Admin Law Part 2 of 7

8/3/2019 Admin Law Part 2 of 7

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlota

ASSOCIATION OF PHIL COCONUTDESSICATORS v PHIL COCONUT

AUTHORITY286 SCRA 109

MENDOZA; February 10, 1998

FACTS- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCAfrom issuing permits to applicants for theestablishment of new desiccated coconutprocessing plants issuance would violate PCAsAdmin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicantswere seeking to operate in congested areas- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA fromussiung licenses- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawalof the PCA from all regulation of coconut productprocessing industry; registration would be limitedto the monitoring of their volumes of productionand admin of quality standards

- PCA then issued certificates of registration tothose wishing to operate desiccated coconutprocessing plants

ISSUEWON the PCA can renounce the power to regulateimplicit in the law creating it for that is what theresolution in question actually is.

HELD- The power given to the PCA to formulate andadopt a general program of devt for the coconutand other palms oil industry is not a rovingcommission to adopt any program deemednecessary to promote the devt of the coconut and

other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised inthe context of the regulatory structure.Reasoning- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30,1973 to take over the powers and functions of theCoconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. CocoAdmin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made anindependent public corp...charged with carryingout States policy to promote the rapid integrateddevt and growth of the coco and other palm oilindustry and to ensure that the coco farmersbecome direct participants and beneficiariesthrough a regulatory scheme set up by law- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 govt temporarily

prohibited the opening of new coco processing

plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of theexisting ones--- because of overproduction in theindustry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of theexport performance of coco-based products- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87authorizing establishment and operation ofadditional DCN plants because of increaseddemand in world market

- The above measures were adopted within theframework of regulation as established by law topromote rapid integrated devt and growth of cocoand other palm oil industry and to ensure that thecoco farmers become direct participants andbeneficiaries- the questioned resolution allows not onlyindiscriminate opening of new plants, but thevirtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of thePCA is to formulate and adopt a general programof devt for the coco and other palm oil industry inall its aspectso By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely

monitoring volumes of production and admin.

Of quality standards, PCA in effect abdicatesits role and leaves it almost completely tomarket forces how the industry will develop

- Constitution Art.XIIo Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote

distributive justice and to intervene when thecommon good so demands

o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibitmonopolies when public interest so requires

o Any change in policy must be made by thelegislative dept of the govt. The regulatorysystem has been set up by law. It is beyondthe power of an administrative agency todismantle it.

Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and

VOID

BLAS OPLE V RUBEN TORRESG.R. No. 127685

PUNO; JULY 23, 1998

FACTS- Senator Blas Ople sought to invalidate A.O 308entitled Adoption of a National ComputerizedIdentification Reference System" on the groundsthat: 1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congressto legislate (bec the establishment of a National ID

system requires a legislative act) 2) the

appropriation of public funds by the president forthe implementation of the AO is anunconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive rightof congress to appropriate public funds forexpenditure; 3) it impermissibly intrudes on ourcitizenry's protected zone of privacy- Respondents: THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A

JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A

JUDICIAL REVIEW; A.O. NO. 308 WAS ISSUEDWITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVEPOWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUTENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OFCONGRESS; THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THEIMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATIONREFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THEBUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES; A.O.NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'SINTEREST IN PRIVACY.

ISSUES1. WON petitioner has standing2. WON petition is ripe for adjudication3. WON A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative

order but a law and hence, beyond the power ofthe President to issue4. WON A.O No. 308 violates the right to privacy

HELD1. YES- As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of therequisite standing to bring suit raising the issuethat the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation oflegislative power. As taxpayer and member of theGSIS, petitioner can also impugn the legality of themisalignment of public funds and the misuse ofGSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.2. YES- The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at

bar is not affected by the fact that theimplementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to bepromulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. Hisaction is not premature for the rules yet to bepromulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.3. YES- A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is notappropriate to be covered by an administrativeorder. An administrative order is:"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of thePresident which relate to particular aspects ofgovernmental operation in pursuance of his dutiesas administrative head shall be promulgated inadministrative orders."

-An administrative order is an ordinance issued by

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotathe President which relates to specific aspects inthe administrative operation of government. Itmust be in harmony with the law and should be forthe sole purpose of implementing the law andcarrying out the legislative policy.- It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No.308 merely implements the Administrative Code of1987. It establishes for the first time a National

Computerized Identification Reference System.Such a System requires a delicate adjustment ofvarious contending state policies - the primacy ofnational security, the extent of privacy interestagainst dossier-gathering by government, thechoice of policies, etc. The said A.O. redefines theparameters of some basic rights of our citizenryvis-a-vis the State as well as the line thatseparates the administrative power of thePresident to make rules and the legislative powerof Congress, it ought to be evident that it dealswith a subject that should be covered by law.-Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do thatA.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers noright, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and

creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizencannot transact business with governmentagencies delivering basic services to the peoplewithout the contemplated identification card. Nocitizen will refuse to get this identification card forno one can avoid dealing with government. It isthus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizenwill have difficulty exercising his rights andenjoying his privileges. Given this reality, thecontention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right andimposes no duty cannot stand.-the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limitsof administrative legislation and consequentlyerodes the plenary power of Congress to makelaws. This is contrary to the established approach

defining the traditional limits of administrativelegislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Manyregulations however, bear directly on the public. Itis here that administrative legislation must berestricted in its scope and application. Regulationsare not supposed to be a substitute for the generalpolicy-making that Congress enacts in the form ofa public law. Although administrative regulationsare entitled to respect, the authority to prescriberules and regulations is not an independent sourceof power to make laws."4. YES-We prescind from the premise that the right toprivacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by theConstitution, hence, it is the burden of government

to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some

compelling state interest and that it is narrowlydrawn.-A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreignerswith the facility to conveniently transact businesswith basic service and social security providersand other government instrumentalities and (2)the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,

fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations bypersons seeking basic services. It is debatablewhether these interests are compelling enough towarrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what isnot arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, theoverbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implementedwill put our people's right to privacy in clear andpresent danger.- The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Sec 4 whichprovides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)as a "common reference number to establish alinkage among concerned agencies" through theuse of "Biometrics Technology" and "computerapplication designs."A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological

characteristics and what particular biometricstechnology shall be used to identify people whowill seek its coverage. Considering the banquet ofoptions available to the implementors of A.O. No.308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacyof our people is not groundless.- The right to privacy is one of the most threatenedrights of man living in a mass society. In the caseat bar, the threat comes from the executivebranch of government which by issuing A.O. No.308 pressures the people to surrender theirprivacy by giving information about themselves onthe pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basicservices. Given the record-keeping power of thecomputer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive

the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives thegovernment the power to compile a devastatingdossier against unsuspecting citizens.Disposition: the petition is granted andAdministrative Order No. 308 declared null andvoid for being unconstitutional.

Separate Opinions:ROMERO concurSo terrifying are the possibilities of a law such asAdministrative Order No. 308 in making inroadsinto the private lives of the citizens, a virtual BigBrother looking over our shoulders, that it must,without delay, be "slain upon sight" before oursociety turns totalitarian with each of us, a

mindless robot.

VITUG concurI find it hard to peremptorily assume at this timethat the administrative order will be misused andto thereby ignore the possible benefits that can bederived from or the merits of, a nationwidecomputerized identification reference system. Thegreat strides and swift advances in technology

render it inescapable that one day we will, at allevents, have to face up with the reality of seeingextremely sophisticated methods of personalidentification and any attempt to stop theinevitable may either be short-lived or even futile.

The imperatives would instead be to now installspecific safeguards and control measures that maybe calculated best to ward-off probable ill effectsof any such device. Here, it may be apropos torecall the pronouncement of this Court in Peoplevs. Nazario that -"As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to bevague when it lacks comprehensible standardsthat men 'of common intelligence must necessarilyguess at its meaning and differ as to its

application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution intwo respects: (1) it violates due process for failureto accord persons, especially the parties targetedby it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) itleaves law enforcers unbridled discretion incarrying out its provisions and becomes anarbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be soextensively drawn that could, indeed, allowunbridled options to become available to itsimplementors beyond the reasonable comfort ofthe citizens and of residents alike.

The subject covered by the questionedadministrative order can have far-reachingconsequences that can tell on all individuals, their

liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should makeit indispensable and appropriate to have thematter specifically addressed by the Congress ofthe Philippines, the policy-making body of ourgovernment, to which the task should initiallybelong and to which the authority to formulate andpromulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.

PANGANIBAN concurI concur only in the result and only on the groundthat an executive issuance is not legally sufficientto establish an all-encompassing computerizedsystem of identification in the country. The subjectmatter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powersof the President to regulate without a legislative

enactment.

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Administrative Law A2010Dean CarlotaI reserve judgment on the issue of whether anational ID system is an infringement of theconstitutional right to privacy or of the freedom ofthought until after Congress passes, if ever, a lawto this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of aproper petition, may the provisions of the statutebe scrutinized by the judiciary to determine theirconstitutional foundation. Until such time, the

issue is premature; and any decision thereon,speculative and academic.

KAPUNAN, dissentThere is nothing in the whole breadth and lengthof Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests ataint of constitutional infirmity.1st ISSUE: was the issuance of A.O No. 308 anexercise by the President of legislative powerproperly belonging to Congress? NO-The Administrative Code of 1987 hasunequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative powers in the form of executive orders,administrative orders, proclamations,memorandum orders and circulars and general or

special orders. An administrative order, like theone under which the new identification system isembodied, has its peculiar meaning under the1987 Administrative Code:SEC. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of thePresident which relate to particular aspects ofgovernmental operations in pursuance of hisduties as administrative head shall bepromulgated in administrative orders.- A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the Presidentpursuant to the quasi-legislative powers expresslygranted to him by law and in accordance with hisduty as administrative head. The contention thatthe President usurped the legislative prerogativesof Congress has no firm basis.

-Being the "administrative head," it isunquestionably the responsibility of the Presidentto f ind ways and means to improve thegovernment bureaucracy, and make it moreprofessional, efficient and reliable, specially thosegovernment agencies and instrumentalities whichprovide basic services and which the citizenryconstantly transact with.-If we think of the separation of powers as carryingout the distinction between legislation andadministration with mathematical precision and asdividing the branches of government intowatertight compartments, we would probably haveto conclude that any exercise of lawmakingauthority by an agency is automatically invalid.

Such a rigorous application of the constitutional

doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible

A mingling of powers among the three branches ofgovernment is not a novel concept. This blendingof powers has become necessary to properlyaddress the complexities brought about by arapidly developing society and which thetraditional branches of government have difficulty

coping with.2nd ISSUE: ripeness-Basic in constitutional law is the rule that beforethe court assumes jurisdiction over and decideconstitutional issues, the ff requisites must first besatisfied: 1) there must be an actual case orcontroversy involving a conflict of rightssusceptible of judicial determination; 2) theconstitutional question must be raised by a properparty; 3) the constitutional question must beraised at the earliest opportunity; and

4) the resolution of the constitutional questionmust be necessary to the resolution of the case.-In this case, it is evident that the first element ismissing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual

case or controversy which is defined as "anexisting case or controversy that is appropriate orripe for determination, not conjectural oranticipatory."3rd ISSUE: is AO violative of right to privacy

-There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded,to suggest that the advanced methods of theBiometrics Technology that may pose danger tothe right of privacy will be adopted.-The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoptionof the new system are clear-cut and unequivocablyspelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of theorder, namely, the need to provide citizens andforeign residents with the facility to convenientlytransact business with basic service and social

security providers and other governmentinstrumentalities; the computerized system isintended to properly and efficiently identifypersons seeking basic services or social securityand reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulenttransactions and misrepresentation-Again, the concerns of the majority are prematureprecisely because there are as yet no guidelinesthat will direct the Court and serve as solid basisfor determining the constitutionality of the newidentification system. The Court cannot and shouldnot anticipate the constitutional issues and rule onthe basis of guesswork. The guidelines would,among others, determine the particular biometricsmethod that would be used and the specific

personal data that would be collected, provide the

safeguards (if any) and supply the details on howthis new system is supposed to work. The Courtshould not jump the gun on the Executive.

MENDOZA, dissentI cannot find anything in the text of AdministrativeOrder No. 308 of the President of the Philippinesthat would warrant a declaration that it is violative

of the right of privacy.PHILIPPINE BANK OFCOMMUNICATIONS v

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNALREVENUE

302 SCRA 241QUISUMBING; Jan 28, 1999

Nature:Petition for review

Facts:- Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filedits quarterly income tax returns for the first andsecond quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paidthe total income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxesdue were settled by applying PBCom's tax creditmemos and accordingly, the Bureau of InternalRevenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memos.- Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered lossesso that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returnsfor the year-ended Dec 31, 1986, it likewisereported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thusdeclared no tax payable for the year.- But during these two years, PBCom earned rentalincome from leased properties. The lesseeswithheld and remitted to the BIR withholdingcreditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and

P234,077.69 in 1986.- On Aug 7, 1987, petitioner requested the CIR,among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00representing the overpayment of taxes in the firstand second quarters of 1985.- On July 25, 1988, PBCom filed a claim for refundof creditable taxes withheld by their lessees fromproperty rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in1986 for P234,077.69.- Pending the investigation of the CIR, petitionerinstituted a Petition for Review on Nov 18, 1988before the Court of Tax Appeals.- On May 20, 1993, the CTA denied the request ofPBCom for a tax refund or credit of P5,299,749.95,on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-

year reglementary period provided for by law. The

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotapetitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting toP234,077.69 was likewise denied on theassumption that it was automatically credited byPBCom against its tax payment in the succeedingyear. Petitioners MFR was denied.- PBCom filed a petition for review with the CA,which affirmed in toto the CTA's resolution.- Petitioner: its claims for refund and tax credits

are not yet barred by prescription relying on theapplicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular statesthat overpaid income taxes are not covered by thetwo-year prescriptive period under the tax Codeand that taxpayers may claim refund or tax creditsfor the excess quarterly income tax with the BIRwithin ten years under Art 1144 of the Civil Code.CitingABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Courtof Tax Appeals petitioner claims that rulings orcirculars promulgated by the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue have no retroactive effect if itwould be prejudicial to taxpayers, as provided bySec. 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code.- Respondent: the two-year prescriptive period

for filing tax cases in court concerning income taxpayments of Corporations is reckoned from thedate of filing the Final Adjusted Income TaxReturn. CIR also states that since the FinalAdjusted Income Tax Return of the petitioner forthe taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed onApril 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15,1988 to seek relief from the court. When thepetitioner filed the case before the CTA on Nov 18,1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed bylaw, and such failure is fatal to petitioner's causeof action.

Issues:WON CA erred in denying the plea for tax refund or

tax credits on the ground of prescription, despitepetitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changingthe prescriptive period of two years to ten years

Held:NO- Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code(NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997)provides for the prescriptive period for filing acourt proceeding for the recovery of taxerroneously or illegally collected. The rule statesthat the taxpayer may file a claim for refund orcredit with the CIR, within two years after paymentof tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. Thetwo-year prescriptive period provided should be

computed from the time of filing the AdjustmentReturn and final payment of the tax for the year.- When the Acting Commissioner of InternalRevenue issued RMC 7-85, changing theprescriptive period of two years to ten years onclaims of excess quarterly income tax payments,such circular created a clear inconsistency with theprovision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing,

the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather itlegislated guidelines contrary to the statutepassed by Congress.- Revenue memorandum-circulars are consideredadministrative rulings (in the sense of morespecific and less general interpretations of taxlaws) which are issued from time to time by theCIR. The interpretation placed upon a statute bythe executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it,is entitled to great respect by the courts.Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusiveand will be ignored if judicially found to beerroneous. Thus, courts will not countenanceadministrative issuances that override, instead ofremaining consistent and in harmony with the law

they seek to apply and implement.- In the case of People vs. Lim, it was held thatrules and regulations issued by administrativeofficials to implement a law cannot go beyond theterms and provisions of the latter.- The State cannot be put in estoppel by themistakes or errors of its officials or agents. Thenullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the ActingCommissioner of Internal Revenue is anadministrative interpretation which is not inharmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC for beingcontrary to the express provision of a statute.Hence, his interpretation could not be given weightfor to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.- Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial

decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as partof the legal system of the country. Butadministrative decisions do not enjoy that level ofrecognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureauhead could not operate to vest a taxpayer withshield against judicial action. For there are novested rights to speak of respecting a wrongconstruction of the law by the administrativeofficials and such wrong interpretation could notplace the Government in estoppel to correct oroverrule the same.Disposition Petition is DENIED. The decision of CAis AFFIRMED.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vMEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF

TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENTMUTUAL FUND

MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT ANDDEVT CORP v PARKWAY REALESTATE DEVT CORP

442 SCRA 572YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 13,

2004

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS- The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 ofHeart Tower Condominium located along ValeroStreet, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was

originally sold by Segovia DevelopmentCorporation (Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, whoin turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto infavor of Parkway Real Estate DevelopmentCorporation (Parkway)- Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitionerMaxima Realty Management and DevelopmentCorporation (Maxima) entered into an agreementto buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 inconsideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos. Itwas further agreed that failure to pay any of theinstallments on their due dates shall entitleParkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way ofliquidated damages.- Maxima defaulted in the payment of the

installments due but was granted several graceperiods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00,leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.- Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with theconsent of Segovia, executed a Deed ofAssignment transferring all its rights in thecondominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deedwas intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in itsname and use the same as security forP1,820,000.00 loan with RCBC, which amount willbe used by Maxima to pay its obligation toParkway. On the other hand, Segovia and Maximaagreed to transfer title to the condominium unitdirectly in Maximas name subject to the conditionthat the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of

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Administrative Law A2010Dean CarlotaP58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utilityexpenses, association dues and miscellaneouscharges.- RCBC informed Parkway of the approval ofMaximas P1.82M loan subject to the submissionof, among others, the Condominium Certificate of

Title transferred in the name of Maxima and theCertificate of Completion and turn over of unit.

- Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia theamount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus,Segovia did not transfer the title of thecondominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway wasnot paid the balance of P1.82M, it cancelled itsagreement to buy and sell and Deed ofAssignment in favor of Maxima.- Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals,Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the HLURB, acomplaint for specific performance to enforce theagreement to buy and sell Unit #702.- HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of theDeed of Assignment and ordered Parkway torefund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00.Segovia was further ordered to issue the

condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 infavor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of theregistration fees.- Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Boardof Commissioners of the HLURB. During thependency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay thebalance of P1.82M, which was accepted byParkway. The Board then ordered Maxima todeliver said amount in the form of managerscheck to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfertitle over the property to Maxima. The latter,however, failed to make good its offer, whichcompelled Parkway to file a Manifestation that theappeal be resolved.- the Board rendered judgment modifying the

decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favorof Parkway 50% of the total amount paid byMaxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway theamount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.- Maxima appealed to the Office of the Presidentwhich dismissed the appeal for having been filedout of time.- Maxima filed a petition for review with the CA.- CA affirmed the Decision of the Office of thePresident.

ISSUEWON petitioners appeal before the Office of thePresident was filed within the reglementary period.

HELD

NO.- In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of thePresident it was settled that the period withinwhich to appeal the decision of the Board ofCommissioners of HLURB to the Office of thePresident is 15 days from receipt of the assaileddecision, pursuant to Section 1521 of PresidentialDecree No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium

Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 222 ofPresidential Decree No. 1344.- We find petitioners contention bereft of merit,because of its reliance on a literal reading of citedrules without correlating them to current laws aswell as presidential decrees on the matter.Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedureprovides as follows:Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President.-Any party may, upon notice to the Board and theother party, appeal the decision of the Board ofCommissioners or its division to the Office of thePresident within thirty (30) days from receiptthereof pursuant to and in accordance withAdministrative Order No. 18, of the Office of the

President dated February 12, 1987. Decision of thePresident shall be final subject only to review bythe Supreme Court on certiorari or on questions oflaw.On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18,series of 1987, issued by public respondent reads:Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by speciallaws, an appeal to the Office of the President shallbe taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by theaggrieved party of the decision/resolution/ordercomplained of or appealed from.As pointed out by public respondent, theaforecited administrative order allows theaggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office ofthe President within thirty (30) days from receipt

of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, suchthirty-day period is subject to the qualification thatthere are no other statutory periods of appealapplicable. If there are special laws governingparticular cases which provide for a shorter orlonger reglementary period, the same shall prevailover the thirty-day period provided for in theadministrative order. This is in line with therule in statutory construction that anadministrative rule or regulation, in order tobe valid, must not contradict but conform tothe provisions of the enabling law.- there are special laws that mandate a shorterperiod of fifteen days within which to appeal acase to public respondent. First, Section 15 of PD

957 provides that the decisions of the National

Housing Authority shall become final andexecutory after the lapse of fifteen days from thedate of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2of PD 1344 states that decisions of the NHA shallbecome final and executory after the lapse offifteen days from the date of its receipt. The latterdecree provides that the decisions of NHA areappealable only to the Office of the President.

Further, we note that the regulatory functions ofNHA relating to housing and land development hasbeen transferred to Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission, now known as HLURB.

Thus, said presidential issuances providing for areglementary period of appeal of fifteen daysapply in this case.- Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty daysset forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules ofProcedure no longer holds true for being in conflictwith the provisions of aforesaid presidentialdecrees. For it is axiomatic that administrativerules derive their validity from the statutethat they are intended to implement. Anyrule which is not consistent with the statute

itself is null and void.- In this case, petitioner received a copy of thedecision of HLURB on October 23, 1995.Considering that the reglementary period toappeal is fifteen days, petitioner has only untilNovember 7, 1995, to f ile its appeal.Unfortunately, petitioner filed its appeal 28 daysfrom receipt of the appealed decision, which isobviously filed out of time.- In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994to appeal to the Office of the President. The appealwhich was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearlybeyond the reglementary period.Disposition WHEREFORE the Decision of the CA isAFFIRMED.

2. Publication and affectivity

PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY94 Phil. 640

MONTEMAYOR; March 29, 1954

NATUREAppeal from the decision of the CFI finding Queguilty of violating CB Circular No. 20 in connectionwith section 34 of RA 265, and sentencing him to

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotasuffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine ofP1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency, and to pay the costs.

FACTS- The charge was that the appellant who was inpossession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S.dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders

amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the sameto the Central Bank through its agents within oneday following the receipt of such foreign exchangeas required by Circular No. 20.- The appeal is based on the claim that saidcircular No. 20 was not published in the OfficialGazette prior to the act or omission imputed to theappellant, and that consequently, said circular hadno force and effect. It is contended thatCommonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 bothrequire said circular to be published in the OfficialGazette, it being an order or notice of generalapplicability. The Solicitor General answering thiscontention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638and 2930 do not require the publication in the

Official Gazette of said circular issued for theimplementation of a law in order to have force andeffect.

ISSUEWON the laws were effective despite lack ofpublication.

HELD- NO.

The laws in question do not require the publicationof the circulars, regulations or notices thereinmentioned in order to become binding andeffective. All that said two laws provide is thatlaws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court

and Court of Appeals, notices and documentsrequired by law to be of no force and effect. Inother words, said two Acts merely enumerate andmake a list of what should be published in theOfficial Gazette, presumably, for the guidance ofthe different branches of the Government issuingsame, and of the Bureau of Printing.- However, section 11 of the RevisedAdministrative Code provides that statutes passedby Congress shall, in the absence of specialprovision, take effect at the beginning of thefifteenth day after the completion of thepublication of the statute in the Official Gazette.- Article 2 of the new Civil Code also provides thatlaws shall take effect after fifteen days following

the completion of their publication in the Official

Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is truethat Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not astatute or law but being issued for theimplementation of the law authorizing its issuance,it has the force and effect of law according tosettled jurisprudence.- Circulars and regulations especially like theCircular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question

which prescribes a penalty for its violation shouldbe published before becoming effective, this, onthe general principle and theory that before the

public is bound by its contents, especially its penalprovisions, a law, regulation or circular must firstbe published and the people officially andespecifically informed of said contents and its

penalties.- although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank wasissued in the year 1949, it was not published untilNovember 1951, that is, about 3 months afterappellant's conviction of its violation. It is clearthat said Circular, particularly its penal provision,did not have any legal effect and bound no oneuntil its publication in the Official Gazette or after

November 1951. In other words, appellant couldnot be held liable for its violation, for it was notbinding at the time he was found to have failed tosell the foreign exchange in his possession withinone day following his taking possession thereof.Disposition decision appealed from is reversed,appellant acquitted

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS v SSS17 SCRA 1077

BARRERA, J.: (1966)

FACTS

- The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., adomestic corporation, since the start of itsoperations in 1957, has been employing Japanesetechnicians under a pre-arranged contract ofemployment, the minimum period of whichemployment is 6 months and the maximum is 24months.- On October 7, 1958, the Assistant GeneralManager of the corporation, on its behalf and asattorney-in-fact of the Japanese technicians, filed aclaim with the SSS for the refund of the premiumspaid to the System, on the ground of terminationof the members' employment.- As this claim was denied, they filed a petitionwith the Social Security Commission for the return

or refund of the premiums, in the total sum of

P2,520.00, paid by the employer corporation andthe 6 Japanese employees, plus attorney's fees.- This claim was controverted by the SSS, allegingthat Rule IX of the Rules and Regulations of theSystem, as amended, requires membership in theSystem for at least 2 years before a separated orresigned employee may be allowed a return of hispersonal contributions. Under the same rule, the

employer is not also entitled to a refund of thepremium- contributions it had paid.- After hearing, the Commission denied thepetition for the reason that, although under theoriginal provisions of Section 3 (d) of Rule I of theRules and Regulations of the SSS, alien-employees(who are employed temporarily) and theiremployers are entitled to a rebate of aproportionate amount of their respectivecontributions upon the employees' departure fromthe Philippines, said rule was amended byeliminating that portion granting a return of thepremium- contributions. This amendment becameeffective on January 14, 1958, or before theemployment of the subject-aliens terminated. The

rights of covered employees who are separatedfrom employment, under the present Rules, arecovered by Rule IX which allows a return of thepremiums only if they have been members for atleast 2 years.- The petitioners raise the issue that the amendingrule violates the non-impairment of contractsclause. They also note that the amending rule wasnot published in the Official Gazette untilNovember 1958. Since they were employed onOctober 1958, it follows that they were not yetcovered by the new rule. The Commission on theother hand noted that its rules are effective uponapproval of the President in January 1958.

ISSUEWON the Commission erred in applying theamended rules to the Japanese employees

HELDNO.RATIO. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, thedate of publication of laws in the OfficialGazette is material for the purpose ofdetermining their effectivity, only if thestatutes themselves do not so provide.[CAVEAT: THIS RATIO IS OBSOLETE, TANADA VS.TUVERA IS THE CONTROLLING DOCTRINE]REASONING In the present case, the originalRules and Regulations of the SSS specifically

provide that any amendment thereto subsequently

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotaadopted by the Commission, shall take effect onthe date of its approval by the President.Consequently, the delayed publication of theamended rules in the Official Gazette did not affectthe date of their effectivity, which is January 14,1958, when they were approved by the President.It follows that when the Japanese technicians wereseparated from employment in October, 1958, the

rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of theamended Rules and Regulations, which requiresmembership for 2 years before such refund ofpremiums may be allowed.

Disposition affirmed

TANADA v TUVERA146 SCRA 446

ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985

NaturePetition for Mandamus

Facts- Invoking the people's right to be informed onmatters of public concern, a right recognized inSection 6, Article IV of the 1973 PhilippineConstitution, as well as the principle that laws tobe valid and enforceable must be published in theOfficial Gazette or otherwise effectivelypromulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamusto compel respondent public officials to publish.and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazetteof various presidential decrees, letters ofinstructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letter of implementation andadministrative orders.

- Respondents contend that publication in theOfficial Gazette is not a sine qua non requirementfor the effectivity of laws where the lawsthemselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of theCivil Code:"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen daysfollowing the completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x xx

IssueWON publication is a condition sine qua non for theeffectivity of laws

HeldYes.Presidential issuances of general application,which have not been published, shall have no forceand effect .

- Considered in the light of other statutesapplicable to the issue at hand, theconclusion is easily reached that Article 2does not preclude the requirement ofpublication in the Official Gazette, even ifthe law itself provides for the date of itseffectivity. Sec of CA 638 provides:

Section 1. There shall be published in theOfficial Gazette [1] all important legislativeacts and resolutions of a public nature of theCongress of the Philippines; [2] all executiveand administrative orders and proclamations,except such as have no general applicability,(3) decisions or abstracts of decisions of theSupreme Court and the Court of Appeals asmay be deemed by said courts of sufficientimportance to be so published, [4] suchdocuments or classes of documents as may berequired so to be published by law, and [5]such documents or classes of documents asthe President of the Philippines shalldetermine from time to time to have generalapplicability and legal effect, or which he mayauthorize so to be published.

- The word "shall" used therein imposes uponrespondent officials an imperative duty. Thatduty must be enforced if the Constitutional rightof the people to be informed on matters ofpublic concern is to be given substance andreality.- The clear object of the quoted provision is to

give the general public adequate notice of thevarious laws which are to regulate their actionsand conduct as citizens. Without such notice andpublication, there would be no basis for theapplication of the maxim "ignorantia legis nonexcusat." It would be the height of injustice topunish or otherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law which he had no noticewhatsoever not even a constructive one.- Perhaps at no time since the establishment of thePhilippine Republic has the publication of lawstaken so vital significance than at this time whenthe people have bestowed upon the President apower heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.While the people are kept abreast by the massmedia of the debates and deliberations in theBatasan Pambansa - and for the diligent ones,

ready access to the legislative records - no suchpublicity accompanies the law-making process ofthe President. Thus, without publication, thepeople have no means of knowing whatpresidential decrees have actually beenpromulgated, much less a definite way ofinforming themselves of the specific contents andtexts of such decrees.

- It is needless to add that the publication ofpresidential issuances "of a public nature" or "ofgeneral applicability" is a requirement of dueprocess. It is a rule of law that before a personmay be bound by law, he must first be officiallyand specifically informed of its contents.Disposition Court ordered respondents to publishin the Official Gazette all unpublished presidentialissuances which are of general application, andunless so published, they shall have no bindingforce and effect.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OFSERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v TORRES

212 SCRA 298GRIO-AQUINO, J.; August 6, 1992

NaturePetition for prohibition with temporary restrainingorder

Facts:

- On June 1, 1991, as a result of published storiesregarding the abuses suffered by Filipinohousemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLESecretary Ruben D. Torres issued DepartmentOrder No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarilysuspending the recruitment by privateemployment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpersgoing to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through thePOEA took over the business of deploying suchHong Kong-bound workers:

In view of the need to establish mechanismsthat will enhance the protection for Filipinodomestic helpers going to Hong Kong, therecruitment of the same by privateemployment agencies is hereby temporarily

suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such,

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the DOLE through the facilities of thePhil ippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration shall take over theprocessing and deployment of householdworkers bound for Hong Kong, subject toguidelines to be issued for said purpose.

- Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEAissued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of

1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Governmentprocessing and deployment of Filipino domestichelpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation ofHong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hireFilipino domestic helpers. On August 1, 1991, thePOEA Administrator also issued MemorandumCircular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processingof employment contracts of domestic workers forHong Kong.- On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filedthis petition for prohibition to annul theaforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and toprohibit their implementation for the followingreasons:

1. that the respondents acted with grave

abuse of discretion and/or in excess of theirrule-making authority in issuing said circulars;2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circularsare contrary to the Constitution, areunreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and3. that the requirements of publication andfiling with the Office of the NationalAdministrative Register were not compliedwith.

IssueWON the assailed Department Order and circularsissued by both DOLE and POEA are legally valid

Held

NO.- Although Article 36 of the Labor Code grants theLabor Secretary the power to restrict and regulaterecruitment and placement activities and thequestioned circulars are therefore a valid exerciseof the police power as delegated to the executivebranch of Government, nevertheless, they arelegally invalid, defective and unenforceablefor lack of power publication and filing in theOffice of the National AdministrativeRegister as required in Article 2 of the CivilCode, Article 5 of the Labor Code andSections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII ofthe Administrative Code of 1987 whichprovide:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen

(15) days following the completion of theirpublication in the Official Gazatte, unless itis otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. -- TheDepartment of Labor and other governmentagencies charged with the administrationand enforcement of this Code or any of itsparts shall promulgate the necessary

implementing rules and regulations. Suchrules and regulations shall become effectivefifteen (15) days after announcement oftheir adoption in newspapers of generalcirculation.Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall filewith the University of the Philippines LawCenter, three (3) certified copies of everyrule adopted by it. Rules in force on the dateof effectivity of this Code which are not filedwithin three (3) months shall not thereafterbe the basis of any sanction against anyparty or persons. (Emphasis supplied,Chapter 2, Book VII of the AdministrativeCode of 1987.)

Sec. 4.Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law notinconsistent with this Book, each rule shallbecome effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of filing as above provided unless adifferent date is fixed by law, or specified inthe rule in cases of imminent danger topublic health, safety and welfare, theexistence of which must be expressed in astatement accompanying the rule. Theagency shall take appropriate measures tomake emergency rules known to personswho may be affected by them. (Emphasissupplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of theAdministrative Code of 1987).

- As held in Taada vs. Tuvera:. . . Administrative rules and regulationsmust also be published if their purpose is toenforce or implement existing law pursuantalso to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)Interpretative regulations and those merelyinternal in nature, that is, regulating onlythe personnel of the administrative agencyand not the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued byadministrative superiors concerning therules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of theirduties. (p. 448.)

We agree that publication must be in full or

it is no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the content of thelaws. (p. 448.)

Disposition For lack of proper publication, theadministrative circulars in question may not beenforced and implemented.

DE JESUS V COA (JAMORALIN)294 SCRA 152

PURISIMA; August 12, 1998

NATURESpecial civil action of certiorari

FACTS- Petitioners are employees of the Local WaterUtilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, RA6758 (prescribing a revised compensation and

position classification system in the government)took effect. The said act provides, among others,for the consolidation of allowances and additionalcompensation into standardized salary rates.- to implement the law, the Dept. of Budget andManagement (DBM) issued a circular,discontinuing without qualification effective Nov.1,1989, all allowances and fringe benefits grantedon top of basic salary. Pursuant to the law andcircular, corporate auditor Jamoralin disallowed onpost audit the payment of honoraria to thepetitioners- petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning thevalidity and effectivity of the circular on 2 grounds:that the circular is inconsistent with the provisions

of RA 6758, the very law it seeks to implement;and that it is without force and effect because itwas not published in the Official Gazette. COAupheld the validity of the circular. Hence, thispetition

ISSUEWON the circular has legal force and effect despitethe absence of publication

HELDNORatioThe Civil Code provides: Art. 2. Laws shalltake effect after fifteen days following thecompletion of their publication in the Official

Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. xxx

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Administrative Law A2010Dean CarlotaReasoning In Tanada v Tavera, the courtconstrued the above provision:all statutes, including those of local applicationand private laws, shall be published as a conditionfor their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after

publication unless a different effectivity date isfixedCovered by this rule are presidential decrees and

executive orders xxx. Administrative rules andregulations must also be published if their purposeis to enforce or implement existing law pursuant toa valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merelyinternal in nature, that is, regulating only the

personnel of the administrative agency and notthe public, need not be published. Neither is

publication required of the so-called letters ofinstructions issued by administrative superiorsconcerning the rules or guidelines to be followedby their subordinates in the performance of theirduties.- the challenged circular in this case needs to bepublished. Following the doctrine, publication in

the OG or in a newspaper of general circulation inthe Philippines is required since the circular is inthe nature of an administrative circular thepurpose of which is to enforce or implement anexisting law. Stated differently, to be effective andenforceable, the circular must go through therequisite publication in the Official Gazette or in anewspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.- the circular, which completely disallowspayment of allowances and other additionalcompensation to government officials andemployees, is not a mere interpretative or internalregulation. It tends to deprive governmentworkers of their allowances and additionalcompensation sorely needed to keep body and

soul together. At the very least, before the saidcircular may be permitted to substantially reducetheir income, the people concerned should beapprised and alerted by the publication of thecircular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation to the end that they be givenamplest opportunity to voice out whateveropposition they may have, and to ventilate theirstance on the matter. This approach is more inkeeping with democratic precepts and rudimentsof fairness and transparency.Disposition Petition is granted.

REPUBLIC (NTC) V EXPRESSTELECOM

G.R. No. 147096, G.R. No. 147210YNARES-SANTIAGO ; Jan 15, 2002

NATUREInstant petition for review on certiorari

FACTS- December 29, 1992 > InternationalCommunications Corp (now Bayantel) filed anapplication with NTC a Certificate of PublicConvenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install,operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile

Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer fora Provisional Authority (PA)- January 22, 1993 > NTC issued MemorandumCircular No. 4-1-93 directing all interestedapplicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to filetheir applications before NTC on or beforeFebruary 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptanceof any application filed after said date until further

orders- May 6, 1993 > prior to the issuance of any noticeof hearing by NTC wrt Bayantel's originalapplication, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-partemotion to admit an amended application.- May 17, 1993 > notice of hearing issued by NTCwrt this amended application was published in theManila Chronicle. Copies of the application andnotice of hearing were mailed to all affectedparties. Hearings were conducted on the amendedapplication.- December 19, 1993 > before Bayantel couldcomplete the presentation of its evidence, NTCissued an Order: In view of the recent grant of two(2) separate Provisional Authorities in favor of

ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in theclosing out of all available frequencies for theservice being applied for by herein applicant, andin order that this case may not remain pending foran indefinite period of time, AS PRAYED FOR, letthis case be, as it is, hereby ordered ARCHIVEDwithout prejudice to its reinstatement if and whenthe requisite frequency becomes available.- March 23, 1999 > Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99 was issued by NTC re-allocating an additionalfive (5) MHz frequencies for CMTS service- May 17, 1999 > Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motionto Revive Case, citing the availability of newfrequency bands for CMTS operators- February 1, 2000 > NTC granted Bayantel's

motion to revive the latter's application NTC noted

that the application was ordered archived withoutprejudice to its reinstatement if and when therequisite frequency shall become available.- Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom)filed in NTC an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss)praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's applicationarguing that: Bayantels application is outdatedand should no longer be used as basis for the

necessity for the proposed CMTS service and thereis no public need for new CMTS operator asexisting operators - Extelcom, Globe, Smart, Piltel,and Islacom- more than adequately addressed themarket demand- March 13, 2000 > Bayantel filed a ConsolidatedReply/Comment, stating that Extelcom cannotclaim that frequencies were not availableinasmuch as the allocation and assignment restsolely on the discretion of the NTC- May 3, 2000 > NTC issued an Order granting infavor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operateCMTS service and denying the Motions forReconsideration by SMARTCOM and GLOBE

TELECOMS/ISLACOM and the Motion to Dismiss

filed by EXTELCOM for lack of merit. The grant ofthe provisional authority was anchored onensuring effective competition in the CMTS marketconsidering the operational merger of (Smart-Pilteland Globe-Inslacom), new CMTS operators must beallowed to provide the service, the need to provideservice to some or all of the remaining cities andmunicipalities without telephone service anddocuments in compliance with the technicalrequirements- In granting Bayantel the provisional authority tooperate a CMTS, NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 ofits 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, whichprovides:

Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an

application, complaint or petition or at any stagethereafter, the Board may grant on motion ofthe pleader or on its own initiative, the reliefprayed for, based on the pleading, together withthe affidavits and supporting documentsattached thereto, without prejudice to a finaldecision after completion of the hearing whichshall be called within thirty (30) days from grantof authority asked for. (underscoring ours)

- Extelcom contends that NTC should have appliedthe Revised Rules which were filed with the Officeof the National Administrative Register onFebruary 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted thephrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, aprovisional authority may be issued only upon

filing of the proper motion before the Commission.

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlota- CA: Extelcom filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition seeking the annulment of the Orderreviving the application of Bayantel and the Ordergranting Bayantel a provisional authority toconstruct, install, operate and maintain anationwide CMTS- September 13, 2000 > CA granted the writs ofcertiorari and prohibition

- MFRs filed by Bayantel and NTC but were deniedfor lack of merit

ISSUES1. WON 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure willstill govern because there was a deficiency in thepublication of the 1993 Revised Rules2. WON NTCs rulings can be touched upon by thecourts

HELD1. YES- NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission,issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch

as the 1993 Revised Rules have not beenpublished in a newspaper of general circulation,the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.- The absence of publication, coupled with thecertification by the Commissioner of the NTCstating that the NTC was still governed by the1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 RevisedRules have not taken effect at the time of thegrant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. Thefact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed withthe UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of nomoment. There is nothing in the AdministrativeCode of 1987 which implies that the filing of therules with the UP Law Center is the operative actthat gives the rules force and effect. Book VII,

Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states:Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with theUniversity of the Philippines Law Center three(3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it.Rules in force on the date of effectivity of thisCode which are not filed within three (3) monthsfrom the date shall not thereafter be the basis ofany sanction against any party or persons.(2) The records officer of the agency, or hisequivalent functionary, shall carry out therequirements of this section under pain ordisciplinary action.(3) A permanent register of all rules shall bekept by the issuing agency and shall be open topublic inspection.

- The National Administrative Register is merely abulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only tothe Office of the President, Congress, all appellatecourts, the National Library, other public offices oragencies as the Congress may select, and to otherpersons at a price sufficient to cover publicationand mailing or distribution costs.- Taada vs. Tuvera stated, thus: "We hold

therefore that all statutes, including those of localapplication and private laws, shall be published asa condition for their effectivity, which shall beginfifteen days after publication unless a differenteffectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered bythis rule are presidential decrees and executiveorders promulgated by the President in theexercise of legislative power or, at present,directly conferred by the Constitution.Administrative Rules and Regulations must also bepublished if their purpose is to enforce orimplement existing law pursuant also to a validdelegation. Interpretative regulations and thosemerely internal in nature, that is, regulating onlythe personnel of the administrative agency and

not the public, need not be published. Neither ispublication required of the so-called letters ofinstructions issued by administrative superiorsconcerning the rules or guidelines to be followedby their subordinates in the performance of theirduties. We agree that the publication must be infull or it is no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the contents of the laws."- Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or anewspaper of general circulation is a conditionsine qua non before statutes, rules or regulationscan take effect. This is explicit from ExecutiveOrder No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the CivilCode, and which states that: Laws shall takeeffect after fifteen days following the completion of

their publication either in the Official Gazette or ina newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines, unless it is otherwise provided.- The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC,which implements Section 29 of the Public ServiceAct (C.A. 146), fall squarely within the scope ofthese laws, as explicitly mentioned in the caseTaada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules andregulations must be published if their purpose is toenforce or implement existing law pursuant to avalid delegation. The only exceptions areinterpretative regulations, those merely internal innature, or those so-called letters of instructionsissued by administrative superiors concerning therules and guidelines to be followed by their

subordinates in the performance of their duties.

- Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should bepublished in the Official Gazette or in anewspaper of general circulation before itcan take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rulesitself mandates that said Rules shall takeeffect only after their publication in anewspaper of general circulation. In theabsence of such publication, therefore, it is

the 1978 Rules that governs.- In any event, regardless of whether the 1978Rules or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, therecords show that the amended application filedby Bayantel in fact included a motion for theissuance of a provisional authority. Hence, itcannot be said that the NTC granted theprovisional authority motu proprio. The Court ofAppeals, therefore, erred when it found that theNTC issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its owninitiative.2. NORatio This Court has consistently held that thecourts will not interfere in matters which areaddressed to the sound discretion of the

government agency entrusted with the regulationof activities coming under the special andtechnical training and knowledge of such agency.It has also been held that the exercise ofadministrative discretion is a policy decision and amatter that can best be discharged by thegovernment agency concerned, and not by thecourts. Administrative agencies are given a widelatitude in the evaluation of evidence and in theexercise of its adjudicative functions. This latitudeincludes the authority to take judicial notice offacts within its special competence.DispositionConsolidated petitions are GRANTED

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFELECTRICITY CONSUMERS v ERC

G.R. No 163935Callejo, Sr., J; February 2, 2006

NATUREPetition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction

FACTS- Meralco filed an application with the ERC toincrease its generation charge from P3.1886 perkWh to P3.4664 per kWh which was approved bythe latter on June 2, 2004. Petitioners filed theaction

- NASECORE, et al. forthwith filed with this Court

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotathe present petition for certiorari seeking to nullifythe said June 2, 2004 ERC Order for lack ofrequisite publication of respondent MERALCOsamended application, thereby depriving thepetitioners of procedural due process. In addition,they invoke Section 4(e), Rule 3 of theImplementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of theElectric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)

which provides for publication of the same in anewspaper of general circulation. Hence theyallege that said failure to comply with thepublication requirement renders the assailed ordernull and void.- Respondent MERALCO, for its part, urges theCourt to uphold the validity of the assailed ERCOrder approving the increase of its generationcharge. In essence, it contends that its amendedapplication for the increase of its generationcharge is excluded and/or exempted from theapplication of the publication requirement, amongothers, in Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA.

The applicable rules are the GRAM ImplementingRules embodied in the ERC Order dated February

24, 2003. These rules govern any petition for therecovery of fuel and purchased power costs. (Thesubject is the additional cost being billed byMeralco to its customers to recover any increase inthe cost of power it purchases from its electricitysuppliers over a base rate. This is in effect a costrecovery mechanism since Meralco is just grantedthe ability to recover additional costs that itssuppliers charge Meralco due to increase in fuelcost and such. To arrive at the additional cost tobe charged, a formula was developed anddiscussed thoroughly in public hearing held for thepurpose. The same formula was published in twonewspapers of general circulation. Thereafter, thisformula was used in computing the increase in the

charges that Meralco can charge without the needof going through the publication, public hearingroute as the method of computation has beenclearly established. I t became merelymathematical at that point. However, with theEPIRA the ERC replaced the ERB and hence newterminologies and methods had to be established.

The old cost recovery mechanism was replaced bya new formula which also went through theprocess of public hearing. Hence, Meralco opinedthat since this new mechanism was essentially thesame as the old one under the ERB, there was noneed for it to go through the process every timethey increase the rates to recover pure costs.)

ISSUE/S

WON ERC committed grave abuse of discretion inissuing the increase

HELDYes.Contrary to the stance taken by the respondents,the amended application of respondent MERALCOfor the increase of its generation charge is covered

by Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. Forclarity, the said provision is quoted anew:(e) Any application or petition for rate

adjustment or for any relief affecting theconsumers must be verified, andaccompanied with an acknowledgement ofreceipt of a copy thereof by the LGULegislative Body of the locality where theapplicant or petitioner principally operatestogether with the certification of the noticeof publication thereof in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the same locality.

The ERC may grant provisionally ordeny the relief prayed for not later thanseventy-five (75) calendar days from the

filing of the application or petition, based onthe same and the supporting documentsattached thereto and such comments orpleadings the consumers or the LGUconcerned may have filed within thirty (30)calendar days from receipt of a copy of theapplication or petition or from thepublication thereof as the case may be.

Thereafter, the ERC shall conduct aformal hearing on the application orpetition, giving proper notices to all partiesconcerned, with at least one public hearingin the affected locality, and shall decide thematter on the merits not later than twelve(12) months from the issuance of the

aforementioned provisional order.This Section 4(e) shall not apply to

those applications or petitions already filedas of 26 December 2001 in compliance withSection 36 of the Act.

- There is another compelling reason why relianceby respondent MERALCO and the ERC on theGRAM Implementing Rules is unavailing. To recall,they advance the view that the June 2, 2004 ERCOrder is valid, notwithstanding the fact thatrespondent MERALCOs amended application wasnot published in a newspaper of generalcirculation, because the same was issued inaccordance with the GRAM Implementing Ruleswhich does not require such publication.

- It does not appear from the records, however,

that the GRAM Implementing Rules, as set forth inthe ERC Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERCCase No. 2003-44, has been published in theOfficial Gazette or in a newspaper of generalcirculation.- Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2of the Civil Code, provides that laws shall takeafter fifteen days following the completion of their

publication either in the Official Gazette or in anewspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,unless it is otherwise provided.- The basic requirement of publication of statuteswas explained in Taada v. Tuvera as follows:

We hold therefore that all statutes, includingthose of local application and private laws,shall be published as a condition for theireffectivity, which shall begin fifteen daysafter publication unless a differenteffectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidentialdecrees and executive orders promulgatedby the President in the exercise oflegislative powers whenever the same are

validly delegated by the legislature, or atpresent, directly conferred by theConstitution. Administrative rules andregulations must also be published if theirpurpose is to enforce or implement existinglaw pursuant also to a valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merelyinternal in nature, that is, regulating onlythe personnel of the administrative agencyand not the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued byadministrative superiors concerning therules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their

duties.- A careful review of the procedural stepsundertaken by the ERC leading to its issuance ofthe Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC CaseNo. 2003-44, which set forth the GRAMImplementing Rules, as well as the Order dated

June 2, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-112, whichapproved the increase of respondent MERALCOsgeneration charge purportedly in accordance withthe GRAM Implementing Rules, shows that therewas no publication of the same in the OfficialGazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

Disposition Petition is granted.

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3. Penal Regulations

PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY94 Phil. 640

MONTEMAYOR; March 29, 1954

NATUREAppeal from the decision of the CFI finding Que

guilty of violating CB Circular No. 20 in connectionwith section 34 of RA 265, and sentencing him tosuffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine ofP1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency, and to pay the costs.

FACTS- The charge was that the appellant who was inpossession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S.dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money ordersamounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the sameto the Central Bank through its agents within oneday following the receipt of such foreign exchangeas required by Circular No. 20.

- The appeal is based on the claim that saidcircular No. 20 was not published in the OfficialGazette prior to the act or omission imputed to theappellant, and that consequently, said circular hadno force and effect. It is contended thatCommonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 bothrequire said circular to be published in the OfficialGazette, it being an order or notice of general

applicability. The Solicitor General answering thiscontention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638and 2930 do not require the publication in theOfficial Gazette of said circular issued for theimplementation of a law in order to have force andeffect.

ISSUEWON the laws were effective despite lack ofpublication.

HELD- NO.

The laws in question do not require the publicationof the circulars, regulations or notices therein

mentioned in order to become binding andeffective. All that said two laws provide is thatlaws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Courtand Court of Appeals, notices and documentsrequired by law to be of no force and effect. Inother words, said two Acts merely enumerate andmake a list of what should be published in theOfficial Gazette, presumably, for the guidance ofthe different branches of the Government issuingsame, and of the Bureau of Printing.- However, section 11 of the RevisedAdministrative Code provides that statutes passedby Congress shall, in the absence of specialprovision, take effect at the beginning of thefifteenth day after the completion of the

publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.- Article 2 of the new Civil Code also provides thatlaws shall take effect after fifteen days followingthe completion of their publication in the OfficialGazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is truethat Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not astatute or law but being issued for theimplementation of the law authorizing its issuance,it has the force and effect of law according tosettled jurisprudence.- Circulars and regulations especially like theCircular No. 20 of the Central Bank in questionwhich prescribes a penalty for its violation shouldbe published before becoming effective, this, onthe general principle and theory that before the

public is bound by its contents, especially its penal

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Section 6.Omission of Some Rules. -(1) The University of the PhilippinesLaw Center may omit from thebulletin or the codification any rule ifits publication would be undulycumbersome, expensive or otherwiseinexpedient, but copies of that ruleshall be made available onapplication to the agency which

adopted it, and the bulletin shallcontain a notice stating the generalsubject matter of the omitted ruleand new copies thereof may beobtained.(2) Every rule establishing an offenseor defining an act which, pursuant tolaw, is punishable as a crime orsubject to a penalty shall in all casesbe published in full text.

Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin andCodified Rules. - The University of thePhilippines Law Center shall furnish one

(1) free copy each of every issue of thebulletin and of the codified rules orsupplements to the Office of thePresident, Congress, all appellate courtsand the National Library. The bulletin and

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987BOOK VII

CHAPTER 2RULES AND REGULATIONS

Section 3.Filing. -

(1) Every agency shall file with theUniversity of the Philippines LawCenter three (3) certified copies ofevery rule adopted by it. Rules inforce on the date of effectivity of thisCode which are not filed within three(3) months from that date shall notthereafter be the basis of anysanction against any party orpersons.(2) The records officer of the agency,or his equivalent functionary, shallcarry out the requirements of this

section under pain of disciplinaryaction.(3) A permanent register of all rulesshall be kept by the issuing agencyand shall be open to publicinspection.

Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition toother rule-making requirements providedby law not inconsistent with this Book,each rule shall become effective fifteen(15) days from the date of filing as aboveprovided unless a different date is fixedby law, or specified in the rule in cases ofimminent danger to public health, safety

and welfare, the existence of which mustbe expressed in a statementaccompanying the rule. The agency shall


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provisions, a law, regulation or circular must firstbe published and the people officially andespecifically informed of said contents and its

penalties.- although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank wasissued in the year 1949, it was not published untilNovember 1951, that is, about 3 months afterappellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear

that said Circular, particularly its penal provision,did not have any legal effect and bound no oneuntil its publication in the Official Gazette or afterNovember 1951. In other words, appellant couldnot be held liable for its violation, for it was notbinding at the time he was found to have failed tosell the foreign exchange in his possession withinone day following his taking possession thereof.Disposition decision appealed from is reversed,appellant acquitted

PEOPLE v MACEREN

4. Interpretative Rules

HILADO V CIR100 Phil 288

BAUTISTA ANGELO; October 31,1956

NATUREPetition for review by certiorari of a decision of theCTA

FACTS

- March Emilio Hilado filed his income tax returnfor 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City claimeda deductible item of P12,873 from his grossincome pursuant to General Circular V-123 issuedby the CIR. The Secretary of Finance, through theCollector, issued GC V- 139 which revoked anddeclared void Circular V-123; and laid down rulesthat the losses of property which occurred in WWIIfrom fires, storms, shipwrecks or other casualty, orfrom robbery, theft or embezzlement aredeductible in the year of the actual loss ordestruction of said property. The deductions heclaimed for were disallowed as deduction from thegross income of the petitioner for 1951. thepetition for reconsideration and the appeal with

the CTA were denied . This is an appeal from the

said decision- petitioner claimed as a loss consisting of wardamage claim which has been approved but hasnot been paid until the US Congress makes furtherappropriation. He claims that the said amountrepresents a business asset as defined in the saidact to which he is entitled to deduct as loss in his1951 returns

HELD- The court held that assuming that said amountrepresents a portion of the 75% of his war damageclaim not paid, the same would not be deductibleas a loss in 1951 because, according to petitioner,the last installment he received from the WarDamage Commission, together with the notice thatno further payment would be made on his claim,was in 1950. Said amount would at most be aproper deduction from his 1950 gross income.- Secondly, said amount cannot be considered as a"business asset" which can be deducted as a lossin contemplation of law because its collection isnot enforceable as a matter of right, but is

dependent merely upon the generosity andmagnanimity of the U. S. government. As of theend of 1945, there was no law under whichpetitioner could claim compensation for thedestruction of his properties during the battle forthe liberation of the Philippines. And under thePhilippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the paymentsof claims by the War Damage Commission merelydepended upon its discretion to be exercised inthe manner it may see fit, but the non-payment ofwhich cannot give rise to any enforceable right,for, under said Act, "All findings of the Commissionconcerning the amount of loss or damagesustained, the cause of such loss or damage, thepersons to whom compensation pursuant to this

title is payable, and the value of the property lostor damaged, shall be conclusive and shall not bereviewable by any court". (section 113).- Under the authority of section 338 of the NationalInternal Revenue Code the Secretary of Finance, inthe exercise of his administrative powers, causedthe issuance of General Circular No. V-123 as animplementation or interpretative regulation ofsection 30 of the same Code, under which theamount of P12,837.65 was allowed to be deducted"in the year the last installment was received withnotice that no further payment would be madeuntil the United States Congress makes furtherappropriation therefor", but such circular wasfound later to be wrong and was revoked.

- In line with this opinion, the Secretary of Finance,through the Collector of Internal Revenue, issuedGC No. V-139 which not only revoked and declaredvoid his previous Circular No. V 123 but laiddown the rule that losses of property whichoccurred during the period of World War II fromfires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or fromrobbery, theft, or embezzlement are deductible for

income tax purposes in the year of actualdestruction of said property.- "It seems too clear for serious argument that anadministrative officer can not change a lawenacted by Congress. A regulation that is merelyan interpretation of the statute when oncedetermined to have been erroneous becomesnullity. An erroneous construction of the law by the

Treasury Department or the collector of internalrevenue does not preclude or estop thegovernment from collecting a tax which is legallydue." (Ben Stocker, et al., 12 B. T. A., 1351.)"Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arisefrom acts or omissions which are against the lawor which infringe upon the rights of others."

(Article 2254, New Civil Code.)Disposition affirmed

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY,INC.vs. SOCIAL SECURITY

COMMISSION114 SCRA 555

BARRERA; Mar 17, 1962

NATUREAppeal from a resolution of the SSC.

FACTS

- The Social Security Commission issued itsCircular No. 22 informing the employers that allbonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cashvalue of other media of remuneration of thefollowing tenor will comprise the Employeesremuneration or earnings, upon which the SSScontributions will be based.- Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitionerVictorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,wrote the Social Security Commission in effectprotesting against the circular. The petitionersarguments are the following:a. Circular 22 is contradictory to a previousCircular No. 7 expressly excluding overtime payand bonus in the computation of the employers'

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Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotaand employees' respective monthly premiumcontributions.b. The Circular is invalid for lack of authority onthe part of the Social Security Commission topromulgate it without the approval of the Presidentand for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.- Overruling these objections, the Social SecurityCommission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule

or regulation that needed the approval of thePresident and publication in the Official Gazette tobe effective, but a mere administrativeinterpretation of the statute, a mere statement ofgeneral policy or opinion as to how the law shouldbe construed.

ISSUEWON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, ascontemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161empowering the Social Security Commission "toadopt, amend and repeal subject to the approvalof the President such rules and regulations as maybe necessary to carry out the provisions andpurposes of this Act."

HELDNO. It is a mere administrative interpretation.Ratio There is a distinction between anadministrative rule or regulation and anadministrative interpretation of a law. When anadministrative agency promulgates rules andregulations, it "makes" a new law with the forceand effect of a valid law, while when it renders anopinion or gives a statement of policy, it merelyinterprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulationswhen promulgated in pursuance of the procedureor authority conferred upon the administrativeagency by law, partake of the nature of a statute,and compliance therewith may be enforced by a

penal sanction provided in the law. This is sobecause statutes are usually couched in generalterms, after expressing the policy, purposes,objectives, remedies and sanctions intended bythe legislature. The details and the manner ofcarrying out the law are often times left to theadministrative agency entrusted with itsenforcement. In this sense, it has been said thatrules and regulations are the product of adelegated power to create new or additional legalprovisions that have the effect of law.A rule is binding on the courts so long as theprocedure fixed for its promulgation is followedand its scope is within the statutory authoritygranted by the legislature, even if the courts are

not in agreement with the policy stated therein or

its innate wisdom. On the other hand,administrative interpretation of the law is at bestmerely advisory, for it is the courts that finallydetermine what the law means.Reasoning Circular No. 22 in question was issuedby the Social Security Commission, in view of theamendment of the provisions of the Social SecurityLaw defining the term "compensation" contained

in RA 1161 which was amended by RA 1792. Priorto the amendment, bonuses, allowances, andovertime pay given in addition to the regular orbase pay were expressly excluded or exemptedfrom the definition of the term "compensation",such exemption or exclusion was deleted by theamendatory law. It thus became necessary for theSocial Security Commission to interpret the effectof such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22was, therefore, issued to apprise those concernedof the interpretation or understanding of theCommission, of the law as amended, which it wasits duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detailthat was not already in the law as amended. Itmerely stated and circularized the opinion of the

Commission as to how the law should beconstrued.DISPOSITION

The Resolution appealed from is affirmed.

PERALTA V CSC212 SCRA 425

Padilla; Aug. 10, 1992

FACTS-petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II in theDepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI). Since hehad no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted

from his initial salary the amount corresponding tohis absences inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays.Petitioner sent a memorandum to Alvis (Chief ofGen. Administration Service), inquiring as to thelaw on said deductions. Alvis replied, citing Ch.5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Phil.Civil Service which states that when an employeeis on leave without pay on a day before orimmediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday orHoliday, such Sat., Sun. or holiday shall also bewithout pay, unless such non-working days occurwithin the period of service actually rendered.-petitioner sent a letter to the CSC chairmanquestioning the cited provision alleging that suchwas tantamount to deprivation of property without

due process as it was not supported by law. CSCpromulgated resolution 90-497, ruling that thededuction was in order, with the rationale that onewho has no leave credits, being absent on eitherMonday or Friday, cannot be favorably creditedwith intervening days had the same been workingdays. Petitioner filed an MFR which the CSC deniedhence this petition.

-during the pendency of this petition, the CSCpromulgated Resolution 91-540 which amendedthe questioned policy, resolving to instead adoptthe policy that an employee, regardless of whetherhe has leave credits or not, is absent on a dayimmediately preceding/succeeding a Sat., Sun. orholiday shall not be considered absent.

ISSUEWON CSCs policy mandating salary deductions isvalid

HELD-NO. Although from the developments brought byResolution 91-540 the issue would appear to have

become moot and academic, the Court hasdecided to render a formal ruling for reasons ofpublic interest.-When an administrative or executive agencyrenders an opinion or issues a statement of policy,it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and theadministrative interpretati

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