Advaita Siddhi

8/13/2019 Advaita Siddhi

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|shrI gaNeshAya namaH |||| shrIviTThalaM namAmi ||

The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most importantpolemical works of advaita. It is Madhusdana sarasvatI!s

"rilliant and successful defense of advaita in response tothe o"#ections of the MAdhvas$ the dualists. %hankara states that his

doctrine of "rahma#nAna &"rahma#nAnamapi vastutantrameva - "rahma-stra- "hAshhya '.'.() is a *vastu-tantra*$ a doctrine "ased on facts$ as

opposed to a *purushha-tantra*$ a doctrine "ased on the knowledge of anan individual. +ne can raise o"#ections against individual opinions

"ut facts cannot "e o"#ected to, they can possi"ly "e misunderstood.+ne can possi"ly epress ignorance of facts "ut not argue against

them. %o one may ask how is it possi"le for the mAdhvas to raise

o"#ections against advaita that is "ased on facts/ It is not possi"le. 0hat the MAdhvas$ the dvaitins$ have done is to epress

misunderstandings$ not o"#ections.

It is$ therefore$ proper to answer the so-called o"#ections of themAdhvas "y clearing their misunderstandings of advaita. 1ut it must

also "e mentioned that$ in some cases at least$ it appears that the

misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings "utmisunderstandings introduced on purpose to A) misrepresent advaitafirst and then$ 1) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation.

Nevertheless$ advaitins should remove all misunderstandings$ whether they "e genuine or otherwise$ and no advaitin has done this "etter

than Madhusdana %arasvatI$ the great logician from 1engal.

I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi!s great treasures$ treasures that are to "e cherished for all time.

In a forum like this one$ it is hard$ if not impossi"le$ to do#ustice to such a monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. %o I

will endeavor to present only a few discussions with translation$ consulting the eplanations of 1ala"hadra 1haTTAchArya in his

advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA$ of 1rahmAnanda in his 2au3a-"rahmAnandI &laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi$ and of 4iTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these

works$ namely the advaita-siddhi$ siddhi-vyAkhyA$ 2au3a-"rahmAnandI$

and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the 2au3a-"rahmA- nandI$ all in the original %anskrit$ have "een edited "y 5andit

Anantakrishna %astri and pu"lished "y 5arimal 5u"lications$ 3elhi$ in '677.

A few words a"out the authors. Madhusdana sarasvatI is a towering giant

among advaitins. An oft 8uoted verse regarding him is madhusdanasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI |

pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhusdanasarasvatI || &+nly) the 2oddess of 9earning$ sarasvatI knows the limits of

&knowledge of) Madhusdana sarasvatI. And Madhusdana sarasvatIknows the limits of &knowledge of) 2oddess sarasvatI:

He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsAfrom mAdhava sarasvatI$ vedAnta from rAmatIrtha$ and took sannyAsa dIA

from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi which isMadhusdana!s *crest-#ewel*$ he is said to have written numerous

other works$ including a lucid commentary on the gItA calledg3hArtha-dIpikA$ and a work called *advaita-ratna-laana*$ a refutation

of the work *"heda-ratna* "y the logician shankara mishra.

Madhusdana demonstrates his a"ility as a master logician in the advaita- siddhi$ which he wrote as a response to the nyAyAm;


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navadvIpe samAyAte madhusdanavAkpatau | chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .a"hd.h gadAdharaH ||

0hen Madhusdana$ the master of speech$ came to navadvIpa$ MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha &who was the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times)

trem"led &with fear) and 2adAdhara &another logician of great repute) "ecame afraid.

1ala"hadra 1haTTAchArya$ the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA$ is said to have a"een a favorite student of Madhusdana. 1rahmAnanda$ the author of

gau3a"rahmAnandI &laghu-chandrikA)$ wrote the work as a response tothe nyAyAm;


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ttha-akhaN3adhIgocharo .a"ht.h | nishhkAmakarmopAsanAnushhThAn-ena shraddhaikAgrachittaH san.h AtmAnaM satya2@Anasukharpa"rahm-

atvena sAAtk;


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o#"ective.0i++ha&esha states here that MadhusUdana has expressed his &ack o)conceit, garvarAhityapradarshana.

In the next verse, MadhusUdana #rie)&y states the purpose o) his

work.

shraddhAdhanena muninA madhusUdanena saNgRihya shAstranichayaM rachitAtiyatnAt.h !#odhAya vAdivi"ayAya cha sattvarANAm-advaitasiddhiriyamastu

mude #udhAnAm.h !! 1 !!

+his advaita-siddhi has #een composed #y the sage MadhusUdana, whoseso&e asset is dedication, with great di&igence, a)ter co&&ecting thetruths o) the shAstras. May this advaita-siddhi #e use)u& in imparting'correct( understanding and in gaining victory over disputants 'withopposite views( to those who are too #usy 'to read &engthy works(and may it #e a 'source o)( "oy to the &earned2

$ere, /rahmAnanda sees a &ink #etween iyam.h 'this( in the currentverse and the )ina& verse o) the advaita-siddhi3

siddhInAm-ishh+a-naishhkarmya-#rahmagAnAmiyaM chirAt.h ! advaitasiddhiradhunA chaturthI sama"Ayata !!

A)ter a &ong &apse o) time since the siddhis o) ishh+a, naishhkarmya, and #rahma, this advaita-siddhi, the )ourth siddhi, has originated.

+he three other siddhi4s #eing re)erred to are the ishh+a-siddhi o)0imuktAtman, the naishhkarmya-siddhi o) 5ureshvara, and the /rahma-

siddhi o) maNana mishra.

MadhusUdana 3-

tatrAdvaitasiddherdvaitamithyAtvasiddhipUrvakatvAt.h dvaita- mithyAtvameva prathamamupapAdanIyam.h !

5ince the esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity is the antecedent o)esta#&ishing the truth o) nondua&ity, on&y the unrea&ity o) dua&ityis to #e esta#&ished )irst.

siddhivyAkhyAkAra '#a&a#hadra( 3-

nanu advaitasiddhAvadvaitasyaiva pratipadanIyatayA tadvihAyA- gre dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanaM kriyamANamasaNgatamityata Ahatatreti ! tasyAmadvaitasidhhau dvaitamithyAtvameva prathamam-

upapAdanIyamityartha$ ! tatra hetu$ advaitasiddherityAdi !tathAcha dvaitamithyAtve upapAdite .advaitaM sUpapAdamitidvaitamithyAtvopapAdanamadvaitasiddhyanuguNatvAnnAsaNgatamiti

dhyeyam.h !

An o#"ection can #e raised3 In advaita-siddhi, on&y advaita shou&d #e

discussed. iscarding that 'o#"ective( in the #eginning, the esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity that is #eing done is irre&evant. In rep&y, 'MadhusUdana( states tatra, etc. In advaita-siddhi 'esta#&ishing thetruth o) non-dua&ity(, the unrea&ity o) dua&ity is to #e esta#&ished)irst6 this is the meaning. +he reason #eing advaitasiddhe$, etc. ie.

since the esta#&ishing o) nondua&ity is preceded #y esta#&ishing theunrea&ity o) dua&ity. And a&so, when the unrea&ity o) dua&ity


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is esta#&ished, nondua&ity is easi&y esta#&ished6 #y the esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity, the truth o) nondua&ity )o&&ows. +here)ore, it is to #e considered that 'such esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity( is not irre&evant.

'+o #e continued(

AnandA review o) some concepts and terms )rom nyAya is in order #e)ore weproceed )urther. 7&ease see Materia&s )or the study o) Navya Nyaya 8ogic#y Inga&&s or +he Navya-Nyaya doctrine o) negation #y /ima& 9rishnaMati&a& )or more detai&s.

7rocess o) in)erence3

:very noneterna& entity, according to nyAya, must #e a resu&t o)an instrumenta& cause 'karaNa( and an operation 'vyApAra(.An in)erence 'anumAna(, that is a means to know&edge o) man and hence

noneterna&, must have an instrumenta& cause and an operation #y which the cause #rings a#out the in)erence.

In the process o) in)erence, the operation is ca&&ed parAmarsha orconsideration, and the instrumenta& cause is the know&edge o)invaria#&e concomitance 'vyApti(, a&so ca&&ed pervasion. +his vyApticorresponds very rough&y to &ogica& imp&ication in ;estern &ogic.

In the in)erence, the mountain possesses )ire #ecause it has smoke, the instrumenta& cause, karaNa is the know&edge o) the invaria#&e concomitance, smoke is the invaria#&e concomitant o) )ire,vahni-vyApyo dhUma$, ie. where there is smoke there is )ire.

+he operation, vyApAra is the consideration 'parAmarsha( that is

a know&edge o) the occurrence o) the concomitant in the su#"ect 'pakshha( where the in)erence is #eing made. In the in)erence, the mountain possesses )ire #ecause it has smoke, the parAmarsha wi&& #e o) the)orm, the mountain possesses smoke which is an invaria#&e concomitant

o) )ire - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h

In po&emica& treatises and de#ates, an in)erence is stated terse&y#y &isting the in)erence 'conc&usion( )o&&owed #y a sing&e wordrepresenting the app&ication o) the consideration and the invaria#&econcomitance.


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#hAshhA-parichchheda 'o) 0ishvanAtha( as3

vyApti$ sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaM#andha udAhRita$ !

Invaria#&e concomitance is said to #e the a#sence o) re&ation o)the 'hetu( to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya.

$ere the re&ation shou&d #e the same as the re&ation under consideration )or the vyApti. As per this de)inition o) vyApti, smoke is an invaria#&econcomitant o) )ire 'or smoke is pervaded #y )ire( #ecause it is not

the case that there is something that has smoke #ut not )ire. $owever, )ire is not an invaria#&e concomitant o) smoke. +here are things suchas a red-hot iron rod that has )ire #ut no smoke. 5o )ire is not aninvaria#&e concomitant o) smoke.

A re&ation #etween two entities is o)ten exp&ained as the superimpositiono) one entity on the other. $ere, the entity that is superimposed isca&&ed the superstratum or Adheya. +he entity on which the Adheya issuperimposed is ca&&ed su#stratum or &ocus. 5anskrit names )or

su#stratum is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa. In the examp&e, #hUta&e gha+o vartate, there is a pot on the ground, the superstratum is the pot 'gha+a(, the ground '#hUta&am.h( is the su#stratum or &ocus, and the re&ation is contact, saMyoga.

Another way o) &ooking at re&ations 'saM#andha( is to di))erentiate#etween what Inga&&s ca&&s occurrence-exacting and non occurrence

exacting re&ations. Re&ations such as inherence 'samavAya( area&ways occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the re&ation

#etween a who&e and its parts, a genus or c&ass '"Ati( and a particu&arinstance o) the c&ass, etc. >ontact 'saMyoga( can sometimes #eoccurrence exacting #ut sometimes not.

In re&ation #etween two entities, one o) the entities is an ad"unct or pratiyogin, and the other is a su#"unct or anuyogin. I) a re&ation issuch that one entity is a &ocus or su#stratum 'AdhAra( o) the other which

must #e the superstratum 'Adheya(, then the AdhAra is the su#"unct oranuyogin. +he Adheya is the ad"unct or pratiyogin. In the examp&e,#hUta&e gha+a$, there is a pot on the ground, gha+a is the pratiyogin

whi&e #hUta&am.h is the anuyogin.

+wo types o) a#sences 'a#hAva( are distinguished in navya-nyAya. ?neis ca&&ed anyonya-a#hAva that is essentia&&y a denia& o) identity#etween to entities. +he other is saMsarga-a#hAva or re&ationa& a#sence.

$ere, there are three kinds3 =( prAga#hAva, the a#sence o) a thing #e)ore it is #rought into #eing, %( dhvamsA#hAva, the a#sence o) a thing a)terit is destroyed, and ( atyanta-a#hAva, eterna& a#sence.

+he terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are a&so used in the context o)a#sences. ;hen we say #hUta&e gha+o nAsti, there is no pot on the

ground, the pratiyogin o) the a#sence is gha+a, pot, and theanuyogin is #hUta&am.h, ground. +he pratiyogin o) this type shou&d

#e ca&&ed a#hAvIya-pratiyogin to distinguish it )rom the re&ationa& ad"unct, #ut naiyAyikas o)ten write pratiyogin )or #oth re&ationa& and a#sentia& ad"uncts.

5ome o) the properties that are common&y used innaiyAyika &iterature are those that correspond to

the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa '&ocus(, vishhayin'know&edge(, vishhaya 'content o) know&edge(, visheshhya'@ua&i)icand(, visheshhaNa '@ua&i)ier(, prakAra 'chie) @ua&i)ier(,


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etc.

+he a#stract properties or re&ationa& a#stracts o) theseare )ormed #y simp&y adding the su))ix, tva or tA toeach term.


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#y pot.:ar&ier, MadhusUdana set )orth the o#"ective o) esta#&ishingthe unrea&ity 'mithyAtva( o) dua&ity 'dvaita(, or in otherwords the unrea&ity o) the wor&d '"aganmithyAtva(.

A)ter a #rie) digression o) navya-nyAya, we wi&& now &ook at

the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( that comes underattack )rom the mAdhva opponent. +his de)inition is the onegiven #y 7admapAdAchArya in his 7anchapAdikA.

advaita-siddhi ---------------

atha prathamamithyAtva-vichAra$ !

+he opponent critici*es the de)inition o) mithyAtva as)o&&ows3

nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h mithyAsha#do-anirvachanIyatAvachana iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasad-anadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatva-vishishh+a-sattvA#hAva$, uta sattvAtyantA#hAva-asattva-atyanta-a#hAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-a#hAvavatvesati asattva-atyanta-a#hAvarUpaM vishishh+am.h !

Now, what is this unrea&ity 'mithyAtva( that 'you( want toin)er 'as characteri*ing the wor&d( +his unrea&ity is #y nomeans non-de)ina#i&ity as de)ined #y the statement o) thepanchapAdikA that the word mithyA 'unrea&( is denoted #ynon-de)ina#i&ity, the non-de)ina#i&ity #eing o) the nature o)N?+ #eing the su#stratum 'adhikaraNa( o) either existence or

non-existence. ;hat is not #eing the su#stratum o) existenceor non-existence

Is it =( the a#sence o) existence @ua&i)ied #y non-existenceor %( the pair o) attri#utes o) a. a#so&ute a#sence o) existenceand #. a#so&ute a#sence o) non-existence, or ( the property o)the a#so&ute a#sence o) nonexistence during the a#so&ute a#sence o)existence, ie. #eing a common su#stratum o) the attri#utes -the a#so&ute a#sence o) existence and the a#so&ute a#sence o)non-existence

nAdya$, sattvamAtrAdhAre "agatyasattvavishishh+asattva-ana#hyu-pagamAt, vishishh+a-a#hAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h !

'Bou( cannot 'c&aim( the )irst 'regarding the wor&d( #ecause thewor&d is the su#stratum o) on&y existence 'sattva( and existence@ua&i)ied #y non-existence is not admitted. And #y proving thea#sence o) existence as @ua&i)ied #y non-existence , 'you committhe )&aw o)( proving what is a&ready esta#&ished 'siddha-sAdhana(.

C7&ease see Note = #e&owD

na dvitIya$, sattva-asattvayorekA#hAve aparasattva-avashyakatvenavyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmaka#rahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .apisadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpyea#AdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena #AdhyatvarUpa-asattvasyavyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaika&yAchcha !

'Bou( cannot 'c&aim( the second. /ecause, wherever there is an


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a#sence o) one o) existence and nonexistence, there the presenceo) the other is necessary6 this &eads to a contradiction. 'A&so(,the wor&d, "ust &ike the /rahman without attri#utes, even #eingwithout the attri#utes, existence and nonexistence, #y 'its very(nature o) existence, is esta#&ished as N?+ unrea&6 this wou&d&ead to 'the de)ect o)( arthAntara, proving something other than

what is to #e proved. In the si&ver-in-nacre 'examp&e o) i&&usionthat is o)ten @uoted #y advaitins to show the onto&ogica& statuso) the wor&d(, 'we grant that( it 'si&ver-nacre( is without existencewhose nature is non-su#&ata#i&ity 'noncontradicted-ness(, '#ut(the a#sence o) nonexistence, whose nature is su#&ati#i&ity'contradicted-ness(, is N?+ esta#&ished6 this &eads to thede)ectiveness o) 'your( sAdhya, what 'you( seek to prove.

C7&ease see Note % #e&owD

ata eva na tRitIya$, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhya-vaika&yAchcha


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o) #oth >AN occur in the same p&ace, ie. the wor&d and due to 'this( there is N? contradiction. +his is to #e thought o).

'+o #e continued(

Notes3

------ Note =3 MadhusUdana4s de)inition o) non-existence can a&so #e understood in this way using ;estern-sty&e &ogic.

8et us de)ine a predicate 5 where#y 5'F( means F is su#&ated.

A&so, &et us say :'t( means the existentia& @uanti)ier there is a t, and U't( means the universa& @uanti)ier )or a&& t. 8et stand )or the negation operator.

+hen the de)inition o) existence 'sattva or simp&y sat( is that thing, say F '/rahman( such that3

':'t( such that 5'F(, )or time t( ... 'A(

In other words, sattva '/rahman( is that which is N?+ su#&ated at any time.

Next, MadhusUdana de)ines nonexistence 'o) something F( N?+ as simp&y negating the expression 'A( a#ove which wou&d "ust #e

':'t( such that 5'F(, )or time t( ... '/( this wou&d mean F such that there is a time t when F is su#&ated.

I) the advaitins had de)ined nonexistence as '/( a#ove, then the mAdhva opponent wou&d have #een "usti)ied in saying that existence and nonexistence are mutua&&y negations o) each other. Negating existence wou&d #e nonexistence and vice versa.

/ut, very signi)icant&y, MadhusUdana de)ines nonexistence 'o) something F( as, where >'F( means F is cogni*ed in a &ocus,3

'U't(3 >'F(, )or time t( .... '>(

meaning )or a&& time t, F is not cogni*ed in a &ocus.

+he negation o) HthisH type o) nonexistence is3

':'t(3 >'F(, )or time t( ... '(

which means there is some time t at which F is cogni*ed in a &ocus. And this is precise&y the negation o) nonexistence that is characteristic o) i&&usions such as si&ver-in-nacre, snake-on-rope, and )ina&&y, the wor&d-on-/rahman i&&usion. +he i&&usory thing is cogni*ed as existing in a &ocus 'su#stratum( sometime 'the period o) i&&usion(. 5o such i&&usory entities >ANN?+ #e said to #e nonexistent in the same way as a )ictitious entity, such as a hare with horns, which is never cogni*ed in any &ocus.

A&so, as MadhusUdana says, '( is not the same as 'A(, and the negation o) 'A( is not the same as the nonexistence '>(. 5o there is N? contradiction i) #oth the negation o) 'A(,


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ie. '/(, and the negation o) '>(, ie. '(, #oth ho&d in the same &ocus. +his exact&y is the conc&usion to #e esta#&ished - '/( and '( #oth characteri*e the wor&d o) dua&ity. +here is a time 'the i&&usion phase( when dua&ity is cogni*ed in a &ocus '/rahman( #y super-imposition 'adhyAsa(. +his esta#&ishes the '( part o) the conc&usion. And there is a time 'the dawn

o) "nAna( when the wor&d o) i&&usion is su#&ated. +his esta#&ishes the '/( part o) the conc&usion.

Note %3 /rahmAnanda c&ari)ies that pratIyamAnatvarUpaM means pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h, capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed.

0i++ha&esha comments3

pratIyamAnatvamityatra &aarthavartmAnatvavivaxaNe pratIti- shUnyatvakA&e mithyAtva-anupapattestadavivaxAM sphu+ayati +IkAyAM - pratIyamAnatvayogyatvamiti !

+he intended meaning o) pratIyamAnatva that indicates

the present tense does not indicate that mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( is not esta#&ished during times when there is no cognition. +o c&ari)y this, '/rahmAnanda writes( pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed, in the commentary.

Note 3

+his can #e understood in this way. 5uppose >'F( means F is a cow, and $'F( means F is a horse.

Now, we have3

>'F( - $'F(

$'F( - >'F(

where - stands )or imp&ies. I) F is a cow then F is not a horse. I) F is a horse then F is not a cow.

5o =( >'F( is an invaria#&e concomitant o) $'F(, the negation o) $'F(. %( $'F( is an invaria#&e concomitant o) >'F(, the negation o) >'F(. +his means it not possi#&e to have3

'>'F( AN $'F(( )or the same entity F. F cannot #e #oth a cow and horse.

5uppose M'F( means F is a came&. +hen the )o&&owing is tena#&e3

M'F( - >'F( AN $'F(

I) F is a came&, it is neither a cow nor a horse.

+his is what MadhusUdana is saying here.A)ter re"ecting the c&aim made #y the opponent that the de)initionso) sadasadanadhikaraNatva are )au&ty, MadhusUdana next shows thatthe charge made regarding arthAntara is a&so not va&id.

MadhusUdana4s rep&y 'continued(3

yachcha - nirdharmakasya #rahmaNa$ sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavat-prapaENchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h!tanna !


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And the 'opponent( said3 Eust as the attri#ute&ess /rahman &acksexistence 'as an attri#ute( #ut 'Its( very nature is existence,the very nature o) the wor&d too is existence. +his esta#&ishesthat the wor&d is not mithyA 'unrea&(. /y this 'it )o&&ows thatyou wi&& have( esta#&ished something other 'than what you wanted to( -arthAntara.

';e say(3 It is not so.

ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau #rahmavat.hprapaENchasya pratyekaM satsva#hAvatAka&pena mAnA#hAvAt.h,anugata-vyavahAra-a#hAva-prasaNgAchcha !

+he understanding o) sat 'existence( as encompassing everythingand everywhere is esta#&ished #y ?ne 'princip&e(. '/ut( each andevery thing in the wor&d cannot #e proved to #e comprehended as'pure( existence in the same way as /rahman. And a contingencywou&d arise due to the &ack o) a comprehensive system 'o)understanding, exp&aining, and discussing a &arge num#er o)

things and topics.( '+here)ore, the c&aim that we wou&d #e committingthe )a&&acy o) arthAntara is not correct.(

MadhusUdana is making a crucia& point here regarding what is technica&&yca&&ed anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. ;hen a propertyoccurs in a num#er o) di))erent things, the naiyAyika wou&d search )ora common term or common concept to represent this common property andthen re)er to each o) those things as possessing that common property.


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o) making the charge o) arthAntara. MadhusUdana a&ternative&y de)inesmithyAtva as the a#so&ute di))erence )rom sattva and the a#so&utedi))erence )rom asattva. It must #e noted that this a&ternativede)inition is not a new de)inition6 it is entire&y e@uiva&ent to theone accepted so )ar, ie. the a#so&ute a#sence o) sattva and the a#so&utea#sence o) asattva. +he a&ternate de)inition makes use o) mutua&

a#sence or anyonya-a#hAva as opposed to atyanta-a#hAva in the)irst de)inition.

MadhusUdana3

satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogika#hedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h ! tathAchau#hayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdRig#heda-asaM#havenatA#hyAmarthAntara-anavakAsha$ !

A&ternative&y, 'we may de)ine( the sAdhya 'the unrea&ity o) dua&ity,mithyAtva( to #e the di))erence that has existence as its counter-

positive AN the di))erence that nonexistence as its counter-positive.

'5imp&y put, mithyAtva is that which is di))erent )rom existence ANdi))erent )rom nonexistence as we&&.( And there is no scope )or 'charging us with( arthAntara due to this #ecause such di))erence )rom #oth'existence and nonexistence( or di))erence )rom one o) them is notpossi#&e 'according to our other opponents- the &ogicians, the /uddhists,and the view o) 0Achaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparya+IkA(.

:xp&anation #y /rahmAnanda and exp&anation o) /rahmAnanda4s exp&anation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- #y 0i++ha&esha --------------/rahmAnanda 'in his &aghuchandrikA(3

#hedeti Atyantika#hedetyartha$ !

/y #heda 'di))erence( 'MadhusUdana( means a#so&ute di))erence.

0i++ha&esha 'in his vi++ha&eshopAdhyAyI(3

nanu prapaENchasya sadasadu#hayarUpatAmate sad#heda-asad#hedayorapiavachchhedaka#hedena tatra sattvAt.h siddhasAdhanaM ata Aha -Atyantiketi !

Now, even as per the view that the wor&d is #oth rea& and unrea&,the di))erence )rom sat and di))erence )rom asat are presentthere as &imiting di))erences. +his &eads to siddha-sAdhana 'doshha(,

esta#&ishing what is a&ready esta#&ished 'since such a view is a&ready he&d #y 0Achaspati Mishra in his nyAyavArttikatAtparya+IkA.( +here)ore, 'in order to re)ute this charge( '/rahmAnanda( says 'the di))erence(is a#so&ute.

' MadhusUdana uses the word #heda which /rahmAnanda c&ari)ies to #e not di))erence used &oose&y #ut a#so&ute and comp&ete di))erence.?therwise, the opponent can say that as per the view that ho&ds the wor&dto #e #oth rea& and unrea&, a partia& di))erence )rom rea&ity and apartia& di))erence )rom unrea&ity can #e said to characteri*e the wor&d.And this wou&d &ead to the o#"ection3 Bou are proving what has a&ready#een proved.(

/rahmAnanda3


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u#hayAtmakatve iti!#hramavishhayI#hUta-a&IkasaMsargavishishh+AdirUpeNa prapaENcho .a&Ika$

rUpAntareNa tu satya iti nyAyape+ikAkAravAchaspatyuktapaxe ityartha$ !

'MadhusUdana says( in 'de)ining the wor&d as having( the nature o)#oth 'sat and asat(. +his means the view o) 0Achaspati Mishra in

his nyAyavArtikatAtparya+IkA according to which As the wor&d is theo#"ect o) erroneous cognition 'such as si&ver-in-nacre(, due to #eing@ua&i)ied #y the )a&se re&ation, it 'the wor&d( is )a&se. /ut in its

other capacity, the wor&d is rea&.

0i++ha&esha exp&ains3

#hramavishhayI#hUta-a&IkasaMsargavishishh+AdirUpeNa prapaENcho .a&Ika iti! idaMra"atamityAdi#hrameshhu satye dharmiNi satyameva hi dRishyaM ra"atAdikaM a&IkasaM#andhena #hAsate, tatra svarUpata$ satyayorapi-ida Mra"atayor-a&IkasaMsargavishishh+a-rUpeNa-asatyattvaM,

In i&&usions such as this is si&ver 'ie. i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre(,

a rea& o#"ect such as si&ver appears in the rea& su#"ect '#ut( with a)a&se re&ation. In such a case, even though this and si&ver arerea& in themse&ves, due to #eing @ua&i)ied #y a )a&se re&ation they

are unrea&.

CIn the i&&usion, this is si&ver, the this and si&ver indicaterea& o#"ects o) cognition. 5i&ver in itse&) is a rea& o#"ect. 5o isthe thing indicated #y this. +he )act that I am seeing something

which I ca&& this is true. A&so, it is true that I have seensi&ver #e)ore. /ut the mistake I make is in identi)ying thiswith si&ver when I say this is si&ver. 5o 0Achaspati Mishra ho&ds

that in an i&&usion, there is a )a&se 'a&Ika( re&ation #etween rea&things that are re&ated #y such a )a&se re&ation. +he re&ata are

rea& in themse&ves #ut as re&ata o) the )a&se re&ation, they areunrea&. +he )a&se re&ation in the i&&usion this is si&ver is the re&ation o) identity 'tAdAtmya(. ;e wi&& see next that this view is extended to de)ine the wor&d as #eing #oth rea& and unrea&.D

etanmate #rahmaNi prapaENchasya-a&IkasaM#andhena #hrama iti na#hramitavyam.h ! idami ra"atasyeva tatra tattatpadArthAnAM#hramAnAdAyaiva sarvasyApi prapaENchasya-a&Ikatopapatte$ !

'/ut( this view shou&d not #e mistaken as 'ho&ding( that there is a case o) i&&usion due to the )a&se re&ation o) the wor&d with /rahman.


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o) the re&ata o) the )a&se re&ation is a&so denied. +hus it is that the wor&d is #oth rea& and unrea&, since its o#"ects can #e re&ata o) #oth rea& and )a&se cognitions. +his is the view o) 0Achaspati in his nyAyavArtikatAtparya+IkA.D

CNext, /rahmAnanda exp&ains what MadhusUdana means when he says

anyatarAtmakatve D/rahmAnanda3

anyatarAtmakatve iti ! #hramavishhayo .api saMsargo deshAntarastha-

tvAt.h satya iti prapaENcha$ satya eveti paxe,

As per the view 'o) the rea&ists, naiyAyikas(, even though the re&ation 'o) identity, )or examp&e in this is si&ver( is the content o)erroneous know&edge, it is rea& #ecause it occurs 'as the content o)va&id know&edge, pramA( in other p&aces. +here)ore, 'a&& things in

the wor&d are rea& and( the wor&d is rea&.

C+he naiyAyikas who are rea&ists-to-the-core insist that erroneouscognition or i&&usion is rea&&y due some de)ect 'doshha(. doshho.apramAyA "anaka$ says 0ishvanAtha in the #hAshhA-parichchheda.;hen there is an i&&usion this is si&ver with respect to nacre,

the memory o) si&ver co&or, the simi&arity o) the co&or #eing seen with si&ver, and other de)ects such as improper &ight, de)ective vision, etc. cause the i&&usion. /ut when rea& si&ver is #eing seen, the same cognition this is si&ver #ecomes a va&id know&edge, pramA. 5o the cognition this is si&ver, though erroneous due tode)ect's( in one p&ace, can #ecome va&id in some other p&ace. $ence,

there is no cognition o) the unrea& any time. And the wor&d is rea&.D

/rahmAnanda3

GBAnAtiriktarUpeNa-a&Ika eva prapaENcho vika&pavishhaya iti paxe chetyartha$ !

And, as per the view 'o) the vi"nAnavAdi-#auddha4s(, the wor&d is on&y )a&se 'unrea&( #ecause it is a#so&ute&y di))erent )romconsciousness and is a )igment o) imagination. +his is the meaning.

CAmong the three views presented so )ar, it is o#vious that a#so&utedi))erence )rom sattva is not possi#&e in the case o) 0AchaspatiMishra4s view in his nyAya text and the view o) the vi"nAnavAdi-/uddhists cannot admit an a#so&ute di))erence )rom asattva. +he naiyAyika'&ogician( says the wor&d is rea&, #ut then what MadhusUdana has said isthat the wor&d is a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom #oth the rea& 'sattva( and

theunrea& 'asattva(. $ence, none o) the three views is identica& to theadvaita view. +his means that there can #e no arthAntara in esta#&ishingthat the wor&d is a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom sattva and a#so&ute&y

di))erent)rom asattva. /rahmAnanda next c&ari)ies that the de)inition given #y

MadhusUdana that inc&udes a#so&ute di))erence )rom sattva ru&es out any arthAntara charge made against advaita in the )o&&owing manner. 5ince 0achaspati4s nyAya text says that the wor&d is #oth rea& and unrea&, this is e@uiva&ent to saying that the wor&d is di))erent )rom the rea& and the unrea&. 5o your de)inition o) the wor&d as #eing di))erent )rom sattvaand asattva is not going to prove mithyAtva at a&&. It is going to prove theview o) 0achaspati in his nyAya text which is not the view o) advaita.

$ence the arthAntara. D


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/rahmAnanda3

anavakAsha iti ! asattvA#hAvasya keva&aprapaENche sattvasyatadupahitaprapaENche svIkAre sattvopahitaprapaENchasya keva&a-

prapaENche tAdAtmyasattvAnna tatraikAntika$ sad#heda iti #hAva$!

+he purport o) 'Madhusudana4s saying( anavakAsha is3 ':ven #y(accepting the a#sence o) asattva in the who&e wor&d which 'a&so(

depends on sattva 'since the wor&d is a&so said to #e sat as per0achaspati in his nyAya text(, the wor&d which thus depends onsattva and this sattva-dependent part is identi)ied in the who&e

wor&d, there is N? a#so&ute di))erence )rom sat, 'which is what our de)inition o) sadasadanadhikaraNatva re@uires(.

C:ven though #oth rea& and unrea& can #e construed as di))erent)rom rea& and di))erent )rom unrea&, this view does not entai&,)or examp&e, a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom rea& which is what

MadhusUdana4s de)inition re@uires. 5o there is no arthAntara whatsoeverD.MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to #e esta#&ished, as the mithyAtvao) dua&ity, the unrea&ity o) dua&ity. In de)ining mithyAtva, one o) thede)initions taken up was the one )rom the panchapAdikA o) 7admapAda.MithyAtva is de)ined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot #ecategori*ed as sat or asat. More speci)ica&&y, this was de)ined to #esadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was c&ari)ied #y MadhusUdana to #e thea#so&ute a#sence o) sattva and the a#so&ute a#sence o) asattva.+he opponent had raised the o#"ection o) arthAntara against the de)initiono) mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not #eing a su#stratum o)either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana re)uted these o#"ections.

$e a&so o))ered an a&ternative de)inition o) sadasadanadhikaraNatva,name&y the a#so&ute di))erence )rom existence and the a#so&ute di))erence)rom nonexistence which ru&es out any possi#i&ity o) arthAntara 'provingsomething other than what is intended(.

+he opponent cou&d, however, &eve& another charge against MadhusUdana4sde)inition. /y de)ining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the di))erence )romexistence and di))erence )rom nonexistence, there is at &east a de)ecto) proving something a part o) which has a&ready #een proved. ANN?+ #e sp&itinto two terms A and /, such that each can #e independent&y proved. ;e$A0: to consider the com#ined di))erence )rom existence and nonexistence.;hy /ecause, the hetu, dRishyatva 'percepti#&ity(, in this case is thehetu )or the >?NEUN>+I?N 'or com#ination( o) a#so&ute di))erence )romexistence AN a#so&ute di))erence )rom nonexistence. 'Reca&& that thesAdhya is to #e in)erred )rom the invaria#&e concomitance o) the hetuwith the sAdhya.(


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;ithout )urther ado, &et us hear the unassai&a#&e rep&y o) MadhusUdana3

+ext3

nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asad#hedasya cha prapaENchesiddhattvena-aMshata$ siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h ! guNAdikaM

guNyAdinA #hinnA#hinnaM samAnAdhikRitatvAt.h iti #hedA#hedavAdiprayogetArkikAdyaNgIkRitasya #hinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher-yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakRite .api mi&itapratIteruddeshyatvA-nna siddha-sAdhanam.h ! yathA tattvA#hede gha+a$ kuM#ha iti sAmAnAdhi-karaNya-pratIteradarshanena mi&itasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakRite .apisattvarahite tuchchhe dRishyatva-adarshanena mi&itasya tatprayo"akatayAmi&itasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h !

+rans&ation3

'And you( cannot charge that there is the de)ect o) partia& siddha-sAdhana'aMshata$ siddha-sAdhana( #ecause the part 'o) the proo)( consistingo) 'esta#&ishing( the a#sence o) asattva 'nonexistence( and the

di))erence )rom nonexistence 'in the a&ternative de)inition( is a&readyesta#&ished regarding the wor&d. +he 'mAdhvas( ho&d that a @ua&ityand the su#stance that possesses that @ua&ity are di))erent ANnon-di))erent )rom each other. In arguing with the tArkikas 'thenaiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the #hA++as, etc.( who accept the di))erence'o) a @ua&ity )rom the possessor o) the @ua&ity(, they 'the mAdhvas(say3 the @ua&ity and its possessor are di))erentand non-di))erent )rom each other #ecause they can #e cogni*ed to #ere&ated #y a re&ation o) non-di))erence. '5o, they say,( there is nosiddha-sAdhana #ecause the intended cognition '>?NEUN>+I?N o) di))erenceand nondi))erence o) a @ua&ity and its possessor( is N?+ proved , eventhough the di))erence 'o) a @ua&ity )rom its possessor( is a&ready proved.5imi&ar&y, in 'our( present case 'o) esta#&ishing a#sence o) sattva AN

thea#sence o) asattva( too, the cognition that is intended 'to #e proved(is >?NEUN>+I?N 'com#ination o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva(.5o 'we( cannot '#e charged with( siddha-sAdhana 'redundancy in reasoning(.'Bou may say that the >?NEUN>+I?N o) ours is not "usti)ied. /ut we say,no2( In the case o) identica& things such as a pot and a "ar 'whichareterms that stand )or the same thing(, there is no cognition o) di))erenceand nondi))erence o) the )orm +he pot is the "ar. '+here)ore,( thecon"unction o) di))erence and nondi))erence is intended to #e esta#&ished.'+his is your stand.(5imi&ar&y, in the present case 'ie. o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o)asattva(, percepti#i&ity is not 'a characteristic o)( a tota&&ynonexistentthing that &acks existence 'sattva(. '+here)ore,( con"unction 'o) a#senceo) sattva and a#sence o) asattva, or e@uiva&ent&y, di))erence )rom sattvaand di))erence )rom asattva( is a prayo"aka 'a necessary )actor( )ordRishyatva, percepti#i&ity 'which is the hetu( and 'so( the esta#&ishingo)that >?NEUN>+I?N is what is intended.

Notes3

0i++ha&esha descri#es that the hetu dRishyatva is an invaria#&e concomitant 'vyApya( o) u#hayatva '#oth-ness or con"unction( o) sad#heda and asad#heda.

dRishyatvasya sad#heda-asad#hedo#hayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h


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is a characteristic o) everything other than /rahman, as per yourview. And /rahman is sat. A&& you need to prove is a#sence o)

sattva or di))erence )rom sattva with regard to the wor&d. 7roving the a#sence o) asattva 'or di))erence )rom asattva( is redundant. $ence the charge o) partia& siddha-sAdhana.

advaitin3 ;hat you say is not "usti)ia#&e. Eust as in your case,the con"unction o) #heda and a#heda is a necessary )actor 'prayo"aka(

o) the hetu, so in our case too the con"unction o) a#sence o)sattva and the a#sence o) asattva 'or e@uiva&ent&y the con"unction

o) di))erence )rom sattva and the di))erence )rom asattva( is theprayo"aka o) the hetu, dRishyatva 'percepti#i&ity(. $ere is why.I) we make "ust the a#sence o) sattva the sAdhya, then we run into apro#&em in the case o) a )ictitious entity 'a chimera(. A )ictitiousentity, such as the horn o) a hare, has a#sence o) sattva on&y. /uthere the hetu, dRishyatva is N?+ present. A )ictitious entity is never

perceived. Again, i) we make "ust the a#sence o) asattva the sAdhya, then we run into a pro#&em in the case o) /rahman. $ere, we have

a#sence o) asattva, #ut again the hetu, dRishyatva is N?+ present in /rahman. +here)ore, we need to have the con"unction o) a#sence o)sattva and a#sence o) asattva as the sAdhya in order to make thesAdhya a necessary )actor 'prayo"aka( o) the hetu. +he charge o)siddha-sAdhana against us cannot #e made.

Notes3

=( +he thrust o) the argument is that the hetu )or the sAdhya in themAdhva4s case as we&& as )or the advaitin has to #e a prayo"aka,a necessary )actor o) the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur

exact&y wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no &ess. +his is more

restrictive than the genera& )orm o) vyApti, as may #e reca&&ed )rom the introduction to nyAya in the third part o) this series. ;henthe mountain has the hetu, smoke and we in)er the sAdhya, )ire, thevyApti is &ess restrictive in the sense that we may a&&ow the sAdhya

)ire to occur without smoke, a&though the smoke must a&ways #eaccompanied #y )ire in order )or the in)erence to #e va&id. /ut in thepresent discussion, we cannot a&&ow the sAdhya to occur where thehetu is not )ound. +he occurrences o) sAdhya and hetu must exact&ycoincide. $ere, the sAdhya )or the advaitin is sad#heda and asad#heda

and the hetu is dRishyatva. /y de)ining a tight )orm o) vyApti, what the advaitin is saying is3

;hatever is percepti#&e 'cogni*a#&e( is di))erent )rom sat ANdi))erent )rom asat.

+he converse a&so ho&ds.

;hatever is di))erent )rom sat AN di))erent )rom asat is percepti#&e'cogni*a#&e(.

5ym#o&ica&&y speaking, i) $ is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the &ogica& con"unction 'AN( o) 5= 'sad-#heda( and 5% 'asad-#heda(, we may write3

$ - 5= AN 5% 5= AN 5% - $

where - means imp&ies


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%( +he mAdhvas4 view here regarding the #heda-a#heda o) a @ua&ity )romthe possessor o) the @ua&ity is used here #y MadhusUdana as an examp&e

on&y. It does not necessari&y mean that MadhusUdana endorses this viewo) the mAdhvas in a #roader context, as )or examp&e, with respect toan exegetica& context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under someheavy attack )rom the 0ishishh+a-advaitins )or not recogni*ing the

#heda 'di))erence( #etween dravya and adravya as RAmAnu"a ho&ds.In his )ourth vo&ume tit&ed $istory o) Indian 7hi&osophy, asgupta out&ines the criticism o) the mAdhvas #y the vishishh+a-advaitin,

7arakA&a Bati in his 0i"ayIndra-parA"aya. 7araka&a Bati points out how severa& texts in the upanishads #ecome a#surd i) the mAdhva

position on dravya and adravya is he&d. Another ma"or disagree- ment #etween the two schoo&s o) 0aishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya position which is he&d #y the mAdhvas #ut re"ected #y the

vishishh+a-advaitins. +he &atter cannot accept 'nor can the advaitins( that there is gradation in /&iss 'Ananda( in the state o) mokshha. +his position is a&so critici*ed #y 7arakA&a Bati on exegetica&

grounds as we&&. +here is another vishishh+a-advaitin work namedAnanda-tAratamya-khaNana that is a&so mentioned #y asgupta.

Neverthe&ess, it must #e noted that the advaitin4s use o) themAdhva examp&e on guNa and guNI is )or i&&ustration on&y. Any

other examp&e wou&d a&so #e )ine.>ontinuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we wi&& nextstudy the second de)inition o) mithyAtva that is de)ended #yMadhusUdana 5arasvatI. ?ther artic&es in this series may #eretrieved #y searching )or siddhi in the su#"ect &ine.It is especia&&y use)u& to #e )ami&iar with #asic nyAya termino&ogyas exp&ained in the third and )ourth parts o) the series.;ithout such )ami&iarity, the discussion #e&ow may not makemuch sense at a&&2

advaita-siddhi text3

pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h !

A&ternative&y, mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( o) something is that which is thecounter-positive or a#sentia& ad"unct 'pratiyogin( o) an a#so&ute negation'a negation )or a&& three periods o) time, past, present, and )uture( inthe very su#stratum where it 'the thing( is cogni*ed.

+his is the second de)inition o) mithyAtva that is taken up #yMadhusUdana in his de)ense o) mithyAtva o) dvaita. +his a&ternativede)inition is #ased on shruti statements such as neha nAnAstikiENchana, as /rahmAnanda says in his gaua#rahmAnandI, nehanAnAstItyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha.

+he second de)inition comes )rom the 0ivaraNAchArya, 7rakAshAtman, theauthor o) the 7anchapAdikA-vivaraNa.

It is important to understand this de)inition and the signi)icance o)the terms invo&ved. As in the case o) the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva,what is a&Ika or a )ictitious entity is N?+ the mithyAtva that isused to descri#e the wor&d.

+he mithyAtva o) the wor&d is akin to the i&&usion o) the snake overa rope or si&ver in nacre. Upon rea&i*ing that the snake is i&&usory,one exc&aims +he snake is unrea&. +he snake was never there to #eginwith, it is not there now, and it wi&& never #e there in the )uture2+his is the mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( o) the wor&d that is #eing ta&ked


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a#out.

?ne important point to remem#er is that the in order )or a thing to#e mithyA or unrea& according to this de)inition, it MU5+ #e cogni*edor perceived in some sus#tratum. +his is a necessary condition )orsomething to #e ca&&ed mithyA. ;hat is perceived is ca&&ed mithyA.

+hat which can never #e perceived, a chimera such as the horns o)a hare, is N?+ #eing ca&&ed mithyA. Rather it is asat. And /rahmanis sat. MithyAtva is di))erent )rom these two, ie. mithyAtva issadasadvi&axaNa.

/rahmAnanda, in his gaUa#rahmAnandI commentary on the advaita-siddhithere)ore, de)ines the term pratipanna-upAdhi as )o&&ows3

pratipanna$ svaprakArakadhIvisheshhya$ ya upAdhiradhikaraNaM tannishh+hoyastraikA&ikanishhedho .atyanta-a#hAvastatpratiyogitvamityartha$ !

pratipanna means the @ua&i)icand o) the cognition that has the 'thingthat is mithyA( as the @ua&i)ier. 5uch a @ua&i)icand that is the

su#stratumis pratipanna-upAdhi. +he counter-positive o) the a#so&ute negation orthe negation )or a&& periods o) time in the su#stratum 'is ca&&edmithyA(.

+his de)inition ru&es out e@uating what is mithyA with a&Ika, a)ictitious entity. Bet another type o) negation is a&so #eing ru&ed outin the de)inition. ;hat is )ictitious is not perceived anywhere. +he otherextreme is the negation that is a&ways empirica&&y perceived.


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has the term traikA&ika. +he negation that is #eing descri#edin the de)inition is traikA&ika, that ho&ds )or a&& times. In thecase o) prAga#hAva, dhvaMsa-a#hAva, and #heda in the a#oveexamp&es, there is no a#so&ute negation 'atyanta-a#hAva(, thatwhich ho&ds )or a&& times.

+here)ore, /rahmAnanda says3

kapA&adinishh+ha#heda-dhvaMsAdipratiyogitvamAdAya siddha-sAdhanaMsyAdatastraikA&iketi !

'+he opponent may( charge us with siddha-sAdhana #y taking thepratiyogitva 'counter-positive-ness( o) the a#hAva 'a#sence( to #e thedi))erence or posterior negation 'dhvaMsa-a#hAva( in things such as thepieces o) a pot. '+o counter this we have added the term( traikA&ikain the de)inition.

In the next part, we wi&& see how the opponent raises an importanto#"ection to this de)inition.

A sma&& re@uest. >ou&d you p&ease )rame this argument interms o) propositiona& &ogic ' as you had done #e)ore (I have read it many times #ut I get &ost as I approach theend. I wou&d sure&y appreciate a gist o) this argumentpresented in )ami&iar terms.

+he on&y reason why I did not attempt to )ormu&ate the de)initionin terms o) predicate &ogic is #ecause the &ogica& expressionstend to get unwie&dy @uick&y as the de)inition gets moreand more re)ined. +he )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva 'p&ease seeadvaita-siddhi - J( is re)ined #y the second de)inition. A&& thatthe )irst de)inition rea&&y says is that mithyA is something that is

di))erent )rom the a#so&ute&y rea& /rahman and )rom a )ictitious entity.As per the )irst de)inition, the thing that is mithyA shou&d #e =(cogni*ed in some &ocus 'su#stratum( and %( #e su#&ated 'negated( at sometime. +he second de)inition re)ines the )irst #y saying that the thingthat is mithyA is =( su#&ated in the very &ocus where it is cogni*edand %( and it is su#&ated so )or A88 times.

At the risk o) #eing uninte&&igi#&e once again, I wi&& attemptto )ormu&ate the second de)inition o) mithyAtva in terms o)predicate &ogic.

+o exp&ain the second de)inition in terms o) ;estern-sty&epredicate &ogic, we need to introduce di))erent time )rameso) re)erence. A&so, we need to consider the second de)initionas a re)inement o) the )irst de)inition. +he second de)initioncomes )rom the 0ivaraNa on the 7anchapAdikA which contains the)irst de)inition.

+he need )or di))erent time )rames arises #ecause o) the)o&&owing. In any case o) i&&usion, there are two time )rames.+he )irst time )rame, say +KA 'time )rame o) avidyA(, is thatwhich ho&ds when the i&&usion is in e))ect. uring this phase,things are interpreted in terms o) the i&&usion.


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is su#&ated )or a&& times 'traikA&ikanishhedha(. >&ear&y, it isa#surd to say that the i&&usion is su#&ated )or a&& times URINGthe i&&usion phase 'avidyA( itse&). +his is akin to saying a dreamis su#&ated during the dream. +he dream is su#&ated on&y upon wakingup, not whi&e the dream is sti&& occurring. +here)ore, it isnecessary to interpret traikA&ikanishhedha as the su#&ation )or

a&& times in a time )rame o) re)erence that is di))erent )rom thetime )rame during i&&usion. ;hat is this other time )rame

+he other time )rame is the time )rame that ho&ds Aa&& this time )rame +KE 'time )rame a)ter dawn o) "nAna(.?nce the i&&usion ends, the previous time )rame +KA no &ongerapp&ies. +here is no snake. ?ne exc&aims there was no snake there,there is no snake now, and there won4t #e the snake in )uture2

;hat a#out the events o) the o&d time )rame +KA +hese getre-interpreted or mapped into events in time )rame +KE.


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Next, MadhusUdana de)ines nonexistence 'o) something F( N?+ as simp&y negating the expression 'A( a#ove which wou&d "ust #e

':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+(, )or time t in some time )rame +, and )orsome su#stratum 8( ......................................... '/(

this wou&d mean there is a time t in some time )rame when F

is su#&ated in su#stratum 8

stated more concise&y as3

':'+(,:'t in +(, :'8( 3 5'F,8,t,+(( ............................'/4(

'Note3 +he terms &ocus and su#stratum are used interchangea#&y.(

Rather nonexistence 'o) something F( is de)ined as )o&&ows3

'U't(3 >'F,8,t,+(, )or time t in a&& time )rames, and )or a&&&oci( ........................................... '>(

>'F,8,t,+( means F is cogni*ed in a &ocus 8 )or time t intime )rame +. 5omething 'F( is nonexistent i) and on&y i) )or a&& time t in a&& time )rames, F is not cogni*ed in any&ocus.

5tated more concise&y,

'U'+(,U't in + (,U'8(3 >'F,8,t,+(( ....................... '>4(

+he negation o) HthisH type o) nonexistence is3

':'t( such that >'F,8,t,+(, )or some time t in some time )rame +, and)or some &ocus 8( ...................................... '(

or more concise&y,

':'+(, :'t in +(, :'8(3 >'F,8,t,+(( .........................'4(

which means there is some time t in some time )rame + during which F iscogni*ed in a &ocus. And this is the negation o) nonexistencethat is characteristic o) i&&usions such as si&ver-in-nacre,snake-on-rope, and )ina&&y, the wor&d-on-/rahman i&&usion.+he i&&usory thing is cogni*ed as existing in a &ocus'su#stratum( sometime 'the period o) i&&usion( and in the time)rame +KA.

+he )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva is 3 '/( AN '(.'p&ease see advaita-siddhi - J(

+here)ore, the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva is written3

':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+(, )or some time t in some time )rame +, and)or some &ocus 8(

AN':'t(3 >'F,84,t,+(, )or some time t in some time )rame +4, and )or some&ocus 84( ............................................. ':(

or more concise&y,

':'+(,:'t in +(, :'8( 3 5'F,8,t,+((AN':'+4(, :'t in +4(, :'84(3 >'F,84,t,+4(( ..................':4(


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Now, what the second de)inition o) the 7anchapAdikA-vivaraNa doesis to re)ine the )irst de)inition, make it more precise and &essam#iguous. A)ter a&&, the )irst de)inition comes )rom the 7ancha-pAdikA and the second )rom the 0ivaraNa on the 7anchapAdikA.

;hat the second de)inition does is =( )ix the time )rames in ':(a#ove , %( )ix the &oci in ':(, and ( make the condition in the '/(part o) the de)inition stronger #y asserting that the su#&ationho&ds )or a&& times.

+he second de)inition o) mithyAtva may #e written )irst #y)ixing the time )rame in '/( as the time )rame +KE 'time )ramea)ter dawn o) "nAna( and the time )rame in '( as the time )rame+KA 'time )rame during the avidyA phase(.

'/ with time )rame + +KE ( AN ' with time )rame + +KA(

which is

':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+KE(, )or some time t in time )rame +KE, )or some&ocus 8(AN':'t(3 >'F,84,t,+KA(, )or some time t in time )rame +KA, and )or some&ocus 84(

+he second de)inition o) mithyAtva may next #e written #y)ixing the &oci 8 and 84 to #e the 5AM:. +he de)inition c&ear&y statesthat the thing that is mithyA is su#&ated in the 0:RB 8?>U5 whereit is cogni*ed.

+his makes the de)inition3

':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+KE(, )or some time t in time )rame +KE, )or&ocus 8( AN':'t( such that >'F,84,t,+KA(, )or some time t in time )rame +KA, and )or&ocus 84( AN '8 84(

Next, making the condition in the '/( part o) the de)initionstronger means the su#&ation shou&d ho&d )or a&& periods o)time in time )rame +KE.

'5'F,8,t,+KE(, )or A88 time t in time )rame +KE, )or &ocus 8( AN':'t( such that >'F,84,t,+KA(, )or some time t in time )rame +KA, and )or&ocus 84( AN '8 84( ....................................''F,84,t,+KA(( AN '8 84( ( ................................''F,84,t,+KA(( AN '8 84( ( AN '+KE 2 +KA(..........................'


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2 means not e@ua&s.

Introducing a predicate M'F( which means F is mithyA, thepredicate is de)ined as 'using to indicate e@uiva&ence(3

M'F(

:'8(,:'84(''U't in +KE(3 5'F,8,t,+KE(( AN ':'t in +KA(3 >'F,84,t,+KA(( AN '8 84( ( AN '+KE 2 +KA(..........................'G(

;e have arrived at the )ina& )orm o) the second de)inition o) mithyAtva3

F is mithyA i) it is su#&ated )or A88 times in the very su#stratumwhere it is cogni*ed.

pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h !

+he second de)inition, i) it has to #e a re)inement o) the)irst de)inition, must imp&y the &atter. ie.

'


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esta#&ished 'ie. the rea&ity o) the wor&d(. :ven 'i) the a#so&utenegation( is empirica& 'vyAvahArika(, you wi&& #e proving somethingother than what you intended #ecause 'such negation( wi&& not #eopposed to the a#so&ute rea&ity 'o) the wor&d(. +he shruti textsthat are non-dua&istic wi&& #e incapa#&e o) revea&ing the truth. And'i) it #e c&aimed that( the wor&d is i&&usory, 'that wi&& not ho&d(

and 'the wor&d( wou&d have a#so&ute rea&ity 'pAramAthikatva(.

8et us examine the opponent4s o#"ection in a &itt&e more detai&.

+he opponent says3 Bou de)ine three orders o) rea&ity - pAramArthika,vyAvahArika, and prAti#hAsika. And you have de)ined mithyAtva as thecounter-positive-ness o) the a#so&ute negation ')or a&& periods o) time(in the very su#stratum where the thing that is mithyA is cogni*ed.In essence, you wou&d &ike to categori*e the wor&d as mithyA.Now, what rea&ity do you assign to such a negation o) the wor&d

=( Is this negation pAramArthika 'a#so&ute&y rea&(

%( Is this negation prAti#hAsika 'i&&usory(

( ?r, is this negation vyAvahArika 'empirica&(

Regard&ess o) the type o) rea&ity you assign to this negation,you run into pro#&ems.

=( +he negation o) the wor&d is pAramArthika. In this case, youhave a direct contradiction with the non-dua& princip&e o)advaita. /rahmAnanda exp&ains the o#"ection3

advaita-hAni$ neha nAnetyAdishruti#odhitasya #rahmaNi dRishya-

sAmAnyA#hAvasya virodha$

'+here is( damage to the princip&e o) non-dua&ity as known )romshruti statements such as neha nAnAsti kiENchana 'there is no

mani)o&d-ness here whatsoever( '#ecause( o) the contradiction due to the common a#sence o) the perceived 'dRishya(.

I) the negation o) the wor&d is pAramArthika, then you have twosuch rea&ities - =( /rahman, and %( the said negation o) the wor&d.

+his compromises the non-dua&ity princip&e.

%( +he negation o) the wor&d is prAti#hAsika, i&&usory. In this case, you have siddha-sAdhana-doshha. /rahmAnanda exp&ains3

siddha-sAdhanamiti ! kapA&e gha+o nAstItyAdi#hrame prAtItikasya- atyantA#hAvasya vishhayatvena siddha-sAdhanamityartha$ !

siddha-sAdhana means that in cases o) erroneous cognition or i&&usionsuch as denying the pot in its parts, the a#so&ute a#sence o) the'erroneous&y( cogni*ed negation is a&ready esta#&ished 'in anothersystem(.

In other words, i) you say the negation is i&&usory, such as thenegation o) a pot in its two ha&ves, such a position is a&readyadmitted #y another system. 'A who&e is said inhere in its parts

as per nyAya. 5o a who&e, such as a pot, cannot #e denied in its parts. Any such denia& is erroneous.(

In other words, i) you say the negation o) the wor&d is i&&usory or


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erroneous, that is a&ready admitted #y the rea&ist schoo&s. 5o you are committing the mistake o) siddha-sAdhana.

(+he negation o) the wor&d is vyAvahArika. In this case, whatyou are saying is that the negation o) the wor&d wi&& itse&) get

su#&ated upon rea&i*ation o) /rahman. ;hat does this mean

+he wor&d itse&) >ANN?+ #e vyAvahArika #ecause it is a#surd 'a contradiction( to say that the wor&d as we&& as its negation get su#&ated upon /rahman rea&i*ation. :ither the wor&d or its

negation can get su#&ated at the same time #ut not #oth2 +here)ore, you are &e)t with two possi#i&ities - a. the wor&d is pAramArthika or a#so&ute&y rea& ?R #. the wor&d is prAti#hAsika or i&&usory.

/ut you deny the wor&d is i&&usory, and so the wor&d can on&y #epAramArthika. +his point is stated #y /rahmAnanda as3prAti#hAsikatva-asaM#havena pAramArthikatvameva #a&AtsyAditi#hAva$ !

'5ince the wor&d( cannot possi#&y #e i&&usory it is )orced to #e a#so&ute&y rea& 'pAramArthika( on&y. +his is the purport 'o) the

opponent(.

Again, 0i++ha&esha exp&ains why the wor&d cannot #e i&&usory when he comments on the term prAti#hAsikatva-asaM#havena o) /rahmAnanda3 #rahmaGBAnAnyA#AdhyatvAditi

'+he wor&d cannot #e i&&usory( #ecause 'it is admitted #y the advaitin( to remain un-su#&ated 'not negated( #y anything other than know&edge o) /rahman.

5o what is the resu&t o) accepting the wor&d as pAramArthika and thenegation o) the wor&d as vyAvahArika +hese are the de)ects.


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C7&ease note that 5hankara4s usage o) asat corresponds to mithyA.D

In the cognition, the pot is 'san.h gha+a$(, the permanent )actoris is which indicates the under&ying existence. ;hat is an i&&usionis the pot. ;hat is cogni*ed is "ust this permanent )actor#ut it is )a&se&y understood to #e a pot #y the super-imposition 'adhyAsa(

o) the name-and-)orm on the under&ying :xistence 'sat(. In anothercognition, the c&oth is 'san.h pa+a$(, again the common, permanent)actoris is. ;hat is an i&&usion has to do with the c&oth. In other words,#etween the cognitions the pot is, and the c&oth is, what iscommon, constant, and permanent is the )actor, is.;hat we see a#ove is a cognition where the cogni*er gives a name to acogni*ed o#"ect, such as a pot, c&oth etc. Another type o) cognitiontries to assert an ad"ective or attri#ute o) an o#"ect. In the cognition,the #&ue pot is, again what is common, constant, and permanentis the )actor is. ;hat is i&&usion is the #&ue pot. 5o whatis #eing denied u&timate rea&ity is the #&ueness and potness o) theo#"ect #ut not pure existence indicated #y is.

Genera&i*ing this to a&& cognitions, a&& o#"ects are rea& as )ar as theyare treated as pure existence, #ut the moment you start associating themwith names and )orms, the i&&usion #egins. +his :xistence is the common,unchanging, and permanent )actor among a&& cognitions.

+here)ore, status o) anything in the wor&d may #e said to #e comprisedo) two components =( a Rea& part and %( an unrea& part. +his is somewhatsimi&ar to the Mathematician4s expression o) a comp&ex num#er as'F O iH B( where F is the rea& part and B is the unrea& 'imaginary( part.':&ectrica& engineers pre)er to write F O " HB, using " instead o) i.(/ut here we are not dea&ing with num#ers, rather cognitions. 5o everycognition is made o) two parts - a rea& part, : and an unrea& part, F.

5hankara assures us that the rea& part : remains the same )or a&&cognitions whi&e the unrea& part F changes.

5o we come to the interesting @uestion3 what does it mean tonegate something in the wor&d, such as a pot It is c&ear that therea& component o) the pot, which is :xistence, can N:0:R #e negated.$owever, the unrea& name-and-)orm 'nAma-rUpa( component o) the pot can#e negated. +his means on&y one thing. +he negation o) the pot a&sohas two components - =( a rea& component, :xistence '/eing( and%( an unrea& component that negates on&y the unrea& component,name-and-)orm 'nAma-rUpa(, o) the pot.

+his is essentia&&y what MadhusUdana says. +he negation o) the wor&dhas two components. +he rea& component 'pAramArthika( is identica& with/rahman 'sat( and the unrea& component is o) the same order o) rea&ityas the wor&d, ie. vyAvahArika. +he unrea& component o) the negation on&ynegates the unrea& component o) the wor&d.

;e wi&& )irst see how MadhusUdana exp&ains the rea& component o) thenegation.

advaita-siddhi text3prapaENchanishhedha-adhikaraNI#hUta-#rahmA#hinnatvAnnishhedhasyatAtvikatve .api na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h ! na cha tAtvikA#hAva-pratiyogina$ prapaENchasya tAtvikApatti$, tAtvikA#hAvapratiyoginishuktira"atAdau ka&pite vya#hichArAt.h !

+rans&ation3


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'I) we ho&d that( the negation 'o) the wor&d( is non-di))erent)rom /rahman which is the su#stratum o) the negation o) thewor&d, then there is no damage done to the non-dua&ity princip&e.And the wor&d as the counter-positive 'pratiyogin( o) thea#so&ute&y rea& 'pAramArthika( negation cannot #e ')orced to #e(

a#so&ute&y rea& '#ased on an erroneous ru&e that the pratiyogino) a negation and the negation itse&) must necessari&y #e&ongto the same order o) rea&ity.( An exception 'to this ru&e whichproves the ru&e to #e erroneous( is the si&ver-in-nacre that is'i&&usory on&y( and its negation 'at the end o) i&&usion( which is rea&.

+o understand MadhusUdana4s stand more, we need to examine hownegation or a#sence 'a#hAva( is treated in di))erent systems.+he @uestions are3 =( Is a#hAva a category 'padArtha( in itse&)in other words, do we have a cognition o) a#hAva %( +hroughwhat means o) cognition 'pramANa( is a#hAva cogni*ed

+he #hA++a-mImAMsakas, )or examp&e, ho&d that a#hAva is a separate

category and it is cogni*ed through a separate pramANa ca&&edanupa&a#dhi or non-apprehension. +he naiyAyikas and MAdhvas ho&dthat a#hAva is a separate category #ut they do not recogni*e aseparate pramANa &ike anupa&a#dhi )or it, and ho&d that a#hAva can#e known through standard pramANas such as perception, in)erence,and ver#a& testimony. +he prA#hAkara-mImAMsakas ho&d that a#hAvais not a category in itse&), nor is there a pramANa such asanupa&a#dhi.


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As to the o#"ection that the negation and the thing negatedmust #oth #e&ong to the same order o) rea&ity, MadhusUdanasays this ru&e is )&awed #ecause there is an exception. In thei&&usion o) si&ver in nacre, the si&ver is i&&usory 'prAti#hAsika( #utthe negation o) the si&ver 'at the end o) the i&&usion( is rea&

or vyAvahArika at #est which is o) a di))erent order o) rea&ity.

+he unrea& component o) the negation, which is vyAvahArika, isdiscussed next #y MadhusUdana./RI:< R:>A73 MadhusUdana started #y accepting the de)initiono) unrea&ity 'o) the wor&d( as pratipanna-upAdhau traikA&ikanishhedha-pratiyogitvam.h 'p&ease see advaita-siddhi =P(. Unrea&ity is thatwhich is su#"ect to a#so&ute negation 'negation )or a&& times( in thesu#stratum where it is cogni*ed. 5o the opponent asks3 Now, how do youc&assi)y this a#so&ute negation that you speak o) Is this a#so&utenegationpAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAti#hAsika ;e have seen how MadhusUdana hasanswered this @uestion #y pointing out that the a#so&ute negation can #e

treated as pAramArthika, identica& with /rahman. In doing so, there isno harm done to the non-dua&ity princip&e. A&so, the opponent cannotinsist on the ru&e that a negation and its counter-positive 'pratiyogin(have to have the same order o) rea&ity 'sama-sattAka(, #ecause anexception that #reaks the ru&e is readi&y )ound in the case o) ani&&usion such as the si&ver-in-nacre i&&usion. +he i&&usory si&ver isprAti#hAsika #ut its negation is pAramArthika i) the su#stratum o)i&&usion is treated as /rahman Itse&) or at &east vyAvahArika, i)the su#stratum is taken to #e nacre.

$aving shown how the negation can #e pAramArthika, MadhusUdana now showshow the negation may a&so #e treated as vyAvahArika. +his correspondsto the unrea& part o) the negation.

+he #asis o) this approach to ana&y*ing the negation is )ound insuch treatises as the dRig-dRishya-viveka which says3

asti #hAti priyaM rUpaM nAma chetyaMshapaENchakam.h !AdyatrayaM #rahmarUpaM "agadrUpaM tato dvayam.h !! %P !!

:verything has )ive )actors3 =( :xistence, %( >onsciousness( /&iss, 1( Name, and Q(


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)ee& the a#sence o) the pot, a&though we continue to perceive theground. uring this phase, we perceive, in some sense, the a#senceo) the pot, as we&& as the ground. 5u#se@uent&y, we )orget a&& a#outthe pot. At this point, we are on&y aware o) the ground, not the potor its a#sence. /oth the pot and its a#sence have #een )orgotten.+here is no memory o) either having existed.

In such a case, where the negation is cogni*ed as di))erent )rom thesu#stratum, the negation can #e taken to #e the same order o) rea&ity asthe thing that is negated, the pratiyogin. +his is what MadhusUdana saysnext.


atAtvika eva vA nishhedho .ayam.h ! atAtvikatve .api na prAti#hAsika$,kiMtu vyAvahArika$! nacha - tarhi nishhedhasya #Adhyatvena tAtvikasattva-avirodhitvAdarthAntaram-iti vAchyam.h ! svApnArthasya svApnanishhedhena#AdhadarshanAt.h ! nishhedhasya #AdhyatvaM pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitvena tantram.h, kiMtu nishhedhyApexayA nyUnasattAkatvam.h ! prakRite cha

tu&yasattAkatvAt.h kathaM na virodhitvam.h !

+rans&ation3

atAtvika eva - on&y unrea&, vA - ?r, nishhedho .ayam.h - this negation,atAtvikatve .api - :ven i) it is unrea&, na prAti#hAsika$ - it is noti&&usory, kiMtu vyAvahArika$ - #ut empirica&, nacha - And 'it( cannot,tarhi nishhedhasya - then, o) the negation, #Adhyatvena - due to #eingsu#&ata#&e, tAtvikasattva-avirodhitvAd-arthAntaram - due to #eing notopposed to the rea&ity o) 'the wor&d(, there is the de)ect o) arthAntara'proving something other than what was intended(, iti vAchyam.h - #esaid thus, svApnArthasya - o) the dream-o#"ect, svApnanishhedhena - #ynegation in the dream, #AdhadarshanAt.h - #ecause o) experiencing the

su#&ation, nishhedhasya - o) the negation, #AdhyatvaM - su#&ata#i&itypAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve - in #eing not opposed to the a#so&uterea&ity, na tantram.h - is not dependent 'does not imp&y(, kiMtunishhedhyApexayA - #ut as compared to what is negated, nyUnasattAkatvam.h -having a &ower order o) rea&ity, prakRite cha - And in the point underdiscussion, tu&yasattAkatvAt.h - #ecause o) the e@ua& order o) rea&ity,kathaM na - how is there no, virodhitvam.h - opposition.

Meaning3

?r we may say that this negation 'o) the wor&d( is unrea&. :ven though itisunrea&, it is not i&&usory 'prAti#hAsika(, #ut empirica& 'vyAvahArika(.And 'you( cannot say35ince the negation, that is itse&) su#&ata#&e, cannot#e in opposition to the rea&ity 'o) the wor&d(, there is the de)ect o)proving something other than intended. ';hy( /ecause, o) the instance o)su#&ation o) a dream-o#"ect a&ong with its dream-negation. +here is nodependence or imp&ication o) the non-opposition to a#so&ute rea&ity onthe su#&ata#i&ity o) the negation, #ut on the negation4s #eing o) a &owerorder o) rea&ity than the thing that is negated. In the present case, thereis e@ua&ity o) the order o) rea&ity 'o) the negation and the thing that isnegated, ie. the wor&d(. 5o how is there no opposition 'to the rea&ity o)thewor&d(

MadhusUdana says here that the negation o) the wor&d can #e viewed asvyAvahArika. +his prompts an o#"ection3 I) the negation o) the wor&d isvyAvahArika, then this negation shou&d itse&) #e su#&ated. Upon su#&ationo) the negation o) the wor&d, the wor&d4s rea&ity, not unrea&ity, wou&d


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#e a))irmed. +hat means the advaitin is proving something other than whathe intended, a de)ect ca&&ed arthAntara. +o this o#"ection, MadhusUdanarep&ies that it is not the case that wor&d4s rea&ity wou&d #e a))irmed uponsu#&ation o) the negation o) the wor&d. In the examp&e o) a dream, ano#"ectin the dream may #e negated &ater in the same dream. And the negation

itse&)is negated upon waking up. +his does not resu&t in the dream-o#"ect#ecomingrea& in the waking state2 5o what imp&ies the rea&ity o) a thing is N?+the mere )act that its negation is su#&ata#&e, #ut the )act that suchnegation is o) a &esser order o) rea&ity than that o) the thing itse&).

A73 MadhusUdana started #y accepting the de)initiono) unrea&ity 'o) the wor&d( as pratipanna-upAdhau traikA&ikanishhedha-pratiyogitvam.h 'p&ease see advaita-siddhi =P(. Unrea&ity is thatwhich is su#"ect to a#so&ute negation 'negation )or a&& times( in thesu#stratum where it is cogni*ed. Now the opponent tries to show thatthe unrea&ity o) the wor&d de)ined #y the advaitin actua&&y amounts

to admitting that the wor&d is a chimera 'a vastu-shUnya( or apure&y )ictitious thing that is on&y imagined, #ut without a reaasis. Is the wor&d according to advaita a vastu-shUnya, a mere nothingor is it something with a rea& #asis 8et us )ind out.

C?ther artic&es in this series may #e retrieved #y searching )orsiddhi in the su#"ect &ine.D


nanu evamatyanta-asattvApAta$ pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedha-pratiyogitvaM hyanyatra-asattvena saMpratipannasya gha+Ade$ sarvatratraikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM paryavasitam.h 6 anyathA teshhAM anyatrasattvApAtAt.h, nahi teshhAmanyatra sattA saM#havatIti tvadukteshcha 6tathAcha kathamasadvai&axaNyam.h, nahi shashashRiNgAderito .anyad-asattvam.h!

+rans&ation3

'?#"ection(3 /eing the counter-positive 'pratiyogin( o) the a#so&utenegation ')or a&& three periods o) time( in the very su#stratum whereit 'the thing that is unrea&, mithyA( is cogni*ed has thus #een de)inedas #eing unrea& 'mithyA( '#y you( and it is a#so&ute&y unrea& 'comp&ete&ynonexistent(.


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said that they do not exist in other su#strata. According&y, how is itthat they 'things o) the wor&d( are di))erent )rom nonexistence 'asat(+his 'the wor&d( is certain&y not di))erent )rom pure&y nonexistent thingssuch as a hare4s horn, 'according to your view(.

+he gist o) the argument here is that i) the unrea&ity o) a thing

consists in its #eing negated a#so&ute&y ')or a&& periods o) time( inthe very su#stratum where it was cogni*ed, then it must #e admittedthat such a thing is negated a#so&ute&y everywhere. ?therwise, itwou&d mean the thing appears somewhere other than the su#stratumwhere it was cogni*ed. /ut this is denied #y the advaitin. +here)ore,the unrea& thing stands negated everywhere and )or a&& times. 5o itis no di))erent than a chimera which is a&so a#so&ute&y a#sent everywhere.


nacha nirupAkhyatvameva tadasattvam.h6 nirupAkhyatvapadenaivakhyAyamAnatvAt.h ! nApyapratIyamAnatvamasattvam.h6 asato .apratI-tau asadvai&axaNyaGBAnasya-asatpratItinirAsasya-asatpadaprayogasya

chAyogAt.h ! nacha-aparoxatayA apratIyamAnatvaM tat.h6 nitya-atIndriyeshhvativyApte$

+rans&ation3

'?#"ection continued3( Nonexistence 'asat( cannot #e unde)ina#&e'nirupAkhya(. /ecause, 'the moment you say it is nirupAkhya(, it #ecomesde)ined #y the 'very( word nirupAkhya2 Nor can you say asat is whatcannot #e cogni*ed. I) asat were not cogni*ed then there wou&d #e nocognition o) anything that is di))erent )rom asat. And therewou&d #e no su#&ation o) cognition o) a non-existent thing.And it wou&d not #e possi#&e to use the word asat.


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7atan"a&i &ists )ive kinds o) chitta-vRitti4s or modi)ications o) themind - =( pramANa, vRitti arising )rom means to rightknow&edge, %( viparyaya, vRitti arising )rom misconception or i&&usion,( vika&pa, vRitti arising )rom pure&y imaginary things, 1( nidrA,vRitti during s&eep, and Q( smRiti, vRitti arising )rom memory.

+he three )actors to #e considered in any cognition arising )romwords are =( sha#da, the word, %( artha, the denotation o) the word,and ( GBAna 'or vRitti(, cognition that resu&ts )rom the word.

;hat happens in the case o) a vika&pa such as that associated with apure&y )ictitious thing expressed #y words such as shashashRinga orhare4s horn is that we hear the word a&right and there is somecognition produced in the mind, #ut there is no corresponding denotation.;e cannot point out a thing in the wor&d that represents the wordhare4s horn.

?n the other hand when we hear the word gau$ or cow, apart )rom thesha#da that we hear and the cognition o) the word or the vRitti in the

mind, there is a&so a denotation o) the word, the o#"ect which is indeeda cow.

+o #e more precise, every word or sha#da may have associated with ita HrepresentationH in the mind o) the &istener.


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0i++ha&esha is answering another possi#&e o#"ection. +he opponent mayargueas )o&&ows. In the i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre, the nacre is no dou#tthe #asis o) the i&&usory si&ver. /ut the #asis nacre itse&) is unrea&according to the advaitin. 5o how can the i&&usory si&ver #e any di))erent)rom an entire&y )ictitious thing such as a hare4s horns, something that

is imagined without a rea& #asis. In rep&y, 0i++ha&esha says that evenin the si&ver-in-nacre i&&usion, the #asis nacre is not a#so&ute&y )a&se#ecause the nacre is itse&) an i&&usion on the a#so&ute&y rea& sat'/rahman(. +here)ore, a vika&pa is di))erent )rom a #hrama.advaita-siddhi text3

'MadhusUdana3(sarvatra traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM yadyapi tuchchha-anirvAchyayo$ sAdhAraNam.h tathApi kvachidapyupAdhau sattvenapratItyanarhatvaM atyantAsattvam.h tachcha shuktirUpye prapaENchecha #AdhAtpUrvaM nAstyeveti na tuchchhatvApatti$ ! na cha #AdhAt.hpUrvaM shuktirUpyaM prapaENcho vA sattvena na pratIyate !etadeva sadarthakenopAdhipadena sUchitam.h !

shUnyavAdi#hi$ sadadhi5h+hAna#hrama-anaNgIkAreNa kvachidapy-upAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvarUpa-asadvai&axaNyasyashuktirUpye prapaENche cha-anaNgIkArAt.h !

sarvatra - everywhere, traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM - #eing the counter-positive 'pratiyogin( o) an a#sence )ora&& periods o) time, yadyapi- even though, tuchchha-

anirvAchyayo$ - o) the trivia& 'a#so&ute&y non-existent, or )ictitious( and the unde)ina#&e 'anirvachanIya(, sAdhAraNam.h- common, tathApi - #ut sti&&, kvachidapyupAdhau - in anysu#stratum, sattvena - as existing ' as identi)ied with:xistence(, pratItyanarhatvaM - incapa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed,

atyantAsattvam.h - a#so&ute non-existence, tachcha shuktirUpye-

and that in the si&ver-in-nacre, prapaENche cha - and in the wor&d, #AdhAtpUrvaM - #e)ore su#&ation, nAstyeveti - isnot at a&&, and thus, na tuchchhatvApatti$ - 'they( cannot #e

a#so&ute non-existence, na cha #AdhAt.h pUrvaM - nor #e)ore su#&ation, shuktirUpyaM prapaENcho vA - the si&ver-in-nacre or the wor&d, sattvena na pratIyate - is not cogni*ed as existing, etadeva - it is exact&y this, sadarthakenopAdhipadena - #y the word upAdhi which has Rea&ity 'sat( )or its denotation, sUchitam.h - 'is( indicated,shUnyavAdi#hi$ - #y the shUnyavAdins, sadadhi5h+hAna#hrama-

i&&usion with Rea&ity 'sat( as the #asis, anaNgIkAreNa - #ynot agreeing, kvachidapyupAdhau - in some su#stratum,sattvena - as existing 'as identi)ied with :xistence(,pratItyanarhatvarUpa - o) the nature o) #eing incapa#&e o) #eing

cogni*ed, asadvai&axaNyasya - o) 'what is( di))erent )romnon-existence, shuktirUpye prapaENche cha - in the si&ver-in-nacre

and the wor&d, anaNgIkArAt.h - due to not agreeing

+rans&ation3

A&though #eing the counter-positive o) a#so&ute negation 'negation )or a&& times( is common #etween the a#so&ute&y nonexistent and the unde)ina#&e 'anirvachanIya(, sti&&, what is a#so&utenonexistence is HHincapa#i&ityHHo)HH#eingHHcogni*edHHasHH

existingHHinHHanyHHsu#stratum. And that 'incapa#i&ity( is N?+ either in the si&ver-in-nacre 'the i&&usory si&ver( or in the wor&d HH#e)oreHHsu#&ation. +hus, they 'the i&&usory si&ver orthe wor&d( cannot #e a#so&ute&y nonexistent 'as, )or examp&e, a

hare4s horn(.


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or the wor&d is not cogni*ed as existing 'as identi)ied with:xistence(. +his is precise&y what is indicated #y the wordupAdhi that has Rea&ity 'sat( )or its denotation 'meaning(.

+he shUnyavAdins '/uddhists( do not agree that the #asis o) 'any(i&&usion is the Rea&ity 'sat(. 5o they do not agree that thesi&ver-in-nacre and the wor&d are capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed as

existing in some su#stratum, which is what makes them 'i&&usoryentities such as the si&ver-in-nacre and the wor&d( di))erent )romthe a#so&ute&y non-existent.

Notes3------

/rahmAnanda c&ari)ies the advaita position vis-a-vis the /auddha4sin his gaua#rahmAnandI '&aghuchandrikA( commentary on theadvaita-siddhi.

nanu shUnyavAdino mAdhyamikasya mate sarvaM mithyeti svIkAre .api

gha+a$ sannityAdidhI$ svIkriyate sarvAnu#havasiddhAyAstasyAapa&Apa-asaM#havAt.h6

'?#"ection3( :ven in the mAdhyamika or shUnyavAda system 'o) the/auddhas( it is accepted that everything is mithyA or unrea&,#ut cognitions such as the pot is, etc. are accepted #ecausethey are esta#&ished #y universa& experience and, as such,cannot #e denied. '5o how is the advaita position di))erent)rom the mAdhyamika(

Rep&y3

tatra cha-a#AdhyarUpasattAdAtmyaM na #hAti, kiMtv-arthakriyAkAritva-

miti tai$ svIkriyate

$owever, in their 'mAdhyamika( system, the 'unrea& thing( does notappear as identi)ied with Rea&ity 'sat(. Rather, what is acceptedis that 'existence o) the wor&d is the same as( the capacityto produce e))ects or causa& e))iciency.

In the /uddhist system, existence is de)ined as arthakriyAkAritvaor arthakriyAshakti, the capacity to produce e))ects. A pot existssimp&y #ecause it produces some e))ects, such as cognition, in usand its surroundings. $owever, in this system, this arthakriyAshaktiis universa&&y concomitant with momentariness which means thateverything that exists is on&y momentary.


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#asis 'adhishh+hAna( which is sat. +his is what /rahmAnanda ispointing out in his &aghuchandrikA. +hat is why he interpretssattvena in MadhusUdana4s rep&y as a#AdhyarUpasattAdAtmyena,as #eing identi)ied with Rea&ity 'sat( that is unsu#&ata#&e.$e says )urther3

san.h gha+a ityAdipratyayopapatterukta-a#AdhyatvaM mAdhyamikena na svIkriyate

+he said unsu#&ata#i&ity that is esta#&ished in cognitions such asthe pot is is not accepted #y mAdhyamika.

nacha #AdhAtpUrvama#AdhyatvaM prapaENche .astyeva tanmate .api- iti vAchyam.h

Nor can 'you( say that even in that system 'mAdhyamika( theunsu#&ata#i&ity o) the wor&d I5 there #e)ore its su#&ation.

';hy(

trikA&a-a#Adhyatvasya-eva-asmA#hirniveshAt.h !

/ecause we have inc&uded the term trikA&a-a#Adhyatva ,non-su#&ata#i&ity )or a&& times.

;hat /rahmAnanda means here is that the wor&d is itse&)unsu#&ata#&e unti& o) course there is the #AdhakaGBAna,GBAna that su#&ates the wor&d. And unti& that happens thewor&d appears identi)ied with the eterna&&y unsu#&ata#&e/rahman. No such view is expressed anywhere in themAdhyamika system 'tanmate tu na kutra .api iti(.

/rahmAnanda conc&udes3

a#Adhyavisheshhyaka-prapaENcha#hramasya svIkAre prapaENcheapy-a#AdhyatAdAtmya#hramo .avashyaM svIkArya$, paraspara -

adhyAsAnurodhAt.h, anyathA tu tatra mAnA#hAva iti #hAva$ !

Upon accepting that the wor&d is an i&&usion on theunsu#&ata#&e @ua&i)icand '/rahman(, one must necessari&y

accept a&so that there is the i&&usion o) identi)ying thewor&d with the unsu#&ata#&e, #ecause o) the re@uirement due

to the mutua& superimposition '#etween the wor&d and /rahman(. :&se, there wou&d #e no evidence 'to accept that the wor&d is an i&&usion on the unsu#&ata#&e /rahman(. +his is the purport'o) what MadhusUdana says(.

A&though the advaitin says the wor&d is an i&&usion on /rahman, he is care)u& to point out that the i&&usion invo&ves the'erroneous( identi)ication o) the wor&d with the unsu#&ata#&e/rahman. Unti& and un&ess there is a #Adhaka-"nAna, "nAna thatsu#&ates the wor&d, the i&&usion o) the wor&d wi&& persist,HHindependentHH o) time. +he su#&ation o) the wor&d dependsHHso&e&yHH on the #Adhaka-"nAna. In contrast, there is nosuch re@uirement in the /auddha system. ;hatever exists doesso on&y momentari&y. +he su#&ation o) whatever appears to existis not in any way dependent on a #Adhaka-"nAna. +his isshUnyavAda.

As the Atmatattvaviveka says3


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na grAhya#hedamavadhUya dhiyo .asti vRittistad#Adhane#a&ini vedanaye "ayashrI$ !

nochedanityamidamIdRishameva vishvaM tathyaM tathAgatamatasya tu ko .avakAsha$ !!

+he cognition o) an o#"ect does not exist i) its di))erence)rom the o#"ect is disregarded - the power)u& 0edAnta hasscored a victory #y de)eating this view. +his wor&d o) i&&usion

as we know it is 'in essence( rea&. 5o where is the scope )or the theory o) the /auddha in this '0edAnta(

In )act, the characteristic o) 'the wor&d4s( #eing su#&ated #y "nAna'"nAna-nivartyatva( is taken to #e one o) the de)initions o)mithyAtva itse&), as we sha&& see &ater. +his underscores theparamount importance o) "nAna as the destroyer o) a&& dua&ity. ;ecannot simp&y wish the dua&ity to go away without resorting to"nAna. And what is this "nAna It invo&ves shravaNa, manana, andnididhyAsana #y the aspirant who has the )our-)o&d @ua&i)ications,

sAdhana-chatu5h+aya. Eust saying that wor&d o) dua&ity does not existor putting )orth a nice theory wi&& not #e o) much use.

In this connection, there is a &esson in the 7anchadashI. 5omeonewho has mere ver#a& )ami&iarity with advaita asks3 ;hy am I sti&&without rea&i*ation 0idyAraNya gives the examp&e o) a man whoheard that an award was #eing given to anyone who knew the )our0edas. +his man c&aimed that he knew there were )our 0edas 'andpro#a#&y their names( and so he was entit&ed to the award2;ith respect to /rahmanL5e&), 0idyAraNya asks o you "ust saythe word /rahman or do you rea&i*e its meaning 'sha#dAnevapa+hasyAho te5hAmarthaM cha pashyasi(.

advaita-siddhi - = - +he third de)inition o) mithyAtva


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know&edge or cognition.

+his is an extreme&y pithy de)inition which must on&y #eunderstood #y care)u& ana&ysis, not "ust #rushed o)) as somethingo#vious and trivia&. +he de)inition comes )rom the 0ivaraNAchArya,7rakAshAtman.

onsider the 5anskrit sentence nI&o gha+a$ 'the pot is #&ue.($ere the vishe5hya is pot, the vishe5haNa is nI&a and there&ation #etween them is that o) inherence o) #&ue co&or in the


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pot. 5uch a re&ation is ca&&ed samavAya in n

Advaita Siddhi

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