Organization andEmployment of

Aerospace Power

Air Force Doctrine Document 2 28 September 1998

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Lt Col D. Robert Poynor, USAF)Certified by: HQ AFDC/CC (Maj Gen Ronald E. Keys, USAF)Pages: 146Distribution: FApproved by:MICHAEL E. RYAN, General, USAF

Chief of Staff

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2 28 SEPTEMBER 1998

BY ORDER OF THESECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

iFOREWORD

The 1943 version of War Department Field Manual 100-20, Commandand Employment of Air Power, opened with an unmistakably clearpronouncement which was printed in capital letters to emphasize its im-portance: LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL ANDINTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THEOTHER. This theme was reemphasized on the second page when dis-cussing command of airpower:

THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER IS ITSGREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY MAKES IT POSSIBLETO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLEAIR POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN TURN; SUCHCONCENTRATED USE OF THE AIR STRIKING FORCE IS ABATTLE WINNING FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE.CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE CEN-TRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISEDTHROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHER-ENT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A DECISIVEBLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EXPLOITED.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2 (AFDD 2), Organization and Em-ployment of Aerospace Power, demonstrates that good doctrine endures.This capstone document of our operational doctrine series, when takentogether with the other keystone documents, describes how our AirForce organizes and employs aerospace power throughout the spec-trum of conflict at the operational level. AFDD 2 is the companiondocument to AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, which presents thefundamentals of aerospace powerwhat we, the Air Force, believe to bethe best ways to organize and exploit the global capabilities and strategicperspective of aerospace power. AFDD 2 provides the unifying backgroundfor succeeding doctrinal publications that cover the specific operations,tactics, techniques, and procedures of the many elements that must workin concert for aerospace power to reach its full potential.

AFDD 2 is an entirely new document in our hierarchy of doctrine pub-lications. The concepts it introducesthe role of the Commander, AirForce Forces (COMAFFOR), the methodology for setting up air expedi-tionary forces (AEFs), and the use of air operations centers (AOCs) as thenerve centers behind all aerospace operationsneed to become stan-dardized across the Service for all our operations. The details must be

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debated and refined, and eventually captured in subsequent iterations ofthese documents.

Those who speak of a revolution in military affairs say three ele-ments must come together: technology, doctrine, and organization. TheUnited States Air Force has been honing the aerospace weaponthe tech-nology piecesince its inception. The publication of Air Force DoctrineDocuments 1 and 2 brings together the other two piecesdoctrine andorganization.

Our operational doctrine, as embodied in AFDD 2 and the other key-stone doctrinal publications, describes not only how we would employaerospace forces to meet the threats and challenges facing us today, butalso the point of departure for guiding our nations Air Force in meetingthe challenges of tomorrow. Aerospace power is a criticaland decisiveelement in protecting our nation and deterring aggression. It will onlyremain so if we, as professional airmen, study, evaluate, and debate ourcapabilities and the environment of the future. Just as technology, worldthreats, and opportunities change, so must our doctrine. We, each of us,must be articulate, knowledgeable, and unapologetic advocates of aero-space power.

MICHAEL E. RYANGeneral, USAFChief of Staff

28 September 1998

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

Introduction .......................................................................................... v

OVERVIEW ........................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER ONEAerospace Operations ............................................ 1The Nature of Aerospace Power ......................................................... 1An Airmans Perspective of the Levels of War .................................... 2Aerospace Maneuver Warfare ............................................................. 4Theater Air and Space Objectives....................................................... 6Employment Options .......................................................................... 6Conflict Termination ........................................................................... 8The Contributions of Aerospace Power............................................. 12

Peacetime Engagement and Crisis Response ............................... 12Deterrence and Contingency Operations ..................................... 15War Winning ................................................................................. 17

CHAPTER TWOThe Transition from Peace to Conflict .............. 23Deliberate Versus Crisis Action Planning ......................................... 23The Crisis Action Planning Process .................................................. 24Other Force Generation Considerations ........................................... 29

Reserve Component Mobilization................................................. 29The Civil Reserve Air Fleet .......................................................... 29

Summary .......................................................................................... 30

CHAPTER THREEOrganizing Air Force Forces ........................... 31Fundamental Command and Organizational Concepts .................... 31The Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force ................................... 32Presentation of US Air Force Forces ................................................. 33

The Command Element ............................................................... 33Air Expeditionary Forces .............................................................. 35Air Expeditionary Wing ................................................................ 36Air Expeditionary Group ............................................................... 37Multiple AEW Employment .......................................................... 37Designation of ASETF .................................................................. 38Control of CONUS-based and Out-of-theater Forces ..................... 40

CHAPTER FOURLeading Expeditionary Airand Space Forces ............................................................................. 41The Joint Force Commander ............................................................ 42The Commander, Air Force Forces ................................................... 44The Joint Force Air Component Commander ................................... 47COMAFFOR Headquarters Organization: The AStaff .................. 51

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Air Mobility Integration .................................................................... 57Director of Mobility Forces ........................................................... 58Intertheater Operations ................................................................ 59Operations Primarily Involving Air Mobility ................................ 60Air Mobility Operations External to the Joint Task Force ............. 60

CHAPTER FIVEThe Joint Air Operations Center ....................... 63Primary JAOC Functions .................................................................. 63The Air and Space Assessment, Planning, and Execution Process .. 64Other Operational and Planning Considerations.............................. 66JAOC Organization............................................................................ 68

JAOC Director ............................................................................... 69Core Teams................................................................................... 69Strategy Division .......................................................................... 70Combat Plans Division ................................................................. 71Combat Operations Division ........................................................ 71Air Mobility Division .................................................................... 72Specialty Teams ............................................................................ 73Support Teams .............................................................................. 73

Summary .......................................................................................... 74

CHAPTER SIXThe Joint Air and Space Operations Plan ........... 75Planning Air and Space Operations .................................................. 75Five-Stage JASOP Planning Process ................................................. 76

Stage 1: Operational Environment Research ................................ 76Stage 2: Objective Determination................................................. 77Stage 3: Center of Gravity Identification ...................................... 79Stage 4: Strategy Development..................................................... 81Stage 5: JASOP Development ....................................................... 81

Suggested Readings ............................................................................ 85

AppendicesA. Operations Report3 .................................................................... 87B. JCS Warning Order ...................................................................... 89C. Planning Order ............................................................................ 95D. Alert Order .................................................................................. 101E. Operation Order ..........................................................................105F. Execute Order .............................................................................109G. Joint Air and Space Operations Plan ..........................................113H. Reserve Component Mobilization ...............................................117I. Sample Division of OPCON and TACON Responsibilities ..........119

Glossary ...............................................................................................121

vINTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This document has been prepared under the direction of the Chief ofStaff of the Air Force (CSAF). It establishes doctrinal guidance for organiz-ing and employing aerospace forces at the operational level of conflictacross the full range of military operations. It is the capstone of US AirForce operational-level doctrine publications. Together, these publicationscollectively form the basis from which air commanders plan and executetheir assigned aerospace missions and their actions as a component of ajoint Service or multinational force.

APPLICATION

This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) applies to all active duty,Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel.The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. There-fore, commanders need to consider not only the contents of this AFDD,but also the particular situation when accomplishing their missions.

SCOPE

Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) can be usedacross the range of military operations at the strategic, operational, andtactical levels of war. This AFDD discusses the fundamentals of organiza-tion and employment of Air Force air, space, and information capabilitiesto accomplish the missions assigned by commanders in chief (CINCs).More specific guidance on Air Force operations may be found in subordi-nate operational- and tactical-level doctrine documents.

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OVERVIEW

In 1991, the United States led a coalition of nations against the Iraqimilitary in Operation DESERT STORM. Since then, a wide variety of interna-tional crises and conflicts have resulted in a broader and more frequentuse of US military forces to achieve national security objectives. TodaysAir Force remains ready to respond with unmatched speed and efficiencyto a wide range of contingencies around the world.

The Air Force has reaffirmed valuable lessons about organizing to con-duct expeditionary operations. New organizational paradigms now dictateclearer lines of authority, better unity of command, and a mechanism forcommanding Air Force forces. Recent analyses of the potential offered byaerospace forces, coupled with innovations and advances in technology,point the way to a new American way of war. This new operational wayof war exploits the inherently offensive nature of the aerospace weapon toprovide joint force commanders (JFCs) with additional options. It usesthe rapid employment of sophisticated military capabilities to engage abroad array of targets simultaneously, strongly, and quickly, with dis-criminate application, to decisively shape the conflict and avoid the re-sults of previous wars of attrition and annihilation.

AFDD 2 is an entirely new document within the Air Forces doctrinedocument hierarchy. It builds upon the fundamentals presented inAFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, and provides a broad overview ofhow the Air Force transitions to contingency operations, organizesitself afield, and assesses, plans, and executes its assigned missions.It expands upon and supersedes the Presentation of USAF Forces, knowncolloquially as the Little Red Book. It presents nominal recommenda-

To develop anything, the underlying thought andreason must govern, and then the organizationmust be built up to meet it.

Brigadier General William Billy Mitchell

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tions for organizing and operating Air Force forces afield; as with anydoctrine, it is authoritative, but not directive. It is not meant to be all-inclusive, nor is it intended to cover every conceivable type of operation.Every deployment will be different from previous ones; commandersmust apply sound professional judgment in each situation.

Furthermore, this document contains many extracts from joint publi-cations and joint doctrine documents. Their inclusion here allows thereader to draw a more complete picture, from beginning to end, of themyriad events that must take place to deploy, plan, and execute Air Forceforces afield.

Chapter one presents an overview of aerospace operations. It firstexplores the nature of aerospace power and then talks about theater airand space objectives, employment options, and conflict termination. Thechapter concludes with an examination of types of aerospace operations.

Chapter two sketches how a military response is created due to acrisis, beginning with the National Command Authorities (NCA) decisionprocess that leads to the employment of military forces. It provides anoverview of how the US armed forces spin up to deploy, with emphasison how US Air Force elements are brought into play, and illustrates whendecisions are made that may affect the size and mission of Air Forceforces.

Chapter three discusses how US Air Force forces are organized forexpeditionary operations and explains the mechanics for setting up airexpeditionary forces. US overseas-based forces have drawn down consid-erably in recent years. The US Air Force now has the challenge of deploy-ing smartly and quickly from the continental United States (CONUS) toareas in which there is little or no in-place presence; therefore, it needsorganizational models to support these deployments. The US Air Forceshould organize to provide clear lines of authorityairmen will lead air-menand should present the JFC with a single face to execute the US AirForce element within a joint force.

Chapter four discusses leadership and command relationships. It pro-vides an overview of senior leadership relationships and responsi-bilities within a joint force. This chapter outlines the roles, responsi-bilities, and command structures of the JFC, the COMAFFOR, and thejoint force air component commander (JFACC).

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Chapter five discusses the joint air operations center (JAOC). Re-gardless of the size of an operation, deployed US Air Force forces shouldestablish a command mechanism for internal control of US Air Force forcesand for linkage to the JFC. This mechanism will be a JAOC, appropriatelysized and tailored for the operation at hand. This chapter discusses JAOCfunctions, the process used within the JAOC for planning and executingaerospace operations, and notional JAOC organization.

Chapter six builds upon all the previous material and discusses theprocess for building the Joint Air and Space Operations Plan (JASOP).Created during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning,the JASOP reflects how the JFCs overall operations concept is translatedinto a plan for employing joint aerospace forces.

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1CHAPTER ONE

AEROSPACE OPERATIONS

THE NATURE OF AEROSPACE POWER

Aerospace power is the use of lethal and nonlethal means byaerospace forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical ob-jectives. Aerospace power can rapidly provide the national leader-ship a full range of military options for meeting national objec-tives and protecting national interests. From peacetime engagementto deterrence, from crisis response to winning wars, aerospace forces of-fer rapid, flexible, and effective lethal and nonlethal power.

Due to its speed and range, aerospace power operates in ways that arefundamentally different from other forms of military power. Aerospacepower has the ability to focus the entire theaters efforts onto a singletarget or target set, unlike surface forces that typically divide up the battle-field into individual unit operating areas. Airmen view the applicationof force more from a functional than geographic standpoint andclassify targets by the effect their destruction has on the enemyrather than where the targets are physically located.

There are those who like to say we have four AirForces in Americathey are absolutely wrong. Thisnation has one Air Force. There are other serviceswith air arms, and they are magnificent air arms,who focus on certain things in support of ournational capabilities. But it is your Air Force thatis charged with the full spectrum of capabilities.We are asked to provide for the nation air and

space power, starting with science and technology; research anddevelopment; testing and evaluating; fielding, employing andsustaining air and space forces. We have no other tasks. That is ouronly job. It is not a diversion for us. We do it full timeall the time.

General Ronald R. Fogleman

2AN AIRMANS PERSPECTIVE OF THE LEVELS OF WAR

Warfare is typically dividedinto three levels: strategic, op-erational, and tactical. The fo-cus at a given level of war is noton the specific weapons used, oron the targets attacked, but ratheron the desired effects. A given air-plane, dropping a given bomb,could comprise a tactical or stra-tegic mission depending on theplanned results. Effects at thestrategic level of war includedestruction or disruption of theenemys center(s) of gravity (COGs) or other vital target sets, includingcommand elements, war-production assets, and key supporting infrastruc-ture that impairs his ability or will to wage war or carry out aggressiveactivity. At this level the NCA, sometimes as a member of a group ofnations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) secu-rity objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources toaccomplish these objectives. These national objectives in turn providethe direction for developing overall military objectives, which in turn areused to develop the military objectives and strategy for each theater. Ingeneral terms, the strategic level of war addresses the issues of WHYand WITH WHAT we will fight and WHY the enemy fights againstus.

At the other end of the spectrum lies the tactical level of war, whereindividual battles and engagements are fought. To the airman, the dis-tinction between this level and higher levels of war is fairly clear-cut; wetend not to fight battles with aerospace power but focus at the tacticallevel on the individual engagement. The tactical level of aerospace war-fare deals with how these packaged forces are employed, and the specif-ics of how engagements are conducted and targets attacked. In short, thetactical level of war deals with HOW we fight.

Between the strategic and tactical levels of war lies the operationallevel of war. At this level of war, campaigns and major operations areplanned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic goals withintheaters or areas of operations. These activities imply a broader dimen-sion of time or space than do tactics; they provide the means by which

Figure 1.1. Levels of War

LEVELS OF WAR:AN AIRMANS VIEW

Strategic ............. Why, With What

Operational .......... What to AttackOrder of Attack

Duration

Tactical .................................. How

3tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. Operationaleffects such as theater air superiority, command and control (C2) decapi-tation, and battlefield isolation are the tools with which the operationalair commander supports the overall strategy. In terms of air and spaceoperational employment and targeting, planning at the operational levelof war determines WHAT we will attack, in WHAT order, and forWHAT duration.

It may be more instructive to think of the operational level of war interms of the concept of operational art. Operational art is the process ofplanning and sustaining operations and campaigns to meet strategic ob-jectives; it is the process by which strategic guidance is turned into tacticaltasking. Operational art determines what will be accomplished in thebattlespace; it is guided by the why from the strategic level and imple-mented by the how at the tactical level. In terms of aerospace poweremployed against ground targets, for example, operational art determineshow specific missions and assets will be used to achieve the desired high-

During the Persian Gulf War, coalition air attacks first halted, thendestroyed, Iraqi forces en route to the Saudi Arabian town ofKhafji, much like these shown here. Aerospace poweremployment in that engagement isolated the battlefield, destroyedfollow-on forces, halted the Iraqi offensive, and demonstrated tothe Iraqis the futility of further offensive action. The strategicresults included a reduction in the Iraqi armys overall will to fight.

4level effects and involves such areas as enemy assessment and analysis,targeting, and force packaging.

Focusing an entire theaters aerospace power in a central planning pro-cess maximizes the overall effect on the enemy, given a finite amount ofaerospace power assets. The process of developing the joint air and spaceoperations plan (JASOP), and executing it through an air tasking order(ATO), represents the operational art of aerospace warfare. Through thisprocess, the air component commander (ACC) and his staff integrate allof the available assets into an optimized final product. During the execu-tion phase, the ACC maintains centralized oversight of all required changesto the ATO due to unforeseen events or enemy reaction. This oversightfunction allows aerospace power to remain flexible during execution, whilekeeping the operational objectives of the ATO in sight.

Once the ATO is distributed to the wing and squadron level, the pro-cess arrives at the tactical level of war. Mission planning cells at theseunits plan the details for individual missions, which are then executed byindividual strike packages, flights, or elements. The execution of thesemissions is decentralized, as the individual flight leaders have consider-able latitude on the tactical details of how they accomplish their assignedmissions.

AEROSPACE MANEUVER WARFARE

In the strategic sense, aerospace power conducts maneuver throughglobal mobility and global attack. At this level of war, maneuver concernssuch issues as Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (ASETF) deploy-ment, overflight rights, intertheater airlift, and orbital access. Commandand control of such globally deployed aerospace power is also involved. Atheater CINC positioning forces so operational commanders can use themto greatest possible effect exemplifies strategic maneuver. This position-ing includes not only the combat forces themselves, but also all of thecombat support and infrastructure required for them to function. In simpleterms, strategic maneuver involves deployment while operational andtactical maneuver concerns employment. Some missions can involve allthree types of maneuver, such as when a deploying unit drops munitionsen route to its deployed location or when a long-range bomber departs itsCONUS home station, drops ordnance on a distant target, and returns.

Tactical maneuver is the most readily recognized form of maneuverand involves individual platforms using three-dimensional movement

5through air or space to accomplish specific tasks. Examples include a fightermaneuvering to its opponents six oclock position for a gun kill, a bomberusing terrain masking while inbound to the target, or a reconnaissancesatellite performing an orbital plane change to overfly a desired point ofinterest. In these cases, air and space assets use their common advantageof three-dimensional maneuver to achieve an advantage in the battlespace.While tactical maneuver emphasizes such technological measures of per-formance as g-available and delta-v, tactical superiority only countswhen it can be turned into an operational or strategic advantage.

Operating from the third dimension, air and space forces can strikedirectly at an adversarys centers of gravity and vital centers. Thiscapability allows air and space forces to achieve effects beyond tacticalsuccess and at a tempo inside the adversarys decision cycle. By wrestingthe initiative, setting the terms of battle, establishing the tempo of operations,and taking advantage of tactical and operational opportunities, air and spaceforces can defeat the adversarys strategy. By focusing on this desired out-come of operational maneuver warfare, the advantages of aerospace powerquickly become obvious. Aerospace powers ability to strike the enemyrapidly and unexpectedly across all of the critical points, from deep toshallow, adds a significant morale impact to an equally devastating physi-cal blow. Surface maneuver warfare requires that small-unit commandersprobe for weaknesses in the enemy line, which may then be exploited bylarger mechanized formations.

Air and space forces, however, are able to proceed directly totheir intended targets without the need for large-scale reaction tothe enemy. As such, they should be thought of as true operationalmaneuver elements in their own right, and not just as fires support-ing the surface component. The ability to conduct this dislocation ofthe enemy hinges on gaining and maintaining air, space, and informationsuperiority, which not only enables our air and surface components toemploy operational maneuver against the enemy, but also prevents theenemy from doing the same to us.

Finally, traditional principles of warfare are increasingly coupled tothe realization that the possession and manipulation of information itselfcan be a key element of the war-winning equation. Thus, more than atany other time in history, information has evolved from being only anadjunct supporting primary weapon systems to being, in many cases, it-self a weapon or target, and perhaps being a field for operational maneuver.

6THEATER AIR AND SPACE OBJECTIVES

Once the theater commanders objectives and intent are communi-cated, the air component commander forms a concept of air operationsthat supports the CINCs objectives. That is, the air component commanderproposes operational air and space objectives and devises a scheme ofintegrated aerospace operational actions to achieve theater objectives.

Theater and national objectives shape the conduct of theater aerospacestrategy. Well-defined objectives give subordinate commanders a clearpicture of the theater commanders intent for operations. As eventsprogress, war rarely adheres closely to the original concept of operations.Knowing the theater aerospace objectives and understanding the conceptof operations, subordinate air and space commanders are able to rapidlyadapt to changing conditions in the battlespace. Accordingly, theater aero-space objectives allow latitude for judgment in a dynamic combat envi-ronment.

Centralized control provides strategic focus while decentralized execu-tion allows operational flexibility to meet theater aerospace objectives.Centralized planning is the first step in achieving effective central-ized control, providing the optimum concentration of aerospacecombat power at the required decisive points. Decentralized execu-tion permits the flexibility to realize tactical success. This conceptsupports the inherent flexibility and versatility of aerospace power, giv-ing commanders the tools to adapt to changing circumstances while re-maining focused on campaign objectives.

EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS

Parallel operations involve simultaneous attack of varied targetsets to overwhelm and incapacitate an enemy, often resulting indecisive effects. For example, in the Gulf War, the enemy command andcontrol structure was severely degraded through parallel attacks on theelectric grid, communications nodes, and command facilities. Althoughparallel operations have been conducted in the past, it usually took con-siderable time for the effects to be felt. In the meantime, the enemy wasoften able to establish alternate transportation and communication links,slowing or even negating the effects of those operations.

Aerospace power is usually employed to greatest effect in paral-lel, asymmetric operations. This includes precision strikes against sur-

7face forces, information attack against command and control systems, orprecision strikes against infrastructure and COGs. Asymmetric attack usesthe speed and range of aerospace power, coupled with its three-dimen-sional advantage, to strike the enemy where it hurts the most. Symmetricforce-on-force warfare is sometimes required, such as the air-to-air com-bat often associated with achieving air superiority. At the beginning of aconflict, other offensive operations can sometimes be accomplished inparallel with counterair operations. If the enemy strongly challenges ourair superiority, we may be forced into serial operations in which all avail-able assets must be dedicated to winning air superiority before any offen-sive operations other than counterair attack missions are flown. In gen-eral terms, experience has shown that parallel and asymmetric op-erations are more effective, achieve results faster, and are less costlythan symmetric or serial operations.

Today, precision engagement and increased intelligence capa-bilities allow simultaneous and rapid attack on key nodes and forces,producing a cumulative effect that overwhelms the enemys capac-ity to recover. As a result, the effects of parallel operations are achievedquickly and are likely to be decisive. In addition to the physical destruc-tion from parallel operations, the shock and surprise of such attacks,coupled with the uncertainty of when or where the next blow will fall,can lead to serious morale effects on the enemy. Commanders shouldconsider these facts when deciding how best to employ aerospace powerat the theater level.

Parallel operations can be conducted in conjunction with otherelements of a joint force. For example, air interdiction, in conjunctionwith simultaneous and coordinated surface attack, can overwhelm an

During DESERTSTORM aerospacepower executedsimultaneous andlethal attacksacross a variety oftarget sets.

8enemys reinforcement and resupplycapacity, creating synergistic effects thathave an adverse impact throughout theenemy system. In this case, the surfaceand air maneuver elements of the jointforce are working in conjunction witheach other, rather than one in supportof another, to achieve decisive results.

Asymmetric force strategy lever-ages sophisticated military capabilitiesto rapidly achieve objectives. Thisstrategy, executed in parallel withother air and surface operations, at-tacks the enemys centers of gravity.Asymmetric warfare pits our strengthsagainst the adversarys weaknessesand maximizes our capabilities whileminimizing those of our enemy toachieve rapid, decisive effects.

When employed in an independent role, air and space forcesconduct operations aimed directly at accomplishing the theatercommanders objectives. These types of operations may not rely onconcurrent surface operations to be effective, nor are they directly af-fected by the geographical disposition of friendly surface forces. Instead,they are planned to achieve dominant and decisive theater-level effectsby striking directly at enemy centers of gravity, which may include fieldedforces. Such operations are planned to disrupt the enemys overall strat-egy or degrade the enemys ability and will to fight. These operations aredefined not by mission types or weapon systems but by the objectivessought. In some situations decisive operations can be conducted globally,reducing or even negating the requirement for the forward deploymentof friendly forces.

CONFLICT TERMINATION

Conflict termination is a vital aspect of tying military actions to strate-gic objectives, establishing a better state of peace, and ensuring longterm US national objectives are met. Cessation of hostilities will usu-ally follow one of three patterns. The first is the victor imposing itswill on the vanquished by force or other means. The unconditional sur-

Just as air and space forces arenot solely employed indepen-dently of ground and naval op-erations, parallel and asymmet-ric operations are not solelyaerospace power concepts.When used in this context,aerospace power provides tre-mendous leverage to the jointforce by broadening optionsagainst an adversary throughtime, distance, and space.

9render of the Axis powers ending World War II is one example. Anothermethod may be through a mutual, negotiated settlement between theparties involved, such as the negotiations between US and North Viet-namese representatives that ended US military involvement in the war inVietnam. Finally, a settlement may be imposed or brought about bya third power. NATOs intervention in the Bosnian civil war resulted inthe Dayton Accords, which ended the conflict. The end of conflict is rarelypredictable or even final. For example, the harsh penalties placed on Ger-many after World War I produced the conditions that led to World War II.Termination of the war (or conflict) on terms that allow the nation tomeet its desired political goals is the ultimate objective of the militarycommander.

The theater commanders strategy should ultimately result inthe desired military end state. Citing Joint Pub 30, Joint Operations:

The desired end state should be clearly described by theNCA before the Armed Forces of the United States are commit-ted to an action. An end state is the set of required condi-tions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be apreliminary end statedescribed by a set of military condi-tionswhen military force is no longer the principal means tothe strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state thattypically involves returning to a state of peace and stability,and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informa-tional, and military conditions.

Termination planning should establish the conditions and detail thoseactions needed to attain the chosen national security goals and objec-tives. Also, the way a conflict is conducted may have a great effect on theactual end state achieved. For example, unnecessarily aggressive opera-

I had spent two tours in a war that seemed endlessand often pointless. Warfare is such an all-absorbingenterprise ... that after starting one, a governmentmay lose sight of ending it ... I thought that the peopleresponsible should start thinking about how it shouldend.

General Colin PowellChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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tions may foster ill feelings from the populace, may aggravate refugeeproblems, or may collaterally damage or destroy so much infrastructurethat recovery is more difficult.

Termination planning should begin as early in the conflict aspossible, preferably prior to the beginning of a conflict. Histori-cally, this has rarely been done. Termination planning is extremely diffi-cult as the conflict can evolve in many directions, forcing a revision of theoriginal termination plan and, in some cases, a change in definition ofthe end state. The greatest difficulty at the operational level is trans-lating national goals into quantifiable military objectives that cre-ate the conditions needed to achieve the desired end state.

Regardless of how termination comes about, operational con-cerns should be addressed early in the termination effort to avoidresumption of combat. Provision for the security of remaining forces,responsibilities toward the civilian population, prisoner of war account-ing and repatriation are all issues that need to be addressed during thetermination phase. Providing for the security of former adversaries and otherbasic human needs will significantly enhance peaceful resolution of the con-

This figure shows how operations may transition, oftenunintentionally, from one type of conflict to another. It illustratesthe complexity and challenges that may belie the best intentionsof both military and civilian planners. (Source: Col D.F. Todd)

t

Limited RegionalConflict

Insurgencies

MajorTheater War

NBCExchangeResolution of

Hostilities

HumanitarianAssistance

DisasterRelief

PeaceOperations

Peacekeeping

Counterterrorism

s

t

t

ss

t

s

t

tt

ss

s

Flow of Events Escalation or De-escalation Re-escalation

t

Figure 1.2. Continuum of Conflict

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flict. Establishing rules of engagement and targeting criteria, intelligence andother information operations, media, psychological operations, funding, forcestructure, medical care, and coordination with nonmilitary organizations arekey considerations for friendly forces to better understand their role. Theseconsiderations may lead to expanded or increasingly constrained posturesto preclude the resurgence of hostilities, enhance public support, and en-sure the security of military operations. The influence of nonmilitary in-struments of national power will increase as termination approaches andis achieved. Consideration of the requirements for the other instrumentsof national power will significantly support achieving desired objectives.

Aerospace power can be instrumental to success in this phase of opera-tions. Air and space forces can assist in locating and removing unexplodedordnance. They can help locate pockets of enemy resistance, and, if nec-essary, neutralize the threat. The same information gained during thecombat research phase of campaign planning can be used to identify thosesocial, economic, political, and cultural factors that may require post-hos-tilities attention. This data, combined with the intelligence gathered dur-ing the conflict, can be used to identify and apply required national assis-tance or military influence to stabilize the post-conflict environment. Airand space forces can provide intelligence, airlift, and humanitarian assis-tance; help restore basic infrastructure; provide transportation , commu-nications, and information support; and provide other assistance requiredby military, international, regional and private organizations. Air and spaceforces can directly support treaty compliance and verification. Militaryoperations may vary from establishing a military government (e.g., post-World War II Japan), conducting civil affairs (e.g., post-JUST CAUSE inPanama), performing aerial occupation (e.g., no-fly zones in Iraq), con-ducting humanitarian operations (e.g., PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey), to co-operating with a myriad governmental and nongovernmental organiza-tions. The nature of the operation and the required military support willbe decided by the objectives of the NCA. Finally, the redeployment offorces should be planned to provide for an orderly, well-defended with-drawal once the required objectives are met.

Whether conflict termination is imposed by decisive military victory orthrough a negotiated settlement, air and space forces play a critical role inany post-hostility transition as they offer global and theater-wide capabili-ties. Since air and space forces offer national leaders a potent force to sup-port political and economic instruments of national power during post-hos-tilities, COMAFFORs must clearly and explicitly define the capabilities oftheir respective forces to meet the objectives of conflict termination.

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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AEROSPACE POWER

The specific tasks involved in any given air or space operation willvary greatly, depending on the detailed context of the larger conflict orcontingency, national policies and objectives, forces available to do thejob, and a host of other considerations. The following discussion illus-trates how aerospace power may be employed under varying circum-stances, ranging from peacetime engagement and crisis response, to de-terrence and contingency operations, to war-winning operations. Theexamples are not an exhaustive list but represent a fairly wide spectrumof potential aerospace power tasks.

Peacetime Engagement and Crisis Response

Peacetime engagementanchors aerospace power tothe basic objectives of theNational Security Strategyprotecting the nation andits vital interests. A key aimof this strategy is the promo-tion of long-term internationalstability. Stability, in turn, es-tablishes conditions necessaryfor promoting continueddemocratic developmentworldwide. Such developmentis fostered by maintaining permanent overseas presence, participating incombined and joint exercises, and working with allies on security arrange-ments. Space and information systems provide timely and vital warningand monitoring of potential crises through intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance. Aerospace power provides a national response for safe-guarding human life through evacuation, humanitarian and relief opera-tions, or peacekeeping reinforcement when aggression or natural disas-ters cause physical destruction, privation, or hardship.

Examples of peacetime engagement and crisis response opera-tions include:

J Military-to-Military Contacts: Military-to-military contacts are directinteractions between US forces and forces of friends and allies specifi-cally designed to enhance mutual trust and interoperability. These in-

Figure 1.3.Peacetime Engagement andCrisis Response.

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT& CRISIS RESPONSE

Military-to-Military ContactsUnilateral/Multilateral Exercises

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster ReliefArms ControlCounterdrug

CounterterrorismRescue/Noncombatant Evacuation

13

clude personnel exchange and liaison programs in which select per-sonnel are assigned to foreign operational units and military schoolsand security assistance programs in which US military personnel pro-vide training to foreign military personnel.

J Unilateral and Multilateral Exercises: Unilateral and multilateralexercises are conducted either through the auspices of a single Serviceor a joint or multinational event. These exercises reinforce the lessonsof training and help identify problems in operations, command andcontrol, and combat support. Exercises with allied partners also helpidentify potential problems with access, interoperability, and infrastruc-ture in the host countries. In todays joint environment, truly unilat-eral exercises are rare, since most exercises involve some degree ofjoint participation, however small. An example of a multilateral exer-cise is COPE TIGER, an annual exercise with air force units from Thailandand Singapore, with US Air Force and US Marine Corps participation.

J Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations: These op-erations are con-ducted to alleviatenatural or man-made disasters orother endemicconditions such ashuman pain, dis-ease, hunger, orprivation thatmight present a se-rious threat to lifeor result in greatdamage. (Gener-ally, humanitarianassistance appliesto such operationsexternal to the US,while disaster re-lief occurs within the US.) These operations may supplement orcomplement the logistics efforts of civil authorities who may have theprimary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance and fre-quently take the form of transport, supply, and distribution. This wasthe case in Joint Task Force Andrew when 21,000 tons of material andfood were airlifted in by 1,014 air sorties to southern Florida after Hur-ricane Andrew struck in 1992. Another example is Operation PROVIDE

In 1948 the Berlin Airlift overcame the Berlinblockade. The effort kept more than two millionBerliners alive through a harsh Europeanwinter.

14

COMFORT, which furnished Kurdish refugees food, water, relief centers,and medical assistance after they fled Iraqi forces in northern Iraq.

J Arms Control Operations: Arms control operations limit and reducethe number and types of weapons threatening stability within a re-gion. They encompass arms control verification that entails collecting,processing, and reporting of data indicating testing or employment ofproscribed weapon systems, including country of origin and location,weapon and payload identification, and event type. The Open SkiesTreaty, signed by 27 nations in 1992, allows overflight verification ofeach countrys conventional military posture and confirms that signa-tory nations are in compliance with the Conventional Forces in Eu-rope treaty.

J Counterdrug Operations: Counterdrug operations are those activemeasures taken in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies todetect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use ofillegal drugs. Military air, space, and intelligence operations continueto aid law enforcement agencies by providing surveillance, notifica-tion, and assistance in apprehending drug traffickers attempting to pen-etrate US borders.

J Counterterrorism Operations:Counterterrorism operations areprograms designed to detect, pre-vent, or neutralize terrorist activi-ties by identifying, targeting, andrepressing individuals, groups, ororganizations conducting or sus-pected of conducting terrorist ac-tivities. In 1986, Operation ELDORADO CANYON included air strikesagainst terrorist sites and encamp-ments within Libya to dissuadeMuammar Qaddafi from support-ing international terrorism.

J Rescue/Noncombatant Evacua-tion Operations (NEO): Airpower has often been used to mount res-cue operations in crisis situations. Such operations generally involveemploying vulnerable aircraft over or within hostile territory, thusentailing high risks. Accordingly, rescue/NEO operations require care-ful planning and execution. The evacuation of 281 civilians from theUS Embassy in Somalia during January 1991 represents a successful

In April 1986, joint air forces,including US Air Force F111s,conducted a raid into Libya,striking a successful blow atinternational terrorism.

15

operation. The failed attempt in April 1980 to rescue American hos-tages held in Iran demonstrates the risks involved.

Deterrence and Contingency Operations

Aerospace power pro-vides the nation with arapid and responsiveglobal force to deter ag-gression or prevent con-flicts from escalating tohigher levels of aggres-sion. Air and space forcesprovide both attack capa-bility and support to deter-rence through the poten-tial use of overwhelmingforce. Space and informa-tion assets provide moni-toring and warning of potential threats through such capabilities as stand-off airborne and overhead reconnaissance and missile launch warning.These capabilities, and the knowledge by a potential aggressor that wehave such capabilities, are vital to deterrence. All facets of aerospace powermay come into play during contingency operations, which can vary frommaintaining an existing peace to intervening in an active conflict to im-pose peace on warring factions.

Examples of deterrence and contingency operations include:

J Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): The evolu-tion of air, space, and information technologies offers a new opera-tional horizon from which military forces can increase situation aware-ness, tailor operations tempo, gain and maintain information superior-ity, and improve overall responsiveness and effectiveness. The em-ployment of surveillance and reconnaissance assets can also help de-ter a potential aggressor by letting them know the United States is in-terested and watching closely. In practice, confronting potential ag-gressors, either directly or indirectly, with facts about their monitoredactions, may serve to diffuse a situation. In 1941, the mismanagementof available ISR resources and the lack of a centralized control activityin Hawaii contributed to the destruction of the battleships of the USPacific Fleet and the air defense of Hawaii. Conversely, advancementsin ISR technology provided early and accurate assessments of Soviet

Figure 1.4. Deterrence and ContingencyOperations

DETERRENCE & CONTINGENCYOPERATIONS

Intelligence, Surveillance, & RecceShow of ForceForced Entry

Aerial OccupationRaids

Coercion

16

ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962, allowing prompt US reaction andaverting a potentially serious threat to US security.

J Show of Force: Aerospace power often is the only instrument of mili-tary power with the speed to respond globally to demonstrate US re-solve. Through the increased visibility of United States combat poweron short notice, potential conflict can be deterred or a crisis defused.The rapid deployment of an expeditionary air force to Kuwait in 1997provided a demonstration of rapid combat power and deterred furtherhostile Iraqi actions.

J Forced Entry: Air and space forces play a critical role in establishingconditions necessary for successful introduction of forces into a crisissituation. When crisis response is met with armed opposition, air forcescan seize air superiority to allow the introduction of ground or navalforces or inject aerospace power directly to restore stability. OperationJUST CAUSE in Panama during 1989 saw forced entry airpower deliver-ing surface forces to restore stability. This operation demonstrated theuse of aerospace power for coercion using lethal force.

J Aerial Occupation: Through presence and responsiveness, air andspace forces are employed to prevent hostile forces from operating ef-fectively within specific areas. The fusion of information from air andspace systems provides a heightened awareness of hostile activity. Re-sponsiveness, coupled with the increased situation awareness from air-and space-based reconnaissance capabilities, enhances the ability toconduct aerial occupation. Aerospace power can deter hostile actionwithout the need to be constantly present overhead, as long as all sidesunderstand the capability to rapidly respond is there. Aerial occupa-tion is not the same as ground occupation; it provides a different de-

US Air Forceaircraft, such asthese F15s, canperform aerialoccupations asin OperationsSOUTHERN andNORTHERN WATCH.

17

gree of intrusive presence with a smaller investment in personnel andmateriel and thus provides the NCA with another military option. Theno-fly zones established over Iraq following the Gulf War, OperationsSOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH, demonstrate aerial occupationoperations to coerce and deter.

J Raids: Aerospace power provides for the rapid projection of combatpower into hostile territory to secure information, to confuse the en-emy, or to attack hostile targets. Usually of a small scale, aerospacepower raids are conducted to achieve operational or strategic effects.Operation BABYLON, the 1981 Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclearreactor at Osirak, is an example of a raid.

J Coercion: Aerospace power can be decisive in both deterring an en-emy from performing an action counter to US interests, or in compel-ling an enemy who is already performing such an action to cease anddesist. US aerospace powers recognized ability to rapidly and decisivelystrike at global distances enhances our deterrence capability, as poten-tial threats to our interests at home and abroad must consider all pos-sible consequences of hostile activity. Nonlethal coercion relies eitheron nonlethal instruments of aerospace power, or the implied use oflethal means, to face down the aggressor without actual combat op-erations. Lethal coercion employs combat power to punish an aggres-sor, demonstrate the risk of further aggression, deny the enemy thecapability of further aggression, or incapacitate the aggressors mili-tary forces. In 1995, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE succeeded in convinc-ing the recalcitrant Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy weapons fromdesignated exclusion zones and eventually forced them to return to thenegotiating table.

War Winning

Should deterrence measuresfail and a crisis deteriorates intoarmed conflict, aerospacepower makes a decisive con-tribution to successful mili-tary operations and the at-tainment of rapid and lowcost victory. War winning isthe most important of the tasksassigned to military power, asmore vital national interests (oreven national survival) are at

Figure 1.5. War-Winning Operations

WAR-WINNINGOPERATIONS

Destruction DisruptionDiversion DelayDeception Halt

Deployment & SustainmentInformation Operations

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stake than with smaller contingencies. Conversely, the US military is moreoften involved in contingency operations than in wars, so our experiencebase with large-scale war tends to become dated. The actions listed belowmay also occur during smaller contingencies, or forces may be deployedwith the potential to perform these actions should the contingency opera-tion deteriorate into open warfare. During war, these become the highpriority functions for aerospace power. These tasks are not platform-spe-cific but are often accomplished by multiple types of air and space assets,as well as by special operations forces (SOF).

Air superiority is aprerequisite for all othercombat operations. Attain-ing air superiority pro-vides both the freedom toattack and freedom fromattack. In most cases it isthe decisive factor ingaining the necessaryforce protection for mili-tary operations. Air supe-riority can be localized (e.g.,protection of high value as-sets) or theaterwide as itwas during DESERT STORM. Itincludes both offensive anddefensive missions and in-volves the destruction ofenemy aircraft and ballisticand cruise missiles, both inflight and on the ground.Offensive counterair is thepreferred method, allowingus to choose the time andplace of the attack, thus re-taining the initiative. The JFACC normally is the area air defensecommander (AADC), and is charged with integrating joint offen-sive and defensive counterair operations to achieve air superiorityfor the JFC.

Also, securing control of, and access to, the space environment isan increasingly vital function. Defensive counterspace operations in-

THE GAINING OF AIRSUPERIORITY IS THE FIRSTREQUIREMENT FOR THESUCCESS OF ANY MAJOR LANDOPERATION. AIR FORCES MAYBE PROPERLY AND PROFITABLYEMPLOYED AGAINST ENEMYSEA POWER, LAND POWER, ANDAIR POWER. HOWEVER, LANDFORCES OPERATING WITHOUTAIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKESUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITYMEASURES AGAINST HOSTILEAIR ATTACK THAT THEIRMOBILITY AND ABILITY TODEFEAT THE ENEMY LANDFORCES ARE GREATLYREDUCED. [Capitalization inoriginal]

Field Manual 10020Command and Employment of

Air Power, 1943

19

volve securing our own space assets from attack through such methods ashardening, maneuver, and dispersal, and include defending vital groundnodes as well as spacecraft in orbit. Offensive counterspace attacks theenemys access to space through his spacelift and communications, whichcan be disrupted by assets from all of our military components. Directattack of enemy spacecraft, should such a capability ever be developed,would also be included in the counterspace function. Counterspace isenhanced by our ability to perform space surveillance, which can coverthe spectrum from tracking orbital space debris to following the maneu-vers of an enemy antisatellite weapon.

Examples of war-winning operations include:

J Destruction: Aerospace powers most obvious wartime force applica-tion is the destruction of targets. Its objective is to create maximum,long-term damage the enemy cannot recover from in the immediatefuture or for the duration of the conflict. It can, for example, mean thedestruction of enemy electrical power generating capability by target-ing main generators, hydroelectrical facilities, etc. Destruction of theenemys COGs can result in severe, long-lasting reduction of his com-bat power, as well as influencing his morale. Such targets include, butare not limited to, high-level command and control facilities and net-works, industry, power generation, transportation networks, and mili-tary forces. Destruction of military forces in the field can be accom-plished by aerospace power acting alone or in joint operations withother components. Destruction of critical targets can also lead to sev-eral other effects such as disruption, diversion, or delay of enemy forces.These effects often work to maximum benefit when synchronized withground maneuver. Modern precision, coupled with the flexibility ofaerospace power, often allows destruction through focused combatpower without having to physically mass forces over the target. DESERTSTORM is an excellent example.

J Disruption: The ability of aerospace power to disrupt the enemy isvital. Its objective is temporary incapacitation, preventing an enemyfrom deploying resources or capabilities for a limited amount of time.It can be the disruption of enemy electrical power generating capabil-ity by targeting transformers, power lines, or electrical switching sta-tions. Disruption causes delays, disorder and confusion, and destroysunit cohesion. It makes the enemy far more vulnerable to follow-onattacks by all types of forces. For example, in June-July 1944 the Ger-man Panzer Lehr division, moving to contain the Allied landing in

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Normandy, was subjected to continuous Allied air interdiction attacks.Panzer Lehr suffered significant attrition and, more importantly, lostunit cohesion to the point of battlefield ineffectiveness. Attacking en-emy command and control facilities could also lead to disruption ofthe enemys ability to control his forces or to gain intelligence aboutour own operations. In DESERT STORM, coalition destruction of the Iraqicommand and control nets rendered lower echelon Iraqi units leader-less.

J Diversion: Aerospace power is used to divert enemy forces to delay ordestroy them or divert other resources from supporting the main wareffort. Diversion is achieved by concentrating attacks against sensitivetargets or by compelling an enemy to reroute forces and resources fromoffensive to defensive duties. It can be either direct or indirect attackon advancing or retreating enemy forces to change their direction ofmovement or to force them into or out of a specified area. For example,during World War II the strategic bombing campaign forced the Ger-mans to divert an estimated ten thousand artillery pieces and almostone million troops, that were badly needed by their land forces, intotheir antiaircraft artillery force for defense of the homeland. At theoperational and tactical levels, aerospace power achieves diversion byselectively attacking chokepoints such as bridges or port facilities. Aero-space power can selectively attack enemy forces to channelize them,either for optimizing their vulnerability to further air attack or to posi-tion them for attack by our own surface forces.

J Delay: The effects of dislocation, destruction, and diversion create de-lays. Aerospace power is used to impose delays on the enemy to allowfriendly forces to deal more effectively with an attack or to aid friendlyforces in shaping the battlefield. It can be either direct or indirect at-tack on advancing or retreating enemy forces to slow or temporarilystop their movement. Delay of enemy forces may be accomplished bydestroying critical transportation choke points like bridges and roadsor by air-dropping mines. Direct attacks on enemy forces may be nec-essary if transportation choke points are not available. An excellentexample of operational delay occurred in the fall of 1950, when airinterdiction significantly lengthened the time it took for North Koreanreinforcements to reach the Pusan perimeter. This delay helped theembattled defenders to stop the enemy advance, allowing them to holdon to the peninsula while allied forces counterattacked at Inchon.

J Deception: Aerospace power conducts actions to deliberately misleadenemy military decision makers about friendly capabilities, intentions,

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and operations. Deception causes the enemy to react in a way thatcontributes to successful accomplishment of our overall mission. Anexcellent example of tactical deception was Operation BOLO, which oc-curred in 1966 during the Vietnam War. In this ruse, US Air Force fighterpilots flew air-to-air F4s into North Vietnam but mimicked air-to-groundF105 formations and used F105 radio call signs. North VietnameseMiG fighters, which were effectively in sanctuary while on their air-fields, took the bait and were lured out to attack. The operation re-sulted in the downing of seven MiGs in twelve minutes with no Ameri-can losses. Thus stung, the North Vietnamese grounded their fightersfor a period of time afterwards.

J Halt: Through the combination of destruction, disruption, diversion,delay, and deception, aerospace power is capable of denying an en-emy the ability to offensively employ his forces. This result may occurthrough aerospace power acting alone or in conjunction with surfaceoperations. Todays modern technology provides the capability to em-ploy precision aerospace power attacks to rapidly halt major enemyadvances, well short of enemy objectives. This puts the enemy on thedefensive and opens up additional options for the NCA and theaterCINC, including the option of an eventual ground counteroffensive, ifnecessary. It can be direct attack on advancing or retreating enemyforces to prevent further movement. Halting enemy forces means pre-venting any movement of enemy forces. Disruption of transportationand or communications networks, as well as direct attack on enemyforces, will be employed. An example of an air-to-surface holding ac-tion occurred during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Caught off guard, theIsraelis used airpower to contain the Syrian Armys offensive until Is-raeli ground forces generated sufficient strength to respond effectively.In this case, airpower was the only means available to avoid a majormilitary and political disaster.

J Deployment and Sustainment: The ability to deploy and sustain aero-space power is key to its successful application as an expeditionary

We have the enemy surrounded. We are dug in and haveoverwhelming numbers. But enemy airpower is mauling us badly.We will have to withdraw.

A Japanese infantry commanderssituation report to headquarters

Burma, World War II

22

force. The lack of deployment and sustainment capabilities may forcea commander to constrict, interrupt, delay, or even cancel operations.This function includes such varied tasks as inter- and intratheater air-lift, aerial refueling, spacelift, satellite control, force protection, andinfrastructure support. Failure to manage deployment and sustainmentoperations properly may well lead to defeat. During the North AfricanCampaign of World War II, Allied air interdiction decisively preventedGerman Field Marshal Erwin Rommel from obtaining reinforcementsand logistically sustaining his forces, directly contributing in largemeasure to his overall defeat.

J Information Operations:

JJ Information in Warfare (Surveillance and Reconnaissance):Air and space reconnaissance and surveillance provide the infor-mation required to formulate strategy, develop plans, and con-duct operations. These assets perform such tasks as target loca-tion and identification, tracking ground and airborne objects, mis-sile launch warning, and other vital functions. During OperationDESERT STORM, the Iraqis complete lack of reconnaissance and sur-veillance capability prevented them from reacting effectively tocoalition initiatives. By contrast, the coalition maintained near-total situation awareness.

JJ Information Warfare (IW): Information warfare involves suchdiverse activities as psychological operations (PSYOP), militarydeception, electronic combat, both physical and information(cyber) attack, and a variety of defensive activities and programs.For example, in DESERT STORM, Iraqi air defenses were totally blindedwithin the initial hours of the campaign by electronic warfareand physical destruction of their command and control nodes.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE TOCONFLICT

War has always been a complex undertaking; especially so in modernwar. To ensure an orderly transition from peace to war, and to en-sure orderly deployment and employment of American forces, the-ater and functional CINCs use an extensive planning process havingtwo sides: deliberate planning and crisis action planning. The resultingplans, backed with identified forces and deployment schedules and imple-mented through a series of universally understood orders, provide themechanism for bringing together the resources, equipment, and person-nel needed in a military response.

The deliberate and crisis action planning and execution processes havebeen, for many years, driven by processes outlined in joint publications,most notably by the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, orJOPES. Therefore, there are very few separate Air Force procedures forthis process beyond some internal Air Force major command (MAJCOM)procedures. The purpose of the following discussion is to illustrate thelinkage between the products of planning and how they affect Air Forceleaders and forces in the field.

DELIBERATE VERSUS CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

During peacetime, theater planners use deliberate planning pro-cedures to evaluate specific situations and plan the military re-sponse. Planners use scenarios and threats identified in national guid-ance (especially the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan [JSCP]), as well asthe CINCs evaluation of the assigned regional area of responsibility (AOR),

Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modernweapons, against an enemy in complete command ofthe air, fights like a savage against modern Europeantroops, under the same handicaps and with the samechances of success.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

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to develop a series of plans that span a wide range of operations. Thisformal process develops responses to potential crises, determines forcesrequired to achieve objectives, prepares deployment plans, and continu-ously evaluates selected courses of action (COAs).

This lengthy process results in a series of formal plans within eachtheater, and herein lies a key value of this process: these final plans con-tain lists of apportioned forces and their time-phased deployment sched-ules. These forces and detailed deployment schedules may provide thebasis for plans needed in crisis action planning.

Crisis action procedures are used in time-sensitive situations toplan for military action. Here, the situation is dynamic, and time forplanning may be limited to a matter of days. An adequate and appropri-ate military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to thetime available, rapid and effective communications, and use of previousplanning and detailed databases and region analyses whenever possible.

THE CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESS

As a crisis develops, the theater commander provides an assessment tothe National Military Command Center. The most common reports arethe Critical Intelligence Report and the Operations Report3 PINNACLE(OPREP3P). Appendix A contains a sample OPREP. An OPREP3 shouldcontain the following:

Figure 2.1. Comparing Crisis Action Planning Procedures withDeliberate Planning Procedures (Source: Joint Pub 50)

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J Information on the current situation.

J Action being taken within the constraints of the commanders currentrules of engagement (ROE).

J Forces that are readily available.

J Time frame for the earliest commitment of forces.

J Major constraints, if any, on the employment of forces.

With the decision of the NCA to employ military force, the Chairman,Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issues a warning order (see appendix B),which should:

J Describe the situation.

J Establish command relationships.

J State the mission, objectives, and assumptions.

J Refer to applicable operations plans (OPLANs) and operations plans inconcept format (CONPLANs).

J Allocate forces and transportation assets, or request that the CINC iden-tify resource requirements.

J Establish tentative key timing points (e.g., C-day, L-hour), or solicit theCINCs recommendation.

J Identify the anticipated D-day for planning purposes.

J Discuss guidance for administrative, logistics, public affairs, civil af-fairs, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelli-gence (C4I) subjects.

The NCA will task a geographic or functional CINC who becomes thesupported CINC. Depending on the operation, the supported CINC mayestablish a joint task force (JTF) to accomplish the mission. US Air Forceinteraction with a JTF may take several forms, depending on whetherthey are internal or external to the JTF.

J Within a JTF, Air Force elements will normally be presented to thesupported CINC as a task-oriented, tailored organization called an Airand Space Expeditionary Task Force (ASETF) under the command of aCOMAFFOR.

J External to a JTF, Air Force elements will provide support but nor-mally remain under the control of their parent MAJCOM.

The command relationships and the precise degree of control(what the gaining commander will exercise and the losing commander

26

will relinquish) will be specified in Secretary of Defense memoranda.Generally, forces will be assigned to, attached to, or in direct support of aJTF.

Upon receipt of the warning order, or sooner, the CINC convenes hisbattle staff or crisis action team, and starts structuring a JTF. The CINCssupporting Service and functional component commanders usu-ally augment the CINCs staff to develop COAs as recommendedmilitary responses to the developing crisis. Air Force planners fromthe designated supporting numbered air force (NAF) may be tasked atthis time to augment the CINCs planning team. The supporting MAJCOMwill consult with the tasked NAF to ensure qualified planners and liaisonsare tasked to augment the CINCs staff while the Air Force componentand JFACC staffs retain the right manning balance.

At about this time, the standing Air Force component commanderwill designate a COMAFFOR to lead the Air Force element of theJTF. MAJCOMs acting as a warfighting CINCs Air Force component willdesignate a subordinate NAF as the CINCs wartime Air Force compo-nent. The COMAFFORs task at this time is to advise the CINC or JFC on thebest employment of aerospace power in developing COAs. Some special notes:

J If aviation assets of more than one Service are to be employed, the JFCnormally will appoint a JFACC from the Service that has the prepon-derance of the assets and the capability to command them.

J If the military response is air-centric, such as an air attack or a hu-manitarian airlift operation, the JFC could be an Air Force officer.

J If the operation is sufficiently large, and composed primarily of AirForce assets, the NAF commander or even the Air Force regionalMAJCOM commander might be designated the JFC.

With few exceptions, all Air Force forces are assigned to a combatantcommander. Individual CINCs exercise combatant command (commandauthority) (COCOM) whereas subordinate JFCs normally exercise opera-tional control (OPCON) over assigned forces. Assignment is usually apermanent transfer of forces. The gaining commander exercises fullcontrol of assigned forces.

At times, a CINCs requirements may exceed the capabilities of theassigned forces. In such situations, the NCA may elect to transfer AirForce forces from a supporting CINC through attachment to a supportedCINC. Attachment is a temporary transfer of forces between CINCs.

27

Whenever forces attach, theNCA will specify the degree ofcommand authority the gainingcommander will exercise andthe losing commander will re-linquish. Typically, supportedCINCs who gain forces throughattachment will exerciseOPCON or tactical control(TACON) over those forces andnormally delegate this author-ity to their subordinate com-manders, as necessary.

Where neither assignmentnor attachment is appropriate,forces may function in directsupport of the supported CINC.A support relationship maybe established by a superiorcommander between subordi-nate commanders when oneorganization should aid, pro-tect, complement, or sustainanother force. In this case, asupported/supporting relation-ship is usually established be-tween the supported CINC andthe CINC providing direct sup-port forces. At times, the sup-ported CINC may be grantedTACON over direct supportforces. In all cases, however, the NCA will define applicable commandrelationships.

Upon receipt and review of the CINCs COAs, the NCA select one. Priorto COA selection, the CINC may receive a CJCS planning order (sampleat appendix C) to compress execution planning. A planning order doesnot replace formal NCA approval of a COA. The planning order should:

J Identify forces and resources for planning.

J Define the objectives, tasks, and constraints.

Command Relationshipsfor PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the hu-manitarian relief effort for Kurds innorthern Iraq, provides an example ofthe different ways command relation-ships may be established:

J The NCA designated USCINCEUR asthe supported CINC. Subsequently,USCINCEUR-assigned fighter aircraftdeployed from Lakenheath AB,United Kingdom, to Incirlik AB, Tur-key, supporting the JTF in northernIraq. USCINCEUR retained full com-mand authority over these forces de-ployed to support his subordinateJTF.

J Additional aircraft were needed, soUSCINCPAC-assigned fighters fromMisawa AB, Japan, were deployed toIncirlik AB, Turkey and were trans-ferred via attachment to USCINCEUR.As part of the transfer, the NCA speci-fied that USCINCPAC would relin-quish OPCON of these aircraft toUSCINCEUR.

J Finally, USTRANSCOM-assigned air-craft conducting intertheater opera-tions flew relief supplies into theEuropean AOR in direct support ofUSCINCEUR and Operation PROVIDECOMFORT. USCINCTRANS retained fullcommand authority over theseintertheater forces operating in a di-rect support role.

28

J Contain further planning guidance by the Joint Staff.

J Give a deadline for submitting the operations order (OPORD).

Once the NCA select a course of action, the CJCS publishes an alertorder (see appendix D). This communicates the NCA decision to developa detailed military response to the crisis. The contents are similar in for-mat to the planning order, except the operation description clearly statesthe message is an alert order and execution planning for the selectedCOA has been authorized. The contents of an alert order may vary; sec-tions may be deleted if the information has already been published.

Execution planning is the detailed planning necessary to execute theselected COA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transporta-tion resources are identified, and the concept of operations is describedin an OPORD that coordinates the execution of military action (see ap-pendix E). Based on the JFCs guidance and intent, the componentcommanders begin their respective detailed planning. For theCOMAFFOR, this means providing inputs for developing the JointAir and Space Operations Plan (JASOP). The process behind JASOPdevelopment is explained in chapter six.

Once an NCA decision has been made to commence the operation, theCJCS transmits an execute order (see appendix F) directing the CINC tocarry out the military action. The issuance of an execute order is time-sensitive. The format may vary; however, information previously providedin the warning, planning, or alert orders will not be repeated. Upon re-ceiving this order, the JTF elements execute their assigned missions.

The broad outline of all information provided by the sum of all theorders should provide the following total picture:

J Reference.

J Narrative.

J Authority.

J Situation.

J Missiona refined statement of tasks and purpose.

J Executioncourse of action, allocation of combat forces, coordinatinginstructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, ROE, PSYOP guid-ance, deployability status, operations security (OPSEC), deception guid-ance, etc.

29

J Administration and Logisticsallocation of intertheater lift, load plan-ning, logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc.

J Command and Signalcommunications guidance, command relation-ships, and signal.

OTHER FORCE GENERATION CONSIDERATIONS

Reserve Component Mobilization

The Air Force has a substantial part of its forces in the Air Force Re-serve and the Air National Guard. These forces may be made availableduring the planning process by the NCA. While they may seamlessly op-erate alongside the active Air Force, they are subject to different levels ofactivation and different degrees of operational and administrative control(these types of controlOPCON and administrative control (ADCON)are discussed in more detail in chapters three and four). The four levelsof activation are:

J Volunteerism: The Secretary of the Air Force is allowed to place theSelected Reserve on active duty with no time limit.

J Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up: The President can authorize upto 200,000 members for up to 270 days.

J Partial Mobilization: In time of a national emergency declared by thePresident, or when otherwise authorized by law, up to 1 million re-serve members may be involuntarily activated for not more than 24consecutive months.

J Full Mobilization: In time of war or a national emergency declared byCongress, or when otherwise authorized by law, all reserves may beactivated for the duration of the war or emergency and for 6 monthsthereafter.

For a more complete description of the levels of Reserve activation andOPCON and ADCON relationships with the COMAFFOR, see appendix H.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a unique and significant part ofthe nations mobility resources that may be activated to support the move-ment of forces into a theater. Selected civil aircraft from US airlines, con-tractually committed to CRAF, support Department of Defense (DOD)airlift requirements in emergencies when airlift need exceeds the capa-

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bility of military aircraft. Airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the vari-ous CRAF segments, and are ready for activation when needed. To pro-vide incentives for civil carriers to commit these aircraft to the CRAFprogram and to assure the United States of adequate airlift reserves, AirMobility Command (AMC) awards peacetime airlift contracts to civilianairlines that offer aircraft to the CRAF.

Three stages of incremental activation allow for tailoring an airlift forcesuitable for the contingency at hand. Stage I is for minor regional cri-ses, Stage II for major regional contingencies, and Stage III for peri-ods of national mobilization. The Commander in Chief, United StatesTransportation Command (USCINCTRANS), with approval of the Secre-tary of Defense, is the authority for all three stages of CRAF activation.During a crisis, if AMC has a need for additional aircraft, it may requestUSTRANSCOM take steps to activate the appropriate CRAF stage.

Each stage of CRAF activation is only used to the extent necessary toprovide the amount of civil augmentation airlift needed by DOD. Whennotified of call-up, the carrier response time to have its aircraft ready fora CRAF mission is 24 to 48 hours after the mission is assigned by AMC.The air carriers continue to operate and maintain the aircraft with theirresources; however, AMC controls the aircraft missions.

SUMMARY

The time and events between the start of a crisis and initiation of amilitary response vary greatly; many activities will probably be com-pressed, and many processes may run concurrently. However, the de-tailed attention given during the planning phase is the primary factor thatdetermines success. Two examples of military operations that influencedjoint planning reform were Operation EAGLE CLAW, the 1980 Iran hostagerescue attempt, and Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 operation in Grenada.Although many reasons exist for the difficulties experienced during thesetwo operations, the subsequent passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DefenseDepartment Reorganization Act of 1986 laid the foundation for OperationDESERT STORMs successful joint plan. That joint plan successfully and ef-fectively transitioned US forces from peace to conflict. One of the mainreasons the plan was successful was that there was a short, simple, cen-tralized chain of command. The following chapters explain these con-cepts further.

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CHAPTER THREE

ORGANIZING AIR FORCE FORCES

FUNDAMENTAL COMMAND AND ORGANIZATIONALCONCEPTS

Two central ideasthe principle of unity of command and thetenet of centralized control and decentralized executionunderpinthe way the Air Force organizes. In order to effect this, the Air Forcerequires a universally understood organizational structure that can sup-port joint and combined operations throughout the entire spectrum ofconflict. In any operation, a COMAFFOR is designated from the USAir Force and serves as the commander of US Air Force forces assignedand attached to the US Air Force component. Air Force elements de-ployed in an expeditionary role are designated as an Air and SpaceExpeditionary Task Force (ASETF). The COMAFFOR, with the ASETF,presents the JFC a task-organized, integrated package with the properbalance of force, sustainment, and force protection elements. The follow-ing discussion presents recommendations for organizing and operatingAir Force forces afield. Commanders should apply sound professionaljudgment to tailor their organizations and operations for the taskat hand and for the requirements within differing theaters.

For each joint operation, the operational and administrative responsi-bilities and authorities of the COMAFFOR are established through theoperational and administrative chains of command, respectively. Theoperational chain of command flows from the NCA through the com-mander of a combatant command (CINC) and, if established, any subor-dinate joint force commander(s), to the COMAFFOR. The Service admin-istrative chain of command flows from the NCA through the Secretary ofthe Air Force (SECAF), CSAF, MAJCOM, and NAF commanders.

It turned out to be another scrambledoutfitwith so many lines of responsibility,control, and coordination that it resembled a canof worms as you looked at it.

Lieutenant General George Kenneys initialassessment of one of his new commands

Australia, 1942

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Each CINCs COMAFFOR is the associated Air Force MAJCOM com-mander. For example, the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Commands(USCINCPACs) COMAFFOR is the Commander, Pacific Air Forces(PACAF). MAJCOM commanders may delegate COMAFFOR authoritiesto NAF commanders. For example, Commander, Air Combat Command(ACC) has delegated some authorities to Commander, Ninth Air Force(9 AF), who acts as COMAFFOR to USCINCCENT. Similarly, Commander,PACAF, has delegated some authorities to Commander, 7 AF, who acts asthe COMAFFOR to Commander, United States Forces Korea (COMUSFK).

THE AIR AND SPACE EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE

The ASETF is the designated organization to fulfill the JTF and JFACCcampaign objectives. An ASETF encompasses all Air Force forces assignedor attached to the JTF and includes other forces dedicated to the JTFmission provided via reachback. It provides the JFACC with a single pointof contact for air and space force capabilities in a task-organized,tailored package. Where appropriate, the functions of an ASETF can beaccomplished by an in-place NAF. The ASETF can be sized depending onthe level of conflict and the desired political and military objectives. Thecommand element includes the COMAFFOR, a staff, and a com-mand and control function. Like the force itself, the command ele-ment is tailored to the unit(s) and mission.

The NAF is the senior war-fighting echelon of the US Air Force.War-fighting NAFs conduct theater aerospace operations with assignedand attached forces through the AOC and train to perform this role as anintegral command and control (C2) element. Not all NAFs maintain thiscapability. A NAF conducts operations with assigned and attached forcesunder a command element. When participating in a joint operation, the

The Air and SpaceExpeditionary TaskForce provides JointForce Commanderstask-organized andtailored packages ofaerospace power.

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tasked NAF(s) will present US Air Force forces to the JFC within the frame-work of an ASETF. When an in-place NAF is tasked to support a JFC, theframework will be the same as an ASETF, but the in-place NAF will retainits NAF designation (e.g., 7 AF). The tasked NAF, for geographic combat-ant commands, and the COMAFFOR will be designated by the tasked AirForce component command.

When a CINC forms a JTF that includes Air Force forces, the associ-ated MAJCOM will form an ASETF or task an in-place NAF. The ASETFcommander is the COMAFFOR. The COMAFFOR may be a colonel tomajor general for an ASETF that is subordinate to a NAF, or the NAFcommander will be the COMAFFOR when the NAF is tasked in-place oras the ASETF. The COMAFFOR normally will not also function ascommander of one of the operating forces (e.g., wing commander orgroup commander).

The COMAFFORs responsibilities, authorities, and command relation-ships with regard to Air Force forces, attached to the ASETF/in-place NAFbut assigned to one of the functional combatant commanders(USCINCTRANS, USCINCSPACE, USCINCSTRAT, and USCINCSOC), areas directed by competent authority through the operational and adminis-trative chains of command. Normally, the COMAFFOR has completeADCON over assigned forces and specified ADCON over attached forces,regardless of US Air Force component.

PRESENTATION OF US AIR FORCE FORCES

The Command Element

The command element for expeditionary air and space forces has threemain components: the commander, an appropriately sized staff, and ad-equate C2 facilities to direct and support the operating forces and interact

NAF COMAFFOR JFACC

Wing COMAFFOR JFACC

Group COMAFFOR

Squadron

Normal JFACC Echelon

Lowest JFACC Echelon

Lowest COMAFFOR Echelon

Lowest Echelon of Force Presentation

Figure 3.1. Guidelines for Presenting Forces in Echelon

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with the JFC. The C2 mechanism has two faces: the operational and thefunctional.

J The operational C2 center for Air Force forces is the AOC. TheAOC will be the senior operations center and focal point for the com-mand and control of air and space forces in Air Force-only operations.The fundamental principle of this system is centralized planning andcontrol through the AOC, with decentralized execution by subordinateorganizations and elements. Note: there should only be one AOC