AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY PROCUREMENT...

AFGHANISTAN

COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT:

CONSULTING SERVICES

June 2007

Procurement Services Unit

South Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the

performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed

without World Bank authorization.

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ABA Afghan Builders Association

ADB Asian Development Bank

AICC Afghanistan International Chamber of

Commerce

AISA Afghanistan Investment Support

Agency

ARDS Afghanistan Reconstruction and

Development Services

ARDS PU Afghanistan Reconstruction and

Development Services Procurement

Unit

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers

Bank The World Bank

CEU Contract Evaluation Unit

CMO Contract Management Office

CPIA Country Policy and Institutional

Performance Assessment

CQS Selection Based on the Consultants’

Qualification

CSC Civil Service Commission

DFID UK Department for International

Development

EC Evaluation Committee

EoI Expression of Interest

EPAP Emergency Public Administration

Project I and II (World Bank)

FBS Fixed Budget Selection

FTP Full Technical Proposal

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoA Government of Afghanistan

GTZ Gesellschaft fuer Technische

Zusammenarbeit (German Development

Agency)

IDA International Development Association

IRS Internationally Recruited Staff

LCS Least Cost Selection

LICUS Low-Income Countries Under Stress

LM Line Ministry

LRS Locally Recruited Staff

MoE Ministry of Economy

MoEW Ministry of Energy and Water

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoLSA Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs

MQS Minimum Qualifying Score

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NO No Objection

NSP National Solidarity Program

ODA Official Development Assistance

PA Public Administration

PACBP Public Administration Capacity

Building Project

PC Procurement Consultant

PDT Peace Dividend Trust (NGO)

PLO Procurement Liaison Officer

PMU Project Management Unit

PPL Public Procurement Law

PPU Procurement Policy Unit (within the

MoF)

PR Rules of Procedure for Public

Procurement in Afghanistan

PRR Priority Reform & Restructuring

Framework

PRP Procurement Reform Program

PU Procurement Unit (within ARDS)

QBS Quality-Based Selection

QCBS Quality- and Cost-Based Selection

RFP Request for Proposals

SPC Special Procurement Commission

SRFP Standard Request for Proposal

SSS Single-Source Selection

STP Simplified Technical Proposal

ToR Terms of Reference

TSU Technical Support Unit

TTL Bank Task Team Leader

UNDP UN Development Programme

Guidelines 2004 Bank Guidelines on the Selection

and Employment of Consultants by

World Bank Borrowers

Vice President : Praful C. Patel

Country Director : Alastair J. Mckechnie

Sector Director : Barbara Kafka

Sector Manager : Els Hinderdael-Forger

Task Team Leader : Shawkat M.Quamrul Hasan

PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................................................II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... III

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

COUNTRY ECONOMIC BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 1 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT .......................................................................................................... 1 SECURITY SITUATION ................................................................................................................................................ 1 CONSULTING SERVICES IN AFGHANISTAN ................................................................................................................. 2 PAST DEVELOPMENTS AND TA IN THE AREA OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT .................................................................. 2 OBJECTIVES AND EXECUTION OF ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................... 3

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................... 4

BANK POLICY ON SELECTION OF CONSULTANTS ....................................................................................................... 4 The Bank’s Response to Crises, Emergencies and Fragile States ....................................................................... 4 Weighing QBS against QCBS .............................................................................................................................. 5

GOA POLICY ON CONSULTANTS ................................................................................................................................ 5 LEGAL AND REGULATORY PROCUREMENT FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................... 6

The New Public Procurement Law ...................................................................................................................... 6 Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement ........................................................................................................ 6 Recommendations to Improve the Legal and Regulatory Framework ................................................................. 8

AFGHAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK & ORGANIZATION OF PROCUREMENT .......................................................... 8 ARDS Procurement Unit ...................................................................................................................................... 8 Line Ministries ..................................................................................................................................................... 9 Procurement Policy Unit ................................................................................................................................... 10 Special Procurement Commission ..................................................................................................................... 10 Contract Management Office ............................................................................................................................. 10 Appeal and Complaint Mechanisms ................................................................................................................... 11 Professional Consulting Associations ................................................................................................................ 11 Recommendations to Improve the Institutional Framework .............................................................................. 11

AFGHAN PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES .......................................................................................... 11 Available Procurement Manuals or Guidelines ................................................................................................. 11 Availability of Standard Request for Proposals ................................................................................................. 11 Recommendations to Improve Procedures & Practices ..................................................................................... 11

BANK PROCUREMENT CAPACITY ............................................................................................................................. 11 PA PROCUREMENT CAPACITY ................................................................................................................................. 12

Procurement Capacity of PC within ARDS ........................................................................................................ 12 Previous and Ongoing Capacity Building and Training .................................................................................... 12 Capacity within Line Ministries - Key Constraints and Challenges .................................................................. 13 Procurement Capacity in Provinces and Districts ............................................................................................. 13

CAPACITY-BUILDING APPROACH BY PACBP AND PRP .......................................................................................... 13 RISKS WITHIN CAPACITY-BUILDING APPROACH BY PACBP AND PRP .................................................................... 14

Efficient Selection of Consultants ...................................................................................................................... 14 Development of National Consultants................................................................................................................ 14 Capacity Building of the PA ............................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 15

CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IN PROCUREMENT OF CONSULTANTS ........................................................................ 16 Steps to be taken by Government ....................................................................................................................... 17 Steps to be taken by the Donor Community ....................................................................................................... 17

PUBLIC SECTOR DEMAND FOR CONSULTING SERVICES ........................................................................................... 17

Domestically Funded Demand ........................................................................................................................... 17 Consulting Services Funded by the Bank ........................................................................................................... 18

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF CONSULTING SERVICES .............................................................................................. 19 International Participation ................................................................................................................................ 19 Performance on Consulting Service Contracts .................................................................................................. 20 Remuneration Levels .......................................................................................................................................... 20 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 20

DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF CONSULTING SERVICES ........................................................................................................ 21 The Local Consulting Sector .............................................................................................................................. 21 Main Areas of Expertise ..................................................................................................................................... 21 Performance on Public Contracts and Remuneration Levels ............................................................................ 22 Capacity Assessment of Afghan Consultancies .................................................................................................. 22 Developing Capacity of the Domestic Consulting Sector .................................................................................. 23 Overcoming the Information Gap on Consultants ............................................................................................. 24 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 24

RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................................................... 25

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS MET ............................................................................................................................ 26 ANNEX 2: DETAILS OF GOA-FUNDED CONSULTING CONTRACTS SINCE DECEMBER 2004 ....................................... 29 ANNEX 3: BANK-FUNDED CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS, 2003-2006 ........................................................................ 30 ANNEX 4: ASSESSMENT OF 10 BANK-FUNDED CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS ON EOI & SUBMISSION RATES ............ 36 ANNEX 5: ASSESSMENT OF 12 BANK-FUNDED CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS ON BILLING RATES ............................. 37

PREFACE

This report was prepared by Martin Ehrenberg (Consultant, SARPS), who visited Kabul,

Afghanistan from November 21 to December 3, 2006. It builds on the findings and

recommendations arising from the 2005 World Bank assessment, Public Procurement for

Development Effectiveness, prepared by Quamrul Hasan (SARPS) and Peter Trepte (Consultant

SARPS), part of a larger Bank review of public finance in Afghanistan.1

During the mission, meetings were held with government agencies’ staff, international

consultancies currently implementing donor-financed projects in Afghanistan, academic

institutions, private sector firms (in particular Afghan consultancies), non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), associations, and with the resident missions of the European Commission,

GTZ, ADB, and DFID.

The assessment involved extensive interactions with Government agencies, whose valuable

cooperation was indispensable and also greatly beneficial. Deepal Fernando, Senior Procurement

Specialist, and Nargis Hakimy, Program Assistant (Procurement) in the Bank’s Country Office,

provided very valuable support, advice and background information. Mariam Sherman, Acting

Country Manager in Afghanistan, offered advice and guidance in the country throughout the

mission. The list of persons met may be found in Annex 1.

This work was carried out with guidance and supervision from Gian Casartelli (OPCPR), who

extensively reviewed the report and provided many recommendations, and Quamrul Hasan

(SARPS). Overall leadership was provided by Els Hinderdael (Regional Procurement Manager,

SARPS).

Ludmilla Butenko (SAC01), Nancy Zhao (SAROQ), Paul Sisk (SARFM), Devesh Mishra

(ECSPS), Joel A. Turkewitz (SARPS), and Nagaraju Duthaluri (SARPS) reviewed the report and

provided insightful comments.

1 “Afghanistan – Managing Public Finances for Development”, Volume II: Improving Public Financial Management

and Procurement, December 22, 2005, World Bank Report No. 34582-AF.

AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT:

CONSULTING SERVICES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Afghanistan is striving to emerge from a prolonged period of military occupation, wars

and the Taliban rule. The country’s security situation remains critical, especially outside of

Kabul, yet the economy is stable and continues to grow. In the reconstruction process the country

is receiving extensive donor support.

2. Taking into consideration the World Bank’s country assistance strategy, this report

examines whether Afghanistan’s Public Administration (PA) has access to the services it needs

from international and national consultants under Bank and Afghan procurement rules. Both, the

Bank’s selection procedures and the Government’s (GoA) policy, laws, rules of procedure, and

practices are examined to determine whether they (1) lead to efficient consulting contract awards

and (2) support the development of local consulting firms. The demand and supply of

international and domestic consulting services are assessed. In addition, this assessment

identifies the key constraints that hamper the evolution of the domestic consulting sector.

3. Suggestions are provided on what the GoA and the Bank could do to create an

environment suitable for (1) qualified international consultants; and (2) the development of

sustainable local consulting capacity necessary to help Afghanistan to implement its reform

programs.

SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS

4. Apart from the security situation, the capacity to enforce legislative reforms and the

effectiveness of the PA remain critical at all levels of government and also affect the selection

and use of consulting services. The key challenges to an efficient selection of consultants are:

5. Limited access to qualified consultants: Based on an assessment of Bank-funded

assignments from the years 2005 – 2007 the average number of proposals submitted per

assignment by international consultants is only about 2.5, of which just 2.1 are awarded a score

above the Minimum Qualifying Score (MQS). According to interviews conducted by the

mission, international consultants do not have sufficient incentives for seeking assignments in

the country. Many firms refrain from participating due to security concerns for their personnel.

Lack of trust in the capacity of the PA also discourages their participation. The entry costs

required to set up and conduct business in Afghanistan are very high. At present, those firms

willing to work in Afghanistan are reluctant to send qualified and experienced staff to

Afghanistan. As a consequence, the quality of the services obtained is often questionable.

6. A local consulting sector barely exists yet. Only a few local firms have evolved over the

past five years. Their main constraints are lack of qualifications and experience and limited

familiarity with procurement processes. As a result domestic firms, if they participate at all,

frequently fail to meet qualification criteria set by the Bank or the GoA. Lack of trust in the

fairness and the transparency of procurement handled by the PA also discourages their

participation.

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page iv

7. Weak procurement capacity: Procurement staff has limited familiarity with basic

principles of procurement and with the stages of the procurement process. In particular, the

executing agencies have difficulty in (1) drafting ToR; (2) organizing and conducting

evaluations; and (3) evaluating the quality of Expressions of Interest (EoIs) and proposals. Once

the consulting firms are selected, supervision and management of the consultants are weak.

8. Weak English and IT skills: The low level or absence of English and IT skills is

hindering capacity-building efforts. International and national procurement personnel are facing

serious problems in interacting with local staff. The work of local translators sometimes creates

confusion instead of facilitating communication.

9. GoA legal and regulatory framework: While the new Public Procurement Law (PPL)

adopted in October 2005 has considerably improved the legal basis of public procurement, it

lacks (1) the necessary foundation of a clearly stated policy on consultants; and (2) a chapter

devoted solely to consultants’ selection. In addition, the Procurement Policy Unit drafted Rules

of Procedure for Public Procurement in Afghanistan which became effective on April 12, 2007.

While these procurement rules provide sound guidance through the process of consultants’

selection and contain appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair competition and the

administrative review of procurement proceedings, they still have several shortcomings

concerning the procurement of consultants. For example, the rules lack (1) simplified procedures

such as the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP); (2) provisions on the continuation of

assignments subject to satisfactory performance of the incumbent; and (3) necessary details on

the selection process such as the weight allocated to price under Quality- And Cost-Based

Selection (QCBS) or indicative weights for evaluation criteria. In addition, their complex

structure will make it difficult for PA staff to understand and apply the rules of procedure on

procurement. Supporting documents such as the Standard RFP and procurement manuals are not

yet available.

THE BANK’S CURRENT STRATEGY

10. The ongoing four-year Bank-funded Public Administration Capacity Building Project

(PACBP) that started in 2005 is addressing these key challenges through three main procurement

subcomponents:

Subcomponent 1: Technical Assistance on procurement facilitation;

Subcomponent 2: Capacity building of Borrower’s procurement staff; and

Subcomponent 3: Legal and institutional framework development.

Under subcomponent 1 the Afghan PA currently draws on advisory services of an international

Procurement Consultant (PC) to facilitate and assist international and domestic procurement

processes. Further support for capacity building (subcomponent 2) and for the completion of the

legal and regulatory framework for procurement (subcomponent 3) is included in the Bank-

funded Procurement Reform Program: Procurement Capacity Building and Legal & Institutional

Framework Development (PRP) that started on 17 March 2007.

KEY RISKS

11. This report finds three risks that might affect the strategy defined by PACBP and its

related PRP, in the areas of consultant selection, development of national consultants, and

capacity building for the PA.

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page v

Efficient Selection of Consultants

12. Since it is a priority for reconstruction that the Afghan PA be reestablished, the Bank

projects focus on building basic procurement capacity. The PACBP provides training to a limited

number of key staff while the PRP includes a broad program for hundreds of trainees from all

levels of government. However, due to PACBP’s limited outreach and PRP’s broad focus,

training will only concentrate on basic subjects. In particular, PA staff will not receive training

on consultant selection tasks, such as preparing ToR and assessing the quality of proposals.

While specialized capacity building may be too much to expect at this stage, many parties

interviewed expressed concerns about the credibility of the selection process given current

deficiencies in the performance of these tasks. The same PA officials who have trouble drafting

ToR then later are responsible for evaluating the proposals. Given this critical gap and the

reluctance of consultants to seek assignments in Afghanistan, it is reasonable to conclude that the

PA needs further support in evaluating proposals.

Development of National Consultants

13. The PRP includes basic training courses for local firms which will focus on (1) creating

awareness about the new Public Procurement Law; and (2) procurement procedures for goods,

works and consulting services. However, the following issues also need to be addressed:

(1) The GoA and Bank’s procurement procedures do not sufficiently take into account the

technical and administrative weakness of the PA and the local consulting firms and apply

complex standard procurement methods where simplified ones are needed.

(2) Neither PA nor donors have adequate information on locally available expertise and are

facing difficulty identifying the few available local resources.

Capacity Building of the PA

14. While the PRP provides for a comprehensive capacity-building approach, its

effectiveness may face serious challenges since interaction between international and national

procurement staff is hindered by language barriers, unfamiliarity of nationals with IT systems

and the lack of qualified translators. In addition, the training program could be compromised by

the small number of local staff trainable in the complex procurement processes required by Bank

or GoA regulations. Experienced PA staff is often poached by donor agencies and NGOs and the

lack of qualified counterpart personnel in the Afghan PA often renders on the job training

impossible. When counterpart staff is available low motivation due to low pay and limited

opportunity for merit based promotion undermine the knowledge transfer.

SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

Key Recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan

R1: The GoA may consider developing a comprehensive policy paper on professional and

expert consultants to meet the specific needs of the PA and to encourage the creation of local

consulting firms. The 2005 Public Procurement Law only reflects basic policy principles for

selection of consultants while the new ‘Rules of Procedures’ provide the principles and

procedures of consulting services in details. The GoA should explore the possibility of

improving the pertinent rules of procedures depending on the changes in the country

circumstances. Once ministries have clearly defined their mandates and their respective

functions, a review of the range of services that local consulting firms could provide to the PA

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page vi

should be performed to decide which functions could be outsourced to local consultants.

Drawing on experience with present Bank-funded public administration reform programs and its

recommendations on HR planning and management, the policy should also address capacity

building of PA staff through training and incentives.

R2: The GoA should consider reviewing the procurement rules of procedure’s provisions on

consultants’ selection in light of the special situation in Afghanistan. Since both the PA and local

consulting sector are weak, the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) should be

considered for routine assignments designed to attract local attention. The regulation should also

provide for the continuation of assignments subject to satisfactory performance and necessary

details on the selection process such as the weight allocated to price under Quality- And Cost-

Based Selection (QCBS) or indicative weights for evaluation criteria. The consultants

implementing the PRP could provide advice on the revision of the procurement rules of

procedure.

R3: The PA is still a long way away from being able to efficiently select consultants. The

GoA (with support from the Bank) should therefore consider assigning reputable consulting

firms with strong procurement expertise in the field of the specific projects to the task of

conducting proposal evaluations under major Bank-funded projects in close cooperation with the

PA. The same consultants could also be entrusted with the quality and administrative control of

the contracts and with building capacity. In particular, Bank-funded projects that cannot rely on

the support of internationally staffed Project Management Units (PMUs) or Technical Support

Units (TSUs) should benefit from this approach. For smaller Bank-funded projects, specialized

individual consultants should be assigned to Evaluation Committees.

R4: Since Afghan consultancies can best develop their capacity through associations with

international firms, the Requests for Proposals (RFP) and the Terms of Reference (ToR) for

internationally competed assignments funded by the GoA should clearly identify, whenever

possible and feasible, those components that can be executed by local consultants. In case no

competent Afghan consultancies exist, the tender documents should clearly require from

international firms to transfer skills and know-how to local individual advisors. Once these

individual consultants were involved in internationally executed projects and developed their

capacity under the supervision of experienced international consultants, they would be in a

position to establish their own consulting companies.

R5: Since international consultants and PA staff are having difficulty interacting effectively,

the GoA (with Bank support) may consider conducting a study on local translator training

centers and implementing a training program for translators. It is also recommended to raise the

level of English and IT skills of national procurement staff. Therefore, the GoA may consider

developing and implementing training modules for procurement staff in the area of English, IT

and computer skills.

Key Recommendations to the Bank

R6: For Bank-funded projects that are too small to justify the use of international consulting

firms as under Recommendation 3 (R3), the Bank should encourage Bank staff to more actively

support the weakest counterpart agencies. Bank specialists in the required areas should

extensively review and also provide input to draft ToR regarding objectives, components,

activities, milestones, and evaluation indicators. Common weaknesses in TA projects such as the

fragmentation into small assignments of short duration, inadequate monitoring or the disregard

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page vii

of local circumstances should be avoided by better procurement planning, and effective

supervision.

R7: Since continuity is essential for successful capacity building, but international

participation is low and entry costs for international firms are very high in Afghanistan, the Bank

should consider including a provision for continuation of work by the same consultant under

Single-Source Selection (SSS) in the initial RFPs whenever justified by the characteristics and

the circumstances of the projects.

R8: Mirroring Recommendation 4 to the GoA (R4), the Bank should (1) provide incentives

for local participation by encouraging international and local firms to form partnerships and

associations whenever feasible; and (2) require from international firms to transfer skills and

know-how to local individual advisors.

R9: When drafting ToR, the security situation should be taken into account. Especially when

the services are not related to capacity-building activities that need to take place locally, the ToR

should provide for international consultants to perform services from outside the country to the

greatest extent possible.

R10: For consultants’ selections under Bank rules and conducted by the PA, the following

precautions are recommended: (1) Quality-Based Selection (QBS) and Fixed Budget Selection

(FBS) should be applied to standard assignments; (2) QCBS should only apply when clearly

justified by the nature of the ToR; and (3) Simplified Technical Proposals (STPs) should be used

as much as possible. Information on local consulting firms already made available by other

stakeholders such as the NGO Peace Dividend Trust should be disseminated to the Bank’s staff

and TTLs. Whenever possible and feasible local firms should be considered for small

assignments generally procured under SSS.

R11: To facilitate the preparation of projects and procurement plans, the Bank should consider

requesting the Procurement Consultant to improve the quality of its monthly progress report by

including data on the participation of international and national consulting firms such as (1)

average number of EoI, size of shortlists, proposals submitted; (2) countries of origin of short-

listed, responsive and winning firms and their categories (NGOs, consultancies, government

agencies, etc.); (3) average billing rates; (4) number and nature of assignments for which the

ToR require the participation of national firms; (5) nature of assignments limited to national

participation; and (6) number and nature of assignments in which local firms are associated with

international firms. Alternatively, the Procurement Consultant could be requested to prepare an

annual report focusing on the points described above and complementing the monthly progress

reports.

R12: Finally, the Bank could also consider cooperating with two stakeholders already

providing support and training to local consulting firms. The Bank’s PRP could (1) draw on the

experience of the NGO Peace Dividend Trust on training courses in procurement for local

companies; and (2) collaborate with the Engineering Capacity Building Project for local

consulting engineering companies implemented by the American Society of Civil Engineers

(ASCE).

AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT:

CONSULTING SERVICES

Introduction

Country Economic Background

1. Afghanistan is striving to emerge from a prolonged period of military occupation, wars

and the Taliban rule and remains one of the world’s poorest countries with an estimated per

capita GDP of only US$355 in 2006/07.2 The country’s security situation remains critical,

especially outside of Kabul, yet in recent years the economy has continued to grow in this

volatile political, economic and security environment. Real GDP for 2006/07 is estimated at

US$8.88 billion and projected to grow by 11% in 2007/08 (excluding opium production). The

macroeconomic environment has been stable and inflation returned to a moderate level in

2005/06 (approx. 5%).

Public and Private Sector Development

2. Starting in 2002, the GoA has introduced a number of structural reforms. A new Income

Tax Law, a revised Customs Code, a modern Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law,

a strengthened Procurement Law, Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, a new Civil

Service Law, and a revised Law on Foreign and Domestic Investment are in place. Fiduciary

standards have been strengthened and administrative reforms have been undertaken. The GoA is

committed to fiscal discipline but fiscal sustainability remains a challenge. In 2004/05, total

public expenditures amounted to US$3.4 billion, of which only US$0.9 billion was implemented

by the GoA. Revenue mobilization remains low at 5.5 percent of GDP in 2005/06, one of the

lowest ratios in the world, and domestic revenues cover only half of total operating expenditures

in the Government’s core budget. Almost all public sector consulting services contracts are

externally funded. Continued progress in reform of Afghanistan’s Public Administration (PA)

and the rule of law are critical for progress, but PA capacity is still very limited.

3. Achievements in private sector development include the establishment of the Afghanistan

Investment Support Agency (AISA) as a one-stop shop to register firms,3 approval of a Banking

law, licensing of more than a dozen commercial banks, and creation of an Industrial Park

Authority.

Security Situation

4. Apart from challenges of education, health, and infrastructure, the lack of security is the

main obstacle to Afghanistan's reconstruction program. The country has not yet fully emerged

from its state of conflict and the security situation in the country has deteriorated since April

2004. Even major NGOs are reluctant to send their national staff to the provinces where conflict

is ongoing. International experts avoid travel within the country, and when they do, they either

keep a low profile or hire extensive and costly security support. As a result, studies and reports

2 See Bank document “Interim Strategy Note Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Period FY07-FY08” (February

2007), p. 6, Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators. 3 Afghanistan is ranked 17 out of 175 countries for ease in starting a business according to the Bank’s Doing

Business Report 2007.

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 2 of 37

are frequently based on old data since visiting missions in dangerous provinces are rarely

feasible. Compared to the provinces where the conflict is ongoing the security situation in Kabul

is relatively stable. However, attacks on international staff, threat warnings, and seizure of

explosives are common. Risks related to security lead to a low level of interest from potential

bidders, higher costs and/or delays in assignment execution. The security situation is not likely to

change in the medium term and will limit operational activities while requiring substantial

security expenses.

Consulting Services in Afghanistan

5. Traditionally, most technical departments of the PA covered in-house their limited needs

for planning, research, studies, designs, and supervision services. However, nearly 30 years of

unrest reduced Afghanistan to political and economic ruin. The process of political

reconstruction following the end of the Taliban regime in 2001 has had barely any significant

impact on the creation of a domestic consulting service sector as yet.

6. One of the most dramatic consequences of decades of turmoil was the loss of knowledge

capital as the majority of skilled labor left the country. Young and qualified professionals,

mainly educated in Pakistan, prefer to pursue careers outside Afghanistan. The risky operating

environment in Afghanistan is also reducing the incentive for qualified foreign consultants to

undertake assignments in the country.

7. While extensive donor support could encourage local consultancies to emerge, the

exodus of local capacity is still seriously hampering their development. The lack of basic

professional management, English language and IT skills prevents domestic firms from emerging

and participating in development projects. At present the local consultancy market is very small.

The domestic supply of consulting services is discussed in detail below (paras. 69 ff).

Past Developments and TA in the Area of Public Procurement

8. Steps to improve the Afghan procurement environment were initiated under the First and

Second Emergency Public Administration Projects (EPAP I and II) funded by the Bank starting

in 2002. Under the Procurement Strengthening Component of the EPAP I, the Government

appointed a consulting firm as the PA’s central Procurement Consultant (PC) responsible for

handling procurement operations under IDA and other donor-funded aid within the Procurement

Unit (PU) of the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services (ARDS).4 The purpose

was to put in place emergency procurement capacity and to facilitate rapid and transparent

utilization of donor resources for reconstruction.

9. A progress review conducted in January 2004 identified key constraints in achieving

EPAP I and EPAP II’s objectives and recommended further actions to be addressed by the Bank-

funded Public Administration Capacity Building Project (PACBP), being implemented May

2005 – June 2009. Additional consulting services to be provided under the procurement

component of PACBP were approved in 2004 and can be grouped into three main categories:

Procurement services (subcomponent 1);

Technical assistance on capacity building (subcomponent 2); and

Legal and regulatory framework development (subcomponent 3).

4 The PC provided procurement services to the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) until the AACA

was dissolved in September 2003 and the AACA unit responsible for procurement was renamed ARDS.


The procurement support services (subcomponent 1) are provided by the PC (currently RITES

Ltd. from India) within ARDS.5 This assignment includes capacity building of local procurement

counterpart staff to be trained as Procurement Liaison Officers (PLOs).

10. Based on recommendations of the 2005 Bank assessment, Public Procurement for

Development Effectiveness,6 the following tasks were accomplished:

A Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) within the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was

established in August 2006; and

Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement to implement the new Public

Procurement Law (PPL) were prepared by the PPU and became effective on April

12, 2007.

11. The international consulting firm responsible for implementing the most recent relevant

assignment, the Procurement Reform Program: Procurement Capacity Building and Legal &

Institutional Framework Development (PRP), commenced work on March 17, 2007.7 The

objectives of this assignment cover the subcomponents 2 (capacity building) and 3 (legal and

regulatory framework development) of PACBP and are:

To develop local procurement capacity within Line Ministries (LMs) and to

enable them to progressively carry out procurement;

To train the PA and as far as practicable the private sector in procurement

procedures and practices under the new Public Procurement Law (PPL); and

To develop procedures under the national law and to provide further support to

the PPU.

Objectives and Execution of Assessment

12. Taking into consideration the Bank’s country assistance strategy, this report examines

whether Afghanistan’s PA has access to the services it needs from international and national

consultants under Bank and Afghan procurement regulations. It is based on a mission that visited

Afghanistan from November 21 to December 3, 2006; due to the security situation in

Afghanistan and travel restrictions, the mission was limited to Kabul. The mission met with

government agencies’ staff, international consultancies currently implementing donor-financed

projects in Afghanistan, academic institutions, the private sector firms (in particular Afghan

consultancies), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), associations, and with the resident

missions of the European Commission, GTZ, ADB, and DFID (the list of persons met is attached

to the report as Annex 1).

13. The report investigates both the capacity and competence of the purchaser (PA) and also

the ability of suppliers (consulting firms) to provide the required services. The Bank’s selection

procedures and the Government’s (GoA) policy, laws, rules of procedure, and practices are

5 Crown Agents from UK performed the role of the Procurement Consultant (PC) from August 2002 until August

2004. The consulting service contract with their successor RITES from India was signed in September 2004. 6 Part II (p. 52 – 79, prepared by Quamrul Hasan, SARPS, and Peter Trepte, Consultant) of Volume II: “Improving

Public Financial Management and Procurement”, World Bank Report No. 34582-AF: “Afghanistan – Managing

Public Finances for Development (In Five Volumes)”, December 22, 2005. 7 Charles Kendell & Partners Ltd./UK in association with the International Development Law Organization/Italy

(IDLO) and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply/UK (CIPS).


examined to determine whether they (1) lead to efficient consulting contract awards8 and (2)

support the development of local consulting firms. The demand and the supply of international

and domestic consulting services are assessed. In addition, this assessment identifies the risks

concerning the current Bank capacity-building strategy and the key constraints that hamper the

evolution of the domestic consulting sector.

14. Suggestions are provided on what the GoA and the Bank could do to create an

environment suitable for (1) qualified international consultants and (2) the development of

sustainable local consulting capacity necessary to help Afghanistan to implement its reform

programs.

Findings & Recommendations

Bank Policy on Selection of Consultants

The Bank’s Response to Crises, Emergencies and Fragile States

15. Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs) interviewed for this report stressed the need to flexibly

apply the 2004 Bank Guidelines on Selection and Employment of Consultants in Afghanistan due

to the weak national institutions and the high risk of conflict. However, neither the Bank’s

approach to Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), of which Afghanistan is a severe

case, nor its response to crises or emergencies allow for disregarding the Guidelines. The Bank’s

approach to LICUS only suggests outsourcing procurement functions in post-conflict

environments.9 The Bank’s rapid response to crises and emergencies is designed to facilitate the

Bank’s rapid response to emergencies and is limited to the immediate aftermath until regular

procurement procedures can be used without comprising the timely delivery of assistance.10

16. Nonetheless, the Bank’s procurement tools to cope with crises and post-conflict countries

have been useful in assessing the main obstacles to efficient consultants’ selection in

Afghanistan and providing recommendations for this report. The Bank’s response to crises and

emergencies suggests the following procurement-related activities: (1) increased flexibility in the

use of simplified procurement methods; (2) outsourcing of procurement and the ability to draw

on pre-qualified procurement and project management agents through sole-source (SSS) or

qualification-based (CQS) selection; (3) sole sourcing of consulting firms already working in the

area and which have a proven track record for the provision of technical assistance; (4) extension

8 “Efficient contract awards” result from the consideration of the Bank’s main policy principles defined in Art 1.4 of

the 2004 Bank Guidelines when selecting consultants: (1) high-quality services; (2) economy and efficiency; (3)

equal opportunities for all qualified consultants; (4) the development and use of national consultants; and (5)

transparency. 9 Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) cover a spectrum of fragility, including countries with deteriorating

governance, those in prolonged political crisis, post-conflict transition countries and those in gradual but still fragile

reform processes. See “Low-Income Countries Under Stress Update”, OPCS, World Bank, December 19, 2005.

LICUS are identified by weak Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA) ratings. “Severe”

LICUS, as Afghanistan, score lowest within this grouping. 10

The Bank policy on rapid response to crises and emergencies policy is not intended to address economic or social

impacts associated with prolonged poor performance by a country. It replaced the policy on emergency recovery

assistance in March 2007. See Bank document R2007-0010 of January 17, 2007 (revised March 2007), “Toward a

New Framework for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies”, its Supplemental Note (R2007-0010/1), and its

Annex C (Draft OP/BP 8.00, “Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies” applicable to emergency operations

submitted for approval after March 1, 2007).


of contracts issued under existing projects for similar activities through increase in their

corresponding contract amounts; and (5) encouraging Bank teams working on emergency

operations to actively support counterpart agencies at various stages of the procurement process,

including preparation of ToR, RFP, and drafting of shortlists.

Weighing QBS against QCBS

17. The use of Quality- and Cost-Based Selection (QCBS) has recently been questioned by

many Bank TTLs in view of the high deviations in proposal prices observed in consultants’

selections. As a result, quality becomes less decisive since price turns out to be the overriding

selection factor in many cases. This may lead to poor proposals gaining the highest overall score

and thus to poor quality services. The prudent use of Quality-Based Selection (QBS) could

reduce this risk by placing the main focus on quality. The benefits of using QBS should

particularly be considered for major capacity-building or management/procurement agent

services, which generally have a strong impact on the development of the PA and the

implementation of projects.

GoA Policy on Consultants

18. The GoA has not yet developed a specific policy on consultants, which could form the

basis for a legal and regulatory framework that effectively addresses the needs of the PA and the

consulting firms. The 2005 Public Procurement Law only reflects basic policy principles for

selection of consultants while the new ‘Rules of Procedures’ (see paras. 22) provide the

procedures of consulting services in details. However, a review has not been conducted yet

covering

The range of services that domestic consulting firms could provide to the PA;

The domestic consulting sector, its characteristics, and its capacity to implement

assignments funded by the GoA; or

The quality of services that consultants have already provided to the public sector.

To date, no consultant association has been formed in Afghanistan that could participate in a

public sector dialogue on policy and contribute views on regulatory issues. Considering the

weakness of the few existing consulting companies, it is presently too early to establish a

consulting association in Afghanistan.

Recommendation:

19. Once ministries have clearly defined their mandates and their respective functions, a

review of the range of services that local consulting firms could provide to the PA should be

performed to decide which functions could be outsourced to local consultants. The GoA may

then wish to consider drafting a strategy/policy paper on professional and expert consultants in

the medium term to meet the specific needs of the PA and to encourage the creation of local

consulting firms. The policy on consultants could cover the following areas:

Outsourcing: Relying on present public sector reforms, the policy should

indicate areas and functions for which the GoA will require the support of

professional and expert consultants;

Management & Capacity Development: Drawing on experience with present

public administration reform programs and its recommendations on common


functions like HR planning and management, the policy should address capacity

building of the PA through training and incentives;

Enabling Environment & Policy Dialogue: The policy should foresee means for

an institutionalized public-private dialogue. This dialogue should explore

opportunities for developing a favorable fiscal and employment policy for

consulting firms.

Legal and Regulatory Procurement Framework

The New Public Procurement Law

20. The new Public Procurement Law (PPL) prepared by the Procurement Unit (PU) of

ARDS and enacted in October 2005 has considerably improved the legal basis for public

procurement. Considering the need for reforms, the new law is certainly to be considered a major

achievement. A proposed amendment to the PPL recently has been referred to Parliament after

approval by the Cabinet extending the timeframe where interim procurement arrangements shall

apply.11

21. However, it is recommended that the following shortcomings be addressed in future

amendments.

(1) The new PPL lacks the necessary foundation of a comprehensive policy on

consultants’ procurement (see previous section);

(2) The PPL lacks a well-defined and user-friendly chapter on consultants’ selection;

(3) The Dari language version PPL that was approved is reported to be inconsistent

with the original English version from which it was translated.

Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement

22. The PPL’s complexity and its lack of a chapter devoted to consultants’ procurement will

make it difficult to apply under the present situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, regulations or

rules of procedure on procurement compliant with international best practice and addressing the

needs of both the GoA and the domestic consulting sector are fundamental for effectively

implementing the PPL. In accordance with Art. 106(1) PPL the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU)

developed Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement in Afghanistan which became effective on

April 12, 2007.12

These procurement rules (PR) provide sound guidance through the process of

consultants’ selection and contain appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair

competition and the administrative review of procurement proceedings.13

However, since the

11

The amendment concerns Art 104 (a) and (b) PPL. The extended timeframe for interim procurement arrangements

are “three” and “five” years instead of “one“ and “two” years respectively. 12

The PPU had originally drafted regulations on public procurement. However, the Afghan Ministry of Justice

decided that this document was mostly procedural in nature and did not have to be submitted to the GoA for

approval. Therefore, the regulation was renamed rules of procedure, approved by the Ministry of Finance and issued

by the PPU in accordance to Article 106(1) PPL. 13

See for example Articles 157 PR (Records) and 81 PR (Publication of Notices) on transparency, Article 162 PR

on declarations on conflicts of interest, Article 164 PR on post-employment restrictions on public officials, Article

165 PR on avoidance of conflict of interests in consulting services, or Articles 170 ff PR on the administrative

review.


consulting firm responsible for implementing the PRP will no longer provide support to the PPU

in improving the PR,14

some of the remaining shortcomings of the PR are summarized here.

(1) User-friendly Chapter on Consultants’ Selection: The PR lack user-friendly

provisions on the selection of consultants that will allow the PA to apply the

national law on procurement correctly. While the PR distinguish between non-

consultancy services and consultants’ services they do not provide clear guidance

on these two procedures. Several provisions concerning the selection of

consultants can be found only when referring to other chapters of the procurement

rules.15

(2) Definition of Consultants and Mixed Shortlists: The PR neither define the term

consultants16

nor do they mandate that the shortlist shall only comprise

consultants of the same category, similar capacity, and business objectives. Thus,

a management consulting firm might find itself in the position that it has to

compete against a non-profit organization. If a mixed shortlist is unavoidable

under the circumstances, QBS instead of QCBS should be applicable. In addition,

the PR should define the terms professional and expert consultants.

(3) Simplified Technical Proposals (STP): The PR provide for Quality- and Cost-

Based Selection (QCBS), Quality-Based Selection (QBS), Fixed-Budget

Selection (FBS), Least-Cost Selection (LCS)17

and Single-Source Selection

(SSS)18

but lack specific rules for small assignments designed to attract the

attention of local consultancies. Presently even for small assignments standard

procedures apply while simplified procedures could be a major incentive for

increased participation of evolving Afghan consultancies. Considering the

widespread corruption stakeholders do not advocate the use of Selection Based on

the Consultants’ Qualification (CQS). However, an alternative solution would be

the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) for routine assignments with

insignificant downstream impacts.19

Considering the limited capacity of domestic

procurement staff and the local consulting sector discussed below,20

the use of

STPs could help to (1) improve the selection of consultants; and (2) encourage

participation of local consulting firms.

14

Originally it was foreseen that the consulting firm implementing the PRP would have been responsible for

drafting (to the extent required) and modifying the existing rules on procurement and assisting the GoA towards its

finalization. However, amendments to the ToR for the PRP resulted in the deletion of this specific objective. 15

For example, Article 80(1) PR simply states that procuring entities shall ensure that they have complied with all

relevant requirements of Chapter II while this chapter also refers to the procurement of goods and (non-consultancy)

services. Furthermore, the provision listing all available methods for consultants’ selection (Article 84(2) PR) lacks

a clear reference to SSS regulated in Articles 27(1), 29 and 114ff PR. 16

Article 3(7) PR only defines consultants’ services as “activities of a professional, intellectual and advisory nature

that do not lead to a measurable physical output” but does not refer to different categories of consultants such as

consulting firms, NGOs, auditors, UN agencies, universities, or research institutions. 17

See Article 84(2) PR. 18

See Articles 27(1), 29 and 114ff PR. 19

For details see Section 2 (Instructions to Consultants) of the May 2004 edition of the Bank Standard RFP (SRFP).

According to best practice STP should be used when the following conditions are met: (a) the assignment is unlikely

to have significant downstream effects; (b) the assignment is of routine nature and the ToR already define in detail

the objectives, tasks, and required outputs; (c) the consultants’ previous work experience has been sufficiently

evaluated during shortlisting; and (d) capacity building is not a specific component of the assignment.

20 See PA Procurement Capacity, paras. 40 ff and The Local Consulting Sector, paras. 69 ff.


(4) Quality-Based Selection (QBS): QBS should be made mandatory for complex

and specialized assignments with high downstream effects, and assignments that

can be carried out in substantially different ways. Currently, Article 84 (4) PR

only states that QBS may be used for these types of assignments, thus leaving

room for the inappropriate use of QCBS.

(5) Continuation of Consulting Assignments: The PR lack a provision for awarding

a consultant an assignment that is a continuation of the initial contract subject to

its satisfactory performance in the previous assignment.

(6) Disclosure of Staff Months or Estimated Costs: According to best practice the

RFP should disclose either the estimated staff months or the cost estimate (not

both) whenever available to allow for comparable proposals.

(7) Weight Allocated to Price under QCBS: The weight allocated to price under

QCBS should be addressed within the PR.

(8) Indicative Weights for Evaluation Criteria: The PR should provide for

indicative weights to be used for the evaluation criteria. It is recommended to add

them to the evaluation criteria defined in Article 96(3) PR.

Recommendations to Improve the Legal and Regulatory Framework

23. While a revision of the PPL would depend on the policy on consultants to be elaborated

in the medium-term, the GoA should consider adjusting the PR by addressing the eight

shortcomings just listed. As originally foreseen, the consultants implementing the PRP could

provide advice on the revision of the PR.

Afghan Institutional Framework & Organization of Procurement

ARDS Procurement Unit

24. The assignment of the Procurement Consultant (PC) within the PU of ARDS has two

major objectives:

(1) Procurement facilitation for all goods, works & services under operations

financed directly by IDA, by the IDA-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction

Trust Fund (ARTF), by budgetary expenditures from domestic resources21

as well

as, to the extent feasible, by EU, ADB and other donors; and

(2) Capacity Building and training for ARDS key staff on procurement-related

matters.

Under supervision of ARDS the PC is assisting the Line Ministries (LMs) in procuring

consultancy services starting with the issuing of Expressions of Interest (EoI) and shortlisting of

consulting firms, through preparation of RFPs, receipt and opening of proposals, assistance in

evaluation of proposals, obtaining World Bank’s clearance, and issue of notification of awards.

25. Procurement for contracts using donor funds are usually subject to the rules of the

respective donor organizations. However, the PC is increasingly conducting procurement for

21

Excluding any procurement related to police, military or paramilitary.


projects financed by the GoA22

(either own resources or budget-support proceedings) subject to

domestic procurement rules.

26. The table below presents the procurement of consulting services contracts assisted by the

PC from 15 August 2002 until 31 March 07:23

Selection Method No. of Contracts Value US$M % Contracts % Value

QCBS 49 109.50 40.5% 44.6%

QBS 8 13.21 6.6% 5.4%

CQS 12 9.54 9.9% 3.9%

SSS 52 113.19 43.0% 46.1%

Total 121 245.44 100% 100%

Due to the need for emergency responses a high number of consulting contracts has been

awarded under SSS. However, 43 contracts were sole-sourced from August 2002 to November

2004. Only 9 contracts have been awarded under SSS since December 2004.

The Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) has reviewed all cases facilitated by the

PC, but its report has not been finalized yet.

Line Ministries

27. One of the key constraints identified in former reviews was that there is no consistency in

the organizational structures of the Line Ministries (LMs) with regard to the procurement

functions and processes. Despite the procurement structure foreseen by the new PPL, the various

LM seem to have adopted different models of organizing procurement. Some ministries have

procurement departments, while in others procurement is conducted through service or planning

departments. According to the interviews procurement officers in LMs are sometimes not

involved in procurement processes. The reasons for disregarding available procurement

personnel seem to be:

(1) Lack of trust in the capacity of the procurement personnel;

(2) Lack of management, English and IT skills of procurement personnel and a

history of frequent delays and non-performance of procurement personnel;

(3) Lack of communication between trained procurement staff and senior officials

and consequently no awareness that qualified procurement personnel might be

available; and

(4) Desire to retain control over the procurement process without interference of

procurement personnel.

28. In some LMs (e.g. the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development) management

and procurement consultants are responsible for all matters regarding the procurement of

services and the implementation of Bank projects. Other LMs (e.g. the Ministry of Urban

Development), with Bank or donor support, have created Project Management Units (PMUs) and

Technical Support Units (TSUs) and are drawing on the services of international personnel

22

Procurement of goods, works or services of a value exceeding US$200,000 is to be handled exclusively by the PU

of ARDS. 23

Prior to appointment of the current PC (RITES Ltd.), Crown Agents from UK were providing similar services to

ARDS. The table presents all procured consultancy contracts facilitated by both RITES and Crown Agents.


specialized in budgeting, finance management and procurement. International procurement

advisors within PMUs are assigned to handle the procurement, to closely cooperate with local

staff and to build capacity within the respective LM by constant on-the-job training. Ministries

which currently have no PMU or TSU generally demand further support and expatriate staff

specialized in procurement for building capacity in their counterpart procurement teams.

29. The clarification and strengthening of procurement functions within the LM are to be

addressed by the PRP. The procurement processes will be reorganized to follow institutional

arrangements defined in the new PPL by

Identifying 9 key spending ministries to be integrated into the Priority Reform &

Restructuring (PRR) framework devised by the Civil Service Commission

(CSC);24

Assisting identified ministries to prepare applications for obtaining PRR status

that will result in increased equipment and higher salaries in those ministries and

will encourage adherence to the institutional structures foreseen by the new PPL;

Providing procurement training to staff in key ministries.

Procurement Policy Unit

30. The PRP will further support the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) within the MoF by

drafting its rules of procedure, thus enabling the PPU to become a key player in the formulation

of future policies, legislation and procurement rules and to execute its functions according to

Article 94 of the PPL. These functions include monitoring procurement proceedings to ascertain

efficiency and compliance with the law, the collection of data or reports and the review of

procurement records and files, and proposing improvements in procurement practices. Currently,

one international advisor (since August 2006) and 4 national staff (since September 2006) are

running the PPU and consultancy support is expected to be phased out by PACBP credit closing

(June 30, 2009).

Special Procurement Commission

31. The Special Procurement Commission (SPC) within the Office of the President provided

for in Article 91 of the PPL grants approvals for all contract awards exceeding the levels of first

grade award authorities.25

Its rules for procedure (Transaction of Business Rules for SPC) were

drafted by the PPU and approved on March 31, 2007. The PRP will provide further assistance to

the SPC.

Contract Management Office

32. According to Article 69 of the PPL, a Contract Management Office (CMO) has been

established within the MoF. It serves as the Secretariat to the SPC. According to Article 183 PR

the CMO has the overall responsibility for planning and executing the work of SPC as well as

record keeping.

24

It was envisaged that the PRP would concentrate on the full capacity development of 6 Line Ministries and 6

Provincial Offices. However, required linkages with the provincial procurement entities are still missing. Therefore

the consultant implementing the PRP will undertake capacity development of 9 LMs. 25

See Annex A to the new PPL for details on thresholds for award authorities.


Appeal and Complaint Mechanisms

33. The PPU has finalized the design and implementation of an independent complaints

review mechanism and the respective rules of procedure in accordance to Article 86 of the PPL.

Articles 170 ff PR adequately provide for the administrative review of procurement proceedings

challenged by a bidding firm. The PRP consultants will be responsible for providing further

support and for conducting training for committee members.

Professional Consulting Associations

34. To date, there are no consulting associations in Afghanistan that could play a role in

monitoring professional standards, representing the sector in the public-policy dialogue with the

GoA, and in promoting the role of independent consultants in the Afghan economy. The capacity

of the few existing local firms is still too limited. Therefore, steps towards the establishment of a

consulting association in Afghanistan should be postponed until the local consulting sector has

developed more capacity.

Recommendations to Improve the Institutional Framework

35. It is recommended that results of the PRP and INT’s review of all procurement cases on

consulting services facilitated by the PC within ARDS be monitored.

Afghan Procurement Procedures and Practices

Available Procurement Manuals or Guidelines

36. There is an immediate need for an interpretative Manual on the Selection of Consultants.

While the rules of procedure on procurement cover the general steps of the selection process,

they lack clear guidance on specific points such as the definition of evaluation criteria, the

composition of the evaluation committee and the evaluation process. Currently, no

comprehensive manuals exist on the selection of consultants (such as a Good Procurement

Manual or Consultant Services Manual). While ARDS has prepared a Quality Manual, it focuses

only on Bank rules and lacks guidance on many specific issues such as shortlisting, defining

evaluation criteria, and the evaluation process. Comprehensive application manuals will be

developed under the PRP.

Availability of Standard Request for Proposals

37. The Standard Request for Proposals (RFP) will be developed under the PRP.

Recommendations to Improve Procedures & Practices

38. The consulting firm responsible for elaborating manuals and the Standard RFP should

rely to the extent possible on the recommendations and advice laid down in the Bank Consulting

Services Manual (2006). Since the PPL and the rules of procedure on procurement are inspired

by Bank rules, many practices suggested by the Consulting Services Manual will prove very

helpful in the Afghan context.

Bank Procurement Capacity

39. According to TTLs interviewed the procurement capacity of the Bank has considerably

improved since a senior procurement specialist joined the Bank office in Kabul in June 2006.26

26

The Bank’s organizational capacity in Afghanistan is considerably higher than in other fragile states (13 IRS and

59 LRS in Sept. 06 compared to an average of 3 IRS and 15 LRS in other fragile states). See Bank document


PA Procurement Capacity

40. There is a widespread recognition that lack of capacity is probably the greatest constraint

(apart from security concerns) to achieving results in Afghanistan.

Procurement Capacity of PC within ARDS

41. Many TTLs interviewed expressed concern about the capacity of the PC handling

procurement for the Bank and the GoA (see ARDS PU, paras. 24 ff). They concede that many

delays are caused by time-consuming Afghan decision-making processes. However, Bank TTLs

specifically feel that the PC lacks capacity to ensure the professional evaluation of proposals.

Therefore, TTLs stress the need to contract in additional capacity for major Bank-funded projects

and refer to successes gained by outsourcing the procurement services and the project oversight

to international consultants independent from the PC (as practiced, for example, under the Bank-

funded National Emergency Employment Program and the Emergency National Solidarity

Project).

Previous and Ongoing Capacity Building and Training

42. Under EPAP I and II the PC undertook training of between 110 and 150 procurement

staff from various LM. However, the training was based mostly on Bank procurement rules and

national legislation that was then superseded by the PPL. Not all stages of the training course

were completed as planned due to lack of resources and other pressing priorities. Training on the

provisions of the new PPL is foreseen under the PRP.

43. Ten Procurement Liaison Officers (PLO) were selected under EPAP II and PACBP for

intensive procurement training and attended a course at the Administrative Staff College of India

in Hyderabad. The training began in January 2004 and the PLOs were intended to provide core

procurement capacity and to assist the LMs in building their own capacity. The plan was to

retain the PLOs within ARDS first and to subsequently place them in the procurement units to be

set up in the LMs pursuant to the new PPL. However, according to the most recent information,

five of the ten PLOs left ARDS to pursue better paid careers. ARDS’s loss will have a negative

impact on the capacity-building programs within the LMs. Since the PLOs were intended to be

transferred into at least six to nine key spending LMs specifically supported under the upcoming

PRP, their loss might delay achievements under the new project.

44. Further training provided by the PC under PACBP included:

Staff of three LM (Ministry of Energy and Water, Ministry of Defense and

Ministry of Mines) received a one-month training program on the new PPL and

related procurement procedures;

Two procurement officers of Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation are currently

receiving on-the-job training; and

Training for other LM (4 staff members per ministry) commenced at end of

November 2006.

In addition, the GoA decided to transfer responsibility for consultant selection and administration

to the LMs so that they can develop further capacity through increased involvement in the

procurement processes.

SecM2007-0018, “Strengthening the World Bank Rapid Response and Long-Term Engagement in Fragile States”,

for details on the three-tiered approach for strengthening the Bank’s staffing and organizational support.


Capacity within Line Ministries - Key Constraints and Challenges

45. Three key issues were identified by the mission consultations and by the PC in its March

07 Progress Report:

(1) Weak PA capacity:

Lack of procurement capacity of LM officials;

Weak capacity of LM procurement consultants;

Inefficient internal procedures (for example, a requirement to obtain a No

Objection (NO) from domestic higher award authorities after having

obtained NO from donor agency);

Lack of capacity to conduct evaluations and assess the quality of EoI and

proposals (see Efficient Selection of Consultants, para. 49).

(2) Lack of understanding of procurement principles and rules, lack of compliance

and accountability at decision-making level.

(3) Lack of adequate IT infrastructure within LMs.

The level of capacity varies, with higher capacity in the few LM that can draw on the assistance

of PMUs or TSUs, and lower capacity in LMs that do not have access to international advice.

Concerns about the capacity of local staff dealing with procurement were expressed by all TTLs

interviewed. Almost constant assistance by expatriate staff is deemed necessary for delegating

parts of the procurement processes to local counterparts.

46. In addition, TTLs and international consultants interviewed referred to lack of capacity in

the PA for managing and supervising consulting assignments. The PA and consultants often

seem to disagree on payment terms and on the interpretation of tasks defined in the Service

Contracts.

Procurement Capacity in Provinces and Districts

47. No data on procurement in the provinces and districts was obtained by the mission.

However, according to interviews with NGOs implementing the NSP, regional procurement

entities are facing the same problems as the national authorities.

Capacity-Building Approach by PACBP and PRP

48. In addition to training of key procurement staff provided by PACBP mentioned in the

previous section, the PRP will build capacity by:

Developing a nationwide procurement capacity-building strategy for central,

provincial and municipal governments;

Identifying key ministries and provinces to be supported under the new project;

Planning the transfer of procurement capacity and responsibility to LM according

to a set of milestones;

Organizing workshops for the dissemination of the new PPL;

Assessing the procurement training needs of the procuring entities (LMs,

provinces, districts);

Developing appropriate selection criteria for trainees;


Developing methodologies for implementation of a broad training program to

train hundreds of trainees of all levels of government;

Conducting a survey to identify a future procurement training centre for the

country.

Risks within Capacity-building Approach by PACBP and PRP

Efficient Selection of Consultants

49. Since it is a priority for reconstruction that the Afghan PA be reestablished, the Bank

projects focus on building basic procurement capacity. The PACBP provides training to a limited

number of key staff while the PRP includes a broad program for hundreds of trainees from all

levels of government. However, due to PACBP’s limited outreach and PRP’s broad focus

training will only concentrate on basic subjects. In particular, PA staff will not receive training

on consultant selection tasks such as preparing ToR and assessing the quality of proposals. While

specialized capacity building may be too much to expect at this stage, many parties interviewed

expressed concerns about the credibility of the selection process given current deficiencies in the

performance of these tasks. These concerns relate to three stages of consultant selection in

particular:

(1) Preparing the ToR and the RFP: According to TTLs interviewed LM staff lack

experience in designing projects along with the capacity to deliver and define the

technical inputs necessary for the preparation of ToRs. Most ToRs are drafted by

technical advisors funded by donors.

(2) Compiling shortlists: According to the interviews many Evaluation Committees

(EC) lack the capacity to adequately examine EoIs, assess the experience and

capacities of candidates and compile shortlists.

(3) Evaluating submitted proposals: International consultants and donor

representatives specifically question the capacity of local evaluators to adequately

evaluate the quality of complex proposals. The stakeholders interviewed also raise

doubts about the outcome of the evaluations of standard assignments since many

EC seem to lack specialists in the disciplines of these assignments. The same PA

officials who have trouble drafting ToR are then later responsible for evaluating

the proposals.

50. These concerns are a key challenge to attracting qualified international firms and

achieving value for money in the selection of consultants. Combined with concerns about a poor

command of English and corruption, the lack of trust in the qualifications of evaluators

discourages qualified consultants from seeking assignments in Afghanistan (see para. 65 for

participation rates).

Development of National Consultants

51. The PRP includes only basic training courses for local firms that which will focus on (1)

creating awareness about the new Public Procurement Law; and (2) training on procurement

procedures for goods, works and consulting services. The Bank program does not provide

assistance on revising the rules of procedure on procurement although a tailor-made solution is

needed to address the weakness of the local consulting firms (see paras. 22 no 3 and 83 for

details and recommendations).


52. Moreover, neither PA nor donors have adequate information on the available local

expertise and are facing difficulty to identify the few available local resources (see paras 82 ff).

Capacity Building of the PA

53. According to the interviews the collaboration between expatriates and local procurement

personnel often fails and training turns out to be fruitless because of insurmountable

communication barriers. International consultants frequently reported that international and

national procurement personnel have serious problems interacting effectively. The work of local

translators, generally domestic PA staff members who are not fully qualified translators,

sometimes creates more confusion and misunderstanding instead of facilitating communication.

In addition, expatriates reported that the level of IT skills of their local counterparts is very low

and that they are forced to allocate extensive periods of time to simple on-the-job IT training.

54. Based on the numerous interviews conducted in the course of the mission, four

constraints could hamper the current capacity-building strategy and the shift of responsibilities to

the local counterpart procurement personnel:

(1) Lack of effective interaction between international and national procurement staff

due to language barriers;

(2) Lack of qualified translators to facilitate effective communication between

expatriates and local counterparts;

(3) Lack of correct translations of procurement documents originally prepared in

English; and

(4) Very weak IT capacity of national procurement staff.

In addition, the training program could be compromised by the limited availability of local staff

trainable in complex procurement processes as required by the Bank or the GoA. Experienced

PA staff is often poached by donor agencies and NGOs and the lack of qualified counterpart

personnel in the Afghan PA often renders on the job training impossible. When counterpart staff

is available low motivation due to low pay and limited opportunity for merit based promotion

undermine the knowledge transfer.

Recommendations

55. While most issues are already addressed by the upcoming PRP, the GoA and the Bank

may consider the following approaches to address remaining risks within the capacity-building

approach of the PACBP and PRP.

(1) Professional evaluations of proposals are fundamental for achieving value for

money and attracting qualified international consultants. The GoA (with support

from the Bank) should therefore consider assigning reputable consulting firms

with strong procurement expertise in the field of the specific projects to the task

of conducting proposal evaluations under major Bank-funded projects in close

cooperation with the PA. The same consultants could also be entrusted with the

quality and administrative control of the contracts and building capacity. In

particular, Bank-funded projects that cannot rely on the support of internationally

staffed Project Management Units (PMUs) or Technical Support Units (TSUs)

should benefit from this approach.

(2) For Bank-funded projects that are too small to justify the use of international

consulting firms to handle proposal evaluation and contract management, the


Bank should encourage Bank staff to actively support counterpart agencies at

defining the technical input for ToR. Bank specialists in the required areas of

expertise should extensively review and also provide input to draft ToR regarding

objectives, components, activities, milestones, and evaluation indicators.

Common weaknesses in TA projects such as the fragmentation into small

assignments of short duration, inadequate monitoring or the disregard of local

circumstances should be avoided by better procurement planning and effective

supervision. Furthermore, consultants with expertise in the required fields should

be assigned to Evaluation Committees.

(3) The GoA (with support from the Bank) may wish to consider addressing the lack

of qualified translators by designing and implementing a training program at a

selected training institute for future translators.

(4) In addition, the GoA may consider developing and implementing training

modules for the procurement staff in the area of English, IT and computer skills.

Recommendations for the development of the local consulting sector are provided in para. 83.

Corruption and Integrity in Procurement of Consultants

56. All persons interviewed at international and domestic consulting firms complained about

nepotism and corruption. Most of the local consultants interviewed consider it useless to apply

for GoA-funded projects without having a special relationship with the government officials and

decision-makers involved. Corruption is especially threatening to international firms or Afghans

returning from overseas who do not have powerful patrons or fully understand how the local

system works.

57. According to the interviewees negative public perceptions of widespread corruption at all

levels of GoA have increased,27

threatening to undermine or even reverse the GoA’s and

international community’s efforts to build functioning institutions able to attract qualified

consultants. Allegations mainly concern the selection of individual consultants:

High-level officials interfere with selection processes;

Shortlists are manipulated or limited to pre-selected candidates with good relations to

powerful patrons;

Evaluation criteria are changed or disregarded after submission of CVs (requiring

doctoral degrees when originally a master’s would have been sufficient);

Information is leaked to preferred candidates; and

Job vacancies are not correctly advertised.

58. The new PPL addresses the need for transparency and accountability under a separate

special chapter (Chapter X). In addition, the rules of procedure for public procurement contain

appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair competition and the administrative review

27

The 2005 Transparency International Corruption Index ranks Afghanistan 117th

placing it among the world’s most

corrupt countries.


of procurement proceedings.28

Article 108 of these recently enacted rules also effectively

regulates the selection of individual consultants.

59. The Bank’s Anti-Corruption Study (P101117) has recommended the following steps:

Steps to be taken by Government

Clarify administrative mandates and provide political support and resources

accordingly, with consideration of a small number of quick win or high profile

measures to demonstrate the GoA’s commitment to addressing the problem of

corruption in Afghanistan.

Accelerate efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to corruption in management of budget

funds and strengthen internal and external audit of public funds.

Improve transparency and effectiveness of merit-based recruitment processes and

monitor progress.

Initiate work toward developing and implementing an anti-corruption strategy, with

technical support from the international community.

Steps to be taken by the Donor Community

Provide technical assistance on anti-corruption policies and programs;

Renew the international community’s efforts on transparency (through regular public

disclosure of financial reports, audits, and contract awards).

In close collaboration with GoA, engage in rapid analysis of key Government sectors,

functions, processes and managerial responsibilities to identify points of vulnerability

to corruption and make recommendations for improvements.

Initiate analytical work on corruption to expand and strengthen the information base

for effective anti-corruption policies and programs.

Start incorporating an anti-corruption dimension into key development projects and

programs.

60. Considering the low level of capacity of PA officials and the lack of user-friendly rules

of procedure and manuals, it is not surprising that corruption remains a key issue. The GoA and

the Bank should ensure professional evaluations by outsourcing this task to international

consulting firms at least for major Bank-funded projects (see para. 55). In addition, the low

procurement capacity of the PA could be addressed by simplifying the tender process. The use of

Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) for routine assignments could help to increase

transparency in the evaluations of proposals (see para. 22 for details and recommendations).

Public Sector Demand for Consulting Services

Domestically Funded Demand

61. This section concentrates on the national budget available for procuring consulting

services. There are also local budgets available at the municipal level, and municipalities can

28

See for example Articles 157 PR (Records) and 81 PR (Publication of Notices) on transparency, Article 162 PR

on declarations on conflicts of interest, Article 164 PR on post-employment restrictions on public officials, Article

165 PR on avoidance of conflict of interests in consulting services, or Articles 170 ff PR on the administrative

review.


exercise some degree of fiscal autonomy. Revenues collected at the local level are mainly used to

fund municipal expenditures.

62. Since 2001 the focus has been on reconstruction, delivery of basic services and the

development of infrastructure. In addition, revenue mobilization in Afghanistan is still among the

lowest in the world and covers only 9% of total public expenditure. Therefore, only a small

percentage of national funds are spent on consulting services. The lack of trust in the capacity of

the domestic consulting sector further undermines efforts to successfully procure more

consulting services.

63. According to data provided by ARDS the GoA spent approx. US$130,900,000 for

contracts on goods, works and consulting services since 2004.29

Ten out of 49 contracts (8.6% of

total amount for goods, works and consulting services funded by GoA) concerned the provision

of consulting services. Seven consultancy contracts were awarded to international firms; 3 to

NGOs. No data is available on domestic consulting firms or subcontractors that may have been

associated with the implementation of the assignments. The data is summarized in the table

below, with details provided in Annex 2.

Consultancy Contracts Funded by GoA30

Selection Method Scope of Services Value US$ Winning Firm Origin

QBS Design of Building 500,000 Japan

QCBS Survey 450,000 Pakistan

QCBS Feasibility Study 751,239 Iran

QCBS Feasibility Study 2,321,560 India



QCBS National Skills Development 1,558,972 International NGO

QCBS National Skills Development 963,574 International NGO

QCBS National Skills Development 242,690 Local NGO

QCBS Design of Building 134,938 Pakistan

Total GoA Funding for Consulting Services: 11,264,983

Consulting Services Funded by the Bank

64. Since April 2002, the Bank has committed over US$1.28 billion for 25 development and

emergency reconstruction projects and two budget support operations in Afghanistan.31

This

support comprises US$849.8 million in grants and US$436.4 million in interest-free credits. Two

budget support operations, emergency public works, infrastructure reconstruction, and education

rehabilitation projects have so far been completed. Of the US$1.28 billion the World Bank has

29

The data provided by ARDS mainly concerns contracts above a value of US$200,000. 30

Awarded since December 2004 and facilitated through the PC within ARDS. 31

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), administered by the World Bank on behalf of 25 donors and

managed in conjunction with ADB, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Assistance Mission for

Afghanistan, and UNDP, remains the main mechanism for providing coordinated funding support to Afghanistan’s

recurrent budget and investments in line with agreed budget priorities of the GoA. As of October 22, 2006, 25

donors had pledged US$1.66 billion to ARTF, of which US$1.45 billion have been received.


committed to Afghanistan, approx. US$175.8 million (14%) were allocated to 63 consulting

service assignments which can be grouped by sector as shown in the table below, with details

provided in Annex 3.

World Bank Funded Consulting Assignments

(Signed Contracts from 29 May 2003 until 01 March 06)

Sector No of Contracts %

Agriculture 1 1.5 %

Education 3 4.8 %

Energy 3 4.8 %

Health 12 19.0 %

Public Administration and Law 8 12.7 %

SWAps (NSP) 27 42.9 %

Transport 4 6.3 %

Water & Sanitation 5 7.9 %

Total 63 100 %

The consulting contracts were awarded as follows:

World Bank Funded Consulting Assignments


Category of Consultant No of Contracts %

NGOs 38 60 %

International Consulting Firms 22 35 %

National Consulting Firms 1 2 %

Other 2 3 %

Total 63 100 %

International Supply of Consulting Services

International Participation

65. Participation rates of international consultants are low. Based on an assessment of 10

Bank-funded assignments from 2005 to 2007 the average number of international proposals

submitted per assignment was only 2.5. On average just 2.1 proposals scored above the

Minimum Qualifying Score (MQS). These outcomes are summarized in the table below, with

details in Annex 4.

Participation Rates EoI

Received

Size of

Shortlist

Proposals

Submitted

Proposals

Above MQS

Average 8.4 4.5 2.5 2.1

66. According to the international consultants interviewed the reasons for low participation

are:

(1) The security situation;


(2) Low PA capacity to evaluate consultants’ qualifications and lacking transparency

of selection processes; and

(3) Low PA capacity to adequately supervise and to pay international consultants

fairly and timely.

In addition, international consultants stressed the high costs required to set up and conduct

business in Afghanistan (security, electricity, safe housing for employees, identifying reliable

local partners or suppliers, etc.). The entry costs are considered to be extremely high. Once

established, firms tend to apply for other opportunities again. However, according to the

interviews the willingness of firms to operate in Afghanistan is mainly linked to the availability

of bilateral contracts and not to Bank-funded assignments which are merely seen as an addition

to the core business. International consultants interviewed point out that the incentives for

seeking Bank-funded assignments are missing. Excessive demands from the PA, its lacking

appreciation of consulting services, and delayed payments are among the many issues that

discourage qualified consultants.

Performance on Consulting Service Contracts

67. PA and donor officials generally consider the performance of international consulting

firms as merely satisfactory under the present circumstances and have observed that firms

generally refrain from sending experienced and qualified staff to Afghanistan. Assignments

focusing on capacity building implemented by international firms are generally rates as less than

satisfactory. However, officials admit that contract durations of 2 to 3 years make it difficult to

carry out comprehensive capacity-building contracts. In addition, the lack of trainable local staff

challenges any training program.

Remuneration Levels

68. Based on a sample of 12 Bank-funded contracts international firms from Part 1 countries

demand a median fee of $23,000 for key team members for operating in Afghanistan as outlined

in the following table, with details in Annex 5 on the 12 assessed contracts.

WB-funded Consulting Contracts (excluding NGOs): Monthly Billing Rates

Billing rates Team Leader Key Staff Nationals

Average $24,900 $18,750 $3,700

Median $23,550 $18,550 $2,900

Median (Part 1 country firms): $29,050 $23,000


Recommendations

(1) Since continuity is deemed essential for successful capacity building, but

international participation is low and entry costs for international firms are very

high, the Bank should consider including a provision for continuation of work by

the same consultant under SSS in the initial RFPs whenever feasible.

(2) When drafting ToR, the security situation should be taken into account.

Especially when the services are not related to capacity-building activities that

need to take place locally, the ToR should provide for international consultants to

perform services from outside the country to the greatest extent possible.


Domestic Supply of Consulting Services

The Local Consulting Sector

69. While contractors and suppliers of varying capacity seem to provide a sound local source

for implementing smaller contracts, the situation appears much less advanced in the area of

consulting firms. However, a full assessment is hindered by lack of information. While various

LMs have registered local firms, this information mainly serves to disseminate procurement

opportunities to potential local consulting service providers. It does not provide indications on

the actual expertise available or the previous performance of firms. The same problem applies to

the company registration scheme run by the Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA).

70. ARDS is registering firms and requires them to provide information about their main

areas of interest. However, no information from ARDS could be obtained during the mission.

71. While it is far from being exhaustive, an immediately available source of information on

the local consulting sector is the Afghanistan Procurement Directory (www.

procurementdirectory.af) launched by the Canadian NGO Peace Dividend Trust (PDT) in

September 2006. This directory currently lists 14 local consulting firms, of which 6 have

previous experience with donors and 10 can rely on either permanent or temporary international

staff.

72. Based on site visits to a number of local companies’ offices and information provided by

PDT, the local consulting sector can be further divided into three categories:

(1) Kabul-based consulting firms owned and managed by foreigners with a proven

track record of professional experience in the country (mainly studies and

research), drawing on international and local staff and relying on a strong

clientele from the Afghan private sector (e.g. the national telecoms); approx. 2 out

of 14 companies listed under the Afghanistan Procurement Directory are in this

category.

(2) Domestic firms owned and run by local professionals mainly educated in Pakistan

and fluent in English with a limited number of international staff (mainly

temporary) on their payroll that occasionally have won small donor-funded

consulting contracts.

(3) Purely domestic consulting firms, with a limited number of local staff and no

international staff, that have no experience in providing consultancy services to

public sector clients.

Firms belonging to categories 2 and 3 are generally involved in many areas of business other

than consulting. According to interviews these types of firms are currently trying to win

consultancy contracts funded by the GoA or the international donor community, but mainly must

engage in construction and supply activities (e.g. the import of cars).

Main Areas of Expertise

73. According to the information gained during interviews at local companies and through

the assessment of firms’ webpages and data provided by the local consulting companies under

the Afghanistan Procurement Directory the main areas of local expertise are:

http://www.procurementdirectory.af/

http://www.procurementdirectory.af/


Areas of Expertise of Afghan Consulting Companies Listed under the

Afghanistan Procurement Directory

No of companies listed: 14 100 %

Capacity & institution building, training 2 14 %

Monitoring & evaluation 1 7 %

Community & social services 1 7 %

Research & surveys 4 29 %

Business support services 5 36 %

Public relations & advertising 7 50 %

IT services 3 21 %

Project support services 2 14 %

This table should be seen as mere indication of the range of services domestic consulting firms

could provide to the Afghan PA. It is not uncommon that webpages, company flyers or

brochures list vast areas of expertise while it turned out in interviews that the companies had yet

to provide consultancy services to a public client.

Performance on Public Contracts and Remuneration Levels

74. No data was available on the quality of local consultancy services provided to the Afghan

PA or donors.

75. According to the assessment of Bank-funded contracts for Afghan consultants nominated

by international firms, a median monthly billing rate of about US$2,900 applies (see

Remuneration Levels, para. 68). According to TTLs interviewed the fees of individual local

freelance consultants are generally higher (about $3,500 to 4,500) since the Bank has to compete

with other donors for the few experts available.

Capacity Assessment of Afghan Consultancies

76. The capacity of local consulting firms remains very weak. The few profitable domestic

firms operating from Kabul are developing skills by on-the-job training, in-house courses held by

international consultants and twinning (i.e. one international and one local staff are implementing

the same task). One of the biggest challenges is availability of qualified local professionals since

the private sector can rely neither on functioning advanced education systems nor on institutions

where experience can be gained.

77. NGOs implementing nationwide projects on behalf of the donor community are

contributing to the development of local capacity by in-house training courses in English

language and IT skills and by delegating project components to be implemented in the provinces

to local personnel.

78. According to the interviews conducted the major key constraints faced by the domestic

consulting firms are:

Lack of qualified local staff due to the new nature of assignments, higher quality

standards, and the weak and poorly funded Afghan tertiary education system;

Weak management, English and IT skills;


Competition for experts with donors and international consultants implementing

projects in Afghanistan;

Limited public demand and scarce financial resources;

Lack of developed banking system; many local consultants face serious difficulty to

obtain bank guarantees.

These problems are reflected in the poor track record of local consultants in winning contracts

from donors or the GoA. Other specific reasons for lack of success in public procurement

opportunities are:

Limited familiarity with public procurement, procurement procedures and

documents, partly due to lack of English skills;

Lack of experience in preparing compliant technical and financial proposals;

Failure to meet qualification requirements for proposed staff (for example, the post

requires a postgraduate degree despite the fact that there are no post-graduate

programs in Afghanistan, or qualified but young experts have too few years to meet

the requirement on minimum professional experience); and

Lack of trust in the fairness and transparency of procurement processes handled by

the GoA and therefore limited participation.

79. Once local firms were awarded contracts they face further problems since they lack

experience in project implementation under GoA or Bank rules (firms may switch key staff

without being aware that this requires a No Objection and have trouble preparing invoices

according to required standards).

Developing Capacity of the Domestic Consulting Sector

80. While most of the constraints faced by the consulting sector can only be addressed in the

long-term, the exclusion of domestic consultancies from the development process can be

addressed, at least in part for simple assignments, through training courses or workshops. The

upcoming PRP will include basic procurement training for local firms, conducting seminars (at

least twice a year) on the new PPL and structured training programs (four times a year) on

procurement procedures for contracts funded by the GoA and the donor community. However,

workshops and training courses do not focusing solely on consulting firms, but will also address

contractors and suppliers. In addition, the current lack of procurement manuals will hinder the

preparation and implementation of training materials and programs.

81. Therefore, the consultant responsible for the PRP could benefit from the experience of

two ongoing local training programs. The NGO Peace Dividend Trust (PDT) procurement

training courses focus on the major weaknesses of local firms in following procurement

procedures.32

While PDT has only offered a first training session for the construction sector in

May 2006, it plans to conduct a series of workshops on procurement for consulting services. The

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is about to start the Engineering Capacity Building

Project for local consulting engineering companies.33

Training will cover a broad range of topics

32

Contact: Mrs Shirine Bakhat-Pont, Country Director Kabul Office, Peace Divident Trust Markeplace Project;

www.peacedividendmarketplace.org ; email: [email protected] 33

Contact: Mr Michael G. Goode, Director Grants & Contracts, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE);

www.asce.org ; email: [email protected]

http://www.peacedividendmarketplace.org/

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.asce.org/


such as management, project management, and procurement. A collaboration between the PRP

and the ASCE project could achieve synergies.

Overcoming the Information Gap on Consultants

82. The monthly Progress Reports submitted by the Procurement Consultant to the Bank do

not enable a reviewer to extract information necessary to assess the quality of the selection

process. In particular, it lacks information on the nature of assignments and the extent of

international and national participation (average billing rates, participation rates from

international and national firms, and nature of assignments attracting national firms). Precise data

would enable TTLs and PA staff to better plan assignments and selection parameters.

83. Moreover, many representatives of the PA or the donor community interviewed are

unaware that at least some capable local firms exist in Afghanistan. Only a few persons

representing the public sector were able to name or recommend one local consultancy. As a

result, local firms are generally not taken into account when firms are selected under SSS for

special or urgent assignments.34

Information tools like the Afghanistan Procurement Directory

could help to minimize the information gap (see para. 71).

Recommendations

(1) Since Afghan consultancies can best develop their capacities through associations

with international firms, the Requests for Proposals (RFP) and the Terms of

Reference (ToR) for internationally competed assignments funded by the GoA

and the Bank should clearly identify, whenever possible and feasible, those

components that can be executed by local consultants. In case no competent

Afghan consultancies exist, the tender documents should clearly require from

international firms to transfer skills and know-how to local individual advisors.

Once these individual consultants were involved in internationally executed

projects and developed their capacity under the supervision of experienced

international consultants, they would be in a position to establish their own

consulting companies.

(2) For routine assignments limited to national consultants, the Bank and the GoA

should consider the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP). Quality-Based

Selection (QBS) and Fixed-Budget Selection (FBS) should apply to standard

assignments and Quality- and Cost-based Selection (QCBS) only when clearly

justified by the nature of the ToR. This should encourage local consultants to seek

participation. Information gained should be disseminated to the Bank’s TTLs (for

example, concerning the research tool Afghanistan Procurement Directory).

Whenever possible and feasible local firms should be considered for small

assignments generally procured under SSS.

(3) To facilitate the preparation of projects and procurement plans, the Bank should

consider requesting the PC to improve its monthly progress report. It should

include data on the participation of international and national consulting firms

such as (1) average number of EoI, size of shortlists, proposals submitted; (2)

countries of origin of shortlisted, responsive and winning firms and their

34

For example, under the Afghanistan Public Administration Reform Project (P100960) the selection of a US firm

for a survey on public opinion and expectations on the GoA was cleared although local capacity in the area of

surveys is good.


categories (NGOs, consultancies, government agencies); (3) average billing rates;

(4) number and nature of assignments for which the ToRs require the participation

of national firms; (5) nature of assignments limited to national participation; and

(6) number and nature of assignments in which local firms are associated with

international firms. Alternatively, the Procurement Consultant could be requested

to prepare an annual report focusing on the points described above and

complementing the monthly progress reports.

(4) The Bank could also consider cooperating with two stakeholders currently

providing support and training to local consulting firms. The Bank’s PRP could

(1) draw on the experience of the NGO Peace Dividend Trust on training courses

on procurement for local companies; and (2) collaborate with the Engineering

Capacity Building Project for local consulting engineering companies

implemented by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).

Risk Assessment

84. A detailed risk analysis could not be carried out. However, the interviews with

stakeholders indicate the following key risks:

Security Risks – Lack of security is the number one challenge in Afghanistan's

development environment. The critical security situation will not change in the short

term and will limit operational activities. Only national firms and local staff will be

available to implement projects for reasonable fees in the remote provinces where

conflict is ongoing or likely to erupt again.

Technical and Economic Risks – The quality of consulting services has a direct

impact on the Afghan economy. Lack of quality services leads to questionable results,

increases project costs and causes delays. Considering the current weak capacity of

the local consulting sector and the increased fees for international consultants willing

to work in the daunting environment of Afghanistan, the costs to the Afghan economy

are likely to be alarmingly high.

Professional and Business Risks – The challenging operating environment, the

weak educational system, and lack of prospects for young professionals lead to a

constant drain of knowledgeable people. The loss of intellectual capital is one of the

most serious risks for the slowly evolving domestic consulting sector.

Regulatory Risks – The lack of provisions specifically tailored to support the weak

local consulting firms and the PA’s low capacity to efficiently award contracts have a

serious impact on the local consulting sector and make it costly and risky for

consultants to tender and to implement consultancy projects for the GoA.

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 1: List of Persons Met page 26 of 37

Organization Name Position

Government of Afghanistan

Ministry of Finance, Office of

the Deputy Minister of Finance,

Procurement Policy Unit

Mr. Raj KAMAL Advisor to the Deputy Minister of

Finance,

Head of PPU

Independent Administrative

Reform & Civil Service

Commission

Mr. Mirza ABDULLAHI Director, Public Administrative Reform

Implementation – Civil Service

Management

Ministry of Urban Development Mr. Al-Haj Wahid Abdul AHAD Advisor to MoUD and PMU Team

Leader

Kabul Urban Development Project

(KURP)

Ministry of Public Works Mr. G.R. SINGAL Advisor to the MoPW

Donor Agencies

European Commission

Delegation to Afghanistan

Mr. Jens ENGELHARDT Deputy Head of Section Contracts &

Finance

European Commission

Delegation to Afghanistan

Mrs. Sandrine PETRONI Economic and Trade Advisor

ADB Mr. Brian FAWCETT Country Director

Afghanistan Resident Mission

ADB Mr. Robert Gordon RINKER Senior Project Management Specialist

DFID Mr. John GORDON Deputy Head

DFID Afghanistan

GTZ International Services Mrs. Marita DIEHLING Program Manager NSP

GTZ International Services Mr. Aziz Ahmad SARHADI Head of Administration

Consultants / NGOs

RITES Ltd. Mr. Virender Kumar GARG Team Leader & Program Manager,

Afghanistan Reconstruction and

Development Services (ARDS)

Peace Dividend Trust Mrs. Hedvig Christine

BOSERUP

Project Director -

Afghan Procurement Directory

Peace Dividend Trust Mrs. Sylvie M. GAROIA Trainer (Procurement courses for SME)

SMEC Intern. PTY. Ltd. Mr. David LORD Team Leader

World Bank –

Kabul Urban Development Project (KURP)

Bearing Point Mr. Kelvin POWER Chief of Party & Financial Management

Consultant -

Emergency Public Administration Project

Landell Mills Ltd. Mr. Jan van AGTHOVEN Institutional; Development Specialist –

Preparing the ADB Commercial Agriculture

Development Project

Rodeco Consulting GmbH Mr. Hans HUSSELMANN Team Leader


GTZ -Water Sector Reform Project

Ministry of Energy and Water

Rodeco Consulting GmbH Mr. Mike O’LEARY Team Leader

GTZ -Institutional Strengthening &

Organizational Development of Water

Utilities -


CIPE - Center for International

Private Enterprise

Mr. Tim BISPEE Deputy Chief of Party

Individual Mr. Gil M. SORIA Consultant (ADB) – Project Implementation

and Procurement Specialist,


Sheladia Inc. Mr. Mir HASHIMI Acting Team Leader (ADB Pul-e-Khumri-

Balkh Road Project)

Sheladia Inc. Mr. Paul J. GUNARATNAM Project Manager / Socioeconomist

Scanagri / Terrainstitute Dr. Stefan SCHUETTE Team Leader,

Capacity Building for Land Policy and

Administration Reform (ADB),

Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation

ACTED – Agency for Technical

Cooperation and Development

Mrs. Ziggy GAREWAL Country Director Afghanistan

DED – Deutscher

Entwicklungsdienst

Mrs. Kerstin LEPPER Project Manager

Individual Mr. Malcolm TOLAND Advisor to the Ministry of Commerce,

Technical Assistance & Capacity Building

in the Ministry of Commerce Project

Hope Worldwide Mr. Daniel R. ALLISON Country Director

Hope Worldwide

CNFA (Citizens Network for

Foreign Affairs)

Mr. Gerald TURNBULL, PhD Country Director

CNFA Afghanistan

(Afghanistan Agriculture Development

Project, AADP, funded by USDA)

Individual Mr. Bradley DOLLIS Technical Advisor – Administration,

Ministry of Finance

ARD Inc. Dr. Lewis RASMUSSEN Senior Technical Advisor – USAID

Afghanistan Local Governance and

Community Development Project

Afghan Consulting Firms

AICB – Afghan Innovative

Consulting Bureau

Mr. Jan NAZARI Vice President

Afghan Bena Group Mr. Jamshid IBRAHIMI CEO

NBCC – Nawee Bakhter

Construction Co. Ltd.

Mr. Engineer Nazir AHMAD Director

Trust Project and Design Co. Mr. Abdul MUSA Director

Kabul Group Consulting Firm Mr. Sayed Javed ANDISH Managing Director

ALTAI Consulting Mr. Eric DAVIN Partner

Academic Institutions


Kabul University Prof. Abdul KABIR KARIMI Lecturer, Faculty of Economics

Kabul University Mr. Ahmad Jawed SHUAIBI Lecturer, Faculty of Economics

Other

Afghanistan International

Chamber of Commerce

Mr. Atiqullah M. NUSRAT Membership Director

ABA – Afghan Builders

Association

Mr. Naeem YASSIN President

ASCE – American Society of

Civil Engineers

Mr. Michael R. SANIO Director International Alliances

BRAC Afghanistan Bank Mr. Shawkat HOSSAIN COO & Senior Vice President

World Bank Task Team Leaders and Staff

Mrs. Nancy ZHAO Operations Advisor (SAROQ)

Mr. William BYRD Advisor (SASPR); TTL – Anti-Corruption Study

Mr. Paul Edwin SISK Senior Financial Management Specialist (SARFM); TTL – Public

Administration Capacity Building Project

Mrs. Susanne HOLSTE Senior Transport Specialist (SASEI); TTL – National Emergency Rural

Access Project, Emergency National Solidarity Program

Mr. Mitsuyoshi ASADA Senior Transport Specialist (SASEI); TTL – Emergency Transport

Rehabilitation Project

Mrs. Scherezad LATIF Education Specialist (SASHD); TTL – Strategic Higher Education TA

Project, Strengthening Higher Education Program

Mrs. Sorarya GOGA Senior Urban Development Specialist (SASEI); TTL – Kabul Urban

Reconstruction Project

Mrs. Julia M. FRASER Senior Financial Analyst (SASEI); TTL – Second Emergency Power


Mr. Nigel COULSON Senior Public Sector Specialist (SASPR)

Mr. Deepal FERNANDO Senior Procurement Specialist (SARPS)

Mrs. Sima KANAAN Senior Operations Officer (OPCFS)

Mrs. Patricia MACGOWAN Senior Procurement Specialist (LCSPT)

Mrs. Irina LUCA Lead Procurement Specialist (AFTPC)

Mr. Frederick KRANZ Consultant (MNAPR)

Mr. Nagaraju DUTHALURI Procurement Specialist (Consultant SARPS)

Mr. Habibullah WAJDI Education Specialist (SASHD)

Mr. Nargis HAKIMY Program Assistant – Procurement (SARPS)

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 2: GoA Consulting Contracts page 29 of 37

(Facilitated through PC within ARDS)

No ARDS

Ref Mode Scope of Contract

Funding

Agency

Amount in

US$ Name of Winner

Year of

Award

1 MoFA/555 QBS Design of Japan Embassy Building GoA 500,000 PDS, Japan 12/2006

2 AISA/281 QCBS Survey of Industrial Parks GoA 450,000 NESPAK, Pakistan 03/2005

3 MoEW/279 QCBS Feasibility Study of Gambiri Irrigation

Project GoA 751,239

Toossab Consulting

Engineers, Iran 08/2006

4 MoEW/283 QCBS Feasibility Study of Farah Rud Irrigation

and Hydro Power GoA 2,321,560 CES, India et al. 08/2006

5 MoEW/354 QCBS Feasibility Study of Small & Medium

Dams GoA 2,132,010 CES, India et al. 11/2006

6 MoEW/305 QCBS Feasibility Study for Kelaghai Dam

Project GoA 2,210,000 CES, India et al. 12/2006

7 MoLSA/445

con1 QCBS

Consultancy Services for the National

Skills Development & Market Linkages

Program

GoA 1,558,972 International Rescue

Committee (Intern. NGO) 12/2006

8 MoLSA/445

con1 QCBS



Program

GoA 963,574 Solidarity Afghanistan

Belgium (Intern. NGO) 12/2006

9 MoLSA/445

con2 QCBS



Program

GoA 242,690 Sanayee Development

Foundation (Local NGO) 12/2006

10 MoFA/440 QCBS Design of Embassy Building GoA 134,938 Engineering Associate,

Pakistan 12/2006

(1) Consulting services contracts funded by GoA: US$11,264,983 8.6 %

(2) All contracts funded by GoA (goods, works, and consulting services): US$130,877,432 100 %

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-funded Consulting Assignments page 30 of 37


No Project Name Contract Description

Contract

Amount in

US$

Signing

Date Company

Country of

Origin

1

Kabul Urban


Consultants for Municipal Finance Support for

Kabul Municipality

$299,000 01-Mar-2006 Infrastructure

Professional

Enterprises (IPE)

India

2 Kabul Urban


Technical Support Unit Assistance to MUDH

for KURP Implementation

$2,705,000 04-Feb-2006 SMEC Australia

3

Emergency Transport


Design and Construction Supervision for the

Rehabilitation of Taloqan-Faizabad Road -

PHASE 2

$750,000 01-Jan-2006 SMEC Australia

4 Emergency Irrigation


Feasibility Study for Lower Kokcha Irrigation

and Hydropower Project

$2,203,000 22-Dec-2005 Fichtner Germany

5 Emergency Power


Technical Assistance for Recruiting and

Commercialization of DABM

$10,677,000 25-Oct-2005 MVV Consulting Germany

6 Public Admin Capacity

Building Project

Government Financial Management Project -

System Study

$640,000 05-Sep-2005 ABU Consult Germany

7

Public Admin Capacity

Building Project

Consultancy Services to Support Treasury

Operations within the MoF, Line Ministries &

Provincial Administrations

$6,851,000 20-Jul-2005 Bearing Point US

8 Emergency National

Solidarity Project

Contract for the External Mid-Term

Evaluation of NSP

$459,000 20-Jul-2005 University of York UK

9 ARTF - Feasibility

Studies Facility

Rehabilitation of Baghdara Hydro Power Plant $4,100,000 07-Jun-2005 Fichtner Germany

10 Public Admin Capacity Consultancy Services to Support Audit $1,809,000 15-May-2005 Deloitte Touch India

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-Funded Consulting Assignments page 31 of 37

Building Project Operations & Capacity Building of CAO Tohmatsu

11

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project

Hiring of Consultant for CMW Training

Program in Panjshar and Kapisa

$357,000 02-May-2005 Health Net

International

International

NGO

12 Emergency Power


Design and Supervision of Rehab. &

Expansion of Urban Distribution Networks

$1,340,000 2-May-2005 SMEC Australia

13

ARTF - Afghanistan -

Short-Term Urban

Water Supply and

Sanitation Project

Continuation of Consulting Services for Re-

establishment & Operation of Water Supply &

Sanitation Services in Provincial Towns

$3,200,000 29-Apr-2005 Beller Kocks Consult Germany

14

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project


Program in Parwan

$633,000 20-Apr-2005 International Medical

Corps.

International

NGO

15

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project


Program in Parwan, Panjshar and Kapisa

$473,000 20-Apr-2005 BRAC Regional NGO


Solidarity Project

Facilitation of NSP in 72 Villages in Laja

Mangal District of Paktia Province

$302,000 17-Apr-2005 People in Need (PIN) International

NGO


Studies Facility

Amendment 2 for Consultancy Services $880,000 02-Oct-2004 Beller Kocks Consult Germany

18 Public Admin Capacity

Building Project

Procurement of Facilitation Services for

ARDS

$4,280,000 30-Sep-2004 Rites India


Solidarity Project

Assessment of Year 1 Performance of NSP

Facilitating Partners

$324,000 09-Aug-2004 Altai Consulting Afghanistan


Studies Facility

Program Implementation Support Unit for

MWP

$2,315,000 15-Jul-2004 Decon Germany

21 Emergency Public

Administration Project

n.a. $1,700,000 08-Jul-2004 The British Council UK


II

22

ARTF - Civil Service

Capacity Building

Afghan Expatriate Services $5,000,000 08-Jul-2004 International

Organization for

Migration (IOM)

International

NGO

23

Emergency Public

Administration Project

II

Consultancy Services to Manage Public

Administrative Reform

$2,563,000 03-Jul-2004 The Services Group

(TSG)

US


Solidarity Project

Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in

the District of Balhkab in Sar-E-Pul Province

$1,076,000 27-May-2004 German Aggro

Action

International

NGO

25

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project

Performance Based Partnership Agreement

between TISA and AMI for Delivering BPHS

in 3 Districts of Badghis Province

$3,748,000 13-May-2004 Aide Medicale

Internationale

International

NGO

26

Emergency

Infrastructure


Hiring of Consultancy Services for Sanitation

Improvements in Kabul under EIRP

$1,300,000 27-Feb-2004 Gauff Ingenieure Germany

27

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project


between TISA and BRAC/BDF for Delivering

BPHS in Balkh Province

$8,384,000 26-Feb-2004 BRAC Regional NGO

28

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project


between TISA and SCA for Delivering BPHS

in 3 Districts of Badghis Province

$4,293,000 26-Feb-2004 Swedish Committee

for Afghanistan

Local NGO

29

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project


with IBN Sina for Delivering BPHS in Sari

Pul Province

$4,129,000 26-Feb-2004 IBN Sina Regional NGO


Solidarity Project

Facilitation of NSP in Jawand and AB-

Kameray Districts in Badghis Province


31 Emergency National Facilitation of National Solidarity Program by $1,628,000 17-Feb-2004 MADERA International


Solidarity Project Madera in 4 Districts in Nuristan and

Laghman Provinces

NGO

32

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project


between TISA and BRAC for Delivering

BPHS in 3 Districts of Badghis Province


33

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project

Consultancy Services for Third Party

Evaluation of MoH Programs

$3,859,000 03-Feb-2004 John Hopkins

University

US


Solidarity Project

NSP Facilitating Partner $1,297,000 21-Nov-2003 Oxfam International

NGO

35

Emergency Education

Rehabilitation and

Development Project

Facilitation Agency for Community Grant for

School development in Parwan and Kapisa

Provinces

$2,265,000 17-Nov-2003 BRAC Regional NGO

36

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project

Consultancy Services under PPH in Nimroz

Province

$1,691,000 30-Oct-2003 COOPI International

NGO

37

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project

Consultancy Services under PPH in Farah

Province

$5,381,000 28-Oct-2003 CHA Regional NGO

38

Health Sector

Emergency

Reconstruction &

Development Project

Consultancy Services under PPH in Hilmand

Province

$7,919,000 25-Oct-2003 IBN Sina Regional NGO


Solidarity Project


Selected Districts/Provinces

$902,000 27-Sep-2003 Ockenden

International

International

NGO


Solidarity Project

NSP - Oversight Consultant $24,322,000 08-Sep-2003 GTZ Germany


41 Emergency Transport


Design and Construction Supervision for the

Rehabilitation of Taloqan-Faizabad Road

$750,000 28-Aug-2003 SMEC Australia

42

Emergency Education

Rehabilitation and

Development Project

Bamiyan Province - Facilitation for

Community Grant for School Development

$2,420,000 24-Jul-2003 CARE International International

NGO

43

Emergency Education

Rehabilitation and

Development Project

Logar Province - Facilitation for Community

Grant for School Development

$2,286,000 24-Jul-2003 CARE International International

NGO

44

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Samangan & Jawzjan Provinces - Darra-I Suf

et al.

$652,000 25-Jun-2003 ActionAid International

NGO

45

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Samangan & Ghor Provinces - Hazrati Sultan

et.al

$2,807,000 25-Jun-2003 AfghanAid British NGO

46

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Badakshan & Baghlan Provinces - Shignan et

al.

$4,912,000 25-Jun-2003 Aga Khan

Development

Network

International

NGO


Solidarity Project


Selected Provinces

$745,000 25-Jun-2003 AREA n.a.

48

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Faryab, Baghlan, Kunduz & Takhar Provinces

- Almar et al.

$3,726,000 25-Jun-2003 ACTED International

NGO

49

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Nangarhar, Partiak & Heland Provinces -

Rodat et al.

$4,845,000 25-Jun-2003 BRAC Regional NGO


Solidarity Project


Ghazni & Paktia Provinces - Malistan et al.

$2,982,000 25-Jun-2003 CARE International International

NGO


Solidarity Project


Alkh Province - Dawlatabad et al.

$933,000 25-Jun-2003 CHA Local NGO

52 Emergency National Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in $739,000 25-Jun-2003 CONCERN International


Solidarity Project Selected Districts/Provinces NGO


Solidarity Project


Laghman & Badghis Provinces - Alingar et al.

$2,396,000 25-Jun-2003 DACAAR International

NGO


Solidarity Project


Sar-I-Sul Province - Sayyad etal.

$1,194,000 25-Jun-2003 German Aggro

Action

International

NGO


Solidarity Project


Kunduz Province - Qalayi et al.

$1,539,000 25-Jun-2003 Ghazi Rural Support

Program (GRSP)

Local NGO

56

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Logar & Khost Provinces - Mohammad Agha

et al.

$4,289,000 25-Jun-2003 International Rescue

Committee (IRC)

International

NGO


Solidarity Project


Kunar Province - Serkani et al.

$265,000 25-Jun-2003 Islamic Relief

Agency (ISRA)

International

NGO


Solidarity Project


Wardak Province - Markaz-I Behsud et al.

$984,000 25-Jun-2003 Swedish Committee

for Afghanistan

Local NGO

59

Emergency National

Solidarity Project


Kabul Province - Bagrami et al.

$1,848,000 25-Jun-2003 Sanayee

Development

Foundation (SDF)

Local NGO


Solidarity Project

Facilitation of NSP in Kabul Provinces -

Shahjoy, Arghandab & Qalat Districts

$1,475,000 17-Jun-2003 Afghan Development

Association (ADA)

Afghanistan


Solidarity Project


Selected Districts/Provinces

$527,000 16-Jun-2003 GOAL International

NGO

62

Emergency Transport


Consultancy Services for the Supervision of

the Construction of the Doshi to Shrikhan

Bandar Road

$1,650,000 02-Jun-2003 Louis Berger Group US

63

Emergency

Infrastructure


Re-establishment of Water Supply and

Sanitation services in Selected Provincial

Towns

$2,700,000 29-May-2003 Beller Kocks Consult Germany

Total (approx.): US$175,860,000

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 4: Assessment of 10 Bank-funded Consulting Assignments page 36 of 37

Project Assignment No of EoI

Received

Size of

Shortlist

Proposals

Submitted

Proposals

above MQS

Health Sector Emergency

Reconstruction and

Development Project

Performance-based Partnership Agreements to Deliver Basic

Package of Health Services to Nimroz Province 5 5 3 2

Emergency Power


Supervisory Engineering Services for Rehabilitation of Naghlu

Hydropower Plant 6 6 1 1

Public Administration and

Capacity Building Project

Procurement Support Reform Project - Procurement Capacity

Building and Legal and Institutional Framework Development

for Procurement in Afghanistan

19 3 2 2

Emergency Power


Consultant Services for Legal Technical Assistance to the

MoEW to negotiate Power Purchase Agreements for Imports

from Neighboring Countries

5 5 2 2

Kabul Urban


Preparation of Development Plan for Kabul 8 5 3 2

First Emergency Power


Consultant Services for Reactive Power Compensation for the

North-Eastern Transmission System 9 3 3 2



Consultancy Services to Support Treasury Operations within

MoF, Line Ministries and Provincial Administrations 12 6 3 3

Kabul Urban


Preparation of Development Plans for Kandahar and Herat 4 3 2 2



Consulting Services to Support Audit Operations and Capacity

Building with the Control and Audit Office (CAO) 12 6 3 2

Kabul Urban


Preparation of Development Plan for Mazar-i-Sharif and

Jalalabad 4 3 3 3

AVERAGE: 8.4 4.5 2.5 2.1

Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 5: Assessment of 12 Bank-funded Consulting Assignments Billing Rates page 37 of 37

WB-funded Consulting Contracts (excluding NGOs): Monthly Billing Rates

Contract Selection

Method

Firm

from

Contract

Date

Team

Leader

Key

Staff National

(1) PRP - Procurement Reform Support Project: Procurement Capacity Building

and Legal & Institutional Framework Development (under PACBP) QCBS UK 02/07 $24,000 $23,000 $4,000

(2) Supervisory Engineering Services for Rehabilitation of Naghlu Hydro Power

Plant (under Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project) QCBS Germany 09/06 $31,000 $25,200 ./.

(3) Consultancy Services for Improving Air Traffic Management System of

Afghanistan Airspace (under Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project) QBS France 04/06 $33,800 23,000 ./.

(4) Consultancy Services as Technical Support Unit to the PMU in the MoUDH

(under Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project) QCBS Australia 04/06 $23,100 $17,800 $2,500

(5) Government Financial Management and Administration Project – System

Study (under PACBP) QCBS Germany 09/05 $49,500 $31,000 $2,200

(6) Consultancy Services to Support Treasury Operations within the MoF, Line

Ministries & Provincial Administrations (under PACBP) QCBS US 07/05 $35,700 $26,600 $2,700

(7) Feasibility Study for Baghdara Hydropower Project (under ARTF Feasibility

Study Facility Project) QCBS Germany 06/05 $27,100 $18,100 $2,900

(8) Consultancy Contract for the Design and Construction Supervision for

Rehabilitation of Taloqan to Faizabad Road (under Emergency Transport

Rehabilitation Project)

QCBS Australia 08/03 $22,000 $19,000 ./.

(9) Consultancy Services to Support the Audit Operations and Capacity

Building of CAO (under PACBP) QCBS India 05/05 $18,000 $11,000 $7,000

(10) Procurement Strengthening and Support for ARDS (under EPAP II) QCBS India 09/04 $15,000 $13,000 $4,500

(11) Consultancy for Engineering Services for the Procurement and Installation

of OPGW and Associated Equipments for 220K Transmission Line from Kabul

to Pul-I-Khumri (under Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project)

SSS India 06/06 $12,000 $10,000

(12) Consultant Services for Reactive Power Control for the North-Eastern

Transmission System (under Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project) QCBS India 06/06 $7,500 $7,500

Average $24,900 $18,750 $3,700

Median $23,550 $18,550 $2,900



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