Advanced High-Speed Aircraft - Princeton University

Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

April 1980

NTIS order #PB83-110585

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600060

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003 -00745-2

Foreword

In April 1978, the House Science and Technology Committee requested that theOffice of Technology Assessment perform a technology assessment “to provide a freshlook at the impact of eventual widescale introduction of advanced high-speed air-craft. ” The specific issue raised was whether the potential benefits of advanced super-sonic transport aircraft—or second generation supersonic transports—justify increasesin the levels of Federal funding for generic research and development in supersoniccruise technology. This request was subsequently endorsed by the Senate Committeeon Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

Responding to this request, OTA proposed a broad and long-term study to exam-ine the potential for advanced air transport technology, both passenger and cargo. Theobjectives of this study were to examine the economic, environmental, energy, soci-etal, and safety impacts of advances in the technology of high-speed aircraft, com-muter aircraft, and air cargo. To bring the scope of the assessment within manageablebounds, we focused strictly on the aircraft technologies and excluded the examinationof such areas as the airport and terminal area capacity and the air traffic control proc-ess, all of which could affect the convenience, efficiency, and safety of our future air-port system.

This report is the first in a series and deals solely with advanced high-speed air-craft, including both subsonic and supersonic. Three other reports to be published inthe near future comprise the remaining parts of this assessment. They are: “Financingand Program Alternatives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, ” “Air Service to SmallCommunities, ” and “Air Cargo. ”

In conducting this assessment, OTA was assisted by an Advisory Panel and aWorking Group each comprised of representatives from Government agencies, theaerospace industry, public interest groups, financial institutions, and universities. Thecontributions of these individuals and members of their respective organizations weresignificant and extremely important to the outcome of this study.

JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

. . .Ill

.

Impact of Advanced Air TransportTechnology Advisory Panel

Robert W. Simpson, ChairmanDirector, Flight Transportation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Jane H. BartlettPresidentArlington League of Women Voters

Ray E. BatesVice PresidentDouglas Aircraft Co.

Norman BradburnDirectorNational Opinion Research Center

Frederick Bradley, Jr.Vice PresidentCitibank, N.A.

John G. BorgerVice President of EngineeringPan American World Airways, Inc.

Secor D. BrowneSecor D. Browne Associates, Inc.

F. A. ClevelandVice President, EngineeringLockheed Aircraft Corp.

Elwood T. DriverVice ChairmanNational Transportation Safety Board

James C. FletcherBurroughs Corp.

William K. ReillyPresidentThe Conservation Foundation

David S. StemplerChairman, Government Affairs Committee of

the Board of DirectorsAirline Passengers Association, Inc.

Janet St. MarkPresidentSMS Associates

John WildExecutive DirectorNational Transportation Policy Study

Commission*

Holden W. WithingtonVice President, EngineeringBoeing Commercial Airplane Co.

Michael YarymovychVice President, EngineeringRockwell International

Observers:

Charles R. FosterAssociate Administrator for Aviation

StandardsFederal Aviation Administration

James J. Kramer**Associate Administrator for Aeronautics

and Space TechnologyNational Aeronautics and Space

Administration

*Commission was dissolved Dec. 31, 1979.* ● Resigned from panel during conduct of study after leaving NASA.

iv

Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Project Staff

Eric H. Willis, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Transportation Division

Robert L. Maxwell, Transportation Program Manager

Lemoine V. Dickinson, Jr., Project DirectorJerry D. Ward, Co-Project Leader

Yupo Chan Larry L. Jenney Jacquelynne Mulder

David Seidman Paula Walden Arthur L. Webster

Contractors

F. Edward McLean, Technical Advisor to Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Working Group

William E. Howard, Editor

Advanced High-Speed AircraftWorking Group

Richard Alpagh William SensChief, Nonhighway Transportation Pratt and Whitney Engine Co.

BranchDepartment of Energy

Jane H. BartlettPresidentArlington League of Women Voters

Richard D. FitzsimmonsDirector, Advanced Program PlanningDouglas Aircraft Co.

Jack I. HopeManagerHAECO Inc.

Publishing Office

Armand SigallaChief, Technology Preliminary DesignBoeing Commercial Airplane Co.

John WeslerDirector of Environment and EnergyFederal Aviation Administration

Bruce R. WrightLockheed California Co.

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joanne Heming

Contents

Chapter Page

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Current State of Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Variable-Cycle Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technology Validation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fuel Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Financing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Foreign Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Energy Issues: Availability and Price of Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Issues: Noise, Sonic Boom, and Atmospheric Pollution.. . . .World Requirements for New Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Societal Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Study Findings in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Advanced High-Speed Aircraft: The Next 30 Years . . . . .Outlook for New Aircraft Types . . . . . .:....... . . . . .World Requirements for New Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Beginnings of Supersonic Transport—The Concorde, . . .The American Supersonic Transport (SST) Program. . . .Current Status of Supersonic Technology . . . . . . . . . . . .

Variable-Cycle Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technology Validation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prospective Issues. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Variables Affecting a Supersonic Transport Market . . . .The Path to Improved Productivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cost of Productivity for Supersonic Aircraft . . . . . . . . . .The Impact of Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Potential Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Energy Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Stage Lengths and Environmental Conditions. . . . . . . . .The Cost of Environmental Acceptability . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prospects for Future Long-Range Aircraft: Five ScenariosProjected Fleet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Types of Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .% . . . . . . . . . . .

Economic Issues: An Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Effects of Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Energy: Fuel Price and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Present Fuel Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fuel Price Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Comparative Fuel Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Analysis of Energy Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents—continued

Chapter Page

Alternative Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Application to Supersonic Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

VII. Environmental Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Sonic Boom Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Cosmic Ray Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

VIII. Supersonic Transportation and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Impact of Increased Long-Distance Travel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Communications and Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94The Future Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

IX. Competitive Considerations and Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Identification of the Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . ..101Alternative Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103Beyond Technology Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............104

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

1. World Requirements—New Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32. NASA Supersonic Cruise Research Program R&D Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333. Progress in Aircraft Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404. Free-World Commercial Jet Fleet With and Without ASTs—Year 2010 . ......., . . . . . 555. Characteristics of Four Projected Aircraft Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

6. Economic Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647. Present and Projected Commercial Air Service and Fuel Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708. Estimated Fuel Efficiency of Advanced Subsonic and Supersonic Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . 729. Energy Impacts of AST-III: Scenario l. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

10. Energy Impacts of AST-I and AST-III: Scenario 3 , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7311. Energy Impacts of AST-II or AST-III: Scenario 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7412. Summary of Energy Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7413. Properties of Some Candidate Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

14. Comparison of a Supersonic Transport Aircraft Fueled With Liquid Hydrogen orJet A Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

15. Advantages and Disadvantages of Liquid Hydrogen Compared to Synthetic Jet Fuel . . . 80

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

l. Aircraft Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42. Relative Total Costs of Supersonic and Subsonic Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53. Effect of Fuel Price on Aircraft Operating Cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134. The Relationship of Aircraft Productivity and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405. Influence of Speed on Aircraft Productivity and Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426. History of Direct Operating Costs, 1930-75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437. Influence of Market on Unit Cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Contents—continued

Figure No. Page

8. Relationship of Aircraft Productivity, Technology, and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459. AST Market Shares, New York-Paris Route in 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . 46

10. Impact of Relative Fares on Fleet Mix, New York-Paris Route in 1995. ..., . . . 4711. Commodity Input to U.S. Balance of Trade—1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5412. Scenario Timetables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5713. Time Between Introduction of AST-I and AST-III v. Market Split . . . . . . . . . . 6614. The Price of Coal-Derived Aviation Fuels as a Function of Coal Cost . . . . . . . . 7815. The Cost and Uncertainty of Noise Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8716. Predicted Effect of Improved Aircraft Technology on the Ozone Layer. . . . . . . 9017. Average Auto Trip Rate v. Trip Time. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9518. Long-Term Economic Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9619. Typical Aircraft Cash Flow Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............10020. Phases of Advanced Transport Development (SCR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10321. Cost of a Representative AST Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104

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Chapter I

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The following are the major findings of theOTA assessment on advanced high-speed air-craft—both subsonic and supersonic types—inthe context of major uncertainties over worldenergy supplies:

● Barring some major disruption in thegrowth of the world economy and assum-ing reasonable success in coping with in-creasingly costly energy, the total marketfor air travel and commercial aircraftshould continue to expand in the future.Growth in passenger-miles and airlineroute miles over the next 30 years will beclosely tied to the price and availability offuel. Accordingly, the demand for ad-vanced long-range aircraft could vary from2,200 to 3,300 units. This would representsales by manufacturers on the order of $150billion in 1979 dollars. (See table 1.)

Table 1 .—World Requirements-New Aircraft

Potential sales1980 thru 2010 1979 dollars

Short and medium range(up to 2,700 nautical miles) 6,500-8,500a $235 billion

Long range(over 2,700 nautical miles) . 2,200-3,300a $150 billion

aEstjmates exclude U S S R and the People’s Republlc of China.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

● While supersonic aircraft might satisfy aportion of this long-range market, it is ex-pected that the market will be dominatedby subsonic aircraft—at least in this cen-tury. Substantial improvements in technol-ogy for subsonic aircraft may provide theincentive for new designs. To offset risingfuel costs, manufacturers already are devel-oping subsonic aircraft with more energy-efficient engines, such as the Boeing 767and 757. This trend probably will continueand will most likely be fed by more techni-cal advances in aerodynamic efficiency,lighter materials, and still more efficient en-

●

●

gines. These could help lower operatingcosts, energy usage, and aircraft emissions.

The most compelling argument for an ad-vanced supersonic transport (AST) is im-proved aircraft productivity—seat-milesgenerated by an aircraft per unit of time.Since the advent of jets, major productivityimprovements have resulted almost entire-ly from increases in size. (See figure 1.) Butthe potential for further productivity gainsthrough scaling up aircraft size is not as im-pressive as in the past. Thus, while aircraftmay be further stretched, the market forlarger subsonic jets will be constrained bythe number of airline routes with sufficient-ly high passenger densities to warrant plac-ing them into service.

Increased speed offers another avenuefor major productivity improvement. Anaircraft able to fly at better than 1,600 mph(Mach 2 + ) can transport twice as manypassengers a day on long-distance flights(more than 2,700 nautical miles) as a sub-sonic aircraft of equivalent size. This higherspeed provides a significant timesaving forthe passenger on these long-distance jour-neys.

The drawback in the past from pursu-ing speed-derived productivity has beencost. The productivity could have beenachieved, but at too high a proportionateincrease in total operating costs (TOC). Inother words, higher productivity does notnecessarily mean profitability. Over time,however, this cost penalty has been de-creasing—the difference in the potentialcost of supersonic aircraft compared tosubsonic aircraft has been shrinking. Whilerising energy costs could slow the trend, itis reasonable to expect that through techno-logical improvements this convergence willcontinue. To the extent that it does, theeconomic penalty of supersonic cruisingaircraft will become less. (See figure 2.)

3

4 ● Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

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I,/-

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.—

Ch. I—Summary of Findings ● 5

Figure 2.—Relative Total Costs of Supersonic and Subsonic Aircraft

3

2

1

Props ‘ \

1930 1950 1970 1990 2010

Year of introduction into commercial service

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment based on industry data.

●

●

Assuming that an economically viable andenvironmentally acceptable AST could bedeveloped in the 1990-2010 period, itsgreater productivity could command salesof about 400 aircraft worth about $50 bil-lion in 1979 dollars. This would representapproximately one-third of the total salesanticipated for the long-range marketthrough 2010. AST sales would mean fewersales of subsonic aircraft. It is estimatedthat 400 ASTs could replace approximately800 subsonic aircraft.

While the market outlook for an AST ap-pears to be inviting, the actual develop-ment, production, and operation of such anaircraft are clouded by major uncertainties.Two principal uncertainties are fuel priceand availability and the technical feasibilityand cost of satisfying increased communitysensitivity to noise around airports.

—Fuel price and availability: There aregreat unknowns as to the future priceand availability of fuel. However, giventhat an AST would have fuel consump-tion rates at least 1.5 to 2 times greaterper seat-mile than equivalently sized sub-sonic transports, it would be more sensi-tive to fuel price increases than a subson-ic aircraft. Therefore, future fuel price in-creases could have a larger impact on thetotal operating cost of an AST than on asubsonic transport and could be a signifi-cant factor in determining its future via-bility.

Further, fuel for transport aircraftmust be available on a worldwide basis.Examination of alternative fuels such assynthetics or liquid hydrogen or methaneshould be continued.

—Noise: One of the greatest obstacles ap-pears to be the ability of an AST to cope

—

6 . Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

●

with diminishing public tolerance towardnoise, especially in the vicinity of air-ports. Public attitudes are likely to bringabout more stringent noise standards inthe future, affecting both supersonic andsubsonic aircraft as well as airport opera-tions. While present supersonic work bythe National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration (NASA) indicates the possi-bility of meeting the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) (FAR part 36,stage 2) noise regulations, more researchand technology development, at furtherexpense, would be needed to meet morestringent regulations. Until the uncer-tainty over changes in the regulations isresolved and the uncertainty about su-personic aircraft noise is reduced, air-craft manufacturers may be reluctant tocommit themselves to a new supersonicaircraft program. The investment wouldbe too large to risk failure of not meetinga more stringent noise standard.

The Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) pro-gram conducted by NASA since the Ameri-can supersonic transport (SST)* was can-celed by Congress in 1971 has identifiedand made advances in several technologyareas—aerodynamics, structures, propul-sion, and noise reduction on takeoff andlanding. Significant improvements may beachieved with further work, but even ifthese technology advances are validatedthere can be no guarantee that the aero-space industry would act on them. The costof applying this technology to the designand development of a suitable aircraftcould run to $2 billion in 1979 dollars.Tooling up and starting production couldrequire at least an additional $5 billion to$7 billion–sums believed to be far beyondthe resources of any one company. T h efinancial risk could be reduced by the for-mation of a domestic consortium of two ormore aerospace companies, or perhaps byan international consortium that would in-

‘Throughout, the abbreviation SST refers only to the U.S.supersonic transport program that was begun in 1963 and termi-nated in 1971.

elude foreign manufacturers. Formation ofa corporation similar to that of COMSATis another alternative which may be appli-cable for undertaking such a program. *

Foreign manufacturers are moving ahead inthe subsonic field. Their willingness to em-bark on an AST appears to be tempered bythe same uncertainties as those facing theU.S. industry. However, the supersonicarea does present them with another open-ing where they could alter the longstandingU.S. competitive advantage in the sale oflong-range aircraft. Thus, given the prob-ability of an expanded market for air trans-portation in the future and the importanceto our domestic economy and our interna-tional trade balance of sustaining U.S. lead-ership in commercial aviation, it appearsthat it would be in our national interest tokeep our options open in the supersonicfield.

Accordingly, it appears appropriate tocarry out a generic R&D** program to pre-serve the supersonic option. This programshould be adequate to maintain the skillsand knowledge from which a future devel-opment project could be effectively initi-ated and should produce more factual in-formation to reduce the technical uncer-tainties. The objectives of this generic R&Dprogram should be carefully defined toyield information that would facilitate a de-cision on whether or not to proceed with anAST at a later date. The financial risks alsoneed to be more fully understood. If Con-gress wishes to maintain the U.S. SST op-tion, then the existing level of Federal sup-port is not considered adequate to accom-plish this. R&D, however, will not shedlight on those external factors governingthe viability of an AST—the increasing sen-

● An analysis of these alternatives is reported in a soon to bepublished OTA report entitled “Financing and Program Alter-natives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft .“

● ● In this report, generic R&D is that process of verifying andvalidating technologies leading to a state of “technology readiness”for development of a specific product. At a state of “technologyreadiness, ” R&D activities can move from the generic to the speci-fic. Specific R&D is that part of the process where a product or afamily of products is defined. When the term “research” is used inthis report, it refers to generic R&D.

Ch. l—Summary of Findings ● 7

///us frat/ons Courtesy of McL)onne// Doug/as and Boe/ng Aircraft CO

Artists’ concepts of advanced supersonic transport


sitivity of the public to aircraft noise, the plies, and the availability of financing forprice and availability of adequate fuel sup- such a major capital commitment.

DISCUSSION

This study examines the prospects for intro-ducing new types of large, long-range aircraft—subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic, beyondthe next generation of scheduled aircraft such asthe Boeing 767 and 757—into commercial serv-ice over the next 30 years and weighs the finan-cial and other risks inherent in acquiring thetechnology for developing these advanced trans-ports. Traditionally, the generic R&D fromwhich subsequent generations of commercialaircraft have evolved has been supported by theDepartment of Defense, by NASA, and by theU.S. aerospace industry. In the subsonic field,this trend seems likely to continue, althoughNASA’s ro le may become comparativelygreater than the military’s in the pursuit of morefuel-efficient and quieter transport aircraft tosatisfy future environmental concerns.

Generic R&D leading to an AST that is safe,economical, and environmentally acceptable in-volves a different supporting structure. Becausethe military is not aggressively pursuing a super-sonic cruise aircraft, no suitable engine or air-frame is expected to emerge from the Depart-ment of Defense R&D programs. Since the can-cellation of the U.S. SST program in 1971, tech-nological development at a low level of efforthas been carried out by NASA and the aero-space industry. It is generally agreed that con-siderable additional technological developmentwould be necessary to reduce the technical risksof embarking on an AST to a level acceptable toprivate investors.

Therefore, a central purpose of this assess-ment is to identify for Congress the positive andnegative impacts of future commercial super-sonic transports. These will need to be takeninto account in considering the level of FederalGovernment funding of NASA’s generic R&Dleading to possible development of an AST, asecond-generation aircraft with performance ca-pabilities beyond the British-French Concorde.In this perspective, our assessment is not a mar-ket study of the prospects for a specific super-sonic aircraft design. It is rather an evaluationof whether technological research toward a classof possible future supersonic aircraft seems sen-sible in the long run and whether mastery of su-personic technology in this country will be animportant factor in our international competi-tiveness in the future.

In looking at the overall issue of supportingfurther research into supersonic cruise aircraft—and what might be gained from it—this studyassesses where the technology stands now andexamines the directions it might take. The realissue now is whether the long-term promise ofsome kind of supersonic transport—to be de-signed perhaps in 5 to 10 years—is sufficient tojustify getting the technology ready. If we keepwith past practice, the burden of financing suchresearch would fall in large measure on the pub-lic treasury, which is why the question was orig-inally put to OTA.

CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGY

Present supersonic technology is not likely to aerodynamic or other solution to the presentproduce an aircraft during the time frame con- Federal ban on over land supersonic commercialsidered in this study that would be able to fly flights appears to lie many years away. Theat supersonic speeds without producing a sonic question of “solutions” to the sonic boom isboom. Although some theoretical work has critical in looking at where technology is headedbeen done on “shaping” the sonic boom, an because restricting any proposed AST to super-


sonic flight over water also restricts the mar-ket—and possibly the overall viability of asupersonic aircraft program.

The Concorde represents proven technologydating back to 1960. This aircraft has shownthat a supersonic airliner can be operated safelyfrom existing airports. Its major deficiencies aresmall size (about 100 seats), high fuel consump-tion, and engines designed before noise regula-tions were imposed.

Since 1971, NASA’s SCR program has gener-ated knowledge that could realize sizable gainsover the Concorde. Among other advances, thework has yielded a new wing configuration thatwind tunnel tests indicate would result in muchimproved aerodynamics and a lift-to-drag ratioin the range of 9 to 10, approximately 20 percentmore efficient than the Concorde in supersonic

cruise. Advanced computational and finite-ele-ment modeling techniques have been developed,reducing the structural design time for majoraircraft components from 3 months to 1 weekand offering promise of lower developmentcosts.

NASA’s studies indicate that major weight re-ductions (10 to 30 percent) and cost savings (upto 50 percent) in aircraft structures may beachieved through superplastic forming and con-current diffusion bonding of titanium. Variousforms of high-temperature polyimide compositestructures with further weight-cutting possibil-ities also have been investigated.

Variable= Cycle Engine

In the propulsion area, a concept has beenproposed for a variable-cycle engine which may

Photo credif, Nat/ona/ Aeronautics and Space Adrn/n(sfraf/on

Variable-cycle experimental engine testing


be able to operate at nearly optimal fuel efficien-cy while cruising at either supersonic (turbojet)or subsonic (turbofan) speeds. Moreover, the in-ternal configuration of the engine would permitchanges in the exit nozzle velocity profile thatmay lower the sideline noise at takeoff and land-ing.

A body of opinion within the aviation indus-try holds that, should the variable-cycle engineprove itself in a development and test program,it would be a significant factor in designing aviable AST. The engine’s promise is this: if ableto operate optimally at both subsonic and su-personic speeds, the engine would enhance thepossibility that an AST could be integrated intoregular airline route structures. For example, itwould be possible to originate AST service toLondon or Tokyo from Chicago, Denver, orDallas. The over land legs would be flown sub-sonically and the over water legs supersonically.

Technology Validation Program

In August 1979, in response to a request fromthe House Science and Technology Committee,NASA outlined possible plans which were iden-tified as focused initiatives in a number of aero-nautical fields. In supersonic cruise research,NASA concentrated on propulsion, airframe,and aircraft systems technology. In the propul-sion area, the program would be broadened toinclude research on a variable-flow propulsionsystem and an advanced core engine system thatwould be integrated with the variable-cycle ex-perimental engine. The aim would be to producedesign options for an array of supersonic air-craft applications, plus potential military ap-plications. The airframe technology programwould concentrate on nacelle/airframe integra-tion and acoustic suppression design methodsand high-temperature structures problems, in-cluding the selection, fabrication, and testing oftitanium and composite materials. The aircraftsystems technology effort would identify thoseportions of the engine and airframe programsrequiring inflight investigation and validation.NASA estimates it would take up to 8 years toaccomplish these objectives. If successful, theprogram would lead to a state of “technology

readiness, ” which would be a decision point forthe aerospace industry on whether further de-velopment of an AST appears feasible.

The proposed NASA program would cost$662 million (1981 dollars) over an 8-year peri-od, as opposed to an alternate program offeredby NASA in 1978, which was priced at $561million (1979 dollars) over a similar 8-year peri-od. In addition to these two plans, again inresponse to a request from the House Scienceand Technology Committee, NASA prepared aplan leading directly to “technology readiness”in industry. This plan would sustain full com-petition in the U.S. industry and would requireas much as $1.9 billion (1977 dollars). The threewidely different plans have raised a question forCongress as to what is the appropriate level ofFederal support for supersonic research, becausea decision to embark on any one plan wouldmean a substantial increase over the approx-imately $10 million a year that has been in-vested in SCR since 1971.

Fuel Considerations

In the event an AST is eventually developed,the aircraft would be designed for a service lifeof about 20 to 25 years. This means that whenthe time for decision on development arrives, inthe late 1980’s by NASA’s timetable, future fuelsupplies for the aircraft and confidence in fuelprice stability must be assured from the onset,

The impending petroleum shortage hasprompted the Federal Government to support alarge-scale program to develop alternate energysources. These efforts may begin to bear fruit inthe late 1980’s, putting the Nation on a differentenergy track. If that track is synthetic petro-leum, resulting in Jet A fuel with characteristicssimilar to Jet A from petroleum, only minormodifications would have to be made in aircraftsystems to use it. But if liquid hydrogen,methane, or a fuel dissimilar to Jet A shouldbecome the track, radical changes might be re-quired in future aircraft design concepts in-cluding fuel systems and engines. Thus, uncer-tainty hangs over what fuel a future aircraftshould be designed to use. While that designdecision does not have to be made now, it is a


reason for adopting a cautious approach in both program and in continued examination of possi-the funding and the content of the technology ble alternative fuels.

FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS

Even if the energy picture becomes clarified,manufacturers still may be hesitant to embarkon a full-scale development program because ofthe cost of design and development, estimatedto be around $2 billion in 1979 dollars. An addi-tional estimated $5 billion to $7 billion would beneeded to tool up and start production. Suchsums are far beyond the present financial re-sources of any one U.S. aerospace company.This situation could change over the next sev-eral years. But it remains questionable whetherthe industry and private capital markets would

However, alternative financing arrangementsbeyond the generic R&D phase, may be possiblewithout direct U.S. Federal Government sup-port. These options include formation of do-mestic or international consortia involving twoor more manufacturers and creation of aCOMSAT-type public corporation to assumeresponsibility for producing the aircraft. Thesemanagement and financing options are exam-ined and reported in a soon to be published vol-ume on the “Financing and Program Alter-natives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft .“

be able on their own at the point of “technologyreadiness” to initiate activities leading to full-scale production.

FOREIGN COMPETITION

The more advanced a supersonic aircraft iseconomically and environmentally at the timeof introduction, the better its chances in themarketplace. The level of technology availableat the time of design makes the difference. Whilethis may be a truism, it needs to be kept in mindin deciding the pace of a research program de-signed to keep our options open in the super-sonic transport field. The main reason for main-taining options is the size of the potential ASTmarket and the threat of losing some or all of itto foreign competition.

Our assessment indicates potential aircraftsales of about 400 for an AST that could flysupersonically only over water. This wouldamount to expected sales totaling $50 billion in1979 dollars in the 1990-2010 period—or ap-proximately one-third of the value of all sales oflong-range transports anticipated over the next

30 years. This amount would be a significantsum for the U.S. aircraft industry to lose to for-eign manufacturers.

How great is the threat of foreign competi-tion? Though we were unable to collect in-formation on the Russian TU-144, manufactur-ers in France and England are now engaged ingeneric AST research and have the same doubtsas the U.S. industry. They also believe risingfuel prices and the expense of hurdling the tech-nical barriers of an AST—restrictions on air-craft noise and increasing total operatingcosts—make the development and productionof an AST too risky at the present time. Thus, itappears that the threat of foreign competition isnot close at hand or at a point where it mightdictate the pace of technology development bythe United States.

Ch. l—Summary of Findings ● 1 3

ENERGY ISSUES: AVAILABILITY AND PRICE OF FUEL

Projections of steadily rising airline trafficover the next 30 years may be optimistic. An ex-panded market for both advanced subsonic andsupersonic aircraft may not materialize. If themarket does not materialize, the questions deal-ing with the impact of advanced aircraft aremoot. The controlling factors could be the risingcost and limited availability of fuel. Today, theworld’s commercial aircraft fleet, excluding theSoviet Union and the People’s Republic ofChina, uses approximately 1.5 million barrelsper day (MMbbl/d) of fuel.

Estimates indicate that by the year 2010 theworld commercial air fleet fuel usage couldrepresent about 3.5 MMbbl/d. The majority ofairline consumption will continue to be forshort- to medium-range service with the long-range aircraft using about 15 percent of thetotal. However, a fleet of 400 ASTs could in-crease the worldwide petroleum consumption ofcommercial aircraft by about 10 percent. Fur-thermore, if serious shortages occur, air trafficmay be drastically reduced. This would favormore energy-efficient subsonic aircraft, be-

cause, by current estimates, they would con-sume approximately half the amount of fuel perseat-mile as future supersonic aircraft. The high-er fuel consumption of an AST, associated withrising fuel price, would make the increased ener-gy costs of supersonic aircraft greater than thoseof subsonic aircraft.

Over time, the cost penalty for improved pro-ductivity has been decreasing and, as previouslyshown in figure 2, the difference in the totaloperating cost of supersonic aircraft comparedto subsonic aircraft has been shrinking. Further,if an economically and environmentally accept-able AST could be developed, it is reasonable toexpect that this convergence would continue.However, rising fuel costs could offset the gainsto be expected from improved AST technologyand might actually cause the curves to diverge.

Figure 3 compares the estimated total operat-ing costs (TOC) for an advanced subsonic trans-port (ASUBT) with those of an AST as a resultof increasing fuel price, relative to all othercosts. As can be seen, because of higher fuel

Figure 3.—Effect of Fuel Price on Aircraft Operating Cost

11 ‘1978 actual ~ Supersonic

10 — aircraft9

8

7

6

54[

aircraft

3 –

2 —

1 —1 I I I 1 I I 1 1

.20 .40 .60 .80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00

Fuel price per gallon(constant 1978 dollars)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment based on industry data

1.4 ● Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

usage, the supersonic aircraft is more sensitive nificant factor in determining the economic via-to fuel price increases than a subsonic aircraft. bility of a future commercial AST.

There is much disagreement over the futureprice and availability of fuel. If all other effects On the other hand, labor cost could also haveare held constant, figure 3 shows that the ratio a major effect on TOC. Rising labor costs wouldof supersonic aircraft TOC to subsonic aircraft probably be more detrimental to subsonic air-TOC would rise from about 1.2 at $0.50 per gal- craft economics than to supersonics due to thelon to approximately 1.4 at $1.30 per gallon and higher productivity of flight crews in supersonic1.5 at $2.00 per gallon. Fuel price could be a sig- aircraft operations,

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: NOISE, SONIC BOOM,AND ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION

The most critical environmental issue facingfuture supersonic aircraft is the ability to meetincreasing community sensitivity to airportnoise. In the case of the Concorde, the principalcontroversy surrounding permission to operateat Washington’s Dunes Airport and New York’sJohn F. Kennedy Airport was the anticipated ad-ditional noise in neighboring communities. TheConcorde was placed at a disadvantage becauseit had already evolved before noise rules wereestablished for any class of aircraft. Since thestart of operations, carefully controlled takeoffand landing procedures have minimized noisecomplaints. But, it should be recalled that thenoise issue played a major part in the cancella-tion of the prior U.S. SST program in 1971 andmost probably will be a major factor in the con-sideration of any future U.S. SST program.

The noise issue has to be looked at in the con-text of total aircraft operations expected in thefuture, If air traffic expands substantially a n dthere is a major increase in the number of jettransports, communities will be exposed tomore noise—even if future subsonic transportsare made quieter. The number of operations bysupersonic aircraft would be relatively smallcompared to the total. But nonetheless theywould add to the total noise—and therefore becontroversial. Furthermore, the public seems tobe becoming less tolerant toward noise andmore active in opposing environmental degra-dation.

Currently, it seems likely that communitieswill press for more stringent airport noiseregulations. It may be some time before final

standards are promulgated. Until the uncertain-ty over changes in the regulations is resolved,aircraft manufacturers may be reluctant to com-mit themselves to a new supersonic aircraft pro-gram. Their investment would be too large torisk failure of not meeting noise standards.

The sonic boom is another environmentalconcern that remains from the first SST pro-gram and the Concorde. Present Federal regula-tions prohibit civil aircraft from generatin g

sonic booms that reach the ground. This effec-tively bars present and future SSTs from oper-ating supersonically over land, forcing them tofly at subsonic speeds and at less efficient fuelconsumption rates. Research indicates theremay be ways to lower sonic boom pressures,but practical aerodynamic solutions appear tobe many years off.

Research to ameliorate sonic booms should beemphasized because of its long-term importanceto an economically and environmentally accept-able, AST. The capability of cruising superson-ically over land would increase the market po-tential of an AST and might eventually permit itto replace most long-range subsonic transports.

In 1971 there was considerable concern thatengine emissions from a fleet of supersonic air-liners would deplete the ozone in the upper at-mosphere. A reduction in this protective shieldagainst the Sun’s rays, it was feared, would in-crease the incidence of skin cancer. However,studies since then, including an FAA programnow in progress to monitor the upper atmos-phere, indicate that previous predictions of

—

Ch. l—Summary of Findings ● 1 5

Photo credit Errv/ronrnenta/ Pro fecf/on Agency

Noise pollution


ozone loss through subsonic and supersonic air- istry and physics is still growing and, as newcraft pollution appear to have been substantial- data and models become available, it will bely overstated. The science of atmospheric chem- clearer whether the current outlook is justified.

WORLD REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT

If a solution can be found for the world’s oil aircraft, which could be on the order of $150 bil-problem and national economies are stable and lion in 1979 dollars over this period, is expectedgrowing, the demand for air travel and for more to be dominated by continued production of ex-aircraft—both additional and replacement—is isting widebody jets and by the introduction oflikely to expand substantially in the next 30 new models, such as the Boeing 767 and 757years. Technical advances in subsonic jets could now under development.make them quieter and possibly more energy ef-ficient. Greater energy efficiency could affectthe cost of air travel favorably by permitting thereal prices for air transport services to decrease.

Approximately 4,700 jet aircraft are in opera-tion around the world today, excluding thefleets of the Soviet Union and People’s Republicof China. Within the next 30 years, the total re-quirements for new aircraft in the jet fleet couldtotal 7,000 to 12,000 aircraft, as already pre-sented in table 1, if projected demand for airtravel materializes. The market for long-range

In addition to increasing fuel efficiency, itmay be possible to stretch further the body ofsubsonic jets, thereby increasing the payload,and thus improving productivity. Seating for upto 800 passengers is considered technically feasi-ble. However, the demand for such large air-craft would be limited because of the small num-ber of routes with travel densities sufficientlyhigh to warrant putting them into service. Theonly other avenue to significantly higher pro-ductivity is increased speed. The relationship of

Photo credit’ Boeing Aircraft Co

Model of the Boeing 757 now under development

Ch. I—Summary of Findings ● 17

improved productivity resulting from increasedsize and higher speed was illustrated in figure 1.

Thus, in an expanding commercial air system,supersonic transports might satisfy a portion ofthe long-range market and complement subson-ic service. The logic for an AST is that at twicethe speed of sound it could carry about twice asmany passengers per day as subsonic aircraft ofequivalent size. As noted previously, the majordrawback is the cost of developing an AST thatis both economically viable and environmental-ly acceptable.

If the technological problems and uncertain-ties concerning fuel availability, fuel price, andnoise are resolved, there could be a market forabout 400 ASTs through the year 2010, with ex-pected sales of about $50 billion in 1979 dollars.

In arriving at this estimate, it was noted that theConcorde, despite its size limitation, has dem-onstrated both customer appeal and safe super-sonic commercial operations. On its NorthAtlantic runs, the aircraft has operated ataverage of 70-percent capacity, even thoughfares are up to three times higher thanaverage coach fares on subsonic aircraft.

anthethe

If the problem of sonic boom can be solved toeliminate the annoyance on the ground and fur-ther technical advances are made to lower totaloperating costs, there is a greater potentialmarket for a third-generation AST that couldfly supersonically over land. Thus, it is possibleto regard continuing generic R&D on an AST asa promising direction in the continuing evolu-tion of aircraft technology.

SOCIETAL CONCERNS

For most Americans, the question of pursuingresearch on a supersonic aircraft was renderedmoot by the cancellation of the previous SSTprogram in 1971. The inability of the Concordeto become a paying proposition in terms of air-craft sales can be expected to reinforce public at-titudes that further Government support for re-search in this area is not warranted.

Furthermore, the Government may be subjectto criticism for involvement in a program thatmay lead to eventual development of an aircraftperceived by some as being affordable only byprivileged classes. In this connection, there alsomay be negative reactions to an aircraft that is ahigh user of energy in an era of rising fuel costsand dwindling energy supplies.

Another unknown that could affect the futureof air travel is the continuing revolution intelecommunications. Over the next 30 years,improved electronic devices may make it easier

to transmit more data, voice, and picture in-formation and could substitute for many typesof travel. At the same time, better electroniccommunication could also stimulate travel bymaking more people aware of new opportuni-ties in other places, both for business and rec-reation. It is too early to say with certainty whatthe effect of telecommunications will be onfuture air travel.

The perceived impacts on society of an ASTwill be extremely important in determining itsacceptability. Prospective concerns about ozonedepletion, noise, and sonic boom were criticalfactors in the cancellation of the previous U.S.SST program. Undoubtedly they will continueto be major considerations in decisions on anyfuture U.S. supersonic aircraft program—alongwith how much a program would cost and thelevel of Federal involvement in such a program.

.—.


STUDY FINDINGS IN BRIEF

In sum, the study of advanced high-speed air- . Support of a generic R&D program appearscraft has found: appropriate. This would:

—maintain the option for future develop-. The long-term prospects for advanced ment of an AST, and

supersonic transports are significant and —clarify and reduce the technical uncer-real.

• The uncertainties

●

real. Specifically:

tainties, however, it would not shed lighton those external factors governing the

are also significant and viability of an AST: the increasing sensi-tivity of the public to aircraft noise, the

—fuel price and availability, price and availability of adequate fuels 4s

—noise, and supplies, and the availability of financing—market size. for such a major capital commitment.

● If Congress wishes to maintain the U.S. su-The potential threat from foreign com- personic option, then the existing level ofpetitors appears tempered by the same un- Federal support is not considered adequatecertainties. to accomplish this.

Chapter II

ADVANCED HIGH-SPEED AIRCRAFT:THE NEXT 30 YEARS

Air transport technology is entering a newevolutionary phase. Both American and Euro-pean manufacturers are midway in the develop-

;

ment of the next generation of subsonic jet-liners, a first step along a path to create more <v

energy-efficient equipment for the air carriers.

The pattern is being established by the BoeingCompany’s 757 short-range transport and medi-um-range 767 and in Europe by the Airbus In-dustrie's A-310, another new medium-range air-craft , al l scheduled for introduction into service , -~ ‘,,:,J-:,.,/,during 1981 to 1983. New long-range aircraft, “ , ‘” ‘“*% “-”including derivatives of present models, are ex-pected to be introduced later in the decade by a Photo credlf. A/rbus Industne

number of manufacturers.Airbus Industrie's A-310

These new models are incorporating what theindustry calls “phased improvements” in tech- provement in fuel efficiency over the decade tonology covering materials, manufacturing tech- offset rising energy costs. Further substantialniques, aerodynamics, cockpit automation, and technological advances are expected in thepropulsion. The goal is a 15- to 20-percent im- 1990’s and beyond the year 2000.

Boeing’s 767 medium-range transport

Photo credit: Boeing A/rcraft Co

21


OUTLOOK FOR NEW AIRCRAFT TYPES

Intercontinental versions of these aircraft,designated as advanced subsonic transports(ASUBTs), probably will carry between 200 and400 passengers, being sized to replace 707s andDC-85, which will be 30 years old by 1990, andto fill market gaps between these early jets andthe present generation of widebody aircraft. Therange of the ASUBTs will be about the same asthe present long-range jets or slightly greater—up to 6,500 nautical miles at cruising speeds ofup to 600 mph (Mach 0.85).1

IJ. M. Swihart, The Boeitlg New Airplane Family, paper pre-sented to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,15th annual meeting, Washington, D. C., Feb. 6, 1979.

,

-.

Under the evolutionary approach, there willbe no quantum jump in size or performance,such as occurred with the widebody jets intro-duced in the early 1970’s, to greatly increaseproductivity (the number of seat-miles gener-ated by an aircraft per unit of time). Instead, theASUBTs will contain improvements leadingtoward reduced operating costs. The industryconsiders it possible over the long run to obtainfuel consumption rates in the ASUBTs that are20 to 30 percent better per seat-mile than the2,450 Btu per seat-mile typical of today’s wide-body jets.

Total operating costs (in constant dollars)could be perhaps 10 to 20 percent below those of

Photo credit: American A/r//nes

Boeing 707 transport

the most efficient aircraft now in service, evenwith increased fuel prices. High-bypass-ratioengines and noise suppression materials used ininlets and ducts will allow quieter operationover a wide range of power settings to increaseenvironmental acceptance.23

Beyond 1990, further development of subson-ic aircraft is possible and, therefore, so is thecontinuation of the trend toward more fuel-effi-cient, economic, and environmentally accept-able aircraft. These aircraft might be derivationsof the ASUBTs introduced in the 1980’s or mightbe of an entirely new design. There is also apossibility that very large advanced aircraft(400 to 800 passengers) will be developed to pro-vide service on high-density transcontinentaland transoceanic routes.

The demand for very large aircraft, however,is likely to be restricted because they could be

‘Ibid., pp. 1, 4-5.‘OTA Working Paper, Lockheed-California Co., Feb. 5, 1979.

productive only on routes with extremely highpassenger travel densities. At present, no esti-mates are available as to when there will be asufficient number of high-density routes to war-rant undertaking the development of such anaircraft.

A further option would be the development ofan advanced supersonic transport (AST), a sec-ond-generation aircraft with performance capa-bilities substantially better than those of theBritish-French Concorde and the Soviet TU-144.An AST operating at more than twice the speedof sound (Mach 2 + ) offers the only remainingpath to significantly greater aircraft productivi-ty. It could haul twice the number of passengersas a subsonic airliner of equivalent size in thesame time period. There are major questions,however, whether it is possible to create an ASTthat is both economically viable and environ-mentally acceptable. These questions are ana-lyzed at length later in this study.

60-285 0 - 8J - 3


Looking beyond an AST to the prospects ofhypersonic cruise aircraft coming into commer-cial service, the consensus of those involved inthis study was that it will not happen before2010. This judgment is based on the presentstatus of knowledge of the hypersonic regime,the time it would take to obtain a state of tech-nology readiness to design such a craft, plus thetime needed to go through a development cycleto produce one. Although research has beenconducted on problems associated with hyper-

sonic aircraft, the knowledge base is small com-pared to the status of knowledge in the super-sonic area. The technical problems and require-ments of a hypersonic transport, although moreextensive and severe, do contain all the require-ments of a supersonic aircraft. Therefore, itseems reasonable to assume that supersonictechnology readiness must be achieved beforehypersonic technology readiness and that anydecision to leapfrog the supersonic system for ahypersonic aircraft should come after super-sonic technology readiness is achieved.

A similar situation exists for suborbital flight.Although technology advances appropriate tothis type of flight could come from the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)space shuttle program, it is doubtful that thistechnical base could be translated into a sub-orbital commercial passenger airplane withinthe 1980-2010 time frame for this study.

As indicated, the consensus decision to deletethe hypersonic and suborbital commercialtransports from the current study was made onpractical considerations. This decision by nomeans implies that research should not continuein these areas in order to determine the potentialof such aircraft.

Illustration’ Courtesy of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

Artist’s concept of Lockheed’s hypersonic cruise aircraft

Ch. II—Advanced High-Speed Aircraft The Next 30 Years ● 25

WORLD REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT

Perhaps one of the more surprising develop-ments during 1979, in view of economic uncer-tainties, continuing inflation, and an energysupply picture clouded by unrest in Iran and ris-ing oil prices, was the placement of multibilliondollar orders for the 757, 767, and A-310 by theair carriers. Boeing’s sales for the year increasedto an unprecedented $12 billion, according tocompany estimates. Moreover, these orderswere booked in the face of an expected U.S. eco-nomic recession in 1980 and at a time when thelong-range effects of passenger fare deregulationon airline revenues are far from clear.

Underlying the airlines’ decision to order hun-dreds of new planes are projections for con-tinued strong growth in air travel demand. An-nual traffic growth has averaged 11 percentsince 1977 and hit 15.6 percent in the first half of1979. While industry analysts expect a recessionto hold growth to only 2 percent in 1980, theyare forecasting an average annual traffic expan-sion of 7 percent through 1990.

If air traffic increases by only 6 percent annu-ally on average, passenger-miles over the next30 years would quadruple. A potential also ex-ists for a doubling of present airline route-milesin this period as more areas of the world, suchas the Orient, are opened to commercial traffic.

These projections assume that there will be nomajor disruptions in the growth of the worldeconomy and that the airlines, along with othertransportation sectors, will be able to meet their

needs for fuel that is becoming increasinglymore expensive. If traffic growth holds up, sowiIl the market for new aircraft. Both the air-craft manufacturers and the airlines agree an in-crease in passenger-carrying capacity already isindicated for mature travel markets over thenext decade, particularly for short- to medium-range routes.

Thus, based on current trends and projec-tions, there is a potential market over the1980-2010 period for 6,500 to 8,500 short- andmedium-range aircraft, both additional and re-placement. This part of the market could meansales totaling $235 billion in 1979 dollars. Overthe same 30-year period, the potential marketfor long-range aircraft (more than 2,700 nauti-cal miles) is estimated at 2,200 to 3,300 unitswith a sales volume of $150 billion. Should asuccessful AST be developed, it is believed itcould capture about one-third of the dollar vol-ume of this market with sales of about 400 air-craft between 1990 and 2010. But many techni-cal problems and other uncertainties need to beovercome in the near term before it is possible tocontemplate whether an AST is indeed feasiblein all respects.

To gain an appreciation of the magnitude ofthe difficulties—and the scope of the issues—itis instructive to review briefly the short historyof supersonic flight programs in the UnitedStates and abroad and to look at where super-sonic technology stands today.

BEGINNINGS OF SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT–THE CONCORDE

In the late 1950’s, commercial aircraft design-ers began turning their attention to passengertransports that could add the element of speedto aircraft productivity. In Great Britain andFrance, studies were initiated independentlyabout 1956 into the feasibility of supersonicpassenger aircraft. In the United States, techni-cal feasibility studies were begun slightly later.However, by 1959, NASA was giving seriousconsideration to a supersonic transport that

would be a civilian derivative of the XB-70bomber which was later canceled.

For the Europeans, the impetus to develop asupersonic transport came from several sources.In Great Britain, it was seen as a way of recoup-ing the loss in prestige and market advantagesuffered by the failure of the Comet jet trans-port. By the time the Comet’s problems hadbeen corrected and the aircraft was ready to re-

enter service, the U.S. Boeing 707 and DC-8 hadbuilt up an unassailable lead. In the words of SirCyril Musgrave, permanent secretary of theUnited Kingdom Aviation Ministry in 1956,“All the major airlines were buying the 707 orthe DC-8 and there was no point in developinganother subsonic plane. We felt we had to goabove the speed of sound, or leave [the mar-ket].” 4

The British aircraft industry had seriousdoubts about the economic soundness of the su-personic transport proposed at that time. Thedevelopment costs were estimated to be high, *the market for such an aircraft was uncertain,and the operating cost for a New York-Londonnonstop flight at Mach 1.2 to 1.8 was projectedto be five times greater than the cost of subsonicjets then in service. Designers later increased thespeed and capacity of the proposed aircraft, but

4P. Gillman, “Supersonic Bust: The Story of the Concorde, ”Atlantic, vol. 239, January 1977, p. 73.

● Depending on range, speed, and payload, the estimates at thattime varied from $165 million to $265 million. These estimatesproved to be wildly optimistic—the British Government’s finalfigures on Concorde development costs were $3.25 billion, sharedby Britain and France.

the industry members of the British SupersonicTransport Aircraft Committee remained skepti-cal.

While study and debate were going on in Bri-tain, the French Government and aircraft indus-try were also conducting preliminary studies ofa supersonic transport. The French design con-cept, like the British, was a Mach 2.0, all-alumi-num aircraft, but it had a shorter range and ahigher payload intended to serve a European,near Eastern, and African travel market, InFrance, the impetus for developing such an air-craft came largely from outside the sphere oftechnology and economics. The French Govern-ment was determined to enhance the role ofhigh-technology industries in both the nationaland the European economy. A supersonic trans-port was perceived both as a response to “theAmerican Challenge” and as a means to gener-ate the expertise and skills needed to build andsustain a European industry that could competein high-technology aerospace engineering.

Doubts about development and productioncosts and about the eventual world market forthe aircraft continued to nag the British and the

Ch. II—Advanced High-Speed Aircraft: The Next 30 Years ● 27

French. In 1960, both began to cast about forways to lessen cost and to reduce the techno-logical and capital risks. Negotiations betweenthe two governments began in the summer of1960 and culminated 2 years later in November1962 with an agreement for a joint effort tobuild an aircraft appropriately called Concorde.The design team consisted of the British AircraftCorp. and Sud-Aviation (later reorganized asAerospatiale) , with Bristol-Siddeley andSNECMA providing the engine.

The aircraft that emerged from the jointdesign effort had a thin, fixed ogee wing andwas powered by a “civilianized” version of theOlympus 22R—a then lo-year-old military en-gine that had been developed by Bristol-Sid-deley for the TSR-2 multimission combat plane(which was canceled in 1965 after $532 millionhad been spent). The Concorde originally wasintended to have a payload of 112 to 126 passen-gers (later reduced to 90 to 100) and a range of3,500 to 4,000 nautical miles. The speed of theConcorde was limited to Mach 2.2 because of adecision to employ aluminum instead of titani-um, which was more difficult and risky to usebut would have allowed speeds up to Mach 3.

The cost of the Concorde development pro-gram was estimated in 1965 at $400 million andlater revised to $770 million, then to $1.26 bil-

lion, $1.75 billion, and ultimately $2.63 billionby 1975. The final cost figures quoted by theBritish Government in 1977 were $3.25 billionfor development and $0.85 billion more for pro-duction costs and losses sustained in operatingthe Concorde, making a total program cost ofover $4 billion. Sales estimates made at varioustimes during the course of the program variedwidely—from 100 to 500—and the projectedpurchase price fluctuated accordingly, from $30million to $56 million.5 6 But only 16 Concordeswere built, 2 for testing and 14 for sale; 9 havebeen sold at a price of $80 million each to theState-owned airlines of the two countries,British Airways and Air France. The Concordeproduction line was closed in September 1979and the remaining seven planes were given tothe two airlines.

Construction of the first prototype Concordebegan in 1965. The first test flight was in March1969, and the first supersonic flight took place 7months later in October 1969. Commercial pas-senger service began in January 1976 with flightsfrom Paris to Rio de Janeiro (via Dakar) by AirFrance and from London to Bahrain by BritishAirways. Service from Paris and London to

‘D. Rodd, “The Concorde Compromise: The Politics of Deci-sion-Making, ” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 34, No. 3,March 1978, p. 47.

‘Gillman, op. cit., p. 78.

Photo credit: British Aircraft Corp

The Concorde

28 Ž Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

Washington started on May 24, 1977. 7 T h eConcorde now operates on routes from Parisand London to New York, Washington, Caracas(via the Azores), Rio (via Dakar), and Bahrain.The level of service for the two airlines com-bined was about 110 flights per month for thefirst year of operation and has risen to about140 per month since inauguration of flights toNew York in December 1977. Load factors forall routes have averaged slightly under 50 per-cent, but have reached as high as 85 to 90 per-cent for the North Atlantic routes. g The aircraftpresently operates at an average of 70-percentcapacity on these routes.

While many feel that the Concorde programproved economically disastrous, several bene-

7F. Melville, “The Concorde’s Disastrous Economics, ” Fortune,Jan. 30, 1978, p. 67.

‘P. Sweetman, “Concorde First Passenger Year, ” Flight Interna-tional, Feb. 12, 1977, p. 358.

fits were obtained from it. First, the Concordeshowed that an aircraft could be developed andproduced which is capable of safe, sustainedrevenue operations at supersonic speeds. Muchhas been learned about commercial supersonicaircraft operations which would be extremely

beneficial to any future generation of supersonictransports. Secondly, the British and Frenchgained much experience in working together,especially in learning how to manage an ad-vanced technology program with many coordi-nation problems. The Concorde has aided theFrench in a military regard, specifically in thetechnology applied to the Mirage series offighters (Mirage 2000) which is capable ofspeeds of Mach 2.5. Last, the project helpedpreserve and focus the French and British com-mercial aerospace industry, which has gone onto become a major contender in the world com-mercial air transport market.

THE AMERICAN SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT (SST) PROGRAM

The official entry of the United States in thesupersonic transport competition dates fromJune 1963 when President John F. Kennedy an-nounced at the commencement exercises of theU.S. Air Force Academy:

It is my judgment that this Governmentshould immediately commence a new programin partnership with private industry to developat the earliest practical date the prototype of acommercially successful supersonic transport su-perior to that being built in any other country inthe world . . .9

Actually, the U.S. interest in an SST beganmuch earlier. The Director of the NASA Officeof Advanced Research Programs had testifiedbefore the House Committee on Science and As-tronautics about the prospects of an SST asearly as 1960. 10

‘John F. Kennedy, commencement address, U.S. Air ForceAcademy, June 5, 1963, in Public Papers of the President, speechNo. 22., cited in M. E. Ames, Outcome Uncertain: Science and thePolitical Process (Washington, D. C.: Communications Press,1978), p. 50.

IOU*S. congress, committee on Science and Astronautics, %e-cial Investigating Subcommittee, Supersonic Air Transport, Hear-ings, May 17, 18, 19, 20, and 24, 1960, 86th Cong., 2d sess.(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 9.

From the outset, the U.S. concept of an SSTwas shaped by two primary considerations—technological preeminence and economic viabil-ity. It was recognized in President Kennedy’sspeech and specifically stated by NASA and theFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) laterthat the SST had to be a “better airplane” thanthe Concorde or the Soviet TU-144 and that“better” meant more advanced technologically

and more productive economically. Thus, theinitial design concept of the SST called for a400,0()()-lb titanium airplane capable of flying atMach 2.7 or faster with a range of at least 4,000nautical miles and a payload of 125 to 160 pas-sengers. The importance of sonic boom was alsorecognized, and the FAA request for proposalsin August 1963 specified that overpressure couldnot exceed 2 lb/ft2 during acceleration and 1.5lb/ft 2 during supersonic cruise. Further, the SSThad to be at least as quiet during approach andtakeoff as subsonic jets. 1

1

In January 1964, three U.S. aircraft manufac-turers submitted design proposals to FAA. The

I IM E, Ames, Outcome uncertain: Science and the pO/itJca/Proce;s (Washington, D. C.: Communications Press, 1978).

Ch. II—Advanced High-Speed Aircraft: The Next 30 Years . 29

Lockheed design theoretically was the fastest,flying at Mach 3.0 with 218 passengers. How-ever, the range of the aircraft was limited. TheLockheed “double delta” wing was designed toprovide safe and efficient operation at lowspeeds while offering good aerodynamic charac-teristics in the supersonic cruise regime. Boeingproposed a Mach 2.7 aircraft with a small pay-load of 150 passengers. The unique feature ofthe aircraft was a variable-sweep wing—devel-oped by Boeing in its unsuccessful bid for theTFX military fighter-bomber—which added me-chanical complexity to the design and was per-ceived as a serious technological risk. NorthAmerican Aviation, Inc., (now Rockwell Inter-national) proposed a commercialized version ofthe B-70 bomber design, which had a fixed deltawing and a forward stabilizing wing called acanard. The design speed was Mach 2.65 and itcarried 187 passengers. Three engine manufac-turers—Pratt & Whitney, Curtiss-Wright, andGeneral Electric—proposed various turbojetand turbofan designs, none of which were clear-ly superior to the others in noise characteristicsor efficiency. 12

The competing aircraft designs were eval-uated by the Government and a panel of 10 air-lines. None met both the range and payload re-quirements specified by FAA and none prom-ised to fulfill the general objective that the air-craft be profitable in commercial operation. InMay 1964, FAA awarded contracts to Boeingand Lockheed for further airframe designstudies and to General Electric and Pratt &Whitney for additional work on the engine. Im-provements in three fundamental areas weredesired: aerodynamic design (a fixed wing or avariable-sweep wing), engine performance(thrust, fuel efficiency, and noise), and operat-ing economics (payload, range, and commercialprofitability). Of these, the economic problemwas the most intractable.

In December 1966, after 2½ years of addi-tional design studies and reviews by 3 presiden-tial committees, the National Academy of Sci-ences, 7 congressional committees, 13 FederalGovernment agencies and departments, and un-

121 bid., p. 59-60.

told analyses by profit and nonprofit consultingorganizations, FAA announced that it wasawarding contracts to Boeing to build the air-frame and to General Electric to produce theengine. This decision was taken despite the find-ings of two FAA-sponsored studies—one by theRAND Corp. in 1962 and the other by the Stan-ford Research Institute—which concluded thatthere was “no direct economic justification foran SST program.”13 The cost of the program bythen had reached $311 million, PIUS another$200 million soon to be requested to help fi-nance the construction of two preproductionaircraft. Furthermore, there were major techno-logical problems of range, payload, weight, andengine noise still to be solved.

Why then did the Government (specificallyFAA) proceed with the SST program? In part, itwas because aircraft designers and Governmenttechnical experts presented strong argumentsthat, given enough money, time, and hardwork, the technological problems could besolved. There was some wishful economicthinking, supported by a series of studies com-missioned by FAA which raised the market fore-cast from the original estimates of 25 to 125 air-craft to 500 and eventually to over 800.14 Not tobe overlooked was the personal commitment ofthose in key positions at FAA from 1960 to 1970—Lt. Gen. Elwood L. Quesada, Najeeb Halaby,Maj. Gen. William F. McKee, Gen. Jewell C.Maxwell, and William M. Magruder. All werepublicly avowed proponents of an AmericanSST, and all had had previous involvement withhigh-technology aerospace programs in militaryor industrial settings. They never voiced anydoubt that the SST could, and should, be builtor that it would be technologically and commer-cially superior to the Concorde and the TU-144.

However, these factors may not have sus-tained the SST program, if it had not been thatthe SST had also become a political symbol ofthe preeminence of U.S. technology. The SSTwas seen, at that time, as a counterpart to the

13Fi~al Report: A n ECOnOrnir Analysis of the Supersonic Trans-port (Stanford Research Institute, SRI project No. ]SU-4266,August 1963), p. 1.

14L. D. C]ark, “controversy About Supersonic Transport in theUnited States, ” Miner-m, vol. 12, No. 4, 1974, p. 427.

.


Apollo man-on-the-moon program. By failingto keep up with foreign competition the U.S.aircraft industry might lose its leadership in theworld market. This argument was advanced in1962 by FAA Administrator Halaby who listedthe consequences of failure to develop an SST asloss of world civil transport leadership, an un-favorable balance-of-payments situation, loss ofexports, declining employment in the U.S. air-craft industry, and dependence on foreignsources.15 Halaby warned that a successful Con-corde, with no U.S. equivalent, could “conceiv-ably persuade the President of the United Statesto fly in a foreign aircraft.”16

By 1968, after a total of $650 million had beenappropriated for the program, the SST was stillbeset with technological difficulties and politicalcontroversy. Boeing announced that the swing-wing design would have to be scrapped on ac-count of its mechanical complexity and the 2 5tons it. added to the aircraft weight which af-fected the range requirements. The redesign tofixed-wing configuration would set back theschedule and raise the development costs of theaircraft. The estimated cost of the overall pro-gram, through testing and two preproductionaircraft, had grown to approximately $4.5 bil-lion of which the Government share was about$1.7 billion. The $4.5 billion broke down into:total costs through the prototype of $1.6 billion(of which the Government would supply $1.3billion); certification cost of $0.8 billion (ofwhich the Government would supply $0.4 bil-lion); and production startup cost of $2.0 billionto $2.5 billion (which the industries would un-dertake without Government support). Theforecasts of sales, return on investment, - a n doperating costs were still not very encouraging.

At about the same time, two new issuesemerged that were to prove decisive for the SSTprogram. The first of these was mounting con-cern about potential environmental and healthconsequences of a fleet of SSTs. Public reactionto sonic boom tests conducted by FAA con-

ISM. Horwitch, “The American SST Experience—The Trans-formation of Multifaceted Technological Enterprises, ” workingpapers for AAAS Symposium, February 1972, p. 5.

“N. Halaby, memorandum to President John F. Kennedy,11/15/62 (JFK Library, President’s Office Files), cited in M. Hor-witch, loc. cit.

vinced Boeing that it would be necessary torestrict supersonic flights by the future SST toover water routes, thus eliminating about one-third of the trips on which the original SST mar-ket estimates had been based.

The anticipated noise that the SST wouldgenerate over populated areas during takeoffand landing touched off intense public protest.The most heated controversy about environ-mental impacts, however, centered around thepossible changes in the upper atmosphere thatmight be caused by hundreds of SSTs operatingworldwide. Evidence was adduced to show thatthe water vapor and gaseous emissions releasedby the SST in the stratosphere could deplete theozone layer and might lead to irreversibleclimatic change or an increase in the incidenceof skin cancer. There was also concern aboutpossible health hazards to passengers and crewfrom exposure to cosmic radiation in prolongedand repeated high-altitude flights. These con-cerns, however, were based on preliminaryscientific evidence. They have since been shownto be overblown, but at the time they generatedwidespread fear of potentially catastrophicenvironmental damage from the SST.

A second issue which became the subject ofpublic debate centered on the social implicationsof high technology as represented by the SST.The SST was portrayed by some as an elitist air-craft, financed by taxpayer money for the bene-fit of a privileged few. It became another objectof a growing resistance to technology for itsown sake, especially when the costs of that tech-nology were high and its potential consequencesfor the health and well-being of present andfuture generations might be harmful. This viewwas summarized in a New York Times editorial:

The attitude . . . was that technology existsto serve mankind and that proposals to move itahead at great expense must be judged on thebasis of cost-benefit analysis of the widest andmost comprehensive sort .. .17

The widening of the debate over the SST toinclude issues of social goals and priorities wasto spell the cancellation of the program. Publicdiscussion about the appropriateness of the SST

17 Ames, op. Cit. P. 73.


as a technological undertaking for the Nation,coupled with the growing societal concerns andcost, brought the matter to a head in House andSenate votes on fiscal year 1972 appropriations.The cost of the program including preproduc-tion development was $1.6 billion. Design prob-lems for the airframe and engine were still to besolved. The commercial success of the airplanewas severely questioned. Fears about environ-mental effects added fuel to the debate. InMarch 1971, the House, by a vote of 217 to 203,deleted all SST funds from the Department ofTransportation appropriation for fiscal year1972. An amendment to restore SST funds wasdefeated in the Senate, 51 to 46. On May 1,1971, the Senate approved $156 million in ter-mination costs. Thus, after 8 years of R&D andan expenditure of approximately $1 billion, theUnited States withdrew from the supersonictransport competition.

The total cost of the original SST programthrough prototype and certification would havebeen shared by the Government and industry ona 73- and 27-percent basis, respectively. As in-dicated previously, the production startup costwould have been totally supported by industry.At the same time the program was canceled, 9U.S. trunk carriers, 2 supplemental, 1 leasingcompany, and 14 non-U. S. flag carriers had in-vested $59 million of risk money and $22million for delivery reservations for 122 U.S.SSTs. The manufacturers had invested approx-imately $322 million. The program was con-structed so that the U.S. Government invest-ment would have been returned on delivery ofthe 300th production aircraft.

The U.S. SST program did generate a numberof technical developments that have contributedto advancing aircraft technology. For example,in the area of aerodynamics, relaxed static sta-bility and variable camber flaps on the wingleading edge were developed and evaluated inthe U.S. SST program and have since been ap-plied to the F-16/fighter plane. With regard tohuman factors technology, various elements inthe 747 cockpit are direct descendants of devel-

opment work on the SST. Other examples in-clude digital displays and advanced navigationsystems developed for the SST that are nowbeing incorporated in the 767 aircraft design.

In the structures and materials area, the air-frame design problems associated with the SST—more complex than those associated with con-ventional subsonic designs—prompted the de-velopment of more sophisticated and accuratecomputerized structural design and analysismethods. Methods based on these SST develop-ments are currently employed in the design ofadvanced subsonic aircraft and are being ap-plied to automotive and other vehicle designs.Also, the work on titanium sandwich struc-tures, formerly conducted concurrently in theSST and 747 programs, contributed to the 747aircraft and is being applied to military aircraftand missiles. In the propulsion area, the originalSST program added substantially to the tech-nology of high-temperature turbines and ad-vanced materials which in turn led directly toimprovements in the high-bypass-ratio enginesused on most current subsonic transports.

In retrospect, the SST program was probablyneither as well-founded an undertaking as itssupporters claimed nor as ill-considered as itsopponents argued. The goal of the program, inbuilding two preproduction aircraft, was todetermine whether a technologically advancedand commercially viable supersonic passengeraircraft could be achieved. The program dem-onstrated that the technology available at thattime would have resulted at best in an economi-cally and environmentally marginal airplane.But it is also true that the technology base wasgreatly enhanced by the effort and that valuablelessons were learned. However, whatever wasachieved was lost from sight in the conflict thatled up to cancellation. One of the most impor-tant lessons learned is that a genuine and impor-tant national interest will have to be clearlyidentified before any future high-technologylarge-scale commercial undertaking can expectto receive significant Government support in thefuture.


Photo credit Nat/ona/ Aeronaut/es and Space Adm/n/straf/on

Cockpit of Boeing’s 747 aircraft

Photo credit Boeing Aircraft Corp.

Cockpit of Boeing’s 767 aircraft now under development

Ch. II--Advanced High-Speed Aircraft: The Next 30 Years “ 33

CURRENT STATUS OF SUPERSONIC TECHNOLOGY

Generic research on supersonic cruise aircrafthas been continuing at a low funding level sincecancellation of the SST program in 1971. Initial-ly, between 1971 and 1973, FAA had responsi-bility for this research and allotted it a totalbudget of $15 million, The program was trans-ferred to NASA in 1972 and named the super-sonic cruise aircraft research program. In 1979,the name was shortened to the SupersonicCruise Research (SCR) program. The total ap-propriation for the NASA program in the fiscalyears 1973 through 1979 was $72.9 million, oran average of about $10 million a year (table 2).

Table 2.—NASA Supersonic Cruise ResearchProgram R&D Expenditures

(in millions of dollars; FY 1973.79)

Propulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $29.5Structures and materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.7System integration studies . . . . . . . . . . . 15.8Aerodynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1Control systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2Emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $72.9

SOURCE. F. E McLean, Working Paper for OTA, Mar 15, 1979.

Research has concentrated on propulsion,structures, materials, and aircraft and airframesystems technology that might be applied to anyAST. At this point in time there are no specificaircraft designs. The results so far indicate thatrather impressive improvements over the 20-year-old technology of the Concorde now ap-pear possible. For example, new wing config-urations have been tested in wind tunnel testsand have indicated lift-to-drag ratios above 9,which would allow approximately 20-percentmore efficient operation than the ratio of theConcorde’s wing in supersonic cruise. In thestructural area, NASA officials say the most ex-citing development has been the application offinite-element modeling and advanced computa-tional methods to the design of large aircraftcomponents, allowing for a reduction in designtime from 3 months to 1 week. This not onlypermits rapid analysis of various models but of-fers promise of lower development costs.

NASA’s studies performed with the assistanceof aircraft manufacturers show that superplasticforming and concurrent diffusion bonding of ti-tanium may be able to reduce the weight of air-craft structures by 10 to 30 percent and, at thesame time, achieve cost savings of more than 50percent. Various forms of high-temperaturepolyimide composite structures have been in-vestigated and they show even greater weight-cutting potential.

Variable= Cycle Engine

As seen in table 2, a major portion of the SCRprogram has been devoted to propulsion tech-nology. These investigations have producedconcepts for a variable-cycle engine able to varythe airflow at different power settings. Theengine may be able to operate at near optimumfuel efficiency while cruising at either supersonic(turbojet) or subsonic (turbofan) speeds. Be-cause the engine’s internal configuration allowsthe exit nozzle to move and alter the exhaustvelocity, it also has potential for reducingsideline noise at takeoff and landing. In addi-tion, an indicated greater combustor efficiencymay be able to reduce nitrogen oxide emissionsby more than 50 percent, thereby cutting theamount of atmospheric pollution.

Presently within the aerospace industry thereis considerable optimism about the engine.Many experts feel that, should the engine proveout in a development and test program, it wouldbring a second-generation supersonic transportmuch closer than is generally realized.18 T h eengine’s promise is twofold:

1.

2 .

There is a possibility the engine may beable to meet the Federal Aviation Regula-tion part 36, stage 2 noise rule which wasestablished in 1969.If able to operate optimally at both sub-sonic and supersonic speeds, the enginewould enhance the prospects for integrat-ing an AST into regular airline route

18C. Driver, “Advanced Supersonic Technology and Its Implica-tions for the Future, ” paper presented to the Atlantic AeronauticalConference, Williamsburg, Va., Mar. 26-28, 1979.


structures, as opposed to the limitedroutes flown by the Concorde. For exam-ple, it would become possible to originateAST service to London or Tokyo in Chi-cago, Denver, or Dallas. The over landlegs would be flown subsonically and thenthe AST would switch to supersonic cruiseoverseas. In theory, this extra utilitywould greatly improve the sales potentialfor the aircraft. But it still would havehigher total operating costs than an ad-vanced subsonic aircraft.

Technology Validation Program

In August 1979, in response to the House Sci-ence and Technology Committee, NASA out-lined possible plans for technology validation,which were identified as focused initiatives, in anumber of aeronautical fields. 19 The completionof generic research in technology validationwould be a necessary step in the future develop-ment and production of an AST. In supersoniccruise research the plan concentrated on propul-sion, airframe, and aircraft systems technology.The propulsion part of the program would bebroadened to include research on a variable-flow system and an advanced core engine sys-tem that would be integrated with the variable-cycle experimental engine. The aim would be toproduce design options for an array of super-sonic aircraft applications, plus potential mili-tary applications. The airframe technology pro-gram would concentrate on nacelle/airframe in-tegration and suppression design methods, anddesign and high-temperature structures prob-

““Potential Future Initiative Directions in NASA AeronauticsPrograms, ” Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, Na-tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, August 19791

lems, including the selection, fabrication, andtesting of titanium and composite materials.The aircraft systems technology effort wouldidentify those portions of the engine and air-frame programs requiring inflight investigationand validation. Accomplishment of these objec-tives would be expected to take up to 8 yearsand would bring the SCR program throughtechnology validation leading toward “technol-ogy readiness, ” regarded as a decision point onwhether the aerospace industry would considerfurther development of an AST feasible. Thereis presently some question whether the aero-space industry on its own would be willing atthese decision points to initiate activities leadingto full-scale production.

The proposed program would cost $662 mil-lion (1981 dollars) over an 8-year period, as op-posed to an alternate program offered by NASAin 1978 ,20 which was priced at $561 million(1979 dollars) over a similar 8-year period. Inaddition, NASA also prepared a $1.9 billionplan (1977 dollars) in 1977 which would havesustained full competition in the U.S. industryand would lead directly to “technology readi-ness.” 21 These three plans have raised a questionfor Congress as to what is the proper level ofFederal support for supersonic research, becauseany one would mean a substantial increase overthe approximately $10 million a year that hasbeen invested in SCR since 1971.

‘“”A Technology Validation Program Leading to Potential Tech-nology Readiness Options for an Advanced Supersonic Trans-port, ” Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NationalAeronautics and Space Administration, September 1978.

“’’Program Options for Achieving Advanced Supersonic Trans-port Technology Readiness, ” Office of Aeronautics and SpaceTechnology, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,September 1977.

PROSPECTIVE ISSUES

The issues surrounding the development of an technically feasible in view of the environmentalAST, including the technical difficulties, have objections and economically viable from an en-been given a considerable amount of study by ergy standpoint.the aircraft industry both here and abroad. Thecollective judgment on both sides of the Atlantic One question concerns the degree of technicalappears to be that more intensive generic re- sophistication an AST should achieve. Essen-search is needed to determine whether an AST is tially there are two choices, which are the sub-


ject of the analysis in chapters IV and V: 1) a200-passenger, Mach-2 aluminum aircraft witha design superior to that of the Concorde whichcould be introduced around 1990 and 2) an ad-vanced titanium aircraft capable of carrying 200to 400 passengers at speeds of Mach-2.4 or high-er at ranges of up to 5,500 nautical miles.

In the United States, the aviation communityappears to be persuaded that the more advancedversion has the best chance of meeting the de-mands of the marketplace. There is guarded op-timism that, in terms of development costs, op-erating expense, and market potential, such anAST could be made a commercial success. Thetechnological problems of aerodynamic and en-gine design, structural materials, and aircraftrange and payload are regarded as not insur-mountable. It is believed that such effects asnoise, emissions, and fuel use can be held withinacceptable limits through adequate R&D ef-forts.

Beyond these concerns there are issues of pub-lic policy involving value judgments and alloca-tions of costs and benefits among individualsand segments of society. Energy consumption,environmental effects, costs of the program tothe public, and societal benefits have to be ad-dressed in the debate over whether or not theUnited States should continue to support super-sonic research and at what level of funding.

The issues are not new. They were raised inconnection with the Concorde and the SST.Back then, proponents emphasized such advan-tages as contributions to national defense, bal-ance of trade, and the health of the aerospace in-dustry. The arguments against the Concordeand the SST centered on the high cost to tax-

payers, noise in the vicinity of airports, sonicboom, air pollution, potential harm to people,and climatic effects because of changes in theupper atmosphere. It can be expected that theseissues will arise again in connection with theAST, although perhaps not in the same form orwith the same emphasis.

There is also a more comprehensive set ofissues to be addressed—issues that concern pos-sible choices between supersonic and subsonicaircraft. Regardless of whether an AST is devel-oped, the world market for advanced subsonicaircraft over the next 30 years is expected to belarge, perhaps up to 12,000 aircraft to replaceolder subsonic aircraft in the fleet and to accom-modate the growth in travel demand. 22 Histori-cally, the United States has been the principalsupplier of passenger aircraft for the world mar-ket (as of 1978, over 80 percent of the passengeraircraft in the free world were of U.S. manufac-ture), but there is concern about the ability ofthe U.S. industry to sustain this market suprem-acy in the face of growing competition fromforeign government-industry consortia, such asthat producing the A-300 and A-310. This raisesa question as to the long-term importance ofsupersonic technology to a competitive andviable domestic aircraft industry and a favor-able balance of trade. An allied issue is themagnitude of U.S. Government support to theaircraft industry in the interest of optimizing theprospects for long-term growth and to main-taining a major U.S. share of the world aircraftmarket.

ZZOTA Working paper, Working Group A—Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., January 1979.


These U.S. manufactured aircraft are serving worldwide fIeets

Chapter Ill

VARIABLES AFFECTING ASUPERSONIC TRANSPORT MARKET

Any supersonic transport that is developedwill have to be feasible in economic terms andacceptable from an environmental standpoint.Environmental constraints will definitely enterinto the total economic picture, but so will fuelcosts, ridership, stage lengths, and other fac-tors. This chapter lays out some of the variablesthat are involved in projecting the future marketfor new high-speed aircraft, specifically an ad-vanced supersonic transport (AST). It considersespecially how the variables affect the economicviability of the AST relative to a future possibleadvanced subsonic transport (ASUBT).

The criterion of economic feasibility will bethe return on the commercial investment re-quired to bring the aircraft and supporting sys-tems into being. As the early history of the auto-mobile and the airplane witnesses, the first em-bodiment of a new technology frequently failsto pay for itself. A new technological path can-

not be followed for long unless there is promisethat along the way the economics will becomeattractive. It is assumed here that a bright prom-ise for an economically sound and environmen-tally acceptable system is a prerequisite for pur-suing either new subsonic or new supersonic air-craft.

As the historical discussion in chapter 11brought out, considerations other than long-term economic ones often enter into the decisionconcerning a long-range technological develop-ment program. Some of these, such as nationalpride, are not economic at all, at least in a strictsense. Others, such as the lobbying of a particu-lar industry, are economic, but not essentiallylong-sighted. Nonetheless, this study assumesthat such considerations will not prevail forlong if the program at issue does not make long-run economic sense.

THE PATH TO IMPROVED PRODUCTIVITY

An aircraft’s product is seat-miles. Aircraftproductivity is usually measured in terms of theseat-miles an aircraft can generate per hour ofoperation. Two primary ways that productivitycan be improved are increased size—movingmore seats—and increased speed—moving seatsat a faster rate. Other variables affecting pro-ductivity are discussed later.

Most major transportation improvementshave occurred in a sequence of steps. The firsttrains, the first cars, the first airplanes all repre-sented a jump —or sometimes only the potentialfor a jump—in productivity and in service thatat first cost too much to attract a broader mar-ket. As technology improved in a succession ofsmaller and diverse steps, vehicle and operatingcosts came down enough that the gain in pro-

ductivity eventually yielded an actual decreasein costs.

In the early days of aviation, productivitygains that were derived from changes in aircraftdesign came from successive improvements insize, range, and speed. However, for over 2 0years —since the jet replaced the piston engine—nearly all the gains in aircraft productivity havecome from size-related improvements (see figure1, ch. I). Such improvements have been accom-panied by some reductions in vehicle cost andtechnology-related improvements in operatingefficiency. Table 3 shows the historical progres-sion of productivity improvements through in-creases in size and speed. Size multiplied bycruise speed, labeled “cruise speed seat-miles, ” isonly a rough index of true productivity becauseit does not account for time lost at airports.

39

69-785 0 - 80 - 4


Table 3.—Progress in Aircraft Productivity

Date ofTypical aircraft introduction Number of seats

Ford Tri-Motora. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1926 12Handley Pagea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1931 38Lockheed Oriona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1931 6Douglas DC-2a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1934 14Douglas DC-3a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1936 21Convair 240b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1948 40Douglas DC-6.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1948 58Boeing 707b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1958 122DC-8-61 b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1967 251Boeing 747b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970 405Concorde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1976 90Illustrative AST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 300lllustrative ASUBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 600

Cruise speed(miles per hour)

115127224160180270300525600575

1,3001,600

575

Productivity(seat-miles per hour)

1,3804,8261,3442,2403,780

10,80017,40064,050

150,600232,875117,000480,000345,000

SOURCES: aMdler& Sawyers, The Techn/ca/ Deve/opmenfof Modern Av/af/orr, Praeger, 1970.bH=ard, Tran~Por(afion Management.Econom/cs-Poticy (Cambridge, Mass: Cornell Marnlrne press, 1977)

The desirability of an improvement in pro-ductility depends both on what it costs and onhow it is perceived to improve service. Startingwith the cost aspect: if doubling the productiv-ity of an aircraft, say, by doubling its size is ac-companied by a doubling of what it costs to buyand operate, no net gain in costs per seat-milehas been made. If, however, the cost of increas-ing size is proportionately less than the produc-tivity gain, then a net reduction in seat-milecosts has been achieved. Such savings have been

the motive behind the development of theB-747, the DC-10, the L-1011, and more recent-ly the A-300 aircraft: the cost of size has beenproportionately less than the gain in productiv-ity, so costs per seat-mile have come down.These relationships are arrayed in figure 4.

Size-related productivity improvements arestill possible, but have less potential than in thepast as a means of savings. The 747 is roughlyfour times the size of the last piston aircraft.

Figure 4.—The Relationship of Aircraft Productivity and Costs

Primary aircraftcharacteristics

. .

OfficeSOURCE: of Technology Assessment.

Ch. Ill— Variables Affecting a Supersonic Transport Market ● 41

However, comparable gains do not seem likelyin the foreseeable future, even if larger aircraftof 600 to 800 seats do come into being, The mar-ket for such very large aircraft appears limitedbecause an enormous number of travelers over agiven route would be required to keep such air-craft reasonably full and still necessitate fre-quent enough departures. Furthermore, theirsize would make them incompatible with cur-rent airport facilities. Therefore, the current ob-jective in designing new ASUBTs is not in-creased size but improved energy efficiency, re-duced environmental impact, and better mainte-nance and reliability. These areas, along withmoderate size increases, provide the opportu-nity for lower cost aircraft.

Other factors affect seat-mile productivity.One is aircraft utilization, the number of hoursper day an aircraft is used. A second is stagelength, the distance flown between stops. Be-cause short flights involve a larger proportion oftotal aircraft time spent on the ground, not gen-erating seat-miles, the productivity of shortflights is lower than that of longer flights. Ex-tending aircraft range increases productivity

because it decreases the number of intermediatestops and thus the time spent on the ground. To-day, long-range aircraft are capable of joiningall the major cities of the world and, thus, thisavenue of productivity improvement is almostentirely exploited.

The rationale underlying a supersonic aircraftis to take advantage of the last remaining pathof major productivity improvement—increasedspeed. Productivity is proportional not simplyto cruise speed, but to average speed, becausethe time lost in airports and on climbout and let-down as well as the demands of route circuityhave to be taken into account. As speeds in-crease from about the Mach 0.8 of subsonic jetsto the Mach 2.0 to 2.4 of supersonics, averagespeed and therefore productivity roughlydoubles. ’ Thus, a 300-seat supersonic aircraftcould carry as many passengers per day as two300-seat subsonic aircraft or one 600-seat sub-sonic aircraft.

‘E. Q. Bond, E. A. Carroll, and R. A. Flume, Study of the ln-pact of Cruise Speed on Scheduling ur~d Productiz~ity of Commer-cial Transport Aircraft, NASA report CR-145189, April 1977.

COST OF PRODUCTIVITY FOR SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT

The uncertainty and controversy over theeconomics of a supersonic aircraft have neverrevolved around the issue of its productivity. Itis recognized that higher speed will improveproductivity, and the degree of improvement isfairly predictable even though it is qualified byother factors such as flight distances and airportturnaround times. The real concern has been thecost associated with obtaining this increasedspeed. Unlike size increases, which up to a pointcan usually be achieved with only minor im-provements in basic technologies, appreciablyhigher speeds demand new technological capa-bilities. Because these capabilities are new, theyare expensive and they involve uncertainties.

Figure 5 adds the variable of speed to the rela-tionship arrayed in figure 4. How much thespeed costs depends on the state of technology.As the various technologies associated with su-personic cruising flight advance, the cost of

building and operating a supersonic transportwill come down. As shown in figure 6, the his-torical experience of subsonic aircraft provides aprecedent in this regard.

The first hopes that it might be possible tobuild a practical supersonic aircraft began toglimmer in the mid-1950’s. At the time super-sonic flight in military aircraft had beenachieved only in dash capability, but antici-pated advancements in technology held out thepromise of sustained supersonic cruise. Themilitary B-58 achieved limited supersonic cruisecapability in the late 1950’s. Following an exten-sive —and, by then current standards, expen-sive—technical development program, two veryhigh-speed and long-range military supersoniccruise aircraft emerged in the early 1960’s: theXB-70 and the SR-71. It is probably safe to con-jecture that at this time it would have beentechnically possible to build a supersonic cruis-


Figure 5.— Influence of Speed on Aircraft Productivity and Costs

*

Primary aircraftcharacteristics

I

SOURCE. Office of Technology Assessment.

ing passenger transport, but at a hopelessly highcost, possibly 5 to 10 times more than the sub-sonic jets of the day.

During the rest of the decade, technical ad-vancement continued. By 1970, based on the de-signs produced in the U.S. SST program, the es-timated cost of building supersonic aircraft hadcome down to roughly 3.6 to 4.0 times that ofan equivalent subsonic aircraft.2 Given that thesupersonic transport would be roughly twice asproductive as the subsonic transport and thatindirect operating costs somewhat favored thesupersonic, this estimation translated into totaloperating costs of roughly 1.35 to 1.45 timesthose of equivalent subsonic aircraft of thatperiod. These higher costs would have impliedthe need for supersonic fares 1.35 to 1.45 timeshigher than subsonic fares. Whether these costestimates were accurate or whether such an air-craft would have been successful in the market-place is uncertain: there are still strong opinionson both sides of these questions.

Aerospace industry officials estimate thatwith reasonably vigorous technology improve-

2R. S. Shevell, “Selection of the Fittest: The Evaluation andFuture of Transport Aircraft, ” Israel Journal of Technology, vol.12, 1974, pp. 1-22.

ment an AST could be built in the late 1980’s orearly 1990’s with the production cost gap nar-rowed from the 3.6 to 4.0 of the late 1960’s toabout 2.5 and total operating cost differencesfrom the 1.35 to 1.45 range to perhaps 1.20 to1.30 .

However, one very important factor stands inthe way of further convergence of the costs ofthe supersonic and subsonic transport. That isthe matter of fuel costs. Speed improves the pro-ductivity of the capital embodied in the vehicle,the productivity of crew labor, and even theproductivity of some of the indirect cost ele-ments such as maintenance labor. But it doesnot increase the productivity of fuel. It is inevi-table that supersonic aircraft will use more fuelper seat-mile than subsonic aircraft. Estimatesof the difference vary widely, but a factor of 1.5to 2 times more fuel per seat-mile for an ASTthan a present subsonic aircraft seems reason-able. A continuing rise in fuel prices would havea larger impact on supersonic operating coststhan on those for a subsonic aircraft (see figure3, ch. I).

The future availability and price of fuel is animportant uncertainty in the future prospects


Figure 6.- History of Dlrect Operating Costs,1930-75

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1960

Year of initial service

SOURCE: R. S. Shevell, “Technological Development of Transport Aircraft—Past and Future,” Joumr/ of A/rcWf, American Institute of Aero-nautics and Astronautics, vol. 17, February 1980.

for commercial supersonic aircraft. One can can expect some further improvement in super-probably expect further convergence in the rela- sonic fuel efficiency. However, it is likely thattive costs of building supersonic and equivalent supersonic fuel efficiency will continue to besubsonic aircraft because the less well-advanced substantially lower than subsonic fuel efficien-state of supersonic technology holds more op- cy. As long as this is true, rising fuel costs willportunities for improvement than is likely in cause this element of total operating costs of thesubsonic technology. For the same reason, one two kinds of aircraft to diverge.

THE IMPACT OF QUANTITY

The costs of technologicalbe quite high and the price of

advancement may flexible. The major variable, bearing on bothfuel may prove in- supersonic and subsonic aircraft, that can miti-


gate these effects will be the number of aircraftbuilt and sold.

Figure 7 indicates the typical relationship be-tween the cost of an aircraft and the numberbuilt. It shows graphically what can happen tocosts if an aircraft fails to sell as well as hopedand fewer are built. Such an outcome is a largepart of the economic story of the Concorde,production of which halted at 16 aircraft.

Costs decrease with increasing numbers pro-duced for three basic reasons. First, the initial,nonrecurring costs of development, tooling, andfacilities are largely independent of the numberof aircraft built. These costs are typically ab-sorbed by all the aircraft produced, so theamount allocated to each depends on the num-ber built. Second, there is a learning curve in

production, so that recurring production costscome down as more aircraft are built. Third,costs will come down if an optimal productionpace is maintained. If aircraft are being builtslowly because only a small number are neededand production is extended over a long period oftime, the physical facilities and the specializedlabor associated with production are not uti-lized as intensively as they could be and costsrise.

The ultimate cost of an aircraft will dependon the number built, which will depend on thenumber sold. However, the number sold will de-pend on their price, which is partially dependenton what they cost. This circular set of relation-ships is illustrated in figure 8.

Figure 7.— Influence of Market on Unit Cost

Average unit cost penalties for reduced sales

Productcost

ion

per unit(cumulativeaverage)

Base

o 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Number of units total

SOURCE: McDonnell Douglas Corp., Douglas Aircraft Co., Off Ice of Planning,


Figure 8. —Relationship of Aircraft Productivity, Technology, and Costs

[

(

I(I

SOURCE. Office of Technology Assessment.

THE POTENTIAL MARKET

The number of aircraft built raises the entireissue of the nature and size of the market. Super-sonic transportation will thrive only if sufficientpatronage can be attracted in competition withalternative subsonic aircraft. The level of pa-tronage is primarily dependent on the farescharged, the incomes of the travelers making thechoice, and their perception of the importanceof the better service provided by a shorter flighttime. Figure 8 illustrates many of these relation-ships.

Quantifying these relationships so that anestimate can be made of how subsonic and su-personic aircraft will split the market requires

hypotheses and assumptions about human be-havior. It is assumed here that the choice be-tween subsonic and supersonic service is basi-cally a choice between time and money: super-sonic flight will save time, but will cost moremoney. Thus, patronage will depend on howpeople evaluate the fare difference and the timedifference between subsonic and supersonic air-craft. Although there is always a strong motiva-tion to save money, some people will choose thetimesaving either because they wish to avoidthe discomforts of longer confinement in flightor greater jetlag or because they wish their flightto fit better into the schedule of the businessday.


Making quantitative estimates of how manypeople will choose supersonic service at a givenprice can be approached in a number of ways.Such estimates may be based on separating po-tential travelers into different groups based onfactors such as income level, purpose of trip, ortheir typical choice of booking (first-class, full-fare economy, or discount fare). For instance,one approach is to estimate what proportion offirst-class, full-fare economy, and discount-farepassengers will choose supersonic service. Thisapproach projects that average revenue per pas-senger on the AST will be higher than on a sub-sonic competitor not because different fares areassumed, but because each aircraft carries a dif-ferent weighted average of the various classes ofservice. 3

In order to estimate how future travelers willbehave when offered the choice between super-sonic or subsonic service, the analyst tries tofind past situations where travelers faced dollar-time tradeoffs and deduce from what actuallyhappened how people seem to assign relativevalue to their time and their money. A commonassumption is that an individual’s value for timesaved varies with income level. This suggestsquantifying a traveler’s willingness to save timein relation to the traveler’s hourly income. A re-cent analysis4 used data obtained around 1960when subsonic jets were still competing withpropeller aircraft and from the 1970’s on routeswhere the Concorde competed with subsonicjets to derive the multiple of hourly income thatpeople would pay to save an hour of flight time.This analysis found that, on the average, busi-ness travelers would be willing to pay about 2.6times their hourly income to save one hour offlight time, while nonbusiness travelers wouldonly pay 1.3 times their hourly income.

Such analyses must be interpreted very care-fully and recognized as imprecise. Though itmay be unsatisfying to use such apparently ten-uous reasoning to gauge future markets, suchestimates do provide some guides. Their cogen-cy depends on our willingness to assume that

3R. D. Fitzsimmons, “Testing the Market,” Aeronautics and As-tronautics, July/August 1974.

4A. Dubin, Supersonic Transport Market Penetration Model,presented at the AIAA Conference on Air Transportation: Techni-cal Perspectives and Forecasts, Los Angeles, Calif., August 1978.

the basic logic is correct, that past behavior is aguide to future behavior, that future incomeshave been correctly forecast, and that all majorvariables have been accounted for.

Figure 9 shows the results of an analysis ofhow a supersonic aircraft could split the marketwith a subsonic transport for varying fares. Thecurve applies to the New York-Paris route andto income levels projected for 1995. If weassume real incomes continue to rise, then thiscurve would shift to the right for points furtherin the future, i.e., if incomes rise, then for thesame relative supersonic-to-subsonic cost ratio,more people would be willing to pay for super-sonic. Conversely, such curves for the lower in-come levels of today would show fewer peopleselecting supersonic service.

Figure 9.— AST Market Shares,New York-Paris Route in 1995

I I 1 1 i I 11.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

Ratio of average advanced supersonic fares v. subsonic fares

“Assumes a speed greater than Mach 2.0.

SOURCE: A. Dubin, Supersonic Transportation Market Penetration Model,AlAA Conference Paper, Los Angeles, Cal If., August 1978.


While not used in later analyses, this curve,which is drawn simplistically, illustrates howthe cost convergence between supersonic andsubsonic aircraft will affect patronage. Accord-ing to figure 9, if the average AST fare were, forexample, 75 percent higher than that of a sub-sonic jet (that is, 1.75 on the curve), thenroughly 35 percent of the people would fly thesupersonic aircraft and 65 percent would fly thesubsonic. This would suggest that, out of 100total aircraft, 35 would be supersonic and 65would be subsonic aircraft. However, becausean AST would be twice as productive as a sub-sonic aircraft only half of the 35 ASTs would berequired (assuming all the aircraft were the samesize). Therefore, only 17 ASTs and 65 subsonicaircraft would be needed to satisfy the given de-mand. The total of supersonic and subsonic air-craft would be reduced to 82, of which 21 per-cent would be supersonic. If AST costs could belowered so that fares were only 25 percentabove subsonic (1.25 on the curve), thenroughly 80 percent of the travelers wouldchoose the AST: now 66 percent of the aircraftcould be supersonic.

By filling in other values, the curves of figure10 are obtained. These show how the marketsfor both supersonic and subsonic aircraftchange as the net costs (as indicated by fares) ofthe one aircraft change relative to those of theother. The aircraft are assumed to be otherwiseequivalent: the same size and utilization and op-erating at the same passenger load factor. AsAST costs (and therefore fares) approachASUBT costs, approaching 1.0 on the figure,the shift in the relative AST-ASUBT market ac-celerates. Because the AST is twice as produc-tive as the ASUBT, one added AST displacestwo ASUBT aircraft, so the ASUBT marketdrops twice as fast as the AST market grows.The number for aircraft in the total fleet alsodrops correspondingly.

As a final point, the impact of any reductionin the net costs of an AST that might be achiev-able through improving technology is leveragedby the combined and interacting effects of theexpanding market (figures 9 and 10) and thelowering of aircraft purchase costs with in-creased quantity built (figure 7). For example, if

Figure 10.— Impact of Relative Fares on Fleet Mix,New York-Paris Route in 1995

I I I I I I1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.5

Ratio of average advanced supersonic fares v, subsonic fares

‘Assumes same aircraft size and load factor.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

one starts with a 100 AST market at 1.5 timessubsonic fares, a reduction of roughly 10 per-cent of the potential fare brought about by tech-nological advancement can expand the marketto roughly 175 aircraft and lower the fares by 17percent, i.e., to 1.25 times subsonic fare. * Thisis because of the additional cost reductions de-rived from the increased quantity built as themarket expands. The total cost reduction fromR&D (10 percent) and the quantity effect (7 per-cent) is the 17 percent needed to move from 1.75to 1.25.

Improving technological capabilities shouldlower the cost of supersonic flight by a greaterpercentage than it will lower the cost of sub-

● This calculation is illustrative only and assumes the 30-percentreduction in airplane purchase costs from figure 7 results in a 7-percent reduction in the net costs on which fares are based. Thisvaries with other conditions and costs, but it is a reasonable figurefor illustration.


sonic flight. Progressive cost convergency sonic transport. Because prices depend in partshould increasingly expand the supersonic mar- on market size, the impact of both technologicalket and shrink the subsonic market. Likewise, a improvements and rising incomes would tend tocontinuation in the rise of incomes would be allow lower prices and thus a further expansionlikely to expand the potential market for super- in the market.

ENERGY UNCERTAINTIES

The major uncertainty and adverse factor forthe supersonic market is the cost of fuel, asnoted above. Fuel consumption per seat-mile foran AST is estimated to be about twice that of anASUBT based on current projections and fuelcosts are therefore a much larger proportion oftotal costs for supersonic than for subsonic air-craft. Thus, the general uncertainty about fuelcosts in the future is more serious for supersonicaircraft. For example, in one design study com-parison, doubling fuel costs over 1976 levelsraised the supersonic total operating costs by 33percent as compared to a 19-percent increase insubsonic costs.

But costs are only part of the question. Anaircraft introduced in 1990 would likely be in

production in 2005 or 2010, and these aircraftwould still be flying in the years between 2025and 2040. By then, parts of our economy maybe based largely on entirely new fuels, say, hy-drogen or methane. While the technology—thestate of metallurgy, fabrication, aerodynamicknowledge, electronics—to build a supersonicaircraft using hydrogen is not really differentfrom that for a kerosene-fueled aircraft, the spe-cific design is very different. Thus, one of theuncertainties is deciding what fuel should a newsupersonic be designed to use. This decisiondoes not have to be made now, but it wouldhave to be before starting a new aircraft pro-gram.

STAGE LENGTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

Besides fuel considerations, two other factorsare important in evaluating the ultimate poten-tial of the AST and ASUBT markets.

First, stage length —the distance betweenstops—must be large for the AST to have an ad-vantage over the ASUBT. The productivity ofan AST is twice that of an equivalent subsonicaircraft (100-percent advantage) only at rangesbeyond about 2,000 nautical miles. As the dis-tance decreases to 1,500 nautical miles, the ad-vantage drops to about 80 percent and, at 1,000nautical miles, it drops to slightly over 60 per-cent. The reason subsonic and supersonic pro-ductivities converge with decreasing stagelength is that the productivity of the higherspeed aircraft is penalized more by the time lostin airports and in climbout and letdown. Thisloss in relative productivity of the AST causesits costs to rise relative to the ASUBT. As theAST’s relative advantage in regard to speed de-

creases, so also does its advantage in regard toservice. Thus, it is hard to visualize ASTs com-peting successfully with less expensive subsonicaircraft on short- or even medium-distanceroutes (although supersonic planes may some-times fly these routes as segments of longertrips). As far as can be judged, this portion ofthe market is secure for subsonic aircraft.

A second constraint on the potential ASTmarket is the sonic boom associated with super-sonic flight. It must be assumed that the next su-personic aircraft, like the Concorde today, willbe prevented from operating supersonicallyover inhabited land because of regulationsagainst sonic booms propagated by commercialaircraft over land. This assumption eliminatesthe AST from contention in the large U.S. coast-to-coast domestic market and equivalent overland markets in other countries and confines itsmarket to international flights over water.

.


Work has been done indicating the possibilityof designing a low-sonic-boom supersonic air-craft at some penalty in operating costs.5 If anacceptable over land supersonic aircraft couldbe designed with only a moderate cost penalty,a very much larger market could be realized.For example, the capability of cruising super-sonically over land would increase the marketpotential of an AST and might eventually per-mit it to replace most long-range subsonic trans-ports. This is another technological “if” thatshould be researched further and considered inevaluating the long-term potential for superson-

5L. J. Runyon, A. Sigalla, and E. J. Kane, “The Overland Super-sonic Transport With Low Sonic Boom—A Feasibility Study, ”Acta Astronautic, vol. 4, 1977, pp. 163-179.

ic aircraft. Given the potentially large size ofthis market and the sensitivity of aircraft unitcost to quantity, solving this problem might beof great consequence.

An over land AST would not have the sameconfiguration as the basic over water craft, butit might have many subsystems in common withit. The important point is that the physical phe-nomena that would permit alleviation of thenoise impact of sonic booms have in generalbeen identified and understood, and design prin-ciples to exploit them are known and have beenpartially explored. Further research is needed,although based on what is known today it is notlikely such over land derivatives are possible fora next generation of AST.

THE COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTABILITY

Noise is now considered to be the principalenvironmental constraint for either an ASUBTor an AST. Significant upper atmospheric pollu-tion that could decrease the ozone protectionagainst radiation, which was a widely publi-cized concern a few years ago, is not presentlybelieved to be a problem. Nevertheless, ourknowledge is still imperfect, and that issueshould remain open.

These and other environmental issues are dis-cussed in chapter VII. However, in this context,it is important to remember that there is a rela-tionship between environmental constraints andeconomics and therefore the size of the AST

market. It now appears that it is possible tobuild an AST that meets the Federal AviationAdministration’s (FAR part 36, stage 2) noisestandards for subsonic aircraft at a relativelysmall penalty in direct operating costs. If noisestandards are made much more stringent, how-ever, the costs of meeting them begin to risemuch more rapidly unless some better techno-logical approaches to noise suppression arefound. The impact of costs on market size hasalready been illustrated. The direct relationshipbetween the size of the market and the strin-gency of environmental standards should thusbe clear.

Chapter IV

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE LONG-RANGEAIRCRAFT: FIVE SCENARIOS

Historically, the United States has been theleading producer of commercial aircraft in thefree world. The U.S. civil aviation industry(manufacturers and airlines) has dominated thefree-world aircraft market for the past 40 years.The industry presently provides more than 80percent of the free-world’s transport aircraft.Although the United States has a competitiveadvantage in the development and productionof commercial jet aircraft, this advantage is nowbeing challenged by Western Europe, whereconsortia, with strong financial backing fromgovernments, are developing advanced aircraft.

Foreign competition is an extremely impor-tant issue for national economics and interna-tional trade. For example, the dollar value of allcommercial jet aircraft and engines producedand sold in the world to date (excluding theU.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China)has been about $50 billion. Of this, the U.S. air-craft manufacturers’ share has been about $45billion, or 90 percent. Approximately one-thirdof this share has consisted of exports, contrib-uting positively to the U.S. balance of trade. In1977, exports of aircraft and aircraft parts ac-counted for a net of $7 billion in the U.S. bal-ance of trade.l Figure 11, which compares air-craft with other export commodities in 1977,shows this graphically. Over the next 20 to 30years, the potential sales of long-range aircraftand parts could amount to $150 billion, depend-ing on the market, of which about half could beexports if U.S. firms continue to capture a pre-dominant market share.2 Exports amounting toas much as $50 billion to $75 billion would con-tribute substantially to a favorable balance of

‘American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Astronau-tics and Aeronautics, vol. 15, No. 9, September 1978.

‘OTA Working Paper, Working Group A, “Advanced Hi@-Speed Aircraft, ” Douglas Aircraft Co., Task 5, January 1979.

payments and would partially counteract thenegative impact of petroleum imports. Thechoice to develop or not to develop an advancedtransport with a potential payoff as indicatedabove involves stakes that are quite high.

Assuming that there will be this potentiallyvery remunerative market, the question comesdown to what country or countries, if any, willattempt to exploit it and how any countrywould do so, developing what kind of aircrafton what kind of a time schedule. This studylooked at various answers to these questionsand attempted to evaluate the risks and advan-tages associated with several plausible routes bywhich advanced high-speed aircraft might enterthe worldwide commercial aviation market. Asalready indicated, the key variables in project-ing these possibilities for the aircraft future arewho will take the lead in developing a super-sonic transport; whether development will pro-ceed under noncompetitive, competitive, or co-operative conditions; how sophisticated an air-craft will be developed; and how the develop-ment program and introduction into commer-cial service will be timed.

Five plausible futures or scenarios are de-scribed in greater detail below. In brief, theyare: a base case in which no advanced super-sonic transport (AST) is developed by either aU.S. or foreign manufacturer and the worldcommercial fleet continues to consist virtuallyentirely of subsonic craft; scenario 1 in which anAST is developed by the United States withoutforeign competition; scenario 2 in which anAST is developed by foreign manufacturerswithout U.S. competition; scenario 3 in whichboth U.S. and foreign manufacturers developASTs in competition with each other; and sce-nario 4 in which a consortium of U.S. and for-eign manufacturers undertake joint develop-ment of an AST.

53

54 “ Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

60

50

40

30

20

Figure 11 .–Commodity Input to U.S. Balance of Trade–1977

0 Imports

10

0Food Crude Chemicals Electrical Machinery Auto- Manufac- Aircraft, Other Total

materials, mobiles tured parts tradefuel goods balance

SOURCE: F. E. McLean, OTA Working Paper, “Advanced High Speed Aircraft. ”

PROJECTED FLEET SIZE

To assess the impact of the AST for each sce-nario, it was necessary to estimate the size of thesubsonic and supersonic aircraft fleet in theperiod from 1980 to 2010.

In 1978, the world passenger jet fleet includedabout 4,700 aircraft, ranging from small two-engine standard-body aircraft (e.g., B-737,DC-9) to large three- or four-engine, widebodyaircraft (e.g., B-747, DC-10, L-1011). Withregard to future aircraft requirements, therehave been several recent forecasts of fleet sizefor various years in the period covered in thiss tudy . 3-12 The forecasts range from 7,000 to

“’Studies of the Impact of Advanced Technologies Applied toSupersonic Transport Aircraft, ” NASA contract No. 11938, Boe-ing Commercial Airplane Co., April 1973.

“’Aviation Futures to the Year 2000, ” Federal Aviation Adminis-tration, February 1977.

5R. D. Fitzsimmons, “Market Trends, ” McDonnell DouglasCorp., November 1976.

‘E. Q. Bond, E. A. Carroll, and R. A. Flume, “Study of the Im-pact of Cruise Speed on Scheduling and Productivity of Commer-cial Transport Aircraft, ” NASA report No. CR-145189, April1977.

‘E. Q. Bond, B. R. Wright, E. A. Carroll, and R. A. Flume, “Im-pact of Cruise Speed on Productivity of SST’s, ” Jan. 15, 1979.

12,000 aircraft, depending on the assumedgrowth rate for air travel and the assumed mixof aircraft types and sizes. The estimated worldfleet size used in this study to examine the im-pact of an AST is based on a review of thesestudies and on working papers prepared by in-dustry participants in Working Group A.13-15

‘R. D. Fitzsimmons, “Testing the Market, ” McDonnell DouglasCorp., August 1974.

‘A. Dubin, “Supersonic Transport Market DemonstrationModel, ” presented at the AIAA Conference on Air Transporta-tion: Technical Perspectives and Forecasts, Los Angeles, Calif.,August 1978.

‘@’’Dimensions of Airline Growth, ” Boeing Commercial Air-plane Co., March 1978.

‘‘G. G. Kayten, “A View of the Future—Constraints and Op-portunities, ” National Aeronautics and Space Administration,August 1977.

“’’Potential for Advanced Air Transport —Preliminary Econom-ic and Market Analysis, ” Working Paper for Impact of AdvancedAir Transport Technology Assessment, deButts Associates, Nov.15, 1978.

I~OTA working paper, Working Group A, “Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, ” Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., January 1979.

IqOTA Working Paper, Working Group A, “Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, ” Lockheed California Co., January 1979.

ISOTA Working Paper, Working Group A, “Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, ” Douglas Aircraft Co., January 1979.

Ch. IV—Prospects for Future Long-Range Aircraft: Five Scenarios “ 55

Using the estimate that approximately 8,000 to9,000 subsonic commercial jet aircraft would beneeded to satisfy demand in the period 1980 to2010, approximately one-fourth of these aircraft(2,000 to 2,200) would then be required to sat-isfy the long-range travel demand; the re-mainder would serve the medium- and short-haul markets.

If an AST were introduced, U.S. restrictionson sonic booms would allow it to compete withsubsonic aircraft only on long-distance overwater routes. On the basis of stage lengths andcity pairs appropriate to the AST and assumingthat no additional travel would be induced byits introduction, * a market for as many as 300to 500 ASTs in the world commercial fleet bythe year 2010 has been predicted. In examining

*In fact, some travel may be created by the higher speed serviceof an AST. However, to simplify the analysis, all such inducedtravel was excluded. The estimated impacts of the AST are, there-fore, limited to those that would result from the single substitutionof supersonic for subsonic aircraft.

the impact of the AST below, a round value of400 ASTs was used.

The AST, because of its speed, would be ap-proximately twice as productive as a subsonicaircraft of equivalent size. Thus, the introduc-tion of 400 ASTs would eliminate the need for800 to 850 subsonics and advanced subsonics ofcomparable capacity on long-distance overwater routes. Table 4 shows one possible de-tailed estimate of fleet size and composition bythe year 2010, with and without ASTs: ASTscould replace 850 subsonic aircraft, reducing thetotal subsonic aircraft fleet to about 7,250.

In the scenarios which follow and in the anal-yses in later chapters, fleet estimates are limitedto the portion of the market for which ASTsmight compete with subsonics. Thus, the over-shadowing effects of short- and medium-haulsubsonic aircraft are removed from the analysisand attention is focused sharply on the centralquestion: the impact of the U.S. or foreignmanufacturers introducing ASTs into the worldfleet during the next 30 years.

Table 4.—Free-World Commercial Jet Fleet With and Without ASTs—Year 2010

World fleet Number of subsonic aircraftAircraft typea Passenger seats Without AST With AST replaced by AST

Short and medium haul2S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 150 1503S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—130 700 700

2S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .—

160 1,200 1,2002W, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—200 2,000 2,000

3W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .—

250 1,550 1,5503W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—290 400 400 —

Long haul3W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 LRb 150 100 503W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 LR 400 200 2004W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 LR 750 350 4004W ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 LR 500 400 1004W , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600 LR 300 200 1004AST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 — 400 —

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,100 7,250 subsonic 850400 supersonic

aAlrcraft are classified by the number of engines (2, 3, or 4) and by body (S= standard, W = wide); AST = advanced supersonic transport.bLR = seating configuration for Iong-range flights

SOURCE: OTA Working Paper, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., Jan 22, 1979.


TYPES OF AIRCRAFT

Constructing the scenarios required a projec-tion of types of aircraft that might be in servicefrom 1980 to 2010. Four possible types wereused in the scenarios —one advanced subsonictransport (ASUBT) and three ASTs. Table 5lists the characteristics of the possible types. Thesupersonic aircraft are designated AST-I, AST-11, and AST-III in order of their sophistication intechnology and performance. However, the des-ignations are not to be regarded as successivegenerations of supersonic transports. It is as-sumed that U.S. or foreign manufacturers willeach develop at least one model of supersonicaircraft during the period considered in thisstudy, if either develops a supersonic at all. Itshould also be realized that, as indicated inchapter II, the real choice comes down to a 200-passenger, Mach-2 aluminum aircraft with abetter design than the Concorde (along the linesof the AST-I in the scenarios) or a 200- to 450-passenger advanced titanium aircraft to fly atM a c h 2.4 or faster (like the AST-III of thescenarios).

vanced than the generation of subsonic aircraft(such as the B-757 and B-767) scheduled forintroduction by the mid-1980’s. The modelASUBTs, used for analysis in the scenarios,would have a range of 3,600 to 5,500 nauticalmiles and a payload of from 400 to 800 passen-gers. The ASUBT family could make its first ap-pearance by the late 1980’s or early 1990’s and,if so, reach full deployment in the world fleet byabout 2005.

The three model versions of supersonic air-craft considered in the scenarios vary in speed,range, payload, structural material, and type ofengine. They represent a spectrum of technolog-ical possibilities, from an advanced Concorde toan advanced Mach 2.4, 300-passenger, titaniumaircraft with a range of up to 5,500 nauticalmiles that might enter service in the mid-1990’s.Figure 12 indicates a schedule postulated for theintroduction and deployment of the aircraft inthe several scenarios. The rationale for the air-craft used in each scenario is provided below.

In fuel economy and noise characteristics, theASUBT aircraft are expected to be more ad-

Table 5.—Characteristics of Four Projected Aircraft Types

Subsonic Supersonic

Advanced subsonic Advanced Concorde Advanced supersonic Advanced supersonictransport (ASUBT) (AST-I) transport-II (AST-II) transport-Ill (AST-III)

Passengers . . . . . . . . . . .

Design range(nautical miles) . . . . . .

Speed (Mach). . . . . . . . . .

Material(primary structure) . . .

Engine type. . . . . . . . . . .

Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sonic boom. . . . . . . . . .

400 (600) 800

3,600 to 5,500

0.85

Aluminum

Advanced turbofan

Satisfy legalrequirements at time of

introduction

NA

200 225 200 (300) 450

4,200 4,800 5,500

2.0 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.7

Aluminum Titanium Titanium

Low bypass Low bypass Variable-cyclew/ mechanical w/ mechanical engine

suppressor suppressor

Stage 2a Stage 2a No more than othercomparable aircraft

introduced at that time

4 No over land boom *

aAt Introduction( )Nomlnal value

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Ch. IV—Prospects for Future Long-Range Aircraft: Five Scenarios “ 57

Figure 12.— Scenario Timetables

1980 1990 2000 2010

SCENARIOS

The base case assumes that there will be nofurther development of supersonic transport air-craft by either U.S. or foreign manufacturersprior to 2010. The base case thus serves as a ref-erence for comparing the impacts of other sce-narios involving some form of supersonic trans-port aircraft.

The market in the base case consists of onlythose 850 subsonic aircraft which, as shown intable 4, would have been competing with orreplaced by supersonic transport in the case ofthe other scenarios. It is assumed that, withoutany additional supersonic transports (besidesthe existing Concords), ASUBTs will be devel-oped and introduced into commercial service bythe late 1980’s or early 1990’s with full fleetdeployment around 2005.

Scenario 1 projects that the United States isthe sole developer of an AST and that the air-craft is an AST-III, the most technologically ad-vanced of the transports considered. It is as-sumed that, given an orderly development pro-gram in the absence of foreign competition, theUnited States will not elect to undertake to pro-duce an aircraft of lower capability and dimmereconomic promise. Thus, this scenario allowsthe examination of the impact of the UnitedStates alone developing the most technological-ly advanced, economically viable, and envi-ronmentally acceptable supersonic transportachievable within the period considered in thisstudy.

The market in scenario 1 consists of 400 AST-111 aircraft that replace 850 of the subsonic

58 • Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

aircraft in the base case. Introduction intocommercial service is assumed to take place inthe mid-1990’s, with full deployment around2005 .

Scenario 2 projects that the United States doesnot participate in the development of an ASTand that foreign manufacturers do develop andintroduce it. It is assumed that, depending onhow foreign manufacturers exploit the technicaladvantage of Concorde experience, they will de-velop either an AST-I or AST-III. This scenarioallows the examination of the consequences of aU.S. decision not to become involved in a super-sonic transport program.

If the foreign countries elect to develop anAST-III, it is expected that the market will besatisfied by the same number of supersonic air-craft (400) as in scenario 1. Because it is an-ticipated that U.S. airlines will buy some ofthese AST-IIIs instead of American-built sub-sonic aircraft, this scenario will involve a sig-nificant impact on the U.S. economy. If foreigncountries adopt a different strategy—early de-velopment of an AST-I based on existing tech-nology in order to solidify their competitiveposition—the market for aircraft sales will bedifferent. Although it is estimated that therecould be a market for perhaps 400 AST-Is, thenumber of subsonic aircraft replaced by theAST-I will be less than in scenario 1, because thesize of the AST-I will be smaller than that of anAST-III.

Scenario 3 examines the possibility of super-sonic transports being developed and intro-duced by U.S. and foreign manufacturers incompetition with each other. Given the existingtechnology bases here and abroad and the dif-fering degrees of readiness to produce a signifi-cantly advanced supersonic aircraft, it is as-sumed that the competition takes the form of aless advanced, foreign-built supersonic aircraft(AST-1) developed rather early (by the late1980’s) pitted against a U.S.-built AST-III in-troduced about 5 years later. The foreign strat-egy would be to take advantage of Concorde ex-perience to capture sales that would otherwisego to a more advanced aircraft that will not beavailable until later. The U.S. strategy would beto attempt to win a large market by the promise

of a technologically advanced aircraft with sig-nificantly higher productivity and lower operat-ing costs than the foreign-built AST-I availableearlier.

This scenario depicts the effects of competi-tion on the market. It is projected that a total of250 AST-Is and 250 AST-IIIs are sold. Thus,both the U.S. and the foreign participants real-ize a smaller share of the market than if there isno competition. However, the total supersonicmarket is larger because there are two versionsof supersonic transports available. Nonetheless,the total number of subsonic aircraft replacedby the two versions of supersonic transport isabout the same as in the other scenarios—850—because the AST-I is not as productive as theAST-III. Hence, the market share—in terms ofpassenger trips diverted to supersonic aircraft—does not change significantly even though moresupersonic aircraft are in use.

The consortium scenario (scenario 4) assumesthat a supersonic transport is developed and in-troduced into commercial service around 1990through a joint venture by a consortium of U.S.and foreign manufacturers. The joint effort re-duces the economic risk for each party, but atthe cost of diminished returns for each becausethe revenues from sales must be shared. Further-more, a joint program may cost more than aprogram run by a single manufacturer as a re-sult of the extra expense of coordinating morethan one supplier and utilizing duplicate facil-ities and production lines.

Two possible consortiumprojected, one leading toother leading to an AST-III.

.scenarios have beenan AST-II and the

The consortium scenario leading to an AST-IIassumes that the United States has pursued onlya modest technological advancement programand lacks technology for an AST-III and that theconsortium results from foreign initiative. It isprojected that the aircraft produced is an AST-11, of a design reflecting the differences in thetechnological bases of the participants. In rangeand payload the AST-II falls about midway be-tween the AST-I and the AST-III. It is assumedtitanium is used for many structural com-

Ch. IV—Prospects for Future Long-Range Aircraft: Five Scenarios ● 59

ponents and the aircraft has a cruise speed ofMach 2.2.

The market for such an aircraft is estimated at450, slightly larger than the market for the AST-111, partly because of the lower productivity ofthe aircraft and partly because of the stimula-tion of sales to airlines by the cooperative as-pects of the venture. For the purpose of examin-ing one possible joint undertaking, it is assumedthat the contribution of each party is determinedby its experience and technological capabilityand, more particularly, that the U.S. share ofthe program is about 30 percent and the foreignshare, the remaining 70 percent. It is assumedthese percentages are reflected in sales to worldairlines (30 percent to U.S. carriers and 70 per-cent to foreign ones) and in apportionment ofthe revenues from sales.16

The consortium scenario leading to an AST-111 assumes that the United States has pursuedthe technology for an AST-III and initiates a

16Bc)e1n~ Commercial Airplane Co., “Prototype Make or BUY, ”

SST Industrial Engineering Planning Group, 1977.

consortium effort to help solidify a world mar-ket as well as to reduce the financial risk. Theratio of U.S. and foreign contributions is as-sumed to be 50/50, although a larger U.S. pro-portion is possible. Likewise, sales to world air-lines and apportionment of sales revenues areassumed to be 50/50.

The AST-III assumed for this scenario is thesame aircraft envisioned in scenarios 1, 2, and 3.However, its introduction is projected as earlierthan an AST-III’s introduction under a singlemanufacturing effort (scenarios 1 and 2) andlater than an AST-III’s introduction under acompetitive venture (scenario 3). The rationalebehind this projection is that a joint venturewould produce the aircraft faster than wouldone manufacturer but would most likely not beable to produce it as fast as would occur in thecompetitive situation. However, as shown infigure 12, the projected ranges for introductionand deployment are quite broad.

The market for such an aircraft is estimated tobe 400, the same number used for the AST-III inthe other scenarios.

Chapter V

ECONOMIC ISSUES: AN ANALYSIS

Given the several ways in which the world improving the U.S. balance of trade and, in ad-may meet its future needs for advanced, inter- diction, the level of employment in the industrycontinental air transport, an analysis can now is closely associated with the overall economicbe presented of the economic implications for posture of the United States. Therefore, theseeach scenario described in chapter IV. The aero- two variables are the focus of this economicspace industry has contributed significantly to analysis.

ASSUMPTIONS

Two types of aircraft sales are examined inthis analysis—total worldwide program sales byall manufacturers and total sales of U.S. pro-grams alone. The difference between these twohas significance for the U.S. economy. If world-wide sales are much larger than U.S. sales, theproportion of U.S. aircraft in the world fleetwill be lower and so will be the U.S. aerospaceindustry’s contribution to the balance of trade.In the analysis, the total aircraft sales are deter-mined by multiplying the world market, definedin chapter IV, by the aircraft’s selling price; U.S.aircraft sales are determined by multiplying thenumber of U, S.-manufactured aircraft in theworld market by the aircraft’s selling price.

As in chapter IV, the world market analyzedfor each alternative included only those aircraft,subsonic or supersonic, that would be in com-petition with, or replaced by, other aircraft forlong-range over water routes. Inevitably, othersubsonic aircraft in each of the scenarios will bea part of the world market during the periodfrom 1990 to 2010, but these are not included inthis analysis.

A key concern in this analysis was to identifythe number of subsonic and/or supersonic air-craft in the world market that would be ex-ported from the United States. The exportswould be in addition to the number of U.S. air-craft purchased by U.S. airlines. The amount ofU.S. aircraft exports will differ under eachscenario.

The base case can be construed in two lights:viewed optimistically, it would involve theUnited States maintaining the major percentageof the world’s market of advanced subsonictransports (ASUBTs); viewed less optimistical-ly, it would assume that, on account of competi-tion from comparable foreign subsonic aircraft,the hold of U.S. manufacturers on the worldmarket of ASUBTs would diminish to abouthalf.

In scenario 1, the assumption, based on thetotal number of long-range B-7475 and DC-10sexported to date, is that 70 percent of the 400U.S.-built AST-IIIs in the world market wouldbe exported and the remaining 30 percent wouldbe sold to U.S. airlines.

Because scenario 2 only involves foreign man-ufacturers, there would be no U.S. exports toconsider; on the contrary, to stay in competi-tion, U.S. airlines would need to buy a certainnumber of foreign supersonic aircraft, the num-ber depending on the type of aircraft produced.

The competitive scenario (scenario 3) assumesthat U.S. airlines would initially have to pur-chase a small number of AST-Is just to remainin the market, but it is assumed that the UnitedStates would export 55 percent of the AST-IIIsintroduced later.

Scenario 4, the consortium scenario, wouldallow for two cases. A consortium in which for-eign efforts dominate would reduce the amountof both risk and profit, and would also allow

63


only a small number of AST-IIs to be exported tium would develop and produce AST-IIIs, halfby the United States. The U.S.-initiated consor- of which would be U.S. exports.

RESULTS

Based on these assumptions, economic im-pacts were determined for each scenario. Astable 6 reveals, the impact of choices regardingthe development of a supersonic transportvaries significantly among the scenarios. For ex-ample, cash inflow to U.S. manufacturers overthe 20 years from 1990 to 2010 ranges from ahigh of $35 billion, * in the case of the UnitedStates alone introducing an AST-III, to a low of– $15.0 billion, in the case of the United Statesrefusing involvement in any supersonic pro-gram despite the pursuit of such programs byforeign manufacturers.

U.S. aircraft manufacturer employment (col-umn 9) and total U.S. aerospace employment(column 10) are both functions of total U.S. pro-gram sales (column 7): aircraft manufactureremployment is calculated at the rate of 30 man-

● A1I dollars are in 1978 values.

years per million dollars of U.S. aircraft salesand total aerospace employment is a multiple ofaircraft manufacturer employment by a factorof 2.75.1 Cash inflow to U.S. manufacturers(column 11) is determined directly from the U.S.program sales (column 7) and the percent U.S.exports (column 8).

The base case would yield a return to the U.S.manufacturers of from $12.9 billion to $23.1 bil-lion depending on which subsonic strategy isassumed and would produce from 0.77 millionto 1.38 million man-years of effort in U.S. air-craft manufacturer employment. The U.S.-onlyscenario for supersonic transport developmentwould yield a cash flow of $35.0 billion, whichis from 50 to 170 percent greater than in the basecase.

‘R. D. Fitzsimmons, “Civil Aviation Joint Venture Analysis:The Effects of Several Proposed Alternatives, ” 1971.

Table 6.—Economic Impacts

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

U.S. aircraft Total U.S. Cash inflowSelling price Total Us. manufacturer aerospace to U.S. man-

U.S.-manu- Foreign per aircraft program program Percent employment employment ufacturersWorld factured manufac- 1978$ sales 1978 sales 1978 Us. (million (million 1978$

Alternatives market aircraft tured aircraft (million) $ (billion) $ (billion) exports man-yrs) man-yrs) (billion)Base case a. 850 765 85 $60 $51.0 $45.9 50(385) 1.38 3.79 $23.1

ASUBTsb. 850 425 425 60 51.0 25.5 50(215) 0.77 2.10 12.9

ASUBTs

Scenario 1 400 400 0 125 50.0 50.0 70(280) 1.5 4.1 35.0(U.S. only) AST-IIIs

Scenario 2 400 AST-Is o 400 90 36.0 0 – 5 o 0 – 1.8(foreignonly) 400 AST-Ills o 400 125 50.0 0 - 3 0 0 o -15.0

Scenario 3 250 AST-Is o 250 90 22.5(Competi-

0 – 5 0 0 – 1.1and

tion) 250 AST-IIIs 250 0 125 31.3 31.3 55(138) 0.94 2.6 17.3

Scenario 4 a. 450 135 315 110 49.5 14.9 50(68) 0.45 1.2 7.4(Con- AST-IIssortium) b. 400 200 200 125 50.0 25.0 50(100) 0.75 2.1 12,5

AST-IIIs

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Ch. V—Economic Issues: An Analysis ● 65

If foreign manufacturers pursued the super-sonic market without any U.S. competition (sce-nario 2), U.S. manufacturers would lose from$1.8 billion to $15.0 billion. The difference inthe balance of payments between the U.S. intro-ducing the AST-III and the same aircraft beingintroduced by foreign manufacturers might beas much as $50 billion. The difference betweenthe case of foreign manufacturers alone devel-oping the AST-III and the case of the UnitedStates and foreigners continuing to develop onlysubsonic aircraft would range from $27.9 billionto $38.1 billion.

In a competitive situation (scenario 3), inwhich 250 foreign AST-Is and 250 U.S. AST-IIIsare introduced, a total cash inflow to U.S. man-ufacturers of $17.3 billion would result. The dif-ference in the balance of payments projected forscenario 3 and the base case ranges from – $5.8billion to + $4.4 billion. The difference for sce-nario 3 and scenario 1 is $17.7 billion—a reduc-tion of 51 percent. Since the employment differ-ence for the same two scenarios is 38 percent,scenario 1 can be seen to provide a larger return(in terms of cash inflow) for the same invest-ment (in terms of employment) than scenario 3.

In the case of a foreign-initiated consortiumproducing 450 AST-IIs (scenario 4a), total cashinflow to U.S. manufacturers would be $7.4 bil-lion. Between this scenario and the base case,the balance of payments would differ by a nega-tive $5.5 billion to $15.7 billion. Although thiseffort would result in the lowest cash inflow toU.S. manufacturers of any scenario involvingthe United States with the introduction of super-sonic aircraft, it also involves the lowest costand the least risk. It may be unrealistic, how-ever, to assume that U.S. manufacturers wouldjoin a consortium in which they would havesuch a small share of the program.

However, if the United States were to joinforeign manufacturers to develop and introduce400 AST-IIIs, splitting the enterprise equally(scenario 4b), a total cash inflow of $12.5 billionwould result to U.S. manufacturers. This wouldbe anywhere from $0.4 billion to $10.6 billionless than the total cash inflow in the base case.Here it was assumed that the United States

would build so percent, or 200, of the totalworld market of 400 AST-IIIs and that, on ac-count of competition with foreign manufac-turers, the United States would export to third-world countries 50 percent, or 100, of the U. S.-manufactured aircraft.

Scenario 4b points up the sensitivity of bothemployment and cash inflow values to varia-tions in the level of participation of U.S. andforeign manufacturers in a consortium. For ex-ample, if the share of U.S. involvement were toincrease from so to 70 percent and U.S. exportswere to remain at so percent, the cash inflow toU.S. manufacturers would increase to $17.5 bil-lion, which is 40 percent more than the $12.5billion inflow in the SO/SO program split.

Finally, certain observations must be made toplace the values in table 6 in perspective. Firstand most significant, the future market is uncer-tain. The economic variables are very sensitiveto any changes in the assumptions on whichprojections have been made. Second, the valuesassigned for both employment and balance ofpayments are included within the 20 years from1990 to 2010. In reality, however, the timeframe for aircraft sales, exports, and employ-ment differs for each scenario which affects thepresent worth of cash inflow over the periodcovered. Third, these figures focus on only asmall portion of the total number of aircraft thatwill be in operation from 1990 to 2010, omittingconsideration of long-haul subsonic aircraft thatwill not fly strictly over water routes and the en-tire medium- and short-haul markets.

As previously indicated, when the world re-quirements for all future long-range aircraft areconsidered, the expected sales could approach$150 billion. ASTs could command a third ofthese sales dollars. It should be remembered thatthe AST considered here was assumed to be re-stricted to only over water flights, mainly due tothe sonic boom. If, as discussed in chapter III, asolution is found to this phenomenon, the mar-ket for the AST could expand significantly and a“third generation” AST after 2010 could replacemost long-range subsonic aircraft. This occur-rence would have a further significant impact onthe U.S. balance of trade.

.


THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION

In addressing the competitive situation of sce-nario 3, a significant question is when, if at all,the United States should enter a program of thisnature. Two variables are important in this dis-cussion—the aircraft type and the time of intro-duction. If both manufacturers introduce com-parable aircraft into service at the same time,the market will most likely be shared aboutequally. As the time between introduction of thetwo aircraft widens, the first aircraft will have afirmer position on the market and an advantageover the competitor.

A second wrinkle enters the competitive situ-ation by adding another variable, a more ad-vanced aircraft, so that competition exists be-tween an AST-III versus an AST-I. If manufac-turers of two different aircraft decided to intro-duce their respective aircraft at the same time,the more advanced aircraft would capture near-ly all of the market from the less advanced com-petitor, provided that the fare structures of theaircraft were similar. (Even if the fare structureswere different, some passengers might be willingto pay more to travel in a more advanced air-craft offering them higher speed and greaterconvenience, including nonstop service. )

However, as the time between introductionswidens, an AST-III, introduced after an AST-I,would most likely satisfy a smaller percentageof the market. This is illustrated by the diver-sion curve in figure 13. In fact, a period wouldcome in which an advanced aircraft (AST-III)introduced by the United States would not beable to attract the market or divert any trafficfrom that being satisfied by the foreign aircraft(AST-I). Such an immunity of the market toU.S. penetration might occur despite the air-

Figure 13.—Time Between Introduction of AST-I andAST-III v. Market Split

+Elapsed time

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

lines’ knowledge of the imminent introductionof a more advanced supersonic because theymight be unwilling to wait the extra time for amore advanced aircraft and so buy a less ad-vanced one. Moreover, having bought a less ad-vanced one, they might not then be in a positionto buy the superior aircraft. The key issue hereis to be able to determine the time period when itwould be inappropriate for the United States toenter the market with an AST-III.

One last point is relevant. While programcosts influence selling prices, the basic determi-nant is the market. What are the airlines willingand able to pay? The existence of two competingprograms tends to limit the profit potential ofboth programs because it may force prices be-low the market potential. On the other hand,lower prices for the aircraft may imply bothlower fares for the traveler and increased air-craft sales.

Chapter VI

ENERGY: FUEL PRICE AND AVAILABILITY

Of all the uncertainties confronting the futureof commercial aviation, the most serious are thefuture availability and price of fuel. Recent tem-porary shortages of petroleum have driven upprices and prompted industrial nations to takeconservation measures. Total world productionof oil is leveling off and is expected to begindeclining over the next decade.

projected growth in air traffic over the next 30years may not materialize. This, in turn, wouldrestrict any major expansion in the market fornew advanced aircraft and significantly affectthe prospects for developing an advanced super-sonic transport (AST), which would have higherfuel consumption rates than a subsonic jet.

If limitations are imposed upon aviation fuelsupplies in the future or prices rise too high, the

PRESENT FUEL CONSUMPTION

The world now uses about 305 quadrillionBtu (Quads) of energy from all sources eachyear. The United States consumes about 25 per-cent of this (or 78 Quads). About half of U.S.energy consumption derives from petroleum. In1977, the U.S. used 17.5 million barrels per day(MMbbl/d) of petroleum equivalent. Transpor-tation needs accounted for slightly over half thisamount, or 9.2 MMbbl/d. Commercial aviationused 0.5 MMbbl/d, 5.4 percent of the transpor-tation figure and 2.9 percent of all petroleumused in the United States. By comparison, pri-vate passenger automobiles used about 5 . 2MMbbl/d of petroleum in 1977, or 10 times asmuch as U.S. commercial aviation.12

The worldwide commercial aviation fleet ofabout 4,700 jet aircraft (excluding the U.S.S.R.and the People’s Republic of China) consumes1.5 MMbbl/d or 3 percent of the world’s dailypetroleum use. In the period from 2000 to 2010,utilizing the projections indicated in chapter IV,about 8,100 commercial jet aircraft would be inservice. Such a fleet, depending on the fuel effi-

ciency achieved by aircraft at the time, wouldconsume between 3.5 and 4.4 MMbbl/d, or 3.8to 4.8 percent of daily world petroleum con-sumption. 3 4 H o w e v e r , according to currentpredictions, unless the percentage of petroleumfuels available to aviation is increased (perhapsas other energy-consuming sectors convert to al-ternative sources), world production capabil-ities will not satisfy these needs. Thus, althoughthese numbers were used to perform an analysisof the impact of supersonic aircraft on energyuse, it is unclear where this petroleum will becoming from and whether it actually will beavailable.

The long-haul portion of the present worldmarket —transcontinental and transoceanicflights with stage lengths of 2,700 to 3 , 0 0 0nautical miles or more—now consumes approx-imately 0.2 MMbbl/d or 15 percent of all com-mercial aviation fuel. Given the projectedgrowth in air travel, long-haul aircraft woulduse between 0.5 and 0.7 MMbbl/d by 2000-10,again 15 percent of projected total fuel usage bycommercial aviation. The portion of the com-

ID. B. Shenka, ed., Transportation Energy Conservation DataBook, Edition 3, Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the U.S. De-partment of Energy, ORNL-5493, February 1979.

2 Changes in the Future Llse and Characteristics of the A u torno-bile Transportation System (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress,Office of Technology Assessment, February 1979), vol. I, OTA-T-83, p. 6.

30TA Working Paper, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co.,March 1979.

‘OTA Working Paper, Pratt and Whitney Engine Co., Jan. 17,1979.

69

———

70 “ Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

mercial jet fleet now serving long-haul routes is 2000-10. Table 7 compares present and pro-about 33 percent, a percentage expected to di- jected commercial air service and fuel consump-minish to about 25 percent by the period tion.

Table 7.—Present and Projected Commercial AirService and Fuel Consumption

Commercial fleeta 1976 2000-2010

Short and medium range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,200 (67%) 6,000 (74%)Long range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500 (33%) 2,100 (26%)

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,700 8,100

Route air miles (billion)b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.05 10.7

Available seat-miles (billion)b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798.5 3,170

Revenue passenger miles (billion)b . . . . . . . . . . 463.1 2,150

Load factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58% 67%

Weekly departuresShort and medium range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130,400 (840/o) 220,600 (870/o)Long range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,800 (16%) 32,700 (13%)

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155,200 253,300

Fuel consumption (MMbbl/d)Short and medium range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 (85%) 3.0- 3.7 (85%)Long range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 (15!40) 0.5- 0.7 (15YO)

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 3.5 4.4

MMbbl/d = mllllons of barrels per day.a Bas e case, subsonic aircraft onlYbscheduled air carriers plus charter.

SOURCE: OTA Working Paper, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., Working Group A, “Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, ” January1979.

FUEL PRICE EFFECTS

The rise in fuel price since 1974 has intensifiedthe importance of fuel economy in commercialaviation. The price of jet fuel has dramaticallyincreased since 1974 to over $1.00 per gallon inearly 1980. The continuing rise in jet fuel pricesis cited as a major cause for the 6- to 8-percentincrease in airfares observed by the end of 1979.Opinion varies aboutprice of petroleum inrun, making analysistremely difficult.

what will happen to theboth the short and longof possible impacts ex-

Rising fuel prices have particular effects onprospects for supersonic transport. Although itcan be shown that, through technological im-provements, total operating costs (TOC) for a

supersonic aircraft may continue to convergeover time with those for a subsonic aircraft (seefigure 2, ch. I), such a convergence would bethreatened by rising fuel prices. The supersonicaircraft is more sensitive to fuel price increasesbecause it uses more fuel than a subsonic air-craft of the same size.

Thus, a key factor in assessing the feasibilityof supersonic aircraft is fuel efficiency. * Fuel

*For purposes of this analysis fuel efficiency is generally ex-pressed in Btu per seat-mile, although in actual airline service amore appropriate measure is Btu per passenger-mile, a function ofattained load factor and design efficiency. However, to eliminatehaving to guess future airline passenger patronage and thus simpli-fy the later analysis, all comparisons are made in terms of Btu perseat-mile, which is a measure of the fuel efficiency designed into anaircraft.

Ch. VI—Energy: Fuel Price and Availability ● 71

adds weight, so that the more fuel an aircraft ofgiven size and range requires, the smaller thepayload. Reduced payload results in reducedproductivity, as does inefficient fuel use (say, onaccount of wasteful operational procedures).The amount and cost of fuel consumed per seat-mile bear directly on operating costs and, hence,on an aircraft’s profitability in airline service.

Most commercial aircraft introduced duringthe past 40 years have been successful, in part,because they offered greater fuel efficiency perseat-mile than older aircraft they replaced. Forexample, the latest generation of passenger jets(B-747, DC-10, L-1011) are about 30 percentmore fuel efficient than the first generation ofpassenger jets (B-707, DC-8).5 6 One of the ma-

jor operational disadvantages of the Concordeis its high fuel consumption in comparison withthat of competing subsonic aircraft. Assuming afull load for each aircraft, the Concorde obtains15.8 passenger-miles per gallon of fuel, com-pared to 33.3 for the B-707, 44.4 for the DC-8-61, 46.3 for the B-747, and 53.6 for theDC-10. 7

5A. B. Rose, “Energy Intensity and Related Parameters of Se-lected Transportation Modes: Passenger Movements, ” Oak RidgeNational Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy,ORNL-5506, January 1979.

“J. M. Swihart, ~l~e Boei)~g NeuI Airplat~c Famil<v, p a p e r p r e -sented to AIAA 15th annual meeting, Washington, D. C., Feb, 6,1979, pp. 3-6.

‘Secretary Decisio)l 0 ) 1 Co)zcorde Su~7crso~~ic ~ra}zs})ort

(Washington, D. C.: LJ. S. Department of Transportation, Feb. 4,1979), p. 29.

COMPARATIVE FUEL EFFICIENCY

Estimates of the technological improvementspossible for supersonic aircraft vary widely.Projections for fuel usage per seat-mile rangefrom a low of 1.2 to a high of 2.0 times that ofpresent subsonic aircraft. However, supersonicsof the future would likely be competing not withpresent subsonics but the advanced and morefuel-efficient versions of the subsonics, using 20to 30 percent less fuel per seat-mile than currentsubsonics.

These estimates are reflected in table 8, whichshows fuel-efficiency values that might be at-tainable by each of the ASTs considered in thisassessment. For the AST-III, the table indicateshigh, medium, and low fuel-efficiency valuesbased on the possible technological improve-ments. In the interest of simplifying the analysisof energy impacts, the later comparison of fuelusage in each scenario will be based on single-point estimates. These assumed values must beregarded with caution since they may vary by asmuch as 25 to 50 percent. Where this variancehas a particularly important influence on theoutcome of the analysis, the reader will be re-minded again of the magnitude of the uncer-tainty.

Given the projected fuel efficiencies arrayedin table 8, it is possible to assess the impact ofthe several scenarios described in chapter IVwith regard to fuel use. Four assumptions aremade in this analysis. First, for all comparisons,it is assumed that 75 percent of the world fleetwill operate on short- and medium-haul routesand, thus, that the AST will be in competitionwith, and replace some portion of, the 25 per-cent of the fleet operating at stage lengths of2,700 nautical miles or longer. Second, it is as-

sumed that short- and medium-haul aircraft willconsume 85 percent (3.7 MMbbl/d) of the fuelestimated in the base case for an all subsonicfleet. Third, it is assumed that the AST will cap-ture a 40-percent share of the long-haul travelmarket, i.e., 400 ASTs will replace 850 long-haul subsonic aircraft as discussed in chapterIV.

The fourth assumption is that the AST will becompeting against and replacing a 300-passen-ger advanced subsonic transport (ASUBT), thatis, an aircraft with a seating capacity equivalentto the AST-III. In reality, the ASTs will be re-placing less efficient, older subsonic aircraft ofvarious sizes rather than the more efficient


Table 8.—Estimated Fuel Efficiency of Advanced Subsonic and Supersonic Aircraft

PresentParameters subsonics a ASUBT Concorde AST-I AST-II AST-III

Passengers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200-400 400-800 100 200 225 300Maximum range (rim) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000 5,500 3,200 4,200 4,800 5,500Speed (Mach) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.85 0.85 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4

Fuel-efficiency 2,900Btu/seat-mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,450 1,700 b 6,000 4,900 4,400 3,900

4,900

Load factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58% 67% 60% 67% 67% 67%5,850

Btu/passenger mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,225 2,550 10,000 7,350 6,600 4,3507,350

Relative fuel-efficiency (per seat-mile)1.2

v. present subsonicsa . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.70 b 2.45 2.0 1.8 1.62.0

1.7v. ASUBT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1 3.5 2.9 2.6 2.3

2.9

0.5v. Concorde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.28 1 0.8 0.75 0.65

0.8

aB-747, De-lo, L.loll.buPPerbOundofiazO. loso.percentirnprovernent in ASUBTfuel efficiency

SOURCES: Present aircraft: A. B, Rose, Energy /rrhwsity and Re/ated Parameters of Se/ected Transportation Modes, U.S. Department of Energy, ORNL-5506, January1979 Projections: OTA, Working Group A.

ASUBTs. However, this assumption allows a may be developed for use on high-density, long-comparison of the AST scenarios with the base haul routes by 2010. Eliminating such very largecase in which, assuming no ASTs were built, aircraft from the analysis allows direct compari-850 ASUBTs would be produced. The last as- son of subsonic and supersonic aircraft fuelsumption represents a major simplification. usage, without the confounding but significantSome of today’s aircraft can carry 400 passen- effect of productivity differences arising fromgers, and it is projected by some that subsonic size as well as speed differences.transports with a seating capacity of up to 800

ANALYSIS OF ENERGY IMPACTS

Scenario 1 envisions the operation in 2010 of400 U.S.-built AST-IIIs, which would replace850 of the long-haul subsonic fleet projected forthe base case and so reduce this fleet from 2,100to 1,250 aircraft. Thus, the split in the long-haulmarket would be 60 percent for the subsonic and40 percent for the supersonic. The fuel efficien-cies of the ASUBT and the AST-III are estimatedto be, respectively, 1,700 Btu and 2,900 to 4,900Btu per seat-mile. The AST-III would thereforeuse between 1.7 and 2.9 times more fuel perseat-mile than the ASUBT. Table 9 shows fuelconsumption increases over the base case if

scenario 1 eventuates. (The fuel efficiency of theASUBT is based on a 30-percent decrease in fuelusage over the present subsonics. If there is onlya 20-percent decrease, the AST-III would use 1.5to 2.5 times more fuel per seat-mile than theASUBT.)

In scenario 2, the United States would refrainfrom an AST program, but foreign manufactur-ers would develop and introduce a version of asupersonic aircraft by 2010. If they were to de-velop an aircraft roughly equivalent to an AST-111, the effect of this scenario on the energy situ-

Ch. VI—Energy: Fuel Price and Availability Ž 73

Table 9.—Energy Impacts of AST-III: Scenario 1

Scenario 1: AST-III fuel efficiency

Fuel consumption Base case High Medium Low

Short and medium range (MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.74Long range (MMbbl/d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.66 0.84 1.00 1.15Increase over base case (MMbbl/d). . . . . . . . – 0.18 0.34 0.49Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — + 27% + 5 0 % + 7 5 %

All commercial aviation (MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . 4.40 4.58 4.74 4.89Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — + 40/0 + 8% + 1 1 %

P e r c e n t o f i n c r e a s e i n w o r l d p e t r o l e u m u s e . — + 0.2% + 0.30/0 + 0.5%

MM bbl/d = mllllons of barrels per dayAssumptions:1 Short. and medium-range aircraft make up 75 percent of the fleet and use 85 percent of the fuel In the base case2 Base case fleet = 6,000 short and medium.range and 2,100 Iong.range subsonics.3 Scenario 1 fleet = 6,000 short- and medium-range, 1,250 Iongrange subsonic, and 400 AST-111.4 Long. range subsonic fuel efficiency = 1,700 Btu/seat.mile5 AST-111 fuel efficiency (Btu/seat-mile). Hlqh = 2,900, Medium = 3,900; Low = 4,9006 Long. range subsonic and ASTIII are 300~passenger aircraft


ation would be identical to that projected forscenario 1. If the foreign manufacturers were todevelop an AST-I, the impact on the energy sit-uation would probably be somewhat less be-cause in reality fewer aircraft may be sold. Theeffect also would be minimal because the AST-Iwould be less fuel efficient than the AST-III;however, detailed estimates for this case havenot been calculated.

Competition in the supersonic market (sce-nario 3) would result, according to our assump-tions, in a foreign-built AST-I introduced in thelate 1980’s and a U.S.-built AST-III introduced 5to 7 years later. It is calculated that by 2010 ,1,250 ASUBTs, 250 AST-Is, and 250 AST-IIIswould be in service. The assumed fuel efficiency

of the AST-I is 4,900 Btu per seat-mile and thatof the AST-III 2,900 to 4,900 Btu per seat-mile(3,900 Btu per seat-mile was estimated for sim-plicity in this analysis). Assuming an ASUBTfuel efficiency of 1,700 Btu per seat-mile, the ra-tios of the fuel efficiencies of the supersonics tothe fuel-efficiency of the ASUBT would be, forthe AST-I, 2.9 and, for the AST-III, 2.3. Table10 shows the increases in fuel consumption overthe base case if scenario 3 were to occur.

Scenario 4 projects a joint program by U.S.and foreign manufacturers resulting in the in-troduction of either an AST-II in 1990 (scenario4a) or an AST-III in the mid-1990’s (scenario4b). Scenario 4a estimates that by 2010, 450AST-IIs are in operation replacing 850 long-haul

Table 10.—Energy Impacts of AST-I and AST-III: Scenario 3

Scenario 3: fuel efficiency

All AST-I AST-IIIFuel consumption Base case aircraft port ion port ion

Short and medium range (MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . 3.74 3.74 — —Long range (MMbbl/d). ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.66 1.06 0.30 0.36Increase over base case (MMbbl/d). . . . . . . . – 0.40 0.20 0.20Percent of increase. ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — + 61 %. + 30% + 3 0 %All commercial aviation (MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . 4.40 4.80 — .Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — + 9% + 4.50/o + 4.5%Percent of increase in world petroleum use. — + 0.4% + 0.2% + 0.2%

MMbbl/d = millions of barrels per dayAssumptions.1. Short- and medium-range aircraft make up 75 percent of the fleet and use 85 percent of the fuel in the base case,2 Base case fleet = 6,000 short- and medium-range and 2,100 Iong-range subsonics.3. Scenario 3 fleet = 6,000 short- and medium-range, 1,250 long-range subsonic, 250 AST-I, and 250 AST-III.4. Long-range subsonic fuel efficiency = 1,700 Btu/seat.mile5 AST-I fuel efficiency = 4,900 Btu/seat-mile, AST-III fuel efficiency = 3,900 Btu/seat.mile6. Long. range subsonic and AST-III are 300-passenger aircraft, AST-I IS a 200-passenger aircraft.


—

74 • Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

subsonics. AST-II fuel consumption is consid- unilateral undertaking by the United States.ered to be 4,000 Btu per seat-mile which is 2.6 Table 11 shows the results of fuel consumptiontimes an ASUBT fuel efficiency of 1,700 Btu per analyses for either of the consortium cases.seat-mile. Scenario 4b differs from scenario 1only in the matter of timing in that a joint ven- Table 12 summarizes fuel consumption in theture could introduce 400 AST-IIIs earlier than a base case and in the four scenarios. Any scenar-

Table 11 .—Energy Impacts of AST-II or AST-III: Scenario 4

Scenario4a: fuel

efficiency Scenario 4b AST Ill: fuel efficiency

AST-II High Medium LowFuel consumption Base case

Short & medium range(MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.74

Long range (MMbbl/d). . . . . . . . 0.66increase over base case

(MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . . —All commercial aviation

(MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.40Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . . —Percent of increase in world

petroleum use . . . . . . . . . . . . —

3.74 3.74 3.74 3.741.19 0.84 1.00 1.15

0.53 0.18 0.34 0.49+ 80% + 27% + 50% + 75%

4.93 4.58 4.74 4.89+ 12% + 4% + 8% +11%

+ 0.6% + 0.2% + 0.3% + 0.5%

MMbbl/d = millions of barrels per day.Assumptions:1. Short- and medium-range aircraft make up 75 percent of the fleet and use 85 percent of the fuel in the base case.2. Base case fleet = 6,000 short- and medium-range and 2,100 long-range subsonics,3 Scenario 4a fleet = 6,000 short- and medium-range, 1,250 Iong-range subsonic, and 450 AST-II.

Scenario 4b fleet = 6,000 short- and medium-range, 1,250 long-range subsonic, and 400 AST-III.4. Long-range subsonic fuel efficiency = 1,700 Btu/seat-mile5. AST-II fuel efficiency = 4,400 Btu/seat-mile; AST-III fuel efficiency (Btu/seat-mile): High = 2,900; Medium = 3,900; Low =

4,500.6 Long-range subsonic is a 300-passenger aircraft; AST-II is a 225-passenger aircraft; and AST-III IS a 300-passenger aircraft.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

Table 12.—Summary of Energy Impacts

Scenarios

1 2 3 4Impacts Base case U.S. only Foreign only Competition Consortium

Fleet characteristicsNumber & type of long-haul

aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

a b

2,100 ASUBTs 1,250 ASUBTs400 AST-IIIs

1,250 ASUBTs400 AST-Is or400 AST-IIIsAST-I; 4,900

AST-III; 3,900

1,250 ASUBTs250 AST-Is

250 AST-IIIsAST-I; 4,900

AST-III; 3,900

1,250 ASUBTs450 AST-IIs

1,250 ASUBTs400 AST-IIIs

Fuel efficiency (Btu/seat-mile). 1,700 AST-III; 3,900a AST-II; 4,400 AST-III; 3,900a

Fuel-efficiency ratio(AST/ASUBT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 AST-I; 2.9

AST-III; 2.3AST-I; 2.9

AST-III; 2.32.6 2.3

Fuel consumptionLong-haul fuel (MMbbl/d) . . . . .Increase over base case

(MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . .Total commercial fleet

(MMbbl/d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Percent of increase. . . . . . . . . .Percent of increase in

world petroleum use. . . . . . .

0.66

——

4.40—

—

1.00 N Eb

1.06 1.19 1.00

0.34+ 500/0

N Eb

N Eb

0.40+ 600/0

0.53+ 800/0

0.34+ 500/0

N Eb

N Eb

4.80+ 9%

4.74+ 8%

4.93+ 12%

4.74+ 8%

+ 0.3% N Eb

+ 0 .40 /o + 0.60/0MMbbl/d = mlll!ons of barrels per day.aMlddle value of estimated range of 2,900 to 4,900.bNot estimated



io involving the introduction of a supersonictransport will involve greater overall fuel con-sumption than if no supersonic is developed.The percentage of fuel use increase in the long-haul market (which consumes about 15 percentof the total commercial fleet fuel) ranges from ahigh of 80 percent in the case of a consortium-built AST-II (scenario 4a) to a low of 50 percentin the case of a U.S.-built AST-III (scenario 1).These values depend heavily on estimates of fuelefficiency for the various aircraft. Because theseestimates are uncertain, the fuel consumptionfigures may vary by 20 to 25 percent.

According to table 12, the impact of super-sonic aircraft on the total amount of fuel con-sumed by the commercial aviation fleet wouldbe approximately 8 to 12 percent—if the market

estimates for supersonics are reasonably accu-rate. Likewise, the impact of supersonic aircrafton worldwide consumption of petroleum fuelswould be miniscule —0.3 to 0.6 percent, figuresmuch smaller than the probable error in theestimation process used here.

If supersonic aircraft were introduced andused in numbers comparable to those assumedin these scenarios, overall worldwide fuel con-sumption by commercial aviation would ap-proach 5 MMbbl/d by 2010. This figure isequivalent to the amount of petroleum-basedfuel anticipated to be used by all private auto-mobiles in the United States at that time. If thesetypes and numbers of supersonics were not in-troduced, worldwide commercial aviation fuelconsumption would be 4.4 MMbbl/d, or about10 percent less.

ALTERNATIVE FUELS

The rising cost of petroleum-based fuels andthe uncertainty of the long-term supply of petro-leum have prompted all sectors of the economyto intensify the search for alternative energysources. The need for substitute fuel is keenlyfelt in the air transportation industry, which isparticularly dependent on an assured supply ofa low-cost fuel that is equivalent to kerosene inweight and energy content. Because air trans-portation is a world activity, it is also of criticalimportance that the substitute fuel—whatever itis—be a uniform and generally available prod-uct .

The prospect facing the aircraft and airline in-dustries has been summarized by one observerthus:

The question is, in view of the grim outlookfor the future of petroleum-based fuel, what arethe alternatives facing the air transport indus-try? What other fuels offer more promise andwhat are the criteria that should serve as a guidein making the choice of a fuel in the future? Thedesign and development cycle for large commer-cial transport aircraft of advanced design is ap-proximately 10 years. The normal design life ex-pectancy for aircraft of this type is about 20years. Assuming a production cycle of 10 years,any new commercial transport aircraft whose

design is started in 1976, for example, wouldnormally be in service from 1986 through 2015,at a minimum. It is not realistic to assume thatcurrent quality fuel will continue to be generallyavailable around the world at economically ac-ceptable prices that far into the future.8

The question of alternative fuels is a generalone that will affect the development of all typesof advanced aircraft, and future decisions con-cerning supersonic aircraft will be conditionedby broader trends and developments in the avia-tion industry. Thus, it seems unlikely that su-personic aircraft would evolve toward the use ofone fuel and subsonic aircraft toward another.More likely both forms of air transport technol-ogy will follow a single course and the fuel even-tually selected will be one compatible for all ad-vanced aircraft operating in the period 2000 to2010. Questions that will have to be addressedin making a transition to an alternative fuelare:9

● What is the preferred fuel for commercialaviation from the standpoints of cost, per-

“D. G. Brewer, Hydrogen Fueled ~rur{sport Aircraft, paper pre-sented at the U.S.-Japan Joint Seminar on “Key Technologies forthe Hydrogen Energy System, ” Tokyo, Japan, July 1979, p. 7.

‘Ibid.


●

●

●

formance, emissions, energy, noise, andlong-range availability?How can the transition to a new fuel be im-plemented without serious disruption of ex-isting commercial airline service?How much will it cost to provide facilitiesto store and handle the new fuel at airports,and how should this process be financed?Recognizing that the problem is interna-tional and that the choice of the new fuel re-quires cooperation among the principal na-tions, how can this choice best be accom-plished?

At present, several candidate fuels are beingconsidered. Generally they fall into two catego-ries: synthetic liquid fuels with properties simi-lar to kerosene, and cryogenic fuels such as liq-uid hydrogen or methane. These fuels could bederived from a number of sources—oil shale, tarsands, coal, or heavy crude oils. Table 13 sum-marizes the properties of some of the candidatefuels. ,

The National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration (NASA) has conducted and sponsoredseveral studies of coal-derived aviation fuels.10

Coal has been identified as one of the more plen-tiful remaining U.S. energy resources (at anorder of magnitude greater than crude oil). Thefuels considered were synthetic aviation kero-

IOR. D . Witcofski, “Alternate Aircraft Fuels—Prospects andOperational Implications, ” NASA TMX-7403, May 1977.

sene, because it appears more compatible withthe present air transportation system than otherfuels, and liquid methane and liquid hydrogen,because they offer high energy content perpound. The investigations addressed the areasof fuel production, air terminal requirements foraircraft fueling, and the performance character-istics of aircraft designed to utilize alternatefuels. In the fuel production studies, the energyrequirements associated with the production ofeach of the three selected fuels have been deter-mined, as have estimates of the fuel prices. Inthe area of air terminal requirements for alter-nate fuels, only liquid hydrogen has been as-sessed thus far. Subsonic commercial air trans-ports, designed to utilize liquid hydrogen fuel,have been analyzed and their performance char-acteristics have been compared to aircraft utiliz-ing conventional aviation kerosene. Environ-mental and safety aspects were addressed aswere key technical and economic issues.

Lockheed-California Co. has produced infor-mation on the processes and costs of productionof several alternate fuels .11 When conventionalcrude oil is refined into a variety of fuels, in-cluding jet fuel, the energy content of fuels com-ing out of the refinery can vary from about 88 to95 percent of the energy input to the refinery de-pending on the type of crude oil being refinedand the mix of products. When fuels are pro-duced from coal, an even smaller percentage of

“OTA Working Paper, Lockheed-California Co., Feb. 5, 1979.

Table 13.-Properties of Some Candidate Fuels

Synthetic Ethyl Methyljet fuela Methane alcohol alcohol Ammonia Hydrogen

Nominal composition . . . . . . . . C H1 9 4 CH4 C 2H 50 H C H30H NH3 H2

Molecular weight, . . . . . . . . . . . 120 16.04 46.06 32.04 17.03 2.016Heat of combustion (Btu/lb). . . 18,400 21,120 12,800 8,600 8,000 51,600Liquid density (lb/cubic ft

at 50° F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 26.5 b 51 49.7 42.6b 4.4b

Boiling point (0 Fat1 atmosphere) . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 to 550 – 258 174 148 - 2 8 – 423

Freezing point (0 F) . . . . . . . . . . – 58 to – 90 – 296 – 175 – 144 – 108 – 484Specific heat (Btu/lb O F) . . . . . . 0.48 0.822 0.618 0.61 1.047 2.22Heat of vaporization (Btu/lb). . . 105 to 110 250 367 474 589 193

aDerived from coat or shale.

bAt boiling point.

SOURCE: D. G. Brewer and R. E. Morris, ~ar?k arrd Fuel Systems Considerations for Hydrogen Fueled Aircraft, Society of Automotive Engineers, paper No. 751093,November 1975.


CARGO COMPARTMENTCARGO CAPACITY 106,330 lb 48,230 kg

FUEL CAPACITY 50.070 lb 22,710 kg///ustrat/on. Courtesy 01 Lockheed A/rcraft Corp.

Artist’s concept of hydrogen-fueled cargo aircraft


the energy in the coal feedstock actually comesout the plant as useful fuel.

The thermal efficiency of the consol syntheticfuel (CSF) process for producing aviation kero-sene from coal is about 70 percent. After hydro-gen has been produced from the high-Btu gasproduct and used to hydrocrack and hydroge-nate the heavy oil from the CSF process to pro-duce a synthetic aviation kerosene, the overallthermal efficiency is 54 percent.

Of all the fuels and fuel processes investi-gated, liquid methane produced by the HYGASprocess is the most thermally efficient coal-de-rived liquid fuel (64 percent). The relatively lowenergy requirements for liquefying methane (re-ported at 12.2 kWh per million Btu of liquidproduct) account for this efficiency.

Of the hydrogen production processes consid-ered, the most thermally efficient process is thesteam-iron process. Depending on whether thebyproduct gas (heating value plus sensible heat)or electrical power generated from the gas iscredited as the byproduct energy, the thermal

efficiency of liquid hydrogen product via thesteam-iron process is 49 or 44 percent. The en-ergy requirements for hydrogen liquefactionwere determined to be 104.7 kWh per millionBtu of liquid product.

At the time of the Lockheed study (1977) do-mestic airlines were paying about $0.32 per gal-lon ($2.60 per million Btu) for aviation kero-sene. The price in early 1980 was over $1.00 pergallon. The price of synthetic fuels will be deter-mined by a number of factors, including the costof the energy source from which they are pro-duced (coal in the present discussion), the costof labor and materials for constructing theplants, the cost of a method of financing theconstruction of plants, and the price of competi-tive fuels.

A summary of fuel prices as a function of coalcost is presented in figure 14. Although notbased on current prices, the data are still usefulin comparing one fuel or fuel production proc-ess against another. As a point of reference, Vir-ginia Electric and Power Co. was paying be-

Figure 14.— The Price of Coal-Derived Aviation Fuels as a Function of Coal Cost

Assumptions● Electric power costs 2¢/kWh. Current Iiquefaction technology


tween $20 to $25 per ton for mine-mouth coal inMay 1977. The figure shows that, for the proc-esses and fuels considered, liquid methane pro-duced by the HYGAS process is the least expen-sive, and the price increase on account of in-creased coal cost would be less than for theother fuels and fuel processes. Liquid hydrogenis the most expensive fuel within the range ofcoal costs considered. Synthetic aviation kero-sene (produced from the CSF process) falls be-tween liquid hydrogen and liquid methane.

Figure 14 also shows that the price of gaseoushydrogen and methane are comparable and, atthe lower coal costs, gaseous hydrogen is lessexpensive than gaseous methane. The reasonthat the liquid hydrogen prices are so high incomparison to the other two fuels is the cost ofliquefying the hydrogen. At $25 per ton, thecost of coal represents more than half of thetotal cost of liquid hydrogen produced by lique-faction. Studies are currently underway at Lindeto assess the possibility of reducing the cost ofhydrogen liquefaction. These studies include ananalysis of the idea of joining to the liquefactionplant a heavy water plant from which byprod-uct heavy water would be sold.

In summary, at a coal cost of $20 per ton,Lockheed estimates that liquid hydrogen wouldbe priced at $7 per million Btu, synthetic kero-sene at $5.50, and liquid methane at $4.30 .However, a later study conducted by NASA12

has indicated that at a coal cost of $18 per ton,liquid hydrogen would be priced at $11 per mil-lion Btu, synthetic kerosene at $8.47, and liq-uid methane at $8.00. The variance surroundingthese estimated costs indicates the uncertainty inthis area.

ducted by NASA,13 Boeing, 14 Lockheed, 15 andEXXON. I’ Lockheed has probably been themost active supporter of hydrogen-fueled air-craft, and table 14 summarizes some of theirfindings. The Lockheed view is that liquid hy-drogen is superior to other fuels as a long-termsubstitute for petroleum, especially as a fuel forsupersonic aircraft, Among liquid hydrogen ad-vantages cited by Lockheed are reduced aircraftweight, lower engine thrust requirements, betterspecific fuel consumption, lower direct operat-ing cost, and reduced sonic boom overpressure.

However, EXXON in a study comparing al-ternative aviation fuels has reached oppositeconclusions concerning the relative advantagesof hydrogen. The study pointed out that, on avolume basis, the heat content of liquid hydro-gen is 25 percent that of synthetic jet fuel and,thus, more storage volume would be requiredfor a given flight. Other disadvantages of liquidhydrogen are low density and boiling point, aswell as being very expensive fuel compared toliquid fuels from coal or shale. Table 15 summa-rizes advantages and disadvantages of liquid hy-drogen enumerated in the EXXON study. Itshould be remembered that disagreement re-mains within the industry over findings in boththe Lockheed and the EXXON studies.

The following summation, excerpted from theEXXON study, highlights some of the majorpoints of comparison among the various alter-native aviation fuels that might be used forsupersonic and subsonic aircraft.

● Of the cryogenic and the synthetic jet fuelsconsidered, hydrogen has the highest heatof combustion on a weight basis and thehighest specific heat (a measure of its abili-ty to be used as a coolant), but it has the

Application to Supersonic Transports

Studies of the use of synthetic fuels and liquidhydrogen for supersonic aircraft have been con-

I ZR D Wltcc)fski, “Comparis(>n of Alternate Fuels for Aircraft, ”. .NASA Technical Memorandum, September 1979.

‘ ‘R. D. Witcofski, “Hydrogen Fueled Subsonic Aircraft, ” NASALangely Research Center, presented at the International Meetingon Hydrogen and Its Prospects, Liege, Belgium, November 1976.

‘“G. J. Schott, “Alternate Fuels for Aviation, ” Boeing Commer-cial Airplane Co., presented at the 29th annual conference, Cali-fornia Association of Airport Executives, July 1975.

15G D Brewer and R. E. Morris, Tank and ~ue~ Systems c~)l-. .sideratiom for Hydrogen Fueled Aircraft, Society of AutomotiveEngineers, paper No. 751093, November 1975.

16 EXXON Engineering and Research Company, Alterrrute Ener-gy Sources for Non-Highway Transportation, for U.S. Depart-ment of Energy, contract No. EC-77-C-05-5438, December 1978.


Table 14.—Comparison of a Supersonic Transport Aircraft Fueled WithLiquid Hydrogen or Jet A Fuel

(Mach 2.7,4,200 nm, 234 passengers)

RatioJet A

Parameters Unit LH2 Jet A LH2

Gross weight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lb 394,910 762,170 1.93Operating empty weight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lb 245,240 317,420 1.29Block fuel weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lb 85,390 330,590 3.88Thrust per engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lb 52,820 86,890 1.64Wing area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ft2 7,952 11,094 1.39Span . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ft 113 113.5 1.18Fuselage length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ft 304.2 297 0.87Field length required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ft 7,800 9,490 1.22Lift/drag (cruise) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.42 8.65 1.17Specific fuel consumption (cruise) . . . . . . . . Ib—flb 0.575 1.501 2.61

hrAircraft price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10’ 45.5 61.4 1.35Direct operating cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¢/seat nm. 3.40’ 3.86 b 1.14Energy utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Btu/seat nm. 4,483 6,189 1.38Noise, sideline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EPNdB 104.0 108.0 —Flyover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EPNdB 102.2 108.0 —Sonic boom overpressure (start of cruise). . psf 1.32 1.87 1.42

‘BaSedOnaCOSt of$xooperlo6f3tU.bBa~~don acoStof$2,00per 106EtU.

SOURCE: OTA Working Paper, Lockheed-Ca~fornla cov January 1979

Table 15.—Advantages and Disadvantages of Liquid Hydrogen Compared to Synthetic Jet Fuel

Advantages Disadvantages●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Lighter weight aircraft than synthetic jet fuel aircraft.

Longer range possible.

Greatest performance advantage is with supersonic flight

Emission of CO, CO2, HC, and odor eliminated; NOX

emission equal to or less than synthetic jet fuel.

Reduction in noise and sonic boom due to smaller sizeaircraft.

Initial cost lower for supersonic aircraft, about same forsubsonic.

Maintenance cost may be lower.

Can use shorter runways.a

●

●

●

●

●

●

Airport modification to add hydrogen storage and handlingfacilities would be a major undertaking.

Overall economics unfavorable compared to shale oilbased fuel for subsonic and supersonic aircraft. *

Overall economics unfavorable with coal-based liquidsfor subsonic, but close for supersonic. *

Requires more energy from mine to engine.

Amount of water vapor emitted in flight is higher.

Handling liquid hydrogen is more hazardous than syntheticjet fuel.

‘Based on a ratio of coal based liquids to shale oil fuel cost per gallon of 1.8 to 1.

SOURCE” EXXON Research and Engineering Co., Alternate Energy Sources for Non-Highway Transportation, December 1978.

●

disadvantage of a low density and so lowvolumetric heat content and also a lowboiling point. ●

Liquid methane is 15 percent more ener-getic on a weight basis and has a specificheat 1.7 times greater than synthetic jet

fuel. It is six times more dense than liquidhydrogen.The fuel costs, on a per-flight basis for asubsonic aircraft, are lowest for shale-de-rived jet fuel, followed by an indirect coal-liquid jet fuel. A direct coal-liquid jet fuel


●

●

●

Illustration: Courtesy of Lockheed Aircraft Corp

Artist’s concept of hydrogen-fueled hypersonic aircraft

and liquid methane are roughly equal incost. The hydrogen-fueled aircraft wouldbe the most expensive to operate—overthree times the cost of operating an aircraftfueled with a shale-derived liquid. *For a supersonic aircraft (Mach 2.7, 4,200nautical miles, and 234 passengers), the de-sign advantages with hydrogen are greaterthan for a subsonic aircraft. However, thefuel cost per flight still favors the syntheticliquid fuels—shale oil first, followed bycoal-derived jet fuel and then hydrogen. *With regard to natural resources and the re-sources required between the mine and theaircraft, a shale-oil-derived jet fuel is themost efficient. Hydrogen requires aboutdouble the amount of natural resources asshale oil.Laboratory tests have shown that accept-able jet fuels can be made from either coalor shale. Production of aircraft fuels fromshale oil should be more straightforwardthan from coal.

*Based on the following cost ratios per 10” Btu: liquid hydrogenfrom coal (3.8); jet fuel from coal liquefaction (1 .8); and jet fuelfrom shale oil (1 .0).

●

●

Coal-based jet fuels will have poorer com-bustion properties than shale oil fuels be-cause they form naphthenes rather thanparaffins when the coal liquids are hydro-genated.An economic comparison between upgrad-ing fuels to meet current hydrogen levelsand modifying the engine shows that thereare incentives to develop an engine that canaccept a poorer quality fuel. If a fuel of 12percent hydrogen can be used, the incentivewould be about $170,000 per year per en-gine to operate an engine capable of using afuel with a lower hydrogen content.

The Federal Government currently is plan-ning to launch a large-scale synthetic fuel pro-duction program. But the details of the plan andwhere this new fuel would be allocated have notbeen worked out, so they cannot be related todevelopment of a supersonic aircraft at thistime. However, due to the uncertainty of the en-ergy picture, it seems quite appropriate to con-tinue the examination of alternative fuels to en-sure fuel availability for any new type of ad-vanced air transport —either subsonic or super-sonic.

Chapter Vll

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Over the past two decades, the potentiallyadverse effects of commercial supersonic flighton the environment have been the subject ofconsiderable controversy and, at times, heateddebate. The principal issues are noise, the sonicboom, pollution from engine emissions, and, toa lesser extent, radiation effects on passengersand crew. During the debate, both fact and con-jecture have been used to support opposingpoints of view, clouding the issues in the mindsof most Americans.

In an effort to remove these clouds and to de-termine whether the environmental concerns are

real or imagined, the U.S. Government initiatedseveral research efforts following cancellation ofthe U.S. supersonic transport (SST) program in1971. These research programs, although stillnot providing complete and final answers, havegenerated a greatly improved understanding ofpotential advanced supersonic transport (AST)environmental impacts. In the following sec-tions, the results of U.S. Government studiesare summarized briefly and the environmentalimpacts that are currently perceived for an ASTdesign are discussed.

Engine noise was a critical factor in the can-cellation of the prior U.S. SST program and alsothe focus of controversy about the Concordeoperating at Washington and New York air-ports. The noise issue will figure prominently inthe consideration of any future U.S. aircraftprogram. Consequently, engine noise has been amajor subject of the National Aeronautics andSpace Administration’s (NASA) research pro-grams on both subsonic and supersonic technol-ogy.

Since the Concordes have been operating atDunes and Kennedy and more recently at Dal-las-Fort Worth airports, a doubt has surfaced asto whether these supersonic aircraft have actual-ly increased the overall noise exposure of neigh-boring communities because the number of su-personic aircraft operations compared to thetotal number of aircraft operations is small. It isexpected that supersonic aircraft will compriseonly about 5 to 15 percent of future total air-craft operations and, hence, will always con-tribute relatively little to overall noise. In thisregard, it is important to keep in mind that onlyone generation of supersonic transports is inoperation today. This generation’s design repre-sents the technology available roughly between

1955 and 1965, a period before noise rules forany class of aircraft were promulgated. Thus,the supersonic transport has had no opportunityfor the evolutionary progress in noise controlthat has benefited the subsonic fleet throughseveral generations of aircraft and propulsioncycles.

Notwithstanding the fact that the noise im-pact of future ASTs would be relatively small,the NASA supersonic research program hasaimed at achieving noise levels comparable tothose of advanced long-range subsonic aircraft.The research centers on an advanced variable-cycle engine, which appears to have the capabil-ity of lessening noise by inherent design, and onadvanced mechanical suppressors, which wouldsubstantially reduce noise with relatively smallthrust loss. I The NASA program has madesignificant progress and, while verificationthrough actual hardware is still necessary, it ap-pears that an AST would be able to meet theFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) noiserule (FAR part 36 stage 2), issued in 1969. Thus,

‘Cornelius Driver, “Advanced Supersonic Technology and ItsImplications for the Future, ” presented at the AIAA Atlantic Aero-nautical Conference, Williamsburg, Va., May 26-28, 1979.

85


Noise pollution

this research promises a considerable improve-ment over the-noise levels of currently operatingConcordes and of models reached by the closeof the prior U.S. SST program.

However, the viability of these improvementsis thrown into doubt by the outstanding ques-tion of what additional noise standards both fu-ture subsonic and supersonic aircraft may haveto satisfy by the time they are introduced intorevenue operations. More stringent standardscould affect the feasibility and acceptability ofboth kinds of aircraft and require further re-search and technology development.

Because of the greater interdependence of alldesign facets in the aircraft, an AST will prob-ably be more sensitive to strict noise require-ments than comparable subsonic aircraft. Giventhe current status of supersonic technology,

achieving noise2 will be veryformed a study

Photo credit: Environmental Protect/on Agency

levels below FAR part 36, stagecostly. Lockheed recently per-to provide data for FAA to use

in working with the International Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO) Committee on AircraftNoise, Working Group E. This committee is set-ting noise standards for possible future super-sonic transports. Lockheed addressed the rela-tionship between predicted noise levels at theFAR part 36 measurement points and predicteddirect operating costs for a supersonic transportwith a specified emission. The results are shownin figure 15.

This figure plots achievable noise versusoperating cost penalties. The curve on the leftreflects the results of Lockheed’s calculations.Optimistically it shows that such an airplanewould readily meet FAR part 36, stage 2 (108

Ch. VII—Environmental Issues “ 87

Figure 15.—The Cost and Uncertaintyof Noise Reduction

EPNdB 105 FAA 110 115 120level regulation *

Traded takeoff noise - EPNdB

“FAR part 36 stage 2.

SOURCE OTA Working Paper, Lockheed California Co , January 1979

EPNdB) without economic penalty and that itmay meet stage 3 (about 105 EPNdB) with a 5-

to 6-percent direct operating cost penalty. How-ever, when the second curve is added, reflectingthe margin of uncertainty, the cost of meetingthe various noise regulations greatly increases.Part of the reason for the 5 db margin of uncer-tainty, is the lack of solid experimental data tosupport the theoretical predictions. Thus, the re-sults indicate that going much beyond the 1969FAR part 36, stage 2 standards is likely to in-volve substantial direct operating cost penalties.Unless much of this uncertainty in noise calcula-tions for supersonic aircraft is removed or re-duced significantly, no manufacturer is likely tocommit to a new supersonic aircraft programbecause the investment is too large to risk fail-ure in meeting the standard. Substantial re-search and engine hardware testing will beneeded to develop the data with which to reducethe margin of uncertainty to acceptable propor-tions.

SONIC BOOM EFFECTS

The general issue of noise dovetails with thespecific problem of the sonic boom. Designedwithout regard to limiting the sonic boom, thetypical supersonic transport would produceoverpressure levels ranging from 1.5 to 4.0pounds per square foot (lb/ft2). These shockwaves generated during acceleration and cruiseflight remain an environmental concern whichU.S. regulations have responded to in prohib-iting civil flights at speeds which generate aboom that reaches the ground.

Sonic boom effects on humans are difficult topinpoint because of the subjectivity of the peo-ple’s responses and because of the diversity ofvariables affecting their behavior. Responses de-pend on previous exposure, age, geographic lo-cation, time of day, socioeconomic status, andother variables.

Research and experimentation by FAA,NASA, and ICAO have turned up several find-ings about sonic boom phenomena related tohumans, structures, and animals:2 3

●

●

~Anon., Co)zcorde Superso)l ic Tram.port Aircraft, Draft Etlz~i-ro)zme~ztul Impact Statemetz t (Washington, D. C.: U, S, Depart-ment of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, March1975).

Sonic booms do not affect adversely hu-man hearing and vision or the circulatorysystem. The human psychological responseis more complex, involving attitudes andhabituation to sonic booms and theirsources. In addition to the general observa-tion that unexpected and unfamiliar noisestartled people, the research indicated thatintense booms tend to disorient people.

Damage to structures appears the most seri-ous potential impact of sonic boom, al-though even here the projected damagecaused by supersonic transports may beminimal. Sonic booms with an intensity of1.0 to 3.0 lb/ft2, that is the intensity associ-ated with a large supersonic transport, cancause glass to break and plaster to crack. Inthe range of 2.0 to 3.0 lb/ft2, overpressurewill damage about 1 window pane per 8million boom pane exposures. Booms withoverpressure from 3.0 to 5.0 l b / f t2 c a ncause minor damage to plaster on woodlath, old gypsum board and bathroom tile,

‘L, J. Runyan and E, J. Kane, Sot~ic BOIII)I Literature Sur-z!ey,Volume 1 State of tllc Art, Federal Aviation Administration reportNo. RD-73-129-1, September 1973.

6’3-285 O - 80 - 7


and to new stucco. Sonic boom impact willvary according to the condition of thestructure.

Boom overpressure dissipates with depth ofwater (e.g., to a tenth of initial value at adepth of about 122 feet) and so appears topose no threat to aquatic life, including thecapacity of fish eggs to hatch.

Research on chickens, embryo chicken andpheasant eggs, pregnant cows, race horses,sheep, wild birds, and mink indicates thatsonic boom effects on fowl, farm, and wildanimals are negligible. Like humans, ani-mals are startled by loud noises, but thisreaction was found to diminish during test-ing.

Although research indicates that overpressureof 4.0 lb/ft2 or less produces little damage andfew lasting psychological effects, sonic boomsof such intensity would constitute a public nui-sance. As ‘present regulations prescribe, currentand, at least, any second-generation supersonictransport cannot fly supersonically over popu-lated land masses. Thus, market studies for fu-ture ASTs are restricted to flight patterns in-volving city pairs with over water supersoniclegs.

NASA has expended considerable effort onsonic boom minimization studies, 4 5 w h i c hpoint to the possibility of supersonic aircraft de-signs with a boom of lower intensity. Such low-boom airplanes will require a degree of tech-nological refinement beyond current capabilitiesand are not a likelihood for the period consid-ered in this report. Additional research could al-ter the picture, perhaps allowing an AST to bedeveloped for introduction beyond the year2010 that could operate over land.

4F. E. Mclean and H. W. Carlson, “Sonic-Boom Characteristicsof Proposed Supersonic and Hypersonic Airplanes, ” NASA TND-3587, September 1966.

‘E. J. Kane, A Study to Determine the Feasibility of a Low SonicBoom Supersonic Transport, NASA CR-2332, December 1973.

Recently, the term “secondary sonic boom”has been used in connection with some Con-corde operations. Secondary sonic boom iscaused occasionally by certain meteorologicalphenomena. For example, the structure of theatmosphere is such that its temperature de-creases from sea level up to an altitude of about5 miles. From this altitude the temperature con-tinually increases and decreases up to a regioncalled the thermosphere. 6 This temperaturestructure is the primary factor that determinesthe noise profile in the atmosphere. With thewind profile it determines how sound propa-gates through the atmosphere and can result,under special circumstances, in sound radiatedinto the atmosphere being returned back toEarth.

In the case of aircraft-produced sonic boom,the source of the noise could be waves from theairplane that propagate upward and are then re-turned or could be waves that reflect off the sur-face of the ocean, travel upwards, and then arereturned. Measurements of these shock waveshave been taken showing overpressures on theorder of 0.02 lb/ ft2.7

Sources of these secondary sonic booms havebeen identified as Concorde flights, distant gun-nery practice, quarry blasting, and similar ac-tivities. They have also been associated withthe overflight of space vehicles, including theApollo 12 and 13 moon flights.8

A Naval Research Laboratory study has con-cluded that secondary sonic booms from Con-corde are of sufficiently low amplitude andfrequency that it is unlikely that they are eitherresponsible for some mysterious sounds ob-served off the east coast in 1979 or likely todisturb the public.9

6M. Lessen and A. W. Pryce, “ Now Don’t Get Rattled,” Journalof Acoustical Society of America, 64(6), December 1978.

‘Ibid.‘D. Cotten and W. L. Dorm, “Sound From Apollo Rockets in

Space,” Science, vol. 171, February 1971.‘J. H. Gardner and P. H. Rogers, “Thermospheric Propagation

of Sonic Booms From the Concorde Supersonic Transport, ” NavalResearch Laboratory, NRL memorandum report 3904, Feb. 14,1979.

Ch. VIl—Environmental issues “ 89

EMISSIONS

In the early 1970’s, concern was aroused thatthe engine emissions from a fleet of supersonictransports would deplete the ozone in the upperatmosphere, reduce the shielding from the Sun’sultraviolet rays, and, thus, cause an increase inthe incidence of skin cancer. This concern, orig-inally directed only at anticipated supersonicaircraft, spread to the potential impact of thegrowing fleet of subsonic aircraft. At the timethe issue was raised, there was simply notenough knowledge from which to draw theneeded scientific conclusions.10

During the congressional debate over thefuture of the SST program in 1970, the Depart-ment of Transportation (DOT) was directed tomount a Federal scientific program to obtain theknowledge needed to judge how serious the con-jectured ozone-depletion effects might be andreport the results to Congress by the end ofcalendar year 1974. This directive led to theestablishment of DOT’s climatic impact assess-ment program (CIAP), which drew on 9 otherFederal departments and agencies, 7 foreignagencies, and the individual talents of 1,000 in-vestigators in numerous universities and otherorganizations in the United States and abroad.At the same time, a special committee of the Na-tional Academy of Sciences (NAS) was orga-nized to review the work of CIAP and to forman independent judgment of the results.

The principal findings of the CIAP study11

were:

●

●

Operations of present-day supersonic air-craft and those currently scheduled to enterservice (about 30 Concordes and TU-144s)cause climatic effects which are muchsmaller than minimally detectable.Future harmful effects to the environmentcan be avoided if proper measures aretaken in a timely manner to develop low-emission engines and fuels.

IOA. J. Grobecker, S. C. Coroniti, and R. H. Cannon, Jr., ~~eEffects of Stratospheric Pollution by Aircra/t (Washington, D. C.:U.S. Department of Transportation, report DOT-TST-75-50, De-cember 1974).

11A. J. Grobecker, et a]., op. cit.

●

●

●

On

If stratospheric vehicles (including subsonicaircraft) beyond the year 1980 increasegreatly in number, improvements over1974 propulsion technology will be neces-sary to assure that emissions do not signifi-cantly disturb the stratospheric environ-ment.The cost of developing low-emission en-gines and fuels would be small compared tothe potential economic and social costs ofnot doing so.Many uncertainties remain in our knowl-edge of the dynamics and chemistry of theupper atmosphere. A continuous atmos-pheric monitoring and research programcan further reduce remaining uncertainties,can ascertain whether the atmosphericquality is being maintained, and can mini-mize the cost of doing so.

the recommendations of the CIAP studies,Congress has supported a NASA program to de-velop the technology for low-emission jet en-gines. This program has been successful in de-fining and testing a conceptual design for aburner which might solve potential future high-altitude emission problems as well as reducelow-altitude emissions.12

Also, on the CIAP recommendations, FAAinitiated a high-altitude pollution program(HAPP) to monitor continuously the upper at-mosphere and conduct systematic research toaddress the uncertainties regarding ozone deple-tion attributable to future subsonic and super-sonic aircraft. The ongoing HAPP studies havealready indicated that the earlier CIAP andNAS studies substantially exaggerated the ex-tent to which future aircraft will reduce theozone layer. Present understanding of the phe-nomena indicates much smaller impacts andperhaps no net impact at all.13 14 15 The currentpredictions are compared with earlier CIAP andNAS predictions in figure 16.

Izcorne]ius Driver, OP. cit.

13A. Broderick, “stratospheric Effects from Aviation, ” presentedat the AIAA/SAE 13th Propulsion Conference, AIAA paper77-799, July 1977.

“See p. 90.IsSee p. 90.

—


This is a significant finding, but it should beaccepted only tentatively. Knowledge about at-mospheric chemistry is growing and continuedassessments are necessary as new data and im-proved atmospheric models become available.Current findings, however, are on much firmerground than prior estimates and give some rea-son for optimism on the emission problems ofadvanced aircraft.

(Footnote continued from p. 89. )14P. J. Crutzen, “A Two-Dimensional Photochemical Model of

the Atmosphere Below 55 km: Estimates of Natural and ManCaused Ozone Perturbations Due to NOx,” Proceedings of theFourth Conference on the Climatic impact Assessment Program(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, reportDOT-TSC-OST-75-38, 1976).

ISI. G. poppoff, R. C. Whiteen, R. P. Turco, and L. A. Capone,An Assessment of the Effect of Supersonic Aircraft Operations onthe Stratospheric Ozone Content, NASA reference publication1026, August 1978.

Figure 16.—Predicted Effect of Improved AircraftTechnology on the Ozone Layer

(000 Ft) km

65 ~

60 -

55 -

50 -

45 -

40 “

35 ~

‘-24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4

Ozone column change, percent

SOURCE: “High Altitude Pollution Program,” Federal Aviation Administration,

December 1977.

COSMIC RAY EXPOSUREAt the higher cruise altitudes expected of However, the increased intensity of radiation

supersonic transports, cosmic rays are filtered will be somewhat compensated for by the de-by the atmosphere less than at subsonic cruise crease in exposure time resulting from the air-altitudes or on the ground. This factor has given craft’s supersonic speed. The best evidence torise to some concern that crew personnel will date is that such radiation exposure will not ex-undergo excessive exposure to cosmic rays. ceed permitted occupational levels.

SUMMARYBased on the current state of knowledge and

assuming all supersonic legs will be flown overwater, noise is the most significant environmen-tal problem of a new generation of supersonicaircraft. Although other concerns do not appearto be as critical at this time, it is likely that all ofthe environmental issues of a future supersonictransport will both intensify and subside in thefuture. They will intensify in the sense that regu-lation is likely to become more comprehensiveand stringent, and measurement and evaluationtechniques more sophisticated and accurate. Atthe same time, the regulations are more likely to

be shaped by compromise between all relevantconsiderations and thus viewed as an equitablebalance between diverse points of view and con-flicting objectives. Debate concerning environ-mental standards will be a more familiar and es-tablished process. The regulations that will bederived from them will be more accepted, sothat the equipment that conforms to these regu-lations will likewise be more accepted. Whilethis process is evolving, it seems clear that thecontinued technical assessment and research onthe environmental issues of future advanced air-craft are highly appropriate.

Chapter Vlll

SUPERSONIC TRANSPORTATION AND SOCIETY

It is clear that advancements in transportationtechnology, such as the development of viablesupersonic flight, would have an impact that al-ters the world we live in. It is possible to have aclear sense of the tangible ways in which tech-nology changes the human environment, But atthe same time, it can be very difficult to foreseeexactly what a projected technological develop-ment will demand in the way of specific accom-modations in the status quo.

The more specific the technological develop-ment we are considering, the more general orspeculative attempts at prediction become. Theimpact of the advent of advanced high-speedaircraft will be felt in the area of long-range, andespecially international, travel. Advanced high-speed aircraft would not appear to offer a dra-matic change in the character of patterns of in-

ternational travel, but it would seem to offer theopportunity for an increase in the scale oftravel.

However, this potential for enhanced trans-portation is proceeding at the same time as revo-lutionary improvements of all sorts in commu-nications capabilities. It is conceivable thatprogress in the communications area could al-low the replacement of some amount of travelby rapid and sophisticated communications;however, as discussed below, it is often notedthat increases in the quality and quantity ofcommunications tend to be accompanied bysimilar increases in transportation. Assessingand projecting the effects of the mutual interac-tions of improving transportation and improv-ing communications are very difficult tasks, andperhaps impossible.

IMPACT OF INCREASED LONG-DISTANCE TRAVEL

Underlying the assumption that an advancedsupersonic aircraft would be economically feasi-ble is the assumption that there would be a rid-ership for an aircraft that could fly basically in-ternational flights at very high speeds (see ch.III). The analysis here has not considered theamount of new travel induced by the higherspeed service, especially offered by an advancedsupersonic transport (AST) (see ch. IV). How-ever, past experience suggests that most newtransportation systems do in fact create a cer-tain amount of new travel. A continuation inthe rise of general real incomes and hence of dis-cretionary incomes would tend to reinforce anincrease in air travel.

The late anthropologist, Margaret Mead, sug-gested that mankind is just now on the verge ofa new consciousness of air as the ordinary medi-um for transportation: “We have only begun tothink in air terms instead of land and sea terms.The air sets up a new set of possibilities forhuman development, but also a new set of chal-

lenges.” She writes, “It is a framework withinwhich the people of the world who have foughteach other for land rights and water rights mustnow cooperate or perish. ” Indeed, at least fourmajor trends can be conjectured that roughlyfollow from this recognition.

The first is global cultural and linguistic ho-mogenization, Habits and practices are trans-mitted across borders by both business andtourist travel. Xenophobia is likely, in general,to recede. This trend is likely to be turbulent andnot universal. The portent of change can be theprecipitator of resistance—witness the recentevents in Iran. But in the longer run, the generaldirection seems more likely to be toward soften-ing rather than hardening of differences.

The second phenomenon is the slow strength-ening of supranational cooperative organiza-tions. Increasing travel brings increasing aware-ness of common interests and mutual impacts.An example was the impact of nuclear testing in

93


an atmosphere that the whole world shares. Asthe awareness of need for supranational organi-zations grows, so will their likelihood. It is rele-vant that the strata of society most likely to un-derstand these issues, and most likely to be in aposition to take an activist role in their estab-lishment, are also most likely to be the peoplewho do the traveling.

The third is a growing economic interde-pendence. This is really a subset of the trendsaddressed above, restricted to the sphere of theprivate sector and economic organization.

Strengthening of the trend toward multinationalcompanies should improve the efficiency ofglobal resource usage.

The fourth is a further strengthening of theposition of the large cities in the world’s socialand economic geographical hierarchy. The linksin travel will be large cities. Given an AST,Tokyo and San Francisco will be closer in timethan Bakersfield, Calif., and Eugene, Ore. AsMargaret Mead has said, “The ports of the fu-ture will be air cities, not coastal cities or rail-road centers. ”

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

The communications field is undergoing arevolution with the application of advances inelectronics to the transmission of information. Itwill be easier in the future to transmit moredata, more voices, and more picture informa-tion and, in addition, it will become easier to setup more versatile combinations of these formsof communication (through holography, for in-stance) and thus extend telecommunicationscapabilities into new uses. It is anticipated thatthese innovations will take place at costs that,sooner or later, will make them quite attractive.Many of the anticipated developments in com-munications will have an immediate bearing onthe continuing practicability of local and short-range transportation, but they also can help es-tablish a framework in which the interactions ofcommunications and long-distance travel can beconsidered.

The way the issue of the interaction of com-munications developments and transportation istypically framed is in terms of better communi-cations either substituting for certain kinds oftravel or stimulating travel. It is possible to con-jure long lists of ways in which communicationstechnology can serve both functions, but listswill not really analyze the problem. Develop-ments in data communications and “electroniccorrespondence” may, in conception, allow theelimination of instances in which material orpeople are physically transported from office tooffice, from office to bank, or even from hometo office. The development most relevant to

long-distance travel is in teleconferencing tech-nology. AT&T’s picturephone meeting service isa step in this direction, although it currently stilloperates only out of a small number of largeAmerican cities and requires that confereestravel to a special center for the long-distanceaudiovisual encounter. One report states thatalthough “there could be some impact on airtransport, replacing business trips with audio-visual transmission, ” such teleconferencing“may as often stimulate as replace or supple-ment the need for travel. ” It is noted that inmost organizations that use teleconferencing nodiminution of overall travel budget has takenplace: travel money has been reallocated forpurposes other than for travel to and from meet-ings. 1

Other evidence suggests that, although com-munications innovations may eliminate theneed for certain kinds of trips at least in theory,such innovations will not have the overall effectof reducing time and money spent on travel. Forone thing, evidence from past communicationsdevelopments does not suggest that a communi-cations breakthrough reduces travel. The intro-duction of neither the telephone nor the tele-graph appears to have been followed by a dis-cernible reduction in travel. In a more recent in-stance, we do not tend to think of satellite com-munications as having reduced contemporary

“’National Transportation Policies Through the Year 2000,” Na-tional Transportation Policy Study Commission, Final Report,June 1979.

Ch. Vlll—Supersonic Transportation and Society . 95

reasons or opportunities for travel, although noempirical work can be elicited to show this.

In fact, there is a fair amount of evidence thatthe average time people spend in daily travel hasremained essentially constant as far back in his-tory as clues can be obtained. For the past cen-tury, more systematic data bears out that aver-age travel time per person per day has remainedroughly the same. This is rather remarkable,considering that during this century the tele-phone was invented and proliferated and thephysical character of cities has changed fromrelatively dense developments where people de-pended largely on walking to extended areascrisscrossed by highways.

One would think that in small cities, wherethe average travel time to work is shorter thanin large cities, the total travel time per personwould be much less than in large cities. How-ever, this does not seem to be the case; peopleseem to compensate for short commutation withmore noncommuting travel. Figure 17 showssome data on auto trips that illustrate this point.Eighteen cities ranging from New York with 16million area residents to Rapid City, S. Dak.,

Commuter parking at airports

Figure 17.—Average Auto Trip Rate v. Trip Time

SOURCE. Vacov Zahavi, Traveltime Budgets and Mobi//ty in Urban Areas, May 1974.

with 73,000 are identified. It would appear thatin smaller cities in which shorter distancesshrink the average trip, people use the timesaved to make more trips. *

*If this effect could be transferred to the market associated withsupersonic travel, one would expect that the AST would increasethe travel market on account of the timesaving of higher speedtravel.

Phofo cred(fs Enwronmenta/ Protect/on Agency

Passengers waiting at airport terminals

THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

One approach to future projections is to im-plicitly assume that the world of the next 30 to50 years will contain no long-term deviations

from past trends. In Dr. Herman Kahn’s expres-sion, it is the “surprise-free scenario, ” at leastthe “big surprise-free scenario. ” Given our cur-


rent concerns over the shortage of petroleum, isit reasonable to assume that we will somehowcope with the energy problem, possibly by pro-viding substitutes, albeit at higher costs, thatnational economies will continue to expand, al-beit slowly, and that world order will remainlargely intact? These are necessary assumptionsfor growth in the air system. If these assump-tions fail, the issues addressed in this assessmentare moot.

Historical precedent supports the reasonable-ness of these assumptions. The economic systemof the world and the Nation has shown a re-markable ability to weather many other crisesthat in the context of a quarter-century could beconsidered short-term. Figure 18 shows a 100-year history of economic and population trendsfor the United States. Under any economicgrowth rate that reasonably approximates pasttrends, we will be a more affluent nation by theend of the century. At the right of figure 18 arefive hypothetical annualalternative outcomes in

growth rates that showgross national product

(GNP) per capita for the next 25 years. The totalwealth should increase: at 2-percent annualgrowth in GNP, the Nation would generate $48trillion in GNP (1975 dollars) between the years1975 and 2000, compared to the $27 trillion be-tween 1950 and 1975. At a 3-percent growth,the figure would be nearly $55 trillion. What-ever the growth in population, it should not be adrag on GNP because the labor force is expectedto increase more rapidly than the population asshown.

Whatever happens in this country is likely toapproximate generally the economic well-beingin other advanced nations of the world as theUnited States has become intertwined in theworld economy.

Obviously, the future is uncertain. In the con-text of the issues of this technology assessment,it seems that the most useful assumption aboutthe nature of evolving high-speed air transportis not cataclysmic or revolutionary, but is gen-erally a broad continuation of the trends of thelast two centuries.

Figure 18.—Long-Term Economic Trends (1975 dollars)

3.45 I 2.74 I 3.25

I GNP— 3 . 5

1.4

0.4

-0.6

1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000

SOURCE: “Toward 2000 Opportunities in Transportation Evolutlon, ‘ report No DOT-TST-77-19, March 1977.

Chapter IX

COMPETITIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND FINANCING

The costs of a new commercial aircraft pro-gram—research, development, and production—are very large. In the case of an advanced su-personic transport (AST), no one really knowsthe cost, though estimates range from $6 billionto $10 billion in 1979 dollars. The figure couldbe much larger. Much of the investment is es-sentially independent of the number of aircraftbuilt, so that scaling back production plans isnot an option for reducing the financial risks.

A particular drawback is that a very large in-vestment must be made even before testing hasproceeded far enough to verify the technicalsoundness and performance of the product. Fig-ure 19 shows how much an initial investmentmust be made before there is any possibility of areturn. On the positive side, although the nega-tive cashflow trough is very deep, it is followedin the later years of a successful program bylarge positive cash flows.

Figure 19 also indicates how initial invest-ments have been escalating over time. TheDouglas Aircraft Planning Department has esti-mated that since the 1940’s these costs have risenat about 11 percent annually in constant dollars,the result largely of growing size and complexityof various aircraft. (For example, the cost perpound has escalated from $83 for the DC-3 to$6,300 for the DC-10 in constant 1975 dollars.1)By comparison, the net worth of the companyhas only grown at an annual rate of 6.6 percent.The discrepancy gives a crude measure of theability of the company to finance new pro-grams. As another example, the DC-10 front-end costs were 155 percent of Douglas equity,though the same costs for the DC-6 were 42 per-cent.

The magnitude of the required investmentsand the delay in any substantial returns wouldinduce a company to time any new program to

take advantage of positive cash flows from priorprograms to help finance the initial costs of newones. The periods of positive cash flows—andrelatively smaller commitments of technicalskills—are the “windows of opportunity” for acommercial aircraft manufacturer. Determiningwhen such “windows of opportunity” are likelyto occur is important in the intelligent pacing ofany precursor technological readiness pro-grams.

The magnitude of the required investmentswould either limit or preclude the possibility oftwo new aircraft programs being started at thesame time by one company, or possibly by theentire industry. Thus, from the industry’s per-spective, a new supersonic aircraft programmust be seen as competing directly with newsubsonic aircraft programs. The freedom of thedeveloper is impinged by the fact that the next“window of opportunity” is at least a decade orso in the future. Developers of large new com-mercial aircraft are motivated to act in accordwith what they perceive as their long-term in-terests, not to assume high risks for the sake offlaunting technological glamour.

Current financing trends are making it in-creasingly difficult, and perhaps impossible fora single company to undertake a large new com-mercial aircraft program. The sheer size of thefinancial commitment required to enter the su-personic transport market means there will notbe many competitors, even if ways, such as sub-contracting and consortium arrangements, arefound to mitigate the financial burdens.Whereas there is the potential for many entrantsin the general aviation and small transport mar-ket in countries around the world, the potentialcompetitors for an AST market are only from afew of the most technologically advanced na-tions and from a few industrial organizations.(Of course, the list of potential collaborators ismuch larger. ) It should be remembered thatcompetition offers its own set of risks: the po-tential for one economically successful program

99

— —— —


Figure 19.—Typical Aircraft Cash Flow Curve (billions of 1976 dollars)

Development

Production

“$6 billion to $10 billion, in 1979 dollars.

SOURCE: OTA Working Paper, Lockheed California Co , January 1979.

of, say, 400 aircraft might, with two competi-tors in the field, turn into two more expensiveand/or unsuccessful programs of perhaps 150aircraft each.

Balancing the forbidding size of developmentinvestments is the prospect that it pays to be thefirst to introduce a major new kind of aircraft. Itis often observed that a large proportion oforders for a new aircraft are placed within thefirst several years before and after its introduc-tion. Certainly, if an AST, reasonably competi-tive with subsonic aircraft, were introduced byone airline on a route, enormous pressure oncompeting airlines to follow suit would ensue. Ifthe competitors fail to follow the lead, theystand to lose a major share of their markets. Anairline can only afford to wait for a second of-fering if a later aircraft is sufficiently superior torecapture the lost competitive advantage.

Another reason that the first manufacturer tooffer a new aircraft product will stand to gain is

that airlines prefer operating a homogeneousfleet. A mixture of airplanes not of the same ba-sic technical family complicates maintenanceand parts inventory and demands a more di-verse standing array of labor skills—all ofwhich increase costs. Thus, though there aresimplifications here, once an airline has com-mitted itself to a given aircraft, only the verymarked superiority of an alternative will inducethe airline to switch to other manufacturers forsubsequent orders as the fleet expands. The risksof a homogeneous fleet, such as greater vulnera-bility if flaws appear in the chosen aircraft, donot appear to deter this inclination toward ahigh degree of homogeneity.

Once any manufacturer commits to produc-tion and begins accepting orders for a new AST,in an international market where sales and com-petition are not constrained politically, the“window” for a second competitor with only amarginal technical advantage may be open for a

Ch. IX—Competitive Considerations and Financing ● 101

very short time, perhaps less than 2 years. Howlong the “window of opportunity” is kept closedafter this initial opening depends on the rate ofgrowth of both the market and the increment oftechnical, and therefore economic, superioritythe later aircraft might embody.

The time and expense required to build a tech-nological base will depend on the degree of ad-vancement set as a goal. No U.S. manufacturernow feels the necessary technology is availableand sufficiently validated to prudently commitbillions of dollars for an AST development andproduction program. What further degree of ad-vancement is necessary to meet environmentalstandards and reasonably assure an economi-cally successful aircraft is still a matter of judg-ment, although attention has been devoted todefining the investment in money and time re-quired to fill the existing deficiencies. The Na-tional Aeronautics and Space Administration’s(NASA) technology validation program thathas emerged, described in chapter II, could cost$0.6 billion to $1.9 billion depending on varioussuggested plans and require from 5 to 8 years tocomplete.

The large financial demands and the need toensure a large market for the aircraft are pres-sures to spread the manufacturing, and possiblysome of the development costs, of an AST inter-nationally. This can be accomplished either byextensive subcontracting or through the forma-tion of some kind of consortium. For nationswhere the state partially or wholly controls bothairlines and aircraft manufacturing there is amotivation to exert pressure for a quid pro quo:“I will buy your airplane instead of X’s, if youwill let us manufacture the hyperthrockels.”

One consideration in regarding such interna-tionalization would be technology transfer li-censing. Another would be cost. The impact of amultinational program would probably be toraise the price of development on account of thecosts of coordinating and bridging the distancebetween participants. In addition, sharing theprogram would probably attenuate the balance-of-payments impact of each aircraft. On theother hand, an internationally diffused programwould enlarge the assured market which mightoffset any such reduction in the balance-of-pay-ments impact.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY

The military has traditionally been of greatservice to the commercial aviation industry. Forone thing, the military has led in researchingand developing aircraft technology and hasbeen responsible for such developments as all-metal construction, radar, navigation systems,high-strength lightweight materials, and variousjet engines (the JT3, JT8, C-5 which led to theCF-6, and also the B-1 which led to theCFM-56) .2 3 Furthermore, the military has en-hanced the economic viability of the commer-cial sector by ordering a large number of trans-port aircraft, such as, in the past, the DC-3,DC-4, and DC-6, the Constellation, and to alesser extent the KC-135 and B-707, and, in thepresent, modifications of the DC-10 (KC-10tanker), B-707 (AWACS), B-737, and DC-9.

“ Future {~t Aviation, ” C{)mmittee Report, HC)LIW Science andTechn(~log}, U.S. Con~rw\, octobcr” l~7b.

“’l<cwarch and lk>~’elopm(’nt C(lntrlbuti(~ns to A v i a t i o n Prog-r(’~< ( \\’a\h I ngton, [), C: Fdera I A\. la t Ion Adm I n ]~t ra t ion, 1 Q72 ).

However, the situation has changed. The mil-itary is no longer leading the way in aircraft de-velopments and thus spinoffs to commercial air-craft areas have been reduced or eliminated.The main reason for this change is that the goalsof military aircraft are no longer compatiblewith those of commercial transports. What thismeans is that if it is desired to keep improvingthe U.S. technology base, other ways of sup-porting aeronautical technology should be con-sidered.

For subsonic aircraft, improvements are ex-pected to continue in propulsion-system effi-ciency (through higher temperatures and pres-sures achieved by advances in metallurgy andmaterials), noise suppression, structures andweight technology (through composites, in-creased use of titanium, and advanced fabrica-tion techniques such as superplastic forming),and aerodynamics (through airfoils, winglets,and active controls ). Improvements are also an-


Phofo credif Boe/ng A/rcraff Co

B-707– AWACS

ticipated with respect to cost, safety, and main-tenance.

If the Government’s role in funding researchfor subsonic technology continues as it has inthe past, there will be further technological ad-vancements in subsonic aircraft, Some fundswill continue to be used to assess far-term tech-nologies—generally the high-risk technologyitems —including composite primary structures,laminar flow control, advanced avionics, andalternative fuels. Industry R&D funds are pri-marily directed at near-term technologies appli-cable to both new aircraft and derivative ver-sions of existing aircraft. These include: activecontrols, composite secondary structures, aero-dynamics, and improved applications of currenthigh-bypass-ratio engines.

In the supersonic area both NASA and the ae-rospace industry have been involved with im-

proving the “state-of-the-art” for supersonic air-craft. As discussed in chapter II, NASA has pro-posed a supersonic cruise research (SCR) pro-gram divided into four phases, shown in figure20. Two initial phases, of technology identifica-tion and validation, led to a phase of technologyreadiness—and a decision whether to precedewith any commercial aircraft production. Todate, approximately 90 percent of the SCR pro-gram funds have been allocated to technologyidentification and the question now is howmuch should the Federal Government invest inthe validation and readiness phases. The po-tential technology solutions include blendedwing/body designs, further propulsion im-provements (coannular nozzles, advanced inletdesign), improved noise suppression, titaniumsandwich construction, increased structural effi-ciency, active controls, advanced flight con-trols, flight management systems, and greatly

Ch. IX—Competitive Considerations and Financing Q 103

Figure 20.— Phases of AdvancedTransport Development (SCR)

Technologyreadiness

improved aerodynamic efficiency at subsonicand supersonic speeds. Along with the variable-cycle engine concept, these technology solutionscould provide a basis for achieving the desiredeconomically viable and environmentally ac-ceptable AST. However, as discussed in chapterII, work is only beginning on validating theseadvanced elements, identified in the first phaseof technology research.

SOURCE: NASA - OAST, “A Technology Validation Program Leading to PotentialTechnology Readiness Options for an Advanced Supersonic Transport,”September 1978.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

The immediate issue is not a go or no-go deci-sion on an AST, but rather the selection of a de-sired level of commitment to technology readi-ness. (Such readiness in the context of an as-

sumed $8 billion total program is shown graph-ically in figure 21. ) Selection must weigh the at-tractiveness of future possibilities that a givenlevel of technology might create or maintainagainst the cost of achieving such readiness.

One strategy would be to concentrate on thesubsonic market and not attempt to compete

Figure 21.— Cost of a Representative AST Program

2

1

with a supersonic aircraft—the base case dis-cussed earlier. This strategy would be appropri-ate if a significantly worse energy situation inthe 1980’s makes an AST less attractive. Itwould also be appropriate, regardless of energyconsiderations, if the potential competitors ofthe United States also hold back from significantinvestment in technological advancement. If anew foreign supersonic transport were intro-duced without benefit of further advancement intechnology, it may well capture enough of themarket to be successful—say, $20 billion—but itis less likely to be so successful as to make thesubsonic market unattractive.

The no-supersonic strategy has the greatshort-term advantage of saving the money thatwould be invested in technological develop-ment. However, its risk is long-term. If a super-sonic transport were developed and it were suf-ficiently successful, it could capture the lion’sshare of the market. Once there is a successfulsupersonic, the market for a third-generationaircraft could very well expand tremendously,especially if over land supersonic flights werepermitted. If the United States refused to jointhe market at an early point, it would find it

SOURCE. F E Mclean, OTA Working Paper, “Advanced High-Speed Aircraft.’” both difficult and expensive to catch up. Among

104 w Advanced High-Speed Aircraft

other impediments, it would be very hard totrain a new generation of specialists with com-petence in supersonic technology. How difficultand how expensive such catching up might behas not been evaluated.

The second strategy open to the United Stateswould be the opposite of the above—a commit-ment to a fairly vigorous supersonic technologydevelopment program of perhaps $100 millionto $150 million annually. This path could leadto a U.S. AST program or a major U.S. role in acooperative international program. The ramifi-cations of these possibilities have already beendiscussed. The risk is that the investment mightlead to nothing except perhaps application ofthe technology to subsonics, military aircraft,or space transport.

The third alternative might be called thehedge strategy. The United States might invest acertain amount—perhaps $50 million per year—in technological R&D. Such a strategy couldserve as an adequate base to negotiate a cooper-ative international program. It also would re-tain the option of future acceleration as a basisfor a U.S. program.

It seems plausible that, whichever strategy istaken, the industry response would roughly par-allel the national program. A vigorous super-sonic R&D program sponsored by the FederalGovernment would probably evoke a muchlarger private sector financial commitment thana weak effort at the Federal level. The national

“signal” is very important to the aircraft manu-facturers.

If some commitment is made to a supersonicprogram, it would appear that there is no short-run alternative to continuing the past and cur-rent practice of funding NASA. As noted,NASA has a relatively modest SCR programunderway, funded at about $10 million an-nually.

In the long run, however, there may be pref-erable approaches for the continued develop-ment of aeronautical technology. Such alterna-tives have not yet been seriously identified andevaluated, but certain principles that shouldguide the identification of alternatives should benoted. Any alternative should ensure a healthycompetitive posture for the aircraft industry. Itshould also encourage innovation.

Any alternative to the NASA arrangementshould seek to internalize the costs of aeronau-tical research to the air system. This would re-quire, first, identifying appropriate sources offunds and, second, determining the best methodfor their allocation. The former is probablyeasier to accomplish than the latter. For exam-ple, each one-tenth of a cent levy on each do-mestic revenue passenger-mile would provide$200 million annually. Defining an allocationprocess would take time. However, in this andother regards relating to an alternative to theNASA research program, the general principleof limiting Government involvement should befollowed.

BEYOND TECHNOLOGY READINESS

During the conduct of this study, concern wasexpressed about the manner in which the phasefollowing technology identification, validation,and attainment of technology readiness wouldbe funded. Though this area is addressed as asubsequent activity of this study, it is relevanthere to present several alternatives which maybe appropriate under different circumstances forfinancing the development and production ofadvanced supersonic aircraft:

● A U.S. aircraft manufacturer could under-take the effort as a private venture andhave suppliers develop components on arisk basis in the same manner as the largesubsonic transports are now developed. Inaddition, funds could be obtained throughadvanced payments by the airlines.

● It may be possible for several U.S. manu-facturers to combine efforts or to form anindependent organization supported by

Ch. IX—Competitive Considerations and Financing ● 105

several companies involved in the technol-ogy development phase. If two or moreU.S. companies combined efforts, theywould run the risk of antitrust threatswhich would have to be removed beforethis option could be considered, A recentNASA publication discusses some of theantitrust policy questions. It states:

Among the most significant barriers tothe formation of both domestic and multi-national consortia is antitrust policy. T h eU.S. Department of Justice is not presentlyreceptive to the suggestion that there maybe a need for rationalization of the com-mercial airframe industry without whicheffective market competition may be re-duced in the long run and U.S. interestsmay suffer materially in several ways. Theonly means currently available to a firmcontemplating participation in any consor-tium to ascertain formally the acceptabilityof that consortium to the antitrust author-ities is the Business Review Procedure ofthe Department of Justice. However, evena positive opinion by the Justice Depart-ment does not grant a permanent exemp-tion from prosecution. The competitive im-pact of any proposed cooperative arrange-ment will be gauged by the Department ofJustice primarily by: 1) the extent to whichmarket competition in the United States be-tween commercial airframe producerswould be foreclosed in both the short termand the long term, and 2) the way in whichthe arrangement proposes to treat the issueof technology transfer. The competitive ef-fects of proposed airframe consortia arelargely indeterminate ex ante, particularlyin the long run. However, given the presentand prospect, both multinational and allU.S. consortia have at least as great a likeli-hood of enhancing competition as ofthwarting it.4

● The possibility also exists for a collabora-tive effort between a U.S. company andone or more. foreign companies or govern-ments. A principal reason for such a con-sortium would be to reduce the amount ofmoney committed unilaterally to finance anew aircraft project through sharing thecosts, benefits, risks, and responsibilities.

NASA has offered various motives for be-coming involved in either intranational or inter-national consortia:

The mechanism of a consortium can be ex-pected to reduce the resources required for thedevelopment, production, and marketing of atransport aircraft below what would be requiredif any individual participant were to undertakethe project alone. However, the consortiumdevice will probably increase markedly the totalresources required for its project. Neither multi-national consortia with U.S. participation norall-U. S. consortia automatically imply either areduction or an increase in domestic aerospaceemployment opportunities, in either the shortrun or long run. Each case must be analyzed onits own merits.

For example, some may argue that if a U.S.and foreign manufacturer formed a consortium,a certain amount of employment would be lostto foreign countries. However, it may be arguedthat, if such participation served to strengthenthe domestic industry, a net improvement inemployment could result in the future. A case inwhich this would apply would be one in which aU.S. manufacturer saw a potential for a familyof aircraft, but would not engage in this ventureon its own.

The primary motive of U.S. firms for con-sidering participation in multinational consortiais the enhancement of their individual financialresources. The consortium mechanism mightalso provide a means for a U.S. firm to pursuecontemporaneously more than one transportaircraft development project. Preservation ofmarket access is a secondary, but perhaps attimes important, motive for commercial air-frame manufacturers to join multinational con-sortia. 6

While this discussion is by no means exhaustive,it does indicate some potential ways in whichconsortia can aid in the AST programs.

This chapter has only preliminarily addressedsome of the major financing concerns with re-spect to validating the technology and develop-ing and producing ASTs into commercial serv-ice. The intent was not to evaluate options forfinancing but only to suggest some alternatives.

‘Itlld

“It-)Id

—.—


A further examination of the alternatives as well documented in a later report “Financing andas possible funding mechanisms is planned as a Program Alternatives for Advanced High-Speedsubsequent activity in this assessment, to be Aircraft. ”

IJ . S . GOVERNMENT PFINTING OFFICE : 1980 0 - 60-285

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