Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security

8/6/2019 Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security

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may meet less or more frequently depending uponcircumstances such as crisis situations or just prior to

major summit meetings. Currently, when the PC in theBush administration meets four times a week, it conductstwo 45-minute back-to-back meetings on Tuesdayafternoons, and a second series of two 45-minuteback-to-back meetings on Thursday mornings. Each45-minute meeting usually covers one major policytopic. In addition to (or sometimes in lieu of) formalPC meetings, weekly informal meetings involving theSecretaries of State and Defense and NSA often are heldover breakfast or lunch, or via conference calls or securevideo teleconferences. Approximately 50 percent of thePC meetings are conducted using the SVTS. During 2006-07, meetings topics frequently included discussions ofthe overall strategies for Iraq, Afghanistan, the global waron terrorism, and dealing with North Korea, Iran, and

Sudan. Other issues that are time sensitive and involvecritical U.S. interests (such as the security situation inBaghdad and the plot to hijack airliners originating inEngland during the summer of 2006) also are likelyto be discussed at the PC level. In general, as theGeorge W. Bush administration progresses through itssecond term, there has been more involvement at thePC level on updating policies and honing and ensuringthe successful implementation, or follow-through,of existing policies rather than developing many newinitiatives.

Likewise, the Deputies Committee (DC) meetswhen necessary, often four or ve times a week, toreview PCC recommendations, deliberate issuesupon which the PCCs could not reach a consensus,

and decide what matters should be forwarded tothe PC. Like the PC, many of the DC meetings areconducted via SVTS. Issues worked during the last


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year in the Bush administration at the DC level parallelthose worked at the PC level. Like the PC during the

last year of the administrations rst term, the DC hasbeen more involved with re ning and ensuring thesuccessful implementation of existing policies ratherthan developing many new initiatives.

Issues forwarded to the PC include policyrecommendations made at the DC and PCC level, andpolicy issues upon which an interagency consensuscould not be reached at the PCC and DC levels (althoughsometimes President Bush prefers the PC to see an arrayof analyses and options rather than a single, consensusposition). In general, the DC seeks to review issue papersand policy options and recommendations provided byPCC level groups and pass them up to the PC duringthe following week.

During crisises, the PC, DC, and PCCs meet

frequently. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War,1999 Kosovo crisis, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks inSeptember 2001, and the conduct of military operationsin Afghanistan and Iraq, a typical day often included:

Departmental meetings with Secretaries orDeputy Secretaries in the early morning toreview developments, responsibilities,taskings, and policy matters related to eachdepartment.

In mid-morning, the DC meets, sometimesconducted via secure teleconferencing with seniorstaff and area/functional experts, to developinteragency positions on developments andnew policy issues. This DC meeting might befollowed immediately by a meeting of the DC

senior members (without supporting staff) todiscuss sensitive intelligence or policy issues.


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In late morning or early afternoon, the PC meetsto discuss the results and unresolved issues of

the DC, consider strategic policy directions,and determine what issues need to bebrought to the attention of the President.PC members may then meet with the President(who usually receives updates on the crisissituation from the NSA throughout the day).

In mid or late afternoon, the DC againmeets to discuss the implementation ofdecisions reached by the PC and President,and discuss the results of PCC meetingsthat have been held throughout the day.(Individual PCCs may meet more than oncea day during crisis periods.)

Individual members of the DC are likelyto have a late afternoon meeting with their

principal to confer about developments of theday, and a subsequent meeting with their staffsto discuss the days decisions, developments,and next steps. Depending upon thecircumstances of the day, the PC may have anadditional evening meeting and subsequentconsultation with the President.

This kind of high operational tempo may persist forseveral weeks or months, depending upon the durationof the crisis and the need to involve the President andcabinet level of cers on a daily basis.

9/11 and the subsequent missions of OperationENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan) and OperationIRAQI FREEDOM produced a policy decision tempo

that resulted in unusually frequent (from an historicalstandpoint) NSC and PC meetings. Due to thesimultaneity of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq,


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the evolving policies and operations related to theglobal war on terrorism (and domestic policy concerns

related to the establishment of the Department ofHomeland Security and potential domestic terroristthreats), the NSC and PC found themselves meetingon a regular, often daily, basis during the rstterm of President George W. Bush. The swiftnesswith which potential threats and circumstancescould change, and the complex, multiple, and oftenoverlapping or con icting policy and operationalissues, required regular review of mission outcomesand their implications for maintaining or altering policydecisions. The rapid pace of developments combinedwith the extensive senior government experience ofthe PC (Vice President Cheney as a former Secretaryof Defense, Secretary Powell as a former NSA andCJCS, and Secretary Rumsfeld as a previous Secretary

of Defense) meant that many policy problems wereidenti ed, assessed, and decided at the NSC or PC levelrather than being delegated to the DC or PCCs to bestaffed. Furthermore, the evolution of events in the

eld meant that PC decisions coordinated one daymight be modi ed in a discussion by a principal the nextday with President Bush or in a departmental meetingbecause of some new development. As such, membersof the Deputies Committee often had to work hard tokeep abreast of evolving decisions from the PC level,and strived to implement well-coordinated policiesacross departments and agencies.

Policy Coordination Committees and the PolicyProcess.

Policy Coordination Committees deal with arange of national security matters that cut across the


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responsibilities of executive branch departments andagencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy

toward Iraq or NATO expansion, or functional, suchas arms control agreements with Russia or terrorism inSouth Asia. PCC work is different than that performedin the departments or agencies. Departmental or agencyplanning focuses on achieving agency objectives on aregional and operational level. Coordination is focusedon departmental ways and means and is based uponinternal agency doctrine and processes.

Contentious issues are resolved internally atsenior levels. PCC planning is focused more onadvance planning at the political and strategic level.PCCs do the heavy lifting in analyzing policy issuesand developing policy options and recommendationsthat provide policymakers with exibility and arange of options that are politically acceptable and

minimize the risk of failure. Interagency groups alsomust develop policy options that advance U.S. intereststhrough coordinated actions often involving manydepartments and agencies. An effective interagencyprocess reduces the complexity of the policy decisionsand focuses the planning on how to make the missionsucceed. Accordingly, policy planning must integratedesired policy aims and synchronize the efforts of thedifferent departments and agencies.

Collaboration is central for success, but teamworkand unity is vulnerable to political risks, bureaucraticequities, and personal relationships. Because U.S.interests and foreign policy have tended to remainfairly stable from administration to administration,an informal policy consensus often exists across

agencies when dealing with routine matters. But,policy disagreements and turf battles are inevitablebecause of divergent political philosophies,


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different departmental objectives and priorities,disagreements about the dynamics or implications

of developing situations, or because departmentsare seeking to evolve or formulate new roles andmissions. Also, hard problems do not lend themselvesto easy solutions, and frequently there are genuinedifferences between departments over the best waysand objectives for dealing with a national securityproblem. Moreover, because regional experts tend todominate on overall policy approaches (even thoughthey may lack expertise on many functional issues),different interpretations of events or credibility issuesmay arise within the PCC group. These issues must beopenly addressed to enable the group to collaborateeffectively, re ne core policy issues, and achieve aconsensus policy document. As one former NSC staffmember observed, the easiest outcome to produce in

the interagency process is to prevent policy from beingmade.The operational dynamics of individual PCCs

vary according to the personalities (and, sometimes,personal agenda) of the individuals who are in chargeof, or participate in, them. In general, however, mostPCCs undertake a ve-part process when working on apolicy issue:

1. De ne the problem: This includes assessingwhat U.S. national interests and strategic objectives areinvolved, reviewing intelligence reports, and seekingto determine some understanding of the dynamics of thesituation (including what is known, what is assumed, andwhat is unknown) and the interests and motivations ofthe actors involved. Is there a consensus on the issues

at stake for the United States and the implicationsof acting or not acting? This part of the process alsoincludes identifying additional information and


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intelligence needs and levying requirements to theintelligence and diplomatic communities.

2. Clarify PCC processes and intragroup rulesof engagement: Develop broad principles to guidethe way the interagency group should think about aproblem and craft a strategy for addressing it.

3. Articulate policy objectives, assess options,and develop an overall strategy for implementingU.S. policy: Deliberations may include preventivestrategies, or strategies for responses to possibledevelopments as policies are implemented. Missionareas for the departments and agencies shouldbe clari ed and component strategies (includingidentifying capabilities and resource needs) developedthat, eventually, are integrated into a single strategicapproach. Strawman proposals are useful forclarifying departmental perspectives. Strategies

usually are required for consulting with friends andallies, and developing multilateral consensus onstrategic objectives and operational activities. Otherconsiderations include monitoring the implementationof complex, multidimensional activities (which mayinclude the activities of several departments), andanticipating transition dynamics as policies beginto produce expected and unanticipated effects.

4. Identify policy instruments and componentstrategies (including ways and means) to achievethe desired policy objectives: Operational planningmust be clari ed and coordinated among the agenciesinvolved, and integrated missions must be identi edand coordinated where appropriate. A process mustbe developed that steers around interagency and

bureaucratic roadblocks. The standard operatingprocedures in departments and agencies may havedif culty working with coordinated interagency plans


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and gaps may develop in implementation. PCCs mustseek ways to talk with operational-level staff to

determine potential problems and solicit suggestionsfor effective implementation.5. Draft an integrated policy document: Ideally,

this document should con rm the strategic approach,objectives, scope of effort and timelines, requirementsand preparatory actions, chains of command,communication, and responsibilities (independent andshared) and accountability for the departments. Italso should identify assets, resource, and logisticalrequirements. Mechanisms should be established forintegration at all levels as policies are implemented.Key judgments about the situation, the important policyissues, and recommendations should be identi edfor the Deputies and Principals Committees. TheDeputies and Principals need enough detail (but not

too much) to be able to understand the dynamics ofthe situation, the major issues at stake, and implicationsfor our national security. Depending upon thepreferences of the incumbent administration, the PCCmay be tasked to recommend a single policy optionor multiple options, and provide majority anddissenting positions.

Although regional or functional PCCs deal withissues unique to their area of responsibility, there area number of issues that most, if not all, PCCs nduseful to consider. These include assessments of:

Whether there is a compelling necessity foraction. Are there threats to vital (or critical orimportant) U.S. interests? Is there an imperative

for the United States to act? Are there viablealternatives to U.S. action?


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Desired U.S. objectives and the level ofcommitment to those objectives (by the

departments and agencies, Congress, and U.S.public). Are the objectives clear and directlylinked to U.S. interests?

The level of U.S. resolve in its policy commitmentsas perceived by the countries the policies aretargeted toward, as well as other states inthe region, allied, friendly, neutral and hostilestates. The PCCs also should consider how theU.S. Congress and the U.S. public are likelyto perceive the administrations resolve onproposed policies.

The capabilities and willingness of allies,friends, and neutrals to support U.S. policyobjectives and initiatives. Is there a consensusby key states or actors on the issue? What are

their national interests? To what extent willthey bene t or experience costs for supportingU.S. policy? What resources (political orotherwise) will they be willing to commit insupport of the policy objectives; are theywilling to act in a combined or coordinatedmanner?

The likely reaction of regional states, allies,friends, neutrals, or hostile states that might op-pose U.S. objectives. What are their calculationsof costs and risks versus bene ts to opposingthe United States?

The likely reaction of the United Nationsor other international organizations to U.S.objectives. What are their calculations of costs

versus bene ts to supporting or opposing theUnited States? Costs and risks in implementing the policy

versus costs and risks of inaction.


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Supporting or opposing legal authorities (e.g.,international law, U.N. resolutions).

The effects of stalled policy initiatives, and theadministrations willingness to escalate (e.g.,incentives, in uence, coercion, etc.) to achievepolicy objectives.

Receptivity to considerations of alternativepolicies, and strategies for achieving the policyobjectives in the face of stalled initiatives.

The inherent limitations in trying to in uence thecourse of events in achieving policy objectives.

The effects of policy actions over time, includingunintended consequences.

Expected costs and bene ts for those depart-ments and agencies involved.

Some policy issues are even more complex and

involve multidimensional assessments of allies andfriends, neutrals, international organizations, andaffected populations. For example, policy planningfor peace operations, stabilization and reconstruction,or humanitarian missions would include considerationof issues related to:

Diplomatic collaboration to solicit participantsand build coalitions for delivering humanitarianassistance and deploying military forces (ifrequired).

The role of regional groups and organizations. The role of the United Nations or other

international organization. Cease- re/disengagement/stabilization in the

crisis area.

Prisoner exchange between warring parties. Weapons control/demobilization. Demining.


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Humanitarian relief. Refugee/displaced person return.

Internal political cooperation. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Antiof cial corruption/illicit criminal opera-

tions. Strengthening local or regional institutions or

organizations. Management of factions/actors in the crisis area

with political objectives incompatible with, orin direct opposition to U.S. objectives and whowill seek to thwart U.S. actions.

Political transition/elections/democratization. Rule of law/police/criminal justice. Atrocities/abuses/war crimes prosecution. Civil and social order. National reconciliation.

Economic reform and restoration/private in- vestment. Public diplomacy. Flash point management.

Likewise, a PCC dealing with trade issues wouldinvolve considerations related to domestic and foreigneconomic and political issues, international laws andorganizations, and the concerns of departments andagencies involved.

Managing the process by which a PCC conductsbusiness is complicated given the range andcomplexity of issues addressed. Lessons learned inthe PCC process for promoting collaboration andhigh performance include maintaining a focus on

a high conceptual level. This includes havingparticipants support the following objectives:


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1. Share an understanding of principles, goals, andpriorities.

Bureaucratic interests must be represented,but remember that the nal objective is goodpolicy.

Fully understand the policy context andpreferences of their department principals, aswell as those represented by others aroundthe table.

Expand individual frames of referenceto gain an understanding of diplomatic,political, military, economic, humanitarian,developmental, and legal perspectives onthe policy problem at hand.

Seek a broad situation assessment, utilizinga wide range of intelligence, diplomatic,allies and friends, and nongovernmental

organization (NGO) sources. Search for ambiguous assumptions andinformation gaps.

Focus on a realistic time horizon. Clarify the tough value trade-offs in the

policy decisions. Match commitments with political will.

2. Support a prudent consensus approach. Agree on an effective process plan. Strengthen interagency team identity. Control internal politics among team mem-

bers. Foster competitive and constructive de-

bate.

Prepare well thought out issue or policypositions backed up by data, examples, orpersuasive points of argument.


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Forge a consensus approach for action.Internally, bring together opposing views

and develop a consolidated position withoutdiluting or ignoring important issues.Externally, build support with thosesharing similar perspectives, and bring insupporting material from outside actorsnot directly involved in the meetings butwho can affect nal acceptance of policydecisions (e.g., congressmen, staffers, tradeinterests, NGOs, etc.). This considerationshould be weighed against the desiresof higher-level policy groups who preferto have multiple analyses and options tocontemplate in order to determine theirown policy recommendations. Awarenessof the preferences and operating styles of

senior policy groups is crucial for workingeffectively at the PCC level. Keep your boss informed of developments;

dont let him or her be blindsided in a higher-level policy forum.

3. Maintain vigilance over intra-group manage-ment.

Be well prepared on substantive issues,legal constraints, and the bureaucratic/policy preferences of your principal andthe other agencies represented.

Adjust and self-correct for changingconditions or ineffective group practices.

Manage time, including competing commit-

ments and responsibilities, in order toadvance the analytical and decision processand produce required policy products ontime.


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Seek to be constructive and be willing tocompromise and make trade offs.

Participants in such meetings are not immuneto considerations of their professionalreputations and careers. Professionalism andthe constructive handling of disagreementsare important to successful operations.

Keep pacestay ahead of the crisisenvironment.

Anticipate media/press issues and congres-sional concerns.

Meetings in response to crisis conditions arelikely to experience additional complications.Crises are characterized by fast moving events,pressure to act quickly to minimize damage orprevent crisis escalation, partial and sometimes

confusing or con icting information or intelligence,and the complexities of multitasking and coordinatingthe activities of a wide range of actors and interestedparties. Moreover, in crisis situations similar to the post-9/11 period in the George W. Bush rst term, PCCsmay nd that most policy decisions are handled at thePC and DC level. The PCC groups may nd that theyare dealing with regularly changing higher level policydirectives, uncertainty about policy deliberations anddecisions, and limited representative authority fromtheir department to make decisions because the rapidpace of developments keeps most serious decisionissues at the PC or DC level.

For the individual, the keys to being an effectivemember of a crisis management team are: (1) exibility in

thinking, (2) maintaining involvement, (3) maintainingalertness, (4) maintaining a strategic focus, (5)excellent writing skills, and (6) being unbiased.


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Flexibility in thinking: The preparation processfor this annual report involves interviewing a

range of experienced, senior U.S. Governmentof cials who have served on or supportedprincipals in high level policy groups. Theone attribute most frequently mentioned bythese senior of cials over the years as neededfor working effectively in interagency groups is

exibility in thinking. Participants must be ableto understand the concerns and perspectivesof other participants, quickly recognize newproblems, and be creative in developingnew approaches for dealing with problems.Reaching a consensus decision does not meansettling for the lowest common denominator,but instead balancing competing concerns toachieve the best policy recommendations for

U.S. interests. Participants also must be able tounderstand the viewpoints of other participantsand agencies, and capable of reframing theirperspectives on analyses and issues as events,actors, and interagency needs change. A rmly

xed view of the world and U.S. Governmentpriorities becomes an obstacle to findingcreative and effective solutions to complex,multidimensional problems.

Maintaining involvement: Effective participa-tion in working groups includes being anactive team member, making insightful (but notredundant) contributions at meetings, knowingyour departments positions and equities, keepingsenior of cials in your department informed,

staying abreast of the latest developments (e.g.,reading the intelligence reports and embassycables), doing a share of the drafting of papers,


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and being reliable (i.e., producing what you sayyou are going to do). This skill also includes

being able to contribute to effective meetingdynamics in often unstructured situations,including supporting processes that move theanalytical and policy issue paper writing processalong expeditiously, and contribute to producinga high quality written document in a timelyfashion.

Maintaining alertness: Although self-evidentat a super cial level, the day-to-day demandsof working at the NSC or on interagency groupscan be grueling, often 12-14 hours a day, 7 daysa week. NSC Directors frequently work on 3-5PCCs simultaneously, sometimes workingmultiple taskings from each group in additionto their normal NSC staff responsibilities.

Moreover, NSC Senior Directors also haveresponsibility for the 3-6 Directors who workunder their supervision. Working in supportof the President requires having physical andmental stamina. Crises that last weeks andmonths are even more physically and mentallydemanding. They require perseverance anda willingness to spend long hours attendingmeetings and doing follow up work (as in thecase, for example, of the Counter-TerrorismSecurity Group PCC which meets twice daily).

Maintaining a strategic focus: Althoughindividual working group members normallyrepresent individual agencies, they must be ableto concentrate on strategic interests and broad

objectives, and not get bogged down in tacticalor trivial issues that are the responsibilitiesof the policy implementing departments.


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They must keep in mind that they are writingrecommendations for presidential action that

must serve the interests of all agencies as wellas the nation. Participants must be able tosuccinctly identify the critical central issuesin frequently volatile, uncertain, complex, andambiguous situations.

Excellent writing skills: The typical policy issuepaper written for the NSA or the President isonly a couple of pages. PCC level issue paperson complex topics are only a few pages long.Working group members must be able towrite short, well-organized documents whichclearly and succinctly describe the policy issuebeing considered, why the issue is importantenough to warrant presidential attention, andwhat options the President has for dealing

with the situation. Participants must beable to think and write at the presidentiallevel and present concise, clear analysis andarguments. A clearly written, well-organizedissue paper allows for more effective use of asenior policymakers time.

Being unbiased: Being unbiased means comingto working groups without personal agendasor predetermined, in exible positions.Effective participation on working groupsrequires the ability to be objective about differentperspectives and aspects of issues, andbeing able to develop balanced analysesand recommendations that take into accountthe many concerns and equities of the

interagency. Wri tten recommendations forthe President must clearly present facts anddata, what is known, unknown or assumed,


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without partiality. Participants also must beable to step back from the crisis periodically to

see if interests, dynamics, or its strategic contexthave changed. Effective PCCs must be able toperiodically question assumptions establishedearlier in the crisis management cycle.

Department of State.

Under the Constitution, the executive branch andthe Congress have responsibilities for foreign policy.President George Washingtons rst cabinet includedSecretary of State Thomas Jefferson. The Secretary ofState is fourth in line of succession to the presidency.Within the executive branch, the Department of Stateis the lead foreign affairs agency and the Secretaryof State is the Presidents principal foreign policy

advisor. The Department also supports the foreignaffairs activities of other U.S. Government entities,including the Department of Commerce and the Agencyfor International Development.

As the lead foreign affairs agency, State has theprimary role in:

Leading interagency coordination in developingand implementing foreign policy;

Managing the foreign affairs budget and otherforeign affairs resources;

Leading and coordinating U.S. representationabroad, and conveying U.S. foreign policyto foreign governments and internationalorganizations through U.S. embassies andconsulates in foreign countries and

diplomatic missions to international organ-izations;


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Conducting negotiations and concludingagreements and treaties on issues ranging from

trade to nuclear weapons; and, Coordinating and supporting internationalactivities of other U.S. agencies and of cials.

The Department of State, like many other cabinetdepartments, is a centralized organization, with theSecretary of State at the helm. Beneath the Secretaryin the senior hierarchy are other principalstheDeputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Counselor ofthe Department. In rank order, assistant secretaries forregional bureaus follow.

Although the Department of State is the leadgovernment foreign affairs agency, it does not dictateforeign policy for the U.S. Government. Because somany executive branch departments have international

programs, there is an inherent difference in perspectiveat interagency meetings. Secretary Powell, in histestimony before Congress on April 23, 2003, addressedthe phenomenon in this way:

With respect to whats going on within the administration,its not the rst time I have seen discussions within theadministration between one department or another. I have

seen four straight administrations at a senior level; andthus it has been, and thus it has always been, and thusit should be. There should be tension within the nationalsecurity team, and from that tension, arguments aresurfaced for the President. And the one who decides,the one who makes the foreign policy decisions for theUnited States of America, is not the Secretary of State,or the Secretary of Defense or the National SecurityAdvisor. Its the President.

In conducting international affairs, the Secretaryattends cabinet meetings, NSC meetings chaired bythe NSA, and PCs. When the Secretary is traveling


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security-related incident causing serious injury, lossof life, or signi cant damage of property at or related to

a U.S. mission abroad. In brief, ARBs investigate andto make recommendations. Retired and active dutyrepresentatives from State, the FBI, CIA, and the privatesector served on the two boards.

Among the recommendations from the ARBs chairedby Crowe was an appropriation of $1.4 billion a year forat least 10 years for embassy construction and repair.Albright writes in her autobiography:

By the time I left of ce, we had gained agreementfor appropriations close to the level recommended byAdmiral Crowe, an agreement that was critical because wehad learned that the dangers to our personnel were nolonger localized but global. There was no such thing asa low-risk post. If we had soft spots, we could expectour enemies to exploit them.

Below this level, there are numerous otherinteragency groups. They may meet recurrently or just once. After Saddam Husseins invasion of Kuwaitand Operation DESERT STORM, there were a series ofinteragency sessions on a wide range of U.S. policyissues in the Gulf. Similarly, during the Clintonadministration, the State Department called a one-timeinteragency meeting on Lebanon when the issue of thepassport restriction on American citizens was underreview. Of cers at the GS-15 or equivalent rank wereasked to attend from a wide array of agenciesDoD,Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), CIA, andthe like. Likewise, a variety of interagency meetingswere held before, during, and after Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM. The purpose of such meetings may notbe to decide the issue, but to exchange views and laygroundwork for issues expected to be considered byPCCs, DCs, and PCs. Staff work for such meetings


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may be narrowly focused, and handled even by asingle of ce in a bureau.

One State Department of ce created explicitly forthe purpose of promoting interagency collaborationon policy development and execution is the Of ce ofthe Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization(S/CRS). Established on August 5, 2004, the mission ofS/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S.Government civilian capacity to prevent or preparefor post-conflict situations, and to help stabilizeand reconstruct societies in transition from con ictor civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable pathtoward peace, democracy and a market economy. 10 The State Departments authority for this missionis derived from National Security PresidentialDirective-44 (NSPD-44) concerning the Managementof Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction

and Stabilization which directs the Secretary ofState to coordinate and lead integrated United StatesGovernment efforts, involving all U.S. Departmentsand Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare,plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstructionactivities. 11 Working under the authority of NSPD-44,S/CRS has established a number of sub-PCC workinggroups to plan, prepare, and conduct stabilization andreconstruction missions. The of ce works with theU.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Justice, Treasury, the Department of Labor, Of ceof Management and Budget and other governmentagencies to devise interagency organizationalstructures, identify resource requirements and prepare

interagency mobilization plans, coordinate political-military planning for stabilization and reconstruction


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operations, conduct decision support exercises andprepare implementation strategies.

The staff work done for the Secretary of State and hisor her principals for interagency meetings is a complexand highly organized undertaking. The Of ce of theExecutive Secretary (S/ES) is key. S/ES is located onStates seventh oor and is comprised of some 175-plus employees. It is responsible for coordinatingState Departments internal operations, liaisingbetween the bureaus and principals, running the StateDepartments 24\7 operations center, organizing andstaf ng the Secretarys foreign travel, and liaisingbetween the NSC and other executive branchdepartments. More speci cally, S/ES is responsiblefor tasking papers within the State Department forinteragency meetings involving the principals. S/ES sets the due dates for these papers in line with the

time of the meetings. An Executive Secretary and fourDeputy Executive Secretaries lead S/ES. The ExecutiveSecretary traditionally is a very senior, career ForeignService of cer.

The relationship between States Executive Secretaryand Executive Secretaries in the National SecurityCouncil and DoD is very important. It is often throughtheir communications, both verbally and in writingthat noti cation of high-level meetings is made. StateExecutive Secretaries also may receive debriefs fromtheir counterparts on decisions from more informalmeetings or discussions among the Secretary of State,Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor.

One aspect of the State Department which sets itapart in the interagency process is its own special

composition. In his memoirs, James Baker, formerSecretary of State under Bush 41, wrote that,


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Without a doubt, the State Department has the mostunique bureaucratic culture Ive ever encountered.In most of the federal government, the work is guidedby a small number of political appointees who worktogether with civil servicethe career bureaucracy that isdesignated to be above politics and provide institutionalmemory and substantive expertise. But at State there isalso the Foreign Service, the elite corps of foreign affairsof cers who staff the Departments country and functionaldesks in Washington and our embassies abroad. 12

At interagency meetings, the State Departmentrepresentatives, whether in support of a Principal oron their own, bring to the table a wealth of on theground, in-depth experiences in dealing with foreigngovernments and cultures from around the globe,which helps frame their recommendations andconclusions. In addition, by virtue of States positionas the lead government agency in foreign affairs,the State Department has an unusual breadth ofinformation to tapfrom all agencies. In his memoirs,Secretary Shultz wrote that,

As secretary, I could see that I had at hand an extraordinaryinformation machine: it could produce a ow of reportson what was happening in real time, background onwhat had been done before and how that had worked,analyses of alternative courses of action, and ideason what might be done. The Department is a greatengine of diplomacy for the secretary to use in carryingout the presidents foreign policy. 13

Department of Defense.

To understand and have an appreciation of DoDs

role in the interagency process, it is instructive to lookbrie y at DoDs history and how it evolved into theorganization it is today.


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One should remember that the department didnot exist, nor did the JCS receive statutory authority,

until the late 1940s. Up until and through World WarII, there were two military departmentsWar andNavy. Both the Secretary of War and Secretary of theNavy reported directly to the President. Con icting judgments often arose between the Army and Navyover critical issues, including allocation of resources,strategic priorities, and command arrangements.Disagreements sometimes affected how militaryoperations were conducted. To coordinate effortsduring World War II, some 75 interservice agencies andinterdepartmental committees were formed. These adhoc arrangements worked, but only because of thenations vast resources were we able to compensate formistakes, inef ciencies, and internal divisions.

The National Security Act of 1947 created a

National Military Establishment (NME) headed bya Secretary of Defense. The three secretaries of themilitary departments (including the Secretary ofthe newly formed Air Force) retained their powers,subject only to the authority of the Secretary of Defenseto exercise general direction, authority, andcontrol. The newly formed NSC, chaired by thePresident, included the Secretaries of State, Defense,Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of theNational Security Resources Board. During this nascentphase of the NSC, the militarys perspectives were wellrepresented by occupying four of the seven NSC seats.

The NME was replaced by DoD under provisionsof the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act.The 1949 Amendment also increased the powers of

the Secretary of Defense, diminished those of themilitary departments, and provided for a Chairmanwith no direct military command function to presideover the JCS (and the Service Chiefs as a corporate


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body). Moreover, with this amendment, the secretariesof the military departments lost their membership on

the NSC.There were two legislative acts during theEisenhower administration (1953 and 1958) thatconsolidated more authority in the hands of theSecretary of Defense. Given President Eisenhowersmilitary background, it should be no surprise that hewas a rm believer in centralized control and a clearlyde ned chain of command. A fairly strong Secretaryof Defense, together with a weakly structured JCS thatfunctioned as a committee, prevailed through the 1960s(mainly the Robert McNamara years) and the 1970s.It was not until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986that the military gained a greater voice in interagencyaffairs. The Act provided, among other things, fora stronger and more active CJCS who would be the

principal military advisor to the President, the NSC,and Secretary of Defense (as compared to a Chairmanwho previously represented the views of the fourChiefs of the Services). Goldwater-Nichols alsosigni cantly increased the powers of the combatantcommanders and clari ed the chain of command fromthe President to the Secretary of Defense to the uni edcommanders. This ascension of the commanders, ineffect, further weakened the in uence of the individualservice secretaries and chiefs.

Today, DoD is a centralized organization withpower clearly resting in the hands of the Secretary ofDefense and, secondarily, in the hands of the CJCS. TheSecretary of Defense, together with the Commander-in-Chief, epitomizes the principle of civilian control

of the military. Ultimate authority within DoD restswith the Secretary. The three Service Secretaries reportdirectly to him, as do the senior civilian of cials in the


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Of ce of the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS, who isthe senior ranking member of the U.S. armed forces

but by law does not exercise military command,also reports to the Secretary of Defense. While theuni ed combatant commanders, by statute, reportto the Secretary of Defense, by practice they clear (orat least discuss) all positions with the CJCS prior tocommunicating with the Secretary. The JCS refers tothe Joint Staffs of the Service Chiefs, while the Joint Staffrefers to the staff who work directly for the Chairman(CJCS), not for the JCS.

The Secretary of Defense and CJCS are the primaryDefense players in the interagency arena. Theyrepresent the Department at NSC meetings chairedby the President, and at PC meetings chaired by theNSA. Their deputies, the Deputy Secretary of Defenseand Vice CJCS, attend the DC meetings (throughout

the rst Bush and the Clinton administrations,however, the Secretary of Defense was represented atthe DC meetings by the Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy).

At the staff level, virtually all the work in DoDfor interagency deliberations is done in the Policyorganization for OSD and in the J-5 directorate (Strategy,Plans and Policy) for the Joint Staff. Attendees atthe PCC meetings and lower lever interagencygroups are Assistant Secretaries, Deputy AssistantSecretaries, and GS-15s from Policy and one- or two-star ag of cers and action of cers (O-5s and O-6s)from J-5. With regard to homeland defense and defensesupport to civil authorities (DSCA) issues, the AssistantSecretary for Homeland Defense is the single point of

contact for the many directorates and agencies withinDoD. It is uncommon for representatives from theuni ed commands or the individual services to attend


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interagency meetings. The possible exception might beif a combatant commander is speci cally invited by

the President (or NSA) to attend a meeting. The JointStaff typically represents the combatant commandersin interagency meetings. People from the Joint Staffare quite protective of the fact that they work to ful llthe statutory responsibilities of the CJCS as the principalmilitary advisor to the President, the Secretary ofDefense, and the NSC.

Some Presidents have preferred to hear acoordinated DoD position while others wished to hearcounterarguments and multiple options. Especiallysince Goldwater-Nichols, the militarys views should besubmitted separately from OSDs. Moreover, PresidentBush, in general, prefers to hear all views, includingdisagreements between the Secretary of Defenseand the CJCS when circumstances allow. However,

crisis conditions may affect the Presidents willingnessto pursue extensive debates on competing options. Forexample, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Secretaryof Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense expressedopinions at a strategy session of senior Presidentialadvisors. At the conclusion of the meeting, thePresidents Chief of Staff pulled the two participantsaside and admonished, The President will expectone person to speak for the Department of Defense. 14 Some DoD of cials believe strongly that if the OSDcivilians and the military have a coordinated positionand speak as one voice, the Departments views carrymore weight, and DoD of cials can be more effective inthe interagency process.

Another example of differing voices occurred

during the initial deliberations in August 1990after Iraq invaded Kuwait. After a meeting with thePresident, then Secretary of Defense Cheney chastised


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General Powell, then CJCS, for offering an opinion thatthe Secretary perceived as political advice. Colin,

he said, youre the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.Youre not Secretary of State. Youre not the NationalSecurity Advisor anymore. And youre not Secretaryof Defense. So stick to military matters. 15

This is not to say, however, that military of cersshould not speak at interagency meetings. Theyshould speak. They are obligated to give their bestmilitary advice. Often, military of cers are criticized fornot speaking out more forcefully. Their reluctance tospeak might be because they do not want to be viewed(especially at the lower of cer levels) as presentingthe views of the CJCS. Another reason for theirreluctance may be personality driven, i.e., a certainamount of intimidation by the senior civilians aroundthe table. Nevertheless, some senior ag of cers believe

strongly that military of cers also should commenton nonmilitary matters. They argue that militaryof cers bring a strategic perspective to interagencygroups that can help clarify (or question) assumptions,identify con icting interests, or raise questions aboutunintended second or third order effects of proposedpolicies. One former DC participant with extensivegovernment experience recommended that militaryof cers educate themselves more broadly on nationalsecurity issues (including resource and economicissues, homeland defense and security, intrastatecon ict, refugees, and migration, etc.) to be able tobetter understand how military roles and missions mayaffect, or are affected by, such traditionally nonmilitarypolicy matters that increasingly involve or constrain

military planning.Even so, it is important that the proper militaryadvice be given (with of cers clearly delineatingwhether they are representing the position of the


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Chairman or their own expertise). Most of thecivilians at interagency meetings have little or no

experience with military operations. They generally donot have an appreciation for what happens behind thescenes of any successful military operation. Withoutgetting into the weeds, military of cers need to explainwhat could be accomplished with the use of militaryforces, and what the limitations are. At the sametime, the military should expect at the conclusion ofthese deliberations to have a clear set of objectives andparameters within which to operate. It is critical thatDoD, and especially the uniformed military, be fullyengaged in debates taking place in the White Houseby civilians when use of the military instrument ofnational policy is being considered.

Traditionally, DoD performs a secondary (or sup-port) role to States lead in foreign policy, but plays an

active role at interagency meetings in determining thetools of foreign policy. From DoDs perspective, its threeprimary concerns are possible uses of military forces,expenditure of Defense resources, and preventinga situation from deteriorating to the point that itrequires military intervention. During the current waron terrorism with military operations in Afghanistanand Iraq (and supporting anti-terrorist military actionsby other countries), however, DoD plays a more equalrole in foreign policy discussions because of coalitionmilitary considerations, and political-military andsecurity problems in the two countries. Historically,though, DoD frequently has resisted the involvementof U.S. troops because situations were assessed to notconstitute a proper military mission or there are other

alternatives available (i.e., other countries militaryforces, UN, NGOs). The Departments position insuch meetings often is to withhold use of U.S. forces


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unless they, and only they, possess the capabilityto perform a function that protects or promotes U.S.

security interests.Ultimately the decision to use military forcesmay be based upon political interests and not DoDs judgments about the best use of combatant forces.For example, in the days leading up to the decisionto deploy U.S. forces into Somalia in 1992 to assisthumanitarian operations responding to widespreadfamine, the combatant commander of the U.S. CentralCommand argued about the deleterious impact onmilitary readiness for dealing with potential threatsto higher level U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf andbroader Middle East region. Nevertheless, the politicaldecision was that the acute humanitarian and U.S.international leadership interests at the time requiredU.S. intervention and overrode DoDs concerns about

the impact on traditional mission capabilities.The second frequent DoD concern is the expenditureof resources. Policymakers rarely consider the cost ofoperations directed by the NSC. This usually is due tothe urgency of taking action or a tendency to ignore (oravoid) the fact that ultimately someone has to pay thebill. There also is a common belief that DoD possessesall the resources. While it is true that Defensesbudget is many times larger than States, there arelaws and regulations on precisely how and for whatpurposes DoDs money may be spent. So, just as useof military forces is not necessarily the best solution,careful attention needs to be paid to the cost of actionstaken through the interagency process, and to who willpay it.

The third concern is preventing a situation fromdeteriorating to the point that it requires militaryintervention. DoD plays an active role in interagencymeetings shaping the strategic situation in many


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regions of the world. DoD strives to ensure that U.S.Government policy and resources are adequately

coordinated to shape the environment and obtain resultsfavorable to U.S. interests. Working closely with theDepartment of State, USAID, and other agencies, DoDsinvolvement in regional programs can be the catalystfor policy changes that could avert future militaryintervention. A pertinent example was DoDs active rolein changing policy regarding Colombia. Until 2002,U.S. policy was based upon helping Colombia reduceits drug production. After 9/11, DoD lobbied hard fora change in the policy and was successful in gettinga PC to authorize the development of a new NSPDfor Colombia. DoD led the effort to produce NSPD 18on November 2002in effect changing the Colombiapolicy from counterdrug to counter narco-terrorism.This policys immediate impact was strengthening the

Colombian government and avoiding potential securityproblems that could have triggered a request for moremilitary assets.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have broadened thescope of DoDs contacts, roles, and missions in theinteragency arena. In response to the attacks, DoDapproved the concept of Joint and InteragencyCoordination Groups (JIACG) to improve interagencycooperation and improve operational effectivenessfor all Regional Combatant Commands, Joint ForcesCommand (JFCOM), Transportation Command(TRANSCOM), Special Operations Command(SOCOM), and Strategic Command (STRATCOM). JIACGs are tailored to meet the requirements andchallenges of each Combatant Commanders Area of

Responsibility (AOR), and may include representativesfrom a wide range of U.S. Government agencies, theintelligence community, and even NGOs such as theAmerican Red Cross.


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The JIACG concept seeks to establish operationalconnections between civilian and military departments

and agencies that will improve planning andcoordination within the government. 16 The JIACGis intended to be a multifunctional, advisoryelement that represents the civilian departments andagencies and facilitates information sharing across theinteragency community. It provides regular, timely,and collaborative day-to-day working relationshipsbetween civilian and military operational planners. JIACGs coordinate where DoD assets need to be ona day to day basis, and with regard to contingencyplanning. JIACGs support Joint Planning Groups, JointOperations Groups, Interagency Coordination Groups,and Joint Support Cells. JIACG functions include:

Participating in combatant command staff crisisplanning and assessment.

Advising the combatant command staff oncivilian agency campaign planning. Working civilian-military campaign planning

issues. Providing civilian agency perspectives during

military operational planning activities andexercises.

Presenting unique civilian agency approaches,capabilities & limitations to the militarycampaign planners.

Providing vital links to Washington civilianagency campaign planners.

Arranging interfaces for a number of usefulagency crisis planning activities.

Conducting outreach to key civilian international

and regional contacts.


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The Intelligence Community.

The primary role of the intelligence communityis to provide information that will help policymakersunderstand the elements and dynamics of the varioussituations they are dealing with. Information providedby the Director of National Intelligence, CIA,Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National SecurityAgency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency,National Reconnaissance Of ce, and other intelligencecommunity components provides analysis about whatis happening on the ground, what is the nature of thegeographic area of concern, who are the actors, whatare their dispositions, and what are their likelyintentions. The latter is the most dif cult analysis forthe intelligence community to produce and often isthe most contentious.

The Of ce of the Director of National Intelligence(ODNI) was established in December 2004 throughthe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Actof 2004. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI),who must be con rmed by the U.S. Senate, does notserve as the head of any of the sixteen agencies withinthe U.S. intelligence community, but establishesobjectives and priorities for the intelligence communityand manages and directs tasking of collection,analysis, production, and dissemination of nationalintelligence. 17 The DNI approves requirements forcollection and analysis, including requirementsresponding to the needs of policymakers and otherintelligence consumers. The DNI also has responsibilityfor developing and executing the overall budget for the

National Intelligence Program (NIP) and providesadvisory tasking to intelligence elements outside of theNIP. The DNI has the authority to establish national


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intelligence centers as necessary and is responsiblefor the management of the Intelligence Community

and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) whichis accountable for mid-term and long-term strategicanalysis and the production of National IntelligenceEstimates. The DNI also is responsible for ensuringaccurate all-source intelligence, competitive analysis,and that alternative views are brought to the attentionof policymakers.

Since the establishment of the ODNI in 2004 andthe appointment of its rst director in April 2005,DNI representatives have assumed the role of primaryintelligence support to the President and the NSCinteragency system. For example, the DNI is now thestatutory intelligence advisor to the National SecurityCouncil, replacing the DCIA. The DNI serves on thePC, and likewise, the DNI Principal Deputy Director

serves on the Deputies Committee. However, theDCIA and DDCIA attend NSC, PC and DC meetings(respectively) when appropriate for CIA relatedintelligence matters. All policy statements related tothe intelligence community are vetted through theODNI.

Established to oversee and direct the implementa-tion of the National Intelligence Program, the ODNIserves as an interface between the Intelligence Commu-nity and policymakers. Most intelligence taskers arerouted through the ODNI to ensure proper coordina-tion, although nished intelligence products often movedirectly from each agency to NSC members and otherpolicymakers. Many other responsibilities and functionsof intelligence community components (such as the

CIA) have not changed with the establishment ofthe ODNI. Of note, though, the ODNI now producesthe Presidents Daily Brief, with input from across


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the Community. Whenever covert operationsissues are being considered, the DCIA or DDCIA are

involved because the CIA retains its responsibility asthe executive agency responsible for covert operations.Including representatives from the various agencies

in the intelligence community in PCCs or other policyplanning groups is critical because reviewing existingintelligence information and determining requirementsfor additional intelligence collection and analysis shouldbe one of the rst steps in considering national securityissues. Analysis from the intelligence communitywill help decisionmakers better understand theactual conditions (political, social, economic, military,transportation, communications, public health, etc.) inother countries, the capabilities of groups or countriesin the area, the motivations and likely intentionsof leaders, the interests and capabilities of other

stakeholders, and what the potential threats are toU.S. interests and personnel both abroad and withinthe United States. The intelligence community alsocan provide assessments of the likely effects (nearand long term) of proposed courses of action onspeci c individuals, groups, or national and regionalpopulations. However, remember that you will neverget all the information you want or feel that you need.The intelligence community is highly capable, but notomniscient.

An example of intelligence support to theinteragency is the National Counterterrorism Center(NCTC). The NCTC is responsible for integratingand analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorismand counterterrorism (CT) and conducting strategic

operational planning by integrating all appropriateinstruments of national power. The purpose ofthe coordinating role of the NCTC is to ensure


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intelligence services) are likely to help or hinder theimplementation of policies. The involvement of the

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet (July 1997- July 2004), with Israeli and Palestinian security serviceson security issues in a possible peace agreement re ectshow intelligence sometimes has a direct involvementin the implementation of U.S. policy. If directed bythe President, the CIA also can be used to implementforeign policy through covert action.

Homeland Security Council Organization. 18

In response to the 9/11 attacks and the continuingterrorist threats to the United States, President Bushestablished the Homeland Security Council (HSC) inOctober 2001 and a new Department of HomelandSecurity in March 2003. Established on October 8,

2001, the HSC serves as the mechanism for ensuringcoordination of homeland security-related activitiesof executive departments and agencies and effectivedevelopment and implementation of homeland securitypolicies. 19 The members of the Council include thePresident, the Vice President, the Secretary of HomelandSecurity, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary ofDefense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Healthand Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation,the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,the Director of National Intelligence, the Director ofthe Of ce of Management and Budget, the Assistantto the President for Homeland Security andCounterterrorism (APHS/CT), the Chief of Staff to thePresident, and the Chief of Staff to the Vice President.

The Assistant to the President for National SecurityAffairs and the Counsel to the President are invitedto attend all meetings of the HSC. The Secretary of


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State and the Chairman of the JCS (or Vice CJCS) haveregularly attended HSC meetings during the Bush

administration, and the Secretary of Agriculture, theSecretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, theSecretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, theSecretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of theEnvironmental Protection Agency, the Assistant tothe President for Economic Policy, and the Assistantto the President for Domestic Policy are invited toattend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. Theheads of other executive departments and agenciesand other senior of cials are invited to attend Councilmeetings when appropriate.

The HSC meets at the Presidents direction and in thelast year normally has met about bimonthlyalthoughmore frequently when events and issues dictate. Forexample, the HSC met daily in response to the plot to

hijack passenger airliners originating in England duringthe summer of 2006. When the President is absentfrom a meeting of the Council, at the Presidentsdirection, the Vice President may preside. The APHS/CT is responsible for determining the agenda, ensuringthat necessary papers are prepared, and recordingCouncil actions and Presidential decisions. Like theNational Security Advisor in matters of nationalsecurity, the APHS/CT serves as the Presidentskey homeland security and counterterrorism advisorin the White House; Frances Townsend leads theHSC staff, and also co-leads, along with the NSA, theNSCs Combating Terrorism Strategy directorate.The APHS/CT conducts regular sessions with HSCprincipals as well as chairing frequent meetings of the

HSC staff and representatives from the NSC. Currentlythe HSC staff conducts the day-to-day managementof homeland security affairs for the White House and


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numbers approximately 40 policy positions includingdetailees and assignees from the U.S. Secret Service and

other Department of Homeland Security agencies, DoD,the FBI, the Department of Health and Human Services,and individuals assigned from other executive branchagencies.

The HSC and the Policy Process.

The primary role of the HSC and the APHS/CT is to advise the President on homeland securityand counterterrorism matters. Some national securitycommentators contend there is not a discernible dif-ference between national security and homeland secur-itythat one ows into the other. If national securityfocuses on protecting U.S. interests around the world,homeland security begins at the nations waters edge

and protects our interests internally from terroristthreats, presumably emanating from abroad. Asde ned in the Presidents National Strategy for HomelandSecurity (July 2002),20 homeland security is a concertednational effort to prevent terrorist attacks within theUnited States, reduce Americans vulnerability toterrorism, and minimize the damage and recoverfrom attacks that do occur. In the years since 9/11,the HSC has taken an all hazards approach to itsmission of protecting the U.S. homeland from harm,and homeland security programs focus on activitieswithin the United States and its territories, or onactivities in support of domestically-based systemsand processes. While homeland security concerns andnational security concerns both encompass threats to

the United States, homeland security includes notonly issues pertaining to attacks within the UnitedStates by foreign interests or factions, but also attacks


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perpetrated by domestic groups not af liated withexternal organizations or nations. Homeland security

also addresses circumstances that occur within U.S.borders, such as pandemic in uenza, and responses tonational disasters and emergencies such as HurricanesKatrina and Rita that struck the U.S. Gulf coast inAugust and September 2005. Thus, while the NSCaddresses activities outside of the United States andcombating terrorism overseas, at a minimum, nationalsecurity and homeland security have large areas ofoverlapping responsibilities. This is particularlyevident when examining the make-up of the NSC andthe HSC.

A comparison of NSC and HSC organizations revealsthat all 11 members (or statutory advisors or frequentsubstantive invitees) of the NSC are of cial HSCmembers (the President, the Vice President, the Secretary

of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director ofNational Intelligence) or invited participants (theSecretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, the Chiefof Staff to the President, the Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security, the White House Counsel, theAssistant to the President for Economic Policy, and theDirector of the Of ce of Management and Budget). Atthe staff level, some directorates of the NSC (such asthat under the DAP/DNSA for Combating Terrorism)have daily contact with HSC directorates. These dualresponsibilities between the NSC and the HSC illustratethe post 9/11 evolution and overlap of homelandsecurity and more traditional international nationalsecurity affairs. One result is that President Bush hasheld several formal joint NSC-HSC meetingssuch as

those during the summer of 2006 concerning the threatto hijack passenger airliners originating in England.


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Regardless of its relationship to the NSC, theHSC has numerous priorities in policy development.

These include supporting the President and his objectiveof ensuring the security of the United States, and ensuringthat policies associated with homeland security arebased upon strategic national security interests andnot political pressures. A core function of the HSCis to recommend policies to the President that areintegrated and have been coordinated across thegovernment. When circumstances involving globalterrorism with domestic implications occur, theAPHS/CT and the National Security Advisor areexpected to act in concert. Because homeland securityinvolves a wide swath of domestic issuessome ofwhich have signi cant international components (e.g.,visa policy, port security, pandemic issues, etc.)HSCcoordination challenges can involve a wide range of do-

mestically oriented executive branch agencies; the Con-gress; and state, local, and private interests. Preventivestrategies for domestic defense that are likely to requirestate-level resource commitments; affect immigration,trade, or other economic issues; produce outcomes thatare harder to visibly demonstrate (i.e., policies thatproduce greater security means that potential attacksare thwarted and become non-events); and affect awide range of federal, state, and local (not to mentionprivate sector) entities are highly likely to have localpolitical as well as national security effects.

In general, the HSC provides policy support to thePresident on homeland security matters. HSC servesas the conduit into and from the President (andother White House of ces) on policy matters. HSC is

responsible for pulling together the perspectives of DHSand other government agencies that might be affectedby proposed homeland security-related policy and


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coordinating those views through to a policy decision,and then monitoring the implementation of the policy.

The HSC deals mainly with domestic policy issues,but also may play a major role in the consideration ofissues and policy recommendations related to Canada,Mexico, and other actors in the immediate continentalUnited States geographic region. These bilateral policyissues include air transport security, maritime security,and border security, as well as other more traditionalnational security policy matters that involve NSC policyareas. HSC also is responsible for understandingthe domestic implications of potential policy decisionsin the homeland security area. DHS, on the other hand,is responsible for coordinating with state and localof cials and rst responders, and for informing the HSCof state and local concerns with regard to homelandsecurity matters and potential policy issues. DHS

also is responsible for letting state and local of cialsknow what policies or DHS activities occur that affectstate and local administrations and business.

Like the PC for the NSC, the PC for the HSC actsas the Presidents senior level policy review andcoordination committee, and seeks to ensure that, asmuch as possible, policy decisions brought to thePresident reflect a consensus between the relevantdepartments and agencies, but also clearly presentany unresolved disagreements. Typically, the HSC PCmeets regularly, but adjusts its frequency dependingupon circumstances such as crisis situations orincreased threat levels. The types of issues consideredby the PC and DC of the HSC include cyber-security;bioterrorism; air, rail, road, and maritime security;

preparedness and protection against terrorism andnatural disasters; intelligence and information sharing;and coordination and communication with federal,


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state, and local authorities as well as the privatesector. Since the HSCs inception, President Bush

has issued over 18 Homeland Security PresidentialDirectives and about a dozen Executive Ordersdealing with homeland security issues.

The APHS/CT and the HSC staff (as well asPrincipals and Deputies when appropriate) areresponsible for ensuring interagency coordinationwith the Department of Homeland Security, otherCabinet Departments, and the Intelligence Community(including the NCTC). Furthermore, the Assistant tothe President for Homeland Security meets regularlywith the Presidents other senior advisors, as wellas the Vice Presidents senior advisors, and stafffrom other White House of ces. The overlappingrelationship between homeland security and traditionalnational security issues is re ected by the fact that

over the last year, roughly one- fth of HSC-relatedmeetings have been co-chaired by members of the NSCstaff.

Department of Homeland Security.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security wasformed on March 1, 2003, through the merger of nearly30 programs and agencies (over 180,000 personnel)from throughout the Federal government. Headed by acabinet-level Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS has astated mission to lead a uni ed national effort to secureAmerica through preventing and deterring terroristattacks and protecting against and responding tothreats and hazards to the Nation. DHS also will

ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawfulimmigrants and visitors, and promote the free- ow ofcommerce. 21


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transportation security, infrastructure protection,emergency response, and information systems security.

Its intelligence functions include the analysis ofinformation and intelligence from the FBI, ODNI, CIA,and other Federal agencies to assess potential terroristthreats to the American homeland. During 2006, DHSimplemented a major reorganization based uponlessons learned from the operations of the Departmentsince its inception. To fully perform its mission, DHSnow has four major Directorates, six other operationalComponents (besides FEMA, which is also a Directorate),and 18 support Components.

Because of overlap between the global war onterrorism, homeland defense, and homeland security,DHS works with DoDs Assistant Secretary forHomeland Defense, and with a number of other DoDand U.S. Government entities, including Northern

Command, as mentioned above in the section onthe Department of Defense. In addition to DoD,DHS works on a daily basis with the DNI, CIA, andother elements of the Intelligence Community, as wellas the FBI, to coordinate intelligence and strategicintelligence analysis.

The DHS and the HSC face several daunting chal-lenges based upon the breadth of their responsi-bilities and number of Federal entities involved.Trying to coordinate activities that range from the CoastGuard to the Secret Service to the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency continues to be a challenge thatthe recent DHS reorganization is intended to meet moreeffectively. Now merged into a single Departmentfor more than 4 years, the components are making

measured progress in understanding each others rolesand missionsand coordinating their activities andoperations, where appropriate.


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APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL NOMENCLATURE OFPRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYDECISION DOCUMENTS

Truman National Security Council papers (NSC)

Eisenhower National Security Council papers (NSC)

Kennedy National Security Action Memorandum(NSAM)

Johnson National Security Action Memorandum(NSAM)

Nixon/Ford National Security Decision Memorandum

(NSDM)

Carter Presidential Directive (PD)

Reagan National Security Decision Directive(NSDD)

Bush National Security Directive (NSD)

Clinton Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)

Bush National Security Presidential Direc-tive (NSPD) 23

Note: Presidents use Executive Orders and NSPDs

(or their historical equivalents) to authorize mostexecutive actions. In addition, the President usesdirectives called ndings to authorize covert action.


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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. The authors are indebted to Leonard H. Hawley, whoseexperiences as a Deputy Assistant Secretary at both DoD and theState Department, and as an NSC Director, provided numerousinsights into interagency dynamics, objectives, and lessons; toPhil Lago, Executive Secretary, National Security Council; andLieutenant Colonel James Regenor, USAF, NSC Deputy ExecSec; David Trulio, HSC Executive Secretary; Fred Schwien, DHSExecutive Secretary, and Everett Kaplan, DHS Deputy Exec Sec;D

Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security

Documents

Transcript of Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security