African Security Challenges - HSDL

African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon

Weapons of Mass Destruction in Africa: Current and/or Future Threat?

WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION REPORT

Jennifer Perry

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

and

Jennifer Borchard Science Applications International Corporation

Contributed Essay:

Dr. Stephen Burgess U.S. Air War College

April 2009

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect

the official policy or position of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office

Report Number ASCO 2009-004

DTRA01-03-D-0017, Task Order 0018-08-03

The mission of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. The Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) supports this mission by providing long-term rolling horizon perspectives to help DTRA leadership identify, plan, and persuasively communicate what is needed in the near term to achieve the longer-term goals inherent in the agency’s mission. ASCO also emphasizes the identification, integration, and further development of leading strategic thinking and analysis on the most intractable problems related to combating weapons of mass destruction. For further information on this project, or on ASCO’s broader research program, please contact:

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office

8725 John J. Kingman Road Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6201

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Acknowledgements:

The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants in the February 2009 “Weapons of Mass Destruction in Africa: Current and/or Future Threat?” working group discussion in

McLean, Virginia, whose presentations and contributions to discussions served as the basis for this report. In addition, we thank each participant for their thoughtful review of this report. In particular, we would like to acknowledge Dr. Stephen Burgess, U.S. Air War

College for contributing a foundational paper to initiate discussion. We’d also like to thank Mr. Randy Cheek, National Defense University; Mr. Jean Du Preez, Monterey Institute for

International Studies, James L. Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Dr. Jessica Piombo, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School; and Dr. Helen Purkitt, U.S. Naval Academy for

lending their expertise to our discussion. We’d also like to thank those U.S. Africa Command representatives who participated in the discussion for their productive

contribution.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1: BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 1

SECTION 2: WORKING GROUP SESSION OBJECTIVES, SUCCESSES, AND CHALLENGES............................................................................................................. 5

SECTION 3: WORKSHOP SUMMARY ..................................................................... 9

Overall Threads of Discussion...............................................................................................................................9 Stephen Burgess Paper, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Latent Threat” .............................................. 10 Discussion of the Overall Nature of the WMD Threat in Africa .................................................................. 11 Discussion of Implications for U.S. Engagement ............................................................................................ 20

SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 25

APPENDIX: STEPHEN BURGESS PAPER, “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN AFRICA: A LATENT THREAT”........................................ A-1

Working Group Discussion Report - i -


Working Group Discussion Report - 1 -


SECTION 1: BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush directed the establishment of a new Combatant Command focused on Africa. The announcement of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) kindled a flurry of discussion amongst Africa watchers in Washington, DC and beyond. Debate largely centered on the implications of this announcement, the mission of the new Command, its location, and above all, how AFRICOM actions would reconcile with those of other players in the region and whether the decision signified a militarization of U.S. policy in the region. Irrespective of this debate, the establishment of the Command reflects several important changes in U.S. Government, particularly U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) perceptions about the importance of Africa to U.S. strategic interests. Previously, three geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) shared responsibility for Africa, a situation that sometimes resulted in fragmented action in the region. AFRICOM’s almost continent-wide responsibility allows the DoD to assume a comprehensive approach as it addresses security challenges on the continent, suggests an increasing recognition of the commonalities across African states and regions, and serves as an acknowledgement that many security concerns and obstacles, as well as their root causes and effects, transcend these physical boundaries. The Command’s interagency component also suggests a greater recognition of the need for consistent coordination of U.S. activities to address these security challenges. The DoD is but one player in the region and must consistently work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to support broader activities in the region when appropriate. With this heightened interest and attention in mind, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA/ASCO) initiated a fundamental research assessment of African security challenges – what they are today and what they might be over the horizon. This assessment could be used to inform future planning and research for ASCO, and inform those U.S. Government players active in the region, including, but not limited to the newest form of DoD engagement, AFRICOM. Research Objective and Approach It is important to note that the vision for this project at the outset was to study AFRICOM’s mission and structure and determine how these would affect the way that the Command addressed security challenges in the region. When it was determined that many conferences, workshops, and publications had already addressed this topic (coupled with the fact that the AFRICOM mission and structure were still being refined as it stood up), the research team realized that a broader and fundamental “challenges-centric” assessment was needed. Indeed, many players were rightly investigating the “nuts and bolts” of AFRICOM and other U.S. engagement in the region (specifically how that might be affected by the stand-up of the new Command), yet few were conducting a comprehensive assessment of what security challenges those players might need to address today and in the future. The research team




felt an “over the horizon” aspect was especially important and an area in which our research could inform future strategic planning. The research objective was to define the major categories of security challenges in Africa today and explore possibilities for what they might be over the horizon. Using fundamental insights from academic and research experts to develop a better understanding of those challenges, the research was intended to explore how the challenges intersect and identify their importance for U.S., especially AFRICOM, activities and engagement on the continent. This research would provide a platform for further study of how the United States can address the identified challenges through various (and ideally coordinated) forms of engagement, including AFRICOM. To accomplish this objective, the research team performed academic literature and expert reviews to identify a large list of African security challenges with the recognition that there is some debate among experts on the challenge areas and their importance relative to one another. The team also surveyed U.S. Government strategic documents (including AFRICOM mission and vision statements) to obtain a list of those challenges the government identifies as important. Eventually, this list was pared down to three broad categories of challenges and served as a foundation for an academic workshop at which the security challenges were discussed in October 2008.1

1. Transnational security issues a. Small arms/light weapons b. Maritime security c. Disease

2. Internal and regional conflict

a. Border issues, spread of conflict, and peacekeeping b. Humanitarian assistance, refugees, and internally-displaced persons c. Rebels d. Post-conflict reconstruction issues

3. Potential flashpoints/future security challenges

a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and R&D developments b. Oil and natural resource competition and exploitation c. Terrorism and radical Islam d. China and other states

While the approach to the challenges selection was not scientific, the research team viewed this research project as a starting point and not an end point in the study. The workshop in October 2008 provided a foundation for more in-depth and specific discussions and

1 The list was pared down for both practical and budgetary reasons. That is, the research team needed to conduct a one day workshop with academic experts and therefore tried to select challenges that could be discussed within that timeframe, but also allow for broad participation among many types of experts. It also selected challenges of particular interest to the sponsoring organization (DTRA/ASCO) and incorporated some challenges that might not be viewed as important today, but could dramatically affect the security landscape tomorrow.



research on major security challenges and their implications; it also pointed the research team to several issues involving government and academic debate. Additionally, it highlighted the need to consider various methodologies to discuss security challenges among these two groups to ensure effective discussion. Indeed, it was also widely understood that one study would not be enough to accurately and comprehensively capture the challenges that make up the African security environment. After the October 2008 workshop, the research team selected four specific challenges, or in some cases combined ones, from the above challenge list to receive more in depth attention by way of working group discussions and analytic papers over the course of the next several months. Participants at these working group discussions would focus on the current and possible future nature of a specific challenge, for example, small arms and light weapons, and how it might intersect with others. They would also preliminarily consider the implications of this challenge for U.S. engagement on the continent. In particular, participants would focus on the dimensions of the challenge that might be manipulated and issues associated with that manipulation. The topics selected for further study included: weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons, conflict over natural resources, and disease.2 After the four topical discussions, the research team would host an additional working session to synthesize results, get additional inputs, and consider the “so what?” question for U.S. engagement on the continent in greater depth. While the topical discussions would mainly involve academic participants, this last working session would more directly involve government players. The report that follows outlines the results of the first working group discussion session that focused on weapons of mass destruction. As such, this report should be viewed as one element of the research endeavor on African security challenges with complete results and findings still pending.

2 These topics were selected for several reasons. They were the subject of broad debate at the October 2008 workshop or similar events, of interest to the sponsoring organization, and/or lacked extensive study within the U.S. Department of Defense.



SECTION 2: WORKING GROUP SESSION OBJECTIVES,

SUCCESSES, AND CHALLENGES

Objectives DTRA/ASCO invited a small group of experts on weapons of mass destruction and Africa to participate in a working discussion to better define the nature of the threat, the possible implications for U.S. engagement, and the ways in which the threat (if deemed important) could be manipulated through activities on the continent. As the first in a series of working sessions on specific security challenges, this working session, like the ones that would follow, had a secondary objective. Experiences at the October 2008 workshop suggested that there are some difficulties associated with conducting government and academic dialogue on security challenges. This was especially apparent when analyzing the different priorities and approaches the two communities when assessing security challenges. One question that revealed the different priorities of the communities, for example, is the issue of whether to consider the root causes of the security challenge area or only their effects. Further, what are the implications of that decision for formulating and implementing policy and related activities in the challenge area? This working session served as one test case to refine ways to facilitate government and academic dialogue in such a way that can most effectively inform strategic planning and understanding while reflecting the analytic complexities of the study topics.3 Working Group Discussion Structure Participants Meeting participants were drawn from U.S. military education institutions and U.S. research organizations. Each of the five expert participants had a publishing record on issues surrounding the question of weapons of mass destruction in Africa, which is somewhat of a niche and understudied area. The majority of the participants were experienced in engaging with the U.S. government. Additional observers represented AFRICOM and DTRA. Agenda The meeting was comprised of both a presentation of a foundational paper and plenary discussions. The research team selected one participant, Stephen Burgess from the U.S. Air War College, to develop a draft foundational paper which would consider the current and future nature of the security challenge posed by WMD in Africa and begin to identify ways in which the United States could engage to manipulate this challenge. He was asked to specifically discuss what AFRICOM might do to address the challenge over the long-term and how the Command’s actions might be coordinated with other players in the region. All

3 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, please see the first workshop report from this study, African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon. A full copy of the report can be found at: http://www.dtra.mil/asco/ascoweb/pdf/Africa%20Security.pdf



participants received the draft paper ahead of time. After a presentation of the paper, the other participants provided specific comments on the draft paper to assist the author in his revision. After this initial discussion, the workshop organizers held an additional moderated discussion to consider the nature of the WMD challenge writ large in Africa and implications for U.S. engagement over the long-term.4 In particular,

- How could this challenge be manipulated? - What dimensions of challenge should each player focus on? What issues can

AFRICOM work on? - What can the players do and how might actions be coordinated?

After the working session, Burgess was given an opportunity to refine his analysis; the final version of his paper can be found in Appendix A of this report. The project team drafted this report to summarize the broader findings of the group. Meeting the Objectives: Difficulties and Successes Success #1: The working session was successful in convening a small group of experts who have analyzed the weapons of mass destruction threat in Africa that could consider both the nature of the threat and implications for engagement. Discussion: The majority of the participants were experts on the known South African case, including one arms control/nonproliferation expert from South Africa with first-hand knowledge of the nation’s experience, and two other American researchers who conducted extensive interviews in country on the nation’s nuclear and biological programs. This is understandable because South Africa represents one of the few historical cases of advanced WMD research and development in Africa and can provide an opportunity to extract lessons learned which can be applied to other African cases. Additionally, there was considerable expertise on the biological weapons issue as well as on the possible linkages between WMD, ungoverned spaces, and terrorism in Africa. Given that this topic is indeed a niche area, the expertise covered most of the waterfront and ensured a substantive discussion. As most of the participants were from U.S. military education institutions, they were also well experienced in considering implications for U.S. engagement and discussion proceeded much further along that line than it had during the October 2008 broad academic workshop.

Difficulty #1: The participants did not represent many different types of academic and research institutions so further analysis could not be conducted on ways to improve academic and government dialogue. Discussion: The participants were mainly drawn from U.S. military institutions, perhaps due to the nature of the topic. While this did serve a positive role in bridging the academic

4 Burgess’ paper primarily focused on the only real known advanced case of WMD development and proliferation in Africa- South Africa.



and government divide on discussing security challenges, it did not help the research team refine a methodology to effectively conduct this type of dialogue. It did, however, point to the value of this sub-community of academics – individuals who, while academically focused, have a strong understanding of the application of their research through their extensive work with government (here, the Department of Defense). Other follow on working sessions, which involve a broader cross-cut of participants from different institutions, might allow for a better test of various approaches.

Difficulty #2: A discussion on WMD in Africa requires an understanding of issues that are at play in both Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Discussion: A substantial amount of time was spent on understanding the current implications of South Africa’s WMD experience and to a lesser extent, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. While this issue is important and should not be neglected, the experts did not, for the most part, address WMD concerns specific to North Africa. The chemical weapons experiences in Libya and Egypt, as well as issues unique to the Maghreb region might have been considered to ensure a continent-wide focus and prevent skewing the analysis. An agenda item which focused on Northern Africa issues and how they mapped with Sub-Saharan issues, including those that relate to South Africa, may have alleviated this issue. However, the historical divide between those that focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and those that focus on North Africa, both in academia and government, and the implications of this division, needs to be acknowledged.

Difficulty #3: A discussion of WMD in Africa necessitates a discussion about natural resource security and/or conflicts. Discussion: The research team decided to conduct one topical discussion on WMD and one on conflicts over natural resources. Although it makes some sense to treat these as distinct issues, like all security challenges in Africa, there are considerable points of intersection which may render distinctions arbitrary. For example, the security of uranium resources is an issue of central concern when considering nuclear weapons threats, but also civil research on energy. The complexities of the security environment require a discussion that is broad, but a concerted effort must be made to ensure that discussions of these issues are specific enough to allow for engagement on various challenges, not just one, perhaps at both the root causes and effects level.

Difficulty #4: When discussing a technical challenge such as WMD, there is a need to distinguish between various types as this has an impact on how one discusses options for engagement. Discussion: When discussing WMD, there is a need to distinguish between various types (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) and to avoid oversimplifications (e.g. WMD equals nuclear). Another point of distinction relates to the type of WMD program (e.g.



civilian or military; offensive or defensive; involving weapons production or simply research). These distinctions are especially important when discussing engagement options. Specific options might be appropriate for some dimensions of the challenge, but not others. A pre-defined agenda that distinguished between all of these issues might have allowed for a further reaching specific-discussion, which would have more effectively bridged the gap between academic discussions of the challenge and considerations on what to do about it.



SECTION 3: WORKSHOP SUMMARY

Overall Threads of Discussion5

There was general agreement that addressing the WMD threat in Africa should not be a priority for U.S. players in the region. There is a need to consider the unique African context, including regional differences, and understand that WMD is a latent threat in today’s Africa. Additionally, African leaders do not possess a uniform view of its importance. However, the United States, working with African partners, can take some preventative steps to ensure this threat does not become a reality. In addition to intelligence sharing, activities toward this end include: working with African states – both bilaterally and through regional organizations better secure borders – both land and sea – and implement control regimes to curb proliferation. In all cases, the United States should take an interagency approach to the issue – with the U.S. Africa Command in a supporting role – and ensure that all activities address the unique African context, capabilities, and perceptions of the threat. When considering the WMD threat in Africa, several discussion points emerged. South Africa, though it had former nuclear and biological programs, is no longer a major proliferation threat and has achieved some success in helping to curb global proliferation. Its experiences may suggest some lessons learned which can be applied to future African cases, but the unique context in which the nation developed its programs needs to be acknowledged. Overall, it is less likely that Africa will be used as a place to produce WMD. African states lack the capability, and there is little motivation to try to develop them. Though still remote, Africa may be used as a place to transfer weapons or materials to be used or developed elsewhere, or stage an attack. However, distinctions need to be made across various weapon types (biological, nuclear etc.) when discussing these potentials. The continent’s porous borders, including coasts and harbors, are cause for concern, as well as the lack of education and high level of corruption among those charged with guarding them. The potential for terrorists to use naturally occurring diseases and resources such as uranium in the region for malicious purposes should be examined, but not overemphasized. Likewise, we should also consider the role of ungoverned spaces in the region for providing havens for terrorist activity, including those involving WMD, while realizing that infrastructure is needed to carry out WMD activities. Several issues were raised throughout the course of the discussion. When discussing WMD and future potentials, the following issues may pertain to the African context overall: linkages with organized crime, terrorism, ungoverned spaces, border security, availability of uranium including its highly enriched form, African interests in nuclear energy and uranium mining, and interests in biotechnology and the life sciences. While there was no general consensus on the relative importance of any of these issues in shaping the future WMD

5 The participants in this workshop primarily focused on issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors would like to point out that, due to various factors, issues specific to North Africa did not receive much attention. However, readers should not assume that those issues are unimportant to understanding the WMD threat landscape on the continent.



environment, active discussion emerged on all of these issues. Because of this, it is important to consider WMD as one element of the African security picture but not one of central importance. However, issues such as border security also pertain to security challenges other than WMD and should be examined further as there are broader implications to addressing or not addressing them.

Stephen Burgess Paper, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Latent Threat”

(Note: This summary addresses the major points of the Burgess paper in its final form. He presented a draft version at the meeting and the other participants offered many helpful recommendations to the author about how his analysis could be strengthened in the final paper. Those recommendations are not included in this summary. A complete and final copy of the Burgess paper can

be found in the appendix.) Current and Future Nature of the Threat Stephen Burgess of the Air War College initiated the discussion with a summary of his paper “Weapons of Mass Destruction in Africa: A Latent Threat” which was prepared for this discussion session. He noted that the main takeaway from his paper should be that the WMD threat is currently latent in Africa – especially when compared to the threat in some Asian regions. However, there exists a limited proliferation threat in the region and we should continue to monitor it to prevent future heightened threats. WMD proliferation issues, however, do not and should not rise to the forefront of current U.S. engagement with Africa. When analyzing WMD issues in Africa, both motives and capabilities need to be examined. Burgess emphasized that South Africa, with its past advanced nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs, poses a limited proliferation threat. Though this threat should not be overblown, this case demonstrates the need to consider the long-term implications of WMD program rollback. Possible issues include the potential sharing of residue scientific and technical knowledge and expertise on WMD among former project directors, scientists, and engineers due to uncertain economic and employment conditions. These individuals could sell their knowledge and, possibly, related equipment and technology to groups in other regions such as Southwest Asia and to a lesser extent, the Horn of Africa, due to financial motives. Burgess also noted some overall issues involving WMD in Africa. He maintained that there is little threat of WMD being developed by states or non-states in the region due to capacity issues and in some cases, motive. The greater concern is that Africa’s porous borders, weak border patrols, and lack of implemented export control mechanisms might allow WMD or related materials or equipment to be smuggled or transited illicitly across borders – both land and sea – to be used in activities elsewhere. North African states like Egypt and Libya that had (not very advanced) chemical weapons programs should also be monitored, but they do not pose a high proliferation threat in and of themselves under current conditions. Additionally, those states like South Africa which have advanced conventional weaponry that could be used in WMD delivery or infrastructure to support nuclear energy programs should



also be monitored, as these resources could be exploited by other actors if they have a motive. Though there is not always an intersection between terrorism and WMD, the potential link is a concern. In the past, Africa’s ungoverned spaces have been the focus of much attention with regard to their potential as a haven for terrorists, including those with WMD plans or aspirations. Though this threat has not been realized, key ungoverned spaces in the region should continue to be monitored. It should not be assumed, however, that there are always WMD activities in these areas, or the motive to conduct them. It is more likely that those places which have adequate infrastructure might also be leveraged by terrorists as bases for operation. South Africa is one potential country that could be used both as a base for operation, given links to regions with more terrorist activity, as well as a place from which to recruit, given a large population of disillusioned youth. However, these threats are both latent and have limited potential of being realized. What to do about it? Burgess briefly noted some ways that Africa could prevent WMD threats and curb potential proliferation – in many cases through the continuation of initiatives already in place. Focusing on South Africa, he advocated for continued monitoring and surveillance of specific South African scientists, engineers, businessmen, and personnel at research centers that may transfer knowledge, expertise, technology, or other materials to other regions. He noted that this surveillance and related law enforcement should extend throughout Africa. He also advocated for increased capacities to implement and enforce export control regimes to prevent materials, technology and weapons from moving illicitly across African states’ borders. Along these same lines, he advocated for greater African activities to ratify nonproliferation regimes. Burgess also briefly discussed what U.S players in the region might do to prevent WMD threats in Africa. He called for greater intelligence capabilities and monitoring of the region through a sustained interagency cooperative approach involving the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, the intelligence community, and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Surveillance should also focus on linkages between WMD and terrorist activity in Africa and activities within the Central Command’s area of responsibility. Overall, the United States should position itself in case the low probability event of a WMD threat in Africa was to come to fruition, but it should not be an engagement priority.

Discussion of the Overall Nature of the WMD Threat in Africa

(Note: This summary addresses all of the topics which were considered in the discussion. It is organized topically. In a majority of cases, the discussion points are not presented in chronological order as participants jumped from topic to topic.)

Distinguishing between various types of WMD Several participants offered that a discussion of this issue needs to reflect the differences between various types of WMD and variations within R&D activities. For one, a nuclear weapon is not the same as a chemical one, which is not the same as a biological one, which is



not the same as a radiological one. It is also important to consider the entity posing the threat – specifically, whether the entity is a state or a non-state actor. These threats manifest themselves in different ways and have different implications. Another important point of distinction involves weaponization. Not every WMD activity on the continent involves or might involve the weaponization of agents for offensive purposes. As one participant pointed out, the now defunct South African biological program did not focus on weaponizing agents. Discussions about weaponization, according to this participant, only occurred within one rogue element of the program. The Egyptian chemical weapons program, however, did have this focus. Lumping all of these programs together can lead to misunderstanding. Yet another point of distinction is ease of development/use. Developing and using a biological weapon may be easier than developing and using a nuclear one. This is especially true for non-state actors. These individuals might also be attracted to this WMD type given the feasibility of developing the weapon from a remote location (a hotel room with a laptop, for example). As such, a nuanced understanding of the goals and capabilities of various types of actors is required when developing an analysis of the potentials. Appropriateness of focusing on South Africa Several debates emerged among the participants about whether South Africa, which was the primary focus of the foundational paper, should be the focus of a broader discussion about WMD in Africa today and in the future. Generally, discussion focused on the degree to which lessons from this case could be applied more broadly to understand potential threats in Africa writ large and the current threat implications of past South African nuclear and biological activities. One group member noted that there may be lessons to learn from the South African experience, both from a historical and current perspective. It would be wise to consider how the South African experience, both historical and current, could be mapped to other countries. For example, can we learn any concrete lessons about potential WMD threats in the broader region by looking at the South African case more closely, or is it too unique and context-specific to provide us with broader insights on WMD threats in Africa? It may be true, she stressed, that many of the South African current concerns do not map to other countries. For example, only Nigeria and Kenya are remotely close to having the same type of industrial complex that South Africa had (and, to some extent, still has) to produce these weapons. Along the same line, most states do not have scientists with intimate knowledge and experience in developing WMD. In the South African context, there are still scientists who worked on its now defunct programs who have this knowledge base. These scientists are facing employment challenges and so the motivation may exist for these individuals to use their knowledge to help others develop WMD. This exploitation potential does not translate to other African contexts. However, concerns about border security do translate. Borders in Africa, both land and maritime, are porous, and concerns about corruption, bribery, and effective and enforced monitoring of them are widespread. While South Africa’s borders are better protected, they are still not perfect.



Another group member suggested that the discussion should focus on a different question. That is, what is the impact of focusing on past South African experiences to understand the threat posed by that state today? One expert stressed the fact that a new regime is in place in South Africa. It may be detrimental to ensuring cooperation with this new regime on nonproliferation and counter-proliferation activities to focus on the country’s WMD past. Focusing on the threat potential and past incidents raises suspicion and makes the regime less willing to trust other players and cooperate. Rather, the focus should be placed on how the country has been successful in contributing to international efforts to reduce the threat of WMD. An example of this is the government’s prosecution of members of the A.Q. Khan network residing in the country, its activities to monitor those who were involved in the nuclear program, and the implementation and enforcement of export control systems. These export control systems make it difficult to get equipment and materials out of the country. The recent Libya centrifuge incident suggests that these controls do work. When analyzing South Africa, this expert reminded the others of the need to consider the context-dependent conditions which provided an impetus for these programs. Western analysts should not simply focus on the effects of the decision to have a nuclear and biological program. They also need to consider the motivation for that decision. In some ways, the programs were developed as a response to Cuban and Soviet forces in Angola; that is, as a means to deter them from threatening South Africa. That WMD threat is no longer present, and there are no indications that South Africa would revert to producing and proliferating WMD. There are also no indications that South Africa, which now has more advanced conventional delivery systems that could be used for WMD than it did when its nuclear and biological programs were active, has offered these systems to other countries or entities. This expert took the discussion one step further and reminded the group that South Africa was not the only African state with a WMD program. Unlike South Africa, Egypt actually used weapons (chemical) in the past, yet there is little discussion of that country as a current threat. Linkages between terrorist WMD activities and the organized criminal enterprise The participants generally agreed that not enough attention has been placed on the linkages between terrorist networks trying to acquire, develop, or transport WMD or related items and other networks engaged in nefarious activities in Africa, such as narcotics smuggling. However, there was some debate about the conditions under which other actors would assist terrorist networks with WMD activities – such as procuring or transporting WMD or related equipment and material. While one discussant suggested that network collaborations, especially between narcotic smugglers and terrorist groups, are the threat of the future, others noted that organized criminals might perceive this collaboration as too risky and cautioned against focusing too much on black market activities when discussing the WMD threat potential. Echoing the previous speaker, another expert noted that, according to most law enforcement experts, criminals, such as those engaged in drug smuggling, would never become involved in any activities that would attract more U.S. attention. Several others



pointed out that these enterprises would fear blowback, increased monitoring of activities, and being subjected to a “higher level of foreign policy.” Others did not view this in such black and white terms. In some cases, an actor, whether as an individual agent or a member of an organized enterprise, might become involved in proliferating because it is profitable to do so. In South Africa, as one group member pointed out, the economic climate may make it enticing for some individuals to assist in procuring or transporting a WMD, but they may not be aware of the endgame, or in some cases, even aware of what they are procuring or transporting. In all cases, motivation needs to be considered. The terrorist/proliferator has different motivations than organized criminals or individuals who get involved because it is profitable to do so. Ungoverned spaces and borders, terrorism, and links to WMD The participants also discussed the extent to which ungoverned spaces in Africa could be used by terrorist groups to engage in WMD and related activities. While many analysts have raised concern about ungoverned spaces in Africa (including some who participated in the previously mentioned DTRA/ASCO October 2008 workshop), some experts pointed out that, in today’s context, Africa would not be used as a center for operations for terrorist activity planning. However, insecure borders are a cause for concern, both due to corruption among officials and the lack of education and training of those assigned to patrol the borders. Several experts made the point that the conduct of terrorist activities, including those related to planning a WMD attack, requires relatively easy and stable access to supplies. Road conditions would make the transport of supplies, whether illicit or not, difficult in Africa. This pertains to both ungoverned and some governed areas. Moving the discussion back to ungoverned areas specifically, one participant remarked that terrorist bases are not generally established in lawless areas because the group would not have access to the basic level institutions and services that it needs to effectively function. As documents in the U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center Department of Defense’s Harmony Database suggest, she said, terrorists like to establish themselves in areas that have some infrastructure and a functioning police force, particularly one that can be bribed to assist with or overlook activities. Anecdotes about Al Qaeda’s experience in Somalia, as described in an analysis of Harmony documents about the terrorist network’s activities in the Horn of Africa, reflect this idea that ungoverned spaces are not always the first choice of places to operate for terrorist groups.6 Along those same lines, it may be hard for a terrorist leader to maintain command and control in Africa as compared to some other regions. Adequate command and control capabilities, as one group member pointed out, are necessary to plan WMD activities. This expert suggested that it was more likely that Africa would be used as a target and suggested Southwest Asia would be a more ideal place to plan activities, including those involving WMD.

6 This study, Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa can be found at: http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp.

http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp



A discussion of ungoverned spaces also gave way to a broader analysis of the way in which insecure borders could shape the current and/or future WMD environment in Africa. There was general agreement that insecure borders were an issue of concern across the region and that this insecurity could be exploited by those looking to transport WMD or related materials. Several issues would be at play here such as the lack of education of border officials and corruption. In particular, border personnel might not know the difference between common, legal infrastructure items (e.g. water pipes) and proliferation items (e.g. centrifuges). As such, a person might be able to transport necessary equipment to develop WMD across borders quite easily if the personnel entrusted with guarding these borders do not have the necessary education or knowledge. As another expert pointed out, this issue not only relates to land borders, but also maritime ones, including harbors. Bribery was also mentioned as a cause for concern. This relates not only to corruption among border officials, but also among those who are driving the trucks or other vehicles transporting the materials. There was also some discussion about whether border issues were endemic to the entire continent or were simply an issue in ungoverned areas. There was general agreement that border issues were a concern across Africa, though border security was better in some places than others. Several participants agreed that while South Africa’s borders, including its 2000 km rugged coastline, were better protected than most African borders, the security situation was still less than ideal. One participant remarked, however, that because the controls were better in this area, though still not perfect, he would not suggest to a weapons proliferator to settle in South Africa. He further added that once an individual successfully exits South Africa, the rest of Africa is open. Uranium as an available resource When discussing the availability of highly enriched uranium in Africa and the related security implications of its presence, the participants first focused on the November 2007 Pelindaba nuclear facility attack in South Africa. The discussion then broadened and the participants considered the degree to which uranium, which is naturally present in many areas of Africa, is secure and whether or not it can be exploited it in its highly enriched form to produce nuclear weapons. The participants also discussed the extent to which African interests in pursuing civilian nuclear energy options might pose a future security threat. There was general agreement about the importance of ensuring the safety and security of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the region over the long-term to prevent it from being used to develop nuclear weapons. Currently, however, there does not seem to be a high security threat associated with HEU in Africa. HEU in South Africa and implications of the Pelindaba attack Regarding the Pelindaba attack, one group member fervently noted that it was important to not jump to conclusions about the security of nuclear facilities in South Africa, and in particular the security of HEU in those facilities. It would be a stretch to say that the attack was indicative of a high security threat to HEU in South Africa. Although he conceded



there is some security risk wherever HEU is located, the participant pointed out that HEU is in a separate vault in the Pelindaba facility and is under 24 hour surveillance and supervision. Also, only members of the South African cabinet have access to keys to the vault, and most security officials within the facility do not know where the vault is. Further, the vault is only opened when the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) conducts its regular inspections. After the attack, the IAEA was the first group to send inspectors to conduct an assessment. Although the inspectors made recommendations on how to improve the security of the facility overall, they did certify the HEU was safe after the attack. The expert further noted that, although the attack did not demonstrate a high threat to HEU, it is indeed cause for some worry particularly because all signs associated with the break in suggest it was an inside job that involved more than petty theft. Further, this was not the first time that the facility was attacked. As such, it is important to understand whether the perpetrators were after some specific item or whether it was a feasibility test. Knowing this information can help in preventing future incidents. Building on the discussion of security implications of HEU, this same expert later suggested that eliminating HEU from this facility or any other one is not the answer to preventing a security threat from becoming a reality. South Africa is not moving to eliminate its stock of HEU because it is a strategic asset. South Africa uses HEU for medical purposes as well as in the research and development of pebble bed reactors and other research reactors such as the Safari (albeit in a downgraded form). The presence of HEU only becomes a security issue when the facilities are not well secured or when there is an excess stock of it. Addressing the excess stock issue would require political will to do so. Uranium mining The discussion of the security implications of uranium mining activities in Africa proceeded along two lines. The first focused on oversight issues while the latter focused on the external state exploitation of uranium resources in the region. There was general agreement that many of the uranium mining activities in Africa receive sufficient oversight but there are still some areas for improvement. The participants all agreed that while other states were interested in exploiting and using Africa’s uranium resources, the current security implications associated with the activities were also minimal. One of the primary points of discussion was whether uranium mining activities required greater oversight to prevent illicit proliferation of the materials. There was some debate on the extent to which adequate safeguards are in place in smaller African countries. One participant pointed out that the IAEA regulated mining in the region and since French national companies do a lot of the mining in the region, they also have their own control measures in place. He surmised that the combined safeguards were adequate, but that did not mean there should not be a discussion on how they might be improved. Building on the point that improvements could be made, another participant called for further attention to the oversight capacities and practices in smaller African countries – such as Niger and Malawi – where mining is a growing industry, and in countries such as Namibia where the government owns a sizeable portion of the mining company’s shares and other



nations such as Iran and Australia are active. The previous speaker disagreed that this was a major current security issue and reiterated his statement regarding the active presence of French companies in the region. He noted, however, while the French companies have strict control measures that provided adequate protection, the context could change if the mining industries in each country were nationalized. If this shift occurred, the safeguards might not be adequate. Building on this point, another group member said the broader point to consider was where the responsibility lies for ensuring these control measures are in place. That is, does it lie with the state or the corporations doing the mining or both? No answer was provided. There was minimal discussion on the ways in which other states are exploiting Africa’s uranium, but many noted China’s interests and activities in the region as well as India’s and Iran’s increasing interest in the continent. No specific security threats were identified, but there was some concurrence that these issues need to be discussed particularly in terms of future security implications. However, one group member cautioned linking a security threat to uranium exploitation. A security issue only arises when the materials disappear. Declarations or decisions to pursue nuclear energy programs One of the major points of discussion was the heightened African interest in pursuing nuclear energy capabilities to address growing civil energy needs. Several North African states – Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt in particular – have made public declarations about their intent to pursue nuclear energy programs so there may be a need to discuss the security implications of these statements. African decisions to pursue this form of energy, and decisions by other states to provide nuclear technologies to them might also need further attention. There was general agreement that the security implications of these programs were minimal today, but several issues need to be examined. One participant remarked that public declarations of interest in nuclear energy do not necessarily translate into statements about capability. They could be viewed in several ways. Governments could make these statements to indicate their interest in pursuing these capabilities. Along these same lines, the statements could be responses to the international community’s stated intention to limit research on elements of the energy cycle in the future in light of the Iranian situation. Yet, the statements could also simply be viewed as the state telling the world that it has advanced technologically. These statements would then be aimed at demonstrating status, not necessarily interest in nuclear energy specifically. Therefore, when discussing what these statements mean and how they might translate to action, it is important to remember that developing nuclear energy resources requires infrastructure. One expert was not convinced that Morocco and Tunisia had the infrastructure to pursue these programs today. When the discussion turned to Egypt, the group members considered whether Iran’s actions were a strong motivator for Egypt’s program. One expert suggested that there was no link and that any discussion of Egypt’s program should focus on its need for electric power. As a result, general international responses should not focus on influencing decisions to pursue nuclear power, but should instead focus on assuring the reactors are appropriate when they are built so that security risks are minimized.



Another expert took this discussion of international responses one step further and focused on the security dangers associated with transferring nuclear technology. He reminded the group that the United States government provided South Africa with the Safari reactor and a supply of fuel. During the Carter administration, the fuel supply was turned off. This resulted in South Africa having to consider other ways to obtain fuel, and, as a result, the avenues it pursued were probably far less regulated. This is a lesson for today because we need to be aware of the security dangers associated with giving states reactors. If the receiving state falls out of favor with the providing state, there may be security impacts. There was some debate on this point as another member noted that this security risk potential should not be a defining factor in determining whether a state should transmit nuclear energy technology to another state. Every effort should be made to ensure safeguards are in place, but any state choosing to acquire this technology will generally choose the path of least resistance. In response, another expert concurred that offers to provide these technologies should not include political conditions, but suggested more broadly that countries that acquire these technologies should be held to a higher standard. This expert also suggested that African countries need to be informed of the expense of building nuclear energy systems and made aware of alternative fuels, such as fossil fuel. This discussion of alternative fuels is important because the primary sources for energy in Africa are wood and coal, both of which have potential negative impacts on human welfare and the environment. The pursuit of nuclear energy needs to be discussed within the context of quests for alternative forms of energy. Other group members agreed that education was important and several mentioned that exchange programs might be one way to educate African countries on this topic in a respectful manner. One participant reminded the group that any such program should be informed by lessons learned by past experiences. We should know what mistakes not to make and how to avoid them. Biological threats Building on a previous point about the need to distinguish between various types of WMD, participants discussed the feasibility of using Africa to plan for or to conduct a bioterrorist attack. Discussion proceeded along three lines: the potential to leverage a natural disease outbreak on the continent, the relative ease of bioterrorist activity for non-state actors, and the degree to which scientific study in Africa, including in biotechnology, could be used for malicious purposes. The participants did not reach any general consensus on these issues. Exploitation of naturally occurring diseases While the participants agreed that natural disease outbreaks were a major concern in Africa, some participants took this a step further and discussed the perceived synergy between natural disease outbreaks and biological weapons. One participant noted that while African leaders are focused on the former and some Western players are worried about the latter, Africans are generally cooperative with those players taking action to prevent biological terrorism on the continent. However, this expert was unsure where the biological threat fell in priority in relation to others for African leaders.



Another participant discussed the degree to which specific types of naturally occurring diseases in Africa could be transmitted intentionally. He noted that Ebola, in particular, is very hard to transmit. We might, however look further at the potential for transmitting pneumonic plague (he cited the Algerian desert as a hot spot). Another concern might be the potential for genetically altering certain biological agents to make them easier to transmit intentionally, such as synthetically creating smallpox out of raw materials. He noted that it would be problematic if those with malicious intent are able to learn this process. Another expert cautioned that while this potential has been mentioned in the literature, no one has yet performed extensive analysis on the possibility. Another point of discussion was the relative ease for a person seeking to engage in terrorist activity to enter the scene of a naturally occurring disease outbreak. In particular, one expert wanted to know whether it would be easy to identify everyone at the scene of a disease outbreak to ensure that everyone belonged there. One participant noted that he assumed it would relatively difficult to identify those that did not belong once they entered because both because everyone would be in protective gear and the scene would be relatively chaotic. He qualified his statement, indicating he had never personally been to one of the sites in question. Relative ease of bioterrorist activity When discussing the feasibility of a bioterrorist attack in Africa, one expert reminded the other participants that a terrorist with a biological agent/weapon would only need to get on an airplane to use it. The person could easily infect people in many areas that way – whether in Africa or in other regions, but he/she would likely go to places that did not receive much attention from the international community to conduct the attack to avoid monitoring. Another participant echoed this point and mentioned that biological targets are hard to isolate. Yet another participant further noted the difficulty of separating combatants and intended victims when conducting this type of terrorist attack and the need to consider the implications of this difficulty. Potential to exploit studies in the life sciences and biotechnology The discussion of scientific advancement in Africa focused on two issues. The first was whether foreign enrollment in the life sciences at African universities was an issue to discuss further. The second was the potential for dual use biotechnology in the region to be exploited for malicious purposes. The participants discussed the ways in which African universities could be used as training grounds in the life sciences and the possible security implications associated with the topic. One participant pointed out a report sponsored by DTRA/ASCO on the intangibles of South African biotechnology research. The 2004 report indicated an increasing number of Pakistani students studying life sciences in South Africa and pointed to a generally high number of Middle Eastern students studying at foreign first rate university centers, many of whom were funded by their respective governments. He asked whether this was a point for discussion and a cause for concern. Responding to this, another group member suggested a



consideration of South Africa’s demographics and noted close religious ties with Muslim communities. Some participants advocated for a program that would track what these students were studying and several debated whether this was being done and if it was not, what entity should do it. At the end of the discussion, there was no consensus as to whether this was a concern. A broader discussion on dual use biotechnology also emerged. One participant pointed out that biotechnological advances in the region were an Achilles Heel given the dual use nature of the technologies. Citing a case where a Cuban vaccine company was engaging in co-production with a South African company, this participant questioned whether this was a cause for concern and whether these types of relationships are being or should be tracked. While another participant noted a natural link between the two programs, a general consensus did not emerge as to whether this was an issue of concern. Noting African interest in excelling in this area, one participant reminded the group that many African countries would like to be centers of excellence in biotechnology and bioinformatics.

Discussion of Implications for U.S. Engagement

While the discussion generally focused on the potential for WMD threats in Africa, there was some discussion about ways that the United States, whether through AFRICOM or other players, could reduce the threat of WMD in the region. The discussion highlighted the need for greater intelligence capabilities, with AFRICOM taking a supporting role, but also the need to cooperate with African partners and to further consider the role of treaties and other control regimes in the region given the unique African context. As one participant pointed out, it is generally assumed that WMD is a lesser issue for African leaders than it is for the West. While this is true in many cases, it is important to realize that the views on the importance of WMD threat reduction efforts and the threats themselves are not uniform across Africa and vary from country to country and region to region. Generally, African countries fall into one of three categories. Some perceive WMD as a threat and seek assistance to deal with it. Others see it as a threat and cooperate on a quid pro quo basis. Others still do not perceive any WMD threat and therefore see no need to cooperate with other players to address it. These distinctions need to be addressed when formulating any specific engagement strategy. Broadly, however, most participants agreed that WMD is a latent threat in Africa. Given its future potential, even if minimal, some actions can be taken to reduce the likelihood the threat will come to fruition. Cooperation will be required, but that may take many forms. In every case, it should be appropriate to the unique African context. Further, any U.S. activity on the WMD issue in Africa should take an interagency approach to the issue. While AFRICOM and the U.S. State Department have a role to play in addressing this issue, so too do the Justice and Treasury Departments. Need to cooperate with African partners One participant advocated for the United States to maintain closer cooperation with African countries to prevent and curb WMD proliferation. He argued for increased intelligence



sharing – especially of cutting-edge information – and the use of advanced technology to facilitate this exchange. Another primary area for cooperation is border security. These activities might involve: helping build African capacity to patrol its coasts, setting up control systems along land and sea borders, and training border personnel. This same participant also advocated for a closer relationship with South Africa in particular, but cautioned that the relationship needs to be based on trust and not suspicion. Another participant echoed the opportunity for closer U.S. cooperation with South Africa and noted that a bilateral commission focused on WMD that flourished 8 years ago has significantly broken down. It might be time to revive the commission and, with it, the closer ties between the two nations. Several participants also discussed using African regional organizations such as the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as a means of gaining cooperation on WMD issues and increasing African capacity to address them. Many African countries are, according to one participant, using NEPAD as a way of attracting foreign corporations. If the leaders are going to try to host these corporations in their countries, they need to provide protections to them. NEPAD could be used as a means to facilitate better export control regimes in Africa. The African Union could also be used to increase capacity to implement and enforce these regimes. However, any discussions about using these organizations should be couched in terns of incentives and done within the diplomatic framework. Role of treaties and regimes in Africa The participants discussed the ways in which global WMD control apparatuses are in place in Africa and how the implementing them is a challenge. While this discussion did not completely focus on what the United States could do, in particular, to strengthen compliance with these controls in the region, it did point to some larger issues involving the applicability of these regimes in Africa. As one participant pointed out, further research needs to be done on the extent to which control regimes can be used to curtail or prevent proliferation in Africa in this context. There was general agreement that complying with global regimes aimed at curbing WMD proliferation are a low priority for some (but not all) African leaders as these countries face many other threats and issues of greater current concern. However, several experts pointed out that it was unfair to classify all African leaders as not caring about WMD proliferation because many of the global agreements aimed at curbing the proliferation of these weapons are not applicable to all African countries. Two issues then need to be discussed: the capacity for implementation and willingness of governments to place resources against this implementation. One issue of great concern in the African context is capacity to implement these regimes. Building on a discussion at the previously mentioned October 2008 DTRA/ASCO workshop, one participant mentioned Igor Khripunov’s presentation on the degree to which African countries are signatories to global WMD control regimes. Khripunov had expressed worry that many African countries were not signatories to all of the available regimes. This expert then asked if this was an issue for concern. Another expert pointed out that the issue for him was not so much the fact that some countries had not signed these



regimes, but, rather, it was one of capacity. Until African countries have the capacity to do the things that the regimes call for, implementation is impossible. He felt that although it was good for countries to ratify these regimes, ratifying them simply because they are expected to do so could lead to a false perception of progress on WMD controls in Africa. Until an implementation and enforcement capability is established, ratifying treaties will not help curb WMD proliferation in Africa. Networks aimed at curbing proliferation are only as strong as their weakest link. Another issue relates to incentives and willingness to place resources against implementing these regimes. Many of these global regimes do not resonate with African leaders. Some may view implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 as low priority. It may be called a “blunt” approach to curbing proliferation – especially for developing countries – even if it is applicable in some cases. For example, as one expert pointed out, 24 African countries have agricultural facilities and equipment that could be used for WMD activities. However, to date, only 18 countries in Africa have reported these items to the United Nations Security Council as required by Resolution 1540. Implementing safeguards associated with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) also pose challenges for developing nations. As one expert pointed out, though implementation of NPT safeguards has been poor, the global community needs to remember that the NPT requires African countries to set up controls for things that some of them don’t have. In some cases, African countries, such as Eritrea, might not implement these safeguards because it has other priorities (for example, the war with Ethiopia). Given this difference in priorities, another expert noted that it may be beneficial to focus on the circumstances under which African leaders do buy into these regimes. In particular, African leaders buy into control regimes when they see economic benefits in doing so. For example, many African countries need assistance from the global community in developing capabilities to implement these regimes, though generally the West has been reluctant to provide this assistance. If this assistance was provided, the infrastructure (training, equipment etc.) could also be used to address other issues and have broader utility. Therefore, this “what is in it for me?” question can be addressed through a dialogue about incentives done within a diplomatic framework. Several participants mentioned U.S. activities to assist Africa in implementing UNSCR 1540, and there was agreement that they should continue. The U.S. Africa Command, for example, is working with the U.S. Department of State on 1540 issues, including putting more resources to provide assistance to African countries and expanding reporting mechanisms to a regional level, particularly in North Africa. This regional approach, one expert suggested, was promising. Another pointed out that this approach has worked well in curbing terrorism financing and that their may be some lessons learned from that experience which can apply to this context. Within this context, another participant offered that instead of or in addition to assisting Africa with implementing 1540 and other regimes, it may simply be the best approach to help Africa minimize environments where rogue states will flourish as these states can pose a greater WMD threat. Additionally, there is a need to consider the root causes of



proliferation when developing responses to address it. These ideas pertain generally to developing nations and may be helpful in the African context. Within this discussion, one expert emphasized that recognizing WMD as a threat and being afforded programs to address it will not always translate into action on the part of African leaders. Sometimes domestic politics prevent any action from taking place. Another group member echoed this point and suggested that sometimes there are good reasons why a government might not want to elevate a particular threat to being a top priority. Terrorism is one example. If it becomes known that something is perceived as a threat, sometimes there is a greater potential for it to become realized as one. Those with malicious intent can exploit this announcement.


SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations on ways to conduct future research emerged from the discussions. They include the following (not listed in priority):

Research on ways lessons learned from the South African WMD experience map to other African countries.

Research on the nexus between terrorists and organized criminals in Africa and the conditions under which they might cooperate to engage in WMD activities.

Research on ways to improve maritime security and the intersection with preventing WMD proliferation.

Research on appropriate ways to educate Africans about alternative ways to meet their energy needs.

Research on the appropriate ways for export control regimes to be implemented in Africa.



Working Group Discussion Report - A-1-

APPENDIX: STEPHEN BURGESS PAPER, “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN AFRICA: A LATENT THREAT”

Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air

War College or the Department of Defense.7 Threats from weapons of mass destruction in Africa are latent in contrast to threats in Southwest (especially Iran and Pakistan) and Northeast Asia (especially North Korea) where they are more evident and pose a more imminent challenge to global security. The purpose of this paper is to assess the limited and latent threat of WMD in Africa. The focus of the paper is on South Africa because that is where the development of WMD in the 1980s was far greater than it has ever been in any other African country and that is where proliferations concerns still reside. In contrast, North African states, such as Egypt and Libya, may have developed chemical weapons, but their programs were less advanced and proliferation concerns associated with these nations’ programs have not been great. The threat of proliferation from South Africa remains more important than the possibility of Africa’s “ungoverned spaces” being used to transport WMD. In considering the WMD threat in Africa, South Africa still poses a limited probability threat of WMD proliferation and WMD falling into the hands of terrorists.8 South Africa developed and dismantled nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles and remains a source of possible proliferation from former project directors, scientists and engineers. Related threats include South African extremist networks, which could gain access to WMD. Other related challenges include sophisticated South African conventional weapons and missile technology, which could fall into the wrong hands. Secondary or cascading threats include South African WMD scientific and technological expertise and secrets spreading to Southwest Asia and other regions of concern. This problem is malleable with continuing South African government surveillance of networks that are linked to Al Qaeda or to larger proliferation networks. The importance of understanding all of the dimensions of the threat is explained in this paper. Additionally, the implications of WMD threats in Africa for ongoing research and development trends and for AFRICOM plans and activities are examined.

After September 11, 2001, scholars and policymakers warned that threats of terrorists with WMD might come from “ungoverned spaces” and “porous borders” including those in Africa. 9 In East Africa, it was thought that terrorists could smuggle WMD from Southwest Asia, especially the Arabian Peninsula, by sea to use in attacking U.S. targets and others. The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2002 attacks on Israeli targets in Kenya offered a glimpse of what a WMD attack in East Africa would be like. The failed

7 Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2005. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, “Correspondence: South Africa’s Nuclear Decisions,” International Security. Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), 186-194. 8 According to Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 178-207, South Africa has been a “disarmament trendsetter” since 1994 and has made efforts to contain the ongoing proliferation danger from previous WMD programs and has thereby minimized the threat. 9 See Peter Chalk, “Case Study: The East Africa Corridor” and Kevin A. O’Brien and Theodore Karasik, “Case Study: West Africa”, in Angel Rabasa, et al, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 2007, 147-205.


Working Group Discussion Report - A-2 -

state of Somalia (an archetypal ungoverned space) offered smuggling opportunities for Al Qaeda en route from Arabia to East Africa. Concerns about Al Qaeda trafficking from the Arabian Peninsula to Somalia and East Africa constituted one of the reasons for the 2002 establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) by U.S. Central Command.10 Sudan, which hosted Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda from 1991 to 1996, could have acquired or developed chemical and biological weapons and passed them on to terrorists or used such weapons in Darfur and Southern Sudan against rebel forces and civilian populations. In North and West Africa, it was thought that Al Qaeda-related terrorist groups, especially centered in Algeria and the Sahara Desert (another ungoverned space), could have stolen or otherwise acquired chemical and biological weapons from facilities of suspect North African states to use against U.S. targets and others.11 This threat was one of the reasons for the U.S. Pan-Sahel Initiative, centered in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad; the initiative was followed by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program. After the termination of the Libyan WMD program in 2003, some thought it possible for Libyan scientists and engineers involved in that country’s WMD program to be engaged in proliferation activities. Also, the ungoverned spaces concept was applied to areas in which uranium is mined, such as Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the danger of smuggling WMD-related materials.

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of Al Qaeda using Africa as an area to develop WMD capability or smuggle WMD and launch attacks on U.S. targets has not materialized. Therefore, the “ungoverned spaces” in Africa concept is not as compelling as it once was.12 Also, a state like Sudan, which could have developed and used chemical and biological weapons in Darfur and Southern Sudan against rebel forces and civilian populations, has not done so. Instead of including Africa in their focus, policymakers and the intelligence community have refined their approach and now focus mainly on Southwest Asia, especially on Pakistan and Iran and ungoverned spaces in that region. A challenge that Africa now poses is from the “porous borders” of its more than fifty states and the lack of supervision of goods that cross those borders. In addition, African states have been slow to sign and ratify conventions that would tighten export and import controls. Given the weakness of border patrols and policing systems and the inattention of most African governments, the possibility remains that WMD and related materials will transit Africa. The unsupervised sea lanes and coastlines, especially in the Indian Ocean, through

10 In addition to CJTF-HOA, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative was launched in 2002 to strengthen the ability of governments to police their territories in defense against terrorists. Also, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched in 2002 enabled U.S. and coalition forces to monitor smuggling activities on the high seas, especially the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. 11 Egypt is suspected of having a covert chemical and biological warfare program. Algeria may have such a program. Libya has discontinued its program. 12 For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between ungoverned spaces and WMD in Africa, see Jessica Piombo, “Ungoverned Spaces and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Africa: Exploring the Potential for Terrorist Exploitation”, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, October 2008.



which WMD might be transported, pose just as great of a challenge. Recent activities of Somali pirates demonstrate the potential for WMD smuggling. Analysis of Current WMD Challenges in Africa: South Africa Since 1994, the South African government has demonstrated a strong and continuing commitment to WMD nonproliferation and arms export controls.13 Nevertheless, South Africa poses a WMD challenge in Africa because of its resident scientists and engineers and former project managers with experience in the apartheid-era nuclear and biological programs of the 1970s and 1980s. Since the rollback of the WMD programs in the early 1990s, the country has been a potential source of WMD supply. WMD proliferation activities have continued to be reported. These reports can be explained by the skill of covert operators and well-developed transnational networks, as well as weak domestic intelligence and police. At issue are whether or not WMD supply and terrorist networks will intersect and the possibility of future surprises. Proliferation problems and transnational networks involving South Africa developed during the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa established nuclear proliferation networks with Israel and other countries and firms throughout Europe and other parts of the world. Starting in the mid-1980s, A.Q. Khan and some South African nuclear scientists, engineers and businessmen established relations that developed into part of A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network. In the 1980s, chemical and biological proliferation networks were established by Colonel Dr. Wouter Basson, director of the biological and chemical warfare program (Project Coast), and Dr. Daan Goosen, scientist and director of the biological warfare Roodepoort Research Laboratories – which was the cornerstone of Project Coast. In 2003, the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network’s supply of centrifuges to Libya’s nuclear weapons program led investigators to uncover network links in South Africa. In January 2004, South African authorities arrested Asher Karni for involvement in a deal to sell “spark caps” that could be used in nuclear detonators to a Pakistani businessman and associate of A.Q. Khan. In September 2004, they arrested four business and engineering figures, including some who had been involved in aspects of the nuclear weapons program of the 1970s and 1980s. South African police arrested Johan Meyer of Tradefin Engineering on suspicion of manufacturing centrifuge parts and equipment for Libya. Tradefin produced the equipment needed to insert and withdraw the uranium hexafluoride gas that is enriched in centrifuges. Tradefin also attempted unsuccessfully to make the sensitive maraging steel rotors for the P2 centrifuges. 14 Meyer admitted to prosecutors that he knew that the items were for a uranium-enrichment plant. Based on his testimony, other individuals were arrested, including Gerhard Wisser, a German citizen and owner of Krisch Engineering in South Africa, who had a long history of involvement with other members of the network.

13 Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 178-207. South Africa had become a “disarmament trendsetter”, dismantling its nuclear weapons program in 1991, chemical and biological warfare program in 1993, and missile program in 1994, as well as leading in the negotiation and signing of an “African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone” in 1995 and bringing compromise in Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences in 1995 and 2000. 14 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly, 28:2 Spring 2005, 115.



Wisser had been arrested a month earlier in Germany for his alleged role in producing centrifuge parts in South Africa for delivery to Libya and was out on bail in South Africa.15

Daniel Jacobus Van Beek, director of South Africa's counter-proliferation office, participated in the raid and called the scheme “one of the most serious and extensive attempts” to breach international nuclear controls. 16 The activities took place in spite of the fact that South Africa has one of the world's strictest anti-proliferation laws, with severe sentences and financial penalties for violators. Van Beek estimated that the 200 tons of equipment seized during the raid was worth about $33 million.17

In November 2004, the Swiss government arrested Gotthard Lerch, a German citizen, who had been employed by Leybold Heraeus, a German company that developed and produced vacuum products and technology. Before undergoing internal reform in the early 1990s, Leybold Heraeus and its sister companies had been major suppliers to many secret nuclear weapons programs, including the programs of South Africa, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. A Malaysian police report mentioned that Lerch was allegedly involved in trying to obtain centrifuge parts for Libya from South Africa. Germany asked Switzerland to arrest Lerch so that he would not be free when Wisser was released on bail by South African authorities.18 Lerch was subsequently acquitted. In 2007, Wisser was given an 18-year suspended sentenced for his role in the network. On February 5, 2008, South African-based Swiss engineer Daniel Geiges became the second person to be found guilty in South Africa of being linked to the network and was given a 13 year suspended prison sentence.

The A.Q. Khan network arrests and convictions point to the fact that South Africa still has a domestic nuclear energy program, industrial infrastructure and sophisticated manufacturing machinery, as well as the scientific, technological and engineering expertise sought by states and organizations seeking to proliferate nuclear materials or build nuclear weapons. The case alerted South Africa and other countries about the limitations of export controls in stopping the transfer of nuclear-related materials. South Africa has been a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member for more than a decade, but investigations called into question whether or not the government was adequately implementing its national export control and nuclear nonproliferation laws.19 Critics pointed out that South Africa’s NSG membership enabled companies assisting the Khan network to receive items from other NSG members without effective checks on their potential end use. The failure to stop the illicit manufacture of centrifuge components has been a matter of concern.20

15 Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan,” 117-118. 16 Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel, “New Branch Found in Nuclear Network: South African affiliates of a Pakistani scientist's proliferation ring tried to outfit Libya with an off-the-shelf uranium enrichment plant,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2004. 17 Frantz and Rempel, “New Branch Found in Nuclear Network.” 18 Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan,” 118. 19 Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan,” 118-119. 20 South African officials assert that the arrests and convictions were the only ones thus far of the A.Q. Khan network and vindicate South African export control and nonproliferation laws as well as law enforcement.



In the 1980s, Wouter Basson led in the establishment of biological and chemical weapons supply networks in Europe and other parts of the world. The result was what one American weapon inspector found in 1995 was the “second most sophisticated biological program next to that of the Soviet Union” and “pathogens that had never been seen before”.21 Though the program was rolled back in the early 1990s, proliferation concerns arose with revelations that Basson had made several visits to Libya in 1993 and 1994 and was found in 1997 to have kept trunk loads of Project Coast documents in his possession. Concerns about Basson’s activities were escalated through revelations in the 1998 Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings and Basson’s 2000-2 trial.

In April 2003, a series in the Washington Post revealed that in early 2002, Dr. Daan Goosen, on behalf of 19 associates, had offered an entire collection of pathogens, including genetically modified ones, to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in exchange for $5 million U.S. dollars and immigration permits for the associates and their families. While personal financial motives were the primary motive of these former Project Coast scientists, their spokesperson, Dr. Goosen, claimed that they had decided to approach the FBI after receiving overtures by several foreigners who were interested in purchasing biological pathogens.22 The fears of many analysts and policymakers were confirmed by this incident involving scientists, some of whom were experiencing problems making a living in the new South Africa. They had reportedly retained specimens and documents that were supposedly destroyed in 1993 and were insinuating that they would sell their expertise and pathogens to the highest bidder, if guaranteed employment was not forthcoming. Even more questions were raised a few months after the Washington Post interview, when Dr. Goosen claimed that his group of scientists had informed South African officials that the group had retained proscribed biological agents in their homes. Goosen claims that South African government officials took DNA fingerprints but allowed the scientists to retain the biological agents.23 The revelations in the South African case confirm warnings made by proliferation and terrorist experts that arms control approaches designed to limit the spread of WMD may have not adequately addressed some proliferation threats.24 The South African case raises concerns about longer-term WMD proliferation associated with WMD rollback. Efforts by actors to acquire biological agents in South Africa and links of U.S. micro-biologists to Project Coast illustrate enduring concerns regarding the possible illegal sale of WMD agents, secrets or expertise. Some American and South African officials remain concerned about

21 Purkitt and Burgess, 164. 22 Joby Warrick and John Mintz, “Lethal Legacy: Bioweapons for Sale; U.S. Declined South African Scientist's Offer on Man-Made Pathogens Copyright,” Washington Post, (April 20, 2003), A1. These foreigners included “a German treasure-hunter and a man claiming to be an Arab sheik’s agent. Other reports surfaced during the latter half of 2002 alleging that a deal involving an apartheid-era general selling Project Coast pathogens to Al Qaeda had been foiled when the former general died under suspicious circumstances. 23 Purkitt and Burgess, 177. 24 For a summary of research on the nature of emerging biological warfare threats see, Guy B. Roberts, Arms Control Without Arms Control: The Failure of the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol and a New Paradigm for Fighting the Threat of Biological Weapons, U.S. Air Force Academy: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Occasional Paper No. 49, March 2003.



what former Project Coast scientists would do for a living in South Africa and what they might do if they immigrated to various parts of the world.25 Analysis of Related Threats - Extremist Networks The existence of extremist networks in Africa, especially in South Africa, alongside proliferation networks are a cause for concern. There is the possibility that WMD materials will be offered for sale in South Africa to Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks and fears that terrorists might be able to obtain and use sophisticated WMD devices and materials, such as centrifuges and weapons-grade anthrax. The prospects for states, such as Iran, to acquire WMD devices and materials are also a concern. There is also the possibility that Iran and other states will pass WMD to terrorist organizations in South Africa. Therefore, South Africa will remain a subject of scrutiny for some time to come in order to provide indications and warnings of WMD terrorist activity. Al Qaeda and its local affiliates have established and increased their presence in South Africa over the past decade, and American and South African authorities worry that Al Qaeda or affiliate cells will spread and that they will strive to recruit new foot soldiers from among disaffected youths in Muslim neighborhoods in South Africa.

Several African countries, including South Africa, were targeted by terrorists as possible locations where materials or components for a WMD device could be obtained.26 The 2001 U.S. Department of Justice indictment of individuals accused of being involved in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, noted that since 1993, Osama bin Laden and other terrorists had made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons.27 The indictments provided evidence from a former Al Qaeda member of attempts by group members to buy uranium of South African origin.28 The group’s desire to acquire chemical weapons and uranium brought them into contact with officials in Sudan.29

25 Many former Project Coast scientists continue to experience difficulties finding professional employment See Robert Block, “Biohazard: Bitter Researchers Are Big Question In Germ Warfare - Closing of South African Lab In ‘90s Isolated Scientists Ripe for Recruitment Now - Ankle-Deep in Chicken Guts,” Wall Street Journal (electronic version), May 20, 2002 and “A Cautionary Disarmament --- South Africa's Surrender of Nuclear Arms Was Only Half the Battle,” Wall Street Journal (electronic version), January 31, 2003. 26 “Nuclear Trafficking Database”, NIS: 38 (www.nti.org). Graham Allison and Andrei Kokoshin, “The New Containment: An Alliance against Nuclear Terrorism, The National Interest, Fall 2002: 35-43. Extensive press coverage of documents seized at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan by U.S. military personnel in 2002 alerted many in the informed public to the fact that Al Qaeda members had been interested in obtaining or building a nuclear bomb or enhanced radiation device. Moreover, reports posted on the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database website note that the CIA had been intercepting messages throughout the 1990s that indicated that Al Qaeda members were trying to obtain a nuclear weapon in order to carry out a plan for a “Hiroshima” against America. 27 Based on summary located in NIS, “Nuclear Trafficking Database,”38. According to this summary prepared in 2002, there were 345 research reactors in 58 states that together contained 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Many individual locations had enough HEU to produce a nuclear bomb. 28 NIS, “Nuclear Trafficking Database,”38. These efforts were in addition to other efforts to buy a complete warhead or weapons-usable materials from Central Asian states or from Chechen criminal groups in a money-and drug in exchange for nuclear weapons deal. 29 Vernon Loeb, “Terrorism Trail Pulls Veil from Hard Cell,” Washington Post, May 24, 2001, A16. There was testimony that a Sudanese military officer had offered to sell uranium to Al Qaeda for $1.5 million. A

http://www.nti.org/



In November 2002 in Mombasa, Kenya, the “Army of Palestine” claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a hotel frequented by Israelis and a failed missile attack on an Israeli airliner. The attack was interpreted by U.S. and South African officials as the work of Al Qaeda. Concerns were expressed that South Africa and several other African states were being used as, “potential breeding grounds, as well as safe havens for terrorist networks.”30 South African officials acknowledged that Al Qaeda operatives may have been operating out of South Africa for years. The main concern of authorities in the United States and South Africa governments was the possibility that,

Several militant Islamic organizations were smuggling gold, diamonds and cash

via Durban and Mozambique to Pakistan and Dubai. President Mbeki also warned the public that Al Qaeda operatives might be establishing a presence in South Africa after the September 11. 2001 attacks in the United States. Mbeki noted that the success of American and European authorities in routing out Al Qaeda cells in other countries, may have led many members of these covert networks to find new bases. 31

The seriousness of warnings about Al Qaeda in South Africa acquired more credence after Khamis Khalfan Mohamed, an Al Qaeda operative from Tanzania who was allegedly involved in the 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, took refuge in South Africa before he was arrested in Cape Town and extradited to the United States in 2002. There have also been several public reports in recent years that Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists are using South Africa as a base from where they can regroup, raise and launder money, and plan more terror attacks.

The United States and other Western states remain concerned about the prospect of terrorists using South Africa as a base of operations. The country has a world-class banking system and stock market, a modern telecommunications system, good road and rail network system and broad civil liberties, all of which makes it easy to move people and money. There have been reports that Al Qaeda was buying gold and diamonds to make it more difficult to trace the organization's wealth in Africa.32

witness claimed that the officer showed Osama bin Laden’s agents a two-foot cylinder that purportedly contained the fissile material, along with documents that were allegedly from South Africa and that he received a $10,000 bonus for arranging the sale but did not know whether it was ever consummated. He did not know whether the cylinder held bomb-grade uranium, leaving open the strong possibility that the deal was a scam. 30 The quote is taken from a U.S. State Department Report on Terrorism published in 2002 and summarized in a South African newspaper account. See Adam Tanner, “Al-Qaeda presence in SA - expert,” Die Burger, (November 28, 2002). 31 Pierre Steyn, “Concern about Al Qaeda in SA,” Die Burger (South Africa), October 12, 2002. In the same statement, Mbeki acknowledged that after the 1998 bomb blast at Planet Hollywood in Cape Town, the South African National Intelligence Agency had warned him that foreign Islamic extremists were covertly operating in South Africa. An unnamed source reported in one local South African press account that members of both Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese-based Hezbollah underwent paramilitary training in South Africa. 32 Steyn, “Concern about Al-Qaeda in SA.” Some of the recent concerns about the use of South Africa by Al Qaeda to move diamonds and money through South Africa are listed in the U.S. State Department 2002



In recent years, the South African government has responded to the growing presence of radical Islamic terrorist groups. For example, to better cope with these allegations, the South African special police unit, the Scorpions, has increased their cooperation and coordination with their role model, the FBI. The Scorpions have also increased their cooperation with counterpart at similar investigative services in several Europe and Asian countries.

In 2002, the South African National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service and the Ministry of Home Affairs uncovered a terrorist ring and funding for terrorists in South Africa.33 The ring was responsible for considerable activity, including trafficking and falsifying documents, as well as the funding of mosques and madrassas.34 The July 21, 2005 London attempted bombings were traced to this ring.35 Islamic radicalism and terrorist support networks are concentrated in Fordsburg, a southern suburb of Johannesburg, and in Durban. Counter-intuitively, the more affluent Muslim communities in South Africa appear the most susceptible to radical Islam. In addition, Saudis, Iranians, and Pakistanis have been found to be providing money to fund radical Islamic groups in South Africa.36

Analysis of Related Threats: Missile and Conventional Weapons Proliferation Related to WMD proliferation is the spread of missiles and other delivery systems and conventional weapons with extraordinary destructive capability. First, some South African weapons scientists who worked on missile programs in the 1980s have been the subjects of proliferation concern. In 2000, a South African engineer allegedly sold weapons secrets to Pakistan, helping that country overcome restrictions on arms sales imposed by South Africa after the 1999 coup by General Pervez Musharraf. An air weapons specialist was tried on 21 counts that ranged from fraud to theft to contraventions of several laws, including the Armscor Act and the Copyright Act.37

In recent years, there has been interest in South Africa’s cluster, fuel air, and flag bombs by governments and organizations around the world.38 One reason for the interest is because it

Terrorism Report discussed in Steyn, “Concern about Al-Qaeda in SA,” 2000. See also a report in the Mail and Guardian (South Africa), March 25, 2003. In 2002, Mohamed Suleman Vaid and his wife Moshena of Durban were arrested at a Swazi border post with more than 1 million rand hidden in their clothing. Vaid denied that the money was meant for Al Qaeda, but authorities claimed that the money was on its way to a Mozambique citizen with Al Qaeda connections. 33 Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, interviewed September 7, 2005. 34 Kurt Shillinger, After London: Reassessing Africa’s Role in the War on Terror, American Enterprise Institute, September 2005. 35 These bombings came in the wake of the July 7, 2005 bombings on London transport. 36 Shillinger commented that U.S.-South African relations in the war on terror still suffer from the fact that many American officials in the 1980s (including Dick Cheney) called the African National Congress (ANC) a terrorist organization. The Minister of Intelligence Services, Ronnie Kasrils, in a recent talk at the U.S. Naval War College, spoke about those issues. Shillinger also observed that The South African constitution is a problem in the war on terror; as there are lots of legal ways to stay in South Africa. 37 Report in the web-based summary of articles in the Mail and Guardian (South Africa), March 29, 2000. 38 In the 1970s and 1980s, South African scientists developed a small fuel air bomb that could saturate a 2-meter roof of a bunker, and a flag bomb, which is a deflagration bomb that is based on the same principles



is difficult to build a fuel air bomb and get the right mix of fuels. A flag bomb is easier to make because it is an enhanced normal explosive. This characteristic makes a pseudo fuel bomb, which uses TNT, an attractive terrorist weapon that could cause a great deal more damage than the conventional bombs used in terrorist attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and elsewhere. After September 11, 2001, the South African government reviewed its arms sales polices to be sure that they were strict enough to ensure that terrorists could not purchase these more exotic bombs or other weapons systems developed in conjunction with the nuclear and missile programs, including gravity bombs, atomic demolition munitions, low-yield miniaturized devices for artillery pieces, and tactical standoff weapons. Conclusion and Implications This paper has demonstrated that South Africa should receive continuing attention when considering current and future WMD challenges in Africa, because the country has been a source of WMD expertise, secrets and agents as well as a locale for Al Qaeda-related activity.39 The country will remain a point of concern regarding WMD; the possibility that Al Qaeda-related terrorists might be able to obtain and use WMD; and the links between South Africa and the South Asian subcontinent and the urban centers of East Africa, especially Nairobi. It is through Al Qaeda-related networks that South African WMD-related issues might have a broader impact on the more general state of WMD threats. A secondary concern is North African states, a few of which may have chemical and biological weapons and which could pose proliferation and terrorism challenges. A preventive measure would be to encourage African states to ratify and enforce all nonproliferation conventions and protocols as well as to increase their capacity to enforce export and import controls, monitor porous borders and key ungoverned spaces.

Secondary or cascading challenges might include the spread of WMD scientific and technological expertise and secrets from South Africa to East Africa, North Africa and Southwest Asia. This problem is malleable if there is continuing surveillance of specific South African scientists, engineers, businessmen, and networks, as well as increased surveillance and law enforcement throughout the African continent. This paper points to the importance of understanding all of the dimensions of the threat; especially the knowledge and expertise of scientists and engineers that can be used to spread WMD secrets and agents as well as the networks that seek to proliferate or acquire WMD. The implications for research and development trends include a continuing focus on South

as a thermalberic warhead. South Africa weapons researchers started developing many of these new conventional bombs, because they were unable to buy new types of bombs from foreign suppliers due to end users restrictions in place since the late 1970s. A precision-guided munition, the Kentron Raptor-1, was developed in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, South African weapon builders decided not to focus their efforts on developing WMD warheads; instead they worked on finalizing sophisticated conventional weapons. The defense company, Mechem, manufactured the fuel air bomb warhead, while a counterpart, Somchem, developed a liquid explosive for the bomb. A prototype fuel air bomb was used in counter-insurgency campaigns. By the time the fuel air bomb program was stopped in 1989, the bomb could be demonstrated but did not have a rocket available to deliver it. 39 In addition, a few of South Africa’s leaders and politicians have considered the rolled back WMD programs to still be “national assets”, which might be reconstituted if the country came under threat from outside powers.



Africa and its WMD-related industries and research centers, as well as a focus on the Horn of Africa and Sahara-Sahel and connections with Southwest Asia. In mapping the South African case to other parts of the world, many of the same components (e.g., high threat levels and an industrial-technological base) exist in Southwest Asia (including the Middle East), and WMD programs have developed there. Conversely, few of the components exist in Africa; therefore, it is unlikely that other African states will develop WMD programs for decades to come. The implications for AFRICOM plans and activities include cooperation with the U.S. Department of State, Department of Justice, and U.S. intelligence agencies in maintaining continued vigilance in regard to South Africa and the Horn of Africa and Sahara-Sahel region. In this regard, there must be an understanding that effective surveillance should be sustained over the areas of responsibility of both the U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Central Command and the links between them in regard to thwarting WMD proliferation activities and the likelihood of WMD terrorism.

African Security Challenges - HSDL

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