AFRICOM: Winning Hearts Tufts CA Team HOA April 10

8/9/2019 AFRICOM: Winning Hearts Tufts CA Team HOA April 10

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Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

Wnnn Hearts an Mns?

Examnn the Reatonsh Between

A an Securt n Kena

A p r i l 2 0 1 0

Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman


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Acknoweements

The report has been written by Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman,who take responsibility or its contents and conclusions. We wish tothank our co-researchers Halima Shuria, Hussein A. Mahmoud, andAmina Soud or their substantive contribution to the research process.

Andrew Catley, Lynn Carter, and Jan Bachmann provided insightulcomments on a drat o the report. Dawn Stallards editorial skills madethe report more readable. For reasons o condentiality, the names osome individuals interviewed during the course o the research havebeen withheld. We wish to acknowledge and thank all o those whogave their time to be interviewed or the study. Finally, we acknowledgethe guiding hand o Andrew Wilder at the Feinstein InternationalCenter at Tuts University, who originated this study and hascoordinated the broader comparative study with Aghanistan.

Thank ou

Funding or the Horn o Arica research was provided by the SwedishInternational Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the RoyalNorwegian Ministry o Foreign Aairs.

Cover hoto

RIFT VALLEY, Kenya - Petty Ocer 3rd Class Brett Custer,

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn o Arica (CJTF-HOA), plays withchildren at one o the schools in Burnt Forest, Kenya. A CJTF-HOAcivil aairs team visited the region to rebuild schools which weredamaged or destroyed during post-election violence there last year.(U.S. Navy Photo by Petty Ocer 1st Class Scott Cohen)Source: http://www.hoa.aricom.mil/le.asp?HR=2&ID=20090112190114


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I. Eectie Smma 4

1. Intodction 8

1.1 Methodology 10

1.2 Structure o the Report 14

2. The Eotion o CJTF-HOA Heats and Minds Doctine and Opeations 12

2.1 Counterterrorism 13

2.2 Failed States and Ungoverned Territory 14

2.3 Hearts and Minds 14

2.4 Stabilization 16

2.5 Hearts and Minds on the Ground 17

3. Kenas Noth Easten and Coast Poinces 203.1 Geography 20

3.2 Ethnography 21

3.3 Historical and Political Overview 22

3.3.1 The Shita War and its Legacies 22

3.3.2 Marginalization among Kenyas Coastal Muslims 23

4. Dies o Insecit in the Notheasten Bodeands 25

4.1 Terrorism 26

4.2 The Infuence o Somalia 27

4.3 Governance and Security 284.4 Islam and Radicalization 29

4.5 Poverty and Security 32

5. Managing the Bodeands: Secit and Deeopment 34

5.1 Community-Based Confict Management 35

5.2 Stabilization and the Securitization o Development 36

6. The Eoing Scope o Heats and Minds Actiities in Kena 38

6.1 The Distribution and Expenditure on Civil Aairs Projects in Kenya 43

7. Assessing the Efectieness o the Heats and Minds Campaign 46

7.1 Countering Terrorism and Enhancing Stabilization 47

7.1.1 Perceptions o Security 47

7.1.2 Insecurity as a Function o Marginalization 48

7.1.3 Insecurity Stemming rom the Confict in Somalia 48

7.1.4 Terrorism is Not Seen as a Security Threat 50

7.1.5 Insecurity Stemming rom the Presence o the US Military 51

7.2 Winning or Losing Hearts and Minds? 51

7.2.1 First Impressions 527.2.2 The Impact o CA Activities is Dwared by the Impact o

US Foreign Policy 58

Contents

(continued)


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7.3 The Eectiveness and Impact o CJTF-HOA Hearts and Minds Activities 60

7.3.1 Consultation and Relevance 61

7.3.2 CJTF-HOAs Capacity to Undertake Development Projects 63

7.3.3 Eciency o Implementation 64

7.3.4 Cost-Eectiveness 65

7.3.5 Coordination 667.3.6 Developmental Impact 67

8. Concsions 72

Chats

Chart 1: Trends in Hearts and Minds Project Implementation, 2003-2008 39

Chart 2: Distribution o Hearts and Minds Projects by Province, 2003-2008 43

Chart 3: Expenditure on Hearts and Minds Projects by Province, 2003-2008 43Chart 4: Distribution o Hearts and Minds Projects by Sector, 2003-2008 44

Maps

Map 1: Kenya 2

Map 2: Mandera Triangle 3

Tabes

Table 1: CJTF-HOA Hearts and Minds Projects in Kenya, 2003-2008 38

Boes

Box 1: Civil Aairs Tasks 17

Box 2: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 18

Box 3: Kenyan Muslims 30

Box 4: Undetected Al Qaeda Operatives 51

Box 5: Open Letter Objecting to US Military Presence 54

Box 6: Raya Borehole 62

Box 7: Extending the Reach o Government 69

Box 8: Paved Roads 71

Contents(continued)

GlOSSAry deyr rainy season rom October to December

jihad a holy war waged on behal o Islam madrassa Islamic religious school mirra a narcotic shrub; the leaves are chewed or their stimulating eect reer Somali citizens o Somalia shita rebel, outlaw or bandit

ulema Muslim scholars


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ACrONyMSACF Action Against HungerAFRICOM United States Arica CommandALRMP Arid Lands Resource Management ProjectAMISOM Arican Union Mission in SomaliaAPHIA II AIDS, Population and Health Integrated Assistance

CA Civil AairsCENTCOM United States Central CommandCEWARN Confict Early Warning and Response MechanismCIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)CID Criminal Investigation Division (US)CIPK Council o Imams and Preachers o KenyaCJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force-Horn o AricaCOL Contingency Operating LocationDANIDA Danish International Development AgencyDC District CommissionerDDF District Development FundsDENTCAP Dental Civic Action ProgramDoD Department o DeenseDSCA Deense Security Cooperation AgencyDSG District Steering GroupEDC Educational Development CenterEMACK Education or Marginal Children in KenyaFBI Federal Bureau o InvestigationGWoT Global War on TerrorHA Humanitarian AssistanceHCA Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

ICU Islamic Courts UnionIGAD Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentMEDCAP Medical Civic Action ProgramMP Member o ParliamentMSI Management Systems InternationalNEMA National Environmental Management AuthorityNEP North Eastern ProvinceNFD Northern Frontier ProvinceNGO Non-governmental OrganizationNSS National Security StrategyOEF-TS Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara

OLF Oromo Liberation FrontONLF Ogaden National Liberation FrontPEACE Peace in East and Central AricaPEPFAR Presidents Emergency Plan or AIDS RelieRELPA Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral AreasSUPKEM Supreme Council o Kenyan MuslimsTFG Transitional Federal GovernmentUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Childrens FundUNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia

US United StatesUSAID United States Agency or International DevelopmentVETCAP Veterinary Civic Action ProgramWFP World Food Programme


8/84Feinstein International Center2

2004 United Nations Cartographic Section

MAP 1: KENYA

As of September 2006


9/84Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya 3

United Nations Ofce or the Coordination o Humanitarian Aairs (OCHA)

MAP 2: MANDERA TRIANGLE



I. ExECuTIvE SuMMAry

In Arica, the United States (US) military since9/11 has become increasingly involved inproviding humanitarian and developmentassistance; the Pentagon controls over 20% oUS assistance to Arica.1 This trend is being

consolidated in the new US Command or Arica AFRICOM that advances a role or the USmilitary in Aricas development. One o themodels or the new command has been theCombined Joint Task Force-Horn o Arica(CJTF-HOA) which, since 2003, has beenproviding humanitarian and developmentassistance to win hearts and minds in Muslimcommunities in the Horn o Arica as part o aregional counterterrorism and stabilizationstrategy. Examining the experience o CJTF-HOA in northeastern Kenya and along theKenyan coast, this study assesses the eectivenesso the US militarys use o sot power inaddressing the security challenges o the US andits allies in the region.

Somalia is considered by the US and its regionalallies to be a threat to their security, not least byoering a possible sae haven or terroristorganizations. Yet the Civil Aairs (CA) teams

attached to CJTF-HOA have not ocused theiractivities on Somalia itsel, but instead on ethnicSomali and other Muslim communities in theneighboring countries o Djibouti, Ethiopia, andKenya. Unlike in Aghanistan and Iraq, CJTF-HOAs attempts to win hearts and minds in Kenyathereore occur in a non-kinetic environmentwhere the US is not an active combatant.

CJTF-HOAs projects in Kenyas North Eastern

and Coast provinces were small, scattered, andunder-resourced. Any conclusions about theirimpact on hearts and minds are thereoreprovisional. But the experience o CJTF-HOA inKenya highlights the limitations o trying to winhearts and minds in a non-kinetic environment.Although these activities were arguably eectiveon a tactical level, in terms o acilitating the USmilitarys entry into regions o potential concern,they also show that small-scale projects (and

exposure to the US military) are not enough tomake communities signicantly alter theirworldview.

Winning hearts and minds is an amorphous

concept, but in the case o CJTF-HOA it appearsto incorporate several overlapping objectives.

Tactically, these military aid projects provide anentry point into communities that are potentiallyhostile to the US and its interests. They allow themilitary to build connections and networks andacquire knowledge about the population;connections and inormation which may then beused to augment intelligence, to infuence localleadership, or to acilitate a military intervention,

should the need arise.

At the same time, these projects are intended toinfuence local perceptions and stereotypes aboutthe US, with the goal o undermining localsupport or groups hostile to the US and its alliesand thus to prevent potential confict.

The objective o winning over a crucialpopulation has also become confated with ar

more ambitious goals around addressing theunderlying causes o terrorism and violentextremism, through alleviating poverty andacilitating the reach and acceptance o theKenyan state into previously ungoverned areas.

Assessing the success o the hearts and mindsactivities in achieving US security goals iscomplicated by the changing objectives, theconceptual conusion underlying these objectives,

and the diculty o disentangling the impact omilitary aid projects rom other CJTF-HOAoperations, including direct military-to-militarysupport and Special Forces operations in the region.

There is some evidence that CJTF-HOA hasachieved a measure o tactical success insoar asCivil Aairs (CA) teams have established apresence in northeastern Kenya and along theKenyan coast. Over the past six years, local

1 More Money or the Military,Arica Condential 51, no. 3. (5 February 2010): 9-10.



attitudes towards their presence have become lesshostile and more accommodating. Familiar ity,political lobbying, better outreach by CJTF-HOAand other US government agencies, and acontinuing demand or external assistance mean

there is a pragmatic and tacit acceptance o thepresence o CA teams. This may make it easier orthe military to build connections, to acquire localknowledge, and to gather atmospherics.

That said, its not clear that the communitieswere innately hostile to the US to begin with;or instance, interviewees spoke avorably aboutthe Peace Corps and United States Agency orInternational Development (USAID) assistance.The initial resistance to the CA teams might

not have refected anti-American sentiment somuch as suspicion o the US military ollowingthe invasions o Aghanistan and Iraq, a suspicionthat was aggravated by the way in which CAteams during the early years o CJTF-HOAseparated themselves rom the populationand acted as though they were in potentiallyhostile territory.

Arguably, the increased acceptance o the presence

o CA teams owes as much to the teamsinteracting more openly with communities andlocal leadersas well as through outreach by theUS Embassy and lobbying by interested localpoliticiansas it does to communities changingtheir perceptions about the US military.

Tacit acceptance, urthermore, is not proo thatthe presence o CA teams and the aid projectshave changed overall attitudes about the US

government and its oreign policy. Communitiesand their leaders are skeptical about the purposeo CJTF-HOAs mission and dubious about theutility o some o the assistance provided.Acceptance does not appear to be based on rmoundations and attitudes can wax and wane inrelation to a variety o variables.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the heartsand minds projects have achieved the broader

strategic objectives o countering terrorism andviolent extremism or reducing confict andimproving stability. One reason or this is thatthese objectives are based upon a series o alseassumptions.

The idea that, by delivering aid, the US militarycan change peoples perceptions about the UnitedStates is premised on very simplistic assumptions.It is naive to assume that a project or series osmall projects are sucient to change peoplesperceptions, convictions, and values, regardless othe historical and contemporary local, regional,and global sociopolitical and economic context.

As we ound in this study, attitudes are infuenced

by a multitude o actors beyond the scope o aidprojects, such as the relationship between thetarget population and the Kenyan state, theirsel-perception as Muslims, local leadership, themedia, and, more importantly, their perception othe impact o US oreign policy, both globally andin Somalia. Acceptance o aid does notautomatically translate into acceptance o thepolicies or belies o the entity providing theassistance.

People dierentiate between CJTF-HOA andother, non-military aid actors. The proximity ocovert Special Forces and the involvement o theUS military in operations within Somalia alsoreinorce suspicions about the ulterior motivesbehind CJTF-HOA aid projects. At the same time,the small-scale nature o much o the assistanceleads people to question whether the US militaryis in act interested in their welare, or has other

motives or providing assistance. The delivery oaid projects by military personnel leads people toconclude that the assistance is part o a militarystrategy in the Global War on Terror (GWoT).

To that end, local communities did not seem tobelieve that CJTF-HOA activities had improvedtheir security. To the contrary, their commentssuggest that some eel more insecure than beorebecause o the US presence. Security in Kenyas



borderlands has worsened over the past threeyears, partially as a consequence o US andWestern policy towards Somalia. Some peopleeared that their association with the US couldmake them more vulnerable to violence by

extremists, although there is no evidence that suchprojects have led to any such attacks. Somerespondents were uncomortable with the USmilitarys association with the Kenyan military,given the Kenyan militarys historical record oviolence against the Somali population in NorthEastern Province. Some people eared that the aidprojects (and in particular borehole drilling) werein reality a cover or harmul activities such as theburial o nuclear waste. In a context where USoreign policy in Aghanistan, the Middle East,Somalia, and Kenya has been seen as an attack onIslam, aid projects that aim to win over bothhearts and minds can appear to people as anattempt to directly infuence a Muslimcommunitys aith and belies.

CJTF-HOA has avoided working in the mostinsecure areas o northeastern Kenya. Mostprojects and in particular the larger-scale projectshave been implemented where there is a more

secure and conducive operating environment. Thisin itsel suggests small-scale aid projects are a bluntinstrument or tackling US security concerns.

The presence o CJTF-HOA and the aid projectshas not addressed the security concerns expressedby the communities. That said, CJTF-HOAs goalso confict prevention and stabilization are notconcerned with reducing the threat to localpopulations, but with the potential threats to the

US that might arise rom these communities.

There is a residual assumption thatunderdevelopment is a push actor inradicalization and that aid projects can address thisby reducing poverty and building state capacity, aperception that has some local acceptance givenlevels o poverty and unemployment.Communities have spoken o the benets ocertain projects such as schools where they have

helped increase enrollment. However, the numberand scope o CJTF-HOAs aid projects are toosmall to have had a cumulative, sustainable impacton addressing the underlying conditions thatmay give rise to radicalization and extremism.

There is no evidence that the CA teams and theirprojects have had any impact on rolling backungoverned spaces. The concept itsel issimplistic and ignores the existence o localgovernance institutions. The idea that educationor health projects can help to extend the reach othe state assumes that ungoverned spaces are theresult or unction o a lack o state presence, inparticular in inrastructure or in the provision obasic services.

The political manipulation o projects orinstance, by politicians seeking to consolidate newadministrative areas or trying to get projectsimplemented in their home areas shows that theissue o governance is not the lack o the state perse. In a situation where state presence ischaracterized by the dichotomy between localizedcapture on one hand and coercive, i not predatory,interventions on the other (i.e., the traditional

response by the military and security services), it ishard to see how simply building inrastructureaddresses the root cause o the problem.

CJTF-HOAs hearts and minds eorts have beenhampered by the act that soldiers are not aidworkers. Despite the developmental rhetoric oCJTF-HOA, there are several glaring problems withthe process o delivering humanitarian anddevelopment assistance that have implications or the

ability o the US military to achieve its objectives.

Whatever the technical skills o the reservists whomake up the CA teams, they do not necessarilyhave the requisite skills or knowledge toundertake community development work. Theshort-term rotation o the CA teams means thatrelationships and projects lack continuity. Fromour interviews, it does not seem that CA teamsare adequately prepared beore deployment, nor



provided consistent support while in the eld.Furthermore, the organizational strength o themilitary does not translate into a more ecientdelivery o aid projects.

Finally, US military use o humanitarian anddevelopment assistance to urther military aimsthreatens to erode long-held principles o aidprovision based on need. At the same time, there islittle evidence rom the experience o CJTF-HOA that security-ocused oreign assistanceincreases the security o Americans.



The US military has been providing humanitarianand development assistance in the North Easternand Coast provinces o Kenya since 2003. USmilitary Civil Aairs (CA) teams and engineeringunits have similarly been operating in Djibouti,Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and theComoros. Most operate in locations that areremote, ar rom centers o high populationdensity, away rom ormal government services,

and among communities that are predominantlyMuslim. These areas are considered strategicbecause they are perceived to be vulnerable toviolent extremism and potential sources opolitical instability. These teams are deployedrom the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn oArica (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti, which wasestablished in 2002 as part o Operation EnduringFreedom, the US governments response to theterrorist attacks on mainland America. The

1. Intodction

creation o CJTF-HOA was prompted byconcerns about Somalia, and the Horn o Aricamore generally, becoming a haven or Islamicmilitants feeing Aghanistan and Iraq and a ocusor Al Qaeda operations. The US militarycampaign in northern Kenya to win hearts andminds through the delivery o humanitarian anddevelopment aid is part o a broadercounterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy

in territories and among populations that areconsidered a security risk to the US governmentand allied Arican states. CJTF-HOA itsel is anexperiment in deense, diplomacy, anddevelopment. With its mixture o orces andmandates, it is considered a likely model, alongwith Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara(OEF-TS), or how the recently ormed USArica Command (AFRICOM) will develop, withother similar orces planned or the continent.2

2 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Americans Have Landed,Esquire, 27 June 2007. See also: Brooks Keene, Secur itization o U.S. ForeignAssistance in Sub-Saharan Arica: Preliminary Research (unpublished report or CARE, 12 May 2008).

Photo:M.

Bradbury

Garissa livestock market.


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1.1 Methooo

This case study is part o a comparative study withAghanistan undertaken by the FeinsteinInternational Center at Tuts University,examining the relationship between aid andsecurity and, in particular, the assumption that aid

projects can contribute to improved security byhelping to win hearts and minds.5

Hearts and minds is a somewhat amorphousphrase. For the purpose o this study, it reers tothe range o US military Humanitarian Assistance(HA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance(HCA) activities undertaken by CJTF-HOA, CA,and engineering units. It does not reer to otherCJTF-HOA operations in Kenya, such asmilitary-to-military training. Furthermore, thestudy does not look at similar projects carried outby CA teams attached to US Special Forcesoperating elsewhere in the region.

Research or the Kenya study was undertaken bya team o researchers rom the United States,Britain, and Kenya, rom September 2008 to April2009.6 The research was undertaken in the US,Djibouti, Europe (including Germany and theUK), and Kenya and was structured in three parts.

The study began with a literature review. Thisincluded studies on the historical context and thepolitical and security considerations motivatingoreign assistance policies and practice, studies, andassessments on northern Kenya, policy literatureon reconstruction, development, and thesecuritization o aid, US government securityand development strategy, and relevant USmilitary doctrine. CJTF-HOA activities in Kenya

are mentioned in several academic studies andnewspaper articles, based mostly on secondaryinormation sources. Needs assessments, technicalassessments, or post-hoc project assessments byCJTF-HOA are not publicly available. There aresimilarly no publicly accessible studies orevaluations by the US or Kenyan governmentsassessing the eectiveness o these military aidprojects over the past six years.

Seventy interviews were conducted during thesecond stage o the research. Interviews were heldwith ocials rom the US State Department(including the Embassy in Nairobi, the Bureau oArican Aairs, the Bureau o Political-MilitaryAairs, the Oce or the Coordinator oCounterterrorism, and the Humanitarian

Inormation Unit), the Department o Deense(including Oce o the Under Secretary oDeense or Policy, US Arica Command,Combined Joint Task ForceHorn o Arica, andthe Deense Security Cooperation Agency),USAID (including the Oce o Military Aairs,the Oce o Transition Initiatives, USAID/ EastArica, and USAID/Kenya), the BritishDepartment or International Development, theBritish Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, theKenyan Governments Ministry or theDevelopment o Northern Kenya and other AridLands, UN agencies and NGOs working innorthern Kenya, and academics with specialistknowledge. These interviews took place inWashington DC, Djibouti, Europe (includingLondon and Stuttgart), and Kenya (includingNairobi, Garissa, and Lamu), as well as occasionalphone interviews. The vast majority o theseinterviews were conducted on background and,given the sensitivity o the subject, no quotes or

opinions are attributed to named individuals inthe text.

The third part o the research was conducted inKenya over the course o February, March, andApril 2009. The research team visited twentyproject sites in Garissa and Wajir districts in theNorth Eastern province and Lamu district inCoast province. Two sites, Wareng District andEldoret town, were also visited in Rit Valley

province. The purpose was to solicit the views othose communities where CJTF-HOA hadimplemented HA/HCA projects. Some sixty-eight individual interviews and twelve ocusgroup discussions were conducted with male andemale community leaders, local governmentocials, school boards, youth, civic activists,proessionals, and business people.

5 https://wikis.uit.tuts.edu/confuence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958

6 The Research team comprised Michael Kleinman, Mark Bradbury, Halima Shuria, Hussein A. Mahmoud, and Amina H. Soud.



The research team was able to compile a list o atleast 151 HA/HCA projects undertaken byCJTF-HOA in Kenya since 2003 as well as anestimate o their costs (see Table 1). This list wascompiled rom a number o sources, including themilitary and USAID. It was not possible to veriywhether this was a complete list; urther, the cost

estimates do not include the cost o maintainingUS units in the eld or related transportationcosts.

The study assesses the impact o CJTF-HOAHA/HCA projectscommonly reerred to ashearts and minds activitiesagainst three broadand at times overlapping objectives: security(countering terrorism and enhancingstabilization); political (winning hearts and mindsand countering the infuence o Al Qaeda andviolent extremists); and developmental (meetingbasic needs and strengthening governance).

1.2 Structure o the Reort

The report is structured in eight parts. Part 1describes the aims o the study and the researchmethodology. Part 2 traces the evolution o theCJTF-HOA hearts and minds doctrine and theoperations o the CA teams in Kenya. Part 3

describes the political and social context inKenyas northeastern borderlands where CJTF-HOA hearts and minds activities are beingimplemented. Part 4 considers some o the driverso insecurity in the borderlands region that thehearts and minds activities are intended to address.Part 5 briefy looks at how non-militarydevelopment resources have been deployed tomanage confict and support stabilization inKenyas northeastern borderlands. Part 6 examinesthe evolution o the CJTF-HOA hearts andminds activities, the actors that have shaped them,and the distr ibution and costs o those activities. Italso examines the distribution and costs o thoseactivities. Part 7 draws on interviews with peoplein the host communities to assess the impact othe hearts and minds activities. The nal Part 8draws together the ndings o the study.



2. The Eotion o CJTF-HOA Heats and Minds Doctine and Opeations

CJTF-HOA was established in October 2002 as acomponent o Operation Enduring Freedom.7The task orce arrived in the region in December2002 and by May 2003 had transerred to CampLemonier, a ormer French Foreign Legion basein Djibouti. It originally ell under the control oUS Central Command (CENTCOM), beoretransitioning to the newly-established US AricaCommand (AFRICOM) in 2008.

As a combinedorce CJTF-HOA includes soldiersrom allied nations and as ajointorce it includesdierent branches o the US military. By 2004,there were between 1,400 and 1,600 US militaryand civilian personnel based in the region. Thecurrent size o the task orce, including troops

rom coalition and partner countries, is around2,000 personnel.8 The Combined Joint OperatingArea covers Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti,Somalia, Kenya, the Seychelles, and Yemen;CJTF-HOA is also operating in Tanzania, Uganda,Mauritius, and the Comoros.9

The original mission o CJTF-HOA was tocapture and kill Islamist ghters and terrorists

feeing the US-led invasion o Aghanistan. Overtime, the approach and articulation o the missionhas changed and expanded, with an increasingocus on hearts and minds activities and military-to-military support, especially ater the Navyassumed command rom the Marines in 2006.10According to its own publicity, it now emphasizes

7 The operation in the Horn o Ar ica is one o our operations, all with a ocus on counterterrorism, the other three being Aghanistan, TransSahara, and the Philippines.

8

Inormation rom CJTF-HOA website at http://www.hoa.aricom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp (accessed 17 January 2010).9 Ibid.

10 J. Piombo, Military Provision o Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Lie o a Civil Aairs Team in the Horn o Arica, (Cen-ter or Complex Operations Case Study Series, National Deense University Press, 25 August 2009), 3.

Photo:M.

Bradbury

Faza village, Pate Island.



countering violent extremism as its primarymission, as opposed to a more narrow ocus solelyon counterterrorism:

CJTF-HOA employs an indirect approachto counter violent extremism. We conductoperations to strengthen partner nation and

regional security capacity to enable long-term regional stability, prevent confict andprotect U.S. and Coalition interests.11

2.1 Counterterrorsm

Since the 1998 bombings o the US embassies inNairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Horn o Aricaand East Arica have been a ocus o internationaleorts to combat terrorism. As the Taliban regimein Aghanistan collapsed in 2001, the Horn oArica, and the collapsed state o Somalia inparticular, were thought to oer a potential saehaven or Islamic militants feeing that war and tobe a breeding ground or Islamic terrorists. Theinternational security climate that prevailed at thetime was refected in the media. For instance, theWashington Times, citing US intelligence sources,reported that there were indications Bin Ladenwas setting up new bases o operations inSomalia.12 Western governments responded by

sending naval vessels and aircrat to patrol thewaters and skies around Somalia to preventterrorist suspects rom gaining a oothold there,and CJTF-HOA established a permanent USmilitary presence in the region. The USgovernment came close to approving militaryaction in Somalia; the rationale being the allegedlinks between the Somali Islamist movement (AlIttihaad Al Islamiya), the Somali-owned money-transer company (Al Barakat), and the Al Qaeda

network.

13

Under the commands o Marine Major GeneralJohn Sattler (2002 to 2003) and Marine BrigadierGeneral Martin Robeson (2003 to 2004), CJTF-

HOA pursued a capture and kill mission. OneState Department ocial described it in thoseearly days as a taskorce on steroids with littleadult supervision.14 CJTF-HOA personnel hadanticipated that they would operate directly inSomalia,15 but the expected exodus o terroristsrom Aghanistan did not materialize. As

Ambassador Lange Schermerhorn, the PoliticalAdvisor to the commanding general o CJTF-HOA rom 2003 to 2004, explained:

The Task Forces rst mission was to go ndbad guys and whack them. There werent alot around, so the desired end state became

while you are at it, stabilize the region. Itwas not well thought-through rom thebeginning. But then they got there andtried to gure it out.16

11 Inormation rom CJTF-HOA website at http://www.hoa.aricom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp (accessed 17 January 2010).

12 Terror ist group likely on the move, Washington Times (Washington, DC), 2001. The Daily Telegraph in Britain also cited intelligence anddiplomatic sources that thousand undamentalist Muslims linked to al-Qaeda are being trained as terrorists at bases in Somalia. Banks-to-terror conglomerate aces US wrath, Daily Telegraph (London), 28 September 2001.

13 M. Bradbury, Somalia: The Atermath o September 11th and the War on Terrorism (unpublished report or Oxam GB, February 2002).

14 Interview with US State Dept. ocial, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008.

15 Rye Barcott, Intelligence, Command, and Control o the Combined Joint Task Force Horn o Arica (unpublished paper, 2007).

16 Ibid., 13.

Photo:M.

Bra

dbury

Street scene, Lamu.



2.2 Fae States an Unoverne Terrtor

In the absence o a mass infux rom Aghanistan,CJTF-HOAs mission was shaped by theemerging view, expressed in the 2002 USNational Security Strategy (NSS), that Americais now threatened less by conquering states than

we are by ailing ones.17

According to the WhiteHouse summary o the NSS:

Regional conficts can arise rom awide variety o causes, including poorgovernance, external aggression, competingclaims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries,and ethnic or religious hatreds. I letunaddressed, however, these dierent causeslead to the same end: ailed states,humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areasthat can become sae havens or terrorists.18

Even i the threat o terrorist migration to theHorn initially proved unounded,19 the region wasstill considered a potential threat because o bothstate collapse in Somalia and the weakness ogovernments in neighboring countries whichlet ungoverned spaces.20 Poverty andunderdevelopment are regularly cited as drivers oviolent extremism; however, it has become

increasingly common to identiy poor or weakgovernance, corruption, lack o services, andpolitical alienation as equally or more importantdrivers.21 Although US security policy initiallyidentied Somalia as presenting the main securitythreat to the region, in the past decade Kenya hasprovided a more conducive environment or Al

Qaedas operations. Evidence unveiled at the trialo men linked to the 1998 bombings o the USembassies in East Arica and rom recoveredpapers and phone intercepts showed that AlQaeda (like oreign aid agencies) ound Somaliain the 1990s to be a challenging operatingenvironment. In contrast, a combination o good

inrastructure, lax government and securitysurveillance, and a disaected Muslim populationenabled a terror network to develop and fourishundetected on Kenyas coast.22 Some o thesuspects in the 1998 embassy bombings oundhaven on the coast. Then, in November 2002,Israeli commercial and tourist interests wereattacked with the bombing o Paradise Hotel inKikambala and an attempt to shoot down anIsraeli charter plane leaving Mombasa.

2.3 Hearts an Mns

The diculties o operating directly in Somalia,the lack o a mass infux o militants romAghanistan, the absence o an active insurgencyin Kenya, and the increasing policy concern withungoverned spaces eventually led CJTF-HOA tore-brand itsel.23 Kinetic capture and killoperations were de-emphasized in avor o apreventative strategy involving the provision o

assistance to win hearts and minds, ocused onDjibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, all o which arenominally allied to the US.

Hearts and minds is itsel a problematic term,implying ar more art than science. The US ArmyCounterinsurgency Field Manual denes winning

17 The National Security Strategy o the United States o America, September 2002, 1.

18 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionIV.html (accessed 17 January 2010).

19 Ironically, this became more o an overt issue several years later, catalyzed by the intervention o Ethiopia in 2006, backed by the US.

20 A similar argument based on the dangers stemming rom ungoverned spaces was also used to justiy the establishment o the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). See British Anthropologist Jeremy Keenan on The Dark Sahara: Americas War on Terrorin Arica, Democracy Now, 6 August 2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2009/8/6/keenan.

21 Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, Guide to the Drivers o Violent Extremism (Management Systems International report or USAID,February, 2009); Harmony Project, Al-Qaidas (mis)Adventures in the Horn o Ar ica (Combating Terror ism Center, West Point, 2007).

22 Ibid., iii.

23

Letitia Lawson, U.S. Arica Policy Since the Cold War, Strategic Insights VI, no. 1 (January 2007), http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2007/Jan/lawsonJan07.html. According to Lawson, Initially, [HOA] was [driven] by concerns thatterrorists feeing rom Aghanistan would be attracted to the vast ungoverned spaces o the Horn o Ar ica. When such a mass infux ailedto materialize, and the local terrorist threat proved to be relatively limited, CJTF-HOA began giving greater emphasis to its role inpreventing terrorism by providing assistance and waging a hearts and minds campaign.



hearts and minds as a desired end-state, ratherthan specic activities. Accordingly:

Hearts means persuading people thattheir best interests are served by[counterinsurgency] success. Minds meansconvincing them that the orce can protect

them and that resisting is pointless.24

This denition is most applicable to the USmilitary engagement in Aghanistan and Iraq;CJTF-HOA, however, is not explicitly engaged ina counterinsurgency campaign in northeasternand coastal Kenya. Instead, it ocuses onpreventing the emergence o a terrorist threat andcountering violent extremism more generally.Describing the activities o the CA teams underthe rubric o hearts and minds establishes littlemore than a broad overarching goal or intention,but remains somewhat vague and open tointerpretation.25 Dierent CJTF-HOAcommanders have articulated the task orces goalsin slightly dierent ways. For example, Navy RearAdmiral James Hart, the commander o CJTF-HOA rom February 2007 until February 2008,dened the goals as the 4Ps preventingconfict, promoting regional security, protectingcoalition interests, and prevailing against

extremism. Navy Rear Admiral Philip Greene, thecommander rom February 2008 until February2009, ocused on the 3Ss increasing security,improving stability, and enabling sovereignty.Within these various rameworks, CJTF-HOAshearts and minds activities seem to have a numbero discrete, albeit overlapping, objectives that

contribute to the US governments overall eortsby gaining access and exerting infuence.

First, the hearts and minds activities serve atactical purpose.26 They acilitate access topopulations and areas considered a threat to theinterests o the US and its allies, enabling the

military to gain a better understanding o localconditions, or instance by collectingatmospherics.27 At the same time, access can allowCJTF-HOA to have infuence, by buildingrelationships with communities that could proveuseul in the uture.28 Projects can also be used asa sweetener to gain cooperation rom localleaders29 and to enable local populations toamiliarize themselves with the US military.

Second, these activities are seen as a way to helpaddress the underlying causes o poverty andextremism in the area.

Third, these activities, more broadly, are meant tochange the perceptions o local communities andto overcome ill-ounded or negative assumptionsthat they might hold about the United States ingeneral, and the US military in particular.30 To thisend, some CJTF-HOA personnel see themselvesas warrior diplomats.31

A ourth, more nuanced, view among somemembers o CJTF-HOA conceptualizes heartsand minds activities in light o larger questions ogood governance. In a country like Kenya,where weak or poor governance is considered adriver o confict, instability, and extremism, hearts

24 Department o the Army Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24, 15 December 2006), Appendix A, A-26.

25 Such ambiguity is not limited to the militaryaid agencies oten use similarly vague terms (e.g., empowerment) without dening exactlywhat they mean in practice.

26 Piombo, Military Provision o Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, 3.

27 Interviews with US State Department and Department o Deense ocials, Washington, DC and over the phone, 2008. Numerous ocialsdrew a distinction between collecting atmospherics and collecting intelligence, arguing that CA teams were involved in the ormer and notthe latter.

28 Interviews with US Embassy ocial and ocers with CJTF-HOA, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008.

29 Interview with ocials rom the US State Dept. Arica Bureau, Washington, DC, 2008.

30 Interviews with CJTF-HOA ocials, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008 and 2009.

31 Ibid.



and minds activities are seen as a way not only tochange local perceptions about the US, but alsolocal communities perceptions o their owngovernment and military.32 Partnering with theKenyan military and other Kenyan agencies toimplement humanitarian and developmentactivities is, according to one ormer commander

o CJTF-HOA, intended to encouragecommunities to be more supportive o theKenyan government.33 In the words o anothersenior ocer, the military aid projects are meantto convey the message that the US is working tohelp your government support you.34 Thesecollaborative activities are also intended to extendthe reach o the state into areas where it hastraditionally had a weak, intermittent, or predatorypresence.35 It is an open question, however, towhat extent this viewpoint is shared by CJTF-HOA as a whole, as opposed to individual ocerstasked with overseeing these activities.36

The 2009 AFRICOM Posture Statement sums upthese various goals:

Civil-military activity and development arealso pathways to security capacity buildingor CJTF-HOA. The presence o CivilAairs (CA) teams in the region help partner

nations improve their civil-military relationswith local communities. These teams provideCJTF-HOA the ability to access high riskareas, thereby helping advance USG and hostnation development priorities. Incoordination with USAID and DOS, civilaairs activities help mitigate the stresses thatcontribute to regional instability.37

2.4 Stabzaton

This view o hearts and minds activities assupporting a larger governance end-goal can besituated within the broader evolution o USmilitary doctrine, and in particular the 2005Department o Deense (DoD) Directive on

Military Support or Stability, Security, Transition,and Reconstruction Operations. The Directivedenes stability operations as:

[M]ilitary and civilian activities conductedacross the spectrum rom peace to confict toestablish or maintain order in States andregions.The long-term goal is to helpdevelop indigenous capacity or securingessential services, a viable market economy,rule o law, democratic institutions, and arobust civil society.38

According to a 2008 report by the CongressionalResearch Service, combating the new threat romdecentralized networks o violent extremists whouse terrorism as their weapon o choice willrequire the US to assist others in developing thewherewithal to protect their own populations andpolice their own territories.39

The shit in policy towards stabilization is alsoinfuenced by the experience o the US in Iraq,where the ailure to plan or anything beyondregime change was responsible or the post-warquagmire in which the US ound itsel.40

32 Interviews with US Embassy ocial and CJTF-HOA ocers, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008 and 2009; also interview with AFRICOM ocials,Stuttgart, Germany, 2008.

33 Interview with ormer CJTF-HOA commander, Stuttgart, Germany, 2008.

34 Interview with CJTF-HOA ocers, Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, 2008.

35 Interview with AFRICOM ocers, Stuttgart, Germany, 2008.

36 Email communication with ocial rom the US Embassy in Kenya, November 2010.

37 United States Arica Command 2009 Posture Statement, based on the Statement o General William E. Ward, USA Commander, UnitedStates Arica Command beore the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee on 17-18 March 2009.

38 Department o Deense Directive 3000.05: Military Support or Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (28

November 2005), sections 3.1 and 4.2.39 The Department o Deense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options or Congress (Nina Serano, Coordinator,

Congressional Research Service, 25 August 2008), 4.

40 Barnett, The Americans Have Landed.



2.5 Hearts an Mns on the groun

The mission o CJTF-HOA in Kenya hasthereore evolved rom one concerned withcountering terrorism through combat operationsto countering terrorism and violent extremismthrough activities that aim to promote

developmental goals o stability and goodgovernance. This evolving strategy needs to beunderstood as part o a broader US governmentstrategy that has involved a mixture o hard andsot security approaches involving the military,government, and non-government aid actors. It isalso important to note that hearts and mindsactivities constitute only one o the ways in whichCJTF-HOA seeks to achieve these goals. Otherinterventions like military-to-military support andtraining are also important to the overall mission,but outside the scope o this paper.

The capacity o CJTF-HOA to pursue any othese roles has been constrained by unding andthe limited numbers o troops available to cover avast area nearly the size o the continental US. Ithas thereore relied on Civil Aairs teams, whosetraditional role is to enhance the relationshipbetween military orces and civil authorities inareas where military orces are present.41

41 Department o the Army, Civil Aairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Field Manual 3-05.401, July 2007), section 5-3.

42 Ibid., section 5-25.

43 Ibid., section 5-40.

44 Interview with CA team in Kenya, 2009.

45 Barcott, Intelligence, Command, and Control, 11.

46 Interview with CA team leader in Kenya, 2008.

47 Phone interview with DoD ocial, 2008.

Since 2003, CJTF-HOA has deployed teamsinvolving dierent combinations o intelligencepersonnel, CA teams, construction units (i.e.Seabees), and orce protection elements to morethan eight o the countries in its area o operation.The teams vary in size, rom some eighty peoplein Lamu to only ve in Garissa. The CA teams

themselves oten comprise no more than our orve soldiers, including a commanding ocer, ateam sergeant, one or two CA specialists, and amedic.44 According to a ormer US servicemanwho served with CJTF-HOA, the local teamleaders generally have remarkable autonomy torun operations and make day to day decisions.45As o 2008, there were two Civil Aairscompanies assigned to CJTF-HOA (not includingcompanies attached to Special Forces), each owhich comprised ve CA teams.46

Although the use o CA teams in the region allsin line with evolving US military and securitypolicy, the decision to actually deploy them doesnot appear to have been based on a deep strategicanalysis, but rather a need to be seen to be doingsomething. As one Department o Deense (DoD)ocial explained, CJTF-HOA commanders weresearching or what to do [so they] turn toCA.47 Another mid-level ocer explained,

Box 1: Civil Aairs Tasks

CJTF-HOA hearts and minds activities relate to a number o core CA tasks, including theprovision o oreign humanitarian assistance and nation assistance. According to the Civil AairsField Manual, oreign humanitarian assistance programs are conducted to relieve or reduce theresults o natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as pain, disease, hunger,or privation that might present a serious threat to lie or that can result in great damage to or losso property.42 In contrast, nation assistance (NA) comprises civil or military assistance (otherthan oreign humanitarian assistance) rendered to a nation by U.S. orces within that nationsterritory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutuallyconcluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support a [host nation] bypromoting sustainable development and growth o responsive institutions. The goal is to promotelong-term regional stability.43



HOA does CA because its something they cando.48 And, according to a civilian DoD employee,CJTF-HOAs theory was we have engineers, sowe dig wells. We have CA teams, so we do CAwork.49 A USAID ocial echoed this assessment,stating that CJTF-HOA was a military commandwithout a combat role, and so, as an outlet, and in

Box 2: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) and Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

The nature o the hearts and minds campaign has also been shaped by the undingmechanisms available to it, namely Humanitarian and Civic Assistance(HCA) and Humanitarian

Assistance(HA), the uses o which are dened under US law.51 HCA unding is restricted toactivities that promote the security interests o both the US and the country in which theactivities are carried out, as well as the specic operational readiness skills o the members othe armed orces who participate in the activities.52 The legislation species allowableactivities, which include: 1) medical, dental, and veterinary care; 2) construction o

rudimentary surace transportation systems; 3) well-drilling and construction o basicsanitation acilities; 4) rudimentary construction and repair o public acilities; and 5)detection and clearance o landmines.53 Because o the operational readiness requirement, USorces must be involved in HCA activities; they cannot be sub-contracted to third parties,although US orces can partner with host nation militaries or civilian agencies to implementthem. HCA activities include MEDCAPS (Medical Civic Action Programs), VETCAPS(Veterinary Civil Action Programs), and engineering projects.

HA activities do not carry the same restrictions. The authorizing legislation simply states thatthese activities shall be used or the purpose o providing transportation o humanitarian

relie and or other humanitarian purposes worldwide.

54

Because HA projects do not haveto contribute to operational readiness, CA teams can identiy projects which meet basichumanitarian needs and then implement them using local contractors. The activities can bestand alone projects and do not need to be tied to operational deployments.55Notwithstanding the name, however, HA activities are not meant as purely humanitarianexercises. According to DoD Policy Guidance or Overseas Humanitarian Assistance:

Important complimentary security goals that HA should aim to achieve include thoseo direct benet to DoD, such as improving DoD visibility, access, and infuence in apartner nation or region; generating long-term positive public relations and goodwillor DoD, and promoting interoperability and coalition-building with oreign military

and civilian counterparts. Just as important are indirect benets to USG securityinterests that arise rom improving basic living conditions o the civilian populace in acountry/region susceptible to terrorist/insurgent infuence; enhancing the legitimacyo the host nation by improving its capacity to provide essential services to itspopulace, including responding to disasters and other crises; and building/reinorcingsecurity and sustainable stability in a host nation or region.56

To that end, the US militarys denition o humanitarian assistance diers signicantly romthat o humanitarian aid agencies.57 Indeed, many humanitarian agencies are againstcollaborating with CJTF-HOA, out o a concern that it would undamentally compromise

their own humanitarian mission and potentially aect sta secur ity.58

A ew developmentagencies have been more open to collaboration.59

order to gain relevance, the command began toocus on CA activities.50 The CA teams (and, to acertain extent, engineering units like the Seabees)have since become the public ace o CJTF-HOAs engagement in the region and are centralto its stabilization strategy.



48 Interview with AFRICOM ocer, Stuttgart, Germany, 2008.

49 Interview with AFRICOM civilian ocial, Stuttgart, Germany, 2008.

50 Interview with USAID ocial, Stuttgart, Germany, 2008.

51 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance by 10 U.S.C. 401, and Humanitarian Assistance by 10 U.S.C. 2561.

52 10 U.S.C. 401.

53 10 U.S.C. 401.

54 10 U.S.C. 2561.

55

PowerPoint presentation, AFRICOM Civil Aair s HA Team Training, July 2008.56 Department o Deense Policy Guidance or FY08 Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, (September 2007).

57 The key dierence is in terms o end goals. Contrast the militarys denition o humanitarian assistance in the text above with the denitiono humanitarian assistance provided by the UN Oce or the Coordination o Humanitarian Aairs: Aid that seeks to save lives andalleviate suering o a cr isis-aected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarianprinciples o humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182. In addition, the UN seeks to providehumanitarian assistance with ull respect or the sovereignty o States. Assistance may be divided into three categories direct assistance,indirect assistance, and inrastructure support which have diminishing degrees o contact with the aected population.

58 Interviews with Oxam GB, 4 February 2009, Nairobi; ACF, 24 March 2009, Garissa.

59 Brooks, Secur itization o U.S. Foreign Assistance, 8-9.

60 Interview with USAID ocial, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008.

61

Under CENTCOM, CJTF-HOA used to have the authority to approve small, de minimus projects under $10,000. Under AFRICOM,CJTF-HOA no longer has this authority.

62 See Special Operations.com, Operation Noble Response, Kenya. 21 January 1998 25 March 1998.

63 Interviews, Faza, Pate Island, April 2009.

Any project carried out by CJTF-HOA nowrequires approval by a number o dierentauthorities. As late as 2005 and 2006, coordinationbetween CJTF-HOA, the State Department, andUSAID was haphazard at best. At that time,USAID and the State Department began to growincreasingly concerned about CA teams making

promises to communities in Kenya and thenailing to ollow through.60 Increasingcoordination eventually culminated in the signingo a joint CJTF-HOA, State Department, andUSAID Memorandum o Understanding in

January 2007, covering CJTF-HOAs operationsin Kenya. A 3D working group within theEmbassy now vets all projects, which then go backto CJTF-HOA and then AFRICOM or nalapproval. This, in turn, oten leads to signicantbureaucratic delays in approving andimplementing projects.61

Finally, it is important to note that US militaryinvolvement in humanitarian and developmentactivities is not an entirely new undertaking in

Kenya. In 1998, a Marine-led Joint Task ForceKenya provided support to the World FoodProgramme operations to deliver relie assistanceto populations aected by El Nino-inducedfooding along the Tana River in northeasternKenya.62 In early 2002, the US military, as part oa training exercise, undertook a project to

renovate and expand the primary school o Fazaon Pate Island, near Lamu.63

Since 2003, CJTF-HOA has deployed two CAteams in northern Kenya. One is based in Garissa,the headquarters o North Eastern province. Theother is stationed within the Kenyan naval base inManda Bay north o Lamu Island. The nature andimpact o hearts and minds activities in these twolocations have varied, refecting, in part, thedistinct eatures o the operating environments.The activities o the CA teams are described inmore detail in part 6 o the report. The ollowingsection descr ibes the physical, political, andsecurity environment within which the CA teamsare operating.



3. Kenas Noth Easten and Coast Poinces

A campaign to win the hearts and minds opopulations in Kenyas North Eastern and Coastalprovinces will inevitably be challenged by thescale and relative remoteness o the area and itsvaried ethnography. The attitudes o people in thisarea to the US, Kenya, Somalia, and Islam areinfuenced by their dierent histories and theirrelationship to the Kenyan state and to Somalia.This section briefy describes the geography,

ethnography, and history o the borderlands, andreligious and development trends.

3.1 georah

The North Eastern rontier province is Kenyasthird largest province, covering some 126,902 km2and bordering Ethiopia to the north, Somalia tothe east, and touching the most northern part othe Kenyan coast where it meets Somalia. It is theleast populated province, with 1,410,300inhabitants and a density o only 11 people persquare kilometer.64 Lamu district in northernCoast province, where the largest number o CA

64 http://www.citypopulation.de/Kenya.html.

Photo:M.

Bradbury

Old town, Lamu.



projects has been implemented, is also lightlypopulated, but at 6,167 km is a raction o thesize o North Eastern province. Lamu district alsoborders Somalia to the north, with Lamu townitsel 80 kilometers rom the border.

The ecology o this region refects the marked

climatic variations, with annual rainall o 1500mm and dense bush and orest on the coast, and aslittle as 200 mm o rainall in the northernsemi-arid savannah around Wajir. Erratic weatherpatterns produce droughts and serious r iverfooding, oten leaving populations in need orelie assistance. Human habitation has let itsmark on the ecology. Charcoal production,reugee camps, restrictions on nomadicmovements, and increased commercial trac allcontribute to deorestation and rangelanddegradation in the northeast, while coastaldistricts have been aected by resettlementschemes, agricultural development, and theunsustainable harvesting o mangroves.

The ecology has shaped the varied livelihoodpractices. Nomadic pastoralism is the predominantlivelihood in the semi-arid North Easternprovince, cattle herding in the richer grasslands onthe southern border area, irrigated agriculture

along the Tana River and its delta, some huntingand gathering in the Boni orests, and shingalong the coast. Historically, trade across theIndian Ocean has been central to the economy ocoastal towns like Lamu, but since the 1970stourism has grown in importance. In thenortheast, increasing numbers o people areinvolved in trade and service industries due tourbanization, the large reugee population,increased cross-border trade, and a signicant

remittance economy.

The population o this large border region ispredominantly rural. However, urban centers havebeen a long-established eature o the coast. Theourteenth century town o Lamu is the longestcontinually inhabited settlement in Kenya. To thenorth, the towns o Garissa, Wajir, and Manderahave experienced rapid growth in the past two

decades due to political changes, the presence oreugees, increased commercial trade withSomalia, and overseas remittances. The biggestsettlement in North Eastern province is Dadaabcamp, which currently hosts over 255,000 Somalireugeesone o the largest concentrations oSomalis anywhere in the world.65

3.2 Ethnorah

Identity politics based on ethnicity, social status,and citizenship is a critical actor shaping confictand security in this border area, and an awarenesso this is important or organizations supportingthe development o the region. The fuidity oethnic identity has been a characteristic o pastoralgroups in the northeast, but the infuence o clanconficts rom Somalia and multi-party politics inKenya has led to an instrumentalization o groupidentity and incited resource competition. Aidprograms that aim to build local inrastructure andstate institutions can, wittingly or otherwise,become part o this political dynamic.

Most people in North Eastern province comerom one o several Cushitic-speaking ethnicgroups who share a similar Islamic culture, history,and, traditionally, a nomadic, pastoral way o lie.

Somalis are the largest ethnic group with theDarod clan-amily66 and its constituent clansand sub-clans dominating the border regionbetween the Tana River in Kenya and the JubbaRiver in Somalia. The Oromo constitute thesecond-largest group. The lower Tana River area isinhabited by the Pokomo (Bantu) armers andOrma and Wardey pastoralists.

Lamu district is ethnically and culturally more

heterogeneous, including among its inhabitantsSwahili traders and shermen, Bajuni shermenand armers, Orma agro-pastoralists, a ew Somalipastoralists, Boni and Sanye orest hunters andgatherers, and Pokomo and Giriama agriculturalists.On the mainland and the islands in thearchipelago, there are diverse and scatteredcommunities o mixed Bantu, Arab, Turkish, andAsian descent who are part o the coastal Swahili

65 Weekly Situation Update, UNHCR Kenya Operation. Week Ending: Friday, 8 January 2010.

66 The Somali nation is structured on a kinship system o patrilineal lineages which segment into subsidiary clans and sub-clans, to the level othe nuclear amily. All Somalis are conventionally described as belonging to one o six clan amilies or clan conederations, which aregenealogically related and trace descent rom a common ancestor, the Darod, Hawiye, Digil, Dir, Isaaq, and Rahanweyn. The impor tance okinship compared to other orms o social organization is contested in contemporary Somali society, but it continues to infuence intergrouprelations, and is an important institution or governance and or organizing and managing violence and commerce.


28/84



war against the shita had long-term social andeconomic consequences, as destitute nomadsbecame an urban underclass and educated SomaliKenyans fed the country.

The war was ormally ended by a peaceagreement between Kenya and Somalia in January

1968, but North Eastern province remained arestricted area and emergency laws weremaintained until 1992. Political relations betweenthe people o North Eastern province and thegovernment did gradually change ollowing aailed coup against President Moi in 1982. Aterthe appointment o Lieutenant-GeneralMahmoud Mohamed a Somali rom Garissa as the Army Chie o Sta, Kenyan Somalis beganto make inroads into Kenyan politics. Since theadvent o multi-party politics in 1992, KenyanSomalis have held several government posts.However, the alleged threat oshita has been usedto legitimize the continuous presence o Kenyanmilitary and non-native soldiers in the province,where it has been responsible or several violentevents, including massacres in Garissa in 1980 andWajir in 1984.72 The perceived threat oshita wasalso used to justiy the nation-wide screening oSomalis in 1989 and 1990.73 As recently asOctober 2008, a Kenyan police and military

operation to disarm warring militias in Manderadistrict resulted in over a thousand casualties and adozen rapes.74 The legacies o the Shita War arestill apparent in the disruption to the pastoraleconomy and the economic neglect o the region.The act that the only paved road to the northeastends at Garissa is requently cited by peoplelocally as evidence o the neglect o the province.To many non-Somali Kenyans, Somalis aresynonymous with shita, and the use o the term

has served to criminalize a whole community in

ways that are similar to current counterterrorismand anti-radicalization strategies that single outcommunities as crucial populations.75 Asdiscussed below, the Shita War contributes to anarrative o injustices that underlie Kenyan Muslimssense o marginalization within the country.

3.3.2 Marginalization among KenyasCoastal Muslims

There is no history o secessionism amongthe coastal Swahili Muslims. But, like Somalisin the northeast, they have a shared sense omarginalization and gr ievances against the state,which they trace to European colonialism andearlier and to Kenyas post-colonial dispensation.76In Lamu district, a particular ocus or thesegrievances has been the pressure on land romsettlement schemes, military bases, and tourism.77

Historically, Lamu town owed some o its wealthto the export o grain produced on the mainland.Under the British colonial authorities, the coastalarea was administered as a protectorate withcoastal lands protected as Crown Land. In theearly 1970s, the government expropriated land tosettle Kikuyus in agricultural schemes, the largestbeing Mpeketoni. The settlers were given titledeeds by the government, whose Minister o

Finance and Economic Planning at the time wasKenyas current President Mwai Kibaki. Theresettlement schemes altered the ethniccomposition o the area, with some claims thatKikuyu now make up 50% o the population othe district. Some Swahilis believe this was adeliberate attempt to destroy their economicpower, which adds to the narrative omarginalization in Kenya.78The words o a religiousleader refect a common sentiment on Lamu:

72 In one particularly violent incident at Wagalla airstrip in Wajir in 1984, up to 300 men o the Degodia clan were killed by the Kenyan army.The incident is regularly invoked as an example o the repressive nature o the Kenyan state.

73 Whittaker, Pursuing Pastoralists.

74 Human Rights Watch, Bring the Gun or Youll Die Torture, Rape, and Other Serious Human Rights Violations by Kenyan Secur ityForces in the Mandera Triangle, (June 2009).

75 Jan Bachmann and Jana Hnke, Peace and Security as counterterrorism? The political eects o liberal intervention in Kenya,Arican Aairs 109 (2010): 97-114.

76

Harmony Project, Al-Qaidas (mis)Adventures, 54; Ndzovu Mwakimako and Justin Willis, Trends in Kenyan Islam (a report prepared orthe Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, October, 2009).

77 Interviews with Paul Goldsmith and Justin Willis, Nairobi, January 2009.

78 Interview with religious leader, Lamu, March 2009.



In colonial times we had access to ourland and could minimize our poverty, butKenyatta gave the land to his people.79

In the 1980s, people were also moved o MandaIsland to make way or a planned military base.Current government-backed plans to develop

another 400,000 hectares or agriculture in theTana delta will urther aect the area and theOrma in particular.80

Coastal Swahilis are not unique in theirexperience o oppression and discrimination;other coastal peoples, such as the Pokomo andGiriama, have historically aced discrimination,including rom the elite Swahilis. For coastalSwahilis, however, the grievances over land tenurecontribute to a deeper sense o loss o politicalstatus and wealth elt by them in post-independence Kenya. In 1990, government actionto clamp down on the Islamic Party o Kenya ledto unrest in Lamu, during which the market wasburned down. Nevertheless, while Lamu town isan important religious center and neighboringShela is a center o Wahhabism, there is notradition o militant radicalism.

The Arab Swahilis o the northern coast have not

made the same kinds o gains in national politicsas Kenyan Somalis. The latter represent a moreunied, predominantly Muslim, voting bloc, thancoastal peoples, who are more divided and includemixed aith communities. Furthermore, theamilial, cultural, and economic links between theArab-Swahili-speaking Muslims o the coast andthe Persian Gul is a distinguishing eature o thisarea and the sense o marginalization has osteredinstead an attitude among some that looks to the

Gul and Middle East or ideas and religiousleadership. The comments o one religious scholaron Lamu refect the sense o grievance with thestate:

79 Interview with head o a community development organization, Lamu, Kenya, March 2009.

80 The East Arican Standard(Nairobi), Monday 20 November 2006 reported thousands o Tana River residents held a demonstration at Garsento protest against Tana and Athi River Development Authority and Mumias Sugar Companys plans to establish a sugar actory in the area.

81

Interview with religious leader, Lamu, Kenya, February 2009.82 This is one o three downrange bases or Contingency Operating Location (COL) or CJTF-HOA, the other two being in Ethiopia. The

US military has launched missile str ikes and air raids in Somalia rom these bases.

83 Barnett, The Americans Have Landed.

The Government o Kenya treat us asoreigners, though we have been here 1,000

years. The Government has to see thesource o the problem. We just wantequality. Muslims make up less than 1% ostudents at university.81

Like in North Eastern province, Kenyan securityorces have also had a long-term presence in thisborder district. Manda Bay naval base was built in1992 in response to the collapse o the Somaligovernment and at the time when US Marineswere leading the UN peacekeeping mission there.Since the mid-1990s, the US military has had anactive presence in Lamu, conducting joint trainingoperations with the Kenyan military. The USNavy Seals have used Manda Bay as a staging postor counterterrorism operations and or trainingthe Kenyan Navy.82 It has become a orwardoperating base permanently housing some eightyUS military personnel, a CA team, and Seabeesand is still used as a staging post or specialoperations units in Somalia.83

As in North Eastern province, services andinrastructure are under-developed, even on LamuIsland, which is a popular tourist destination. Thelack o a paved road north o Witu town is a

regular complaint. Plans to establish a newcommercial port in the Lamu archipelago is alsogenerating concern, particularly among people onLamu, because o the potential environmental,cultural, social, economic and political impact.Some believe that the port development isinevitable and part o a long-term developmentplan or the district, which has involved thesettlement o Kikuyu in the area.


31/84



Somalia, the prolieration o small arms, andIslamic radicalization.86 Confict assessments alsocommonly recognize the regional drivers oinsecurity by including North Eastern province inthe so-called Greater Mandera Triangle, an areavariously described as a zone o confict or arco crisis87 and part o a confict system that

encompasses the pastoralist regions in Kenyasnorthern provinces, southern Somalia, southernEthiopia, southern Sudan, and eastern Uganda(see Map 2).

Regional actors are seen to be less signicantdrivers o insecurity in Lamu and irredentism hasnot been an issue, although anger among coastalMuslim communities in the wake o the 2007elections saw discussion o a Zanzibar-typesecessionism aired. The area was aected by theShita War,88 and Somali shita were being blamedor highway banditry up to the late 1990s.Banditry was eventually curtailed by increasedpolicing and the arming o community-basedpolice reservists. From an international andKenyan state perspective, the primary securityconcerns relate to the haven ound in the area byAl Qaeda operatives, the proximity to Somalia, theweak remit o government, and themarginalization and poverty o coastal Muslims.

From a local perspective, tensions exist betweenthe Swahili people o Lamu and the state overland rights and plans to site the new port in thearchipelago. Drug abuse and criminal activityassociated with it are commonly cited as asecurity threat, and residents o Lamu express earat the consequences o in-migration:

Security in Lamu is worse because so manyup-country tribes have come to Lamu.

Beore we were living by ourselves. I donteel secure walking to the hospital.89

While some describe these tensions as explosive,they seem unlikely to generate serious internalinsecurity. Like the northeast, the area wasunaected by post-election violence in 2008.

4.1 Terrorsm

Since terrorists attacked the US embassies inNairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, Kenya,Somalia, and the Horn o Arica, and East Aricamore generally, have been a ocus or internationaleorts to combat terrorism. The priority given tothe region by Al Qaeda was subsequentlyunderlined by the incidents in Kikambala andMombasa in 2002. A resurgence o the war inSomalia since Ethiopia intervened militarily in2006 to overthrow the Islamic Courts Union(ICU) has drawn Kenya deeper into theprosecution o the Global War on Terror(GWoT).

For reasons already noted, in the past decade AlQaeda has ound Kenya to be a conduciveenvironment or its operations in East Arica.90The Lamu archipelago has been o particularconcern or the US and Kenyan authorities dueto the act that Al Qaeda operatives involved inthe 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks resided in the

area or some time. In 2002, Fazul AbdullahMohammed (the Comoran), thought to be AlQaedas leader in East Arica, lived under apseudonym in the village o Siyu on Pate island,where he marr ied, established a madrassa, and ran aootball team called Al Qaeda. Mohamed SaddiqOdeh, a Palestinian rom Jordan, convicted or hisinvolvement in the Nairobi embassy bombing,married into a amily in Witu in Lamu district andposed as a sh trader. Another member o Al Qaedas

East Arica cell, Salih Ali Salih Nabhan, who waskilled by US Special Forces in Somalia in September2009, used to visit Lamu Girls Secondary Schoolwhere his wie was a matron.91

86 Menkhaus, Kenya-Somalia Border Confict Analysis; Human Rights Watch, Bring the Gun; Hussein A. Mahmoud, Conficts andPastoral Livelihoods in the Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia Borderlands, in Fighting or Inclusion: Conficts among Pastoralists in Eastern Aricaand the Horn, ed. Paul Goldsmith (Nairobi, Development Policy Management Forum, 2007), 54-78.

87 Menkhaus, Kenya-Somalia Border Confict Analysis.

88 Nine Bajuni villages were displaced by Somali incursions in 1964.

89 Interview with the head o a local NGO and a primary school governor, Lamu, March 2009.

90 Harmony Project, Al-Qaidas (mis)Adventures.

91 Nabhan grew up in Mombasa. Another Al Qaeda operative rom Kenya, Sheikh Ahmad Salem Sweden, was also rom Mombasa.



Analysts suggest that the existence o a disaectedMuslim population along the Kenyan coastprovided an environment which Al Qaeda hasbeen able to exploit with ewer security pressuresthan elsewhere in the region.92 This thinlypopulated and orested border area and themyriad islands in the archipelago make it ideal

or overland and coastal smuggling. Odeh maderequent visits rom Witu to Ras Kamboni inSomalia to buy sh and smuggle weapons intoKenya.93 The cross-border smuggling o weaponryis not new; it was a problem in the 1960s and isone reason or the long-term military presence inthe area. Today the Kenyan army and navy, backedby the US navy, patrol the area or weapons andterrorist suspects. The popular tourist beach atShela also has CCTV cameras pointing seawards.The stop and search methods o the military onland and at sea have caused some local complaints.CJTF-HOA assistance projects in this district are,arguably, not just a response to the act that AlQaeda had ound a sae haven there, but are alsomeant to win the acquiescence o the populationto continuing patrols. The arrest o individualswho were allegedly members o SomaliasIslamist movement, Harakat Al Shabaab (youthmovement), and a weapons cache ound on abeach south o Lamu in December 2009, are

likely to be seen as a vindication o this.94

4.2 The inuence o Somaa

The Somali civil war and the collapse o theSomali state in 1991 has been one o the maindrivers o insecurity in Kenyas northernborderlands over the past two decades. The impacthas been greater in North Eastern province, dueto its ethnic composition, than in Lamu district.

State collapse in Somalia produced a protractedreugee crisis in North Eastern province and onseveral occasions ghting between Somali actionsspilled into Kenya. The collapse o the Somali andEthiopian governments and the dissolution oboth armies in the same year let the region awash

with weapons, so that, in the early 1990s, militiaand criminal gangs were oten better armed thanthe police.95 The infux oreer Somaliinto Kenyahas created tensions between the incomers andthe indigenes and has politicized clanism amongKenyan Somalis. Since the late 1990s, militantIslamists have gradually established a presence on

the Somali side o the border and are increasinglyseen to pose a threat to Kenyan sovereignty.Proximity to Somalia means that Lamu district hasalso not gone unscathed by the Somali civil war.The border town o Kiunga was briefy overrunby orces o the Somali warlord General MohamedHersi Morgan in the 1990s. As noted, thedistrict has also been a conduit or cross-bordersmuggling and some instances o robbery on themainland are also blamed on the availability olight weapons rom Somalia.96

Since 2001, security in the Kenya-Somaliborderlands has deteriorated dramatically, asSomalia has emerged as a theater in the GWoT.The overthrow o the ICU by Ethiopia in 2006,the pursuit o its leadership to the Kenyan border,US C-130 airstrikes against terrorists thought tobe harboring with the ICU, the rendition opeople feeing Somalia,97 and the Ethiopian armysoccupation o Mogadishu have caused a major

crisis in the northeastern borderlands. Theintensication o the war has led to an increasein the fow o Somali reugees into Kenya and atwo-way fow o weapons.

In 2007 and 2008, there were reports o KenyanSomalis joining the insurgency against Ethiopia inSomalia. In 2009, the rhetoric escalated betweenthe Kenyan government and the Somali Islamistmovement Al Shabaab. Following several border

incidents, including the kidnappings o nuns andKenyan aid workers by gunmen rom Somalia, theKenyan media and government called or a morerobust response rom the Arican Unionpeacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM),98and raised the specter o Kenyan military

92 Harmony Project, Al-Qaidas (mis)Adventures, 47.

93 Harmony Project, Al-Qaidas (mis)Adventures, 6; Interview with the head o a community development organization, Lamu, March 2009.

94 Anthony Kitimo, Armed Al Shabaab Suspects Arrested in Lamu, 7 December 2009, .


96 Interview with government ocial, Witu Division, April 2009.

97 Human Rights Watch, Why Am I Still Here? The 2007 Horn o Arica Renditions and the Fate o Those Still Missing, (2008).

98 Oxord Analytica, Kenya: Leaders marginalise key threats to security (12 August 2009).



intervention there. In a urther sign odeteriorating security, the northeast appears tohave become a recruiting ground or SomaliasIslamists and the Kenyan army. Reportedly, AlShabaab has been recruiting school children andunemployed youth in Kenya,99 while Somalireugees and Kenyan Somalis are being recruited

by Kenya security orces and trained to ght insupport o the Transitional Federal Government(TFG) o Somalia.100 This is stoking a long-heldear in Kenya and internationally that the war inSomalia will spread to Kenya.

Ater two decades, the impact o state collapse inSomalia goes deeper than the immediate cross-border relations. With over one million Somalisresiding outside the country, the Somali nationhas become transnational. Ironically, it has beenthe collapse o the Somali state rather thansecession rom the Kenyan state that has helped tointegrate the Somali nation. This has taken placein dierent ways. In Dadaab camp, or example,North East province has the largest concentrationo Somalis anywhere outside o Somalia. Statecollapse in Somalia has helped to integrate theeconomy o southern Somalia and northeasternKenya, by stimulating an expanded cross-bordertrade in livestock, ood commodities, electronics,

and weapons. It has transormed parts o theborder by expanding old settlements andgenerating new ones and, at times, has generatedviolent competition over trade and urban realestate. In some places, a convergence o economicinterests has contributed to stabilization. This hasbeen the case or the area south o El Wak, one othe most violent areas in the province in the early1990s. Since 2000, the economic interests o theAbsame clan, who dominate the border area and

who have a stake in Somalias Lower Jubba regionand in Garissa in Kenya, have helped to stabilizethe area.101

The transnational integration o the Somali nationalso encompasses the expanding suburb oEastleigh in Nairobi, where many Somali reugeeshave settled and Somali businesses have boomed.The integration is not solely economic. Anindication o the level o political integration thathas occurred was apparent in the considerable

support that Somalias president Sheikh Sharireceived rom the Somali community in Nairobion taking oce in early 2009. There is also animportant dynamic in the religious discoursebetween Kenya and Somalia, with Kenyan-Somalireligious leaders in Eastleigh nding a ollowingin Somalia and with Somali religious scholarsmoving between Kenya and Somalia. WithEastleighs growing economic and politicalimportance, Nairobi is being drawn into the arco crisis.The integration o the Somali nation alsoincorporates Ethiopia, where the governmentscounterinsurgency campaign against the OgadenNational Liberation Front (ONLF) has resulted inEthiopian Somalis seeking reuge in Kenya.102 Thereported presence o ONLF in Garissa has ledsome people to describe it as the new capital othe Ogaden.103

4.3 governance an Securt

The counterterrorism analysis that ragile statesand ungoverned spaces are a threat tointernational security leads to the conclusion thatthe weakness o government in an area likenorthern Kenya is a driver o insecurity. This canbe challenged in two ways. First, it overlooks thesophisticated indigenous systems o governancethat exist there. Second, it ignores the state itsel as

a driver o insecurity. As noted above, state-building in Kenya has been a violent process.While global and regional actors impact on the

99 Ibid.

100 Katharine Houreld, Kenyans recruited to ght in Somalia, Associated Press, 16 October 2009. Following their deeat by Al Shabaab inKismayo in October, the Somali Islamist group Hizbul Islamiya is reported to be seeking support in Kenya. They may seek to mobilizesupport among the Darod in the North Eastern province, who have interests in Somalias lower Jubba region.


102 The ONLF, established in 1984, is ghting a separatist insurgency in the Somali Ogaden region o eastern Ethiopia. In April 2007, the

ONLF escalated its campaign by attacking a Chinese-run oil eld in Abole, Somali Region, killing Ethiopian and Chinese nationals. TheEthiopian government responded with a harsh military crackdown on the Somali region, causing widespread displacement, which wascondemned by human rights groups.

103 Interview with the head o a local aid organization, Garissa, March, 2009.



security o populations in Kenyas borderlands, themost important driver o insecurity is political.104

Violent competition over pasture and water hasbeen a requent occurrence in North Easternprovince, where issues o resource scarcity areexacerbated by unclear land tenure, inward

migration, the presence o a large reugeepopulation, and increased settlement andurbanization. The demarcation o administrativedistricts that have prolierated since theintroduction o multi-party politics in the 1990s iscontested and has produced zones o ethnicexclusion. In 1998, or example, confict betweenthe Somali Aulihan and Abdwaq erupted overland and access to the Tana River in Garissadistrict, triggered by the infux o Aulihan romSomalia, which threatened to upset the politicalbalance in the 2002 elections.105 Rapidurbanization also means that it is requently urbaninterests and urban populations that are the mainprotagonists in armed clashes in the area, whilepastoralists may serve as a principal source omilitia.

The liting o emergency rule in North Easternprovince in 1992 was a necessary part o theintroduction o multi-party politics into Kenya.

But it also coincided with the introduction ostructural adjustment programs, a retrenchment ostate services, and state collapse in Somalia.106Ater years o repressive rule, North Easternprovince lacked strong community organizationsor authoritative clan leadership to immediately llthe vacuum o government, which in the early1990s eectively lost control over large parts o itsterritory.

Multi-party politics has exacerbated ethno-politics, generating competition over thedemarcation o electoral districts.107 Competitionor land and control o local administrationstriggered communal violence in Wajir in 1992-

1993 and again in 2000 between the Degodia,Ajuraan, and Ogaden clans.108 Similarly,politically-motivated violence was a majorproblem in Garissa district in the 1990s and inMandera in 2004. Agencies deliveringdevelopment in northern Kenya are thereoreconronted by a paradox. Extending the remit o

the state into these ungoverned areas hasbecome both a development and securityobjective because the absence o state authority isperceived to be a actor in the high level oinsecurity. The creation o new districts thatattract state resources and services is portrayed bygovernment as a progressive opening up o th

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