiatedsettlement vs. continued
fighting
Expressed willingness for Talibanmembers to join Afghan securityforces if they lay down their arms
Were unwilling to cedecontrol of some provinces to
the Taliban in a peace deal
Seventy-seven percent supported the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Manyfewer, 46 percent, said they would like to see additional U.S. forces in the country, withwide regional disparities.
52%
N
S
EW
62%
N
W E
S 27%W
S
E
N
39% 39% 37%
Jobs or other economicopportunities
Supply of electricity Support for agriculture
Problems remain. Well fewer than half rated the following positively:
73%
53%
2005 2014
In a discouraging result, the percentage of Afghans who see the cultivation of opiumpoppy as "unacceptable in all cases" has declined sharply.
Support for women's rights was substantial in most cases, but far from universal, andnot always strong.
18%
12%
7%
5%
33%
24%
20%
17%
11%
6%
28%
34%
33%
36%
28%
25%
20%
31%
40%
42%
57%
67%
Women traveling unescorted non-locally
Women traveling unescorted locally
Women holding office
Women holding jobs
Girls' education
Women voting
Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support
Generally, support for women’s rights was highest among urban women,followed by urban men, then by rural women, and sharply lower, in mostcases, among rural men.
of the country’spopulation livesin rural areas.
75%
In a result that’s challenging to Western sensibilities, substantialnumbers said they would accept circumscribed women’s rights inexchange for a settlement with the Taliban.
• Sixty-five percent would accept restrictions on women leaving the homeunescorted.
• Half or nearly half would accept bans on women working, holding politicaloffice, attending school and voting.
• Men and women expressed these views in essentially equal numbers.
Afghans who said civil society organizations were active in their area were more likelyto believe CSOs make things better in their country, compared with those who wereunaware of CSOs operating locally.
43%
45%
45%
50%
51%
53%
56%
57%
61%
25%
30%
30%
38%
45%
31%
46%
52%
34%Reducing corruption
Expanding girls' education
Expanding boys' education
Improving access to health services
Expanding women's rights
Improving election participation
Providing job training
Expanding rights of thehandicapped
Supporting agriculture
Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an
opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.
• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.
• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.
• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.
Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an
opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.
• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.
• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.
• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.
Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an
opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.
• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.
• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.
• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.
Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an
opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.
• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.
• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.
• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.
For moreinformation,please contact:
8300 Greensboro Dr.Suite 450McLean, VA 22102(703) 388-2450www.d3systems.com
D3 Systems, Inc.
Matthew Warshaw
Managing [email protected]
Thank you!For more information:
Gary LangerPresidentLanger Research AssociatesNew York, New [email protected]
Matthew WarshawManaging DirectorACSOR-SurveysAfghanistanmatthew.warshaw@acsor-surveys.com
Gregory HolykResearch AnalystLanger Research [email protected]
Jessica BeairdAssistant Research AnalystD3 Systems, Inc.McLean, [email protected]