Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with (Im)Mobile ...

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Volume 92 | Number 2 Article 5

1-1-2014

Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with(Im)Mobile Homes: Why North Carolina NeedsStatutory Reform to Provide the Mobile HomeOwner-Tenant with Adequate Security of Tenureand Security of InvestmentChad T. Anderson

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Recommended CitationChad T. Anderson, Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with (Im)Mobile Homes: Why North Carolina Needs Statutory Reform toProvide the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with Adequate Security of Tenure and Security of Investment, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 591 (2014).Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol92/iss2/5

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Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with (Im)MobileHomes: Why North Carolina Needs Statutory Reform toProvide the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with AdequateSecurity of Tenure and Security of Investment*

INTRODUCTION .......................................... 592I. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO IN

NORTH CAROLINA. .................................. 594II. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT'S NEED FOR

SECURITY OF TENURE AND SECURITY OF INVESTMENT ....... 598III. NORTH CAROLINA'S CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME FOR

THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO...................601A. N. C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14............. ............ 601B. Other North Carolina Statutes Relevant to the Mobile

Home Owner-Tenant Scenario ..................... 6031. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-37.1: Defense of

Retaliatory Eviction ................ ....... 6032. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14.3: Notice of

Conversion of Manufactured Home Communities.....605C. What Could Have Been: North Carolina's Flirtation

with Good-Cause Legislation ................ ..... 607IV. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE MOBILE

HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO: COMMON-LAW ORLEGISLATIVE REMEDIES? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . 608A. Common-Law Solutions to the Mobile Home Owner-

Tenant Scenario .................................... 6081. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing ................................ 6082. The Implied Covenant of Security of Tenure or

Good Cause for Termination ......... ...... 609B. Common-Law Versus Legislative Remedies..... ..... 610

1. General Considerations ............... ..... 6102. Evaluating Common-Law Versus Legislative

Remedies in the Context of North Carolina................611V. WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE? .......... ... .. . .613

A. The Cost of Good Cause..................... ...... 614B. Striking a Balance: Finding the Most Appropriate

Formulation of Good Cause.......... .................. 614

* @ 2014 Chad T. Anderson.

592 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92

VI. FOURTH CIRCUIT COMPARISONS ............. ................. 616A. South Carolina ............................... 617B. Virginia ........................................... 618C. West Virginia ................................. 620D. Maryland ............................. ...... 622

VII. NATIONAL COMPARISONS ............................ 623CONCLUSION ........................................ ..... 624

INTRODUCTION

This is one of the biggest days of your life, North Carolinaresident. Today you purchased your first home. It is pre-owned, and amobile home, but it is yours-something you have invested in andsacrificed to acquire. It seems things are finally looking up for you.For one of the first times in your life, the American dream of upwardmobility seems within your reach. However, there is one significantproblem: you do not own the land beneath your mobile home.Welcome to the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.'

It is true that you own the mobile home you purchased, but donot mistake your ownership for security of tenure.2 It would be wrongto assume that you are protected from eviction so long as you payrent and act in accordance with the provisions of your rentalagreement.3 In reality, the right for your mobile home to remain on itscurrent lot is subject to the whims of the lot owner.' In NorthCarolina, and many other states, so long as you are given propernotice, the lot owner can evict your mobile home without any reasonat all.' Now, this may seem unfair. After all, you made a substantial

1. See J. Royce Fichtner, Note, The Iowa Mobile Home Park Landlord-TenantRelationship: Present Eviction Procedures and Needed Reforms, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 181,182-83 (2004) (using the 'term "Mobile Home Owner-Tenant" to describe the situationwhere the Owner-Tenant owns the mobile home but rents the land beneath it).

2. See Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protectionsfor Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 819(2008) (using the term "security of tenure" within the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario to describe a context in which the "landowner cannot terminate a tenancy absenta showing of good cause").

3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012) (providing for eviction withoutgood cause so long as the landlord provides the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with sixtydays of notice to quit the tenancy).

4. See id.; Manufactured Housing Resource Guide: Protecting Fundamental Freedomsin Communities, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 4-5 (2010), http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/groundwork.pdf [hereinafter Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities].

5. See § 42-14; see also Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note4, at 5 (labeling North Carolina as a state without "statutes addressing grounds for evictionfrom manufactured housing communities").

2014] MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SECURITY

investment when you purchased your mobile home,6 and youexpected that your purchase would provide you with stability andsecurity. However, in the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario,your investment does not buy you security of tenure or security ofinvestment. To attain security of tenure and security of investment,you need legal rights and protections. As a Mobile Home Owner-Tenant in North Carolina, you currently have very few of either.

This Comment advocates for a change of law in North Carolinathat provides the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant ("Owner-Tenant")with security of tenure and security of investment. Unlike many otherjurisdictions, including every other state in the Fourth Circuit, NorthCarolina does not have a statute requiring good cause to evict anOwner-Tenant. Instead, North Carolina's statutory protection for theOwner-Tenant is limited to timely notice to quit the tenancy.' Thepresumed adequacy of this statutory scheme is based on the premisethat mobile homes are, in fact, mobile, and that granting time to moveis sufficient protection for the Owner-Tenant. However, mobilehomes are generally not mobile,"o and the possibility of evictionwithout cause exposes the Owner-Tenant to inadequate security oftenure and security of investment, which, in turn, results in significantfinancial and psychological costs for the Owner-Tenant and hisfamily." Therefore, North Carolina needs a solution to the MobileHome Owner-Tenant Scenario that does more than provide theOwner-Tenant with additional time to move. In order to providesufficient security of tenure and security of investment to the Owner-Tenant, North Carolina needs a statute that prevents a mobile home

6. See North Carolina Housing Information, MOUNTAINSIDE FIN., https://www.mountainsidefinancial.com/mobile-home-loan-north-carolina.php (last visited Jan. 4,2014) (listing the average cost of a singlewide in North Carolina as $33,400 and theaverage cost of a doublewide as $67,500).

7. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 818-19; see also Protecting Fundamental Freedomsin Communities, supra note 4, at 1-2 (describing how the high cost of moving a mobilehome and the precarious rights of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant combine to deprivethe Mobile Home Owner-Tenant of security of investment). Within the context of thisComment, "security of investment" describes the context in which the Owner-Tenant hassufficient financial security in the mobile home to create an incentive to invest in andmaintain the mobile home.

8. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5.9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14.

10. See, e.g., Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 1("Despite the epithet 'mobile home,' today's manufactured homes are not particularlymobile.").

11. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 820-24.

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community owner from evicting the Owner-Tenant or refusing torenew the Owner-Tenant's existing lease without good cause.12

This Comment proceeds in seven parts. Part I examines thecurrent state of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario in NorthCarolina, concluding that further action is needed to protect Owner-Tenants in the state. Part II examines why security of tenure andsecurity of investment are vital to the lives of Owner-Tenants, whilePart III examines how North Carolina's current statutory scheme isfailing to provide Owner-Tenants with these essential securityinterests. Part IV considers whether legislative or common-lawsolutions are more appropriate remedies within the Mobile HomeOwner-Tenant Scenario, and Part V answers the question of whatshould constitute "good cause" to evict. Part VI looks to NorthCarolina's jurisdictional neighbors in the Fourth Circuit to determinewhether any of these jurisdictions have adopted statutes that providethe appropriate balance of "good cause" protection. Finally, Part VIIlooks to national comparisons.

I. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO IN NORTHCAROLINA

Mobile home ownership" is pervasive in North Carolina. Thestate has the fifth highest percentage of mobile homes in the nation,with mobile homes constituting 14.3% of the state's housing. 4 Nearlyhalf of those owning one of North Carolina's 577,000 manufacturedhomes live within one of North Carolina's 4,000 trailer parks."Therefore, a significant number of North Carolina residents findthemselves in the quasi-owner, quasi-renter arrangement known asthe Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario-they own the mobilehome but rent the lot on which the mobile home rests. 6 Becausethese North Carolina residents do not own the land beneath their

12. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.13. For a discussion of the conditions that determine whether a mobile home is

considered personal or real property in North Carolina, see Manufactured HousingResource Guide: Titling Homes as Real Property, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 14 (2009),http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/manufactured-housing/cfed-titling-homes.pdf.

14. See Mobile Homes, Percent of Total Housing Units, 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ranks/rank38.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).

15. See ALLAN D. WALLIS, WHEEL ESTATE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MOBILEHOMES 16 (1991) (asserting that "approximately 46 percent of all mobile home ownerslive in parks"); Bob Geary, Mobile Home Park Residents Caught in Catch-22: ParadiseLost, INDY WEEK (July 9, 2008), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/mobile-home-park-residents-caught-in-catch-22/Content?oid=1209492.

16. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 182 & n.2.

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mobile home, they are subject to the many maladies of the MobileHome Owner-Tenant Scenario.

A primary problem for North Carolinians living in trailer parks isthat the real estate world treats them as second-class citizens."Because they do not own the land beneath their mobile homes, theyare not considered property owners."s Instead, their mobile homes arelikened to cars and depreciate in value over time." The fact that theseresidents possess hardly any of the legal rights associated with homeownership is exacerbated by the reality that purchasing a mobilehome still requires a substantial investment, frequently costing tens ofthousands of dollars.20 Therefore, those who frequently rely onmobile homes for affordable housing-working-class, low-income,and single-mother families-receive little legal protection or securityin return for their investment.21

An additional problem for North Carolinians living within theMobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario is that the few legalprotections they do enjoy22 are based on the false premise that mobilehomes are actually mobile. Despite the illusory name,"[m]anufactured housing ... is in fact generally immobile, bothbecause 'the homes are subject to damage during transportation' andbecause 'moving a home is a very expensive proposition and caneasily cost $5,000 to $10,000.' "23 Given that the average price for anew mobile home in North Carolina is $58,600,24 the cost associatedwith moving a mobile home is a significant percentage of the mobilehome's total worth. This fact is exacerbated in the case of pre-ownedmobile homes, which cost less but are often even more difficult andrisky to move due to their age.25 Therefore, the reward for those whoare fortunate enough to have the money to move their mobile home

17. See Geary, supra note 15.18. See id.19. See id.20. See North Carolina Housing Information, supra note 6.21. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 185 (noting that one study found that women headed

forty-three percent of all mobile home households); Geary, supra note 15.22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).23. Roisman, supra note 2, at 822-23; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in

Communities, supra note 4, at 1 ("Moving a manufactured home typically costs between$5,000 and $10,000 ... and the move may cause structural damage to the home.").

24. See North Carolina Housing Information, supra note 6 (citing the average cost of asingle wide in North Carolina as $33,400 and the average cost of a double wide as $67,500).

25. See Roger Colton & Michael Sheehan, The Problem of Mass Evictions in MobileHome Parks Subject to Conversion, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.231, 232 (1999) (arguing that if a mobile home is long established in its current location,moving it is more akin in process and cost to "moving a single family house than moving apickup-drawn travel trailer").

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is that the cost of relocation "severely eats into any home equity thehomeowner may have built up."26

A more common scenario than a loss of equity is that the mobilehome is simply abandoned.27 For example, in Raleigh, NorthCarolina, at the Stony Brook North Mobile Home Park, sits anabandoned mobile home where "vandals have splashed MS-13 ganggraffiti on iridescent green walls and carpeted the floor with brokenBudweiser bottles, crushed among dirty socks and feces." Thismobile home is among the estimated 40,000 abandoned mobile homesin North Carolina, a number that is expected to double by 2020.29 Theproliferation of abandoned mobile homes is a serious problem for thestate. Homes like those described above pose significant publichealth, safety, and environmental concerns, and there is no easysolution to the problem, as disposal alone can cost $800 to $1,500."

One reason that mobile homes are frequently abandonedfollowing eviction is that mobile home owners often lack theresources to pay for relocation. 31 Because mobile homes are arelatively inexpensive form of home ownership, they are especiallyattractive to low-income families and the elderly.32 Therefore, thedemographic that is most likely to purchase a mobile home is theexact group that is least likely to be able to afford the cost ofrelocation. The high cost of relocation may make moving a mobilehome an imprudent investment for any owner to undertake; however,most Owner-Tenants lack the financial means to even weigh themerits of moving the structure. For most Owner-Tenants, the decisionwill be rather straightforward: no money, so no moving.

26. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 1.27. See Lisa Sorg, Abandoned Mobile Homes Plague North Carolina: Legislation in

the Works While Cleanup Stymies Local Governments, INDY WEEK (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/abandoned-mobile-homes-plague-north-carolina/Content?oid=1199997; see also Abandoned Manufactured Homes, N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T &NATURAL RES., http://portal.ncdenr.org/web/deao/recycling/amh (last visited Jan. 4, 2014)(providing information regarding recycling abandoned manufactured homes).

28. See Sorg, supra note 27.29. See id.30. See id.31. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 182 (noting that mobile home tenants are likely to be

single parents or elderly individuals with incomes "below that of the average Americanfamily"); Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 1 ("[I]f thehomeowner is required to leave the manufactured home community ... the only realisticoption may be to abandon the home."); Sorg, supra note 27 ("Owners often abandonmobile homes in response to socioeconomic pressures....").

32. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 185.33. See id.

[Vol. 92596


Another reason Owner-Tenants abandon their mobile homes isbecause their mobile homes often cannot be moved due to theircondition or because other lots are unavailable.' Many older mobilehomes, especially those fixed in the same location for long periods oftime, cannot be moved because they are no longer roadworthy.35

Though these units are still a viable source of low-income housing, asa practical matter they cannot be transported.36 Furthermore, manyunits that are structurally capable of being moved cannot be relocatedbecause "many, if not most, parks have strict age and/or conditionrestrictions for the units they will admit."37 These mobile home parkscan afford to be selective because demand often exceeds the supply ofavailable trailer lot spaces.38 For example, in reaction to the closing ofHomestead Village park in Raleigh, North Carolina, a resident of oneof the 160 trailers in the park inquired into availability at nearbyparks only to find that the "nearest park in Raleigh, six miles away,had two vacancies," and a park "in Wake Forest had four."39 Facingsuch steep odds-only six spots existed for the 160 trailers seeking torelocate from Homestead Village 4 0-it is easy to understand why thenumber of abandoned mobile homes in North Carolina is expected todouble by 2020.41

In addition to the issues of relocation cost, roadworthiness, andthe unavailability of other lots, legal restrictions also encumberrelocation efforts and contribute to the abandonment of mobilehomes.42 By ordinance, many counties in North Carolina prohibitmobile homes manufactured prior to 1976 from being "located,placed, transported, or otherwise moved" into the respective county.43

Although these ordinances traditionally exempt manufactured homes

34. See Colton & Sheehan, supra note 25, at 232-33.35. See id. at 232.36. See id.37. Id. at 233.38. See Geary, supra note 15.39. Id. According to Google Maps, Wake Forest is 18.2 miles from Raleigh. GOOGLE

MAPS, https://www.google.com/#bav=on.2,or.r-qf.&fp=21c4e67242bd37c5&q=Raleigh+to+Wake+Forest+NC (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).

40. See Geary, supra note 15.41. See Sorg, supra note 27.42. See Colton & Sheehan, supra note 25, at 232 ("From a legal ... point of view, they

simply cannot be moved.").43. See, e.g., Alleghany County, N.C., Ordinance Establishing a Moratorium on the

Location, Placement, or Transportation of Certain Mobile Homes into Alleghany County,North Carolina from Outside the County (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://www.alleghanycounty-nc.gov/ordinances/1-153.pdf; Sampson County, N.C., ManufacturedHome Park Ordinance for Sampson County (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.sampsonnc.com/mfg-home-park.pdf.

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located in the county prior to June 15, 1976," they have the effect ofnarrowing the already slim options available to Owner-Tenantsseeking to relocate. For Owner-Tenants in a county withoutvacancies, or even more likely, in a county without a park willing toaccept the mobile home given its age, there may be little choice but toabandon.45

North Carolina clearly has a critical problem arising from theMobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario: Owner-Tenants are beingafforded the legal protection of second-class citizens and (im)mobilehomes are being abandoned at a rapid pace. Though solving thisproblem will not be an easy task, an important step involves adoptingstatutory reform that focuses on providing the Owner-Tenant withsecurity of tenure and security of investment.

II. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT'S NEED FOR SECURITY OFTENURE AND SECURITY OF INVESTMENT

Security of tenure exists for the Owner-Tenant where "thelandowner cannot terminate a tenancy absent a showing of goodcause."46 Good cause takes many forms, but the basic premise of thegood cause requirement, and the related concept of security oftenure, is that the Owner-Tenant can expect to remain on theproperty so long as he meets his obligations under the rentalagreement. 47 Providing the Owner-Tenant with this sense of securityand expectation is vital because security of tenure "is the basis uponwhich residents build their lives."48 The expectation of the right toremain allows Owner-Tenants to "make financial, psychological, andemotional investments in their homes and neighborhoods." 49 An

44. See, e.g., Alleghany County, N.C., Ordinance Establishing a Moratorium on theLocation, Placement, or Transportation of Certain Mobile Homes into Alleghany County,North Carolina from Outside the County (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://www.alleghanycounty-nc.gov/ordinances/1-153.pdf. This ordinance does not prohibit the ownerof a manufactured home located within the county prior to June 15, 1976, from moving themanufacture home within the county. Id.

45. This, of course, assumes that the landlord will not permit the mobile home ownerto sell the trailer in its current location. North Carolina is not among the thirty states that"have some statutory provision prohibiting community owners from arbitrarily denying aresident the right to sell the home on-site." Protecting Fundamental Freedoms inCommunities, supra note 4, at 6. Though it is not discussed in this Comment, protectionfrom arbitrary denial of sale is a vitally important legal right that North Carolina law doesnot currently provide.

46. Roisman, supra note 2, at 819.47. See id.; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.48. Roisman, supra note 2, at 820.49. Id.

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individual with security of tenure enjoys the accompanying benefitsassociated with the concept of traditional homeownership, including asense of autonomy and stability.50 In other words, providing theOwner-Tenant with security of tenure is important, not only for theindividual well-being of the Owner-Tenant, but also for society atlarge because the Owner-Tenant with security of tenure has theincentive to invest in his community and the infrastructure within it."

Without security of tenure, the Owner-Tenant is subject toinvoluntary displacement. 52 An individual who is subject toinvoluntary displacement does not have the incentive to investemotionally, psychologically, or socially in his community becauseinvoluntary displacement constantly threatens to disrupt theseconnections." The negative externalities of this residential instabilityare far-reaching.54 With regard to education, involuntarydisplacement produces highly transient classrooms, which in turnresult in school instability, as both transient students and theirclassmates are forced to deal with the "serious educational and socialdisruptions" associated with a high turnover educationalenvironment." In the elderly population, which is one of the mostprevalent demographics within the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario,56 the stress of involuntary displacement can result in illnessand death." In the current housing context, where the waitlist forpublic housing and Section 8 vouchers can be years, the loss of amobile home by poor individuals "may mean literal homelessness."59

This in turn may "lead to [the] division of families, with childrenwrested from their parents' custody to be institutionalized or placedinto foster care."60 Given the strong connection between resident andhome, displacement from one's home has been shown to trigger agrief response in line with that seen in reaction to the loss of a

50. See id. at 821.51. See id. at 820.52. See id. at 821.53. See id.54. See id. at 821-24.55. See id. at 822 (quoting Todd Michael Franke & Chester Hartman, Student

Mobility: How Some Children Get Left Behind, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 1, 1 (2003)).56. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 185.57. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 822.58. See, e.g., Maryalice Gill, Waiting List for Public Housing Can Stretch on for Years,

THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/975533-196/waiting-list-for-public-housing-can-stretch.html.

59. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 823.60. See id.

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person.6 1 In short, being subject to involuntary displacement creates aheavy emotional, social, and psychological burden that threatens themental health of the Owner-Tenant.62

Deriving from and existing within the concept of security oftenure is the concept of security of investment.63 For the purposes ofthis Comment, security of investment describes the condition wherethe Owner-Tenant's investment in the mobile home is protected fromsignificant economic loss due to involuntary displacement. In thiscontext, the Owner-Tenant has an incentive to invest financially inmaintaining his mobile home and community.' Security of tenureprovides security of financial investment because it allows the Owner-Tenant to be confident that improvements to, or investments in, themobile home will not be wasted due to involuntary displacement.sWithout security of tenure, there is no security of investment becauseinvoluntary displacement poses the constant threat of significanteconomic loss in the form of mobile home relocation orabandonment. 6

Considering North Carolina's current crisis with abandonedmobile homes,7 the state is in dire need of policy that provides theOwner-Tenant with an incentive to invest in, maintain, and notabandon his mobile home. Policies that provide security of tenure andsecurity of investment should ameliorate the abandonment crisisbecause experience has shown that mobile home owners withincreased security in the mobile home park are more likely to investin and improve the park and their homes.68 Therefore, security ofinvestment is an important concept because its attainment provides a

61. See id. at 824.62. See id.63. See id. at 820 (discussing how security of tenure enables individuals to make

financial investments in their homes and communities).64. See id.; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 2.

Though "security of financial investment" is clearly a byproduct of security of tenure, andis not discussed as a separate concept by Professor Roisman, given the high cost ofrelocation, the substantial purchase price of a mobile home, and North Carolina's specificissue with abandoned mobile homes, the concept deserves its own name and a separatediscussion.

65. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 822.66. See id. at 822-23.67. See discussion supra Part I.68. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 2

("[W]hen residents own a manufactured housing community, they invest in it. They repavethe roads, fix the sewer system, repair and repaint outbuildings and add landscaping andamenities."). Though owning the community itself is a higher form of security of tenurethan "good cause" protection, the concept demonstrates that people will invest in theirhomes when they have the security of benefiting from the investment.

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potential remedy to North Carolina's issue with mobile homeabandonment. In addition, each of the negative externalities outlinedabove demonstrates the need for security of tenure. Because many ofthe problems associated with the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario derive from a lack of security of tenure and security ofinvestment, any solution to the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario should be measured, at least in part, by the degree to whichthe solution provides these securities.

III. NORTH CAROLINA'S CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME FOR THEMOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO

Thirty-three states currently have statutory provisions limitingthe grounds for eviction of residents from a mobile home community;North Carolina is not one of them.'9 What constitutes a legitimatebasis for eviction within these states varies widely.70 Some states have"full-fledged good cause statutes, prohibiting the community ownerfrom terminating the lease or refusing to renew it except for goodcause such as failure to pay rent or violation of community rules,""and others have statutes that are unclear or simply require "anylegitimate business reason."72 However, North Carolina does not fallanywhere within this spectrum of good cause. Instead, NorthCarolina is among the minority of states that do not have a statutethat addresses the grounds for eviction from a mobile homecommunity.74

A. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14

Pursuant to section 42-14 of the North Carolina GeneralStatutes, "where the tenancy involves only the rental of a space for amanufactured home ... a notice to quit must be given at least 60 daysbefore the end of the current rental period, regardless of the term ofthe tenancy."s7 Thus, once notice to quit is given, all that standsbetween the Owner-Tenant and forced relocation or abandonment isapproximately two months. 76 The landowner does not need cause to

69. See id. at 4, 8 n.7.70. See id. at 4-5.71. Id.; see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476(B) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

25, § 7010(a) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202 (LexisNexis 2010).72. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5; see,

e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012).73. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.74. See id.75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).76. See id.

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evict, and the Owner-Tenant need not have violated the rentalagreement; all that is needed is timely notice to quit."

In at least one way, the current version of section 42-14 is animprovement on its pre-2005 counterpart, which required only thirtydays' notice to quit a tenancy involving only the rental of a space for amanufactured home.18 Providing the Owner-Tenant with anadditional thirty days to move likely aided some individuals with thefinancial means and opportunity to relocate their mobile homes.However, given the high cost and limited opportunities forrelocation,79 the time extension has likely provided very little real-world benefit to the majority of Owner-Tenants because it is based onthe false premise that mobile homes are in fact mobile.80 In reality,additional time to move is not the issue with (im)mobile homes, asmost Owner-Tenants are unable to relocate their homes regardless ofthe time given.

Though the 2005 amendment shows that the North Carolinalegislature is willing to pursue solutions to the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario, the General Assembly chose an inadequate remedy.North Carolina residents living under the present version of section42-14 have inadequate security of tenure and security of investmentbecause the law provides landowners with the power to evict themand their mobile homes with no good cause requirement and onlysixty days' notice as protection.82 Moreover, the constant threat ofinvoluntary displacement created by the inadequacy of section 42-14exposes the state to the negative consequences associated with a lackof security of tenure and security of investment." With this statutoryscheme, there is very little reason for North Carolina Owner-Tenantsto invest in, improve, or maintain their mobile homes because theirinvestment can so easily be lost. The disincentives created by thisdynamic likely contribute significantly to North Carolina's crisis withabandoned homes.'

77. See id. Section 42-37.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes offers the Owner-Tenant some protection in the form of the defense of retaliatory eviction, but the factremains that the landlord can evict without good cause. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1(2011).

78. See Act of Aug. 22, 2005, 291, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1094, 1094 (codified atN.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012)).

79. See discussion supra Part I.80. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.81. See discussion supra Part I.82. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).83. See discussion supra Part II.84. See discussion supra Part I.

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B. Other North Carolina Statutes Relevant to the Mobile HomeOwner- Tenant Scenario

Section 42-14 is not the only North Carolina statute that affectslegal rights within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.Therefore it is important to look to other relevant statutes in order todetermine if they compensate for the inadequacies of N.C. Gen. Stat.section 42-14.

1. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-37.1: Defense of Retaliatory Eviction

Though North Carolina does not provide affirmative protectionin the form of a statute limiting the grounds for eviction," Owner-Tenants are protected broadly against retaliatory eviction." Section42-37.1(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides a list oftenant activities that are protected by law.' The basic idea of theseprotections is that the landlord should not be able to evict tenants forseeking to "exercise their right[] to decent, safe, and sanitaryhousing."" Despite these protections, the tenant has the burden ofproving that the landlord's eviction action was substantially inresponse to the occurrence of a protected act.89 Moreover, section 42-37.1(c) provides a list of situations in which the landlord maynonetheless prevail in a summary ejectment action despite theprotection provided by subsections (a) and (b)." For example, wherethere is a tenancy for a definite period of time, the tenant has nooption to renew the lease, and the tenant holds over after theexpiration of the term, the landlord will prevail even if the tenant

85. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (2011).87. Id. § 42-37.1(a). The following are acts protected by section 42-37.1:

(1) A good faith complaint or request for repairs to the landlord, his employee, orhis agent about conditions or defects in the premises that the landlord is obligatedto repair under G.S. 42-42; (2) A good faith complaint to a government agencyabout a landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, or any regulation,code, ordinance, or State or federal law that regulates premises used for dwellingpurposes; (3) A government authority's issuance of a formal complaint to alandlord concerning premises rented by a tenant; (4) A good faith attempt toexercise, secure or enforce any rights existing under a valid lease or rentalagreement or under State or federal law; or (5) A good faith attempt to organize,join, or become otherwise involved with, any organization promoting or enforcingtenants' rights.

Id.88. Id.89. See id. § 42-37.1(b).90. See id. § 42-37.1(c).

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proves the landlord's action was substantially in response to aprotected act.9'

North Carolina's retaliatory eviction statute provides the Owner-Tenant with some much-needed protection. However, in addition tothe statute's exceptions and its allocation of the burden of proof tothe tenant, the protection from retaliatory eviction provided bysection 42-37.1 does not adequately compensate for the inadequaciesof section 42-14 because it fails to offer the tenant any protectionfrom a landlord who wishes to evict the tenant on a whim or forreasons unrelated to the tenant's actions."

It may seem puzzling that a landlord would seek to evict a tenantwho is complying with the terms of a rental agreement, but in factcommunity owners "often have a strong incentive to drive out low-income homeowners to free up lots."" By freeing up lots, the landlordcreates the opportunity to rent his lot to a new resident at a higherprice.94 Or, in the case where the tenant is forced to abandon themobile home, section 44A-2(e2) of the North Carolina GeneralStatutes provides a mechanism for the landlord to acquire a lien onthe manufactured home.9 5 With a lien acquired, the landlord can sellthe manufactured home and recover an amount equal to

the amount of any rents which were due the lessor at the timethe tenant vacated the premises and for the time, up to 60 days,from the vacating of the premises to the date of sale; and forany sums necessary to repair damages to the premises causedby the tenant, normal wear and tear excepted; and forreasonable costs and expenses of the sale. 6

Because this statute provides the landlord with rent after the home isabandoned, and because many Owner-Tenants will not pay rent afterthe landlord provides notice to quit due to their need to save moneyto find new housing, it is very likely liens will constitute a sizableportion of the mobile home's value. Therefore, this statute minimizesthe economic loss that the landlord would suffer from evicting the oldtenant, thereby enabling the landlord to free up new lots withminimal risk.'

91. See id. § 42-37.1(c)(2).92. See id. § 42-37.1(c).93. Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.94. See id.95. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-2(e2) (2011 & Supp. 2012).96. Id.97. See id.; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.

604 [Vol. 92


In addition to the economic incentives to evict an otherwisecompliant tenant,8 retaliatory eviction protection as it stands isinsufficient because the Owner-Tenant is nonetheless exposed toarbitrary eviction at the discretion of the landowner.99 For instance, ifthe landlord does not like the flowers that the Owner-Tenant plants,then the landowner can give notice to quit, and the protectionsafforded by the defense of retaliatory eviction will not protect thetenant.'" Although this hypothetical may seem extreme and unlikely,evictions like this do occur.'0 For example, in Iowa, a judge presidingover allegations that a mobile home owner had been evicted forrefusing coffee was able to say only, "I'm sorry. There's nothing I cando."" These examples demonstrate that retaliatory evictionprotection alone is insufficient. Without the addition of good causeprotection, the Owner-Tenant's security of tenure and security ofinvestment are so precarious that he is "likely to be fearful of takingany action that would bring [him] into disfavor with the communityowner." 0 Therefore, the economic incentives to evict a complianttenant and the potential for arbitrary evictions strongly suggest thatthe retaliatory eviction protection afforded by section 42-37.1 doesnot adequately compensate for North Carolina's absence of a statutelimiting the grounds for eviction from a mobile home community togood cause.

2. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14.3: Notice of Conversion ofManufactured Home Communities

This Comment focuses on the situation where an individualOwner-Tenant is evicted. Therefore, a thorough treatment of massevictions is beyond its scope; however, mass evictions frequentlyoccur when manufactured home communities are converted to otheruses.'" In such a situation, section 42-14.3 of the North CarolinaGeneral Statutes requires the owner of the manufactured home

98. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.99. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.

100. While working at Pisgah Legal Services in Asheville, North Carolina, in 2012, theauthor received a call where this scenario was the landlord's basis for eviction. A plainreading of section 42-37.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes suggests that thisscenario would not fall into any of the protected acts.

101. See, e.g., Lee Rood, Trailer Dwellers Have Few Rights, DES MOINES REGISTER,July 12, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13954895 (describing the eviction of an Owner-Tenant where the tenant's children "made too much noise riding bicycles").

102. See id.103. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.104. See Geary, supra note 15.

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community to give each manufactured home owner notice of theintended conversion at least 180 days before the home owner isrequired to vacate the lot and move the manufactured home."osThough the Owner-Tenant is afforded more time to relocate in thecase of conversion, mass evictions are only a larger-scale example ofthe familiar issues associated with the cost and difficulty of relocatinga mobile home. 06

A solution which has emerged in response to this problem isresident purchase opportunity law." North Carolina is one ofeighteen states that have enacted some form of resident purchaseopportunity legislation.' North Carolina law currently provides a taxbenefit to community owners who sell the land within a manufacturedhome community "in a single purchase to a group composed of amajority of the manufactured home community leaseholders or to anonprofit organization that represents such a group."' Though this iscertainly a great first step, other states have achieved even betterresults by enacting further measures to promote the purchase ofmanufactured home communities by Owner-Tenants."10 For example,in New Hampshire, strong purchase opportunity law, combined withorganized lending by community development organizations, hastransformed twenty percent of the state's manufactured homecommunities into resident-owned communities."' In addition, studiessuggest that forty percent of the mobile homes within these resident-owned communities are appreciating in value."2 Given the benefitsseen in states like New Hampshire, North Carolina should examineand pursue additional purchase opportunity laws. Unlike extra timeto relocate, purchase opportunity is capable of transforming a win-lose scenario into a win-win scenario. Without purchase opportunity

105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14.3(a) (2011).106. See discussion supra Part I.107. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.108. See Manufactured Housing Resource Guide: Promoting Resident Ownership of

Communities, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 6 (2011), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/manufacturedhousing/cfed-purchase-guide.pdf [hereinafter Manufactured HousingResource Guide]. Resident purchase opportunity law "promotes resident purchaseopportunities for manufactured home communities." Id. at 1. In other words, it seeks totransform residents into owners. See id.

109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.6(b)(19) (2011 & Supp. 2012); Manufactured HousingResource Guide, supra note 108, at 11.

110. See, e.g., Ellie Winninghoff, Impactful Returns from Mobile Home Parks, FIN.ADVISOR (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.fa-mag.comlnews/impactful-returns-from-mobile-home-parks-12926.html.

111. See id.112. See id.

606 [Vol. 92


law, only the community owner receives a desirable result, and a largeportion of mobile homes within a park during conversion will likelybe abandoned to satisfy the interests of the landowner."' However,with purchase opportunity law, the community owner's right to sellmay be slightly impaired, but he still receives a fair price while theOwner-Tenant receives the full security of tenure and investmentassociated with land ownership.

C. What Could Have Been: North Carolina's Flirtation with Good-Cause Legislation

North Carolina's consideration of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario in 2005 ended with the extension of section 42-14 tosixty days' notice of eviction,114 but the original version of the billwould have placed limits on the permissible grounds for eviction of amanufactured home owner."' Under the original version of the bill,an Owner-Tenant's lease could only be terminated for one of thefollowing reasons: (1) failure to fulfill the stipulations of the lease; (2)failure to pay rent; (3) commission of certain criminal acts; or (4)condemnation or conversion of the land in compliance with section42-14.3.116

Had the original version of the bill prevailed, North Caroliniansliving within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario today wouldenjoy increased security of tenure and security of investment becausetheir landlords would not be able to evict them on arbitrary grounds.This would have been a significant step toward improving the legalrights of Owner-Tenants. However, rather than implementing astatutory scheme that would have provided affirmative protectionfrom arbitrary eviction, the North Carolina General Assembly settledfor an extension of time to move. Rather than aiding the Owner-Tenant in staying put, North Carolina saw it best to make it easier forthem to leave. Of course, leaving is not always an option and certainlyis not easy when it involves the relocation of a mobile home."'

Despite the legislature's failure to pass the original bill in 2005,the silver lining is that good cause statutes are on North Carolina'sradar. Given the 2005 amendment's failure to remedy the Owner-

113. See discussion supra Part I.114. See Act of Aug. 22, 2005, 291, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1094, 1094 (codified at

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012)).115. See H.B. 1243, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005) (as filed on Apr. 14,

2005).116. See id.117. See discussion supra Part I.

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Tenant's lack of security of tenure, and North Carolina's crisis withabandoned mobile homes,118 the time is right to find a new solution.In contrast to the current version of section 42-14, future solutionsshould seek to address the actual problem with the Mobile HomeOwner-Tenant Scenario-a lack of security of tenure rather than alack of time to move.119

IV. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE MOBILE HOMEOWNER-TENANT SCENARIO: COMMON-LAW OR LEGISLATIVE

REMEDIES?

A. Common-Law Solutions to the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario

Though many states have turned to statutory schemes to addressthe Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario,120 Professor FlorenceRoisman, of the Robert H. McKinney School of Law at IndianaUniversity, has argued that "common law doctrines provide amplebasis for imposing a good-cause-for-termination requirement onthose ... who rent land on which owners of manufactured homesplace their houses."' 2' In making this argument for common-lawsolutions, Professor Roisman has outlined two common-law doctrinesto provide security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant: the impliedcovenant of good faith and fair dealing and the implied covenant ofsecurity of tenure or good cause for termination.122

1. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is groundedin the widely accepted principle that "[e]very contract imposes uponeach party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance andits enforcement."123 Applied to the lease between a community ownerand an Owner-Tenant, this doctrine "could provide substantialprotection for tenants faced with termination" 24 because it wouldprohibit the landlord from engaging in malicious, vindictive, orarbitrary evictions.125 For example, where a landowner fails to act

118. See discussion supra Part I.119. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 820-22.120. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.121. Roisman, supra note 2, at 836.122. See id. at 843, 849.123. See id. at 843 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).124. See id. at 849.125. See id. at 848.

608 [Vol. 92


fairly, and in good faith, by taking undue advantage of an Owner-Tenant, a judge could apply the implied covenant of good faith andfair dealing so that the Owner-Tenant would be able to enjoy thebenefits of the rental agreement without being exposed toopportunistic or vindictive landlord behavior.12 6

2. The Implied Covenant of Security of Tenure or Good Cause forTermination

On similar grounds to those giving rise to common-lawdevelopment of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,Professor Roisman argues that "courts should recognize and apply animplied-in-law covenant of secure tenure absent good cause fortermination."l 27 In support of this doctrine is Shell Oil Co. v.Marinello," where the New Jersey Supreme Court voided acommercial lease provision giving Shell Oil the absolute right toterminate a lease with only ten days of notice.129 Due to "the unevenbargaining power between" Shell Oil and the opposing party, theNew Jersey Supreme Court "read into" the commercial lease "therestriction that Shell not have the unilateral right to terminate, cancelor fail to renew . . . the lease, in absence of a showing that [the otherparty] has failed to substantially perform [its] obligations under thelease."'30 Though the New Jersey Supreme Court acted in the contextof a commercial lease, the disparity of bargaining power that formedthe basis for the court's application of the implied doctrine of goodcause for termination is even more compelling in the Mobile HomeOwner-Tenant Scenario.13

Within the context of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario,judicial adoption of the implied covenant of good cause fortermination would prevent the landowner from unilaterallyterminating, canceling, or failing to renew the Owner-Tenant'slease. 32 Application of the implied covenant of good cause fortermination within this context would provide security of tenure tothe Owner-Tenant because it would effectively provide the Owner-

126. See id. at 847-48. For example, Roisman cites to situations where the impliedcovenant of good faith and fair dealing has been applied to require the landowner toprovide replacement housing and to prohibit displacement until the end of the school yearor "during notably hot or cold weather." Id. at 847.

127. See id. at 849.128. 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973).129. Id. at 603; see Roisman, supra note 2, at 849.130. See Shell Oil Co., 307 A.2d at 603.131. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 850-51.132. See id.

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Tenant with "a life estate in the leased property, subject tointerruption only for failure to comply with lease conditions.""'

B. Common-Law Versus Legislative Remedies

1. General Considerations

In certain ways, common law development of equitableprotections for the Owner-Tenant is more desirable than legislativeaction in the form of statutory enactment. 3 4 For example, common-law solutions are more flexible as they provide the opportunity for ajudge to balance the competing interests and distinctions of a case onits own particular facts.'35 For instance, where an Owner-Tenant haslived on a lot for a long period of time and has substantially investedin the property, a judge applying the equitable remedies discussed byProfessor Roisman could craft a solution that recognizes the tenant'sinterest in the property. 6 In contrast, where the Owner-Tenant'stenure and investment are insignificant, the balance would weighmore in the favor of the landowner's interests.137

Though common-law solutions are more fact-intensive andflexible, legislative remedies have the advantage of offering morecomprehensive solutions.' In contrast to courts, which can decideonly the issues before them, legislatures can develop comprehensivesolutions due to their ability to "fully consider an issue" through

133. See Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants:Good Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord's Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 537(1985).

134. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 840.135. See id.136. See id. Professor Roisman argues that equitable remedies will allow judges to

balance the following factors:

[W]hether the tenancy is commercial or residential; whether the residentialproperty is a single-family or multi-family home; whether the landowner lives onthe property; whether the landowner is a large or small participant in the rentalhousing business; how long the tenant has lived at that location; how much of afinancial investment the tenant has made in the property; what representations thelandowner may have made about continued occupancy; how many times and forwhat length of time the tenancy may have been renewed in the past; howimportant continued residence may be for educational, health, religious,employment, psychological, or other reasons; and how "tight" the local housingmarket may be and how difficult and how expensive it may be, for any reason, forthe tenant to secure replacement housing.

Id.137. See id.138. See Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L.

REV. 703, 706 (1998).

[Vol. 92610


extensive fact finding.139 In addition, "principles of separation ofpowers arguably require that legislatures make policy choices." 140

Thus, like common-law solutions, there are factors which makelegislative remedies desirable within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario as well.141

Therefore, common-law and legislative remedies each have theirrelative advantages, which is why the debate between the two is"perdurable." 142 Common-law solutions are flexible, yet potentiallyexpose the litigant to arbitrary judicial whims, while legislativeremedies are consistent, yet potentially ill-tailored; the debatecontinues. However, there is reason to believe that legislativeremedies are a superior and more probable solution to the MobileHome Owner-Tenant Scenario within the specific context of NorthCarolina.

2. Evaluating Common-Law Versus Legislative Remedies in theContext of North Carolina

As discussed, the current allocation of legal rights between thelandowner and the Owner-Tenant in North Carolina weighs heavilyin favor of the landowner because it leaves the Owner-Tenant with noright to remain on the premises once the landowner providesadequate notice to quit the tenancy.143 In contrast to North Carolina'scurrent statutory scheme, a fully enforced implied covenant of goodcause for termination would in effect provide the Owner-Tenant witha life estate, terminable only for failure to comply with the conditionsof the lease.1" Under this potential solution, the landowner would beunable to evict the Owner-Tenant absent good cause. Thoughpreventing the landowner from terminating or refusing to renew alease for a manufactured home is desirable because it provides theOwner-Tenant with security of tenure, this new legal relationshipwould constitute a radical transformation of the current allocation oflegal rights within North Carolina's Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario.

Where reform would result in a drastic departure from thecurrent allocation of legal rights between landlord and tenant,

139. See id.140. Id.141. See id.142. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 839.143. See discussion supra Part IILA; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).144. See Bell, supra note 133, at 537.

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legislative action is necessary.145 Judicial adoption of an impliedcovenant of good cause for termination might not constitute a drasticdeparture from the status quo in a state like New Jersey, which hasalready adopted a similar mechanism within the commercialcontext,146 or even in a state that already has a statute limiting thegrounds for eviction of a manufactured home. 147 Within these states,landowners are already on notice that tenants have a general right toremain. However, as discussed, North Carolina landowners live in astate where their rights dominate.14 8 Changing this status quo requiresa substantial policy decision that should properly be decided by alegislative body representing the will of the people.149

Another reason legislative action is more desirable in NorthCarolina is that experience suggests it is more likely to produceresults for the Owner-Tenant.5 o As Professor Roisman concedes,judicial creation of the good cause-for-termination doctrine "has beenessentially non-existent.""' Roisman attributes this fact to litigantsnot pressing courts to impose the requirement rather than courtsrejecting the requirement;15 2 however, a more likely reason thatlitigants do not seek this remedy is because they do not think it willsucceed. Given section 42-14 of the North Carolina General Statutesand North Carolina's notice orientation, an Owner-Tenant, even ifaware of the common-law remedies Professor Roisman advocates,would be reasonable in believing that a court would reject the impliedcovenant of good cause for termination argument and instead adhereto the plain language of section 42-14.153

In the past forty to fifty years, statutes have supplanted judicialaction as the key reform method within the landlord-tenant

145. See id. ("Just cause requirements ... represent such a drastic departure from thecommon-law rules that legislative action would be necessary to implement them.").

146. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 849 (giving the example of Shell Oil Co. v.Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J. 1973)).

147. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5(discussing thirty-three states with good cause statutes).

148. See discussion supra Part III.A.149. See Korngold, supra note 138, at 706 ("[Pjrinciples of separation of powers

arguably require that legislatures make policy choices.").150. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 835; see also Korngold, supra note 138, at 706

("After the initial pathbreaking judicial decisions, legislatures began supplanting courts asthe key reform agents in the field.").

151. Roisman, supra note 2, at 835.152. Id.153. In researching for this Comment, the author could not find a single case, or brief

for a case, in North Carolina where either of Professor Roisman's equitable remedies havebeen argued or accepted.

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relationship,154 and thirty-three state legislatures have enactedstatutes limiting the grounds for eviction of a manufactured homefrom a manufactured home community.'s In addition, North Carolinahas at least considered adopting a statute that would have requiredmanufactured home evictions to be made in good faith,5 6 whichdemonstrates that statutory reform of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario has momentum and is on North Carolina's radar.Unlike the sparse record of judicial recognition of good causeprotection, broad statutory reform by other jurisdictions providesNorth Carolina the opportunity to critically examine the remediesother states have employed. The degree of protection afforded bygood cause statutes varies widely by jurisdiction, and this varianceprovides North Carolina the opportunity to determine what type ofstatute strikes the appropriate balance of rights between thelandowner and Owner-Tenant.

If North Carolina judges were to adopt Professor Roisman'sformulation of the implied covenant of good cause for termination,there is little doubt that Owner-Tenants in North Carolina wouldenjoy security of tenure.157 In the meantime, and until North Carolinais persuaded to adopt a good cause statute, litigators should pursuecommon-law solutions. However, as demonstrated above, there isreason to believe that a statutory remedy would be more appropriateand probable within the specific context of North Carolina.Therefore, though the common law may someday develop to providethe Owner-Tenant with security of tenure, the remainder of thisComment focuses on statutory solutions to North Carolina's MobileHome Owner-Tenant Scenario.

V. WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE?

A key goal of any good cause statute must be to satisfy thepublic's interest in "maintaining a proper balance between thelandlord's interests in running his business efficiently and the tenant'sinterest in retaining his home.""5 s Despite the profound benefit thatsecurity of tenure provides to the Owner-Tenant and society,'59 good

154. See Korngold, supra note 138, at 706.155. Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5.156. See discussion supra Part III.C.157. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 853 ("Just cause standards basically provide the

tenant with a life estate in the leased property, subject to interruption only for failure tocomply with lease conditions." (quoting Bell, supra note 133, at 537)).

158. See Bell, supra note 133, at 537.159. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 820-29.

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cause statutes can create costs in other areas, and, at a minimum,constitute a serious intrusion upon the property rights of thelandowner.

A. The Cost of Good Cause

A downside of any good cause requirement is that it is likely tomake private ownership of a manufactured home community lessdesirable to landowners.160 Some scholars insist that good causerequirements will decrease the supply of mobile home communities1 61

and deteriorate the quality of existing communities. 6 2 As discussed,Owner-Tenants who are forced to relocate their mobile homesalready face limited options, 6 and a decrease in the number ofmanufactured home parks in the state would only magnify the burdenof relocation. If the limitations imposed by good cause are so greatthat landowners no longer have an incentive to establish and at leastmaintain mobile home communities, then good cause protectioncould ironically harm the Owner-Tenant by decreasing access toaffordable housing.'" Therefore, the need for balance in this situationis great, as any statutory solution to the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario must provide security of tenure while minimizing thepotential costs of good cause limitations.

B. Striking a Balance: Finding the Most Appropriate Formulation ofGood Cause

The phrase "good cause" can mean many different things, andprotections which constitute good cause exist within a broadspectrum.'65 At one end of the spectrum is what Professor DeborahBell describes as "just cause."'" "Just cause" standards provide "thegreatest degree of tenant security" because they "basically providethe tenant with a life estate in the leased property, subject tointerruption only for failure to comply with lease conditions."'67

Though "just cause" standards are excellent in that they provide thetenant with almost complete security of tenure, they impose an almost

160. See id. at 838.161. See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring Good

Cause for Tenant Eviction: Dangerous Portents for the United States?, 38 SETON HALL L.REV. 427, 447 (2008).

162. See id. at 454-55.163. See discussion supra Part I.164. See Carroll, supra note 161, at 447.165. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5.166. See Bell, supra note 133, at 537.167. Id.

[Vol. 92614


unrealistic burden upon the landlord because they prohibittermination of the lease "even for legitimate business reasons."1And while it may be true that "[t]he distinction between'opportunism' and 'sound business judgment' is hard to draw,""69

absolutely prohibiting a community owner from terminating a leasefor a legitimate business reason, such as park conversion, is likely toproduce many of the negative externalities associated with goodcause limitations. 1 0 Therefore, the "just cause" standard does notstrike the appropriate balance between the interests of the landownerand the Owner-Tenant.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is good cause protectionthat limits the grounds for eviction but does not require renewal ofthe lease at the end of the term.'71 Though this form of good causeprotection is superior to the mere notice protection seen in NorthCarolina, "[a] protection against eviction without good cause is oflittle value if the community owner can simply decline to renew the[Owner-Tenant's] lease without cause."'72 Despite paying rent andfaithfully meeting the obligations of the rental agreement, an Owner-Tenant living under this type of protection can still be evicted at theend of the lease for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, thisformulation of good cause also fails to strike an appropriate balancebetween the competing interests because it provides inadequatesecurity of tenure to the Owner-Tenant and allows the landowner toterminate the tenancy on arbitrary grounds.

Somewhere between the two formulations of good causediscussed above lies the National Consumer Law Center's ("NCLC")policy recommendation.173 Under the model policy of the NCLC, alease term must be a minimum of two years, community owners areprohibited from evicting without good cause ("defined asnonpayment of rent, rule violations, disorderly conduct or criminalactivity"), and community owners are required "to offer the residenta renewal lease when the existing lease expires except for goodcause."'74 Additionally, to protect the community owner's interest,the NCLC model policy allows the community owner to "terminate

168. See id.169. Roisman, supra note 2, at 853.170. See Carroll, supra note 161, at 447, 454-55.171. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007) (enumerating certain acts for which

tenants may be evicted, but imposing no requirement for renewal of the lease).172. Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.173. See id.174. Id.

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residents' leases because of a change of use of the community.""'This formulation of good cause seems to appropriately balancecompeting interests. On the one hand, it provides security of tenureand investment because the Owner-Tenant has a right to remain solong as rent is paid, obligations are met, and the park is not convertedto another use. On the other hand, the policy recognizes thelegitimate business interests of the community owner by providing anopportunity to terminate investment in the community.

Though the NCLC model policy does impose upon the propertyrights of the community owner, the policy recognizes that "[b]oth thelandlord and the tenant have property interests" at stake in theMobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.176 As Professor Roismaneloquently described, "[t]he issue is not whether to protect propertyinterests, but rather how to accommodate the competing propertyinterests of the landlord and the tenant."" The Owner-Tenant has aproperty interest in the mobile home, which can be lost due toeviction, and the community owner has a property interest in theland. The relevant question here is which interest gives way for theother. Though the NCLC model policy no doubt requires capitulationfrom both groups, it does so in an equitable manner because itprovides security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant without undulyinterfering with the community owner's ability to put the property toa more profitable use. It therefore strikes an appropriate balance byprotecting the Owner-Tenant without removing all incentive for aproperty owner to establish or maintain mobile home communities.This, the above suggests, is the most appropriate construction of goodcause.

VI. FOURTH CIRCUIT COMPARISONS

North Carolina is currently the only state in the Fourth Circuitwithout a statute limiting the grounds for eviction from amanufactured home community.17 1 Therefore, North Carolinacurrently provides less eviction protection to the Owner-Tenant thanMaryland, Virginia, West Virginia, or South Carolina.'79 In seeking to

175. Id.176. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 839.177. Id.178. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5. For

comparison to other states within the Fourth Circuit, see MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.§ 8A-202 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007); VA. CODEANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6 (LexisNexis 2011).

179. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.

616 [Vol. 92

2014] MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SECURITY 617

improve the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario in NorthCarolina, it is important to determine whether the statutes of NorthCarolina's jurisdictional neighbors should serve as templates forstatutory reform. Such an evaluation requires an examination ofwhere other Fourth Circuit states' statutes fall within the "goodcause" spectrum."so

A. South Carolina

As in North Carolina, mobile home ownership is pervasive inSouth Carolina. In fact, during the 2013 Miss America pageant, MissSouth Carolina introduced herself by saying that she is "from thestate where 20 percent of our homes are mobile because that's howwe roll." 1 However, unlike their North Carolina counterparts,Owner-Tenants in South Carolina can only be evicted when one ormore of a limited set of grounds for eviction are present. 8 2 Generally,grounds for eviction include failure to pay rent;1s3 failure to complywith the law," lease,'18 or park regulations;" and "willfully andknowingly making a false or misleading statement in the rentalagreement or application."" Though an Owner-Tenant may be

180. See discussion supra Part V.B.181. Jessica Chasmar, Miss South Carolina Embarrasses Her State with Trailer Joke,

WASH. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/16/miss-south-carolina-embarrasses-her-state-wasnt-fa/.

182. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530(A) (2007). South Carolina's statute provides that

[a]n owner may evict a resident for one or more of the following reasons: (1)failure to comply with local, state, or federal laws governing manufactured homesafter he receives written notice of noncompliance and has had a reasonableopportunity to remedy the violation; (2) engaging in repeated conduct thatinterferes with the quiet enjoyment of the park by other residents; (3)noncompliance with a provision of the rental agreement or park regulations andfailure to remedy the violation within fourteen days after written notice by theowner. If the remedy requires longer than fourteen days, the owner may allow theresident in good faith to extend the time to a specified date; (4) not paying rentwithin five days of its due date; (5) noncompliance with a law or a provision in therental agreement or park regulations affecting the health, safety, or welfare ofother residents in the park or affecting the physical condition of the park; (6)willfully and knowingly making a false or misleading statement in the rentalagreement or application; (7) taking of the park or the part of it affecting theresident's lot by eminent domain; (8) other reason sufficient under common law.

Id.183. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(4).184. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(1).185. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(3). This provision provides the Owner-Tenant with fourteen

days to remedy the violation and come into compliance. Id.186. Id.187. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(6).


dispossessed due to eminent domain, as a general rule, SouthCarolina residents living within the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario are protected from eviction so long as they pay rent, act ingood faith, and comply with the applicable law or park regulations.18 9

Despite these protections, South Carolina's statute falls on theweak side of the "good cause" spectrum because its plain languagedoes not require a community owner to renew the Owner-Tenant'srental agreement in the absence of good cause. South Carolina'sstatute is vague, and there is little-to-no case law interpreting how thestatute should be applied within the context of renewal. Experiencefrom other jurisdictions suggests renewal will not be required unless itis explicitly and unambiguously required by the statute.190 Therefore,the ambiguity and absence of a renewal provision within SouthCarolina's good cause statute likely exposes the Owner-Tenant toeviction for hold-over at the end of the term.191 This statutory schemedoes not provide the Owner-Tenant with security of tenure andsecurity of investment because it does not prohibit the communityowner from refusing to renew the rental agreement of an Owner-Tenant who has met his legal obligations under the rental agreement.Therefore, though an improvement over the notice orientation ofNorth Carolina, South Carolina's good cause statutory scheme shouldnot serve as a template for statutory reform of the Mobile HomeOwner-Tenant Scenario in North Carolina.

B. Virginia

Similar to South Carolina, Virginia's good cause statute providesthat a manufactured home community owner may evict an Owner-Tenant only under certain circumstances." These circumstances

188. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(7).189. See id. § 27-47-530.190. See, e.g., 8 JEROME P. FRIEDLANDER, II, VIRGINIA PRACrICE SERIES:

LANDLORD-TENANT HANDBOOK § 8:9 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) (interpreting Virginia law aspermitting eviction with sixty days' notice and not requiring renewal of a lease despitesection 55-248.50:1 of the Virginia Code Annotated not including lease expiration ornotice as grounds for eviction).

191. This is especially problematic because section 27-47-530 of the South CarolinaCode Annotated provides for eviction due to the presence of "other reason[s] sufficientunder common law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530(A)(8).

192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012). Virginia's statute provides that

[a] manufactured home park owner or operator may only evict a resident for: (1)Nonpayment of rent; (2) Violation of the applicable building and housing codecaused by a lack of reasonable care by the tenant or a member of his household ora person on the premises with his consent; (3) Violation of a federal, state, or locallaw or ordinance that is detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of other

618 [Vol. 92


include failure to pay rent, violation of the rental agreement, andviolation of the applicable housing code or law.193 Notably, in contrastto South Carolina, Virginia park owners are required by statute tooffer "all current and prospective year-round residents a rentalagreement with a rental period of not less than one year."1 94 Thisprovision makes Virginia one of sixteen states that currently requireleases within a manufactured housing community to be of at least acertain length.195 Virginia's combination of a one-year provision andgood cause statute provides more protection than South Carolina'sstatutory scheme because Owner-Tenants in Virginia have security oftenure for at least one year.'96 In contrast, Owner-Tenants in SouthCarolina receive good cause protection only for the length of therental agreement, which South Carolina's statute does not prohibitfrom being month-to-month.197

Despite the minimum term advantage described above,Virginia's good cause statutory scheme suffers a critical shortcomingin that, similar to South Carolina's, it does not generally require leaserenewal at the end of the term.198 Though Virginia's good causestatute "does not include expiration of the lease [or] a term'stermination by 60 days' notice [as grounds for eviction],"199 Virginia's"Termination of tenancy" statute permits a community owner to

residents in the park; (4) Violation of any rule or provision of the rental agreementmaterially affecting the health, safety and welfare of himself or others; or (5) Twoor more violations of any rule or provision of the rental agreement occurringwithin a six-month period.

Id. § 55-248.50:1(1)-(5).193. Id. § 55-248.50:1.194. Id. § 55-248.42:1.195. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.196. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.42:1. South Carolina is not among the states that

require a lease within a manufactured home community to be of a certain length. SeeProtecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.

197. See S.C. CODE. ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007).198. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.46 (2012) (allowing either party to "terminate a

rental agreement which is for a term of 60 days or more by giving written notice to theother at least 60 days prior to the termination date"). Note however that section 55-248.46of the Code of Virginia Annotated may require lease renewal under certain circumstances.Pursuant to that statute,

where a landlord and seller of a manufactured home have in common (i) one ormore owners, (ii) immediate family members, or (iii) officers or directors, therental agreement shall be renewed except for reasons that would justify atermination of the rental agreement or eviction by the landlord as authorized bythis chapter.

Id.199. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 190, § 8:9.

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refuse to renew a rental agreement so long as sixty days' notice is20given.200 Commentators suggest that Virginia's good cause statute

"did not repeal or modify the 60-day provision under 'Termination oftenancy,' " and that, read together, "the new Code section ...relate[s] solely to what constitutes cause for termination for a reason... other than 60-day notice to terminate .... "201 Under thisconstruction, community owners would need good cause to evictduring a lease term but no cause to refuse to renew a lease.202 Thoughnot binding, this interpretation of Virginia's statutory schemedemonstrates that it is an inadequate template for reform in NorthCarolina. Virginia's one-year lease requirement is a step in the rightdirection. However, considered as a whole, the state's statutoryscheme does not provide security of tenure because, similar to SouthCarolina, a community owner can refuse to renew a rental agreementwithout good cause.

C. West Virginia

Under West Virginia's good cause statutory scheme, an Owner-Tenant who places a single-section factory-built home upon a factory-built home site is protected from eviction absent good cause for oneyear, and an Owner-Tenant who places a multiple-section factory-built home is protected from eviction absent good cause for fiveyears.203 Unlike South Carolina and Virginia, West Virginia's statutedoes not specify what constitutes a good cause ground for eviction.204

Moreover, judicial interpretation of the statute's good cause languageis non-existent. Despite this ambiguity, if the grounds for evictionconstituting good cause are found to be similar to those in SouthCarolina and Virginia,205 West Virginia's statutory scheme shouldprovide greater protection to Owner-Tenants than either of the

200. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.46.201. See FRIEDLANDER, supra note 190, § 8:9.202. See id.203. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6 (LexisNexis 2011) ("The tenancy for a factory-built

home site upon which is placed a factory-built home that is comprised of one section,other than a camping or travel trailer, may not be terminated until twelve months after thehome is placed on the site except for good cause. The tenancy for a factory-built home siteon which is placed a factory built home that is comprised of two or more sections may notbe terminated until five years after the home has been placed on the site except for goodcause.").

204. Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6 (giving no definition of what constitutesgood cause for eviction), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007) (listing the reasons forwhich an owner may evict a resident), and VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012)(enumerating when a manufactured home park owner may evict a resident).

205. See discussion supra Part VI.A-B.

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aforementioned states. Whereas there is no minimum term provisionof good cause protection in South Carolina,206 and only one year inVirginia, 21 Owner-Tenants purchasing multiple-section factory-builthomes in West Virginia are afforded five years of good causeprotection.208 This five-year term limit of good cause protection is asubstantial step toward providing Owner-Tenants with security oftenure.

Despite providing a longer term of good cause protection formultiple section factory-built homes, there is at least onecircumstance where West Virginia's statutory scheme is weaker thanVirginia's. In Virginia, the purchaser of a used multiple sectionfactory-built home with six years of tenure in a community wouldreceive at least one year of good cause protection.209 However, underthe plain language of West Virginia's statute, the same purchaserwould not appear to be provided with good cause protection for anyterm at all.2"o This result occurs because West Virginia's good causeprotection is directed at the factory-built home, rather than at theOwner-Tenant. 2 11 Though the statute's plain language suggests goodcause protection would be afforded to any Owner-Tenant during theterm of statutory protection, once the factory-built home has sat on asite for either one or five years, good cause protection seeminglyexpires.212 Therefore, despite the protection it affords to newly-placedfactory-built homes, West Virginia's statutory scheme seeminglyprovides no protection to the Owner-Tenant purchasing a mobilehome with a long tenure in the same community.213

An additional weakness of West Virginia's good cause scheme isthat it explicitly rejects good cause protection for lease renewal.214 Atthe end of the statutory term, the community owner may terminatethe rental agreement "for any reason, unless the rental agreementstates that reasons for termination must exist." 2 15 In the context of a

206. See discussion supra Part VI.A.207. See discussion supra Part VI.B.208. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6(a). West Virginia's single year of "good cause"

protection for single section factory-built homes places it closer in line with Virginia. Seeid.

209. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.42:1 (2012).210. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6(a). West Virginia's statute refers to when the

home "is placed" rather than to when the tenant takes possession. Id. As such, it seemsthat protection would not renew when a change in ownership of the mobile home occurs.

211. See id.212. See id.213. See id.214. See id. § 37-15-6(b)(1).215. Id.

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newly placed multiple-section factory built home, this explicitrejection of renewal absent good cause is less troublesome because atenant will have at least five years of security of tenure. However, inthe context of a single-section factory-built home, or a long tenuredhome, West Virginia's explicit rejection of renewal absent good causeprovides inadequate security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant. In theformer scenario, the Owner-Tenant can be evicted without causeafter a year and, in the latter scenario, the Owner-Tenant can beevicted without cause at any time. Therefore, despite its strengthwithin the context of a newly placed multiple-section factory-builthome, West Virginia's statutory scheme is ultimately undesirable onsimilar grounds as those in South Carolina and Virginia.

D. Maryland

Maryland's good cause statutory scheme is the strongest in theFourth Circuit because it prohibits a community owner fromterminating or refusing to renew an Owner-Tenant's lease absentgood cause.2 16 In Maryland, Owner-Tenants are protected fromeviction so long as they pay rent,2 17 abide by the terms of the rentalagreement,218 are truthful and not misleading in their application fortenancy,219 and do not commit a violation of law "detrimental to thesafety and welfare of other residents in the park."22 0 Therefore,Maryland community owners are prohibited from evicting an Owner-Tenant without good cause.

Similar to Virginia, Maryland community owners are required to"offer all current and prospective year-round residents a rentalagreement of not less than 1 year." 221' However, unlike Virginia, orany other Fourth Circuit jurisdiction, park owners are required tooffer "qualified resident[s]" 222 another one-year term before theexpiration of the one-year period.2 1 A qualified resident is

216. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012); id.§ 8A-1101; Marmion v. M.O.M., Inc., 541 A.2d 659, 663 (Md. App.1988) ("Not only does[Section 8A-202(c)(2)] give qualified tenants the right to demand a one-year lease, it alsoplace[s] upon the park owner the burden of offering a one-year lease to qualified tenantsat the expiration of each one-year term." (emphasis omitted)).

217. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-1101(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.2012).

218. See id. § 8A-1101(a)(2)(iii).219. See id. § 8A-1101(a)(2)(i).220. Id. § 8A-1101(a)(2)(ii).221. Id. § 8A-202(a).222. Id. § 8A-202(c).223. Id. § 8A-202(c)(2)(i); see Marmion v. M.O.M., Inc., 541 A.2d 659, 663 (Md. App.

1988).

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a year-round resident who: (i) Has made rental payments onthe due date or within any grace period commonly permitted inthe park during the preceding year; (ii) Within the preceding 6-month period has not committed a repeated violation of anyrule or provision of the rental agreement and, at the time theterm expires, no substantial violation exists; and (iii) Owns amobile home that meets the standards of the park.224

The effect of Maryland's qualified resident provision is that parkowners are required to offer a lease renewal unless the Owner-Tenanthas failed to meet the reasonable obligations of a qualified resident.Unlike South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia, the Owner-Tenantin Maryland has adequate security of tenure because he can expect toremain beyond the initial term so long as he maintains his legal andrental obligations.

Because Maryland's statutory scheme prohibits termination orrefusal to renew absent good cause, it fits into the most desirable partof the "good cause" spectrum.225 It allows the landowner to changethe use of the land with ample notice 226 while permitting a "qualified"Owner-Tenant to remain so long as the land is used as amanufactured home community.2 27 In addition, Maryland's statutoryscheme neither exposes the landowner to perpetual occupancy byuncooperative and undesirable tenants228 nor exposes the Owner-Tenant to involuntary displacement without cause. 229 It thereforestrikes a reasonable balance between the property interests of thelandowner and the Owner-Tenant. As such, Maryland's good causestatutory scheme should be a model for reform in North Carolina.South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia have each takensubstantial steps toward improving the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario;23 0 however, only Maryland has provided adequate securityof tenure and security of investment to the Owner-Tenant.

VII. NATIONAL COMPARISONS

Though Maryland's good cause statutory scheme can serve as amodel for reform in North Carolina, statutory schemes from beyond

224. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012).225. See discussion supra Part V.B.226. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202(c)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.

2012).227. See id. § 8A-202(c)(2)(i).228. See id. § 8A-202(c)(1).229. See id. § 8A-1101.230. See discussion supra Part VI.A-C.

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the Fourth Circuit should also be considered. Two excellent modelsfor reform are Arizona and Delaware. 23 1 A major strength of the goodcause statutes in Arizona and Delaware is that they are clear andexplicit.232 As seen in South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia,many good cause schemes "are unclear as to whether the communityowner can evade the good cause requirement by simply declining tooffer the resident a renewal lease once the existing lease expires." 233

Arizona avoids this by explicitly providing that "[t]he landlord maynot terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy without good cause." 23 4

Similarly, Delaware's good cause statute clearly provides that "[a]landlord may terminate a rental agreement for a lot in amanufactured home community before it expires or may refuse torenew an agreement only for due cause." 235 The qualified residentstructure of Maryland's statutory scheme achieves the same result,236but Delaware and Arizona demonstrate how simple andstraightforward an adequate good cause statute can be. Therefore,due to the protection and clarity of their good cause statutoryschemes, Delaware and Arizona should stand alongside Maryland asmodels for reform in North Carolina.

CONCLUSION

North Carolina has a problem within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario that is in dire need of correction: Owner-Tenants aresuffering the costs associated with a lack of security of tenure, andsociety is suffering the cost of an epidemic of abandoned mobilehomes. In at least one way, the problems of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario are inherent to the mixed ownership of thearrangement. Because one party owns the land and the other ownsthe mobile home, respective property interests collide when the issueof the right to remain arises.

Finding the appropriate balance among competing interests inthis scenario is a very difficult task indeed, and it is unlikely that anysolution can provide a benefit for one party without imposing a legal

231. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 17-19(setting out statutes in Arizona and Delaware as sample laws protecting residents fromeviction without good cause).

232. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 7010,7010A (2009).

233. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.234. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476(B).235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 7010(a).236. See discussion supra Part VI.D.

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and financial cost upon the other. However, the allocation of legalrights between parties within the Mobile Home Owner-TenantScenario in North Carolina can be made more equitable. Though it isonly one piece of the puzzle for Owner-Tenant's rights," and by itselfwill not provide complete protection, a statute requiring good causeto evict or to refuse renewal of an existing lease would be asubstantial step toward providing the Owner-Tenant with security oftenure.

Fortunately, North Carolina does not have to be the leadertraveling down an unmarked path to provide this much neededprotection. Instead, North Carolina need only look to the multitudeof other jurisdictions that have protected the Owner-Tenant. Stateslike Maryland, Delaware, and Arizona demonstrate that effectivegood cause statutes come in many forms. Some are complex, andsome are simple and direct, but they are all equally effective if theyprovide the Owner-Tenant with adequate security of tenure andsecurity of investment.

CHAD T. ANDERSON**

237. In addition to the freedom from eviction without good cause, the NationalConsumer Law Center outlines three additional protections that are needed within theMobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario: The Freedom of Association and the Freedom ofSpeech, the Freedom from Retaliation, and the Protection of the Right to Sell the Homein Place. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 2. Thoughit is beyond the scope of this Comment, rent control is obviously another subject whichrequires consideration within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario. If the landownercan unreasonably raise rates with impunity, then good cause protection will be of little useto the Owner-Tenant.

** The author would like to thank Professor Alfred Brophy for his assistance indeveloping the topic for this Comment, as well as Elaine Hartman, Joshua Hayes, and theBoard and Staff of the North Carolina Law Review for their tireless editorial assistance.Thanks as well to Pisgah Legal Services for the internship opportunity that introduced theauthor to the plight of Owner-Tenants in North Carolina.

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