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AfricAnDefense4 The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States A case study of the Republic of Uganda in the context of East African security. By Major Alex Bwoma Tumushabe

16 East Africa’s Differing Views of Terrorist Threats Create Responses Challenges African Union’s failure to eradicate terrorism in East Africa threatens long-term stability By Kabir Bhatia

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25 Africa’s Egypt, Rejunvenation Trying to make up for lost decades, Egypt re-engages Africa. By Zaid Al-Nassir

27 The Years of Implementation South African Minister of Defence Ms Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula discusses transformation of the military and the partnership with South African industry.

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African Defense/July 20154

The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing StatesA case study of the Republic of Uganda in the context of East African security.

By Major Alex Bwoma Tumushabe

Ugandan Army

Democratic governments face a dilem-ma of protecting civil liberties and protect-ing the nation, especially in times of crisis. Immediately after 9/11, for example, US leaders introduced broad new authorities and legal measures in such laws as the USA Patriot Act. In the same vein, the govern-ment of Uganda enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, responding to its own internal and regional threats of terrorism. Ugandans met the Anti-Terrorism Act with mixed

feelings, much the same way that American citizens are skeptical about the Patriot Act in regard to their civil liberties, and ulti-mately to the security of the nation. Much of the discourse boils down to whether and at what point forceful measures to protect or imperil the democracy. The challenge is deciding how to balance counterterror-ism measures while upholding democratic principles. The question is, if anything, more press-

ing in a democratizing state like Uganda. Uganda, as a political entity, has been engaged in democratization since 1986, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumed the leadership of the coun-try. Thus, Uganda’s democratic institutions are relatively new, and in some cases still taking form. On the other hand, Uganda finds itself in a tough neighborhood, which includes the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Kenya, with many


African Defense/July 2015 55

direct and regional neighbors that struggle with post-colonial development and internal conflicts amid their own first steps towards democracy. And while neighboring Kenya presents a more stable polity, it shares with Uganda at least one major regional/transna-tional terrorist threat in the form of al-Sha-baab. In other words the sense of danger to the Ugandan state and the government is as real and pressing as the country’s demo-cratic progress. Domestically, Uganda has been facing two ongoing insurgencies for more than two-and-a-half decades: the Lord’s Resis-tance Army (LRA) in the northern parts of the country, and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in the west. In addition, the country has also been challenged by transnational terrorist threats and actions mainly from al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda offshoot operating from the neighboring countries of Kenya and Somalia. For instance, on July 11, 2010, al-Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda, leading to the deaths of 74 innocent civilians; an additional 89 people were injured. These attacks qualified al-Shabaab as a transnational terror group posing a major threat to Uganda.

zxxxx Counter-Terrorism Policies In Uganda

Uganda’s counter-terrorism measures, dealing with both domestic and internation-al terrorist threats, fall into three different categories: the criminal justice model, the military model, and coordination with inter-national conventions. In the criminal justice model, terrorism is perceived as a crime, with the burden of response falling on the state’s regular criminal legal system. In the military model, terrorism is regarded as an act of warfare placed within the remit of the armed forces. A third category leverages international conventions in tackling acts of terrorism transnationally. The models matter because counter-ing terrorism poses significant challenges to the protection and promotion of demo-cratic principles. Over the years, terrorism has increased in both sophistication and scope, taxing the criminal justice systems and the militaries of all nations alike. The growing terrorist threat has also prompted international organizations to redesign their mission to account for the changing security environment emanating from terrorism threats. What follows is a review of Uganda’s counter-terrorism response in terms of these

models. It looks at the criminal-justice and military systems in collaboration with intel-ligence coordination to determine whether they have been effective and efficient in dealing with terrorism. Finally, it considers Uganda’s compliance with international counter-terrorism conventions, emphasizing Uganda’s reasons for compliance.

Ugandan Law and the Criminal Justice Model The criminal justice model considers terrorism to be a criminal act and prescribes the use of law to fight it. The law enforce-ment approach to combating terrorism involves legislation, criminal prosecu-tion, and incarceration. It begins with an understanding of terrorist activity as a form of criminal conduct, which has implications for interventions aimed at tackling it. The conventional institutions for fighting crime the police and the judiciary—are also those responsible for combating terrorism. The police have the primary responsibility of en-forcing anti-terrorism laws in collaboration with other state agencies involved in the criminal justice system. Both institutions are supported by intelligence, which is the first line of defense against any threat to national security. As mentioned previously, in wake of the 1998 bomb attacks in Kampala, as well as the 9/11 attacks in the US, Uganda enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 as the main legislative weapon for fighting ter-rorism in the country and beyond. The act defines terrorism as “any act of violence or threat of violence carried out for purposes of influencing government or intimidating the public and for any political, religious, social, and economic aim, indis-criminately without due regard for the safety of others or property.” The law supersedes the Penal Code Act, which was initially used for formulating various penalties for suspects who committed offenses of capital nature. All offenses related to terrorism are handled under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The act criminalizes anyone involved in running a terrorist organization or any organization that promotes, publishes, and disseminates news or materials that facilitate terrorism activities. In line with this section of the act, the Ugandan government has been able to list four terrorist organizations. Under the second schedule of the act, the LRA, Lord’s Resistance Movement, Allied Democratic Forces/Front, and al-Qaeda have been ga-

zetted as terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the act criminalizes anyone who supports or assists a terrorist organization, and also penalizes whoever makes any contribution of funds or any other resource to a terrorist organization. The act provides for coordination be-tween the law enforcement institutions and judicial jurisdiction over terrorism. It also permits terrorism investigations, intercep-tion of communications, and surveillance as key parts. Financial intelligence has gained value as a key tool in fighting terrorism. The central idea in this approach is that if ter-rorist organizations are starved of financial resources, their capability to carry out ter-rorist activities will be totally degraded. The Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act crimi-nalizes terrorism but contains neither regu-latory nor enforcement mechanisms. This is true because in some cases it becomes difficult to practically monitor and enforce the law due to lack of required capacity in terms of skilled manpower and equipment. The new law also paints terrorism in broad strokes—which may cover more offenses than its proponents supposed. For example, the act defines acts of terrorism as manufacturing, handling or detonating a lethal device in a public place; involve-ment in murders, kidnapping, abduction, or maiming of any person; or actions that attempt to influence the government or intimidate the public. The law does not distinguish between plainly criminal acts and terrorist ones and, thus, seems to bring many acts into the category of “terrorism,” whether or not they were so conceived or undertaken. The 2010 Interceptions of Commu-nications Act and its regulations enhance the Anti-Terrorism Act by providing for lawful surveillance/interception of com-munications in Uganda. The law requires intelligence agencies to apply for warrants to monitor and or intercept communica-tions and mandates all telecommunications service providers to register their clients. Surveillance includes interception of letters and postal packages of any person; interception of telephone calls, faxes, emails, and other communications made or issued by or addressed to a person; and monitoring of meetings of any group of per-sons. Other powers include the surveillance of movements and activities of any person, electronic surveillance of any person, ac-cess to bank accounts, and searching of the premises of any person. The act says that the


purposes for which interception or surveil-lance may be conducted include the safe-guarding of the public interest, prevention of the violation of fundamental and other human rights and freedoms of any person from terrorism, prevention or detecting the commission of any offence, and safeguard-ing the national economy from terrorism.

Military Model The military model is based on the idea that the use of military force and methods can effectively undermine terrorism. It emphasizes the marshalling of all military means in order to quash a terrorist threat or action. From this perspective, terrorism is regarded as an act of warfare or insur-gency. The military model does not work in isolation, however; it must be supported by intelligence efforts in order to be effective. In Uganda, military offensives have been carried out against the LRA and ADF particularly in the northern and western parts of the country. As a result, the LRA was pushed to the extreme areas of the Cen-tral African Republic; and the ADF, to the jungles of the DRC. Although this intervention could have brought relief to the people in northern and western Uganda, the unstable political climate in the neighboring countries of DRC and South Sudan have provided safe havens for these elements. However, the use of diplomacy has enhanced Uganda’s posi-tion to allow the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to pursue these groups across borders. The use of military power to dismantle terrorist cells, especially in counterinsurgen-cy strategies, has proved to be the weapon of choice for many countries, including Uganda. However, some scholars have questioned the efficacy of the military ap-proach. For example, Richard English, in his book Terrorism: How to Respond, contends that a militarized response is unlikely to defeat terrorism. He argued that preemptive action by security forces cannot succeed in taking out every potential. These observations about the efficacy of the military model in undermining terrorism are supported by experiences of Uganda. In Uganda, military pressure on the LRA, ADF and al-Shabaab has failed to suppress their operations. While it may be argued that the LRA and the ADF have been weakened, they still constitute a serious challenge to the security of the state and civilians in the region. The military approach in Uganda has

been associated with killing some members, especially top leaders of the terrorist groups. But as Daniel Byman observed in The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad, killing some members of terrorist and insurgents groups is only successful in the short term because those leaders are easily replaced. Thus, little is gained by removing the top leaders of a given group. Uganda’s military strategy has faced formidable challenges. In the first place, the complex natures of the LRA and ADF, and the versatility with which they can traverse international borders, have overstretched the Ugandan military both in terms of personnel and resources. Second, geopoliti-cal factors also have limited the capacity of the Ugandan military to disrupt the LRA and ADF terrorist groups. For instance, efforts to pursue the LRA and ADF in the jungles of South Sudan and DRC have been dented by these countries’ refusal to grant the Ugan-dan troops access to areas affected by the terrorists. The DRC government has a deeply engrained suspicion of the Ugandan army’s intentions on its soil, which represents a major hindrance in the fight against the LRA and ADF, which groups use DRC territory as a safe haven. The United States supports Uganda’s military approach to defeating the LRA. In May 2010, the US Congress passed the Dis-armament Bill. This measure was followed by the deployment of 100 combat-equipped US troops on October 12, 2011. GeneralCarter Ham, the then-head of the US mili-tary’s Africa Command, asserted that the troops will remain deployed until the LRA group is totally defeated. US support has provided Uganda government with a strong counter-terrorism partnership for fighting terrorists, and, hopefully, the LRA will be eliminated in the region. In addition, Uganda’s involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) under the auspices of the African Union’s (AU) efforts to defeat terrorism in Somalia and the Horn of Africa raises further challenges in its efforts to defeat terrorist organizations in Uganda. Uganda is a lead-ing contributor of troops to the AMISOM, whose current deployment, however, is too small and underequipped to effectively defeat terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab, operating in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has on many occasions used roadside and suicide attacks against AMISOM troops, resulting in

many Ugandan military fatalities. Moreover, there is mistrust between AMISOM and the Somali National Transitional Forces (TFG), which further exacerbates the problem and which, to some extent, has hampered Ugan-da’s efforts to fight al-Shabaab in Somalia. Intelligence is an important compo-nent in helping to combat terrorism. The Ugandan intelligence community has been credited for being able to thwart al-Qaeda attacks against the US embassy in Kampala in August 1998. This success was attributed to the coordination of East African intelli-gence services in sharing and exchanging of intelligence information about the terrorist networks that were operating in the region. The security forces have formed a joint anti-terrorism task force (JATT) as the coordinating interagency unit to enhance the fight against terrorism. JATT is composed of personnel from the military intelligence agencies, police, the Internal Security Organization (ISO), and the External Secu-rity Organization (ESO). Before the 1999 attacks, the security forces police, military, intelligence agencies and private security firms worked independent of each other. The lack of coordination led to duplica-tion of roles and uncoordinated strategies to the management of terror attacks. For instance, between 1997 and 2002, the ADF network was able to detonate more than 48 explosive devices, killing at least 50 and injuring more than 200 people. At that time, there was no security agency specifically detailed to handle the emerging threat of terrorism. Extensive coordination among govern-ment institutions and intelligence agencies, according to Paul Wilkinson in his Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Re-sponse, produces precise intelligence. Only when effective coordination of intelligence services and resources is established can the authorities hope to undermine the opera-tional capabilities of the terrorists groups, a matter that JATT aims to solve. To strengthen the efforts of JATT, the police component reinvigorated the com-munity policing approach so as to increase the participation of local communities in general crime prevention but with more focus on terror threats. The public is the first line of defense as “watch guards” for any suspicious elements in their neighbor-hood and report to police. This plan requires the population to be vigilant because the security agencies will not be everywhere at all times. This drive has been through mass


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mobilization and sensitization of the local people over the national radio, as well as using any other form of education, informa-tion, and communication materials and other sources. But there are challenges to terrorism-related intelligence gathering. The marked lack of collaboration and coordination among the various intelligence and security organs can undermine efforts to combat terrorism. The lack of collaboration and coordination among intelligence services not only affects Ugandan intelligence services but has also been highlighted by many scholars as one the main intelligence failures that contributed to the 9/11 terror attacks. Yet the development of effective intel-ligence and cooperation among intelligence agencies has been earmarked as critical in preventing attacks. Other than depending on internal intelligence, Uganda continu-ously shares intelligence information with other particular foreign partners. The Ugan-dan government observes and cooperates closely with other countries on intelligence sharing of terrorist organizations and their activities. However, the level of cooperation and collaboration among governments and states may be undermined because of mistrust and reluctance to share certain information. Consequently, intelligence may flow in one direction rather than in a quid-pro-quo fashion. Wilkinson observed that such mistrust often impedes an effective international response to terrorism. Further hindrances include serious wars and bureaucratic tendencies, coupled with the fear to reveal sensitive information and sources. As a re-sult, intelligence on terrorist is not given in a timely manner to other services at home and abroad. This delay of information diffu-sion undermines counterterrorism efforts. In all, the use of a military approach does not resonate well in the fight against terrorism, because military actions create situations that make the fight against terror-ism much harder as they seek to balance between democracy and combating terror-ism. Military actions lead to loss of lives, which otherwise would have been avoided. It also subjects the population to the ex-cesses of war that emerge. These actions are exhibited in the form of atrocities and violation of human rights committed against the population. Addition-

ally, some of the military offensives con-ducted outside the borders of country have in turn created strained relationships with the neighboring states. For instance, in one of the offensives against the ADF, Uganda invaded the DRC with the aim of denying the ADF access to the DRC as a springboard to attack Uganda. However, this action in-furiated the DRC, which took such as action as an act of aggression. The DRC accused Uganda of invading, a case that has put Uganda on the spotlight for taking illegal action against another state.

Compliance with International Counter-Terrorism Conventions Uganda has signed numerous interna-tional counter-terrorism conventions with a desire to implement international obli-gations aimed at combating international terrorism. The conventions were bargained mainly through the United Nations and other international organizations. Uganda signed and ratified the follow-ing international conventions for preventing acts of terrorism: the Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed on Septem-ber 16, 1976; the Convention for Suppres-sion of the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, signed on December 4, 1979; and the Convention against the Taking of Hostages, signed on November 10, 1980. Through these conventions, Uganda has been placed in a secure position against any terrorist incident, especially on the side of aviation and its citizens on board. This compliance has greatly improved Uganda’s capacity in the fight against transnational and domes-tic terrorism on top of being a member of international conventions on terrorism. In addition, Uganda is an ally of United States and other Western powers that are in the forefront of fighting terrorism. This alliance has helped Uganda improve its counter-terrorism capability and capacity building through training its personnel in various skills and knowledge. Additionally, at the helm of interna-tional counter-terrorism conventions lies the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), formed in 2001 to monitor the implemen-tation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Accordingly, UNSCR 1373 mandates all nations that are members of the UN to have enabling laws, including creating laws that criminalize terrorism-related offenses.

As a result of this resolution, many coun-tries, including Uganda, have established anti-terrorism acts to deal with terrorism-related cases and are also required to submit periodic reports to the CTC on their efforts to criminalize, prevent and punish terrorism-related activities. At the regional and sub-regional levels, Uganda is a member of several bodies and has adopted agreements and protocols to tackle the dangers of terrorism. The or-ganization most related to Uganda is the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Convention on the Prevention and Combat-ing of Terrorism espoused in 1999. Since 9/11, the African Union (which succeeded the OAU) has reaffirmed its commitment to combating terrorism through a protocol of the 1999 convention. Even though the regional agreements are limited in the use of force in the fight against terrorism, they represent another commitment that is very profound in response to terrorism. The most obvious is the compliance with the inter-national legal instruments and financial muscle support. At the present time, Uganda is co-operating with other nations in an effort to combat terrorism in regard to sharing intelligence information, joint operation, and training exercises. In line with interna-tional efforts, Uganda was among the first countries to support the US war on terror when the United States attacked Afghanistan and Iraq in the fight against terrorism. Thus, Uganda benefited from the support that the United States extended to Kenya and Tanza-nia in the improvement of the aviation se-curity and borders controls and regulations. The support has greatly reduced the level of threats to the aviation industry, which has been a favorable target to the terrorists. On the other hand, detractors have been accusing the government of “doing mercenary work in exchange for financial support and other forms of foreign aid.” As a result, Uganda has been associated with US policies, making it vulnerable to terrorist at-tacks. Nonetheless, by and large, Uganda’s level of compliance with the international counter-terrorism conventions has been quite high. Terrorism is multinational and crosses borders. True regional efforts have been put in place to combat terrorism in the East African region with occasional support from one another and the greater extent in all states in the Great Lakes Region. However, not all states in the GLR have laws that


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can manage terrorism in its current form. Paul Wilkinson argued that much of anti-terrorism legislation is designed to “increase the level of protection of life and property by providing law enforcement authorities with the powers needed to assist them in the apprehension and conviction of those who commit crimes of terrorism.” As such, it is important for countries facing the problems of terrorism to have legal mechanisms in places that enable them to deal with trans-national terrorists. International cooperation is impor-tant in the fight against terrorism because, in most cases, terrorists operate with and within different countries. Situations may emerge requiring states to share information on a terrorist incident or a need for extradi-tion of a terrorist. Here, the criminal justice model plays an important role in instituting the laws that deal with both domestic and transnational terrorism. In Comparative Homeland Security Global Lessons, Morag Nadav argued that the synchronization of anti-terrorism laws among democratic states lessen the burden of fighting terrorisms be-cause similar laws will be used to deal with terrorism. The significance of synchronizing

anti-terrorism was evidenced during the July 2010 Kampala bombing. In this attack, the perpetrators were found to be the citizens from the East African countries and, there-fore, handling those suspects did not present a lot of legal complications.

zxxxx Counterterrorism and the Liberty–Security Tradeoff in Uganda: Quo Vadis?

Fighting terrorism in a democratic so-ciety poses distinct challenges, particularly when policies embraced by governments are interpreted to be undemocratic in the way they are executed. The main claim of critics is that in the process of implementing these policies, governments unintentionally infringe on people’s rights and freedoms because the immediacy and urgency of security considerations preempt the nice-ties of civil liberties. This claim, according to English, is overstated by many scholars who subscribe to the view that governments institute policies in a hasty manner without due consideration of the root causes of terrorism. Either way, both democratic and democratizing states have the obligation to protect their citizens from the heinous acts

of terrorists, and the best way to do so is to put policies in place that support and are supported by the democratic values of the society.

Policy Analysis—and Effects Democracy, by its definition, allows citizens to act freely without being unduly restricted by government actions (poli-cies). It promotes the rule of law and encour-ages institutions to operate without govern-ment interventions. Additionally, democra-tization of a given society is also influenced by various factors, including the involve-ment of civil society in shaping the political landscape; political society; rule of law; and bureaucracy. Civil society, which includes groups ranging from non-government organizations (NGOs) to students’ organiza-tions, to trade unions, help in monitoring government programs especially in areas of accountability, transparency, human rights issues, conflict resolution and the rehabilita-tion of war victims. However, such relationships may not always function as described especially in


a country whose democracy is perpetually disturbed by terrorist activities. Such a situ-ation creates the need for the government to put policies in place to mitigate acts of terrorism, which in their way of functioning restricts the freedom necessary for demo-cratic process. As way of striking a balance between security and civil liberties, these policies need to be seen functioning within the legal framework without comprising the country’s security and civil liberties. Consequently, the government of Uganda in its effort to combat terrorism, while promoting and maintaining the rule of law, carried out several legal reforms and policies geared towards strengthening the existing laws and institutions in the fight against terrorism. Prominent among these changes was the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Interceptions of Communications Act, and other legal reforms that included border controls and police reforms.

Balancing Transparency/Liberty/HR and Security: The Legal Framework Under this legal framework, the Anti-Terrorism Act has been viewed to be grant-ing overwhelming powers to enforcement officers, which the public sees as a violation of civil liberties, eroding constitutionally mandated checks and balances. This contradiction is a major challenge for democratizing states like Uganda be-cause balancing counterterrorism legislation with constitutionally guaranteed human rights is often problematic. This tension is best illustrated by a case in which terrorism charges were leveled against 29 persons who allegedly burnt down a police station in a Kampala suburb during a riot in September 2009. This riot, however, did not have any connection with terrorism; the population was protesting the central government’s prevention of a cul-tural leader from visiting one of the neigh-boring counties. Bringing terrorism charges against people who demonstrate also raises human rights concerns. Some actions backed by the act require a precise legal definition to avoid this kind of contradiction as in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In as much as this contradiction exists within the law, still the Ugandan judicial system accords a fair trial to suspects as required by the constitution, leave alone the demands of human rights

activists who act as potential advocates for civil liberties. For instance, though the initial charge of the mentioned case may have been inap-propriate, still suspects were accorded a fair trial leaving the law to determine whether the charges were correctly applied. Chapter 4, Article 28 of the Ugandan constitution grants every citizen a right to a fair hearing.In addition, issues of constitutional rights have been raised by foreign terrorist sus-pects who are to be extradited from one jurisdiction to another. In Uganda, the sus-pected terrorists involved in the twin bomb explosions on July 11, 2010, challenged their extradition from Kenya and Tanzania. The suspects argued that their extra-dition to Uganda was unconstitutional because proper procedures that would guarantee their rights as protected by the constitutions of their respective countries were not followed. However, the court ruled that their trial in Uganda could stand because there was no extradition. It held that “the alleged ille-galities cannot be attributed to Uganda. This was because the respective police [of Kenya and Tanzania] voluntarily surrendered the petitioners. There is no demonstration of proof of conspiracy in the extradition.” Therefore, their trial could still stand, as Kenya was voluntarily cooperating and not compelled by any extradition treaties. How-ever, there still remains no act to streamline mutual legal assistance between Uganda and other countries. This gap poses chal-lenges to handling of requests for assistance for evidence from foreign partners. The Anti-Money Laundering Act raises its own concerns vis-à-vis democratization in Uganda, namely that the law breaches the agreement of client confidentiality, which requires that banks must keep their clients’ transactions in secrecy. By allowing third parties to get access to anyone’s transactions, the Act greatly undermines the doctrine of fair hearing and the rule of law. Despite this weakness, the financial regulations are managed within the legal framework which in itself has im-plications on the development of democra-tization making it a matter of rule of law as opposed to draconian means which are not backed by the principles of democracy. For instance, rights to privacy outlined in Chap-ter 4 Article 27 section (2) of the Ugandan constitution, which states that “no person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of that person’s home, correspon-

dence, communication or other property.” Specifically with respect to financial intervention, the act presents some chal-lenges with regard to the informal economy and the democratization process. In the first place, the informal sector provides employ-ment to a big section of unemployed popu-lation that is currently engaged in economic and income generating activities including mobile money services. In the effort to regulate such activities (informal sector), the government must ensure that it does not deny its population the source of income. Regulating these activities within the le-gal framework in itself, promotes democracy because the population will not be denied the ability to improve its standard of living. On the other hand, interfering with peoples’ sources of income may jeopardize the pro-cess of democratization because it acts as a disincentive that encourages the population to engage in terrorism activities. In addition, the fight against terrorism has been punctuated with human rights questions that range from curtailing of civil liberties to killing of innocent civilians. The interception of Communications Act has also equally affected the democratization process especially in the manner in which it is applied. It has been seen as a means of curtailing individual rights of freedom of expression. The Interception of Communica-tions Act raises a number of human rights issues for a democracy. It has been seen as a means of curtailing individual rights freedom of expression and privacy, which contravenes the constitution. In the fight against organized crime and terrorism, mod-ern police and intelligence agencies use information and surveillance technology, including phone tapping. This act potential-ly affects numerous innocent citizens who have nothing to do terrorism cases. It also constitutes far-reaching interference with the right to privacy and data protection. Ample examples of this issue appear in the media reports and complaints at the Uganda Hu-man Rights Commission (UHRC) relating to interception of communication and surveil-lance. The same issue was raised by General David Tinyefuza, a high-profile Ugandan government official, who complained about phone tapping after his failed bid to resign from the army in 1997. In addition, mem-bers of parliament (MPs) from the opposi-tion parties were up in arms with the gov-ernment for allegedly tapping their mobile phone conversations without real security


On July 11, 2010, al-Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda, leading to the deaths of 74 innocent civilians; an additional 89 people were injured. These attacks qualified al-Shabaab as a transnational terror group posing a major threat to Uganda.



motive to do so. This incident came after the parliament was informed on September 8, 2003, that intelligence intercepted a con-versation between an opposition MP and a rebel commander of the LRA. Coupled with this complaint, media reports indicated that the opposition politicians were accusing the state intelligence operatives and agencies of phone tapping at the height of the 2001 presidential and parliamentary campaigns.The unwarranted interception of telephone conversations not only denies people freedom of communication, but such acts greatly affect the process of democratiza-tion. However, the use of legal means in tackling terrorism has registered moderate success. It has been argued that criminal prosecution and the detention of terror-ist suspects disrupts their networks. In the case of Uganda, such methods have been effective in apprehending, prosecuting and convicting suspected terrorists. For instance, Edrisa Nsubuga and Mohamed Nsubuga, the perpetrators of the twin Kampala bomb-ings, have been convicted and sentenced to 25 and five years, respectively, and another 85 terror suspects are still on trial. As a counterbalance to all previous laws, the Constitution of Uganda forms the basic foundation through which all forms of laws in the country are regulated. First and foremost, the constitution advocates for protection and promotion of fundamental and other human rights and freedoms to the citizens of the Republic of Uganda. This premise forms a basis through which the balance can be attained. The constitution provides for legal systems to address injus-tice within the public, by allowing citizens fair trials and due process. To ensure that such activities are legally conducted, judicially, parliament, civil society and the media are constitution-ally mandated to be part of the procedure in every incident that takes place in the country. In addition, Article 52 of the Ugan-dan constitution mandates Human Rights Commission (HRC) to receive all complaints and information pertaining to violations of human rights and freedoms in the country, compile and publish periodic reports on its findings. The powers of this commission provide a leveled ground on which counter-terror-ism laws can function and maintain balance between democratization’s demands and the demands of security. Notwithstanding the good intentions for

border controls, freedom of movement has been greatly affected by reforms introduced within immigration systems. However, con-siderations of these reforms have been as a result of increased security threats within immigration forming a basis for the govern-ment to initiate border control measures. These controls are geared towards hav-ing immigration system with tight security controls that enable the travelling public to gain confidence, and to bar individuals with ulterior motives from entering the country illegally. These reforms involve: Border pa-trols, border fencing, issuance of entry visas, and setting up security check points along the borders. In an effort to enforce these reforms, some individual freedoms and rights have been infringed on especially the freedom of movement, which contravenes Article 29 of the constitution that guaran-tees freedom of movement of people. The hassles that the traveling public experiences along the borders do not resonate well with expectations of fundamental human rights as enshrined in the Ugandan constitution. Border patrols, stop-and-search opera-tions as well as targeting of religious, racial and tribal groups are the main activities that are considered to be conflicting with liberties and human rights. This scrutiny has mainly affected the Muslim community members across the East African countries, and people with tribal connections have

also been targeted. In Uganda, the Somali community has been targeted mainly due to its connections with Somalia where al-Sha-baab militants are currently causing havoc. In addition, individuals from countries that have connections with terrorist networks are also among targeted individuals within the travelling public and along the borders. As a way of countering these excesses and the temptations of undermining the rule of law while trying to enforce border re-forms, there are constitutional mechanisms that provide favorable grounds through which individual civil liberties are guaran-teed. The media and the Human Rights Commission, by virtual of their constitu-tional obligations, play an important role in ensuring that people’s liberties are preserved even when some individuals are caught on the wrong side of the law. The media and HRC are in a position to monitor, highlight and expose such violations and excesses. In the process, the balance between security and civil liberties will inevitably be at-tained—and maintained—because these two institutions not only act as watchdogs for liberties, freedoms, and human rights, but also keep on reminding and pressuring the government when issues of human rights abuses crop up. This act in itself is a good indicator that in as much as the government would like to institute reforms with the aim of maintaining security, still these reforms must conform to democratic principles. Currently, Uganda has an active parlia-ment that has presided over the passing of enabling laws in the promotion of democ-racy. Coupled with the legislation, other institutions of government like the police, military and intelligence services have been boosted. As a result, these institutions are showing a growing trend and are function-ing as intended along democratic lines of accountability and transparency. The police, for instance, have carried out reforms that have enabled the force to be one the effec-tive institutions and the lead agency in the fight against terrorism and the promotion of law and order in the country. In addi-tion, with increased advocacy of internal democracy and accountability engineered by the civil society, Uganda has carried out transformation of the existing institutions to promote the rule of law. As a result of this transformation, independent bodies responsible for the gov-ernance and oversight controls have been created to monitor and regulate the activi-


ties of armed forces, police and intelligence services while executing their functions. For instance, Ugandan parliament es-tablished a sessional Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs and mandated it to directly oversee the activities and programs of armed forces, police and intelligence services. This committee is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the armed forces, the police and intelligence services maintain discipline and follow the code of conduct as enshrined in the constitu-tion. With this effort in place, together with the watchful eyes of both domestic and international media, operational methods of all security agencies have been restrained and consequently excesses of human rights concerns have been truncated. On the military front, the involve-ment of Ugandan forces in peacekeeping missions has not only put Uganda in the spotlight but also enhanced the capacity of UPDF to respond to terror attacks as well as being among the leading countries in the fight against terrorism on the African con-tinent. Through the military interventions, the LRA and ADF have been tremendously weakened to the extent that they no longer have the capacity to carry out any attack on the Ugandan soil. This situation had ever been experienced in most parts of the coun-try for the last two and half decades.

zxxxx Lessons Learned from the US and UK’s Experiences

Over a period of time, the United States and the UK have been faced with problems of terrorism but have managed to prevail over them through various approaches. As such, the experience of these countries forms a basis through which Uganda can learn lessons and help it deal with its cur-rent threats of both domestic and interna-tional terrorism. Throughout the campaign of global war on terror, these countries have embraced and maintained the notion of rule of law that is one of the main features of liberal democracies. These countries have developed institutions, advanced, technol-ogy and resources that they have committed in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, the United States, and the UK in their quest to fight terrorism have also had their share of human rights violation criticisms. The US ‘targeted killing policy’ irrespective of whether one is in armed conflict or not clearly brings out the amorphous nature of the global fight against

terror that doesn’t respect international armed conflict principles. The case of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen is for example to some extent regarded as extra-judicial killings and a constitutional violation of rights. The vio-lation of human rights by US and UK forces of its supported foreign troops compromises the fight against terrorism and affects sup-port for the alliance. This violation has been noted in the way suspected terrorist trails have been handled in these countries. The UK has for example been grappling with the extradition of radical Islamic cleric Abu Qatada. The European Court of Human Rights overturned the ruling by the British courts when it held that Abu Qatada cannot be deported for fear that he will not get a fair trial in Jordan. The UK Prime Minister was quoted by the Daily Telegraph casting the human rights concept thus ….

The whole concept of human rights laws is in danger of becoming “distorted” and “discredited” because of the court’s deci-sions. “We do have a real problem when it comes to foreign national who threaten our security…. The problem today is that you can end up with someone who has no right to live in your country, who you are convinced—and have good reason to be convinced—means to do your country harm. And yet there are circumstances in which you cannot try them, you cannot detain them and you cannot deport them. ….So having put in places every possible safeguard to ensure that (human rights) rights are not violated, we still cannot fulfill our duty to our law-abiding citizens to protect them.”

Despite this challenge, the two coun-tries have persisted in the fight against terrorism arguing they will not relent until terrorism is defeated and its ideology up-rooted. The 9/11 events occurred when both the United States and the UK were already involved in in several campaigns which had terrorist components. The United States for instance had witnessed several terror inci-dents both internal and external targeting its interest abroad like the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, or the US embassy bombings in parts of Africa. Other than be-ing involved in handling terror incidents, the United States had also been earlier involved in different campaigns against terrorism in both Africa and Middle East countries

examples of such campaign included the bombings in Libya and Sudan. The UK on the other hand has also been engaged in a domestic campaign against the IRA for a long period. Never-theless, post-9/11, the UK has also been targeted by international terrorist groups, the July 2005, bombings serve as a good example. In this regard, given the number of terror incidents, the levels of threats these countries managed to deal with, and the approaches these countries have used in battling the scourge of terrorism in their respective countries certainly offers lessons for countries facing the problem of terrorism to learn from. One of the key approaches used by the United States and the UK in tackling the threat of terrorism has been military inter-vention. These interventions target countries where terrorists have safe havens, likely breeding states, and rogue states that spon-sor terrorist activities. This military strategy was widely advocated by President Bush immediately after 9/11 as he argued that the best way to fight terrorism was to take the fight abroad rather than fighting it on American soil. Despite its flaws, the military approach has had enormous success in kill-ing and capturing top terrorist leaders. Us-ing similar approach, Uganda used military intervention to fight terrorism in countries where terrorist groups were posing a serious security threat to Uganda. Through the use of the UPDF, Uganda has conducted several military campaigns in two neighboring states, the DRC and Sudan, which were facilitating and providing safe havens for the ADF and the LRA terrorists groups. Through the initiatives espoused by the Intergovernmental Authority on Devel-opment (IGAD), a regional body for the promotion of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, Uganda was allowed to enter Sudan and conduct military opera-tions. In 2002, Sudan and Uganda signed a protocol known as the Kampala Declaration to allow the UPDF to pursue the LRA on the Sudanese territory. With this agreement, Ugandan troops got involved in military op-erations outside Ugandan borders, as most of the battles against the LRA were fought on the Sudan territory. Other than the military approach, the US and UK used the legislative approach by adopting new laws to deal with the problem of terrorism on the legal front.The essential focus of these laws was to


streamline all legal challenges of combat-ing terrorism and filling in gaps in institu-tional measures in the quest for providing a legitimate way of dealing with the threat of terrorism. Thus, domestically, when terrorists are arrested in these countries, the criminal charges can be handled within prescribed laws. This is yet another lesson Uganda should learn from both the United States and the UK. Whatever the criticisms the new laws were subjected to, still they were operating within the democratic systems. Thus, Uganda passed and adopted the Ant-Terrorism Act of 2000 based on a similar premise. The new Act created new specific offences related to terrorism as opposed to the previous general charge of treason that had been used in Uganda. The new law however, did not emerge out of the blue; it went through legal procedures like it was the case with the US Patriot Act and the UK ATCSA. Having well-functioning and strong institutions in place is one important fac-tor that has enabled the United States and UK to contain the scourge of terrorism. The main focus of their efforts has been to empower and strengthen the enforcement agencies and immigration institutions with the view of closing the gaps within the exist-ing institutions to match the current level of threats. The United States and the UK carried out structural reforms that saw the

amalgamation of different security agencies and strengthened them. In addition, other overarching reforms were also instituted within the immigration systems to deny terrorists opportunities to sneak into the country undetected and to transfer weapons and explosives. The importance of carrying out insti-tutional reforms was a lesson that could not escape Uganda’s attention as way of strengthening its counter terrorism efforts. This is because most democratizing states have not developed the capabilities of their forces to reach a level of proficiency which enable them execute sophisticated missions like the American specialized forces. Thus, the creation of Police Counter-Terrorism unit within the mainstream police and the Joint Anti-Terrorism unit (JAT) composed of personnel from different security agencies are two examples of reforms carried out based on the US and UK model. As a result of this consideration, Uganda has been able to benefit from most of the US and UK programs, especially from the law enforce-ment and military assistance inform of training and equipment as way of promoting institutional building and reforms. The legislative select committees of the US and UK have benefits of scrutiny and budget approvals and appropriations with limited political interference, individual willingness to participate in oversight and to withhold confidential information obtained

in the course of their work. In Uganda, some of such operations are classified implying that the legislative committee cannot access any of such information on operations and budgets as in the case of the United States and the UK. This is done pre-sumably to avoid leakages and to safe guard sensitive information on defense matters hence leaving it under the oversight of the executive. The intelligence services of the US and the UK are some of those with more oversight and control systems. Having a similar oversight function in Ugandan intelligence services marks a big step in the democratization process.

zxxxx What does the Balance Look Like?

To be sure, democratic system in Uganda cannot be comparable to the United States or UK, which have centuries of settled democracy on the record. Uganda has recently transitioned from a military junta to multi-party system and still struggles with lingering influences and weak opposi-tion. In contrast, the United States and the UK for example have strong intelligence oversight systems. The common oversight systems include parliamentary oversight, judicial oversight, media and civil society organizations. These serve as a control mechanism and stand for accountability. The commonly


used oversight system is the legislative com-mittee. Whereas in the US, the committee has a mandate covering policy, administra-tions operations and legality, in Uganda it does not cover operations and legality as it does not cover legality in the UK. It is also worth noting that anti-ter-rorism laws in Uganda (as elsewhere) are broad in their implementation. As a result, counter-terrorism policies inevitably af-fect civil society in a number of ways. For example, whereas civil society advocates for free expression and assembly, anti-terrorism policies on the other hand may directly or indirectly limit free assembly or public gath-erings. This is because a free society without legal restrictions compromises the security of the state as in most cases, terrorists take advantage of the laxity within the laws. This incident revealed the extent of security laxity forcing the government to institute legal and security hardening measures in all urban centers and all entry points (borders) with view of denying terror-ists any kind opportunity to strike without being detected. These measures limited any form of public gatherings, assembly, access to public places and government installa-tions. For instance, all proprietors of public places are required to put in place deter-

rence security measures at their own cost.In order to strike and keep the balance between freedom and security, some legal measures with respect to freedom of association and public gatherings, have been considered with the introduction of the Public Order Management Bill (POM), which requires anyone intending to hold any gathering and demonstrations to seek permission from police and inform any other relevant state security organs. Despite the restrictions, which according to critics within civil society argue that such restric-tions compromise the principles of democ-racy, the bill provides an environment that allows freedom of expression and associa-tion by providing the necessary security for any kind of public gathering. Furthermore, these restrictions on pub-lic gathering and assembly do not extend to the press and the media, which remain free. Uganda has a wide range of radio stations, televisions and a variety of newspapers where citizens can freely express their views. Based on the preceding analysis, one could conclude that currently, for Uganda, the liberty/freedom/human rights/transpar-ency versus security balance is heavier on security due to threats levels the country has been experiencing for the last two and half decades.

As legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have observed, “any increase in security requires a decrease in liberty.” This same argument gives a clear understanding why the balance in Uganda is heavier on security side. Better still, Uganda has an active civil society that is at the forefront of ensur-ing that government is delivering services and is also involved in championing the fight against corruption, the eradication of poverty as well as the promotion of election monitoring. In addition, as a way of promoting the rule of law, civil society demands government to involve the public in its own security by providing it with information about potential threats and to give it assurances of how such threats will be handled. The linkage between the state and civil society is that civil society fosters the process of democratization in the way it actively participates in the formulation of public policy and law reform processes. Such actions have the potential to promote and encourage the rule of law that is one of the prerequisites of a democratic state. This is an edited version of a much longer article, including footnotes and cita-tions, by Major Alex Bwoma Tumushabe. To request the full article, send an email to:[email protected]

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East Africa’s Differing Views of Terrorist Threats Create Response ChallengesAfrican Union’s failure to eradicate terrorism in East Africa threatens long-term regional stability.

As the Islamic State quickly emerges as the largest threat to global security, smaller regional Islamist organizations continue to operate, including Boko Haram in West Af-rica, al-Shabaab in East Africa, and Ansar al-Sharia in North Africa. Particularly since the al-Shabbab attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in September 2013, which led to the deaths of 67 people, including four Islamist militants and 19 foreigners of non-Kenyan nationality, the African Union has faced widespread international pressure to beef up its counter-terror strategies, and local governments and militaries have been condemned for their incompetence and fail-ure to sufficiently address the Islamist threat. It is important to understand the African wave of terror in the context of global Islamism and counter-terror efforts. In 2008, al-Shabaab announced its integration into al-Qaeda, and more re-cently, in March 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliph-ate centered in Baghdad, increasing the status of the West African terrorist group in the context of the global Islamist jihad, and posing serious implications to the future of African security as a whole. Not only is the success of local and regional responses to Islamist terror vital to African stability, it is essential to the weakening of the global jihadi movement and the reinvigoration of the post-war security order. At the regional level, the failure of the African Union to successfully operate a comprehensive transnational anti-terror force mandated to eradicate terror cells across the continent, equates to a viola-tion of the African Union’s international obligations outlined under United Nations Resolution 1373, passed shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Resolution 1373 requires that all states adopt compre-hensive anti-terror administrative strategies and ratify all UN anti-terror measures in

an effort to enable an American-ordered international cooperation. While the UN must facilitate anti-terror capacity build-ing, the African Union has an obligation to develop the capacity to absorb, economize, and mobilize technical assistance to fight Islamism in the region. As it stands, the rati-fication of Resolution 1373 by the African Union member states that have ratified this particular piece of legislation, has failed to account for the larger institutional and socio-economic challenges faced by AU member states including underdevelopment and poverty, a lack of governance and the rule of law, a lack of border controls, a lack of an institutional capability to eliminate organized crime, corruption among security officials, and a lack of political will, all of which make the task of eliminating Islamist terror in the region all the more daunting. Since 2001, a number of other signifi-cant UNSC resolutions have been passed including resolutions 1267 (1999), 1456 (2003), 1535 (2004), 1540 (2004), and 1566 (2004). These resolutions created binding obligations upon states to reform their national laws, border control systems, and financial systems; criminalize terrorism; freeze assets of terrorists and their support-ers; deny safe havens to terrorists; deny access to weapons to terrorists; and cooper-ate with other justice systems including by means of extradition. The level of ratification of these resolu-tions and the implementation of practical counter-terror measures varies among East African states, however, with 13 African Union states having as of yet failed to ratify the African Union’s own Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terror-ism, 1999. Furthermore, there has been a failure of African Union member states to adopt laws on extradition and mutual legal assistance, which would otherwise facilitate inter-regional cooperation. The short-comings of the African Union

By Kabir Bhatia

African Defense/July 2015 17African Defense/July 2015 17


can be attributed to differing perceptions of threat-levels among member states, a mistrust of the local governments’ intentions stemming from the perception of the contin-uation of imperial relations with the West, resistance from human rights groups who have displayed hesitance when it comes to implementing counter-terror measures at the legislative level due to the possibility of the erosion of personal freedoms, a perceived failure on the part of the West to take ac-count of African experiences of terrorism, and a lack of economic capacity on the part of African states to sufficiently implement these measures. Where the West has attempted to strengthen East African anti-terror strategies, it has failed. In 2003, the Bush Administra-tion announced the creation of the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), an over $100 million State Department pro-gram to strengthen counterterrorism capa-bilities in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Assistance provided included training and equipment allocated for border security, training and equipment allocated to coastal security, police training, counter-terrorism legislation funding, fund-ing of joint terrorism taskforces, and educa-tion and anti-Islamist propaganda funding. In 2009, the US government an-nounced the creation and funding of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, or PREACT. PREACT, as

outlined by the US State Department is a “multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the counterterrorism capacity and capability of member countries to thwart short-term terrorist threats, counter violent extremism, and address longer-term vulner-abilities. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, expanding border security, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security organizations, improving democratic governance and discrediting terrorist ideology.” PREACT has suffered a number of shortcomings since its incep-tion, the most apparent of which has been its failure to prevent the Westgate Shopping Mall attack. The US State Department has also misallocated PREACT funds, including the commitment of $300,000 to Mauritius, which is not a PREACT partner, for the fiscal years 2009-2013. On September 2, 2014, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) held its first meeting on anti-terror strategies in Nairobi, Kenya, with President Kenyatta of Kenya, President Mahmoud of Somalia, President Déby of Chad, President Museveni of Uganda, President Kikwete of Tanzania, President Jonathan of Nigeria, and Presi-dent Issoufou of Niger all in attendance. A number of proposals were discussed at the meeting, including the creation of regional

counter-terrorism units and the establish-ment of a continent-wide arrest warrant .The PSC stressed the importance of comprehen-sive national counter-terrorism strategies, the establishment of effective criminal jus-tice mechanisms, the suppression of terror-ism funding, the denial of safe-havens to ter-rorists, the improvement of border controls, and the strengthening of the armed forces and local law enforcement. Operational mechanisms such as the establishment of the African Police Co-operation Organiza-tion (AFRIPOL), and the strengthening of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) were also discussed. However, despite an increase in regional cooperation, as best evidenced by the African Union ap-proval of a 7,500 strong force to fight Boko Haram in Nigeria following the February 6, 2015 attack in Bosso, Niger, little has been done by the African Union to eradicate the Islamist threat in East Africa. What has been done has flown in the face of international human rights standards, and rather than eliminate the Islamist threat, has made it more dangerous. In Kenya, for example, security forces have committed a number of human rights violations in their efforts at eradicating Islamism in the country since 2007, including carrying out extrajudicial killings; arbitrary detentions; the extraordinary rendition of Muslims to Ethiopia, Somalia and Guantanamo Bay; and the torture of individuals of Somali ori-gin, Somali refugees and Muslims. Kenyan forces have also been implicated in cases of theft, harassment, and the illegal detainment of journalists, with the Kenyan government rarely investigating or prosecuting these abuses. A secure East Africa is essential for a se-cure Africa as a whole. Africa’s Eastern coast is particularly vulnerable to penetration by foreign jihadi fighters from the Middle East, and with the rise of the Islamic State, it is essential that the African Union does its ut-most to continue the fight against Islamism in the region. Yet, the African Union’s failure to prevent the Garissa University College Attack carried out by Al-Shabbab militants on April 2 2015, which resulted in the death of 152, including the four attackers, and 79 further casualties, serves as a reminder that much has yet to be done in the fight against Islamism in East Africa and across the conti-nent as a whole.Soldiers of the East Africa Response Force arrive at Juba, South Sudan. (US Air Force Tech.

Sgt. Micah Theurich)

African Defense/July 2015 19African Defense/April/May 2015 19

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013Algeria 0.65 1.59 2.20 4.63 5.84 7.38 9.45 10.18 11.23 12.50 14.00 15.23 16.50Angola 0.14 0.27 0.37 0.46 1.14 1.91 3.20 4.60 6.00 10.00 14.78 16.94 19.10Benin 0.36 0.70 0.95 1.18 1.27 1.54 1.79 1.85 2.24 3.13 4.15 4.50 4.90Botswana 3.43 3.39 3.35 3.30 3.26 4.29 5.28 6.25 6.15 6.00 8.00 11.50 15.00Burkina Faso 0.16 0.20 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.63 0.75 0.92 1.13 2.40 3.00 3.73 4.40Burundi 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.35 0.54 0.66 0.70 0.81 0.90 1.00 1.11 1.22 1.30Cameroon 0.28 0.36 0.59 0.98 1.40 2.03 2.93 3.40 3.84 4.30 5.00 5.70 6.40Cape Verde 2.69 3.52 4.32 5.32 6.07 6.81 8.28 14.00 21.00 30.00 32.00 34.74 37.50CAR 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.38 1.00 1.80 2.00 2.20 3.00 3.50Chad 0.05 0.17 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.58 0.85 1.19 1.50 1.70 1.90 2.10 2.30Comoros 0.44 0.55 0.85 1.33 2.00 2.20 2.50 3.00 3.50 5.10 5.50 5.98 6.50DRC 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.44 0.56 0.72 1.20 1.68 2.20Congo (Rep.) 0.03 0.16 0.46 1.08 1.46 2.01 2.76 4.29 4.50 5.00 5.60 6.11 6.60Côte d’Ivoire 0.40 0.50 0.76 0.85 1.04 1.52 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.38 2.60Djibouti 0.34 0.49 0.63 0.78 0.95 1.27 1.62 2.26 4.00 6.50 7.00 8.27 9.50Egypt 0.84 2.72 4.04 11.92 12.75 13.66 16.03 18.01 25.69 31.42 39.83 44.00 49.56Equatorial Guinea 0.17 0.32 0.52 0.84 1.15 1.28 1.56 1.82 2.13 6.00 11.50 13.94 16.40Eritrea 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.47 0.54 0.61 0.70 0.80 0.90Ethiopia 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.37 0.45 0.54 0.75 1.10 1.48 1.90Gabon 1.35 1.94 2.66 2.98 4.89 5.49 5.77 6.21 6.70 7.23 8.00 8.62 9.20Gambia 1.34 1.80 2.44 3.31 3.80 5.24 6.21 6.88 7.63 9.20 10.87 12.45 14.00Ghana 0.20 0.83 1.19 1.72 1.83 2.72 3.85 4.27 5.44 7.80 14.11 12.30 12.30Guinea 0.18 0.40 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.64 0.78 0.92 0.94 1.00 1.30 1.49 1.60Guinea-Bissau 0.30 1.02 1.35 1.81 1.90 2.06 2.21 2.35 2.30 2.45 2.67 2.89 3.10Kenya 0.62 1.21 2.94 3.02 3.10 7.53 7.95 8.67 10.04 14.00 28.00 32.10 39.00Lesotho 0.26 1.08 1.53 2.18 2.58 2.98 3.45 3.58 3.72 3.86 4.22 4.59 5.00Liberia 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.55 0.53 0.51 2.30 3.00 3.79 4.60Libya 0.37 2.24 2.81 3.53 3.92 4.30 4.72 9.00 10.80 14.00 14.00 16.50Madagascar 0.22 0.34 0.42 0.53 0.57 0.61 0.65 1.65 1.63 1.70 1.90 2.05 2.20Malawi 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.97 0.70 1.07 2.26 3.33 4.35 5.40Mali 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.43 0.51 0.73 0.81 1.57 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.17 2.30Mauritania 0.26 0.36 0.42 0.48 0.67 0.98 1.43 1.87 2.28 4.00 4.50 5.37 6.20Mauritius 8.78 10.25 12.19 13.69 15.17 16.70 20.22 21.81 22.51 28.33 34.95 35.42 39.00Morocco 1.37 2.37 3.35 11.61 15.08 19.77 21.50 33.10 41.30 52.00 46.11 55.42 56.00Mozambique 0.16 0.26 0.42 0.68 0.85 0.84 0.91 1.56 2.68 4.17 4.30 4.85 5.40Namibia 2.42 2.63 3.36 3.80 4.01 4.40 4.84 5.33 6.50 11.60 12.00 12.94 13.90Niger 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.39 0.70 0.76 0.83 1.30 1.41 1.70Nigeria 0.09 0.32 0.56 1.29 3.55 5.55 6.77 15.86 20.00 24.00 28.43 32.80 38.00Rwanda 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.56 2.12 4.50 7.70 8.00 7.00 8.02 8.70S. Tomé & Principe 6.31 7.58 10.16 13.32 13.76 14.18 14.59 15.48 16.41 18.75 20.16 21.57 23.00Senegal 0.98 1.01 2.10 4.39 4.79 5.61 7.70 10.60 14.50 16.00 17.50 19.20 20.90Seychelles 11.02 14.30 14.59 24.27 25.41 34.95 38.38 40.44 41.00 43.16 47.08 50.40Sierra Leone 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.58 0.90 1.30 1.70Somalia 0.08 0.12 0.38 1.05 1.08 1.10 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.25 1.38 1.50South Africa 6.35 6.71 7.01 8.43 7.49 7.61 8.07 8.43 10.00 24.00 33.97 41.00 48.90South Sudan Sudan 0.14 0.44 0.54 0.79 1.29 8.66 16.70 17.30 21.00 22.70Swaziland 1.28 1.82 2.44 3.23 3.70 3.70 4.10 6.85 8.94 11.04 18.13 20.78 24.70Tanzania 0.17 0.22 0.68 0.88 1.10 1.30 1.60 1.90 2.40 2.90 3.50 3.95 4.40Togo 0.90 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.80 2.00 2.20 2.40 2.60 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50Tunisia 4.30 5.25 6.49 8.53 9.66 12.99 17.10 27.53 34.07 36.80 39.10 41.44 43.80Uganda 0.24 0.38 0.46 0.72 1.74 2.53 3.67 7.90 9.78 12.50 13.01 14.69 16.20Zambia 0.23 0.48 0.98 2.01 2.85 4.16 4.87 5.55 6.31 10.00 11.50 13.47 15.40Zimbabwe 0.80 3.99 6.39 6.56 8.02 9.79 10.85 11.40 11.36 11.50 15.70 17.09 18.50

Source of data from ITU

Percentage of African Internet Penetration 2001-2013Internet & Social Media Impacting Outcomes?

Can African public policy and security concerns keep pace with Internet growth?



VIP Air Transport—African Requirements Exist Aircraft manufacturers have developed aircraft perfectly suited for the requirements of African leaders. In April 2015, the South African Na-tional Defence Force (SANDF) confirmed that it was indeed looking to acquire ad-ditional VIP aircraft. The SANDF said in a statement that, “South Africa’s international relations and commitments, whether multilateral or bilateral, have been increasing greatly in the past two decades. To this end, the South African Air Force must provide aircraft for intercontinental, continental, regional and local flights for engagements and events.”In fact they said that circumstances some-times dictated that they had to charter commercial aircraft on short notice at high market rates. In a recent Premium Times (Nigerian newspaper), Eric Teniola reported on the VIP fleets of several African countries. He reported that Tunisia currently operates a Boeing 737 BBJ and has an Airbus A340-500 on hand but in storage (since 2011). Both aircraft are reportedly up for sale. Al-geria flies a government A340-500 and the Ivorian government operates a Gulfstream IV in addition to a 727-200WGL. Kenya has an elderly Fokker 70 as a presidential jet—which is configured with an integrated communications suite. “The President of South Africa travels in a Boeing 737 BBJ operated by the South African Air Force’s 21 Squadron, which is based at AFB Waterkloof near Pretoria, the executive capital,” reported Teniola. “21 Squadron also operates a fleet of two Falcon 50 and a Falcon 900B Fleet, 550/1 Citation 2, and a Global Express XRS is hired to es-cort the president on long flights as a back-up aircraft. The Falcon 900 is normally used by the deputy president and high-ranking cabinet ministers.” The president of Zimbabwe travels in a charted Air Zimbabwe Boeing 767-200ER aircraft, which is part of the national airline’s fleet,” Teniola continued. “Occasionally, the president will share the plane with com-

mercial passengers on scheduled flights. The Tanzania Government Flight Agency oper-ates a Gulfstream G550 for VIP transport. There are other two other VIP aircraft a Fok-ker F-50 and F-28 for internal and regional destinations as well.” Ghana flies a Falcon EX 900 jet, the Botswana Defence Force operates a Global Express OK1, Burkina Faso uses a Boeing 727 and a more frequently-used Falcon 900, while the Egyptian government operates an Airbus A340-200 as a VIP transport. Perhaps Nigeria has one of the—if not the—largest VIP fleets on the continent. The presidential air fleet has ten aircraft. These include, two falcon 7X jets, two Falcon 900 jets, Gulfstream 550, one Boeing 737 BBJ (Nigerian Air Force 001 or Eagle One), and Gulfstream IVSP. Others are one Gulfstream V, Cessna Citation 2 aircraft and Hawker Siddley 125-800 jet. The annual operating budget for the fleet is reported to be more than $50.3 million. Transport specific to the needs of senior government and military officials have long been a part of the government landscape. Security, safety, unscheduled needs and the ability to effectively communicate while on the move are cumulatively the reasons for a presidential and government VIP fleet.The cost of acquisition and annual sustainment cost make the proposition very expensive and therefore questionable giving the state of many African budgets. However, once the need is rational-ized, there are a host of options from small business turboprops and jets up to large, multi-engine aircraft that can be customized to fit the needs of the office.

zxxxx Boeing

Boeing offers a wide range of aircraft that can be customized to enable VIP mis-sions. “Boeing has upgrade and modifica-tion expertise in areas ranging from commu-

nications to aircraft security,” said Mukesh Luhar, Boring’s Global Services Group program manager. “In addition, we provide a fully integrated sustainment support plan including technical support, spare parts and repair support, on-site field service repre-sentatives and aircraft on ground support.”Luhar explained that Boeing can provide standard upgrades and modifications or cus-tomized solutions to meet any operational or sustainment requirements. Knowing that each government custom-er will have some specific requirements that can’t be necessarily be packaged together as part of a standard interior, Boeing works with industry leading interior design and modification centers to provide state of the art interior solutions. “Our world class engineering, modification, testing and certi-fication teams are able to design, build and test to meet customer specific requirements, said Luhar. “Boeing has a long distinguished history of providing and supporting head of state requirements to efficiently develop the interior accommodations/floor plan.” An example of sustainment support includes training for maintenance crews and flight crews (pilot training); service and air worthiness bulletin notification and incor-poration; spares and repair support; warran-ty and obsolescence support; low utilization maintenance plan (LUMP), C-checks and any other maintenance requirements. Part of their sustainment support also includes, subscription services such as Jeppesen flight manuals. Since military and government VIP aircraft run the risk of becoming a target, the company works with industry experts to provide aircraft security systems, everything from ground situational cameras to self-protection systems. “With over 100 years’ experience in the aircraft business, Boeing is uniquely qualified to meet the unique requirements of the VIP customer, said Luhar. “The ‘One Boeing’ solution, provided


In April 2015, Boeing Business Jets (BBJ) announced that it was studying offerability of a BBJ Combi, allowing customers to have a split configuration of both passengers and cargo at the same time. The BBJ Combi would be a modified version of the current BBJ Convertible (based on the 737-700C) that also features a large cargo door on the left-hand side of the forward fuselage. “We are very excited about the possibility of a BBJ Combi,” said David Longridge, president of Boeing Business Jets. “We currently offer a product that can be configured for all passengers or cargo and we think that the BBJ Combi could be the next step and a great addition to the BBJ family. It would offer our customers increased flexibility for cargo capability while still being able to accommodate passengers.” More recently, Boeing announced the sale of the first BBJ MAX 9. “We are thrilled to announce that the BBJ MAX 9 program is officially launched with our first BBJ MAX 9 order,” said Longridge. “While maintaining the unmatched cabin comfort of today’s BBJ, the BBJ MAX’s lower fuel use, increased range capability, updated flight deck, lower noise and reduced emissions enable the airplane to better meet the diverse needs of our VIP customers.”

New BBJ Max and BBJ Combi

by Boeing Business Jet and Boeing Defense Systems, the VIP customer will get a state of the art aircraft.” According to Luhar, head of state aircraft numbers are on the rise because to-day’s commerce market and economy have become more and more global. In addition, VIP and head of state customers realize the benefits of a dedicated aircraft. “Our VIP customers fly in a wide range of Boeing platforms that are uniquely qualified. We offer the 737, 747, 777, 787 configura-tions.” The company currently has regional offices in Africa and that coordinate with Boeing’s Head of State program office on all customer inquiries. While not every countries have the or-ganic capability to maintain, many do and Boeing has steps ready and in place to work with those air force’s that do. “Many of our customers prefer that some of the work we do is performed in their country,” Luhar explained. “We coordinate with in-country maintenance, repair and overhaul centers to facilitate customer preferences. Being the OEM of the aircraft allows us to work efficiently on the aircraft because we have access to the data.”


zxxxx Airbus

When talking with Airbus, the company wanted to focus on their series of commer-cial airliners and the converted A330 multi role tanker transport (MRTT). The A330-200 is the most successful and mature civil platform within the Airbus family and is in operation with over 100 commercial and military operators and more than 1,100 plat-forms fly daily across the globe. The MRTT shares an 80 percent commonality with the A330-200. The MRTT was designed from the outset to be convertible to several mission needs in addition to the baseline tanker role—including a VIP transport. “The A330 MRTT enjoys all the benefits of the commercial platform, together with every available state-of-the-art military avi-onics and communication systems,” said an Airbus Defence and Space spokesman.

“The avionic architecture provides full flight envelope protection whilst also giving crews complete situational awareness and secure global communications.” As a military asset, the A330 MRTT can be configured with the latest self-protection systems, including laser-based infrared countermeasures and missile approach warning systems. Forty-six MRTT’s are operating by six Air Forces—none yet in Africa. “Countries like South Africa, which have gaps in its in-flight refueling and multi-role transport capabilities, but which also have national airlines with A330-200 experience (South African Airways operates a fleet of six), are best placed to take advantage of the sup-port, training and maintenance synergies and resulting cost reductions that would exist if their air force also operated A330 MRTTs,” said the Airbus spokesman. Airbus Defence and Security currently has a regional office with experienced staff

and military backgrounds, who continuously engage the potential operators and all stake-holders in discussions to better understand their requirements and provide potential systems solutions. Separately from the militarized MRTT, several months ago Airbus launched a new interior design for the ACJ330—named the ACJ330 Summit. The Summit features a bedroom with ensuite bathroom at the front, followed by an office and a conference and dining room, and then airline-style first-class and economy seating at the rear. This makes the Summit a compromise aircraft not just dedicated to VIP transport or just to commer-cial air service. Turning to Airbus’ family of other com-mercial airlines, the company believes it offers the most comprehensive stable of offer-ings. The company told African Defense that it’s ACJ318, ACJ319, ACJ320 and ACJ321 feature cabins that are the widest and tallest of any corporate jet—they are around twice as wide as traditional high-end business jets, while having a similar external length and wingspan. All Airbus VIP-delivered aircraft fea-ture streamlined, aerodynamically efficient

A notational VIP cabin for the MRTT.



designs, pilot-pleasing common cockpits, fly-by-wire controls that save weight and maintenance as well as introducing greater protection, weight-saving materials such as carbon fiber, and time and cost-saving centralized maintenance. They come with Category 3B autoland, which allows them to get their passengers where they are going, even when poor visibility means that other aircraft have to go elsewhere.

zxxxx Embraer

The acquisition, operational and sustainment costs are only some of the important aspects for governments and au-thorities customers. “Items such as mili-tary-grade avionics modifications, secure communication systems, self-protection systems, customized interior arrangements, range flexibility, reliability, robustness and dispachability are extremely relevant for customers in the defense and security mar-ket,” said an Embraer Defense & Security spokesperson in an interview with African Defense. Embraer explained that many of its original design features also apply when considering many of their airframes as an executive transport and VIP platform. Some of those features include: state-of-the art cockpit and avionics; advanced aerody-namic design; reduced noise and emissions engines; flexibility for operations in short runways and hot and high conditions; large

cabin cross-section; high availability and dispatch reliability; and low operating costs. “Governments have very specific requirements for VIP transportation such as self-protection systems, secure communica-tion systems; customized interior solutions (i.e. mixed class interiors, special cabinetry, monuments, MEDEVAC, and specific IFE solutions with data connectivity options), said the spokesperson. “Embraer has been delivering VIP transport aircraft for govern-ments and authorities for a long time with customized solutions. The vast majority of the aircraft delivered have some of these solutions implemented. One great example is the E-190 dedicated to transport the presi-dent of Brazil which is based on a standard E-190.” Embraer has delivered VIP aircraft with special communication and navigation solu-tions as well as with self-protection (chaff and flare) systems. Bespoke solutions in interiors arrangements and IFE systems are extremely common, according to the com-pany. According to the Embraer spokesper-son, “To date Embraer has delivered more than 50 VIP and special transport aircraft, of which two VIP and one special transport are operated by African customers.” The company focuses on seven aircraft from its portfolio when talking to clients about VIP transports. At the high end is the Lineage 10000E, passing through four ver-sions of the Legacy family and ending with two variants of the Phenom series.

Embraer, a Brazilian company, is the world’s largest manufacturer of commer-cial jets up to 130 seats has an excellent relationship with governments in the African continent. “Together with our subsidiaries, Embraer Defense & Security is offering to the African market a complete portfolio of integrated solutions for the defense and security markets,” said the company.” This includes government transportation aircraft, counterinsurgency and advanced train-ing aircraft (A-29 Super Tucano), tactical transport aircraft (KC-390) and maritime patrol. All solutions are offered together with a comprehensive integrated logistic support package that comprises technical and operational training, technical support (on-site and remote), the provision of spare parts and support equipment and additional support services. “Embraer Defense & Security is keen to supply to African nations our turn-key solutions that combine a high technological level and operational efficiency at competi-tive acquisition and operating costs,” said the company spokesperson. With a growing presence on the global market, Embraer Defense & Security products and integrated solutions are present in 50 armed forces.

zxxxx Gulfstream

Gulfstream has designed and delivered special missions aircraft in a wide range of



mission configurations for the governments and military services of several countries. Over this time, the majority of the special mission modifications were completed on the GIII, GIV and GV series aircraft. “The current Gulfstream aircraft models that are being adapted for special mission roles consist of the G450 and G550,” said Troy Miller, regional vice president, military and special mission sales. “We’re also looking at modifying the G650 and G650ER.” The Gulfstream G450 and G550 are well-suited and proven platforms from which to develop mission-capable, cost-effective special mission aircraft. “The G450 and G550 have perfor-mance and technical advantages that provide excellent design starting points for producing superior high-performance special mission aircraft,” said Miller. “With high-lift wing systems and high thrust-to-weight ratios, the G450 and G550 climb faster, fly higher, and travel farther than special mission platforms based either on other business jets or commercial airliners.”“In terms of VIP aircraft, there are more than 145 Gulfstream aircraft supporting VIP travel, explained Miller. Gulfstream has a long history of pro-viding special mission aircraft around the world, including serving all five branches of the US military and other government agen-

cies. “Our aircraft provide on-demand de-pendability, speed and range; a wide range of configurations as well as role flexibility and operational capabilities under extreme conditions, said Miller. “Those performance attributes have made Gulfstream aircraft the perfect choice for special missions platforms. The market for multi-mission/special mission aircraft is strong and grow-ing. Customers continue to recognize that, when compared to airliner-based special mission platforms, Gulfstream aircraft offer significant life cycle savings and better per-formance, particularly in terms of dispatch reliability. Simply put, Gulfstream aircraft perform better at lower costs and with significantly higher dispatch reliability than typical legacy aircraft engaged in special missions today.”

zxxxx Why Buy When You Can Rent?

Looking to fill the need to rent a VIP transport only for the time you actually need it is Switzerland-based Vertis Aviation. The company had been serving aviation charter needs in Africa with a brand new ultra-long range Bombardier Global 6000, medium range Bombardier Learjet 45 and AW139 helicopter. They have recently added a Super 27

VIP—an enhanced Boeing 727—as well as added a new South African office. The 43-passenger Boeing 727 VIP airliner is a stylish and luxurious aircraft. With a range of up to 3,200 nautical miles, it will likely serve popular routes across the entire African continent as well as intercon-tinental missions. The cabin offers a roomy, Africa-inspired luxury interior featuring a private suite (comprising a bedroom and bathroom with shower and home office with full global satellite connectivity); a six place conference room; a four-place divan with four-place club seating and additional seating for a further 18 passengers. “It’s great to be expanding our portfo-lio in Africa,” said Jeffrey Emmenis partner at Vertis Aviation. The choice to bring this model into our collection reflects our unique boutique approach, which provides tailored aviation services matching the spe-cific needs of our clients. We recognise the importance and growing demand for travel by heads of state and anticipate that it will be highly sought after by this segment of our client base for travel throughout Africa and beyond.” Another company, JetMagic, is a Malta-based charter operator with a fleet of Boeing, Bombardier and Dassault aircraft and are believed to operate a BBJ on behalf of the government of Mali.


African Defense/July 2015 25African Defense/April/May 2015 25

More often than not, security and resources act as two faces of the same coin. Leaders have historically utilized their military capabilities to protect the assets that fulfill their people’s basic needs, such as oil, electricity and water. The case is no different when it comes to one of the longest rivers in the world, the Nile. Running through 12 different countries, the Nile provides desperately needed water and hydroelectric power to those who reside in proximity to its basin. The conversation surrounding the coordinated allocation of Nile waters (or lack thereof) has, for centuries, defined the nature of the political relationship amongst East-African nations. Due to its inherent value, the Nile has been a source of serious contention be-

tween modern countries that lay claim to its waters, mainly Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. In fact, the Nile has been at the corner stone of Egypt’s foreign policy in Africa, and has governed the extent of Egypt’s involvement in African affairs. Recently, the emergence of internal security threats in the shape of Islamic extremists, coupled with the decline of Egypt’s economic prowess, has swayed Egypt towards a path of coop-eration.

zxxxx Past

In 1929, seven years following Egyptian independence, Egypt and colonial Sudan inked an agreement that gave the former near full control of the Nile’s waters. It

Africa’s Egypt, Rejuvenated Trying to make up for lost decades, Egypt re-engages Africa.

By Zaid Al-Nassir


26

provided Egypt with seven months of un-challenged water access and a veto power over any construction projects on the Nile, irrespective of whether it fell inside Egyptian territory or not. Reiterating the terms of this agreement, another was signed in 1959, granting Egypt and independent Sudan 90 percent of the Nile’s waters, with the former taking the lion’s share of the bounty. Increased population rates and severe droughts surrounding the Nile basin spurred the upstream nations to demand their fair share of water access, placing tremendous amounts of pressure on the Egyptian water hegemon. Egypt and Sudan, however, invoked the colonial agreements to claim a historic right to solely access and utilize Nile waters. It was not until the 1980s, following miniscule rainfall at the Nile’s main source in Ethiopia, that Egypt became aware of the extent of its dependency on Nile waters, culminating in a drive towards collaboration with its southern neighbors in 1987. When the rains returned, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak immediately resumed work on a project to divert Nile waters into the Egyptian desert. In retaliation, Ethiopia’s prime minister initiated plans for a dam on the Blue Nile, which further increased the tension between the two nations, as it would severely dimin-ish Egyptian access to water. Mubarak’s immediate predecessor, Anwar Sadat, had previously threatened military measures should his country’s resources fall under any threat. This prickly situation peaked in 1995, when gunmen attempted to assassinate Mubarak as he arrived for an African sum-mit in Ethiopia. The decade or so following this incident witnessed a severe Egyptian disconnect from the African continent, so much so that Egypt refrained from attending any African summit for 17 years. Such was the case until Mubarak was ousted by a popular uprising in 2011, to be replaced by the Muslim Brother-hood’s Mohammed Morsi, who attended the African Union summit in 2012. Morsi and members of his staff were, on one occasion, unknowingly recorded discuss-ing the possibility of taking military action against African nations that pose a risk to Egypt’s water resources. In 2012, a revealed WikiLeaks document purported to show Egyptian-Sudanese plans to bomb a dam in Ethiopia. Egypt and Sudan both denied the allegations, but the presence of such hostile political culture, even if untrue, reveals of the extent of the tension present in that

diplomatic relationship.

zxxxx Present

Following a military coup in 2013, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, who led the upheaval as field marshal, became the new president of Egypt. Egypt’s membership in the African Union was suspended to demonstrate the body’s support for Morsi as a democratically elected President. Following extensive lob-bying and diplomatic maneuvers by Egypt, however, its membership was reinstated in 2014. Since then, Egypt has been inten-sifying its collaboration with its African neighbors, as Al-Sisi has been looking to emulate his immensely popular predeces-sor from the 1950s, Gamal Abdul Nasser, who believed that Egypt cannot ignore the African continent, which ‘fate [had] decreed [Egypt] to be a part of.’ Al Sisi has made it clear that his intentions for Egypt are two-fold: a vibrant, more diverse economy and a heavy hand when it comes to security.Since becoming president, Al-Sisi has called for increased Egyptian immersion in the African continent on numerous occasions. To that end, a committee named Af-rica’s Unity has been formed with the inten-tion of improving bilateral relations between Egypt and African countries. The commit-tee is designed to promote and encourage trade, education, health, investment and cultural ties with Egypt’s continental neigh-bors, as well as open the door for intensified security coordination, given the rising threat of violent extremist groups in the region. Should this committee fulfill its stated obligations, the benefits could be far reach-ing. After all, Egypt’s exports and imports to and from African nations, standing at less than 17 percent and 2 percent of the Egyptian totals, respectively, are economic manifestations of the diplomatic distance separating Egypt and its continental neigh-bors. In March of 2015, the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia signed an agreement of good will and cooperation regarding Nile water access. This treaty paves the way for the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while maintaining an agreement on fair access to the Nile and insisting on peaceful resolutions of any impending disagreements. However, this agreement deals solely with the waters of the Blue Nile which runs through Ethiopia, and does not include other upstream na-tions. To augment this, Egypt’s leaders would

be wise to reconsider signing on to the all-inclusive cooperative framework agreement which was the result of the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative, without insisting on the regula-tions of colonial-era agreements. The leaders of upstream Nile na-tions, such as Tanzania and Kenya, are not mistaken when they argue that the colonial agreements cannot hold true to this day, as these nations never independently agreed to the colonially-designed stipulations.

zxxxx Future

Settling the disagreements surround-ing water allocation amongst Nile coun-tries, coupled with increased inter-African involvement in terms of investment and education could be a solid path towards increased African prosperity. Collaborative development projects throughout the conti-nent, aimed at growing levels of education, access to clean water and readily available health services could provide African na-tions with desperately needed resources and services. Ethiopia and Egypt, the second and third largest populations in Africa, should spearhead the drive towards a more in-tegrated African economy, with hopes of pulling much of the African continent out of poverty. Furthermore, no initiative could be as beneficial to the people of the conti-nent as an African one. The culture of aid dependency in low-income African nations could be countered by promoting mutually beneficial domestic development initiatives. By opening the door for increased inter-African collaboration in several fields, Egypt and Ethiopia can help alleviate the condi-tions that many of their people experience on a daily basis. Additionally, this height-ened level of cooperation can further push the limits of security coordination, with the aim of not only combatting violent extremist ideologies, but the socio-economic condi-tions in which such ideologies flourish. With a combined population of nearly 200 million, Egypt and Ethiopia must abide by their obligations to their people and to their neighbors, particularly in a time where extremist groups thrive on the marginal-ized and disillusioned. Cooperation of this sort would bolster Africans’ capacities to be thoroughly involved in the processes that shape their nations, and would set the continent on a path towards a prosperous Africa by Africans and, more importantly, for Africans.


27

On the afternoon of Thursday, 5th of June, the South African Parliament finally held the long overdue debate on the report of the Joint Standing Committee on De-fence, dealing with the finalization of the Defence Review 2014.

implications that this carries for our various responsibility in the joint execution of the defense mandate. The finalization of the Defence Review not only marks an important milestone in the continuous journey to build the new

The Year of Implementation South African Minister of Defence Ms Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula discusses transformationof the military and the partnership with South African industry.

It gives me great pleasure to announce that the Defence Review 2014 has now been finalised. As we are finally able to welcome this development with great enthusiasm, all of us should equally be mindful of the



SANDF, but it also sets new targets and identifies areas of effort we should be focus-ing on for the next 20 to 30 years. When approving the Review for sub-mission to Parliament, the Cabinet directed that as Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, I should “ensure that the mili-tary strategy, force structure, force design, capability strategy and acquisition plans and funding trajectory are translated into an extended long–term defense development program which is aligned and integrated into government planning cycle” I have already indicated that this pro-grammatic directive of the Cabinet consti-tutes the broad programmatic thrust of the ministry, our two departments and all our entities. In fact, during the engagements on the Defence Review in Parliament, we em-phasized that the Defence Review, and its implementation, is not only urgent task, but one that requires the combined efforts of all sectors of our society, more so those of us who operate directly in this sector. In this regard we have warned that we all do not have a choice, but to respond with urgency to put plans to arrest the decline within the current five years, starting immediately during this financial year. In terms of the Defence Review, five years is averagely the amount of time it will take us to develop a limited and sustainable defense capability. Simply put, the longer the neglect is perpetuated, the greater the effort, time and cost it will take to arrest the decline. At times when we paint the picture of the decline, many people seem to think we are alarmist, and this is because due to the resilience of our women and men in uniform, the SANDF has been able to maintain operational presence. Sometimes I don’t understand how we do it. The fact, however, is this, if we do not start now, the decline will get worse. Our mandate in the next five years is to act fast to restore the minimum capabilities required to safeguard South Africa, protect its maritime resources and trade routes, conduct peace missions and humanitarian interventions. The defense trajectory and Defence Development Plan for the next 30 years has not been clearly mapped out and the Review gives us a clear marching orders for all of us, including the SA defense industry.Any engagements that we have at this level, therefore, should be geared at assessing our collective capacity to carry out this task.

This collective capacity should start with our individual strengths as stakeholders and partners. In our case as a department, we have recognized that such capacity should start within, and have been working hard to de-velop our own implementation framework, even before parliament could finalize the Review. In previous discussions with Arms-cor, I have also emphasized the need to strengthen the corporation’s organization and systems in order to execute its mandate. In this regard I’m glad that since the ap-pointment of the new Board last year, we’ve made some notable strides in harmonizing relations and engagements with stakehold-ers, including industry, much of whom are represented here. As of last month, Armscor also has a new and permanent chief executive officer, Kevin Wakeford. Although we have emphasized many times before, that Armscor, by virtue of its position as an acquisition agency of the department, is not a regulator of the indus-try, it does, however, perform an important catalyst role in: ensuring qualitative trans-formation of the SA defense industry; and providing support for the rejuvenation and growth of the industry and thereby sustain-ing our defense capabilities as a country.

zxxxx Ensuring Qualitative Transformation of Industry

It is time that we cultivate a common understanding of what transformation of the industry means, and agree on what we must achieve in the best interest of the industry and the country’s objectives. The fundamentals must be clear and well communicated. We need a deliberate and focused effort to encourage new players in the industry to ensure its transformation. Such effort, however, cannot be successful or sustainable without the buy-in and active role by the established players currently in the industry. We are talking here of trans-forming the industry, not its destruction and reinventing of the wheel. We need commitments from both sides, to a fundamental principle, that growth of the industry can’t just be for the sake of its size and its market share, but it should contribute to national objectives of broad-ening the skills base, economic inclusion, jobs and a greater share by the previously

disadvantaged in the ownership of knowl-edge and means of production. The change has to be qualitative and that’s why it tends to take time. I did caution all of us, during our dis-cussion at the Armscor Strategy Session last year, that transformation cannot simply be based on percentages of ownership, but also on who possesses the knowledge and skills in such companies and in the industry. Our emphasis on preferential procure-ment qualifications should not just be about how many blacks, women or people with disability own shares in the industry, but how many do indeed possess the technical knowledge and skills to be the future drivers of the industry. This is a matter that talks to our research and development approach, the training and education of young black pro-fessionals, as well as the structured manner of bringing them and growing them into this industry. In addition, we need to look at what is the role of our Defence Industry Par-ticipation programs or setoffs, in facilitating the objectives of economic transformation. One key aspect, which I have raised with the Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association (AMD) leadership on various occasions, is how we use enterprise development as a tool not only of transfor-mation and economic empowerment but also for the benefit of our military veterans. In particular I refer to those veterans of the struggle for liberation who are currently des-titute together with their families and other dependents. As I indicated, I have already asked that the AMD should lead the defense industry in developing partnerships with government, through the DMV in pursuit of this objective. It is possible that we may even need an empowerment charter for the defense in-dustry if we are to pursue a mutually agreed and legally binding future trajectory in this regards. We also need to move away from the short sighted manner in which we do off-sets, and use our investments worth billions in expenditure to benefit future sustainable growth of our economy. The defense acquisition process, given its size and innovation potential, should contribute to the transformation of our economy and support macro level econom-ic objectives. In this regard, I have requested both Armscor and the DoD to develop and submit plans based on the requirements of the National Development Plan and the


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national objectives as set out in the Govern-ment’s Medium Term Strategic Framework for 2014-2019. In this regard we should develop a Defence Industrial Participation strategy that will ensure amongst others, the following:

• Knowledge and technology transfer• Joint research and development• Shared and common exploitation of resultant IP (in the case of international players)• Investment in local infrastructure to ensure local production and assembly• Human resource development in the area of technology and research• Quality job creation (including the reskilling of exiting military personnel and veterans)• Black economic empowerment includ-ing the economic inclusion of our Mili-tary Veterans Defence Industry Council

The process of establishing the National Defence Industry Council is underway and I am aware that AMD is part of the planning team. We are anticipating that the Council should be launched during the last quarter

of the 2015 calendar year. I have also noted the amount of prog-ress the task team has made in getting us this far, and I am certain that save for a few issues of representation, the ground work has been laid for the launch of the Council. What is important though, is that the Council should become the policy and strat-egy capacity for government’s support to the industry and to ensure convergence on what the priorities should be. The medium to long term projections of the industry, its contribution to the economy and its overall viability are an important function of the Council. The AMD and the industry have an important role to play in rebuilding and sustaining the country’s and the region’s defense capabilities. For our part as govern-ment, we remain committed to facilitate access to markets for our industry and to lend government support. In this regard Armscor’s role as the agency through which government lends support will have to be enhanced, including the creation of a distinct capacity to support such a role. Armscor is well positioned not only as an acquisition agency of the depart-

ment, but also as the marketing agency for the industry and the facilitator and gateway for other governments to access South Afri-can defense solutions. This is a role that Armscor can play without additional costs to itself and can sustainably be pursued off balance sheet.This function does not deter or undermine Armscor’s mandate to meet the defense ma-terial requirements of the SANDF. It actually enhances it and e necessary revenue that can be reinvested directly to support the operational readiness of the SANDF. The defense industry is unique and strategically placed differently from other sectors of our economy, and government needs to think very seriously about what we mean by industry support, including the need for marketing support. The international functions of both the DoD and Armscor should align their activities in so far as industry support is concerned and if additional capacity is required, then we should look at ways of acquiring it. It will be important therefore that in the improvement of our acquisition plans, proper coordination between government


and the Industry is achieved. This will ensure common and timeous planning for our requirements, in order to reduce the lead times for acquisition and commission-ing of projects. This is the only way we can address the issue of industry capacity and readiness to support our acquisition require-ments. Part of this will include the need to develop an acquisition strategy and annual acquisition plans based on the new Military Strategy and Force design anticipated in the Defence Review. The role and position of Denel as a state owned assembler that is created to deliver requirements of the SANDF cannot be overlooked in this regard. The relationship between the DoD, Armscor and Denel is essential to the joint planning imperative and for the capacity of Industry to deliver. It is important however that the empha-sis on the role of Denel not be done to the detriment of private industry. In fact the role of Denel as a state owned assembler should enhance better cooperation between Denel and other industry players on sound busi-ness grounds and in support of the country’s objectives.

zxxxx Research and Defence Intellectual Property

The Defence Review correctly di-agnosed the limitations of our current research, development, and evaluations as not being in accordance with defense stra-tegic direction. This has also resulted in the absence of a defense research and develop-ment strategy. Simply put, we are not changing the basis of what we inherited. Our current research and development efforts are only directed at support for anticipated acqui-sition projects. There is no emphasis on innovation, but in maintaining the current technology. A number of our capabilities are de-teriorating and will continue to do so. We can’t simply direct our efforts at them with improved versions of same. We need to identify direct and focused interventions. It is for this reason that we should enhance our capability for defense sci-ence, engineering and technology support, with the appointment of the Chief Defence Scientist. We need a dedicated capacity to ad-vice on the development and maintenance

of capabilities, including the provision of strategic direction in research and technol-ogy development.

zxxxx Africa Aerospace & Defence

I want to congratulate AMD as the lead partner during the previous installment of AAD, once again on a successful exhibition last year. With regard to the governance arrange-ments for the AAD, my previous communi-cation to both AMD and Armscor, stands. The future leading role of Armscor in the AAD going forward, is something that must be discussed and resolved with the other partners. I have, however, also expressed my support for a greater government role and ownership of the show in the future. This should however be done in consultation with the other partners to ensure buy-in and the best value extraction for the whole country. Defence Minister Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula made these remarks at as the opening address to the Aerospace Maritime and Defence 2015 Annual General Meeting.

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