Administrative Law - Pierce - 2002_4

8/20/2019 Administrative Law - Pierce - 2002_4

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Admin. Pierce 2002

I. Generala. Administrative Procedure Act

i. Two types of provisions: Procedure making / structure

ii. our types of decisions making procedure!. ormal Ad"udication #$ %%&'%%()a. *ame elements as "udicial trial +. ,nly availa+le if congress said -on te record after opportunity for agency

earing2. Informal Ad"udication #$ %%%)

a. argest type #tons eac year)#personnel decisions1) +. *pecific coices among individuals not a+le to apply $ %%&'%(c. ots of discretion

3. ormal 4ulemaking #$$ %%35 %%6'%()&. Informal 4ulemaking # $ %%3)

a. To make legislative rules wit same force and effect as statutesiii. To determine wic procedure to use:!. Agency7s rules #sometimes not clear or inconsistent w/ statute)2. Agency *tatutes #in con"unction w/ APA)3. 4ely on due process clause to determine wat to use #statutes usually don7t ave

8magic words7 like -on te record after opportunity1)a. 9at person is entitled to +/c of: istory and tradition5 natural rigts5

+alancing interests 1i. ost common is +alancing of interests

iv. ;udicial review # $$ (0!'06)

+. enver p 2?0 Judicial Requirements

!. owns land in city and > decided it was wort more so demanded iger propertyta@

2. wants a earing to determine value of land > refuses3. ourt:

a. entitled to a earing due process5 can7t -take property from +. > violated due process +y -taking land w/o a earingc. ,nly applied to one individual -individualiBed factsd. Cntitled to te ad"udicatory process

ii. Di'etallic Investment o. v. *tate Doard Political / Legislative Requirements!. *tate raising property ta@ on all land in city5 D wants earing and denied2. ourt:

a. Eot entitled to a earing +/c raised for all5 decision applied to a class +. >ealing wit egislative facts more like rulemaking ten ad"udicationc. A general raise and not specific to D5 or any one person ' -GeneraliBed factsd. Cntitled to te political process


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II. Administrative Ad"udication

a. Ad"udicatory >ue Processi. Timing and Clements of a >ue Process Fearing

!. Gold+erg v. elly p 2?! Drennan !?(0a. A> welfare program kids dependent on welfare +/c parents can7t support

tem +. allenge to procedure used to determine if someone is no longer eligi+le

i. If man seen in ouse all te time5 can7t get +enefitsc. >enied witout a earingH if want a earing5 could take up to a year

i. *o long tat person destitute +y time can get earingd. ourt:

i. *tatutory Cntitlements #like welfare +enefits) are -property!. Pre'Gold+erg were privileges5 not rigts

ii. Timing of te earing and Temporary >eprivations #interval +etweenstopped +enefits and earing) violated due process

!. >ue process demands earing +efore depriving te rigts#property)

iii. Eature of 4e=uired Fearing!. Eeed full oral evidentiary earing +efore deprivation of

+enefits #not full "udicial trial)a. onfrontation and cross e@amination

2. Eum+er of earing skyrockets1e. ,nly time court eld tat due process re=uired a full oral evidentiary earingf. A> repealed in !??65 and now TAE5 wic says is not an entitlement #not

property)

2. attew v. Cldridge !?(6a. *ocial *ecurity disa+ility +enefits similar to A> wen discontinuing

i. Preliminary determination5 only earing if re=uest and year later1 +. Test difficult to apply Dalancing interests

i. Importance of state7s interestii. 4isk of error attri+uta+le to te procedures made availa+le and

pro+a+le valueiii. ost of added procedures

!. Added would +e te preliminary oral evidentiary earing#+ased on Gold+erg)

c. >istinguised from Gold+ergi. Generally5 folks on disa+ility E,T as needyH so potential deprivation

not nearly as ig #potential alternative income +/c not +ased onfinancial need)

ii. 9ritten only procedure involves less risk for error wit disa+ility +/cmore likely to +e literate

!. an use doctor7s aid wit te evidence


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iii. Trut and eracity of witnesses not as +ig a pro+lem as w/ A>#ere5 doctor reports5 medical facts5 etc)

!. Typically5 more o+"ectivity and less credi+ility pro+lemd. *i@ years after Gold+erg and so many earings5 cost went up so ig money

winds up coming from te people on welfare #lower +enefits1) many

"ustices canged mindse. *ocial *ecurity still an entitlement statutes5 so -property and due process stillapplies #unlike new TAE welfare1)

f. attews not a good test too many su+"ective de+ates +etter ten allalternatives toug

3. Goss v. opeB !?(%a. *tudent suspended +y scool principleH entitled to a earing5 +ut:

i. Fearing can +e contemporaneous and eld +y te same people makingte decision to suspend

+. >ue Process i. Anyting from face to face sit down #Goss)

ii. ull oral evidentiary earing #Gold+erg)Hiii. C@tensive paper earing and potential oral later #attews)

&. Drock v. 4oadway C@press !?J(a. 9orker fired from "o+5 claims +/c wistle +lower employer re=uests full

evidentiary earing +efore >, makes tem reinstatei. ourt split four ways:

!. Cntitled to earing2. 9ritten evidence allowed3. ine so long as provide employer w/ evidence against tem&. ear of revealing witnesses against employer +/c tey7d +e

fired

ii. Interests protected +y >ue Process Fearing 4igts!. Applied w/ life5 li+erty or property2. -Cntitlement rigts and Pu+lic Cmployment

a. Property Interest from tese sourcesi. *tatute

!. 9en written in form of entitlement #Gold+erg)ii. ontract #controversial only w/ employment contracts / personal

services)!. *inderman #gov7t action deprives of li+ertyH can +e vindicated

in form of post'deprivation earing)iii. ommon aw #least controversial)

+. Tenure asesi. Doard of 4egents v. 4ot 5 Perry v. *inderman !?(2

!. Professors not reired


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2. ourt draws distinction +etween mere unilateral e@pectation tocontinue work #4ot) AE> a "ustifia+le e@pectation to continue#*inderman)

3. Dased li+erally on contract law w/ *inderman employeeand+ook / policies #4ot on year to year contract)

c. -Ditter wit te *weet 4en=uisti. egislative +ody may write a statute tat confers an entitlement onto a

class of people K gives tem a property rigtii. Due Process cannot compel agency to use furter procedures

iii. Disop finally was accepted +y 6 "ustices5 +ackdoor overrule ofGold+erg

iv. oudermill !?J% !. Teacer fired and demands some sort of earing

2. Ditter wit te *weet >eadL3. Procedure doesn7t get decided +y te legislature5 +ut +y tecourts

&. avis !?(6!. ist of -known soplifters sent to stores2. Te stigmatization is Eot te li+erty interest5 +ut need:

a. >eprivation of a Tangi+le Interest #like te rigt to +uyalcool) coupled wit te *tigmatiBation K ten a-protected li+erty interest violated

3. ourt unclear a+out wat kinds of interests5 and re'workedonstantineau


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c. i+erty can include any oter constitutionally protected interest as welli. 4ot can7t +e punised for e@ercising a li+erty interest #free speec)

!. If fired for no reason or in a way tat doesn7t urt reputation5no protected interest

+. ederal *tatutory Fearing 4igtsi. inding a Fearing 4igt!. lorida Cast oast !?(3

a. I raises rates on all railroads +ased on resolution of contested legislativefacts wat does -earing mean #congress gave I power w/ earing andconsidering certain facts)

i. I earing occurred +y giving notice and allowing 44 to su+mitinformation5 etc. after tat I raised rates

ii. 44 claims no earing and due process violated +. ourt:

i. -Fearing is a mallea+le term and can refer to any num+er ofopportunities to present your views: only need:

!. Eotice of intention2. *ome opportunity to su+mit views3. onclusions on wy / reason +y gov7t

ii. ourt contrasts -earing wit language in APA $$ %%3'%&!. ,nly triggers $$ %%6'%( I says -on te record after

opportunity for an agency earing K ten full evidentiaryearing

a. >efined agic 9ords necessary for full earingc. >issent relies on ondoner and Di'etallic rulemaking #Di) and

ad"udication #ondoner) distinctioni. Eeed a earing in conte@t of agency action tat urts an individualH

and earing needs full evidentiary earingii. a"ority tis is not individualiBed facts5 +ut rater legislative and

affects a class #Di)2. alifano v. Mamasaki !?(?

a. *ocial *ecurity Act if recipient is overpaid5 **A can recoup +enefits +yreducing future +enefits #$ 20&) efeat te purposes of $ 20& +. ourt:

i. an avoid constitutional issues I can resolve issue on *tatutory Dasis

#avoidance)ii. *tatutory Interpretation:

!. **A not re=uire pre'recoupment earing to determine ifrecipient overpaid D a earing to determine ifrecipient was witout fault and to determine e=uity

a. ,+"ective and *u+"ective determinationsiii. *tatute was silent on procedure to +e used


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iv. Pierce low =uality legal reasoning looks at statute +ut tere is nodistinction in language of $ 20& #a) and $ 20& #+) as far as procedures

!. *tatutes say noting a+out procedures2. ourt sould7ve used due process and used attews

+alancing test

a. In tat case5 wen recipient could lose !00N of +enefits5 only a written e@cange necessaryH +ut ere5w/ only a O of +enefits lost5 full earing necessary Kflawed and +ad legal reasoning

+. ,nly factor court looked at was risk of error 1

ii. ,n'te'4ecord Ad"udicatory Process!. *eacoast v. ostle !st ir. !?(J Eo longer good law

a. *tatute a+out weter to give a permit must +e -after opportunity for pu+licearing

i. >oes tis mean need a full oral evidentiary earing +. Folding !

i. !st ir. K agency must ave full earing!. *.rt in Cast oast said statute must say -on te record to

trigger full oral earing procedures in $$ %%6 %( unless statutemakes it clear in anoter way +ut it doesn7t ere1

a. Dut not follow ere5 said still need earing2. !st ir. *ays tis is =uasi'"udicial +/c it affects an individual5

wile la Cast oast addressed a mem+er of a class#ondoner / Di distinction) #ad"udicatory v. rulemaking)

a. Is it really ad"udicatoryi. Fard to classify +/c not a dispute +etween

individuals5 +ut pu+lic interest K citiBen groupsv. individual facts not specific to tese parties

ii. acts at issues similar to attews 5 +/c +asedon scientific evidence5 o+servations5 opinions1

c. Folding 2i. Agency cannot get off te record advice from agency employees wo

rely on e@tra'record resources!. Pierce says sould +e a+le to use tis advice5 +/c agencies are

supposed to +e a+le to depend on teir e@perts in makingdecisions

a. Tis is te power given to agencies +y ongress2. emical 9aste anagement v. CPA !?J?

a. ontrary to *eacoast courts follow tis instead +. *imilar language to *eacoast5 +ut decide not need earing erec. ove away from full oral evidentiary earing and ;isputes written "ust as good if not +etter ten oralevidentiary earings

ii. ,ral evidentiary earings wasteful +/c administrative resources time5cost5 +ogged down..


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iii. evron must upold agency7s interpretation of statute5 ifam+iguous5 so long as interpretation reasona+le

d. ecisis and onsistencyi. Applies to agencies a fair amount5 +ut muc less ten it does to courts

!. ourts , w/ agencies overriding 1so long as


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2. Agencies can overrule precedent


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g. *ome ave split enforcement model #,*FA5 ,*F4I)i. ongress cooses to use for occupational ealt and safety and mind

ii. Two separate agencies to carry out functions!. ,ne for rulemaking2. ,ne for enforcement

iii. ess efficient and fewer prosecutions

iv. anaging Ad"udicatory Personnel

!. A; regionally located1a. Pro+lems

i. an take up to four years for earingii. ack of consistency A;s vary diverse on decisions **A5 if

someone7s pain is *, +ad1iii. ,ver years A;s say 8yes7 to greater portion of cases5 so portion of

population on **A going up2. 9ays of ontrolling A;s

a. >irect 4eviewi. All opinions su+"ect to direct review at ne@t level

ii. Allowed in administrative law5 +ut w/ **A too many cases +. 4ules

i. ery difficult to apply rules to tese casesc. Guidelines

i. C@amples: long delays5 get rid of less productive "udgesii. *et up Presumptive Productivity Goal not fire if not met5 +ut ave

meetings1etc.3. Eas v. alifano !?J0

a. ong delays w/ A;s in **A some not productive5 +ut could only +e

removed +y oter A;s for cause +. **A created presumptive productivity goal of 2&0 cases/yr.5 only &0'60N

8yes7c. A; claimed interfered w/ decisional independence and due process

i. >ist. ourt "udges not say agency can make A; work arder ii. ir. ourt sees **A interests1 , w/ statutory command5 no

violation of due process5 and A; still independent&. Feckler v. amp+ell !?J3

a. **A new rule say -if can perform duties of any "o+ anywere in economyand ad tons of vocational e@perts1 +ut not very consistent1 9/ cangingeconomy and regions

i. ould contest te vocational e@perts findings now5 can **Asu+stitute te grid rule instead of testimony of e@pert

ii. ore onsistent5 +ut ow accurateiii. Takes away A of A;7s discretion5 if "ust ave to follow a grid

+. ourt recogniBes need for rules to enance consistency and accuracy1upolds grid rule

%. Dowen v. Muckert !?J(


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a. **A rule w/ vocational e@perts5 and %'step process to determine if personcould ave any "o+ out tere1

+. After step 25 if no 8severe impairment7 #+ased on non'e@clusive list) A; notgo any furter

i. >oesn7t go on to consider age5 education1

c. ,verall rate of finding folks disa+led went down !%Nd. ourt split5 +ut finds rule valide. oncur wanted to temper rule5 so A; as discretion to go +eyond step 2 if

want

v. Avoiding Ad"udication troug rulemaking!. Airline Pilots Assoc. v. Quesada !?60

a. AA says all pilots must retire at age 60 is tis ar+itrary and discriminatoryi. Information a+out ealt1

+. ourt:i. ould andle troug earings need earing +efore enforcing it5 +ut

still flying in meantime1A; migt not make rigt decisionHii. Too su+"ective w/ earings and Fuge administrative costs #pilots likely

to get lawyers5 e@perts1)iii. 4ule valid and not discriminatory

III. Administrative 4ulemaking

a. Agency Autority to make egislative 4ulesi. 4ulemaking +y ad"udication

!. 9it issuance of a generaliBed5 +roadly applica+le rule of conduct2. ourts do it all te time engage in rulemaking in te course of ad"udication3. Agencies can and do te same ting

a. Dut agencies don7t need to use ad"udication5 like courts5 could "ust issue ruleii. APA $ %%3 tree step process to rulemaking

!. Issue pu+lic notice in ederal 4egister of potential rule2. Provide opportunity for pu+lic comment on te potential rule3. Issue rule wit statement of +asis and purpose

iii. Advantages:!. airness

a. Gives all people potentially affected cance to comment and participate in process K more clear5 detailed rule

2. Cfficiencya. A tone of money would go into a case1w/ witnesses5 e@perts1

3. Qualitya. Greater +readt of participation

&. Political Accounta+ilitya. an complain to ongress and e@ec.

iv. Eational Petroleum 4efiners v. T !?(3!. T ,rganic Act proi+its unfair trade practices now makes rule w/ la+eling of

octane level2. an T issue rules Previously only a+le to issue procedural rules


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3. ourt:a. Mes5 valid rule and T can issue it would +e too +urdensome going to eac

gas station1&. Aftermat: T power over lawyers5 used car'dealers5 funeral omes and +eer

distri+utors all powerful lo++ies and went to ongress

a. T Improvement Act allows opportunity for oral evidentiary earing andcross w/ respect to contested material issues +. 9ay too muc time and effort T never issues rules anymore #even toug

ave te power to)

+. ormal 4ulemakingi. 9irtB v. Daldor Clectric !?63

!. >ept. of a+or trying to enforce provision of 9als'Fealy Act troug ad ocad"udication K minimum wage

a. >, trying to enforce te prevailing minimum wageH +ut didn7t reveal teta+les used to +ase wat te minimum wage was

2. Gov7t only can contract w/ a firm tat pays minimum wagea. 4egional 9ars Eort pricier5 *out ten could under+id +ut E,T if te

minimum wage raised Eort la+or wants it iger5 management not13. *tatute says agency can only act -only on te record after opportunity for agency

earing tat means must do for rulemaking5 and can7t get around re=uirements +yusing ad"udication and witolding evidence

a. 4e=uirements:i. Eotice5 omments #


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i. Eational Figway and *afety re=uired factory installed ead restraintsin all cars

!. anufacturers callenged as ar+itrary and capriciousii. ourt:

!. Eot ar+itrary and capricious

a. anufacturers not credi+le5 first liked rule wen tougit elped tem1 +. Agency easily and ade=uately responded to all

comments #minimal) under $ %%3c. 9as issued for a plausi+le reason

c. Eational Tire >ealers Assoc. v. Drinegar !?(&i. EFT*A issues rule re=uiring la+els on all retreaded tires

ii. ourt:!. Tis rule I* ar+itrary and capricious2. >istinguised from Auto. Parts:

a. Te discussion +y te agency inade=uate

+. Agency o+ligations ere are more serious andlegitimatei. Eature of comments under $ %%3

c. Auto parts makers ad no credi+ility5 S does ereiii. 9at7s really at issue is te ade=uacy of te agency7s statement and

purpose greatly depends on te comments made #during comment period)

!. ust address all of temH list appendi@ w/ scientific data5economical feasi+ility5

2. ;udge not satisfied w/ te agency7s responses insufficientiv. ould +e salvaged w/ +eefier response and more studies1muc more

detailedd. otor eicles anufacturers v. *tate arm !?J3

i. Cvery car re=uired to ave automatic seat+elt or an air+ag 4eaganten rescinded te rule

ii. Tis is ar+itrary and capricious5 +/c te agency did not even consideramending te rule failed to consider a key alternativeH tereforear+itrary and capricious

!. After new data tat could cange te num+er of lives saved +yte rule

iii. Eot a satisfactory e@planation of te new data tat lowered tee@pected increase in seat+elt use needed more sufficient reasoning

ii. Procedural 4e=uirements!. C@emptions to APA re=uirements #notice and comment)

a. Good cause sown #for reason not to follow $ %%3)i. -agency for good cause finds tat notice and pu+lic procedure tereon

are impractica+le5 unnecessary or contrary to te pu+lic interestii. Generally for emergencies toug standard

iii. an put rule in effect immediately5 +ut eventually must do notice andcommentary


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+. Procedural rulesi. 4ules of agency organiBation5 procedure5 or practice

ii. ots of +orderline cases re su+stantive v. proceduralc. *u+"ect atter

i. Denefits #isn7t really e@empt +/c te relevant agencies ave5 +y rule5

re=uired temselves to use $ %%3 due to political pressure)ii. >efense #>,>)iii. Eational *ecurity #IA)

!. ilitary5 foreign affairs functionsiv. atters relating to agency management or personnel

d. Interpretive rules #canges/clarifies te scope of a pre'e@isting duty)i. As opposed to legislative rules #ard to distinguis)

!. 4ule is legislative if: agency as power to make legislativerules and intended to use it

2. Interpretive if lacked tat power or did not intend to use itii. ust interpret someting meaningful

iii. ollow A teste. Policy *tatementsi. *.rt. asn7t touced tis issue

ii. EI2. American ining ongress v. ine *afety RFealt Admin. !??3

a. *FA issued rules a+out mine operator7s reporting illnessesH later5 issuedanoter rule saying if @'ray sows certain level5 ten it7s an illness and must +e reported to *FA

i. A claims 2d rule is legislative and must follow $ %%3 re=uirementsH*FA says merely interpretive rule

+. ourt: applies & prong test:i. A rule is legislative if any of te following:

!. In a+sence of te rule tere would not +e an ade=uatelegislative +asis for enforcement action

2. Te agency pu+lised te rule in te 4 a. Eot old true5 +/c often interpretive rules are pu+lised +. Tis prong later eliminated

3. Agency specifically invoked its legislative autority&. 4ule effectively amends a prior legislative rule

ii. 4ule 2 is interpretive of rule !!. Already ave to report illnesses5 "ust more detailed

interpretations of te guidelines #agency not say it is alegislative rule)

iii. Agencies cannot issue +road legislative rules and ten a +unc adetailed narrow interpretive rules to avoid $ %%3

!. Fave to ave real content in legislative rule interpreting2. Interpretive rule must interpret someting meaningful

3. Policy *tatementsa. Eotice and comment provisions do not apply to general statements of policy +. An agency pronouncement will +e treated as a policy statement if it


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i. Is tentativeHii. It informs te pu+lic and te agency staff of te manner in wic te

agency intends to e@ercise discretionc. ourts are willing to rely on te agency7s la+eld. ommunity Eutrition Institute v. Moung !?J(

i. 4ule defined contaminant level for foodsii. >A issues a -policy statement regarding te enforcement policy!. EI claimed it was a legislative rule +/c su+stantive cange to

te original rule2. ourt agreed

iii. ould make it a policy statement +y saying -migt enforce1!. akes statement less meaningful and more vague2. Policy still te same5 +ut semantics different

a. *tupid court decision&. Eova *cotia oods !?((

a. >A issues rules a+out time and temp. of all fis followed $ %%3 +ut ten

ignored comments and issued rule applied to witefis tooi. E* says never pro+lems w/ witefis1ii. >A says relies on study never disclosed te study in te notice to

allow for E* to respond to it disclosed in issuance of rule +. ourt:

i. Agency cannot rely5 as part of its +asis for issuing a rule5 on a studytat it did not make availa+le for comment as re=uired in $ %%3

ii. Anyting agency relies on must +e included in te notice allstudies1 K C@panded Eotice >octrine

!. *ome limits don7t need every sourceH can eliminate non'contesta+le issues fundamentals5 generally known5 core

iii. Ade=uacy of te notice:!. 9as te final rule a -logical outgrowt of te notice2. >id te notice -ade=uately foresadow te final rule3. Dut if take comments seriously to point of totally canging

proposed rule5 may face carges of inade=uate noticea. an issue interim proposed rule to sow canges early

on K *upplemental notice of proposed rule'making

iii. Fearings wit informal rulemaking!. ourts starting to nudge agencies +ack toward formal rulemaking in regard to

controversial issuesa. ourts feel tese issues sould +e su+"ect to full evidentiary earing

2. ermont Mankee v. Eatural 4esources >efense ouncil !?(Ja. Euclear 4egulatory omm7n determined ow to andle disposal of nuclear

waste troug rulemaking +. ir. *aid it was so important an issue as to re=uire a full evidentiary earing

i. *. rt. 4eversed lots of discretion to agencies5 not courtsc. Potential sources of procedural rigts

i. Agency 4ulesii. *tatutes


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iii. >ue Processiv. Eo longer ommon aw too open ended

d. Agency may allow evidentiary earings on issues so important andcontroversial +ut way too ard to predict

i. Too su+"ective and would lead to earings on everyting

e. If te *tatute says must ave an oral evidentiary earing for important issues5must do it court defers to congressf. ourt can7t re=uire agencies to ave earing #additional rulemaking

re=uirements) if not proscri+ed +y APA #not ' $ %%3) or if not in statute

iv. Politics and 4ationality in 4ulemaking!. C@ Parte ommunications

a. Talking to te decision maker off te record +. APA $ %%( proi+its e@ parte communications in formal ad"udications and in

formal rulemaking #+ut not really e@ists +/c of +urdensome process)c. Informal rulemaking silent tere is a record #comments5 final rule)5 +ut e@

parte usually oral2. FD, v. !?((

a. issues rule5 after proper $ %%3 re=uirements5 to integrate ca+le Ti. FD, wants rule invalidated +/c claims e@ parte communications

!. comm7n aving dinners5 etc5 w/ ED5 AD e@ecs. +. ourt:

i. C@ parte communications proi+ited in informal rulemaking processii. ourt can rely on agency rules5 statute5 and due process

!. Eone proi+it5 tis is a generaliBed rule of conduct5 notindividualiBed #ondoner5 Di)

c. any pro+lems from case agencies can "ust start meeting w/ e@ec. D/&issuing rule5 +/& rulemaking process +egins1

i. ecision makers don7t read comments1 staffers do5 and ten

summariBe1 decision makers get most info. rom e@ parte meetings5makes sense

3. Action for ildren7s Television v. ' !?((a. FD, proi+ition of e@ parte communications only applies wen two

individuals are competing for a valua+le privilege +. >ue process tis kind of dispute sould appropriately +e decided in

ad"udicatory process5 and terefore due process applies #ondoner) c. Any e@ parte from one party to decision maker wrong1

&. *ierra lu+ v. ostle !?J!

a. CPA deciding wat level for coal emissions1 agency eads met w/ witeouse staff5 and senator5 wo tried to influence rule5 in e@ partecommunications

i. Cconomy was in orri+le sapeii. C@ecutive gov7t officials suggested one level5 and CPA followed

+. ourt:i. Eot want President telling administrators wat to do1 +ut reality


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ii. President is constitutionally responsi+le for e@ecutive +ranc decisions#agencies) K e@ parte appropriate w/ gov7t officials

iii. *till need to issue rule w/ statement of +asis and purpose #*tate arm)%. Dias

a. >uty to provide un+ias decision maker to settle disputes: determine if

impermissi+le +ias +yi. Agency 4ulesii. *tatutes

iii. >ue Process +. A; may +e dis=ualified on grounds of:

i. Pre"udgment!. ,pinion on issue of law is permissi+le

a. 9ant people wo are knowledgea+le2. Droad opinion of issue of policy is permissi+le3. E,T allowed opinion on ad"udicative fact

ii. Personal #related1)

iii. Pecuniary #affect financial situation state and local levels most likely)c. Assoc. of Eat7l Advertisers v. T !?(?i. T deciding weter or not to issue a rule tat restricts nature of

advertising for kidsii. air of T making open statements a+out ow ads are -evil etc.

!. air is one of % decision makers a+out ruleiii. ourt: applies test to sow if pre"udgment was made

!. allenger must sow +y lear and onvincing evidence tatagency mem+er #decision maker) as an


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+. Advantages prospective5 parties are on notice and can7t +e surprisedii. oice +etween rulemaking and Ad"udication

!. *C v. enery !?&(a. C@plains wy agencies ave to ave discretion as to weter to use

rulemaking $ %%3 process ,4 to announce a general rule troug ad"udication

+. *C used ad"udication to announce +road rule a+out reorganiBation and stocksi. enery tried to say needed to use $ %%3c. ourt:

i. Agencies ave discretion to use $ %%3 or ad"udicationii. imited foresigt5 lack of e@perience5 specialiBed issues1

!. ase +y case +asis2. Interest of agency to reac satisfactory conclusion on case

+efore it greater ten danger of retroactive ad"udicatory ruleiii. >ifficult court don7t know if agency used ad"udication to avoid

political accounta+ility ma"ority of "ustices not ready to force agencyto use $ %%3 toug

!. ;udicial precedent can create rules1ad"udication1iv. *ince tis case5 court as +een all over te map5 +ut enery is still telaw

2. 9yman'Gordon !?6?a. Previous case5 C@celsior were E4D eld tere was unfair la+or practice

+/c C@ didn7t provide list of union mem+ers to union +/& election1i. E4D said unfair5 +ut not enforce on C@ +/c C@ ad no way of

knowing1never was a +road ruleii. In tat case5 E4D issued te rule prospectively

+. Fere5 9'G didn7t give list and union claims unfair la+or5 as under C@i. E4D directs 9'G to comply5 citing rule from C@

ii. >id E4D ave power to create a general rule of conduct trougad"udication in C@

c. ourt ' pluralityi. Eot like it5 +ut it is lawful

!. ;udicial precedent creates rules5 and E4D could issue teorder for te rule to +e complied w/ #so not penaliBed rigtaway)

ii. >issent ongress clearly wants $ %%3 to +e used5 and can7t make prospective rules troug ad"udication

iii. oncur' autoriBed to use $ %%35 +ut also ad discretion to usead"udicative process

3. Dell Aerospace !?(& unanimously affirms 9yman'GordonH despite orton v.4uiB

&. orton v. 4uiB !?(&a.


18/46

2. 4uiB says never would ave risked tat for family if knewc. ourt:

i. 9rong 4uiB winsH did not violate te rule +/c tere was no notice ofeligi+ility1 needed to go troug $ %%3

ii. >ifficult +/c dealing w/ an individual5 not a ma"or corporation

e@pected to +e aware of oldings5 etc.iii.


19/46

f. itiBens to Preserve want "udicial review of te decisioni. *tatute is silent a+out reviewa+ility

ii. ourt:!. Presumption of reviewa+ility can only +e re+utted +y lear

and onvincing evidence tat ongress intended to preclude

review ' $ (0!2. Eot su+"ect to "udicial review if agency action is committed toagency discretion +y law ' $ (0!

a. Eot ere +. Earrow and rare

3. APA standard applies only wen tere is -no law to applya. Fere5 tere is law to apply +. an7t +uild road troug park if feasi+le and prudent

alternative&. *o court AE review te decision

iii. 9at does court rely on wen reviewing if tere7s not a record on

wic agency made its decision >,T affidavits not ave full info.in tem!. Eo clear statutory re=uirement5 or APA5 tat agency gives

reason for decision2. >ecision still reviewa+le

a. ourt can re=uire decision maker to testify a+out wymade decision #su+"ect to cross)

iv. *tandard of review is -searcing and careful and -toroug pro+ing5in dept -narrow deference to agency

2. ater5 after citiBensa. APA $ %%% applies to informal ad"udication +. Presumption of reviewa+ility still around5 +ut narrower and weaker

i. Eot always need clear and convincing evidence tat not to +e reviewedii. ;ust look to see / infer wat congress wanted

c. ourt more willing to conclude tat ongress didn7t intend court to reviewHand tat congress conferred discretion to te agency #no longer narrow andrare)

d. ess willing to find "udicial review standard in statutory languagee. Eo longer a+le to call decision maker to testify

i. ;ust re=uest a statement of reasons from te agency as to wy madedecision

f. -Eo law to apply standard still stands more fle@i+leg. *tandard of review K -searcing and careful -toroug5 pro+ing5 in dept

and -narrow still good law

ii. indings of act and te *u+stantial Cvidence Test!. $ (06 court sall -decide =uestions of law and -upold findings of fact if

supported +y su+stantial evidencea. ourt will not set aside agency finding if supported +y su+stantial evidence

2. ,ter in general


20/46

a. learly erroneous appellate "udge may reverse if it is firmly convinced tatte agency7s finding of fact were wrong

+. -*cintilla rule agency determinations upeld if supported +y -any +asis offact limited review

c. Eot 4eviewa+le agency findings of fact are +inding on reviewing court

only legal conclusions are reviewed3. on Cd. v.E4D !?3Ja. *ets fort *u+stantial Cvidence Test

i. *u+stantial Cvidence K -suc relevant evidence as te reasona+le mindmigt accept as ade=uate to support a conclusion

ii. ery deferential to agency decisions even if not agree5 must affirm ifreasona+le

+. Post on Cdi. Pro+lems were tere was also evidence detracting from agency7s

findingsii. Pro+lems were A; makes findings of fact contrary to agency7s

findings&. efer to agency if it passes te a+ove test


21/46

iii. 4eview of *cience'Dased >ecisions!. Industrial ept. v. American Petroleum Institute !?J0

a. DenBene case dispute to permissi+le levels of to@ini. ,*FA passed standard low5 and API contests +/c so costly

+. ourt:

i. ,*FA must find tat te pree@isting level presents a -significantealt risk so tat a new5 lower standard is -reasona+ly necessary orappropriate to provide safe or ealtful employment and places ofemployment

!. Tis language not in statutea. Dut any oter reading of te statute would lead to over'

delegation of legislative power 2. Plurality doesn7t want to old statute unconstitutional

a. 9ants to force agency to +e more rational and selectivein its decision making

3. *cientific findings not for a court to determine

a. Cven ,*FA couldn7t make an entirely accurate findingi. 5 eads of agencies are politically accounta+le1so not

rigtd. Aftermat

i. ,*FA issued same rule ( years later w/ stronger foundation!. ourt "ust made more difficult and time consuming

ii. Fow can courts decide tese issues >ifferent approaces:!. Immersion in su+stantive issues K court gets up to speed to

understand tem all #too time consuming)2. Add procedures to re=uire agency to ventilate issue K make

agency fully understand it all #+ut5 if =uestion unanswera+le5more not elp and is costly)

3. >efer to superior e@pertisea. Dut congress re=uires courts to review tese decisions

&. *cience court proposed every few years5 +ut will neverappen

iv. Interpretations of aw

!. evron v. Eatural 4esources >efense ouncil !?J&

a. Important K courts decide to give great deference to agencies in interpretingteir own statutesH wereas pre'evron te courts were te ultimate forstatutory interpretation now5 if a statute is am+iguous5 so long as agency is


22/46

reasona+le #not ar+itrary and capricious) ten court7s defer to teirinterpretation

i. Gave agencies a uge amount of power +/c tey7re politicallyaccounta+le

+. CPA decides to cange its definition of -source to lessen process for approval

i. -Du++le concept all encased in one +u++le!. -*ource of pollution canged to mean entire factory5 insteadof eac piece of macinery

2. ,nly go troug process if +uilding a new plantc. >eals w/ statutory interpretation 2 step process

i. If congress as resolved te issue made clear ow to interpret5 tentat7s te end of te in=uiry K conclusion on law

!. If tere is plain meaning to te statute5 ten agency must followtat plain meaning #as set +y ongress)

2. If ongress asn7t addressed it5 tan an issue of policy wiceiter ongress can resolve or leave it to te agency

a. Dut court7s can7t su+stitute teir interpretation5 +/ctey7re not politically accounta+leii. If te *tatute is am+iguous5 te court must upold any agency

interpretation / construction so long as reasona+le!. ourt finds CPA7s +u++le concept is reasona+le2. To determine if reasona+le5 can7t +e ar+itrary and capricious

a. ourt determines under *tate arm testd. *trong >eference to agency interpretations wen no plain meaning in statute

i. An interpretive rule adopted w/o notice or comment may not +eentitled to suc strong deference

2. IE* v. ardoBa'onseca !?J(a.


23/46

. Availa+ility of ;udicial 4eview

i. 4eviewa+ility!. *tatutory Preclusion

a. ;onson v. 4o+ison !?(&i. egislative istory is clear tat ongress did E,T want "udicial

review for -alternative service for conscientious o+"ectorsii. 4 wants A +enefits after serving alternative service

iii. ourt Applies Avoidance annon!. *tatute tat precludes "udicial consideration of constitutional

issues would raise a serious constitutional =uestion

iv. ongress did not want review +/c!. Avoid +urdening courts and agency2. eep courts from interfering w/ efficiency of agency decision

makinga. Tese reasons ave noting to do w/ constitutional

claimsv. Te statute says non'reviewa+ility of te agency decision5 not non'

reviewa+ility of te statute itself K avoidance of greater const. =uestion!. ourt interpreted as -no review e@cept wen constitutional

=uestionsvi. Aftermat congress passed legislation tat allowed "udicial review of

veteran7s +enefits decisions5 and takes tons of time and costs now1 +. Adamo 9recking v. ecisions -ommitted to Agency >iscretion +y lawa. 9e+ster v. >oe !?JJ

i. IA decisions to terminate employees are -committed to agencydiscretion +y law APA $ (0!

!. ourt must determine wat tat meansii. ourt: Agency discretion +y law is witin $ (0! 2 factors to consider

to determine if decision is committed to agency discretion


24/46

!. 9ording of te *tatute -in its discretion1wenever e salldeem1advisa+le1

a. ery unusual wording leaving it to a personaldecision

2. onte@t

a. IA national security concerns +. >on7t want nat7l security de+ated in open courtiii. 4eaffirms 4o+ison to allow court to review for constitutional claimsiv. >issents

!. ,7onnor stay out of IA +usiness all togeter 2. *calia Eot like line of decisions if congress says no review5

ten sould +e no review #anti'4o+inson) #even w/constitutional issues)

+. Fan and angevini. $ (0!

ii. FA decisions granting rent increases are E,T su+"ect to "udicial

review statute was silent a+out availa+ility of review!. Tree factor test +y !st cir. To determine if review availa+lewere statute didn7t give a law to apply:

a. Appropriateness of issues for "udicial consideration +. Is tere a need ere for review to protect plaintiffsc. Impact of review on agency and courts

i. Tus5 tere is no law to apply2. 2d cir. *ays statute implicitly precluded review

a. Tere is a "ustica+le standard5 tere is a law to apply5 +ut +/c $ (0!5 te statute implicitly precludes review +/cdidn7t give a law to apply

i. Dasically up to ongress pierce likes tis

3. 4eview of Agency Inactiona. Cnforcement >iscretion

i. >unn !?62!.


25/46

a. ,rdinarily court can7t review inaction5 +ut wen reasongiven raises issue of law #reading a *, into testatute)

2. Eow agencies "ust never give reasonsiii. >unlop v. Dacowski !?(%

!. >, decision not to overturn union election results isreviewa+lea. >, must give reasons only 2 are accepta+le

2. ourt makes distinction of wat te statute guarantees1 usesstrong language a+out -sall conduct investigation ifcorruption in election5 and -if 1 pro+a+le cause1

a. 9ord of command5 coupled w/ a law to apply #so notmere policy statement)

+. Private 4igts to protect individual running for officec. Pu+lic 4igt to protect pu+lic at large5 and prosecutor

must take action to protect pu+lic

d. *ince it is a private rigt +eing protected5 ten >,must present reasons for inaction3. Pierce not like tis distinction +/c says all statutes are +ot

private and pu+lic&. *.rt said must present reasons5 +ut not need earing take too

long #+/c private rigt and word of command and law to apply)iv. Feckler v. aney !?J%

!. Anti'deat penalty people say can7t use letal in"ection +/c>A not approve drugs for tat purpose

2. >oes >A need to conduct investigation to determine if drugssafe and effective for tat purpose

a. > ir says presumption of reviewa+ility unless clearand convincing evidence #,verton Park) D


26/46

+. >iscretion to 4egulatei. American Forse Protection Ass7n v. yng !?J(

!. 4efusal to initiate rulemaking is a reviewa+le inactiona. uc less fre=uent for an agency to E,T initiate5 ten

to take no action

+. ,ften +ased on legal groundsc. APA $ %%3 re=uires agency to receive and consider petitions for rulemaking and must give reasons fordenying petition

i. *uggests ongress intended reviewa+ilityii. ourt7s not imposing any new +urden on an

agency2. All circuits addressing tis issue ave eld same3. 4eview is always availa+le5 +ut very rare tat plaintiff wins

a. 9on ere:i. A ad no evidence of reasoned decision

making and didn7t follow its own e@plicit courseof action +. D/c agencies want to prevail5 teir reasons for denying

review are geared towards typically discretionarye@amples

i. Inade=uate resourcesii. ,ter5 urgent issues

iii. *ay still under consideration tey7re studyingit

ii. E4> v. *C decision not to issue a rule ATC4 conductingrulemaking I* reviewa+le already spent resources1

ii. Timing!. 4e=uiring inal Agency Action2. Agency action is reviewa+le E,9 if:

a. inal agency actioni. Agency7s last word on te matter

ii. Fas legal effect +. 4ipe for reviewc. C@austed all administrative remedies

i. Petitioner must overcome all tree5 plus it must +e reviewa+le in first place

3. C> v. Fardin !?(!5 C> v. 4uckelsaus !?(! E, longer good law

a. >>T pesticide cases +. CPA made ancellation process K ela+orate5 long procedures weig te cost

and te +enefitsc. *uspension Process could +e used

i. ew proceduresii. *ort

iii. Imminent FaBardiv.


27/46

d. 9en an agency initiates a cancellation witout an emergency suspension5 istat lack of suspension a final agency decision5 su+"ect to review5 or is it aninterlocutory decision

e. ourti. Agency >ecision not to ave an emergency suspension was a inal

,rder !. >ecision not to act was e=uivalent of an order denying relief 2. Issue of -imminence of te treat was finally resolved

ii. ? types of decisions availa+le to agency:!. >ecision to Initiate ancellation Proceeding

a. Eot final +/c "ust starting not reviewa+le2. >ecision E,T to initiate ancellation Proceeding

a. Argua+ly inal w/ legal conse=uencesi. ould +e doing more researc toug

ii. 4uckelsaus reviewa+le5 +ut no worka+lestandard not real "udicial standard

+. aney canges Agency inaction is E,T reviewa+le3. Inaction altogeter a+out cancellation #Farding)a. inal decision +ut inaction not reviewa+le #aney)

&. >ecision to ave an Cmergency *uspensiona. ourts are *plit if final +. inal last time to apply weter imminent aBardH end

of suspension proceedingi. Immediate legal affects

c. Eot final no record for reviewH court could order toconduct an e@pedited oral evidentiary earing allowingall parties to participate to create a record defeats purpose +/c takes too long

%. >ecision not to *uspend a. ir *plit +. inal started cancellation w/o suspending1H same

arguments as decision to suspendi. Dut same pro+lems w/ reviewa+ility

c. Eot final5 could later decide to suspend if want6. Inaction after petition to suspend

a. > ir. *ame as not suspending and final #Pierce tinksis ridiculous +/c noting to review)

+. Eot final +/c not reviewa+le and unworka+le #aney)(. >ecision to ancel5 after cancellation proceeding

a. inal and reviewa+le ela+orate recordJ. >ecision E,T to cancel5 after cancellation proceeding

a. inal and reviewa+le ela+orate record?. Inaction a+out te cancellation after initiation of proceeding

a. > ir says no final action +/c functional e=uivalent ofsaying no +ut same as under 65 were ridiculous +/cno record5 noting to defend


28/46

+. elay

i. Potential 4emedies ' $ (06!. ourt can order agency to act if action as +een -unreasona+ly

delayed

a. Dut so many reasons for delay possi+le: resources5 procedures1 ard for court to step in5 doesn7t solve pro+lems and agency still migt not +e a+le to act

2. *tatutory >eadlinesa. ongress can set deadlines on agency action

i. ongress not know priorities or pro+lemsHwouldn7t work

ii. 9en litigated5 ourts end up saying agencies can impose owndeadlines

&. >alton v. *pecter !??& a. ommission proposed list of military +ases to +e closed5 President ad to say

yes and ongress said noting so going to close +. *tatute silent on reviewa+ilityc. ourt

i.


29/46

!. 9ould court +e more a+le to decide lateriii. 9ould P suffer ardsip if review deferred

3. Toilet Goods Assoc. v. Gardner !?6(a. 4ule tat >A inspectors need to +e given free access to plantsH if not5 co.

certification taken

+. 4ule E,T ripe for reviewc. ourt applies A++ott test:i. ongress did E,T intend for pre'enforcement review

ii. Eot ripe for review +/c "udiciary E,T ave a record to review Issueof aw and can only +e evaluated in a particulariBed application dependent on facts of te case ' oterwise would take too long

iii. Eo ardsip to S +/c certification alted P,,4 reasoning piercesays court sould not ave addressed tis issue +/c it clearly failedissue 2

d. any cases congress intends pre'enforcement reviewH +ut often5 no record forte court to review need particulariBed facts

i. ourt needs te record to determine if rule ar+itrary and capriciousii. Agency must ave responded ade=uately to all te comments on ruleiii. ed to e@pensive long rulemaking process

&. A++ott made rulemaking long and +urdensome and e@pensive cipped away ata. 4eno v. atolic *ocial *ervices E, ardsip5 +enefit rules not ripe at pre'

enforcement +. Tunder Dasin Try to get pre'enforcement in statute congress provided

e@plicit alternative for review5 so intend E, pre'enforcement reviewi. Dig difference and weakens A++ott

c. Illinois ong Term are callenged first prong of testi. >id congress intend to autoriBe pre'enforcement review 4ater ten

did ongress intend preclude it presumption of non'reviewa+ilityiv. C@austion of Administrative 4emedies

!. allenger must e@aust all teir remedies +efore can get "udicial review2. yers v. Detleem *teel !?3J

a. E4D issues rule over D* D* callenges E4D "urisdiction #says notinterstate commerce)

+. ourti. Agency as initial decision if tere is "urisdiction or not

!. Previously5 agencies never a+le to solve constitutional issues#like "urisdiction)

2. Eow courts say agency makes all decision5 and court willreview after everyting is final

ii. D* must first go troug all agency remedies +efore +ringing it tocourt

3. cart v.


30/46

!. Avoid interruption of agency decision making process2. Allow agency to develop facts to resolve factual issues3. Allow agency to e@ercise discretion and to apply e@pertise&. Cfficiency avoid +urdening agencies and courts w/ multiple

appeals

%. 4espect agency autonomy6. >eter parties from sand +agging agencyii. C@cuses te doctrine ere +/c tese si@ reasons aren7t so important

iii. And any opportunity to e@aust remedies as past 1 too late!. Fardsip of going to prison is ars

&. cGee v.


31/46

i. ourt!. *D not ave a legal rigt tat is +eing violated5 Data Processors !?(0

a. Two Prong test for *tanding In"ury in act and Vone of Interesti. Party must ave suffered -in"ury in fact5 economic or oterwise

!. aused +y te callenged agency action AE> is redressa+le +yte court

ii. -Interest sougt to +e protected +y te petitioner must +e arguably witin te Bone of interests to +e regulated or protected under testatute APA $ (02

!. ust look at te statute under wic action is callenged todetermine wat rigts are intended to +e protected

2. Vone of Interest Test +. Vone of Interest ' Decame new framework for anyone wo callenges court

wanted it to +e igly permissive and easy to meet evolved12. larke !?J(

a. Vone of Interest Test K Eot intended to +e especially demandingi. ,nly to prevent wen P7s interests are so marginal and it seems silly

ii. Eot need to prove tat statute was intended to +enefit P3. Air ourier onf. !??!

a. Puts some restrictions on Vone of Interests reads out -argua+ly +. Eow must prove specific congressional intent to +enefit P7s class

&. Eat7l redit A9 T,>AMa. Put +ack in -argua+ly returned to a fairly permissive test +. Eo need to prove specific intent to include P7s class if statute does actually

+enefit P

v. Associational *tanding

!. Association as standing if: #9asington Apple Advertising)a. Any mem+er as standing +. Interest asserted +y organiBation is germane to purpose of organiBationc. 4elief re=uested does not re=uire participation of individuals

i. Eot so muc issue in admin law cases2. *ierra lu+ !?(2

a. Eo standing "ust for liking te environment "ust +/c te group wants to protect it1


32/46

+. ust meet te test -economic or oterwise can include aestetic in"ury5 +utstill need actual and real in"ury5 not "ust te special interest of te group

3. uring ietnam5 ta@payers / citiBens want to know wat IA spending money

oni. Dased on onstitutional claim tat IA provide accounting

+. In"ury is too general5 not particulariBed sared +y manyc. *uc a small in"ury to ta@payer to sow even ne@us to agency action

3. Akins v. C !??(a. *imilar case5 opposite olding +. Clection laws a+out information of political organiBation given to pu+lic

wants to designate a group political so information is releasedi. ourt

!. ongress confers5 +y statute5 a rigt to know a+out moneygiven +y political organiBations if tat rigt is denied5 a legalin"ury occurred

2. Eot a+stract rigt to an informed vote5 rigt conferred +ystatute +ut is sared +y many

a. ;udicially cogniBa+le in"ury is -lack of information not to genera

3. *ared +y many not on list so long as it is a rigt conferred +ystatute

&. *clessinger !?(&a. aw illegal for mem+er of one +ranc of gov7t to +e a mem+er of anoter

+ranc #mem+ers of ongress also in reserves1) +. In"ury is too general5 too a+stract really a policy issue

%. Favens !?J2a.


33/46

c. ourti. Eo ausation +y agency action

!. Eo proof of direct5 e@act effect of TFI* lawii. lear court "ust defers to I4*5 and not want citiBens interfering w/ I4*

enforcement

iii. Dullsit +/c tere is an in"ury and caused +y tis law(. inda *. v. 4icard >. !?(3a. oter does E,T ave standing to callenge TW for not enforcing ederal

statute a+out cild supporti. Eo causal link

ii. Eot know if remedy!. >oesn7t mean fater would start paying it

iii. Dullsit +/c denying criminal law as any affect1

vii. Cnvironmental *tanding!. *ierra lu+2. Eational 9ildlife ederation v. u"an !??0

a. irst +ig cange since !?(2 ederal gov7t started and lassificationProgram limits scope of action

+. *tatute allows review of final agency Action5 +ut E, statute autoriBes reviewof a Program

i. Eeed to go action +y action1c. E9 callenges one particular re'classification tries to prove mem+er

standingi. em+er says -sometimes uses land in te vicinity of 1 as contact

w/ near+y landd. ourt

i. Agency program is not an agency action so need to callengespecific agency action

!. Eo standing ere +/c callenging program1ii. Geograpic Pro@imity 4e=uirement

!. Immediately ad"acent land is sufficient for standing

3. u"an v. >efenders of 9ildlife !??0a. All environmental statutes create a cause of action for citiBens to enforce +. Cndangered *pecies Act money given to foreign lands to +uild and may +e

lands w/ endangered species 1 P say 8no5 can7t give money7c. ourt no in"ury in fact

i. 4e=uires Temporal Pro@imity

!. *till good law2. an7t +e vague a+out -future plans1don7t know13. Fow set Eeed more ten -sometime1

ii. 4e"ects Ee@us Teories!. Ccosystem ne@us complicated5 ripple effects in world12. Animal ne@us loves animals and wants to see13. ocational ne@us "o+ is studying animal1&. ourt doesn7t +uy any of tem scalia -sared +y all


34/46

iii. Introduces argument +ased on -Take are clause in constitution #nolonger good)

!. Eo one really knows wat clause means: in"uries to pu+lic onlyredressed +y Pres. / C@ec so congress can7t give tocitiBens

iv. Introduces new redressi+ility rules #no longer good)!. *calia: even if violated numerous environmental1+ut ten in end complied w/ alli. > argues no standing +/c no in"ury in fact

ii. P sows dead fis seen5 etc1 > says dead fis not from tem +. ourt

i. imits *teel o. to -wolly past actions not wen ongoing orcance of reoccurrence #like ere)

ii. >efines in"ury as -reasona+le fear of arm: "ust esta+lis reasona+lefear5 ok even if un"ustified fear

iii. ,n going violation #in"ury of reasona+ly fear) can +e redressed +y civil penalties to deter

c. urrently: so long as P as geograpic and temporal pro@imity5 standing will pro+a+ly +e found1unless court not want to meet merits and congress asn7tmade clear it wants court involved


35/46

I. egislative onnection

a. *tatutory agueness and its Antidotesi. Te Eondelegation >octrine

!. All legislative power is vested in ongressa. ongress can7t delegate legislative #policy R rulemaking) power

2. Idealistsa. ongress inerently works to protect te pu+lic

3. ynicsa. ongress is o+sessed wit power and re'election only +. >oesn7t care a+out te pu+lic

&. 4ealistsa. ongress uses disinterested insigt

i. an7t use democratic process to determine every issue%. ourt enforcement of te doctrine

a. ,nly two statutes ave +een eld unconstitutional +. ourt canges te test every time it comes up5 so as to old statutes

constitutional6. Drig Aurora !J!3

a. >elegation to President te -determination of factual predicates to wicapply a legislative policy ' okay

+. ater canged to allow an agency to -fill in details of a policy'c. Again canged to allow ongress to -provide an intelligi+le principle to

guide policy making and te rest can +e delegatedi. >elegations must +e -"ust and reasona+le in te -pu+lic interest and

for -pu+lic convenience / necessity

!. urrent rule(. Panama 4efining !?3%H *cecter Poultry !?3%

a. ,nly case were delegation deemed e@cessive and unconstitutionali. Faven7t +een followed5 +ut aven7t +een overruled

+. *tatute autoriBed President to create +oards re standards of oil and cickensi. Eational Industrial 4ecovery Act

ii. Doards made up of private citiBens in tese markets #essentially acartel)

c. iolation of doctrine +/c insufficient legal standardsJ. Amalgamated eat utters v. onnally !?(!

a. Cconomic *ta+iliBation Act ongress confers to President power to control

all wages and prices for all


36/46

iii. *tatute implicitly incorporates fair and e=uita+le standards!. Dut were

iv. Procedural safeguards!. 4eally noting1$%%% K minimal safeguards5 tere are no

su+stantive standards so procedures mean noting1

v. ;udicial 4eview!. 9ortless w/o su+stantive standard to applyvi. Agency can esta+lis its own standards tat courts ten apply

!. D


37/46

+. egislative etoi. IE* v. ada !?J3

!. Immigrants can stay5 +ut ongress as W days to veto decision of agency to let

immigrant stay ongress vetoed ere2. ourta. egislative eto iolates Dicameralism and Presentment

i. ,pinion +road enoug K all legislative veto wrongLii. ,nly way ongress can +ind te people is troug +icameralism AE>

presentment so all legislative vetos are out +. 9o actually ad power as a result of te legislative veto

i. Agency decision were protected +y +icameralism and presentmentii. eto too powerful w/ massive effects +/c conferred power to individual

mem+ers of congress any strategically placed mem+er of congresscould control agency decision +y veto treat

c. 9at were its incentive effectsi. Gives congress mem+ers great power5 weakens agencies #agency

eads) and emasculates wite ouse and empowers leadersip ofcongress

3. ongressional 4eview Act of !??6 creates a legislative veto5 +y using +icameralismand presentment passing a resolution no real effect

a. linton used once5 ongress and Dus not like

c. >elegation of Ad"udicatory Autorityi. In general

!. an an agency ad"udicate a dispute involving individual rigtsa. Art. III court resolves disputes1

+. (t Amen rigt to "ury trial1c. ourt starts drawing distinction +etween pu+lic and private rigts

i. Agencies can resolve EC9 pu+lic rigts5 +ut not privateii. ommon law private rigts only resolved +y te court

ii. rowell v. Denson !?32!. >etermine if Private 4igt or a Pu+lic 4igt dispute2. ongress can autoriBe only to administrative agencies to ear pu+lic rigts disputes3. ourts can only resolve private5 common law disputes1 D


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3. ey =uestion: does agency ad"udication supplant te essential or core functions ofArt. III ad"udication

&. >issenta. ,nly Art. III court can ad"udicate a private rigt +. Any claim wit a common law antecedent is a private rigt

i. 9at was said in Eortern Pipeline1.v. Tomas v. elaney lause !?%J

!. ood additives5 color additives5 pesticides5 residues1 annot +e used anyting toave caused cancer in man or animals1.%0N tested on animals

a. arcinogenic wen first passed5 only & tings1 now alf of everyting12. *accarin Dan oratorium !?((

a. >A +anned saccarin after sow it caused cancer in rats1+ut suc minimalrisk5 and ridiculous reports1

i. ongress mad and passed statute to over turn tis one +an +. ongress makes >A coose +etween additives wit minimal risks

i. If two +ot so low5 still must coose lowest oneii. Eow can find any level of carcinigen1 uge +urden on >A


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3. Pu+lic itiBen v. Moung !?J(a. >A tries to say tere is a de minimis e@ception to >elaney lause5 +ut clear

language tat tere is E,T

&. es v. 4eilly !??2a. Eo de minimis e@ception in clause pesticide residues in processed food1and fruit5 etc. all count as -food additives

%. Amendment to ederal Insecticide5 1.a. ood Quality Protection Act of !??6

i. If +an pesticides5 price of fruits and vegeta+les goes way up!. People stop +uying and will eat fast +ad food and pu+lic ealt

will plummeta. 9orse ten w/ some pesticide residues1

ii. ongress e@cluded te pesticide and te rest of te clause stillstands1

e. Pervasive Tecni=ues of egislative ontroli. To control agencies5 ongress uses statutes:!. General *tatutes

a. Apply to all agencies +. Indirect5 +ut uge5 effect

2. Agency organic actsa. Fave direct on individual agencies

3. APAa. Eotice Provision allow ongress to get involved in rulemaking process

i. Gives ongress way to ave a little more controlii. Eotice alerts ongress to agency actions

&. ,IAa. Gives ongress way to know everyting tat7s going on witin agency +. Agency must su+mit all to pu+lic disclosure

%. ECPAa. Cnvironmental impact statement re=uired +/& agency takes any -ma"or action

tat may significantly affect te environment +. Eo su+stantive contentc. Procedural statuted. Greatly sapes agency decisions

i. Intended to increase awareness of te environmental conse=uences ofgovt7 action

6. ivil *ervice Acta. iring civil servants1 keeps cong in te know

(. Allocation of litigating Autoritya. >oes agency ave power to re=uest cert or argue +/& te *.rt only some do +. %0/%0 agencies allowed to litigate on own5 oters go to >,;

i. Included in agency organic statuteJ. Allocation of onies


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a. ongress as control over money can refuse to give it to agency if not liketeir policies

?. onfirmation Processa. ,ver all officers must confirm agency nominations congressmen w/

constituency tat cares will make agency do wat say or won7t confirm1

!0. ,versigt Fearingsa. Indirect +ut su+stantial affect!!. asework

a. ongressmen7s onstituent service programs +. C@traordinarily powerful

ii. imitations on ongress7s Power and Influence over agencies!. onstitution

a. >ue Process5 +icameralism and presentment2. ada no legislative veto reduces congress7 power 3. Pills+ury !?66

a. ,versigt earing +. T ad decided against P +ut >ist court rev7d +/c congress ad interfered

too mucc. ourts can put limits on legislature7s involvement in oversigt activity

II. C@ecutive *upervision

a. Presidential ontrol and Influence over agenciesi. onstitution not entirely clear a+out President7s role

!. Provisionsa. Take are lause not clearly defined and igly de+ata+le

+. ,pinion and 9riting clause also not clear c. Appointments lause

+. President7s Power to appoint and remove Administratorsi. ontrolling ongressional Attempts to Appoint and 4emove Administrators

!. Duckley v. aleo !?(6a. !st effort +y ongress to enact ampaign inance 4eform1 ela+orate statute

and alf , +ut alf unconstitutionali. All appened in wake of 9atergate

+. ederal Clection ampaign Act committee created to enforce i. 6 mem+ers 2 appointed +y Pres5 2 +y Fouse ma"ority leader5 2

*enate ma"ority leader

ii. iolation of appointments clausec. All working in gov7t officer5 inferior officer5 or employee

i. ust determine difference President appoints officers w/ some elpof congress5 and appoints inferior officers on own #ead of dept. can orcourt of law too)

ii. ongress can7t appoint officers or inferior officersiii. >etermine ,fficers compare to ivil 4igts ommission #wic was

, even toug same appointments1)


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!. Power to issue legislative rules #same +inding effect asstatutes)

a. C can5 +ut 4 can7t2. Power to ad"udicate disputes w/ formal +inding effect

a. Go to courts to enforce its statute purely e@ecutive

and can only +e delegated +y president not congress3. Pro+a+ly different if only investigative and informative powerslike 4

d. Ta@ ourt e@amplei. ief "udge appoints special "udges to ad"udicate1.is it a court or an

agency eiter way5 ok5 if department or court of law +/c ead ofdepartment or court of law may appoint inferior officers1

!. ourt not clarify ow to distinguis2. Dowser v. *ynar !?J6

a. ongress assigned functions to omptroller General ' violated *,P +. Fistory of *pending Power

i. President used to ave +road power and discretion5 +/c congressdetermined appropriations +ut only a few +ig +road eadings5 andPresident not ave to spend te money1

ii. Eow5 all +roken down to a ton and ton of specific areas and congressmandates tat president must spend all ' ' takes away all discretion and power in president K no fle@i+ility

!. Farder for ongress and +udget and deficit grew1c. Graam 4udman Act set up

i. ind someone to figure out ow to get deficit to 0 must pro"ect watdeficit would +e and ten reduce it to get it down1leaving "ust a fewtings off limits

!. Ten separate all #defense5 domestic spending5 etc.) +y N2. 9ose responsi+ility to determine all of tis

ii. omptroller General instructed to do it!. Appointed +y President5 term of !% years2. ,nly remova+le troug legislative process

a. Citer at will or for cause3. iolates *,P'

a. omptroller General is agent of ongress +/c ongresscan remove im from power5 so ultimately tey7re te +oss

+. *pending is an e@ecutive function ongress can7tdelegate power to spend #fi@ing te +udget) totemselves #te comptroller general)

i. Pierce mmm5 te@tually5 spending is forcongress1appropriations1

d. oncur' Pierce likesi. omptroller General is agent of ongress

ii. ongress can only act troug +icameralism and presentment!. Eo unilateral acts +y ongress


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2. Giving power to G circumvents te +icameralism and presentment +/c unilateral1.

3. adaiii. ongress can7t delegate power it doesn7t ave

e. >issent

i. unction assigned to G does E,T involve policy making or e@erciseof discretion "ust num+ers #Pierce E,)ii. G is E,T an agent of congress

!. ongress never attempted to remove +ig processa. D


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i. 9ant to keep out of plenary presidential control insulate agency eadc. Eot good law anymore to insulate +ut rest okH altoug court migt read

statute different today #it was all inferred +/c statute silent)%. orrison v. ,lson' !?JJ

a. 9eter removal restrictions impede te President7s a+ility to Perform is

onstitutional >uty impermissi+le +urden test +. Independent counsel statute if AG autoriBes5 ten 3 "udge court appointsi. ust follow AG policies and removed +y AG for cause

!. -ause never defined +y courta. 4efusing to comply w/ President policy decisions

ii. *tatute insulates I from President7s controlc. *tatute creating is , ead of court may appoint:

i. I is an inferior officer !. imited *cope #only investigates one allegation)2. imited Term #till task done)3. Eo policy making role

&. ust comply w/ >,; policies%. Inferior to AGii. Insulating from President does E,T interfere w/ President7s Power or

ontrol over te e@ecutive +ranc "ustifia+le to insulate!. Plenary control of independent counsel is not central to

President7s a+ility to control e@ecutive +ranca. Eot tat important

2. Eo attempt at congressional aggrandiBementa. ongress not trying to give self power

i. ;ust taking some from president +. *calia tinks President can7t protect su+ordinates from

congress now3. President retains some control over independent counsel

a. I at will of AG5 wo is at will of President +. >,; policies in control of President

i. Politics keep President from e@ercising 1d. >issent *calia

i. Prosecution as -always and everywere +een an e@ecutive function!. Dullsit toug +/c prosecutions always andled differently5

even +y founders1ad oc5 private atty1ii. An alternative model of gov7t

!. Fow address gov7t corruption1 uses 9atergate e@ample ofwy don7t need one system works as is

2. any tink e7s rigt +est point in opinion wy no longerave an I statute

iii. ourt eliminated te prior fuBBy limit on congressional power witoutannouncing a new limit

!. 9ill lead to aggrandiBement2. ongress could impose any limit on President7s power to

remove


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a. ontrary to *,P3. D


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a. >eleted all reference to ice Presidenti. Defore5 P ead of regulatory oversigt task force5 a+ove te ,D

!. P resolved disputes w/ ,D and agencies +. Eow5 ead of ,D ead of all

iii. *cope of C, !252?2 / !25J66 / !352%J

!. ,nly to e@ecutive +ranc agenciesa. Independent answer to ongress5 and ongress keeps tat control #despitePresident ad oc control still1)

2. ,nly to ma"or rulesa. Eot to ad"udication +/c A; neutral1 +. 4ules tat will ave significant effect in elaney clause5 etc

ii. C, says -to te e@tent consistent w/ te law!. Tus 5 statutes can override it

iii. evron supports te re=uirement of cost'+enefit analysis!. *trengtened power of President vis a vis ongress and ourt5

as well as vis a vis agencies +. Agency must consult w/ ,D +efore issuing a ma"or rule

i. *end over cost'+enefit analysis5 proposed rule and statement of +asisand purpose

c. ,D can re=uire #once agency consults w/ it)i. >eferral of issuance of rule

!. ,D7s strongest power 2. imitations on tat power

a. ongress adds timelines to statutesi. 9ere ongressional and C@ecutive timelines

conflict5 ongressional ones trump +/clegislative process is for ongress5 and C, says-to e@tent consistent w/ law

ii. ongress uses timelines/ statutory guidelines tocontrol presidential control of agencies #lots of partisan politics)

ii. onsultation w/ oter agenciesiii. onsideration of additional data

!. Tis delays rulemakinga. Fave to issue supplemental issuance of notice for

comments on te new data


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v. C@ecutive ,rder !25&?J!. Defore issued

a. ,D would review ma"or rules after rulemaking was complete5 +ut +eforeactual issuance of rules

i. Too late in te game!. ess ten !N of rules canged at tis point2. Dy te time it gets to ,I4A/,D5 is usually pretty solid

2. C, !25&?Ja. 4e=uires every agency to come out w/ annual regulatory agenda descri+ing

every ma"or initiative for te year i. Includes more te "ust rules

!. ocuses on te pre'rulemaking stuff a. Agencies need lots of information +efore can even issue

a notice of proposed rulemakingii. Tells people wat it is planning to do

iii. Includes its calendar !. 9en likely to issue proposed or final rule +. Tis C, is very +urdensome on certain agencies #CPA5 +/c very active)c. Cffects

i. >rafters tougt it would elp ,I4A focus on important issues +eforeit was too late

!. In actuality5 it caused way too muc work5 too early in process5 +/& any kinks are worked out

ii. Fas ad some unintended +eneficial effects!. em+ers of te pu+lic wo are affected +y agency action

#lawyers5 pu+lic interest groups5 etc.) find out info very usefula. Felps tem know wat tey need to focus on wen

lo++ying5 etc.2. People wo run agencies now know wat7s going on in te

agencya. Tey usually only serve for an average of 2 years5 (

montsi. ower level folks are less interested in te

officer7s agenda tan in teir own agenda +. Tis C, prevents lower level folks from keeping

officers in te dark

Administrative Law - Pierce - 2002_4

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Transcript of Administrative Law - Pierce - 2002_4