AFTER ACTION REPORTSU.S. Marine Corps After Action Report for Operation ORANGE, Quang Nam Province, April 1966

After Action Report for Operation PORTSEA, March 20, 1967

After Action Report from Coast Guard Cutter POINT GRACE for engagement September 17, 1967

After Action Report for the Battle of Dak To December 7 1967

After Action Report for Operation CORONADO X, January 18 through February 12, 1968.

After Action Report, The Battle of Hue, 2-26 February 1968

After Action Report for 5th Special Forces Group April 27, 1968

Battle of Dong Ap Bia, AKA Hamburger Hill, Summary Report, 101st Airborne Division, May 1969

After Action Report for OPERATION HOLLY, December 1970

Combat After Action Report LAM SON 719, 1971

U.S. Marine Corps After Action Report for Operation ORANGE, Quang Nam Province, April 1966

After Action Report for Operation PORTSEA, March 20, 1967

After Action Report from Coast Guard Cutter POINT GRACE for engagement on September 17,1967

After Action Report for the Battle of Dak To December 7 1967

After Action Report for Operation CORONADO X, January 18 through February 12, 1968.

BACKGROUND OF OPERATION COVERED IN THE REPORT:

Just before the 1968 lunar new year (Tet) truce, the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division launchedriverine operations in the marshlands of the Mekong Delta under the code name CORONADO X. AnArmy-Navy mobile riverine force searched out the Viet Cong's main force and local battalions in acombination of riverine, search and destroy, patrolling, and interdiction operations. When the Viet Congviolated the temporary truce by attacking eight major cities in the delta, the mission of the mobile riverineforce was refocused toward crushing the Tet offensive. In Operation CORONADO X new equipment andtechniques had to be developed for tactical mobility and fire support in the delta area, where conventionaltechniques were only marginally effective. The terrain was, for the most part, inundated. Swamps, ricepaddies, irrigation ditches, rivers, and canals, while inhibiting the mobility of regular U.S. forces, had beenused to advantage by the enemy. The mobility achieved by the riverine and airmobile forces changed thissituation.

The Mekong Delta had been a target of the Viet Cong for many years. This important rice-producing areacovers about one-fourth of Vietnam but contains approximately one-half of the country's population. Mostof the people live in villages built along the banks of the 2,500 miles of interconnecting waterways. Sincethe limited network of roads often becomes impassable in the rainy season, the Viet Cong used thewaterways as their chief routes for transporting men and equipment. While the helicopter allowed theallied commander to move forces with little regard to terrain, the water lines of communication wereimportant to military operations and to the civilian economy. The Mobile Riverine Force was organized toprevent the enemy from using the waterways and to make the river system safe for the residents of thedelta.

A land base had to be created in the delta area to support the Mobile Riverine Force, because there waslittle land available that was suitable for bases, airfields, and artillery firing positions. At a point about forty-five miles south of Saigon the base was built, using dredges to pump soil from the My Tho River intoadjacent rice paddies. The camp, christened "Dong Tam," covered about 600 acres and provided housingand logistic facilities for the 9th Infantry Division headquarters, division support elements, and the MobileRiverine Force. The base also had a harbor large enough to handle an LST (landing ship, tank).

In addition to the land base, mobile floating bases, consisting of naval barracks ships and watercraft, wereused. The Navy elements of the Mobile Riverine Force were organized to provide an afloat base as wellas combat support and combat service support to the ground forces. A river support squadron suppliedbarracks, repair, salvage, and supply ships. A river assault squadron contained armored troop carriers, command and communication boats, monitors (the tank of the riverine force), and assault support patrolboats. Each river assault squadron was equipped to transport and support an infantry battalionconducting combat operations in the delta.

During CORONADO X, Colonel Bert A. David, commander of the 2d Brigade, controlled the 3d Battalion,47th Infantry; the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry; and 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery. Captain Robert S. Salzer,U.S. Navy, commanded the Navy elements supporting the 2d Brigade. The Mobile Riverine Force hadbeen conducting searches in the rice paddies of western Dinh Tuong Province when the Viet Conglaunched a devastating attack against the city of My Tho. At 1730 hours on 31 January, the 2d Brigadewas ordered to go to the relief of the city. When the order was received, elements of the 2d Brigade werelocated near Fire Support Bases ALABAMA, FLORIDA, and GEORGIA. Company B, 3d Battalion, 47thInfantry, moved to My Tho by helicopter, while other units of the 3d Battalions, 47th and 60th Infantry,boarded their armored troop carriers and moved south to the Mekong River. During night movementthrough narrow, uncharted, and shoal-ridden streams, the riverine force came under several attacks fromsmall arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire. The attacks were beaten off as barge-mounted artilleryfrom the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery, fired beehive rounds directly at both sides of the river. Accurate firefrom the Navy monitors and other watercraft raked the banks. The two battalions and supporting artilleryreached the Mekong River and joined up with the afloat base at 0220 hours on 1 February.

After a short period of resupply the Army and Navy elements steamed for My Tho. Company B, 3dBattalion, 47th Infantry, which had air-assaulted into My Tho earlier, secured the beach landing sites forthe battalion. The battalion beached at 1515 hours with three companies abreast and immediately beganto advance north through the west side of My Tho. Automatic weapon and mortar fire from the Navymonitors and from assault support patrol boats and the barge-mounted artillery were in support. The 3dBattalion, 60th Infantry, beached to the west of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, and also attacked to thenorth. The 47th Infantry's 3d Battalion became involved in fierce street fighting with elements of the 261st,263d, and 514th Viet Cong Battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Ivan C. Bland moved his companies slowly andeffectively, house to house and street by street. Additional artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gunshipswere called in to support the attacks. At the end of the day the two battalions made physical contact withthe enemy and prepared night defensive positions. The 47th's 3d Battalion had killed fifty-eight Viet Congand captured four, while losing two U.S. soldiers. The 60th's 3d Battalion killed twenty-six Viet Cong andsuffered none killed in action. By 2100 hours most of the fighting had ceased, and the enemy had begunto withdraw. The next morning, 2 February, the two battalions encircled My Tho in a combined operationwith Vietnamese units to sever the enemy's routes of escape. Only light resistance was encountered asthe battalions located several enemy soldiers killed in the previous day's battle. The number of Viet Congkilled by the 2d Brigade rose to 106.

For their heroic action in the battle of My Tho, ten soldiers of the 2d Brigade were awarded Silver Stars onthe spot by Major General George G. O'Connor, 9th Infantry Division commander. The Mobile RiverineForce was not allowed to rest on its laurels, however, as much work had yet to be done. The Viet Congwere retreating to the northwest. Intelligence indicated that the area around Cai Lay was the likely locationfor the Viet Cong reorganization. At 1200 hours on 2 February, the 2d Brigade loaded back onto itsarmored troop carriers. Company A, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, was transported to Dong Tam and air-assaulted to Cai Lay. The riverine force moved west to the Ba Rai River, where it turned north toward CaiLay. The 2d Brigade conducted search operations and blocked major rivers in order to frustrate enemyattempts to reorganize. Large food caches were discovered during search operations, but contact with theenemy was limited.

The next day, word was received that the Viet Cong were threatening to take over the city of Vinh Long,which had been hard hit. On 4 February, three Viet Cong battalions were still located south and west ofthe city. The 60th Infantry's 3d Battalion was moved by rivercraft to a suitable helicopter pickup zone nearCai Lay and, from there, was delivered by air assault to landing zones southwest of Vinh Long. The 3dBattalion of the 47th Infantry boarded armored troop carriers near Cai Lay and moved to beaches on theLong Ho River, southwest of Vinh Long. The battalion landed unopposed and established blockingpositions oriented north toward the city. Company A of the 47th Infantry's 3d Battalion and a battery ofartillery from the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery, were airlifted from Cai Lay to secure the Vinh Long airstrip.The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, moved to the east of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, thus completing ablockade across the southern section of Vinh Long.

In the relief of Vinh Long, the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hill, playedthe major role. The battalion came under small arms fire from a Viet Cong force shortly after landing.Companies A and E of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, called in artillery and moved slowly toward the VietCong positions. By late afternoon, Company E had killed seven Viet Cong and captured five weapons. At2030, however, the unit got into an all-night fight with a heavily armed Viet Cong company southeast ofthe city. Riverboats of the Mobile Riverine Force patrolled the waterways in the area to contain theenemy.

At dawn both battalions began search operations. The 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, located thirty-sevendead Viet Cong. Sweep operations continued throughout the day with limited enemy contact. About 1745hours the battalions boarded the armored troop carriers and moved by river into the Mekong Delta areaand on to the afloat base. The tired soldiers and sailors had had eight days and nights of continuousmovement and combat.

After a well-deserved night's rest, the riverine force resumed its pursuit of the elusive Viet Cong.Intelligence sources indicated -that the Viet Cong were now moving south and west to the Cai Cam River.

The 2d Brigade decided to deploy an "eagle float" down the river. This force was an infantry companywith supporting fire mounted in armored troop carriers. In conjunction with aircraft overhead, the unitconducted a reconnaissance in force along the Cai Cam, searching for signs of the enemy. When theenemy was sighted, the eagle float moved ashore to search out the Viet Cong. After the operation, thetroops quickly loaded back on the boats and got under way again. Shortly before noon the leadminesweepers of the small riverine element received automatic weapon, recoilless rifle, and rocket firefrom both banks of the Cai Cam. Company B, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, beached immediately on thewest side of the river and swept to the south. Finding no enemy troops, the company returned to the river.At midafternoon, both Companies B and E put ashore to search again for the Viet Cong. They came underenemy fire from rockets, rifle grenades, and 60-mm. mortars. Company B assaulted the Viet Congposition, killing five of the enemy, while armed helicopters, artillery, and the Navy riverboats provided firesupport. As the Viet Cong retreated, Company A joined the action. To assist in trapping the enemy, thebattalion commander asked Colonel David to send the 2d Brigade's ready-reaction force into the battlearea. Within minutes, the men of Company B, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, had boarded boats and were enroute to the Cai Cam River. The company arrived about 1900 hours and landed under the control ofColonel Hill. At dusk, night defensive positions were established by all units as the fighting came to astop. The eagle float, reinforced by the Mobile Riverine Force, had killed sixty-three of the enemy, whilelosing four U.S. soldiers. Twenty-seven weapons were captured along with medical supplies, ammunition,and documents. On the morning of 7 February Colonel David deployed the remainder of the 3d Battalion,47th Infantry, into the Cai Cam area. Both battalions searched the previous day's battlefield and movedsouthward to look for the fleeing enemy. During the day, seventeen retreating Viet Cong were killed andfive weapons were captured. Both battalions loaded onto armored troop carriers and returned to the afloatbase on the Mekong River.

During the period 29 January to 7 February, the Mobile Riverine Force had made three major relocations.The 2d Brigade was sent from western Dinh Tuong Province to relieve My Tho, to the north to secure CaiLay, and finally to the southwest to protect the city of Vinh Long. After moving by boat and helicopter thesoldiers of the 2d Brigade fought through city streets and through the muck and mire of the swamps tomeet the enemy. The quick response of the riverine force and the well- co-ordinated fire from Navyrivercraft, bargemounted artillery, tactical aircraft, and helicopter gunships turned the Viet Cong offensiveinto a disastrous defeat. The Mobile Riverine Force was again aboard the ships of their afloat base,awaiting orders for deployment in the Mekong Delta.

The 9th Infantry Division was highly successful in adapting unit organizations, equipment, and tactics tomeet the challenge of the delta's terrain and of the Viet Cong's ability to blend in with the people of thevillages. "Jitterbug and seal" operations were examples of the tactical innovations aimed atreconnaissance and encirclement of elusive enemy elements. Planning for these special maneuversstarted at division headquarters approximately one week before an operation. A series of targets wasselected and intelligence efforts were focused on these areas. Commanders at all levels immersedthemselves in the details of the intelligence process to insure a through understanding of enemymovements and patterns in their areas of operation. The day before a jitterbug and seal operation, thebattalion to perform the mission was briefed on the probable targets and assigned air cavalry andairmobile support. The brigade commander would not select the specific targets until the evening beforethe operation so that the latest intelligence could be used. He would then choose five to seven targets forthe jitterbug and seal operation. Tactical air strikes were planned in advance, and artillery was moved tocover the new targets. Orders were issued to the mission battalion, which in turn prepared two companiesfor the assault.

The next morning final co-ordination was completed and the mission was under way. At the first target, ahelicopter with an airborne personnel detector aboard swept the area at tree-top level. Cobra gunshipsorbited at 500 to 700 feet, looking for fleeing Viet Cong. Scout helicopters hovered above the area andsearched for bunkers, trails, or signs of movement. If the enemy's presence was suspected, riot controlagents were placed on the targets, and scout helicopter pilots, wearing protective masks, hovered theiraircraft near the ground, using the prop wash to spread the agent. If enemy bunkers were seen, theCobras made firing passes to make the Viet Cong expose themselves.

Meanwhile, the first lift of a rifle company was in the air ready for action. If enemy contact was made, thebattalion commander evaluated the target information and determined what size force to send into theobjective area. When light enemy resistance was indicated, only five troop helicopters would land. If alarge enemy force was met, the entire jitterbug force would assault the target. As the jitterbug forceattacked, successive helicopter lifts encircled, or sealed, the target. All available firepower was brought tobear. As soon as the battalion's contact began to show promise, the brigade commander assumed controland alerted one of his battalions to begin sealing in the Viet Cong. The encircled enemy force was thenpounded by artillery and air strikes. Canals and rivers were sealed off with concertina wire stretched fromone bank to the other. Hand grenades were thrown into streams every five or ten minutes to discourageescape

After several hours of bombardment, all fire was halted, and the Viet Cong were asked to surrender. Firingwas resumed after the brief pause if the enemy refused. If the enemy was located, a battalion couldconduct as many as five jitterbug and seal operations a day. If no contact with the enemy developed, thebattalion could search fifteen to eighteen targets a day. The 9th Infantry Division learned that whenbrigades performed the jitterbug and seal with skill, the ratio of enemy to friendly losses rose dramatically.

One of the problems encountered in the marshy areas of the Mekong Delta was finding suitable firingpositions for artillery pieces. The 9th Infantry Division solved the problem by mounting 105-mm. howitzerson landing craft and barges that could accompany the infantry. Both direct and indirect fire could bedelivered from these floating platforms. For indirect fire support, the landing craft, mechanized, was run upon a sloping bank and tied to stumps and trees. The barges mounted with artillery were secured against asteep bank in deeper water. In both cases, procedures governing the accuracy and direction of fire werethe same as on land. Direct fire was particularly valuable in providing security for riverine troopmovement. It was also often used to prepare intended landing sites for the floating infantry. Thesevariations provided the artillery with a significant extension of its capability in the delta.

Division commanders in Vietnam found the helicopter to be an effective instrument for deceiving theenemy. In an airmobile operation the commander was able to concentrate or disperse his forces quicklyfor tactical advantage. The same speed and flexibility was often applied in a feint to distract the enemyfrom the real airmobile objective or to lead him into a position favorable to the airmobile force. An enemyobserver was deceived when artillery preparations and air strikes were directed on possible landingzones, followed by the false landing of a flight of helicopters, which then quickly turned and flew to theactual objective. Sometimes the aircraft would touch down in a landing zone with the soldier-passengersclearly visible. As the helicopter lifted out of the landing zone, the soldiers would lie on the floor of thehelicopter giving the impression that the ground forces had unloaded.

The 9th Infantry Division used the helicopter to deceive the Viet Cong in many instances. When a jitterbugand seal operation was completed, helicopters would pick up the airmobile forces to either return them tobase or move them to a new target. During several operations a false pickup was staged, leaving aportion of the force in the area to conduct ambushes or patrols. The division also used false helicopterlandings to fix a Viet Cong force. To hold the Viet Cong in place, false landings were made alongprobable withdrawal routes to make the enemy feel that he was surrounded.

At about 0800 hours one morning, a 9th Infantry Division battalion had been conducting a reconnaissancein force when suddenly the men heard the unmistakable sound of rifle fire. Instinctively the point man hitthe ground and rolled for cover, but there was only silence. Just one shot had been fired. Somewhere outthere was a Viet Cong sniper. The point man surveyed the area; the only possible location for a sniperwas in a wood line about 700 meters in front of him. He summoned the radio operator and reported thesniper fire to his platoon leader. A short time later the report reached the battalion commander, whoimmediately deployed his own sniper team to the point man's location. With its optical equipment thesniper team began a search of the tree line. Finally, the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree 720meters away. While one team member judged the wind using the M49 spotting scope, the other man firedone shot, killing the Viet Cong sniper.

The use of the sniper was not new in Vietnam, but the systematic training and employment of an

aggressive, offensive sniper team -a carefully designed "weapon system"-was. A sniper was no longerjust the man in the rifle squad who carried the sniper rifle; he was the product of an established school.According to Major General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division: ". . . a two weekcourse was designed to train marksmen from each maneuver unit. Each student was armed with anaccurized M14 rifle with a sniper scope mounted. This weapon was retained by the individual when hecompleted the course and returned to his unit." The original sniper school in Vietnam was established atthe 9th Infantry Division in June 1968. The cadre consisted of one major and eight noncommissionedofficers from the Army marksmanship training unit at Fort Benning, Georgia. They had extensiveexp6rience in competitive shooting, and one was a practiced gunsmith familiar with the techniques fortuning the accuracy. of the M14. A training facility was constructed to accommodate thirty students. Thisfacility included a rifle range on which targets were located up to 900 yards away.

Students for the sniper program were selected from volunteers who had qualified as expert riflemen. Theywere well-motivated soldiers and, in some cases, had competitive marksmanship experience. The trainingwas so rigorous that only 50 percent of the students successfully completed the course. The initialequipment consisted of National Match Grade M14 rifles. These rifles were glass bedded into impregnatedstocks that were impervious to water. The rifles were carefully tuned to achieve a high degree of accuracy.Finally, the sniper used 7.62-mm. National Match Grade ammunition to further insure accurate firing. Theselection of the M14 as the sniper rifle to be used in Vietnam was not hastily made. In early 1967 anevaluation was conducted by the U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) to "determine theorganizational, doctrinal, and materiel requirements for sniper operations." This evaluation determined thatthe "accurized M14 was a suitable sniper rifle for Vietnam." Several telescope sights were also tested withvarious degrees of success. The best sight was an adjustable power telescope that incorporated a range-finding feature. The magnification ranged from three to nine power as desired by the man firing the gun.

The most successful use of the sniper was with ambush patrols. Snipers would either accompany aplatoon on an ambush or, when provided with a security element of five to eight men, establish their ownambush-sniper position. They were situated in many cases near known or suspected rice caches ortunnel entrances. Using such tactics, the sniper picked the time and place to engage the enemy, therebymaintaining the initiative. In addition, sniper teams were sometimes left behind to engage Viet Cong whowere following a moving unit. The team established positions that would allow long-range observationover the route that the unit had traveled. This technique was effective because the sniper could engagetargets as far away as 900 meters and because the Viet Cong tended to be lax about their cover atextreme ranges. Thus, the Viet Cong presented excellent targets. Snipers could also operate at night withthe help of "pink light," an infrared searchlight that illuminated an area for a person looking through astarlight scope. This method allowed the sniper to operate anytime of the day or night.

Sniper teams were used against Viet Cong tax collectors, who came from Cambodia to collect taxes fromfarmers. The stay-behind sniper teams, consisting of two snipers, a radio operator, and three PopularForce soldiers, were dropped off during mechanized infantry operations near the border. The teamsremained in position until dusk. According to the villagers in the area, the amount of enemy taxation wasgreatly reduced. Snipers were also used to prevent the enemy from re-entering areas that he commonlymined or roadblocked.

The effectiveness of the first graduates of the 9th Division's sniper school was immediately apparent. Theywere assigned to maneuver battalions on 7 November 1968 and made their first enemy kill on 10November. Through 10 March 1969 the 54 snipers of the 9th Infantry Division made 135 contacts with theenemy, which resulted in 211 confirmed enemy kills. Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, the division commander, commented, "The most effective single program we had was the sniper program." In 1968the 9th Infantry Division tested the first Army vehicle specifically designed to meet the combat needs ofmilitary units operating in the delta: the air cushion vehicle (ACV). The limited road nets, extensivewaterway systems, and seasonal flooding of land areas of the delta made an amphibious craft verydesirable.

The air cushion vehicle is a modified Bell Aerosystem commercial craft. It is thirty-nine feet long andsixteen feet high. The vehicle is supported by a cushion of high-volume, low-pressure compressed air

generated by a centrifugal lift fan. As the fan builds up air pressure in the cushion, the vehicle is lifted. It isalmost frictionless when on the air cushion, allowing easy propulsion up to a speed of seventy-five knots.The same engine that powers the lift fan also drives a nine-foot, three-blade propeller that makes the craftspeed over the delta terrain. To maintain enough air under the ACV for it to clear obstacles, flexiblerubber canvas skirts are hung from the edge of the vehicle to within a fraction of an inch off the ground.The vehicle can clear solid obstacles up to 31j feet high and rice paddy dikes, with sloping sides, up to 6feet high. The air cushion vehicle can force its way through grasses and small trees and navigate ditchesand canals.

The 9th Infantry Division tested the air cushion vehicle in combat operations against the Viet Cong in thesame delta region that was the scene for CORONADO X. In twenty offensive operations, the vehicletraveled over land, swamps, rivers, and the South China Sea at speeds up to seventy knots. The craftmounted machine guns and a high velocity grenade launcher and carried ten to twelve soldiers. During thetest, 43 Viet Cong were killed and 100 detained. Casualties of the, ACV units were two soldiers wounded.The craft also performed successfully in security missions and in transport of troops and cargo. The 9thInfantry Division concluded that the air cushion vehicle was suitable for combat operations in the deltaand recommended that more-vehicles be deployed to Vietnam.

By the end Of CORONADO X, the Mobile Riverine Force had again proved its value by moving rapidlyand efficiently through difficult terrain to relieve the cities of My Tho and Vinh Long and to pursue theenemy forces. This operation demonstrated many tactical and materiel innovations that were the result ofthe resourcefulness and originality of the 9th Infantry Division and supporting Navy elements. Mountingthe riverine artillery on barges and platforms substantially increased the effectiveness of the force. Suchfire support coupled with the mobility provided by the riverine craft, air cushion vehicles, and helicoptersmade the eagle float and the jitterbug and seal tactics possible. In addition, the mobility, firepower, andimaginative tactical concepts of the riverine forces seized the initiative from the enemy and vastlyimproved the security of the waterways for South Vietnamese citizens.

After Action Report, The Battle of Hue, 2-26 February 1968

BACKGROUND OF OPERATIONS COVERED IN THE REPORT:

Hue was the third largest city in South Vietnam. It was a hundred kilometers south of the demilitarized zone and ten kilometers west of the coast. The Huong or Perfume River, running from the southwest tothe coast, divides the populated area. The Citadel, a walled city of about three square kilometers andcomprising about two-thirds of the city, lies on the north bank, and the other third of the city lies on thesouth. A railroad bridge on the west and the Nguyen Hoang Bridge, over which Route 1 passes, connectthe two sections. The Citadel is surrounded by rivers on all four sides. It is further protected by a moatwhich encircles perhaps 75 percent of the interior city. The moat is reinforced by two massive stone walls.

Because of the widespread truce violations, the U.S. Military Assistance Command and the joint GeneralStaff of the Republic of Vietnam officially terminated the cease-fire on 30 January. In northern I Corps,Brigadier General Ngo Quang Troung, the commanding general of the 1st Vietnamese Army InfantryDivision, improved security measures and instituted a series of alerts which placed his units in a state of increased readiness. As a result, the division headquarters in the northeast comer of the Hue Citadel wason alert on 30 January. At 0340 hours, 31 January, the North Vietnamese initiated a closely co-ordinatedrocket, mortar, and ground assault against Hue. Attacking with seven to ten battalions.

Under concealment of low fog Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units were able to infiltrate the city of Hue with the help of accomplices inside. The troops quickly captured most of that portion of the city on thesouth bank of the Huong River and seized the greater part of the northern half including the ImperialCitadel. While the division staff of the 1st Vietnamese Army Division was on 100 percent alert at thedivision compound in the northeast corner of the Hue Citadel, only a skeleton staff of the U.S. AdvisoryTeam of the Vietnamese Army 1st Division was on duty at 1st Division Headquarters in the Citadel. Theremaining members were pinned down in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, compound insouthern Hue by the initial iet Cong and North Vietnamese assaults.

As daylight broke over the embattled city, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese had control of all but thenorthern corner of Hue. The red and blue banner with the gold star of the Viet Cong could be seen flying inthe Citadel flag tower. On 31 January, the mission of the marines was altered, giving the 1st VietnameseArmy Division, which was in an area on the north side of the river, responsibility for that area. While twobattalions of the 3d Vietnamese Army Regiment moved east along the northern bank of the Huong River,two Vietnamese Army Airborne Battalions and the Cavalry Troop fought their way into the 1st VietnameseDivision Headquarters compound in the northeast corner of the Citadel. On 1 February, the Vietnameseforces initiated offensive operations to clear the enemy from his entrenched positions inside the Citadel,and the marines opened operations to clear their area south of the river with particular attention tosecuring the landing craft ramp. The following day, the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, moved into theoperations area to seal off Hue City along the west and north.

During the early portion of the battle, the weather had been reasonably good. 2 February proved to be aturning point and conditions following that date became increasingly worse. The temperature fell into the50's, which is quite cool for that part of the country. The prevalent misty drizzle occasionally turned into acold drenching rain. As clouds closed in and heavy ground fog developed, it became difficult to use heavyfire support properly. Tactical air operations were severely limited and the majority of fire support missionsfell on the howitzer batteries and supporting naval gunfire. Although less restricted by the poor visibilitythan aircraft, the artillery still had to be used with even greater precision. Even then the forward groundobservers were occasionally required to radio corrections to firing batteries based on sound rather thansight.

During the period from 7 to 11 February the enemy units in and around the Citadel continued to offer stiffresistance. The 60 percent of the Citadel still in enemy hands included the west wall through which theNorth Vietnamese and Viet Cong were able to bring in reinforcements and additional supplies each night.The enemy was also using steel-bottomed boats to bring in supplies along the river.

The 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived on 2 February and was assigned the mission ofblocking the enemy approaches into the city from the north and west. The brigade had air assaulted into alanding zone about 10 kilometers northwest of Hue on Highway 1. They then worked their way south andeast towards Hue. The men were tiring, As one trooper put it early in the battle, "We had gotten less thansix hours sleep in the past 48 hours. We didn't have any water and the river water was too muddy todrink."

It was some time before the pressure was to let up on the men of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, of the 3dBrigade. On 4 February, the entire battalion conducted a daring night march through light mist and ankle-deep water towards high ground behind the enemy lines. At six the next morning, understandablyexhausted, the battalion mounted their hill objective overlooking a valley still six kilometers west of Hue.

On 5 February, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, established positions on the high ground giving themexcellent observation of the main enemy routes in and out of Hue. From that position, they were able tointerdict all daylight movement of the enemy by calling artillery down on the plains below. The battalionremained in this location, restricting and disrupting enemy movement until 9 February. During the sameperiod, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was conducting search operations along enemy routes west of thatarea, then controlled by the 2d of the 12th Cavalry. On 7 February, the 5th Battalion made contact withthe deeply entrenched enemy who had reoccupied the area from which the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry,had previously expelled them. Progress was halted by the stubborn resistance of the enemy at this point.The following day, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, tried again to breach the enemy's defense but washalted by heavy volumes of enemy automatic weapons and mortar fire. On 9 February, 5th Battalionremained in its position as a holding force to contain the enemy while the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, lefttheir location on the high ground and attacked northward toward their sister battalion. Enemy resistancestiffened as the battalion entered the village of Thong Bon Tri. Fighting continued throughout the day, andthe infantry slowly moved northward.

As the fighting raged in the cities and towns and along the rice paddies and rivers in I Corps Tactical Zone,General Creighton W. Abrams, deputy commander of the Military Assistance Command, and GeneralCushman conferred on 8 February in preparation for a conference between General Westmoreland andGeneral Cushman on 9 February. The result was the concurrent movement of the two battalions of the101st Airborne Division into I Corps, one by air to Phu Bai to join the Marine Task Force X-RAY operatingin the southern part of Thua Thien Province, the other by sea to Da Nang. The second battalion wastasked to secure the U.S. 35th Engineer Battalion as it moved north repairing Highway I from Da Nang toPhu Bai.

The South Vietnamese also increased their commitment to the recapture of Hue. Two battalions reinforcedwith the Vietnamese Army Cavalry Troop, 1st Division Reconnaissance Company, and the elite BlackPanther Company succeeded in securing the airfield at Hue and then deployed south of the divisionheadquarters in the Citadel. The following day, the remaining troops of the 4th Battalion and the 9thAirborne Battalion were airlifted into the city from Dong Ha and Quang Tri.

Meanwhile, the 1st Air Cavalry battalions remained in their positions through 11 and 12 February, blockingenemy routes and disrupting all visible movement by liberal use of artillery and airstrikes. On 12 February,the 5th Battalion again attacked the well-fortified enemy. By nightfall, there had been no substantialchange in the opposing forces' positions. The cavalry battalions remained in their general locations until 19 February, conducting aggressive probes of the enemy positions and blocking the enemy's movement.

The 3d Brigade had been reinforced with the 2d Battalion, 501st Airborne, which began actively patrollingthe vicinity on 19 February. Also on 19 February, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was relieved from its basedefense mission at Camp Evans and was deployed south to the area of operations on 20 February. The3d Brigade, controlling four battalions by 20 February, continued to search north and south of the initialcontact area and prepared to attack eastward towards Hue the next day. According to the brigade's plan,the two 7th Cavalry battalions were to push into the area of enemy resistance at Thon Que Chu, the 2dBattalion, 501st Airborne, would advance in the center while the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, wouldadvance northward with two companies held as brigade reserve.

During the night the four battalions moved into their attack positions and at the break of dawn on 21February began their attack. The advance continued, with contact becoming increasingly heavy as theenemy contested every foot of ground. Air strikes, naval gunfire, artillery, and helicopter gunships helpedoverwhelm the stubborn enemy and permitted the advancing infantry to maintain steady momentum asthey pushed the North Vietnamese back. Before darkness, the battalions had all reached their objectivesand were within five kilometers of Hue. That night the battalions went into defensive perimeters, poised tocontinue the attack. On 22 February, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, remained in the battle area to searchout by-passed pockets of enemy resistance while the other three battalions pushed their attack eastwardto a point approximately two and a half kilometers from Hue. Heavy resistance was encountered in theafternoon but the battalions forced the stubbornly fighting North Vietnamese eastward as they continuedtheir advance. Again on 23 February, the 3d Brigade pressed its attack and moved astride the enemy'savenues of escape from Hue. Throughout the day, enemy forces continued their stubborn resistance withmortars, rockets, and heavy automatic weapons fire. The attack was continued on 24 February against thedesperate but weakening enemy forces.

The marines had been conducting clearing operations throughout southeast Hue. Marine elements, aftersecuring the area around the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, compound had fanned out east andwest along the southern bank of the river. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, moved west then south,destroying bridges over the Phu Cam to prevent the enemy from using them as a means to enter the area.Although additional sweeps were conducted south of Hue, on 10 February, the area south of the river wasdeclared secure. The marines then concentrated on the area north of the river.

On 12 February the marines displaced the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, across the river by helicopters andLCU's. This battalion relieved the 1st Vietnamese Airborne Task Force in the southeastern section of theCitadel. At the same time, two battalions of Vietnamese marines moved into the southwest corner of theCitadel with the mission to sweep east. The buildup of friendly forces in the walled city added pressure onthe enemy, who in turn doubled his efforts to accomplish his own mission. From 13 to 22 February thebattle swayed back and forth as the U.S. Marines' Vietnamese marines, and Vietnamese Army 1stDivision bore down on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong within Hue. Ground artillery and U.S. navalgunfire were used in heavy measure to support the U.S. and Vietnamese combat force efforts to drive theenemy out of well-entrenched positions within the city.

During the period 17-22 February, additional pressure was brought to bear against the enemy. The 3dBrigade, 1st Cavalry, continued to press in from the west. On 19 February, the commanding general ofthe 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-RAY was given responsibility for co-ordination of all fire support inthe city. Two days later, the 1st Cavalry Division's area of operation was extended south to the HuongRiver and east to the western wall of the Citadel. As the Cavalry moved to fill this area, they effectively cutoff the remaining major enemy supply route and precipitated a rapid deterioration of the enemy's strength.

During the night of 23-24 February, the 2d Battalion, 3d Vietnamese Regiment, executed a surprise nightattack westward along the wall in the southeastern section of the Citadel. The enemy was knocked offbalance by the attack but once it began, he fought savagely. The South Vietnamese persisted and neverlost the momentum their surprise action had given them. During the night they forced the NorthVietnamese to pull back. Included in the ground regained that night was the plot upon which stood theCitadel flag pole. At 0500 on the 24th, the yellow and red flag of South Vietnam replaced the Viet Congbanner which had flown from the flag pole for twenty-five days.

At 0500 the next morning, following a thorough artillery preparation, the final enemy position was overrun.With the loss of this last toehold in the southwest corner of the Citadel, the remnants of the ten battalionenemy force that had attacked and seized the city either fled or became casualties. The Citadel wassecure, and the battle of Hue was officially over.

During the relief of the siege of Hue, the forward headquarters of the Military Assistance Command,Vietnam, considered directing the commanding general of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to establish aforward command post in the city of Hue, co-located with the embattled headquarters of General Troung,commanding general of the 1st Vietnam Army Division. The objective was to establish within the city a

major U.S. headquarters with sufficient command and control, air mobility, and artillery resources tocoordinate and apply the forces necessary to break the siege. Brigadier General Oscar E. Davis, theassistant division commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, was designated as the Hue co-ordinator for theforward headquarters and co-located with General Troung. General Davis was to assess the situation andrecommend directly to General Abrams resources needed to recapture the Citadel. General Davis'srecommendations to divert certain troops to critical areas, to co-ordinate air and artillery support, and toaccelerate supply procedures were decisive. Within 72 hours of his arrival at General Troung's headquarters, the siege of Hue was lifted.

The recapture of Hue was a particularly bitter fight. The battle had formed with four U.S. Army battalions,three U.S. Marine Corps battalions, and eleven Vietnamese battalions on one side and ten NorthVietnamese and Viet Cong battalions on the other. It involved house-to-house fighting similar to that inEurope a quarter of a century before. There was extensive damage to the city where some 116,000 civilians became homeless. It was an expensive battle in terms of human life. The North Vietnamese andViet Cong lost 5,000 soldiers within the city and an additional 3,000 in the surrounding clashes. Anextremely harsh price was the loss of life among the civilian population. This loss was the direct result of asystematic selection process followed by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the 26 days theyoccupied the city. In the wake of the offensive 5,800 civilians were dead or missing. More than 2,800 ofthese persons were found in single or mass graves during the months following the attack. Many of thesevictims were chosen because of their positions and loyalty to the Saigon government.

As the battle for Hue developed, it became rapidly apparent to commanders on the scene that the 3dBrigade of the 1st Cavalry Division had taken on an unusually large enemy force north and west of thecity. Numerous documents captured during the action indicated the presence of elements of threeunexpected North Vietnamese Army regiments and several local units of regimental size. The profusion ofvarying documents revealed that the enemy was using this portion of Quang Tri Province as a stagingarea for actions in Hue. In the last days of the battle, prisoners were captured representing the 6th NorthVietnamese Army Regiment, the 24th Regiment of the 304th North Vietnamese Division, the 29th Regiment of the 325C North Vietnamese Division, and the 99th Regiment of the 324B North VietnameseDivision. Interrogation disclosed that the latter three units had begun moving into the area between 11and 20 February to reinforce the weakening local forces. What was surprising was that each of theseregiments came from one of the enemy divisions located around Khe Sanh or other demilitarized zoneareas. Their presence in the vicinity of Hue had been previously unsuspected. The aggressive actions ofthe 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division had seriously disrupted the enemy plans not only in Hue itself,but quite naturally in those other areas which supplied reinforcing units

After Action Report for 5th Special Forces Group April 27, 1968

Battle of Dong Ap Bia, AKA Hamburger Hill, Summary Report, 101st Airborne Division, May 1969

BACKGROUND OF OPERATION COVERED IN THE REPORT:

On 11 May 1969, a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division climbing Hill 937 found the 28th NorthVietnamese Regiment waiting for it. The struggle for "Hamburger Hill" raged for ten days and became oneof the war's fiercest and most controversial battles. Entrenched in tiers of fortified bunkers with well-prepared fields of fire, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces withstood repeated attempts to dislodgethem. Supported by intense artillery and air strikes, Americans made a slow, tortuous climb, fighting handto hand. By the time Hill 937 was taken, three Army battalions and an ARVN regiment had beencommitted to the battle. Victory, however, was ambiguous as well as costly; the hill itself had no strategicor tactical importance and was abandoned soon after its capture. Critics charged that the battle wastedAmerican lives and exemplified the irrelevance of U.S. tactics in Vietnam. Defending the operation, thecommander of the 101st acknowledged that the hill's only significance was that the enemy occupied it."My mission," he said, "was to destroy enemy forces and installations. We found the enemy on Hill 937,and that is where we fought them."

5. The offect?voness with wl~ich f&e power md maneuver WTC conbhd is shown by the 1.0 to 1 onemy to friendly kill ratio thaL was achieved

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY

C+ Oil 12 Flay the 3-IL87th contliratcd th&.r psh along the rough, can*picd rzLdgesD By 0909 they made heavy contact tith a well discQl.ined force cs%hated at two cDmpatics dug in about 200 meters to their front, They meuvercd agr.ti&, the force and !&l.led 3 WA. The batta2Sm baled in J&.ii and artiXery f&e j_n order IXJ dislodge the enemy from hi3 fort~ified pcsition, The eneqy held fasti, however, and throughout the d;lY the 3467th received heavy automatic weapons and RR fire and lAmSed mortar fire. Hea-ty J’iX air and ax--KUery fires were placed on the enenry positions *

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After Action Report for OPERATION HOLLY - Bob Hope Christmas Tour

Combat After Action Report LAM SON 719, 1971