Adaptive Implementation of Spatial Policies: A Game

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Adaptive Implementation of Integrated Spatial Plans: A Game Jaap Evers CSTM – Twente Centre for Studies of Technology and Sustainable Development, University of Twente

Transcript of Adaptive Implementation of Spatial Policies: A Game

Page 1: Adaptive Implementation of Spatial Policies: A Game

Adaptive Implementation of Integrated Spatial Plans:A GameJaap Evers

CSTM – Twente Centre for Studies of Technology and Sustainable Development,

University of Twente

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INTRODUCTION•

• Spatial Development Veilen:A Simulation Game

• Games Processes

• Games Outcomes

• Discussion & Conclusions

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THE GAME•

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THE GAME•

Vision:Province

Water AuthorityMunicipality

Strategic approachAdaptive approach

Vision ProvinceVision Water

Authority Vision Municipality

Evaluation Evaluation

Planning and R

ealization

Interactive Planning

Evaluation

Gam

e sh

ift

Reaction Inhabitants

Gam

e sh

ift

Realization

Evaluation

Unexpected opportunity

Unexpected threat

Unexpected threat

Unexpected opportunity

Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

Gam

e shift

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GAME PROCESSES•

Not-interactiveSetting agenda, discussionNo-input

ConsultingInforming

(2)(1)

InteractivePolicy development and decision making

Policy development, used for decision making

Policy development, decision may deviate

Co-deciding

Co-producing

Advising

(5)

(4)

(3)

Decision making

Contribution of participantsLevel of Participation

Table 1: Level of participation in decision-making based on Edelenbos (2000)

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GAME PROCESSES•

Table 2: Models and the characteristics of the cooperation processes (Kuindersma & Kolkman, 2005; Soeterbeek, 2000)

Creativity en Consensus seeking for combining goals and innovative solutions (C)

Laboratory Model

Negotiation and Bargaining on deals (N)Market model

Conflict and Fighting for own goals and stakes (F)Arena model

Characteristics of Cooperation process

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GAME PROCESSES•

Table 3: Characteristics of the interaction processes

Interactive(5)C, N, F

Interactive(5)C, N, F

-Interactive(5)N, F

Interactive(5)N, F

Interactive(5)N, F

MunicipalityWater AuthorityProvinceCommunity

Session 3

Not-inter-active(1)F

Not-inter-active(1)F

Not-inter-active(1)F

Community

Interactive(5)C, N, F

Interactive(4)C, N, F

-

Interactive(5)C, N

Interactive(5)C, N

Interactive(5)C, N

MunicipalityWater AuthorityProvince

Session 2

No RoleNo RoleNo RoleNo RoleNo RoleNo RoleCommunity

Interactive(4)C, N

Interactive(4)C, N

Interactive(4)C, N

Interactive(4)C, N

Interactive(4)C, N

Interactive(4)*C, N**

MunicipalityWater AuthorityProvince

Session 1

A3A2A1S3S2S1

Characteristics of the interaction processes

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GAME OUTCOMES•

42 = (2+2)/22 = (2+2)/22A3

4.62 = (2+2+2)/32.3 = (3+2+2)/33A2

93 = (3+3)/23 = (3+3)/22S3

62 = (2+2)/23 = (3+3)/22S2

7.52.5 = (3+2)/23 = (4+2)/22S1

ScoreAverage amount of responsible authorities participated in the realized construction

Average amount of goals realized per site where function combinations were realized

Amount of sites with combined functions

Game

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GAME OUTCOMES•

€ 11,658,800.-€ 13,406,000.-

Minimum Total CostsMaximum Total Costs

€ 200,000.-Budget Recreation (tracking path, cycling path, picnic sites)

€ 904,800.-

€ 1,560,000.-

Agricultural Water Buffer (12 ha)OR

Ecologically constructed Water Buffer (12 ha)

Municipality

€ 286,000.-Reconstruction Veilense Mill Channel(€52,000.-/km, total 5.5km)

€ 1,508.000.-

€ 2,600,000.-

Agricultural Water Buffer (20 ha)OR

Ecologically constructed Water Buffer (20 ha)

Water Authority

€ 8,760,000.-

€ 8,840,000.-

Ecological Network (North, app. 144 ha)OR

Ecological Network (South, app. 146 ha)

Province

CostsMeasurementActor

Table 5: Costs of all measurements to attain the individual policy goals when constructed independently

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GAME OUTCOMES•

The project team has 75.5 ha of land of Mr. Bos left over after land relocation. Extra costs = 75.5 ha x € 30,000.- = € 2.3 million (but the land can be sold to interested farmers or investors in the near future)

A3

No combination of Ecological Network and Water Buffer, did not safe € 3.16 million, because of adaptive behaviour

A2

Paid 10% extra for land acquisition for Ecological Network and offered fam. De Graaf a new tractor. Extra costs = € 0.6 million + tractor

S3

No combination of Ecological Network and Water Buffer, did not safe € 3.16 million.Paid 10% extra for land acquisition for Ecological Network and Reconstruction of Mill

Channel. Extra costs = € 0.63 million

S2

The total property of Mr. Bos (120 ha) was exchanged for a smaller total property of other farmers for land relocation (75 ha).

Extra costs: 120 ha – 75 ha = 45 ha (x €30,000.-) = € 1.4 million

S1

Extra costs and causesGame

Table 6: Extra costs and cause of the games

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DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS•

Strategic Approach• More innovative plans and

outcomes• More conflicts in realization

• Higher costs due to bargaining and negotiation

• Commanding government, route of resistance

• Reactive farmers

Adaptive Approach• Less innovative outcomes

• More cooperation in realization

• Higher costs due to adaptive behavior

• Learning government, route of least resistance

• Proactive farmers (emergence of land relocation projects)

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION•

‘I hear and I forget, I see and I remember, I do and I understand”

(Confucius, Chinese Philosopher, 551-479 BCE)