ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASESFIRST SET

SUMMER 2015

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents. Maximo Calalang in his own behalf. Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan(the case has 3 issues, about police power, social justice, and undue delegation, the third being the most relevant in the sucject)Facts: Antecedent facts Maximo Calalang petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.It was alleged in the petition that: National Traffic Commission recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that Director of Public Works, , recommended to the secretary of public works and communcations the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted resulting to the prohibition of all animal-drawn vehicles to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.Contention of the petitioner: (issue of the case) Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph" To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw libraryRuling: NO.The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

Philippines Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASEI) v. Hon. Ruben D. Torres (Secretary of DOLE) and Jose N. Sarmineto (Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA))G.R. No. 101279Aug. 6, 1992.

1. TOPIC: Express and Implied Powers2. FACTS:a. ANTECEDENT FACTS PASEI: private employment and recruitment agency duly licensed by POEA to engage in the business of obtaining oversease employment for Filipino workers. A petition for prohibition with a temporary restraining order filed by Peititoner to prohibit and enjoin Respondents from enforcing DOLE Department Order No. 16 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting the task of processing and deploying such workers in the DOLE (through the POEA). Department Order No. 16 was issued on June 1, 1991 as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipinos employed in Hong Kong. Memorandum Circular No. 30 provided the guidelines on the Government processing and deployment of workers to Hong Kong, while No. 37 provided for the processing of employment contracts.b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER The respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars The assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair, and oppressive The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Registrar were not complied with.c. RULING OF LOWER COURTS: Not indicated.

3. ISSUES:a. W/N the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circularsb. W/N the respondents failed to meet the requirements of publication and filing.

4. RULINGa. NO, this contention has no merit. Art. 36 of the Labor Code (Regulatory Power) grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities and authorizes the Secretary to issue and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives. E.O. 797 (created the POEA), vests in the POEA the powers and duties: (a) to establish and maintain a system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, (b) to recruit and place workers for overseas employment on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate. IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the deployment of Filipino workers for overseas employment (only specifically to Hong Kong). The administrative issuances fall within the admiinistrative and policing power expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents. The respondents were granted by law the powers and duties to restrict and to regulate. Their actions fall within the scope of these.

b. YES, petitioner failed to meet the requirements of publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar (Art. 2 of the Civil Code, Art. 5 of the Labor Code, and Sec. 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Admiistrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to imp,ement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

c. OVERALL RULING: The writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of the DOLE Department Order No. 16 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37 are SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. CA

Topic: Express and Implied Powers (Police Power)Facts: Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations.The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment.The Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC). Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1]the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former.Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.

Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system.Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:1.Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.2.Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.3.Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.4.Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.

Petitioner's Contention:These department orders, 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law.Further, the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property

Respondents Contention:Respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power.

Issue:WON the department orders constitute a valid exercise of the states police powers.(1) Lower Court: (2) Appellate Court: YES (3) Supreme Court: YESa. Majority Decision:

The latin maximsalus populi est suprema lexembodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power.As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs,"this "least limitable"of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, asparens patriaegives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.

As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers.The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary.

They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's.They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines.Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations.On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers.Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.It was held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.

Benito Symaco v. Hon.Paterio Aquino,L-14535January 30, 1960Topic: Ministerial and Discretionary DutyFacts: On May 22, 1957, the petitioner filed a building permit as required by a Municipal Ordinance in the office of the respondent for the repairs to be made in his house, however on July 2, 1957 when the building inspector conducted an inspection of the repairs made by the petitioner, the former advised that a new building permit should be secured since what the petitioner did was constructing a new building. Consequently the petitioner filed the same, pending the approval, counsel of the adversary party of a civil action of forcible entry filed against the petitioner inform the office of the respondent to withhold the issuance of building permit pending the decision of the case filed, in which the respondent wrote a letter to the Petitioner's counsel regarding the issue. The non issuance of the respondent cause the petitioner to file a writ of mandamus.

Petitioner's Contention:The duty of a Municipal Mayor in issuing building permit is a ministerial duty, thus the respondent has no right to withhold such issuance when all the requirements stipulated in the ordinance were complied by the petitioner.

ARTICLE I, Ordinance No. 20, Series of 1941Every owner, tenant, manager or contrator, shall, before beginning the construction or repair of any edifice, obtain the necessary permit from the Municipal Mayor, stating in the application the name of the owner, location of the building, kind of materials to be used, and the floor area. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents Contention:The respondent alleged that the proper remedy to be availed by the petitioner is section 2188 of the Administrative Code and not the writ of mandamus.

Issue:WON the duty of the Mayor to issue building permit is ministerial or discretionary.Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: (2) Appellate Court: (3) Supreme Court: a. Majority Decision: The duty of the Mayor to issue building permit is ministerial in nature based on the ordinance that mandates it. After the petitioner complied with all the necessary requirements stipulated in the ordinance, the petitioner is entitled to it and the respondent's duty became ministerial. Thus it is incumbent upon the respondent to issue the permit to the petitioner. Likewise the ordinance did not provide any provisions granting discretion to the Mayor to refuse issuance of the permit when all the requirements were complied.

The writ of mandamus is the proper remedy rather than section 2188 of the Administrative Code as assailed by the respondent, because the said provision gives disciplinary actions for erring municipal officer, rather than to compel the performance of a legal duty. b. Dissenting Opinion:

Definition of Terms:Ministerial Duty - is one which the officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts , in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.

Discretionary Duty - If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.

LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs.MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.G.R. No. L-10520; February 28, 1957

FACTS: After the1955 elections, Petitioner Senator Taada was the lone opposition senator. The 23 other seats were filled up by the Nacionalista Party. Petitioner Macapagal was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956: upon nomination of Senator CiprianoPrimicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and CiprianoPrimicias, as members of the SET. upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal; then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong, the Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, however reads:."The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).Both petitioners called for the disqualification of Cuenco and Delgado as members of the SET for Cuenco and Delgado were not nominated by the minority party, as provided for in the Constitution. But, since Sen. Taada is the lone member of the minority, the respondents contended that if the Constitution should be followed to the letter, that would leave the SET with only 7 members.PERTINENT ISSUE: WON the Constitutional provision on the nomination and selection of the members of the SET is mandatory or directory.RULING: The Constitutional provision on the nomination AND selection of the members of SET is mandatory."My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal,and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations."There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes.Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. REVIEW (Might come up as a question)What is a political question?"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.What is a justiciable question?A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts.The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .."

Republic vs. Phil Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.1970

1. Topic: Errors in Exercise of Powers2. Facts2.1. Antecedent Facts: Respondent (registered owner of 238 motor vehicles) paid to the Motor Vehicles Office the amount of P78,636.17 (second instalment of registration fees) The amount was paid in the form of negotiable certificates of indebtedness, not cash2.2. Contention of the Petitioner: Payment of registration fees in the form of negotiable certificates of indebtedness is invalid2.3. Contention of the Respondent: The Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office had issued a circular (Circular No. 5) that quoted a letter from the National Treasurer regarding the Back Pay Law (Republic Act 304), allowing the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness in payment of registration fees of motor vehicles The Auditor General had concurred with the view of the National Treasurer2.4. Ruling of the lower court: Petitioners complaint was dismissed The respondents payment using the negotiable certificates of indebtedness is valid3. Issues:(a) Whether or not the acceptance of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness tendered by the respondent bus firm to and accepted by the Motor Vehicles Office and the corresponding issuance of official receipts therefor acknowledging such payment by said office is valid and binding on petitioner Republic(b) Whether or not the government is estopped for the mistakes committed by its agents4. Ruling4.1. Categorical answer to issues(a) No(b) No4.2. Explanation for ruling(a) Taxes were distinguished from regulatory fees. The object of the latter is the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. The former has for its object the raising of revenue. The Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment of registration fees. The Back Pay Law relied by the respondent is applicable only to taxes, not to registration fees. Respondents mode of payment is invalid.(b) The lower court correctly referred to the national treasurer as being vested with the function of administering the Back Pay Law. It concluded in its decision that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general. The Court disagrees, citing the case of Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands (1919). The Court also cited the case of Pineda v. Court of First Instance (1929) which said that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.4.3. DoctrineRelating the second issue and the topic, it would seem that if there are errors committed in the exercise of powers by administrative agencies, the government is not bound by the errors of said agencies.

G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFITopic :Quasi-Legislative Power : In GeneralFacts: Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlitodel Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffedreach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).Contention of the Petitioner- The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512;(3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and(4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."Lower Court :- Municipal court :quashed the complaint. -The Court of First Instance of Laguna :affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.-The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution.

Issue/s:W/N Administrative order 84 and AO 84-1, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law valid?Ruling :-No.Explanation for Ruling :The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries AdministrativeOrders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.The reason is that the Fisheries Lawdoes not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the powerto declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

Smart communications, Inc. (SMART) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL) v. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)G.R. No. 152063Aug. 12, 2003

1. TOPIC: Quasi-legislative Powers in general2. FACTS:a. ANTECEDENT FACTS Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (June 16, 2000), promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunication devices. The Circular provided it shall take effect 15 days after its publication (Philippine Star, June 22, 2000).1) Billing statements to be received by the subscriber not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. If receipt does fall within this period, the subscriber is granted a grace period to pay the bill and the service shall not be disconnected by public telecommunications entities (PTC) within the grace period2) No charge for calls diverted to voicemail.3) PTEs shall verify the ID and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards, which shall be valid for at least 2 years from first use. After such, the SIM is invalid unless replenished by the holder within 2 years and 45 days from the first use. No additional charge for the installation of the validity of an invalid SIM upon request.4) The unit of billing for CMTS (prepaid or postpaid shall be reduced from 1 minute/pulse to 6 seconds/pulse The NTC also issued a Memorandum (Aug. 30, 2000) to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators on measures to help minimize the incidence of stealing of cellphones. Such measures include requiring all existing prepaid SIM card holders to register and present valid IDs and denyign acceptance of customers using stolen cellphone units (registered to someone else). b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONERS Petitioners filed an action for declaration of nullity of the Memorandums and a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injuneciton and TRO. The NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods (such as the prepaid call cards) since jurisdiction belongs to the Dept. of Trade and Industry (under the Consumer Act of the Philippines). The Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory, and violative of the Constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process The Circular will impair the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity of the prepaid SIM and call cards The requirements of identificaiton of prepaid card buyers and call valance announcement are unreasonablec. RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention, which was granted by the trial court. Oct. 27, 2000, the trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing. NTC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies. TRIAL COURT: On November 20, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunection (enjoining the respondent NTC from implementing pending finality of the case). A motion for reconsideration by the respondents was denied. COURT of APPEALS: NTC filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. The CA.granted the petition, declared that the prliminary injunction be annulled and set aside and that the complaints be dismissed. Petitioners MR were denied in a resolution for lack of merit.

3. ISSUES:a. W/N the CA gravely erred in holding that the NTC and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case.b. W/N the petitioners failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.c. W.N the CA erred in applying doctrine of primary jurisdiction in declaring that NTC possesses jurisdiction over the case.

4. RULING:OVERALL RULING: The petitions are GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC is reinstated and the cases is REMANDED for continuation of the proceedings.

a. YES

IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative (rule-making powers) that allow them to make rules and regulations (delegated legislation) that is within: (a) the confiines of the granting statute and (b) the doctrine of non-delegability and the separation of powers.

The rules should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the agency. It is required that regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and its standards. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.

This is not to be confused with the quasi-judicial power, whereinn officers and agencies investigate facts to determine conclusions as a basis for the exercise of their official action.

b. NO. In quesitoning the validitiy of a rule, a party may not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court when the act concerned was performed pursuant to the agencys quasi-legislative function. Even assuming aguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies, the petitioners sufficiently complied with it.

c. YES, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only when the agency exercises its quasi-judicial function. In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice is to refer it to the administrative agency exercising specialized competence (primary jurisdiction). The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the agencys jurisdictipon (involves sound exercise of agencys special knowledge, experience, and services) prior to its resolution by the agency. But when what is assailed is the validity of a rule issued by the agency (quasi-legislative power), the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same (power of judicial review). The issuance of the Memoranda were pursuant to its law-making powers and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does NOT APPLY (i.e. RTC may take cognizance).

Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Board of Public Utility CommissionersG.R. No. L-11216March 6, 1916

1. TOPIC: Delagation of Legislative Powers2. FACTSa. ANTECEDENT FACTS Appeal of an order of respondents requiring petitioner to file a detained report of its finances and operations in the certain form. The petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under Spanish law and engaged in business in the Philippines as a common maritime carrier (of both people and products) June 7, 1915, the respondents issued an order requiring petitioner to show cause why it should not be required to present detailed annual reports of its finances and operations of its vessels in the form attached. After a hearing, respondent ordered the same. b. CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS The respondent Board has no authority. The provision of Act No. 2307 on which it based its order is invalid since it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the board. Said requirements are also unnecessary and cumbersome.

3. ISSUESa. W/N the authority exercised by the respondent Board has been validly delegated by the Legislature.

4. RULINGOVERALL RULING: The order appealed from is SET ASIDE. The Board Commissioners are ordered to DISMISS their proceedings.

a. NO, the respondent Board has no valid authority since the law does not establish a valid form of delegation of legislative power.

IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: Sec. 16 of Act No. 2306 provides that the Board shll have power to require public utilities to furnish annual detailed reports of finances and operations in prescribed forms.The provision is very general. Leaving the nature of the reports, its contents, the guidelines, and similar matters to the discretion of the board is not an expression of the will of the State. The broad scope of the provision indicates that the Legislature delegated to the Board all of its powers on a given subject matter in a manner almost absolute without laying rules on how the power is to be applied.

In delegating, the law must be complete in all its terms and provisions and nothing must be left to the discretion of the delegate. Congress must lay down the general rules for guidance. When the law reaches the delegate, nothing must be left for it to do than to implement and execute the law. However, leaving the caryring out of details to the delegate is valid.

IN THIS CASE, the law does not lay down general rules of action by failing to prescribe in detail what the reports must contain. Practically everything is left to the Boards discretion.

People v. Vera

Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), at al.G.R. No. 74457March 20, 1987

1. TOPIC: Delegation of Legislative Power

2. FACTSa. ANTECEDENT FACTS E.O. No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos/carabeef and any transported in violation of said E.O. shall be subject to confiscation/forfeiture by the government to be distributed 1) to chartiable institutions and other similar organizations as the Chariman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit (carabeef), or 2) to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabaos) On Jan. 13, 1984, the petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo, which were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER The E.O. is unconstitutional since it authorizes outright confiscation in violation of due process (no right to be heard) The E.O. is also an improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President (Marcos).c. RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS: The RTC sustained the confiscation of the Carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond of P12,000.00 filed by the petitioner. It also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the EO for lack of authority and for presumed validity. The IAC upheld the trial court.

3. ISSUESa. W/N the RTC has the power to examine the constitutionality of the E.O.b. W/N due process of the petitioner has been violatedc. W/N the E.O. provides for a valid delegation of legislative power.

4. RULINGOVERALL RULING: E.O. 626-A is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The decision of the CA is reversed.a. YES, the jurisdiction of the SC provides that it may review the orders of lower courts involving the constitutionality of certain measures (implying that lower courts may pass judgment on the same, subject to review by higher courts). The presumption of validity is also not conclusive.

b. YES. The minimum requirements of due process (notice ad hearing) were not met. While the objective of protecting carabaos and their owners may be a valid subject of police power, it fails to meet the requisite for the exercise of police power (that the means be reasonably necessary to achieve the lawful objective). E.O. 626-A prohibits the movement of carabaos and the Court fails to see how this can prevent their needless slaughter since carabaos may be unlawfully killed in any place. The confiscation was also not justified by the immediacy of a problem.

c. YES. The assailed E.O. is actually a presidential decree (promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing existing law. It was issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6 (whenever in his judgment, there existed a grave emergency requiring immediate action and the legislative failed to act adequately, he could issue decrees, orders, LOIs with the force/effect of law) IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: E.O. 626-A is an invalid delegation of legislative powers. The disposition of the confiscated property is questionable. The seized property is distributed to charitable institutions or other institutions as the Chariman may see fit (in the case of carabeef) or to deserving farmers as the Director may see fit. May see fit is too broad and no reasonable guidelines or limitations for the actions of the officers were provided. This gives the officers exclusive jurisdiction.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) et al.G.R. No. 76633Oct. 8, 1988

1. TOPIC2. FACTSa. ANTECEDENT FACTS Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of M/V Eastern Polaris. He was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985 His widow, private respondent Kathleen D. Saco, sued for damages under E.O. 797 and Memorandum Ciruclar No. 2 of POEA. The POEA assumed jurisdiction and awarded her P192,000. The POEA was created under E.O. 797 to promote and monitor overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. Sec. 4(a) provides that POEA is vested with original and exlusive jurisdiction, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising from laws or contracts involving Filpino contract workers, including seamen. The 1985 Rules and Regulations issued by the POEA include claims for death, disability, and other benefits. The awarding of benefits by POEA was based on its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which prescribed a standfard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER The awarding of P192,000 to private respondent was not valid. POEA had no jurisdiction because her husband was not an overseas worker. The complaint was cognizable by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. Petitioner filed before the SC a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies (NOTE: ordinarily the decisions of POEA should be first appealed to NLRC, giving the agency opportunity to correct the errors of its subordinates, but this case falls under the exception since what have been raised are questions of law). Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Hence, POEA has no authority to promulgate said regulation.c. RULING OF LOWER COURTS: N/A

3. ISSUESa. W/N the deceased was an overseas workerb. W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 violatyes the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

4. RULINGOVERALL RULING: The petition is DISMISSED. The TRO is LIFTED.a. YES. The SC sees no reason not consider Vitaliano Saco as an overseas employee at the time he met the fatal accident. Under the 1985 R&R, overseas employment is defined as employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters. The petitioners actions also indicate acknowledgement of this, such as indicating in the receipt of the burial benefits overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco and the submission of its shipping articles to POEA for processing.

b. NO, the Memorandum Circular (MC) is a valid delegation of legislative power.

IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The authority to issue said regulation is provided in Sec. 4(a) of E.O. 797 (POEA shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration). What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law should be.

To determine whether there is a valid delegation of legislative power, two tests are applied: (1) the completeness test (the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions so that when it reaches the delegate, he will only have to implement it), (2) the sufficient standard test (adequate guidelines to map the boundaries of the delegates authority). The model contract in the MC is a valid administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed therein There is a sufficient standard is present in E.O. 797 mandating the POEA to protect the rights of OFWs to fair and equitable employment practices.

Emmanueal Pelaez vs. Auditor GeneralG.R. No. L-23825Dec. 24, 1965

1. TOPIC: Delegation of Legislative Powers2. FACTSa. ANTECEDENT FACTS From Sept. 4 to Oct. 29, 1964, the President, claiming to act pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (REC), issued E.O. Nos 93-121, 124, 126-129, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner, as Vice President and as a taxpayer, filed for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondent to restrain him and his agents from using and/or allocating any public funds in implementation of said EOs. Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 2370 provides that Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress and Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be createdupon the recommendation of the council of the municipality..Provided, however, that no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred Sec. 68 of the RAC provides that the President may by EO define the boundaries of any province, municipality, any other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory therein, separate political divisions other than a province as may be required, merge such sudivisions with another, name any new subdivisionprovided that the authorization of Conngress must be first obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined/divided. The President may also change the seat of the government in such subdivisions to such place therein as public welfare may require. b. CONTENTION OF PETITIONER The EOs are null and void since Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by Act No. 2370 (Can the President create a municipality when he cannot even create barrios, the units of municipalities) The EOs also constitute an undue delegation of legislative powerc. CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT The President can create a new municipality without creating new barrios by allocating old barrrios under the jurisdiction of a new municipality. The power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 68 of RAC does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power.

3. ISSUESa. W/N the President has been duly delegated legislative power to create municipalities.

4. RULING:OVERALL RULING: The Executive Orders in question are declared NULL AND VOID ab initio. a. NO, Sec. 68 does not delegate legislative power to create munipalities upon the President. IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The power to fix common boundaries in order to settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in nature since it involves adopting mean to put the law creating municipalities into effect. The authority to create municipal corporations is legislative. While Congress may delegate the power to fill in the details of its executions, the law must pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test so that there be no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these requirements of a valid delegation. It does not identify a policy to be carried out by the President, does not provide sufficient standards. The last part provides as the public welfare may require. While it has been held in previous cases that public interest/welfare are sufficient standards for valid delegation, they must be construed in relation to the facts involved (i.e. the public interest must be related to the function/purpose of the administrative agency, such the power of the Director of Public Works to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit on roads). NOTE: In other words, the public interest involved must be related to the specific purpose for which the agency was made.

In this case, the creation of municipalities is not an administrative function but legislative. Public interest becomes a purely legislative/political question and no longer a question of fact.Sec. 68 does not prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact.

Sec. 10(1) of Art. VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control over executive departments and offices, and exercise general supervision over all local governments. The President has only limited authority over local governments and cannot interfere as long as they act within their authority. Therefore, Sec. 68 of the RAC (approved March 1917) must be deemed REPEALED by the subsequent adoption of the 1935 Constitution (incompatible).

Romeo F. Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner v. Hon.Vicente G. Ericta, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City

Topic: Delegation of Legislative PowerFacts: The petitioner as Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office in a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the respondent judge of the CFI, who grants the petition of certain Galo and others for writ of preliminary injunction of the Reflector Law which amended the Land Transportation Code, as well as the Administrative Order issued by the petitioner as implementing rules and regulations of the aforementioned law.

Petitioner's Contention:The Reflector Law is constitutional, likewise the Administrative Order he issued providing specific rules and regulations in order to properly implement the aforesaid law.

Respondents Contention:The Reflector Law is unconstitutional because it is an invalid exercise of police power for being violation of the due process clause, thus the issuance of the Administrative Order is an undue exercise of the legislative power by the Petitioner-Commissioner.

Issue:WON the Administrative Order issued by the Petitioner confirms as a valid delegation of Legislative Power.

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: (2) Appellate Court: (3) Supreme Court: a. Majority Decision: Yes, the Administrative Order confirms as a valid delegation of Legislative Power, because what cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them. To test the validity of the delegated power, two test must be done, 1. Completeness Test - that the statute is complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature, and 2.Standard Test - there must be a standard which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.

The Court ruled, all that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

The Reflector Law which provided the authority of the petitioner to issue the order as an implementing rules and regulations is constitutional. Galo and others who filed a writ of preliminary injunction for the implementation of the law and the order erred in their contention, the law and administrative order did not violate the due process clause of the Constitution since the main purpose of the law is for public safety, which is a valid exercise of police power.

Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et. al., vs. The Secretary of HealthTopic: Delegation of Legislative PowerFacts: Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Petitioners prays for a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and Administrative Order No. 9 series of 1995 as its implementing rules and regulation. Also petitioned for mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant their renewal of license to operate free standing blood banks.

The law steamed from the report of an institution tasked to evaluate the safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System, the report shows that the country relied heavily on commercial blood banks, and the blood sold by the persons to such establishment are more likely to have any of the 4 tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases such as AIDS, Malaria, syphilis and Hepatitis B.

As a solution, the legislature enacted the statute in questioned which provides the phase outing of commercial blood banks within 2 years from the effectivity of the law, which can be extended for a maximum of 2 years by the Secretary of Health. In relation to the said statute, the Secretary executed an Administrative Order as implementing rules and regulations, which also provides the process of phase outing the commercial blood blanks reiterating sec.7 of the statute authorizing the same, also with a statement that the decision to extend shall be based on a result of careful study and review of the blood supply, demand and public safety.

Petitioner's Contention:Petitioners alleged that the law constitutes undue delegation because section 7 of the law constrained the Secretary of Health to legislate whether or not to extend the license of the commercial blood banks for a maximum period of 2 years.

Respondents Contention:The respondent contend that the blood from commercial blood banks are unsafe and in the exercise of police power can close down such establishments to protect the public.

Issue:WON Section 7 of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 constitutes undue delegation of Legislative Power

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: (2) Appellate Court: (3) Supreme Court: a. Majority Decision: No, it does not constitutes undue delegation because the law is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks, the law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate it's policies. The Secretary of Health has been given broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.

Sergio I. Carbonilla et. al. vs. Board of Airlines RepresentativeTopic: Delegation of Legislative PowerFacts: In connection with section 608 of the Tariff and Custom Code of the Philippines which provides authority to the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs to promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the code, also section 3506 which stipulates the assignment of Customs employees to overtime work with a rate fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid for by importers, shippers or other persons served, the rates to be fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise, an Administrative order was issued by the Commissioner amending the rate of overtime pay of Customs employees in NAIA from 25 pesos to 55 pesos as an on going exchange rate per US dollar.

Petitioner's Contention:Petitioners are customs employees affected by the result of the validity of the Administrative Order issued and the Office of the President, they alleged that the respondent did not question the prior Administrative Order which provides the 25 pesos rate of overtime pay, in which that rate is the exchange rate of that time. Also, BOC was merely exercising its rule making power or quasi legislative power when it issued the Administrative Order. Likewise there is a legal presumption that the rates fixed by an Administrative agency are reasonable, and that the fixing of the rates by the Government, through its authorized agents, involved the exercise of reasonable discretion.

Respondents Contention:The respondent contentions are, 1.BOC failed to comply with the publication requirement, 2. that the foreign exchange cannot be a basis for rate increase, and 3. that increase in rate was ill-timed.

Issue: WON there is a valid delegation of legislative power by the Commissioner of Customs

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: (2) Appellate Court: (3) Supreme Court: a. Majority Decision: Yes, it is a valid delegation of legislative power, TCCP section 608 and 3506 pass the completeness and sufficient standard test because the law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do; it gives authority to the collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work, the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates of which it shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.

Likewise, it does constitutes as a double pay because it is a payment for additional work rendered after regular office hours.