Afghanistan Transition

7/31/2019 Afghanistan Transition

1/30

Afghanistan TransitionElevating the Diplomatic Components of the Transition Strateg

at the Chicago NATO Summit and Beyond

Caroline Wadhams, Colin Cookman, and Brian Katulis May 2012

www.americanprogress.o


2/30

Afghanistan TransitionElevating the Diplomatic Components

of the Transition Strategy at the Chicago

NATO Summit and Beyond

Caroline Wadhams, Colin Cookman, and Brian Katulis May 2012


3/30

Contents 1 Introduction and summary

5 NATOs transition strategy in Afghanistan requires

more focus on the political dimensions

6 Afghanistans precarious political balance

7 Unsustainable dependence on the international community

9 The search for alternatives

11 How to bolster diplomacy in pursuit of

an Afghan political settlement 12 Pursuing governance reforms through the political transition process

13 Recommendations for political reforms through the political transition

15 Pursuing a more inclusive political settlement

17 Recommendations for pursuing a more inclusive political settlement proce

19 Security transition and mutual commitments

20 Recommendations for reducing the U.S. military footprint and synchronizin

military transition with political efforts

22 Conclusion

23 About the authors

24 Acknowledgments

25 Endnotes


4/30

1 Ceter or America Progress | Aghaista Trasitio

Introduction and summary

Beween May 20 and May 21, Norh Alanic reay Organizaion heads o sae

will convene in Chicago o hammer ou decisions regarding he handover o

responsibiliy or securing Aghanisan o local orces and he removal o he bulk

o oreign roops rom Aghanisan by he end o 2014.

For he pas 18 monhs, he Obama adminisraion has righly pressed a sraegy

o ransiion in Aghanisanreducing he U.S. miliary presence and encourag-

ing Aghan responsibiliy. Recognizing ha a susainable ransiion also requiresa poliical setlemen among Aghanisans diverse acions, he adminisraion

has also sough o aciliae an Aghan peace process hrough oureach o insur-

gen elemens and he Aghan governmen.

On May 1, 2012, Presiden Barack Obama and Aghan Presiden Hamid

Karzai ook a sep orward wih his vision o ransiion by signing he Sraegic

Parnership Agreemen beween he Unied Saes and Aghanisan. Tis agree-

men oulines a se o muual commimens beween he wo counries, wih he

goal o shiing he long-erm relaionship oward a more normalized one ollow-

ing he wihdrawal o he majoriy o U.S. roops in 2014.1

Bu curren ransiion planning, while correc in is broad sraegic srokes, conin-

ues o ocus oo heavily on he miliary componens o he plan and in paricular

on he Aghan Naional Securiy Forces. Missing rom he NAO conerences

agenda and U.S. governmen planning eors is a meaningul discussion o he

poliical dimensions o he ransiionhow NAOs securiy ransiion and iner-

naional roop drawdown will aec he enuous power balance ha has exised in

he counry since 2001 among Aghanisans various acions and how he securiy

ransiion will sync wih he impending poliical ransiion, when Aghans go ohe polls or he 2014 presidenial elecion.

Te NAO conerence will ocus on he commimens made o he Aghan govern-

men as par o he ransiion sraegy, bu he Aghan governmen needs o provide


5/30


commimens in reurn, or here needs o be a plan or consequences o inacion.

Te U.S.-Aghanisan Sraegic Parnership Agreemen includes pledges rom he

Aghan governmen in erms o ackling corrupion, improving governance, and

srenghening nancial managemen. Bu, as in he pas, he agreemen does no

speciy wha U.S. commimens are ied o Aghan governmen perormance.

Te inernaional communiy has insead oped o separae hese poliical conversa-

ions rom he securiy ones and shi hose concerns o a lower-prole conerence o

inernaional donors aking place in okyo in July. Puting o his vial discussion on

Aghanisans poliical uure makes he Chicago summi a missed opporuniy, given

he degree o which hese issues are inrinsically linked o Aghanisans securiy.

Poliics ulimaely drive he Aghan conic and consequenly hold he key o is

resoluion. Te insular naure o he Aghan governmen is in ac alienaing much

o is populaion and conribuing o insurgen mobilizaiona realiy ha hrea-

ens he Aghan governmen i a broader poliical consensus among he Aghanpublic is no reached.

Indeed, he mos recen public Penagon assessmen o he conic cauions ha

he insurgency coninues o receive suppor rom exernal sponsors, including

Pakisan, and warns ha progress in raining Aghan soldiers and police is under-

cu by widespread corrupion, dependence on inernaional aid and menoring

suppor, and an imbalance o power ha avors he execuive branch over he

legislaive and judicial branches.2 Despie some successes in disruping insurgen

conrol o Aghan erriory over he pas wo years, he insurgencys organizaional

capabiliies appear o be resilien, challenging he abiliy o he Aghan securiy

orces o sem insurgen expansion.3

Te Unied Saes mus srike he righ balance beween providing enduring suppor

and coninuing he ongoing ransiion o Aghan responsibiliy. While coninued

suppor or Aghanisans sabiliy is an imporan ineres or he Unied Saes and

is inernaional parners, he wihdrawal o U.S. orces as par o he ransiion o an

Aghanisan secured by local orces is essenial or boh broader U.S. sraegic ineress

and or he developmen o a more sable poliical equilibrium wihin he counry.

Large-scale oreign miliary involvemen in Aghanisan disors he curren

balance o power wihin he counry and allows Aghan leaders o avoid making

difcul bu essenial poliical reorms. I also serves as a recruiing ool or Aghan

insurgens, who exploi he populaions resenmen o inernaional orces o


6/30


jusiy heir cause. Oher counries in he region remain suspicious o NAO, and

in paricular U.S. inenions, inviing spoiler behavior.

Moreover, he large nancial commimen supporing U.S. and NAO miliary

personnel, coupled wih he lack o public accounabiliy mechanisms wihin he

Aghan governmen, has exacerbaed corrupion wihin boh he Aghan govern-men and he broader Aghan socieyno only undermining he Aghan govern-

mens legiimacy bu also indirecly unding insurgen aciviy.4

Tis imbalance and lack o synchronizaion beween he miliary and poliical com-

ponens o ransiion planning and implemenaion increases he risk o insecuriy

in Aghanisan in he medium and long erms. Te main hrus o he U.S. and

NAO Inernaional Securiy Assisance Force ransiion coninues o be miliary

operaions agains insurgens, especially in he souh and now increasingly in he

eas, along wih he esablishmen o a large Aghan naional army and police orce

o approximaely 352,000 personnel, which will assume responsibiliy or ongoingconic as inernaional orces decline in number.

Placing sole responsibiliy or Aghanisans uure sabiliy on he Aghan

Naional Securiy Forces wihou making progress in creaing a sronger poliical

consensus among Aghanisans diverse acionsboh armed and unarmedis

a high-risk gamble. While he NAO Inernaional Securiy Assisance Force has

me is arges as ar as he number o Aghan orces rained, he capaciies and

loyalies o hese orces, in combinaion wih uncerain unding sreams, pus heir

long-erm viabiliy in doub.

Te Aghan governmen will ace a serious es in 2014, as Presiden Karzai, under

he provisions o he Aghan consiuion, ransers power o anoher democrai-

cally eleced Aghan leader. Signican work remains o be done by he Aghan

governmen and is sponsors o suppor eors o srenghen heir poliical sys-

em, including esablishing poliical paries, ensuring he independence o elecion

ofcials, and esablishing a voer regisraion sysem or viable alernaive in order

o avoid a repea o he highly conenious elecions o 2009 and 2010.

As he Unied Saes manages he ransiion and coninues he reducion o ismiliary and nancial invesmens in Aghanisan, i reains an ineres in boh

Aghan and regional sabiliy and in preserving he gains and sacrices o he

pas 11 years o he Aghan mission, especially or Aghan women and minoriy

groups. Doing so requires commiting o a setlemen ha can accommodae a

more susainable poliical consensus in Aghanisan.


7/30


Wih U.S. and NAO roops righly shiing more quickly o an advising, assis-

ance, and menoring role and away rom comba operaions hroughou he nex

year, U.S. policymakers mus reorien heir sraegic ocus oward he poliical and

diplomaic processes bes suied o addressing he crux o Aghanisans problems:

he poliical dimensions o he conic ha drive insurgen recruimen and oppo-

siion o he governmen.

Presiden Obama hi he righ noes in he Sraegic Parnership Agreemen and

during his speech a Bagram Air Base earlier his monh when he coupled a com-

mimen o a handover o responsibiliy o Aghan leaders wih calls or a negoi-

aed peace setlemen and or Aghan governmen reorms. In order o make good

on hese goals, we have oulined in his paper a clear se o recommendaions or

U.S. ofcials and NAO leaders o ollow:

Begin serious preparaions or he 2014 Aghan presidenial elecions now,

including suppor or ree and air elecions, poliical oureach o dierenpoliical paries and leaders, and he esablishmen o governmenal checks and

balances ouside o he counrys execuive branch.

Faciliae an inclusive and ransparen Aghan peace negoiaions process among

he various acions, in concer wih regional diplomaic eors.

Clariy expecaions or he Aghan governmen hrough a se o condiions and

incenives ied o Aghan governmen perormance.

Align miliary and poliical eors in suppor o a credible poliical ransiion

and an inclusive setlemen process, while pursuing a seady drawdown o U.S.

orces beyond he all o 2012.

A ransiion o Aghan ownership and he drawdown o oreign orces is he righ

approach or he long-erm ineress o Aghanisan, he region, and he Unied

Saes and is NAO parners. Bu or his approach o be successul and susain-

able, here mus be a clear recogniion by all involved ha a securiy ransiion is

inexricably linked o a poliical ransiion. Clearly, more work needs o be done o

prioriize and carry ou he seps necessary or a durable resoluion o he poliicalissues a he core o he conic.

U.S. policymaker

must reorient th

strategic ocus

toward the polit

and diplomatic

processes best

suited to addres

the crux o

Aghanistans

problems: the

political dimens

o the conict.


8/30


NATOs transition strategy

in Afghanistan requires more focus

on the political dimensions

As he Unied Saes coninues o degrade he operaional capabiliy o Al Qaeda

and is afliaes in Aghanisan and he immediae region, i is also acing a hos

o compeing sraegic prioriies in Asia, he greaer Middle Eas, and a home. As

such, we are now realigning our miliary and nancial invesmens in Aghanisan

o more susainable levels and reoriening o oher sraegic prioriies.

Since 2010 he Unied Saes and is NAO allies have carried ou a process o

gradual securiy ransiion whereby increasing numbers o Aghan miliary andpolice orces gradually assume lead securiy responsibiliy across he counry,

culminaing wih a ull ranser o hose responsibiliies and he wihdrawal o

mos inernaional miliary orces by he end o 2014. Te process has already

begun in wo ranches o erriories, and wih he drawdown o U.S. and oher

oreign roops rom heir peak numbers in 2010 and 2011.5 Presiden Karzai

announced a hird round o ransiion, reaching all 34 provincial capials and more

han 230 disrics o begin he week beore he Chicago conerence.6

U.S. and NAO ofcials have discussed securiy dynamics in Aghanisan sepa-

rae rom he underpinning Aghan poliical sysem, and have overesimaed he

Aghan naional securiy orces abiliy o conrol he crises acing he sae in he

medium and long erms. Even i raining arges or local securiy orces are me

and he insurgency is weakened hrough coninued join operaions, he Aghan

miliary risks emerging as a securiy orce wihou a sae.

Te ac is ha poliical suppor or he Aghan governmen is ragile, as i has

generaed growing opposiion rom a diverse se o rivals and lacks he means

o mobilize inernal poliical and nancial suppor. Te Aghan governmen as

currenly esablished will be unable o susain isel agains domesic and regionalchallengers wihou large-scale exernal aid or decades o come, even as is

primary sources o power and legiimacyoreign nancial ows and miliary

orcesare in necessary decline.


9/30


Te upcoming drawdown o inernaional orces and he Aghan presidenial elec-

ion in 2014 have he poenial o seriously upse he enuous power balance ha

has exised in Aghanisan since 2001, wih unpredicably disrupive eecs or

Aghanisan, he region, and indirecly or U.S. securiy.

Tis secion oulines he muliple crises acing he Aghan governmen ha musbe addressed in a successul ransiion sraegy. Making open-ended commimens

in an eor o perpeuae he saus quo or escalaing conic wih insurgen spon-

sors boh have he poenial o be equally damaging o U.S. ineress and are no

viable alernaives o ransiion. Bu he medium- o long-erm viabiliy o he cur-

ren plan remains in doub due o insufcien emphasis on he poliical siuaion,

which demands greaer prioriizaion wihin he overall sraegy.

Afghanistans precarious political balance

Tere is a real risk o racure in he wake o a reducion in direc U.S. miliary iner-

venion in suppor o Aghanisans curren ruling coaliion. Should acions inside

and ouside he Aghan governmen decide o ake up arms agains each oher, hey

would have a ready supply o armed proessionals rom which o draw, including

boh regular police and army orces and a prolieraion o irregular police and miliia

orces, many currenly suppored by NAO rainers. Te Aghan Naional Securiy

Forceshe cenral componen o NAOs ransiion planrisks conribuing o

greaer insabiliy in he even o a poliical breakdown.

Presiden Karzais governmen has managed o mainain relaive conrol o he

counry hus ar hanks o he suppor o he inernaional communiy and his

successul co-opaion o various powerbrokers and poenial rivals hrough he

manipulaion o he ormal and inormal powers o his ofce. Bu he execuive

branchs disconnec romand in many cases acive resisance owardhe

emergence o oher ceners o powers has le i poorly posiioned o mobilize or

susain domesic coaliions o suppor. Te governmen lacks susainabiliy, su-

cien checks and balances, and popular legiimacy.

Under he curren sysem Presiden Karzai direcly or indirecly appoins hou-sands o posiions counrywide, rom elecion ofcials o governors o disric

police chiesmany o whom pay exorbian ren or heir posiions. Decisions

concerning unding or he provision o services are generally made in he capial

ciy o Kabul. Tere are ew, i any, avenues or Aghans o redress wrongs or o

inuence governmen decision making.


10/30


Furher, ormal insiuions, including he parliamen, he judiciary, and local govern-

men bodies, are weak and have litle real auhoriy and ill-dened responsibiliies.

Te srong execuive branch enables abuse and pervasive impuniy, which are per-

ceived as proeced and enabled by NAO and he Inernaional Securiy Assisance

Force, engendering urher disillusionmen wih he Aghan governmen and ueling

insurgen recruimen.7

Given he overcenralizaion o he sysem, is inernaionalbackers remain one o he ew consiuencies capable o holding he Aghan govern-

men accounableand pressing i o change is pracices in his regard.

Te poliical ransiion scheduled o occur wih he consiuionally mandaed presi-

denial elecions in 2014 has he poenial o exacerbae hese ensions, as ineress

boh wihin and ouside he Karzai regime compee over who will succeed him as

presiden. o he exen ha his compeiion akes place wihin he connes o a

poliical sysemhowever loose and inormal ha may be in Aghanisani can

conribue o he counrys sabilizaion, i ineres groups view i as air and legii-

mae and choose o compee peaceully raher han hrough armed conic.

Unorunaely, here remains a risk o repeaing he highly awed elecions o

2009 and 2010. Te problems ha conribued o he previous elecion ailures

remain, including insecuriy, especially in he souh and eas o he counry where

he insurgency is sronges; a awed elecoral sysem ha disempowers mos vo-

ers and marginalizes poliical paries; he absence o a credible voer regisry; and

he limied independence and auhoriy o elecion ofcials.

Te winner-ake-all naure o he Aghan presidency and is conrol over many

o he insrumens o elecoral auhoriy increase he risks o a highly conesed

elecion and discredied oucome. Te curren sysems abiliy o manage a real

ransiion o presidenial power has ye o be esed.

Unsustainable dependence on the international community

Te Aghan governmen has ew lici domesic sources o wealh wih which o

mainain or consolidae is conrol. I largely canno provide services, mainain secu-

riy, and co-op poenial spoilers on is own. And unlike mos srong execuives,who view heir securiy services as an essenial asse or wielding conrol, Presiden

Karzai largely perceives he Aghan Naional Securiy Forces as a U.S. and NAO

orce, raher han one o his own. Wihou he inernaional communiy compensa-

ing or is deciencies, he curren Aghan governmen and poliical ramework lacks


11/30


sufcien popular legiimacy and risks breakdownbeing oo weak o consolidae

power over is rivals and oo insular o eecively negoiae heir coopaion.

Despie Karzais public criicisms o he inernaional communiy and his eors

o asser Aghan sovereigny in negoiaions over he erms o a U.S.-Aghan

sraegic parnership agreemen, his primary concern has been o consolidaeconrol over exernal assisance, no end i. Karzai has sough explici com-

mimens rom he Unied Saes and NAO speciying how much nancial

assisance hey will provide o Aghanisan in he long erm.8 Te securiy bill

is only he larges par o a budge sill principally unded and managed by he

inernaional communiy. Even wih agreemen earlier his monh on a sraegic

parnership, U.S. ofcials have deerred decisions on coninued securiy assis-

ance levels unil he Chicago summi and on nonsecuriy aid unil he donors

conerence in okyo laer his summer, alhough i is unclear wheher his later

session will se specic unding pledges.

Ten here are he Aghan naional securiy orces, which despie increased num-

bers are unlikely o achieve sufcien independence rom oreign roops while

also esablishing he capabiliy o eliminae insurgen challengers in he near erm.

Te perormance o he many dieren overlapping Aghan securiy agencies and

services vary signicanly, bu he bulk o Aghan orces coninue o be relian on

he inernaional communiy or logisics, inelligence, operaional guidance, and

airpower. Indeed, he mos recen public Penagon assessmen o Aghan Naional

Army batalions and headquarers nds only 15 unis (ou o 219) judged o be o

independen capabiliyand even his deniion sill allows or dependence on

ISAF or comba suppor and comba enablers.9 Whas more, he lack o rus

beween U.S. and Aghan orces in he wake o increasing insider (so-called green

on blue) atacks on NAO menors has only made implemenaion o he rain-

ing and suppor mission ha much more difcul.10

In he even ha aid is evenually cu o wihou a corresponding plan or conic

setlemen and demobilizaion, i risks he ragmenaion o he Aghan secu-

riy orces, which includes boh uniormed personnel and irregular orces such

as he Aghan Local Police, whose poliical loyalies and cohesion as a naional

orce have been underanalyzed. While NAO has made a real eor o increasehe diversiy o he Aghan Naional Securiy Forces wih oureach o souhern

Pashuns, he ofcer corps remains heavily weighed owards non-Pashun ehnic

groups and ormer Norhern Alliance gures.11

Without the

international

communitycompensating o

its deciencies, t

current Aghan

government

and political

ramework lacks

sucient popula

legitimacy and

risks breakdown

being too weak

to consolidate

power over its

rivals and too

insular to efectiv

negotiate their

cooptation.


12/30


Te cos o mainaining he Aghan securiy orces, while ar less han elding

American roops, remains ouside he nancial reach o he Aghan governmen or

he oreseeable uure, even when accouning or he compleion o large-scale capi-

al invesmens in arms and maerial ha are expeced o reduce unding coss rom

heir peak levels in he 20102012 period. Projeced annual securiy orce und-

ing coss beween $4 billion and $5 billiondown rom more han $12 billion in2012will likely require a reducion in orce size o around 230,000 police ofcers

and soldiers, a plan o which some Aghan deense ofcials have publicly objeced. 12

oal Aghan governmen revenues were only $1.8 billion in 2011, and World

Bank projecions hrough he year 2022 esimae securiy spending coss will

sill be equivalen o as much as 17.5 percen o Aghanisans gross domesic

producequal o he projeced domesic revenuesleaving litle room or he

governmen o pursue nonsecuriy spending.13

Mainaining hese nancial commimens o he governmen and securiy orcesindeniely will be exremely difcul or he Unied Saes and is inernaional

allies, who ace muliple compeing prioriies or heir assisance and atenion. A

sraegy ha hinges on such commimens or decades o come poses high risks

or boh U.S. and Aghan ineress.

The search for alternatives

While risks exis in he curren ransiion sraegy, doubling down miliary eors

as a subsiue or he weaknesses o he Aghan governmen is no a viable course.

An indenie commimen o roop levels and nancial assisance wih no ime-

lines or expecaions rom he Aghan governmen will no advance U.S. securiy

ineress or a susainable peace in Aghanisan. In ac, large-scale aid delivered o

a governmen ha lacks credible public accounabiliy mechanisms and wihou

clear condiions and oversigh on is use risks urher disoring Aghan leaders

poliical calculaions abou he necessiy or compromise wih rivals or assump-

ions o responsibiliy or he counrys uure. Likewise, messages o uncriical

suppor or he Aghan governmen provide litle incenive or leaders currenly

wihin governmen o ake responsibiliy or difcul concessions and reorms.

Anoher opionescalaing conic wih Pakisan in order o direcly comba

insurgens exernal base o supporcarries equal or greaer risk or U.S. iner-

ess. As has been well documened, aliban and Haqqani nework sancuaries in

An indenite

commitment o

troop levels and

nancial assistan

with no timeline

or expectations

rom the Aghan

government wi

not advance U.S

security interest

a sustainable pe

in Aghanistan.


13/30


Pakisan provide he insurgency wih a base o suppor ha poses serious chal-

lenges o curren coaliion eors o deea opponens o he Aghan governmen.

Pakisans coninued suppor or aliban proxies and unilaeral U.S. miliary and

inelligence acion wihin Pakisani erriory have exacerbaed bilaeral ensions.

In addiion, Pakisan has ailed o deal eecively wih growing concerns abou he

hreas posed by erroris neworks ha operae wihin Pakisan. As a resul, U.S.-Pakisan relaions have sharply deerioraed over he pas year.14

Escalaing conic wih Pakisan over he oucome in Aghanisan carries serious

risks or U.S. orces serving in Aghanisan and o he regional securiy bal-

ancewih sill uncerain impacs on he oucome in Aghanisan, given broader

sraegic challenges. Furher, i would hreaen o ully sever he muliple avenues

o incomplee bu real cooperaion ha Pakisan and he Unied Saes currenly

mainain, including counererrorism and inelligence operaions argeing Al

Qaeda, nuclear securiy, and nonmiliary assisance eors o sabilize Pakisans

economy and suppor he coninuiy and consolidaion o democraic poliicswihin Pakisan. Recen rilaeral alks beween he Unied Saes, Aghanisan,

and Pakisan have afrmed a muual commimen or he aciliaion o alks ha

could include he aliban.15 In addiion, Pakisani leaders have shown increasing

willingness o speak publicly in suppor o broad Aghan reconciliaion. Alhough

Pakisani poliical and miliary leaders appear inernally divided over heir own

ineress in U.S.-Pakisan cooperaion, he governmen is no monolihically

opposed in his regard, and shuting o he relaionship risks a breakdown o his

channel and would urher sall inra-Aghan setlemen alks.

Coninuing o seek cooperaion wih Pakisan a his ime does no remove he

opion o ending ha cooperaion in he uure should Islamabad prove irrevo-

cably opposed o paricipaing consrucively in alks oward a more susainable

poliical setlemen in Aghanisan. Bu given he coss o Americas signican

shared ineress wih Pakisan and he marginal sraegic bene o an escalaed

conic wih Pakisan, his opion should be pursued only as a las resor.

Undeniably, risks are associaed wih every policy currenly available o he Unied

Saes in Aghanisan. Bu he uncerainy o he curren rajecory requires U.S.

and NAO policymakers o reprioriize diplomaic eors oward poliical reormand a poliical setlemen in an eor o miigae he eecs o reduced miliary

engagemen and nancial assisance. Te remainder o his paper oulines some o

he key componens o such a sraegy.


14/30


How to bolster diplomacy

in pursuit of an Afghan political

settlement

Te Obama adminisraion has spoken consisenly abou he need or a polii-

cal resoluion o end he Aghan conic. More han a year ago, Secreary o Sae

Hillary Clinon expressed explici suppor or a reconciliaion process wih Aghan

insurgens, acknowledging ha a successul reconciliaion would creae a more

susainable ransiion o Aghan conrol.16 Bu despie an increase in nonmiliary

suppor in Aghanisan, he Obama adminisraions planning or his process

remains underdeveloped and unsynchronized wih is miliary campaign o weaken

he insurgency and is parallel eors o srenghen he Aghan governmen.

Achieving a poliical setlemen is an undeniably dauning challenge or he Obama

adminisraion and is ulimaely dependen on Aghan leadership and willingness

o compromise. Given Aghanisans racured sociey and he exisence o powerul

individuals boh in and ou o governmen srucureswho mainain linkages wih

armed groups and revenue sreams wihin Aghanisan and/or wih oreign govern-

menssriking a poliical deal wih all paries may prove ou o reach.

Achieving even a parial setlemen, however, will require a renewed ocus by he

Aghan governmen and he Unied Saes and is allies on poliical reorms ha

address he unaccounabiliy and overcenralizaion o he exising sysem, and

more inclusive oureach o insurgen groups and acions currenly marginalized

rom he governing coaliion.

Te wo pahways or pursuing hese objecives are hrough he presidenial

elecions in 2014 and he simulaneous negoiaion process wih insurgens and

oher Aghan acions. Tese wo racks in ac may be overlapping and reinorc-

ing. A legiimae elecion process, or example, may srenghen he Aghan sae

in negoiaions wih insurgens, while hose negoiaions may in urn provideopporuniies or some insurgens o join he ormal poliical process. A poliical

setlemen will also demand greaer clariy on he naure o U.S. commimens o

and expecaions rom Aghanisan.


15/30


Pursuing governance reforms through the political transition process

Moving beyond he unsable saus quo o achieve a more susainable poliical

consensus in Aghanisan requires greaer access o paricipaion in he poliical

sysem, more opporuniies or power-sharing, and more mechanisms or Aghans

o hold heir leaders accounable. Currenly, insiuional checks in he sysem,including he parliamen, he judiciary, and local governmen bodies, are weak

due o lack o auhoriy, undened responsibiliies, and nancial dependence on

Presiden Karzais ofce.

Mainaining suppor or he sae sysem will ulimaely require reorms ha

increase hese insiuions powers and oer he chance o accommodae he

ineress o more acors, including boh he unarmed domesic opposiion and

insurgen paries willing o ener ino a poliical process.

While negoiaions over hese checks and balances and expanded paricipaionin he sysem will likely be a decades-long process, he upcoming 2014 Aghan

presidenial elecion oers a criical opporuniy or creaing greaer buy-in

rom Aghan acions, mobilizing poliical paries, generaing dialogue among

Aghans abou he uure o heir counry, and srenghening he legiimacy o

he Aghan governmenall o which will be coningen on he elecions being

perceived as ree and air.

erm limis as oulined in he consiuion require ha Presiden Karzai sep

down rom he execuive role he has held since he earlies days o he inerim

governmen in 2001. Some Aghan poliical acorsmosly veerans o he

now-much-divided ormer Norhern Alliance, he ani-aliban coaliion o

he 1990shave already begun enaive mobilizaion and coaliion-building

eors readying or his cones.17 Despie verbal pledges o abide by he con-

siuional limis, Presiden Karzaiwho has repeaedly opposed he develop-

men o a poliical pary sysemdoes no appear o have setled on a successor,

exacerbaing uncerainy abou wheher he will sep down and abou he open-

ness o he elecion process. Consequenly, U.S. governmen preparaions or

he elecions mus begin now.

Allegaions o widespread raud in he pas round o presidenial elecions in 2009

and Karzais deerminaion o circumven exising elecion bodies during he 2010

parliamenary elecions by seting up a parallel cour o rehear complains marred

boh elecions and eroded he governmens legiimacy domesically and abroad.18


16/30


As in many oher Aghan governmen insiuions, he auonomy o he

Independen Elecion Commission and he Elecoral Complains Commission

is compromised by he ac ha commission members are direcly appoined by

he presiden, wih ew checks or oversigh o he process rom parliamen or

oher governmen bodies.19

While Presiden Karzai has recenly voiced srong opposiion o inernaional

inererence in he presidenial elecions, i is imperaive ha he Unied Saes

and oher inernaional donors, including he Unied Naions, commi o sup-

poring a ree and ransparen elecion o deermine he nex Aghan presiden

and o holding he Aghan governmen accounable or is pledges in his regard.

Tis does no mean picking Karzais successor, bu i does mean condiioning U.S.

nancial suppor or he elecion and addiional programs on a credible, ranspar-

en process in which Presiden Karzai ransers power o anoher democraically

eleced Aghan leader. Te Unied Saes should no suppor poliical insiuions

and processes ha lack sufcien legiimacy, ransparency, and airness.

Recommendations for political reforms through the political

transition

We urge he U.S. governmen o underake he ollowing acions leading up o he

Aghan presidenial elecions in 2014:

Support for free and fair elections

U.S. ofcials mus clearly signal he imporance o a credible and accepable

elecion process and mus clariy ha he elecion-relaed commimens made

by Aghanisan in he Sraegic Parnership Agreemen are more han rheoric.

Accordingly, American ofcials mus coninue o communicae o Aghan of-

cials in no uncerain erms ha he Unied Saes ully expecs Presiden Karzai

o abide by consiuional erm limis and sep down rom ofce in 2014. A he

Chicago summi and a he okyo donors conerence, he Unied Saes and

oher counries will make commimens o Aghanisans long-erm develop-men and insiuion building. Holding credible presidenial and parliamenary

elecions in 2014 and 2015 should be agreed upon as a clear baseline in reurn

or any long-erm U.S. assisance.

U.S. ocials musclearly signal the

importance o

a credible and

acceptable elect

process and mu

clariy that the

election-related

commitments

made by

Aghanistan in

the Strategic

Partnership

Agreement are

more than rheto


17/30


Support electoral reform

U.S. ofcials should hold he Aghan governmen accounable or is implemen-

aion o elecoral reorms and or he degree o which i allows space or civil

sociey, reormers in he Aghan governmen, and advocaes in parliamen who are

working o improve he elecoral process and are addressing he aws ha under-mined he previous elecions in 2009 and 2010. Tese reorms include:

Esablishing a credible naional voer regisry or an eecive subsiue; Creaing a clear elecoral calendar or he presidenial, provincial council, and

parliamenary elecions; Enhancing he auonomy o he elecoral bodies such as he Independen

Elecion Commission and he Elecoral Complains Commission; Reorming he single nonranserable voing sysem beore he nex round o

parliamenary elecions, which has hamsrung he ormaion o poliical paries; Supporing civic educaion or he Aghan populaion.

Promote increased checks and balances outside of the executive branch

Te main hrus o U.S. diplomaic eors should be o assis Aghans in building

a solid and inclusive poliical oundaion. U.S. ofcials mus be cauious abou

sepping ino quesions o inra-Aghan consiuional reorm debaes, bu lead-

ing up o and beyond he 2014 elecion, he Unied Saes should assis wih he

goal o supporing checks in he sysem such as he parliamen, he judiciary, and

local governmen bodies. Te suppor should include unding and raining as well

as nding opporuniies or hese insiuions o provide an oversigh role. Pilo

programs devolving budgeing auhoriy o eleced provincial bodies should be

urher incenivized, and parliamenary and local oversigh mus be made a condi-

ion or suppor o governmen-run aid programs.

Conduct political outreach and support to opposition

While he U.S. governmen should no pick a leader or poliical pary o succeedPresiden Karzai, he U.S. embassy should mee wih a diverse se o Aghan polii-

cal paries and leaders in he lead up o he elecion. A number o paries have

already emerged including ruh & Jusice, Hope & Change, and he Naional

Coaliion or Aghanisan. Such eors would signal suppor or an open elecoral


18/30


process and genuine compeiion. In addiion he Unied Saes should coninue

o provide unding or raining poliical paries.

Pursuing a more inclusive political settlement

In his speech a Bagram Air Base in early May, Presiden Obama reassered his

adminisraions commimen o reconciliaion, saing ha he aliban could be par

o a poliical soluion i hey agreed o mee he hree redlines o he U.S. governmen:

sever ies wih Al Qaeda, renounce violence, and adhere o he Aghan consiuion.

Several obsacles, however, sand in he way o he pursui o such a setlemen.

As o his wriing, eors by he Unied Saes and he Aghan governmen o

iniiae reconciliaion alks wih he aliban insurgency appear o be salled. Te

aliban leadershipmindul o inernal dissension over alks wih he govern-

menhave repeaedly disavowed ineres in holding discussions wih PresidenKarzai. Following a deadlock over he erms o a prisoner exchange, he aliban

leadership has suspended iniial alks wih he Unied Saes, which Qaar medi-

aed.20 Resisance o concessions is muual, as Aghan leaders boh inside and

ouside governmen have rejeced accommodaion wih heir opponens.21

A presen Aghanisan lacks a clear orum o conduc a serious poliical setle-

men wih insurgens and oher unarmed acions. Te Karzai-appoined High

Peace Councils abiliy o negoiae or he governmen is complicaed by is

racious membership and uncerain mandae. Following he assassinaion o is

ormer Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani, he chairmanship o he council has

now passed o his son, Salahuddin Rabbani, who is also atemping o consolidae

conrol over he remnans o his ahers Jamia-e-Islami pary.22

Eors o co-op insurgen suppor hrough nancial incenive programs such

as he Aghan Peace and Reinegraion Program have only drawn in a small por-

ion o aliban ghers o dae, mosly ajiks rom he norh and wes.23 Given he

cenralizaion o power wihin he presidency, neiher he High Peace Council nor

he provincial-level Aghan Peace and Reinegraion Program councils appear o be

empowered o seriously engage in local-level grievance resoluion or local polii-cal agreemens ha migh involve governmen concessions. I is no ye clear wha

he Aghan governmen is discussing wih aliban represenaives, or i here is any

meaningul discussion a all.


19/30


Te Obama adminisraion and U.S. Congress have also ound i difcul o push he

Aghan governmen o reorm or make concessions, oen characerizing reconcilia-

ion as insurgens acquiesing o he saus quo raher han a process o give and ake.

Despie hese impedimens, reconciliaion may ye be possible. All Aghan ac-

ions lived hrough he devasaion o 30 years o civil war. Pakisan, a primarybeneacor o he aliban insurgency, is suering rom economic, poliical, and

securiy crises and would be hreaened by increased violence across is bor-

der. While Pakisani leaders wan o mainain inuence in Aghanisans uure

setlemen, hey have expressed suppor or an inernal setlemen in Aghanisan

and do no appear o wan an exclusively aliban-conrolled governmen in

Aghanisan.24 In heir suspension o alks, aliban saemens indicaed concern

over he U.S. governmens abiliy o deliver on is own proposed condence-

building measuresno an ourigh objecion o alks o any kind.25

U.S. diplomas, led by Ambassador Marc Grossman, have publicly emphasizedha heir goal in iniial aliban oureach alks has been o press or an inra-

Aghan negoiaion.26 Despie sebacks, his eor mus coninue and be bolsered

using American leverage wih he Aghan governmen, aliban represenaives,

broader Aghan civil sociey and domesic opposiion, and neighboring counries

o nd a more durable poliical setlemen.

Wihou a doub, a successul poliical negoiaion process will be very difcul

o achieve given he divisions wihin he insurgency and he broader Aghan

populaion. Bu he pursui o such a setlemen provides benes by clariying

he objecives and poenial concessions o he paries, esing heir inenions,

and clariy ing who can deliver. Furher, a poliical setlemen process may enable

reorm o he curren sysem hrough greaer inclusion o marginalized groups.

Te process may also empower he pragmaic elemens o he aliban while mar-

ginalizing he exremis ideologues, as well as sow dissen and conusion wihin

he ranks o he insurgencyi he U.S. and Aghan governmen oer some

condence-building measures o srenghen heir posiion wihin a divided move-

men. News oules have already repored ha recen negoiaions beween he

aliban and he Unied Saes have undermined morale among insurgens.27


20/30


Recommendations for pursuing a more inclusive political

settlement process

We urge he Aghan and U.S. governmens and heir NAO parners o underake

he ollowing acions o pursue a more inclusive poliical setlemen process:

Identify a negotiations forum that allows for more stakeholders

Te curren Aghan governmen is a legiimae sakeholder in any Aghan setle-

men process. Bu is atemps o lead an inclusive negoiaions process hrough

he High Peace Council have oundered. Te Unied Saes and is inernaional

allies mus ake a more acive role in ideniying a negoiaing orum wih he

Aghan governmen in which he broad array o Aghan ineres groups, including

women, norhern groups, civil sociey leaders, non-aliban Pashun communiies,

and he aliban isel can have heir concerns heard.

Wihou greaer ransparency in his process, paricipans are likely o grow suspi-

cious ha each group is orging is own separae peace wih oher players in he

conic. Tis no only weakens he prospecs or any consensus agreemen bu

also he abiliy o leaders o negoiae on behal o supporers who are sill divided

over he bene o alks.

Te Unied Naions, Qaar, urkey or Saudi Arabia all oer poenial orums bu

care mus be aken by he U.S. and Aghan governmens in selecing a neural seting

or aciliaing alks o which all Aghan acorsincluding womens groupshave

access and represenaion.

Consult regional actors in settlement talks

Regional involvemen will be necessary o achieve a setlemen ha addresses he

ineress o neighboring counries and oers a ramework or he proecion o

sovereigny or boh Aghanisan and is neighbors. Te appoinmen o a neural

inernaional coordinaor under he auspices o he Unied Naions could aciliaedialogue among regional counries such as Iran, whose relaions wih he Unied

Saes are srained. As America draws down is miliary presence, a neural media-

or hrough he Unied Naions migh be benecial or building regional buy in

and ownership, and can also enable he Unied Saes o reduce is cenraliy o he


21/30


peace processalhough clear U.S. signals o commimen o his process will be

necessary or ohers o see i as a orum worh paricipaing in.

Continue to engage Pakistan in settlement talks

Breaking ou o a counerproducive cycle o muual suspicion and recrimina-

ion beween he Unied Saes and Pakisan requires coninued engagemen wih

boh civilian and miliary leaders. In his regard, he resumpion o U.S.-Pakisan

-Aghanisan rilaeral alks, high-prole U.S.-Pakisan bilaeral meeings in April,

and Presiden Asi Ali Zardaris atendance a he Chicago summi, were all welcome

signs, even i clear breakhroughs in relaions have ye o be reached. All sides have

afrmed heir ineres in a peaceul and sable Aghanisan, bu greaer dialogue is

necessary o clearly deermine which acors are likely o engage in negoiaions and

which remain irreconcilable. In addiion, i remains o be seen how he Unied Saes

and Pakisan can work in concer o suppor an Aghan peace process ha respecsall sides ineress and expecaions. Te Unied Saes should sill be prepared o pu

orh a more explici se o posiive and negaive inducemens o ge Pakisan o ac

agains hose milian paries unwilling o negoiae.

More broadly, he Unied Saes and Pakisan need o redouble heir eors o

enhance sraegic coordinaion on a wide range o issues including counererror-

ism, miliary cooperaion, and regional economic inegraion. Tis will require he

Unied Saes o shi even more atenion owards he challenges and opporuniies

in Pakisan. Pakisan is currenly undergoing an imporan debae abou how o

reorm is own governmen and how i could play a more consrucive role in he

region, as seen in he recen seps o build economic and rade ies wih is neigh-

bors. As difcul as he pas year has been in U.S.-Pakisan ies, Pakisan remains a

key player in he region, and he Unied Saes needs o remain engaged.

Focus talks on identifying common, competing, and negotiable interests

Building condence in a poliical setlemen process requires clear signals rom all

sides ha hey are willing and able o make concessions, and ha commimensrom any one acor will no be one-sided bu raher mached by ohers. Te deails

and iniial negoiaing posures o he various paries may change, bu a heir core,

hese concessions are likely o revolve around:


22/30


Recogniion and accepance o he curren consiuional ramework Recogniion o porions o insurgency as a legiimae poliical movemen Guaranees or Pakisan o is erriorial sovereigny and securiy Guaranees o some level o ederalism o proec he norhern opposiions local

independence rom Kabul

Clear renunciaion o Al Qaeda by he aliban

Ulimaely, each sides leadership mus demonsrae o heir consiuencies ha

hey can advance heir ineress more eecively hrough negoiaions raher han

violence. Early condence-building measures will hereore be required o move

his process orward. A his sage, he poenial o hese seps o unlock a more

subsanial series o concessionspoenially including local or regional de-esca-

laion o insurgen and coaliion miliary operaionsouweighs he relaively

minor sraegic risks o he Unied Saes o an individual prisoner ranser or

permission o sae passage or negoiaing o ake place.

Tese concessions mus drive oward a aliban commimen o ener ino serious

dialogue wih he Karzai adminisraion and oher Aghan acors abou he uure

srucure o he Aghan poliical sysem. Te esablishmen o a aliban ofce in

Qaar can be an incremenal sep in his regard, bu inernaional legiimaion o

he aliban hrough heir leaders urher removal rom he U.N. error blacklis

should be incumben on heir paricipaion in a durable inra-Aghan setlemen

process and he clear renunciaion o Al Qaeda.

Security transition and mutual commitments

Te recen Sraegic Parnership Agreemen is an imporan sep oward clariying

he deails o U.S. commimens in Aghanisan beyond 2014. Bu such commi-

mens mus be reciprocal. One-way messages o suppor or he Aghan governmen

provide litle incenive o leaders currenly in governmen o ake responsibiliy

or difcul concessions or reorms. Addiionally, wihou such concessions mos

insurgen rivals are unlikely o consider joining a sysem ha provides hem wih ew

insiuional bases o power in which o paricipae, shor o he presidency.

Despie eors o separae he issues, he Aghan governmens willingness o

underake poliical reorms and join in an inclusive poliical setlemen, along

wih he inernaional communiys suppor or Aghanisans coninued securiy,

are in ac inrinsically linked. U.S. ofcials mus clearly convey ha American

Ultimately, each

sides leadership

must demonstra

to their

constituencies t

they can advanc

their interests m

efectively throu

negotiations rat

than violence.


23/30


commimensboh in erms o securiy assisance and nancial aido

Aghanisans sabiliy are no uncondiional, and ha he perpeuaion o a

narrow regime unwilling o share power wih rivals is no an overriding ineres o

which he Unied Saes will conribue indeniely.

Te realignmen o U.S. and oher inernaional donors invesmens inAghanisan in ac provides an opporuniy o reduce he disorions in

Aghanisans inernal poliics by increasing he need or compromise on he par

o hose seeking o mainain power. Ulimaely, Aghans hemselves will need o

esablish a more susainable poliical sysem.

Te Unied Saes canno wholly dicae he exac oucome o inernal negoiaions

over he balance o power in is uure sovereign Aghan parner. Bu as he principal

sponsor o he Aghan governmen, he Unied Saes possesses levers o inuence

o encourage movemen on hese wo racks o poliical reorm and reconciliaion,

hrough clear expecaions and a se o posiive and negaive inducemens. Furher,as he mos powerul acor in he Aghan conic wih an ineres in regional and

global sabiliy, he Unied Saes also has he responsibiliy o do so.

Recommendations for reducing the U.S. military footprint

and synchronizing military transition with political efforts

Synchronize military operations with the pursuit of political objectives

and strategy

Te realignmen and reducion in U.S. miliary and nancial invesmens in

Aghanisan remains he righ pah or boh broader U.S. sraegic ineress and

or he conic in Aghanisan, paricularly as large-scale miliary inervenion

shows diminishing reurns and as he poliical and diplomaic processes increase

in imporance. Te principal goal or our miliary operaions mus be o suppor

poliical setlemen processes ha conribue o he counrys sabiliy.

As he Unied Saes reduces is miliary ooprin in Aghanisan and shis oa more limied raining, advisory, and suppor role, he Inernaional Securiy

Assisance Force miliary coaliion mus also work closely wih American and

Aghan negoiaors o suppor any negoiaed condence-building measures

emporary ceaseres, he removal o commanders rom arge liss, or prisoner


24/30


exchangeswih insurgen groups ha can conribue o a more susainable peace

process. Tere are in ac recen repors ha such eors are already underway, wih

argeed deainee releases inended o broker cooperaion wih insurgen acions,

alhough heir linkage o broader reconciliaion alks is unclear.28

Condition security assistance on baseline conditions related

to political reforms

Te Sraegic Parnership Agreemen reached wih Aghanisan provides an

opporuniy or long-erm engagemen in suppor o Aghanisan. Te U.S. iner-

es in he mainenance o Aghan and regional sabiliy means i should be willing

o coninue o oer limied raining and assisance o he Aghan governmen

hrough and beyond he miliary ransiion. While mos U.S. roops should be

removed rom Aghanisan hrough he remainder o his year and 2013, a residual

orce can also assis he Aghan governmen in providing securiy and logisics orhe 2014 elecions process, in addiion o supporing he gradual demobilizaion

o he Aghan naional securiy orces rom heir esimaed 2014 o 2015 peak.

Bu hese commimens o he Aghan governmen mus be reciprocal. Te recen

Sraegic Parnership Agreemen oulined a number o commimens made by he

Aghan governmen oward improving governance. Te upcoming NAO coner-

ence in Chicago, he inernaional donors conerence a okyo, and he negoia-

ion o a more deailed U.S.-Aghan Saus o Forces Agreemen will be criical or

esablishing he exac erms under which he Aghan governmen will make is

own commimens, as a responsible seward o inernaional assisance.

Pas donor eors o push he Aghan governmen o ake acion by ying con-

diions o aid have in ac been parially eecive, as winessed in he govern-

mens grudging response o he Kabul Bank crisis in 2011 aer he Inernaional

Moneary Fund and oher donors suspended on-budge assisance.29 Bu he

eeciveness o hese mechanisms has been bluned in par by a lack o clear com-

municaion abou muual expecaions, along wih an inconsisen applicaion o

incenives and disincenives or good governance and inclusiviy.

Tas why, in uure discussions on boh he miliary and nonmiliary aspecs o

he relaionship, he Unied Saes and oher inernaional donors mus convey

he clear reorm baselines or heir coninued suppor o he Aghan governmen.

Tey should also afrm a willingness o parner wih he Aghan governmen

when i akes he righ seps oward a more susainable poliical consensus.


25/30


Conclusion

Te NAO conerence in Chicago oers member counries an opporuniy o

plan ou heir sraegy or ransiioning securiy responsibiliy o Aghans over he

nex wo years. Bu implemening ha sraegy in a way ha does no exacerbae

insabiliy in Aghanisan and he region over he medium and long erms requires

expanding he conversaion beyond roop wihdrawals, areas o be ranserred

o he Aghan Naional Securiy Forces, and he unding or ha securiy orce.

Discussions on he naure o he Aghan governmen and he expecaions or is

coninued suppor by inernaional donors canno be aricially separaed anddelayed unil subsequen conerences in okyo and beyond. Tere mus be recog-

niion by all involved ha a securiy ransiion is inexricably linked o he poliical

one, and vice versa.

Having signaled suppor or a poliical setlemen in he sraegic parnership

agreemen, is now up o U.S., Aghan, and oher inernaional ofcials o under-

sake serious preparaions or he Aghan presidenial elecions in 2014, o acili-

ae an inclusive Aghan negoiaions process linked o regional agreemens, and

o clariy expecaions or he Aghan governmen hrough a se o condiions and

incenives ied o Aghan governmen perormance.

A ransiion o Aghan ownership and he drawdown o oreign orces is he righ

approach or he long-erm ineress o Aghanisan, he region, and he Unied

Saes and is NAO parners. Bu much more work needs o be done o prioriize

and carry ou he seps necessary or a durable resoluion o he poliical issues a

he core o he conic.


26/30


About the authors

Caroline Wadhams is a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress. She

ocuses on Aghanisan, Pakisan, errorism issues, and U.S. naional securiy.

Prior o joining CAP, she served as a legislaive assisan on oreign policy issues

or Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI). Wadhams also worked a he Council on ForeignRelaions in Washingon, D.C., as an assisan direcor and in New York as a

research associae on naional securiy issues. Her overseas experience includes

work wih he Inernaional Rescue Commitee in Sierra Leone and wo years

in Ecuador and Chile. She served as a U.S. elecion observer in Aghanisans

parliamenary elecions in Sepember 2010 and in Pakisans parliamenary elec-

ions in February 2008. She was a 2005 Manred Wrner Fellow wih he German

Marshall Fund and a erm member a he Council on Foreign Relaions.

Wadhams received a masers degree in inernaional relaions rom he Flecher

School o Law and Diplomacy a us Universiy. She has been a gues analyswih numerous inernaional, naional, and local news oules.

Colin Cookman is a Policy Analys or he Naional Securiy and Inernaional

Policy eam a he Cener or American Progress. His research and wriing a CAP

ocuses primarily on issues relaed o Pakisan, Aghanisan, and American policy

oward he region. He served as a member o Democracy Inernaionals elecion

observaion eam in Kabul during he 2010 Aghan parliamenary elecions. Prior

o joining CAP in January 2008, he was an assisan language eacher in Karasu

Ciy, Japan, and an assisan advisor wih Habia or Humaniy Inernaionals

Summer Youh Bliz Program.

Cookman graduaed rom Boson Universiy magna cum laude wih a bachelors

degree in inernaional relaions in 2005 and is pursuing a masers degree in iner-

naional relaions wih a concenraion in Souh Asia a he Johns Hopkins School

o Advanced Inernaional Sudies.

Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress, where his

work ocuses on U.S. naional securiy policy in he Middle Eas and Souh Asia.

Kaulis has served as a consulan o numerous U.S. governmen agencies, pri-vae corporaions, and nongovernmenal organizaions on projecs in more han

wo-dozen counries, including Iraq, Pakisan, Aghanisan, Yemen, Egyp, and

Colombia. He was a Fulbrigh scholar rom 1994 o 1995 in Amman, Jordan, where

he conduced research on he peace reay beween Israel and Jordan. From 1995


27/30


o 1998 he lived and worked in he Wes Bank and Gaza Srip and Egyp or he

Naional Democraic Insiue or Inernaional Aairs. Kaulis has published aricles

in several newspapers and journals, including Te Washington Post,Los Angeles imes,

Boston Globe,Baltimore Sun, andMiddle East Policy, among oher publicaions. He is

co-auhor oTe Prosperity Agenda, a book on U.S. naional securiy.

Kaulis received a masers degree rom Princeon Universiys Woodrow Wilson

School or Public and Inernaional Aairs and a bachelors degree in hisory and

Arab and Islamic Sudies rom Villanova Universiy.

Acknowledgments

We are graeul or he inpu and advice o our colleagues here a he Cener or

American Progress who have suppored he developmen o his paper and our

body o work on Aghanisan o dae, paricularly John Podesa, Rudy deLeon,and Peer Juul. Any errors are ours alone. As always, our work would no be pos-

sible wihou he help o he Ceners hard-working ediorial eam, including Dan

Wagener, Carl Chancellor, Jan Diehm and Erica Mendez Babcock.


28/30


Endnotes

1 For the text o the strategic partership agreemet, see gover-mets o the Uited States o America ad the Islamic Repulico Aghaista, Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement(whiteHouse, 2012), availale at http://.hitehouse.gov/sites/deault/les/2012.06.01u.s.-aghaistaspasigedtext.pd.

2 U.S. Departmet o Deese, Report on Progress Toward Security andStability in Afghanistan (2011), page 70, availale at http://.

deese.gov/pus/pds/Report_Fial_SecDe_04_27_12.pd.

3 A Flaherty, Feistei, Rogers Say Talia Stroger Sice Surge,Washington Post, May 6, 2012, availale at http://.ashig-topost.com/orld/atioal-security/eistei-rogers-say-talia-stroger-sice-surge/2012/05/06/gIQALQh6T_prit.html.

4 Cogressioal ad Petago ivestigatios have particularlyocused corruptio associated ith U.S. military logistics cotractsas much as $360 millio o a overall $2.16 millio Host natio

Truckig Cotract as oud to have ee diverted to maligactors. See Kare DeYoug, U.S. Truckig Fuds Reach Talia,Military-Led Ivestigatio Cocludes, Washington Post, July 24,2011, availale at http://.ashigtopost.com/orld/atioal-security/us-truckig-uds-reach-talia-military-led-ivestigatio-cocludes/2011/07/22/gIQAmMDUXI_prit.html; Joh F. Tierey,warlord, Ic.: Extortio ad Corruptio Alog the U.S. Supply Chaii Aghaista, Report o the Majority Sta o the House OversightSucommittee o natioal Security ad Foreig Aairs, Jue 2010,

availale at http://media.ashigtopost.com/p-srv/orld/docu-mets/arlords.pd.

5 Departmet o Deese, Report on Progress Toward Security andStability in Afghanistan, page 5152.

6 Oce o the Presidet o Aghaista, Aoucemet y PresidetHamid Karzai o the Ocial Lauch o Trasitio Trache 3, May 13,2012, availale at presidet.gov.a/e/es/9553.

7 For urther discussio o the Agha govermet, see Coli Cook-ma ad Carolie wadhams, Goverace i Aghaista: LookigAhead to what we Leave behid (washigto: Ceter or AmericaProgress, 2010), availale at http://.americaprogress.org/issues/2010/05/agha_goverace.html.

8 Karzais requests or a ritte agreemet o udig levels i theU.S.-Agha Strategic Partership Agreemet ere rejected ySecretary o Deese Leo Paetta. See Elisaeth bumiller, U.S. ad

nATO Fialize Pacts o Edig Agha war, New York Times, April 18,2012, availale at http://.ytimes.com/2012/04/19/orld/asia/uited-states-ad-ato-allies-ear-deal-o-agha-aid.html.

9 Departmet o Deese, Report on Progress Toward Security andStability in Afghanistan, pages 4042. Additioally, 39 out o 435Agha police uits (icludig border Police ad Civil Order Police)ere judged to e idepedet ith advisors.

10 As o May 1, 2012, there have ee 13 reported attacks y Aghasecurity orce memers o U.S. orces, resultig i 19 atalities ada udisclosed umer o ouded. Tety-oe attacks killed 35coalitio service memers i 2011, icludig a high-prole attacko advisors orkig at the Agha Miistry o Iterior. ISAF does otgeerally report details o icidets i hich ISAF soldiers are atallyouded. See Roert burs, U.S. Keeps Mum o Some AghaAttacks, Associated Press, May 1, 2012, availale at http://.ajc.com/es/atio-orld/ap-exclusive-us-keeps-1428944.html.

11 Accordig to ISAF assessmets, souther Pashtus comprise oly6.6 percet o Agha natioal Army elisted recruits i the Octoer2011 to March 2012 reportig period, ad Tajiks are overrepre-seted i the Agha natioal Police. See Departmet o Deese,Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pages20 ad 30.

12 no Agha Forces Drado Util Isurget Haves Destroyed:MOD, TOLONews, May 9, 2012, availale at http://toloes.com/e/aghaista/6172-o-agha-orces-drado-util-isurget-haves-destroyed-mod-. As o this ritig, nATO ocials have yet toormally edorse a udig pla, ad the exact timig or a reduc-tio i Agha orces remais uclear. See Doa Cassata, Allewats Sigicat Comat Poer i 2013, Associated Press, March22, 2012, availale at http://.armytimes.com/es/2012/03/ap-

aghaista-joh-alle-ats-sigicat-comat-poer-032212/;Thom Shaker ad Alissa Rui, Agha Forces will be Cut AterTakig Leadig Role, New York Times, April 10, 2012, availale athttp://.ytimes.com/2012/04/11/orld/asia/agha-orce-ill-e-cut-as-ato-eds-missio-i-2014.html.

13 world bak, Trasitio i Aghaista: Lookig beyod 2014(2011), pages 910, availale at http://siteresources.orldak.org/InTAFGHAnISTAn/Resources/AFbeyod2014.pd.

14 Despite eorts to resume ilateral ties, mutual mistrust coti-ues, ad nATO supply routes through the coutry remai closedolloig the death o 24 Pakistai soldiers i a clash ith a joitU.S.-Agha uit alog the order i novemer 2011. See Declawalsh, Eric Schmitt, ad Steve Lee Meyers, Uited States Talks Failas Pakistais Seek Apology,New York Times, April 27, 2012, availaleat http://.ytimes.com/2012/04/28/orld/asia/talks-etee-us-ad-pakista-ail-over-airstrike-apology.html?pageated=prit.

15 Pakista, Aghaista, US Cosider Sae Passage or TaliaMilitats, Reuters, April 27, 2012, availale at http://da.com/2012/04/27/pakista-aghaista-us-cosider-sae-passage-or-talia-militats/. The Talias su sequet deuciatio othis oer emphasizes the seior leaderships sesitivity to movesthat might split its cotrol over eld commaders. See Tahir Kha,Agha Peace Process: Talia Spur Sae Passage Oer, ExpressTribune, April 29, 2012, availale at http://triue.com.pk/sto-ry/371585/agha-peace-process-talia-spur-sae-passage-oer/.

16 Secretary o State Hilary Clito, Remarks at the Lauch o theAsia Societys Series o Richard H. Holrooke Memorial Adresses,Feruary 18, 2011, availale at http://.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156815.htm.

17 Memership i these groups appears to e fuid, ad mostleaders appear to maitai their o separate parties ithi thelarger coalitio. Some major groups iclude the natioal Frot oAghaista led y ormer First Vice Presidet Ahmad Zia Massoud;

the natioal Coalitio o Aghaista led y ormer oreig miisterAdullah Adullah; ad the Truth ad Justice Party, hose memersiclude ormer Iterior Miister Hai Atmar ad Aghaista Ide-pedet Huma Rights Commissio chairoma Sima Samar.

18 For a rie overvie o the iceptio ad resolutio o the 2010parliametary electio crisis, see Jed Oer, Karzais Court, APakChael, July 7, 2011, availale at http://apak.oreigpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/07/karzais_court; Scott worde, Karzai bliks iAgha Electio Crisis, APak Chael, August 10, 2011, availale athttp://apak.oreigpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/10/karzai_liks_i_agha_electio_crisis.

19 The IEC has proposed chages to the electoral la that ould reiter-ate its role as the sole decisio makig ody o electoral complaitsad ould give commissioers the poer to elect the orgaizatioschairma. The drat la does ot appear to oer parliamet a role icormig commissio memers, hoever, ho ill cotiue to epresidetially appoited. See Qayoom Suroush, Ahmadzai: Chages

to the Electoral System Demad Political Support,Bamdad, March31, 2012, availale at http://.amdad.a/eglish/story/1691.

20 For the most recet rejectio o talks ith the Agha govermet,see Tahir Kha, Agha Peace Process: Talia Spur Sae PassageOer, Express Tribune, April 29, 2012, availale at http://triue.com.pk/story/371585/agha-peace-process-talia-spur-sae-passage-oer/.


29/30


21 See, or example, recet commets y Iterior Miister bismillahMohammadi ad Agha natioal Frot leader Ahmad Z ia Massoud,amog others. Agha G overmet Says Talia Process O Track,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 30, 2012, availale at http://.rerl.org/cotet/agha_govermet_says_talia_process_o_track/24564100.html; Govermet Has no Political Commit-met to Fight Terrorism: natioal Frot, TOLO News, April 28, 2012,availale at http://toloes.com/e/aghaista/6046-govermet-has-o-political-commitmet-to-ght-terrorism-atioal-rot.

22 Murdered Agha Talks Head Raai Replaced y So,BBC News,April 14, 2012, availale at http://.c.co.uk/es/orld-south-

asia-17712058.

23 Iteratioal Crisis Group, Talkig Aout Talks: Toard a Politi-cal Settlemet i Aghaista (2012), pages 1922, availale athttp://.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/aghaista/221-talkig-aout-talks-toard-a-political-settlemet-i-aghaista.pd; Deedee Derkse, Impact or Illusio? Reitegra-tio Uder the Aghaista Peace ad R eitegratio Program(washigto: U.S. Istitute o Peace, 2011), availale at http://.usip.org/pulicatios/impact-or-illusio-reitegratio-uder-the-aghaista-peace-ad-reitegratio-program.

24 Huma Imtiaz, Pakista Caot Make Crucial Decisios based oOe Phoe Call, Express Tribune, Feruary 16, 2012, availale athttp://triue.com.pk/story/337241/pakista-caot-make-crucial-decisios-ased-o-oe-phoe-call-sherry-rehma/.

25 Agha Talia Susped Peace Talks ith U.S.,Al Jazeera English,March 16, 2012, availale at http://.usip.org/pulicatios/the-

agha-peace-process-trasitio-ad-the-do-list-the-us.

26 Gordo Luold, The Agha Peace Process, Trasitio, ad theTo-Do List or the U.S. (washigto: U.S. Istitute o Peace, 2012),availale at http://.usip.org/pulicatios/the-agha-peace-process-trasitio-ad-the-do-list-the-us.

27 Sami Yousazai ad Ro Moreau, Ho Agha Peace Talks AreSpliterig the Talia,Daily Beast, Feruary 13, 2012, availale athttp://.thedailyeast.com/eseek/2012/02/12/ho-agha-peace-talks-are-spliterig-the-talia.prit.html.

28 Kevi Sie, Secret U.S. Program Releases High-Level Isurgetsi Exchage or Pledges o Peace, Washington Post, May 6, 2012,

availale at http://.ashigtopost.com/orld/asia_pacic/secret-us-program-releases-high-level-isurgets-i-exchage-or-pledges-o-peace/2012/05/06/gIQAFJ6T_prit.html.

29 The atermath o the Kaul bak crisis ad the Agha gover-mets respose to it is still ogoig, ut the likage o IMF loaagreemetsad, y associatio, cotriutios rom may otherAgha doorshas clearly orced the Agha govermet todevote more attetio to, at miimum, eig see as takig actioto resolve the crisis. See Coli Cookma, Gettig AghaistasHouse i Order (washigto: Ceter or America Progress, 2011),availale at http://.americaprogress.org/issues/2011/03/a-ghaistas_house_i_order.html; Lesley wroughto ad Ja Harvey,IMF Rees Agha Ties, Approves Loa Deal, Reuters, novemer16, 2011, availale at http://i.reuters.com/article/2011/11/15/idInIdia-60542820111115?eedType=RSS&eedname=southAsianes; Emma Graham-Harriso, Kaul bak Scadal: Hamid Karzai SetsUp Special Triual, The Guardian, April 4, 2012, availale at http://.guardia.co.uk/orld/2012/apr/04/kaul-ak-hamid-karzai-

special-triual.


30/30

The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute

dedicated to promoting a strong, just, and free America that ensures opportunity

for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to

these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values.

We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and

international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that

is of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Afghanistan Transition

Documents

Transcript of Afghanistan Transition