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VMI Archives Adams Center Essays Top Level

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The Seeds of Our Destruct ion:

The United States and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu

Thomas G. Bradbeer

Leadership DepartmentU.S. Army Command & General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Email:[email protected] Phone: Work-913-758-3567

Home: 913-680-0336

I kept telling my men, we must hold on one more day. The Americans will not letus down.

Major Marcel M. Bigeard, Commander, 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion
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Operation Castorbegan at 1035 hours on November 20, 1953 when Major

Marcel Bigeard and his 651 men of the 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion leapt

from the rear cargo doors of sixty-four American C-47 aircraft. They were

followed by 569 men of the 2d Battalion, 1st Parachute Light Infantry Regiment.

As their parachutes began to open, the French and their Vietnamese soldiers

started to receive automatic weapons fire from the valley floor and the nearby

hills. The fire came from elements of the Viet Minh Independent Regiment 148s

920th

Battalion who were conducting a training exercise that morning in the valley

near a village that bore the Vietnamese designation of Dien Bien Phu or big

frontier administrative center.1

Upon landing the paratroopers immediately became involved in hand to

hand combat with Viet Minh regulars, some while they were still in their

parachute harnesses. Individuals and small groups used their carbines, sub-

machine guns, knives and bayonets in the tall elephant grass that covered the

drop zones. The intense and desperate fighting lasted the rest of the morning

and into the afternoon. A third airborne unit, the 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion,

dropped over the battlefield as the fighting culminated with the Viet Minh units

withdrawing southwards. French losses were eleven killed and fifty-two wounded.

Major Bigeard estimated that the Viet Minh had lost two companies almost

totally destroyed.

2

This engagement was the beginning of a battle that would have global and

strategic repercussions for the next thirty years. The United States, having

supported France with enormous amounts of military and financial aid for more
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than four years prior to the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and ever watchful of the

influence and actions of the Soviet Union during this early phase of the Cold

War, would seriously contemplate military intervention and the use of nuclear

weapons to prevent a French defeat in Indochina* and stop the spread of

communism in Southeast Asia. The battle would have far reaching and lasting

long-term effects on every country in the region and, especially the United

States. Americas indirect involvement in the French Indochina War and the

decisions made during the Dien Bien Phu battle would be the spark for the start

of the Second Indochina War ten years later in which 58, 229 U.S. servicemen

would be killed and another 303, 704 wounded.3

The First Indochina War

The Vietnam War would have

unimaginable and unforeseen consequences on the United States, its foreign

policy, the military and society at large. Many of these impacts are still being

reconciled with by the country today.

The First Indochina War had its beginnings at the Potsdam Conference in

July 1945. The Allied governments agreed that once hostilities with Japan ended,

Chinese forces would accept the surrender of Japanese units north of the

sixteenth parallel while British troops landing in Saigon took the surrender south

of that line. Hence the partitioning of Vietnam into North and South was agreed to

by the major powers. Communist Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet Minh

(Nationalist Independence Front), whose forces had fought alongside Allied units

against the Japanese invaders late in the war, hoped that the United States

would support his efforts for a united Vietnam and


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*Indochina consisted of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and was also known asthe Associated States of the French Union. At the time Vietnam consisted ofthree states: Tonkin (North Vietnam), Annam (Central Vietnam) and Cochinchina(South Vietnam).

prevent the French from reasserting themselves as colonial rulers of Indochina,

their pre-war role in the region (see Map 1).


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However, with the war won and the Axis defeated, President Trumanbelieved

Map 1: Indochina: 1946-1954 (map courtesy of Richard F.

Newcomb,A Pictorial History of the Viet Nam War).


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that communism and most especially the Soviet Union were the new threats to

democracy and world peace. His first imperative was to rebuild Western Europe,

creating both an economic and military barrier to Soviet expansion. Truman and

his cabinet also strove to maintain close relations with Great Britain, France, and

the Netherlands in order to use these countries to contain the expected

expansion of Soviet Union interests.4 Thus Truman was reluctant to change the

colonial policies of these three nations. To maintain French cooperation, and

more importantly their ports, airfields and bases in the Far East, Truman

succumbed to demands. In the summer of 1945 he informed Charles de Gaulle

that the United States would not undermine Frances efforts to rebuild its pre-war

empire in the Far East.5

The French were adamant about maintaining control over their colonies

while the U.S. wanted to ensure they successfully defeated the spread of

communism in Asia. More importantly, American support to the French would

also build the foundations

The Presidents decision set in motion a series of events

that would help start the First Indochina War in which French forces would

conduct the fighting while the United States provided financial and logistical

support to its ally.

that would directly lead to Americas eleven year war in Vietnam where more

than three and a half million men and women would serve in one of this countrys

most divisive events in its history.

Ho agreed to negotiate with the French in the hope that he would be able

to gain a united and independent Vietnam through peaceful measures. The


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result was the Franco-Viet Minh Accords signed on March 6, 1946. France

agreed to extended diplomatic

recognition to Hos regime identifying it as a free state within the French Union.*

The

French government also promised to hold free elections sometime in the near

future to determine if Cochinchina would come under Hos control. Ho agreed to

allow 25,000 French troops to replace the Chinese forces north of the sixteenth

parallel for five years. Both sides agreed that a Viet Minh delegation would go to

Paris to more clearly identify the timing of the elections and the details behind

Vietnamese independence. While Ho was in France, the French High

Commissioner for Indochina, Georges T. dArgenlieu created the Republic of

Cochinchina, virtually creating a separate colony within the French Union. Ho

was incensed and believed he that he had been betrayed. Desperate, he turned

to the United States for help and offered to open Vietnam to American

investment, and added the possibility of leasing the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay

in return for diplomatic pressure to get the French out of Vietnam. Though

several State Department officials believed the U.S. should use its influence to

moderate French policy in Indochina, the decision-makers were focused solely

on events in Europe. Primarily because he was a communist, Ho received no

consideration or assistance from the United States.

With the French diplomatic efforts exposed as a sham, Ho met with

Frances Prime Minister Georges Bidault and told him: If we must fight, we will


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fight. You will kill ten of our men, and we will kill one of yours. Yet, in the end, it is

you who will tire.6

Tensions between the French and Viet Minh arose when the Viet Minh

refused to pay custom duties. The French insisted it was their right since the

region was a French

It was to prove to be a prophetic statement.

*The French Union consisted of France and all of her colonies which includedthose in North and Central Africa and Southeast Asia.colony. The Viet Minh disagreed and refused to pay the taxes. On November 23,

1946 dArenlieu ordered French armor and infantry units to attack suspected Viet

Minh hideouts within the city of Haiphong and fighting between the French Union

Army and Viet Minh forces began.

Supported by concentrations of artillery and naval gunfire the French

swept through the city. By nightfall much of it lay in ruins and more than six

thousand people were dead. No one could identify how many of the dead were

Viet Minh soldiers among the thousands of civilian casualties.7 By early

December French units occupied Hanoi. On December 19, General Vo Nguyen

Giap, a former French-trained history professor who had become the commander

of the Viet Minh forces under Ho Chi Minh, ordered a war of national resistance.8

I order all soldiers and militia in the center, south, and north to stand together,

go into battle, destroy the invaders, and save the nation.9 On the same day the

Viet Minh attacked Hanoi, destroying the citys electrical power plant and

assassinating several French officials. Ho, with more than 40,000 troops under

his command, retreated from the city and set up his headquarters sixty miles

from Hanoi.


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The French had a large military force of over 100,000 well trained and

equipped soldiers and did not expect much opposition form the Viet Minh who

had less than 75,000 men, many of whom were untrained, with only one third

being equipped with small arms. The French were able to take possession of all

major cities and towns and easily defeated the Viet Minh forces they engaged in

open battle.10 General Jacques Leclerc, commander of all French Union Forces

in Indochina realized that France could not obtain military victory as long as the

Viet Minh controlled the countryside where they retained the loyalty of most of

the population. He warned the French leadership in 1947 that anti-Communism

will be a useless tool as long as the problem of nationalism remains unsolved.11

The French Minister of War, Paul Coste-Floret recommended to his superiors

that . . . I do not think that we should undertake the conquest of French

Indochina. It would necessitate an expeditionary corps of at least 500,000

men.12

Ho and Giap realized they could not defeat the French in conventional

combat so they quickly resorted to conducting a drawn out guerrilla war that

would bite and nip at the French military and destroy French political will. Giap

was a disciple of Mao Zedongs principles on revolutionary warfare and

developed a three phased strategy to defeat the French. The first stage focused

on Viet Minh survival, avoiding major contacts with French forces and building

reserves. If the Viet Minh were able to attain surprise or overwhelming

superiority, they would attack. Otherwise the Viet Minh would wait out their

enemy while their army grew ever larger. Stage one occurred from 1946-47.


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During that period, Giaps Peoples Army grew from less than 5,000 untrained

peasants to more than 100,000 trained irregular soldiers.13

Stage two occurred primarily during 1948-49 and consisted of ambushes,

assassinations, and interdiction of French logistics convoys. Most especially this

stage demonstrated the adeptness of the Viet Minh in conducting guerrilla

operations. The Viet Minh would ambush French patrols and convoys, destroy

roads and supply routes, assassinate political and military leaders with the

ultimate objective to demoralize the enemy. The third and final phase was to

consist of a force-on-force conventional battle with the French Expeditionary

Corps in Vietnam.

The French government, realizing they were facing a long war, began to

develop an anticommunist, nationalist alternative to the Viet Minh. The biggest

problem they faced was finding a leader whom the Vietnamese could rally behind

and challenge Ho Chi Minhs nationalist vision. Eventually they settled on the

former emperor, Bao Dai. Using the media to full advantage, the French

announced the Elysee Agreement in March 1949 which granted independence

to the State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia,14

For the French, the Bao Dai solution was intended to provide a faade fora continuation of French military rule. It enabled the French to respond to

allowed them to become

associated states within the French Union. In reality the French retained total

control over foreign affairs, defense and other key governmental matters with

Bao Dai as a figurehead who lacked any real power. As Gary Hess states in

Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War:


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critics of their war against the Viet Minh, for they could now claim that thestruggle in Indochina was not a colonial war, but a civil war in which the

Frenchwere supporting one of two Vietnamese contestants.15

As the war in Indochina intensified, Truman and his cabinet began to see

the struggle as part of a larger global battle between the Soviet Union and the

West. The Truman Doctrine issued in May, 1947, provided 400 million dollars in

military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey to support their fights

against leftist-backed guerrillas and prevent their fall to communism. It also was a

response to perceived aggression by the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle

East. The following year Truman announced the Marshall Plan, named after the

United States Secretary of State George Marshall, known officially as the

European Recovery Program (ERP). To one of the Marshal Plans authors, the

State Departments premier expert on the Soviets, George F. Kennan, the

Marshall Plan was the foundation for the new doctrine of containment that he

was advocating. The Soviet Union had now become an arch-rival of the United

States, both in ideology and military prowess. The fear of communism spreading

from country to country, real or imagined, had become very real for most of the

American public.

The Marshall Plan would provide 12.6 billion dollars (equivalent to 130

billion dollars in 2006) in economic assistance over four years to rebuild Western

Europe. The same amount of aid was offered to the Soviet Union and its allies

but only if they would make political reforms and accept certain outside controls.

Stalin refused the offer. When the Plan ended in 1951, the economy of every

participating nation, except Germany, had grown well past pre-war levels.


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But it was three critical events that occurred in 1949 that elevated

anticommunism in the United States from fear to paranoia. 16 The first was the

Soviet blockade of Berlin in which Truman countered that action by directing the

relief of the city via the successful Berlin Airlift. The second event was the

detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union. Now their were two nuclear

powers in the world. The third event, which had enormous strategic implications

in the Pacific region, was the Chinese communist victory under Mao Zedong over

Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalists. China, with the worlds largest population

and an ally of the United States just four years earlier, was now under control of

the communists.17

These three events heightened the ever spreading fear of communism

and forced Truman to revise his Asian foreign policy. The term Domino Theory

had been used to describe what might happen if Greece and Turkey fell to the

communists and its impact on Europe but it took on new meaning as events in

Southeast Asia developed. The Domino Theory was a development of the

containment concept originally developed by George F. Keenan to halt the

spread of Soviet influence immediately after the end of the Second World War. It

would become foreign policy for the United States over the next two decades.

China falling under communist control would force the United

States to reappraise its strategic outlook in the Pacific and the Far East and

would greatly impact the U.S. decision-making and foreign policy in the region for

the next thirty years.

18

As a consequence many American political and military leaders believed that if

the Viet Minh defeated the French in Indochina then Laos and Cambodia would


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fall too. Thailand and Burma would follow, with Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Iran

and the rest of the Middle East succumbing in sequence like a row of dominos.

Communism would then spread to North Africa and the rest of the

Mediterranean. There was already ample proof that the stage was set for this to

occur. Communist guerrillas were attempting to take control in Malaya and

Burma. The Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia was also under attack by

insurgents. The leadership of Australia and New Zealand were also greatly

concerned that if Indochina fell to the communists, then Malaya, the Philippines,

and Indonesia were also in jeopardy.

The spread of communism under the Domino Theory would have

enormous strategic and economic impacts, not only on Southeast Asia, but on

the United States and Europe as well. The British and French economies were

explicably linked to markets and natural resources throughout Southeast Asia. In

1940 the Japanese had posed just such a threat and the result was a world war.

If action was not taken quickly to stop the spread of communism, the entire

Pacific region might fall to the combined weight of the Soviet Union and China. In

late 1949, after nearly three years of guerrilla warfare in Indochina, the French

government began to send warnings to Truman that without substantial military

aid, they might have to make the difficult decision to withdraw altogether from

Indochina.19

After French Intelligence services were able to confirm that China was

providing both logistical support and armaments to the Viet Minh, it convinced

many American leaders that China was focusing on expanding the communist


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movement southward. Then on January 18, 1950 China announced formal

diplomatic recognition to Ho Chi Minh as the leader of all of Vietnam. Twelve

days later the Soviet Union followed suit. In lieu of this threatening new

development, the National Security Council released a statement which warned:

The extension of communist authority in China represents a grievouspolitical defeat for us. . . .If South-east Asia is also swept by communism,we shall have suffered a major political rout, the repercussions of

whichwill be felt throughout the rest of the world.20

With some reluctance but with few alternatives available, the Truman

government responded to the Chinese and Soviet diplomatic recognition of Ho

on February 7 by officially recognizing the Bao Dai government as the legitimate

government of Vietnam. At the same time it also recognized the kingdoms of

Laos and Cambodia. Shortly thereafter the British also offered diplomatic

recognition to Bao Dais Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

On May 15, 1950, Truman told the press that he had decided to provide

fifteen million dollars in military assistance to France in their war against the Viet

Minh. On June 25 the entire strategic picture in Southeast Asia changed when

North Korean forces invaded South Korea. This was the final straw to convince

the American president that the Soviets master plan was nothing less than the

conquest of all of Asia. While Truman committed U.S. forces to South Korea to

halt the communist aggression, he also greatly increased American aid to

Frances war in Indochina by providing an additional 133 million dollars in military

aid (small arms, ammunition, tanks, fighter and bomber aircraft, and several

ships) and a further fifty million dollars in economic and technical assistance.21


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By the time of the battle of Dien Bien Phu three and a half years later, the United

States would spend almost three billion dollars to finance French operations in

Indochina.22

For Giap the start of the Korean War was a godsend, even more so when

five months later Chinese forces attacked into North Korea to repulse a U.S/UN

offensive in November 1950. Military aid to the Viet Minh began flowing in even

greater quantities from both China and the Soviet Union. Receiving both light and

heavy artillery pieces and anti-aircraft machine guns, Giap was able to form

artillery units and heavy weapons companies. He also began to transition

battalions into regiments and even division sized formations.

23

Between September and October 1950, Giaps Viet Minh units attacked

and captured French outposts at Dong Khe and Cao Bang along Route 4. The

French were also forced to abandon Lang Son and Thai Nguyen. These tactical

setbacks cost the French more than 6,000 dead and captured. Bernard Fall, a

pre-eminent Indochina War historian wrote that it was Frances greatest colonial

defeat since Montcalm died at Quebec.

Under intense

training programs run by the Chinese Peoples Army, the Viet Minh began the

process of transforming from a guerrilla force into a conventional army, which

would allow Giap to transition from the second phase of his strategy to his final

phase of the war: counter-offensive.

24 The French also lost enough arms and

equipment to supply a Viet Minh division. Worse still, the French lost their earlier

dominance along the Chinese border. Giap was eager to follow up these


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successes by driving the French into Hanoi and possibly engage in a battle that

might bring about the end of the war.

On December 6, 1950 the French defeats cost the senior military leader

his job. General Carpentier was replaced by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny,

a hero of both world wars.25

De Lattre, believing Giap was over confident after

his series of successes and would overreach himself, was ready for the next

phase of the Viet Minh offensive. In January 1951, when Giaps forces attacked

the French base at Vinh Yen just thirty miles northwest of Hanoi, they were faced

with a much stronger position than he had at first believed. De Lattre, heavily

reinforced the base additional battalions, artillery, and supported by the wars

largest aerial bombardment, was able to beat back the hordes of attacking Viet

Minh. The victory at Vinh Yen provided a much need boost to French morale and

cost Giaps forces dearly with 6,000 dead and 500 prisoners.26

The French chain of command in Indochina was thrown in turmoil when

General de Lattre was diagnosed with cancer. On January 19, 1951 he was

A second attack

was launched by parts of three divisions against Mao Khe and Dong Trieu near

Haiphong. After a week of heavy combat the French defense proved too strong

and the attacks were repulsed. A third attack was launched in late May against

French positions at Ninh Binh and Nam Dinh, twenty miles south of Haiphong.

This attack failed also and forced Giap to withdraw his units. Viet Minh casualties

had been excessive with almost 9,000 dead and 1,000 captured. Even worse

was the fact that two of Giaps divisions were no longer combat effective thus

forcing the Viet Minh commander to halt all offensive operations.


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replaced by General Raoul Salan. For the next sixteen months Salan managed

the campaign by conducting largely defensive oriented security operations in the

Red River Delta. Meanwhile, Giap focused on rebuilding his shattered units. In

late 1952, under Salans guidance, the French developed the theory ofbase

aero-terrestre (air-land base). This concept espoused the development of a

fortified base and airstrip, deep in enemy controlled territory, where the French

could use it to either conduct offensive operations to interdict enemy logistics

from or stay within the perimeter and force the Viet Minh to attack and in the

process suffer massive casualties from the firepower within the air-land base.

Salan directed the first base aero-terrestre be built in a valley at Na San. Salan

believed that a reinforced garrison, supported by on-site artillery, could be

sustained far from the Delta region by airlift alone.27

In June 1952 Truman approved an additional 150 million dollars in military

aid to France and the National Security Council agreed that if the Chinese

Peoples Army did cross the Vietnamese border to fight alongside the Viet Minh,

the U.S. would respond by deploying both air and naval units to Frances aid.

The possibility of conducting naval and air operations against China directly was

also discussed.

Giaps response was to

direct three of his five divisions to assault Na San the last week of November.

After several days of heavy fighting all efforts to capture the fortified position

failed. Once again, Giaps forces had to withdraw. Salans theory of the air-land

base seemed to have been proven valid.

28 It was known that Chinese aid to the Viet Minh had increased

from 400 tons of weapons, ammunition and food per month to more than 3,000


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and there were at least 4,000 Chinese advisors working with Giaps divisions. 29

The Viet Minh were becoming more and more proficient at conducting

conventional tactical operations at the brigade and division level. Theodore H.

White, a war correspondent, observed The enemy, once painted as a bomb-

throwing terrorist or hill sniper lurking in night ambush, has become a modern

army, increasingly skillful, armed with artillery, organized into divisional groups.30

By the end of 1952 the United States was paying almost one-third of the

cost of the French-Indochina War having given France slightly over one billion

dollars in military aid, that included United States Army equipment worth more

than 740 million dollars, given directly to the French Expeditionary Corps.

31The

U.S. government was not satisfied with the results, or lack thereof, by the French.

Furthermore, Truman was not happy that the small American Military Assistance

and Advisory Group (MAAG), sent to Vietnam in 1950 to assist the French with

training of the Vietnamese National Army and development of strategy, had been

intentionally underutilized by each successive French Army commander. De

Lattre, as with the others, ignored his American advisers and never kept them

informed of his operational plans.32

It was evident that the French leadership in Indochina was resisting

American influence within what they considered French territory while at the

same time consistently demanded more military assistance and a greater

American commitment to Frances war against the Viet Minh. It was during this

same period that France began to push Truman and his cabinet for a collective

security arrangement for the defense of Southeast Asia. Even more so it wanted


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a firm commitment from the U.S. that American combat forces would be

deployed to the theater if China entered the war.

When Truman left office in January 1953, his successor, Dwight D.

Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, believed that if

France were defeated in Indochina, then all of Southeast Asia would succumb to

communism. While Truman was reluctant to commit U.S. combat forces to

Indochina, Eisenhower was even more so. He firmly believed that if the French

were to regain the initiative and win the war, they would have to develop a new

strategy which must be executed by a forceful and inspirational leader.

33

Such

a strategy should focus on the offense and not the defense currently being

followed for the past eighteen months. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded

that if the French took the offensive and focused on destroying the Viet Minhs

conventional forces, and also trained and incorporated more Vietnamese units to

assist in the fighting, the war could be won within a year.34

With mounting pressure from Eisenhower, the French replaced General

Salan on May 20, 1953 with General Henri Navarre. Having no previous

experience in Indochina, a decorated soldier from both world wars, it was

believed Navarre would bring a fresh outlook to the problem. Having commanded

at the battalion, regiment, and division level, Navarre just left Germany where he

was the Chief of Staff to the Commander of Central Land Forces, NATO. French

Prime Minister Mayer directed him to create the conditions necessary to place

the French Union forces into a position of advantage that would allow France to

negotiate a favorable peace with the Viet Minh.

35After six and a half years of


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warfare with more than 90,000 French casualties, and having spent twice the

amount of money that the United States had provided in aid under the Marshall

Plan, the French were reaching the point of exhaustion. Even with massive

amounts of U.S. support, they still could not prevent Giaps divisions from

growing larger and stronger with each passing month. The future looked bleak for

France.

At his initial in-country briefing, Navarre was informed that the Viet Minh

controlled two-thirds of the country and now had an army of more than 300,000

troops made up of both regular and irregular soldiers. He was also told that

though French Union forces retained control of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Saigon and

areas along the Cambodian border, all were susceptible to Viet Minh attack.

Navarre was perhaps too over-confident when he naively predicted the war

would end within a year.36

His first major decision was to revise the French strategy then in effect. He

believed what was required was a return to conventional operations. His intent

was to lure the Viet Minh into a major battle in which French firepower would

destroy Giaps forces. It had worked at Vinh Yen. He believed with the right

planning and enough firepower and men, it would work again.

The Navarre Plan

After touring much of the French Expeditionary Corps area of operations,

several times at great personal risk, General Navarre and his staff developed a

plan for future operations in a manner of weeks. He returned to Paris in July

1953 to brief the plan that he firmly believed would win the war in Indochina. His


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audience was the National Defense Committee led by the President and the

newly elected Prime Minister of France, Joseph Laniel, and also included the

French Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan consisted of seven objectives: 1) Increase

the size of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) from 165,000 to 217,000 men in

the next eighteen months. This would allow VNA units to replace French units

conducting defensive operations from static bases and also relieve French forces

from security duties, freeing them for offensive operations;37 2) increase the

strategic reserve force, primarily in the Red River Delta region; 3) create more

mobile groups for the Expeditionary Corps; 4) plan and execute a major offensive

operation in the Southern Highlands to eliminate the Viet Minh threat in that

region; 5) prevent a major Viet Minh offensive in the north-west towards Laos;

and 6) prepare for a decisive main battle in the north which would destroy both

Giaps main force units and his reserves.38

To accomplish these objectives, Navarre stated he would require twelve

fresh infantry battalions, 750 more officers, 2,550 non-commissioned officers,

and significant increases in Air Force and Navy strength. This request was not

welcome news to the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff. He also requested a

substantial increase of supplies and equipment if he was to conduct offensive

operations in the coming year. Before he left the briefing, Navarre was told that

not all of his demands could be met. In fact, he would only receive eight infantry

battalions, 320 officers and 200 non-commissioned officers. Reluctant to remove

any more French units from their NATO commitments in Europe and by law

unable to send conscripts to serve in Indochina, France turned to her other


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colonies for volunteers. Additional battalions from the French Foreign Legion,

already approximately fifty percent of its force serving in Indochina, were sent to

partially meet Navarres request. By the end of the May 1954 the Foreign Legion

would suffer 11,710 men killed and more than 30,000 wounded. Of the 6,328

legionnaires captured during the war only 2,567 returned alive.39

The French submitted the Navarre Plan to Eisenhower for approval. To

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff it looked good on paper. However, the American

military leaders were concerned that the French would not follow their own plan

with enough vigor to achieve its stated objectives.

40

When the fighting in Korea ended with the signing of the armistice on July

27, many of the worlds leaders asked why the war in Indochina could not be

settled in the same manner. Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, stated

just two weeks prior to the signing of the Korean armistice that France would be

in an untenable position [if] peace were reestablished in Korea while the war

continued in Indochina.

In the end, the Joint Chiefs

realized that the Navarre Plan was Frances best hope for success. Though

many of his advisors were only cautiously optimistic of what the Navarre Plan

might actually accomplish, Eisenhower received a formal promise from the

French to aggressively pursue the Navarre Plan and subsequently authorized an

additional 385 million dollars in military aid to support Navarre and the French

Union forces under his command.

41The armistice halting the fighting in Korea occurred

only days after Navarres Paris meetings, and this negotiated settlement may


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have signaled a methodology to the French leadership that there might be a way

to end to the fighting in Indochina through negotiations.

Another more violent option that Bidault feared was the fact that that since

the Chinese Peoples Army was no longer involved in the Korean War it was now

free to significantly increase its support to the Viet Minh. The possibility of

sending Chinese units into Indochina to fight beside their fellow communists

became even a greater cause for concern for both France and the United States.

Actions by Giap and the Viet Minh in the spring and summer of 1953

would have a great impact on the Navarre Plan development and future

operations in Indochina. In April, Giap directed three divisions to attack into Laos

and put pressure on the capital of Luang Prabang to force the French to come to

the aid of another of its colonies. This attack was launched from the Viet Minh-

controlled village of Dien Bien Phu, located in a long valley in northwest Tonkin

only twenty miles from the Laotian border. Giaps attack into Laos stretched

French forces thin across the Tonkin region as they attempted to react to the

incursion. It also deprived the French of the Red River Delta as units were

ordered to the north-east. Already overtaxed and exhausted, French units were

forced to march long distances over rough terrain, fighting several engagements

with well trained Viet Minh infantry battalions. Giap had a done a masterful job of

leading and directing three divisions more than 130 miles from Tonkin and

Annam into Laos.42

His communications, though taxed, had worked very well,

and his flexibility of command had shown that he had learned well the lessons of

earlier campaigns. The French strung themselves out over Tonkin and into Laos


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trying to react to Giaps invasion. When he gave the order to withdraw in May,

Giap was well satisfied that soon his army would be ready for a decisive battle

against the French Expeditionary Corps.

The Navarre Plan addressed protecting Laos from further invasion by the

Viet Minh as one of its objectives. On July 25, Navarre directed his staff to

develop a plan for the reoccupation of Dien Bien Phu which was strategically

placed along the major routes leading from northern Vietnam into Laos. The

French had held the area less than a year previously with one battalion but it was

forced to withdraw when the Viet Minh 148

th

Independent Regiment moved in

and established an operating base there.

Brigadier General Rene Cogny, commander of the northern Tonkin region,

had recommended to Navarre that the village be used as a mooring point for

counter-guerrilla operations against the Viet Minh. He was strongly against

establishing a base aero-terrestre there.43 Navarre disagreed and directed that

Dien Bien Phu serve as an air-supplied hedgehog from which French units

could attack Giaps forces in any direction, and force him to disperse his units.

This in turn would prevent any attempt by the Viet Minh to re-invade Laos.

Navarre was convinced that the French Air Force could sustain the base aero-

terrestre and that the units within the base could endure a siege by two light

divisions. French Air Force senior officers raised several objections to the

proposed plan. One was its ability to sustain the base over time because of the

long distances from the airfields in Hanoi and Haiphong. The unpredictable


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weather in the Tonkin region and the condition of their aircraft were also raised

as major concerns.

On November 14, after months of preparation and planning, Navarre

issued his final orders to his subordinate commanders to execute Operation

Castor, the airborne assault to seize Dien Bien Phu.

Dien Bien Phu was a large village that lay in a valley nearly eleven miles

long and five miles wide. Located in the High Region of Northwest Tonkin, it was

less than eight miles from the Laotian border and largely comprised of rice

paddies with several scattered hills, streams and canals running through it. Its

importance was due to it being the largest rice growing area in the region,

providing huge amounts of opium to the Viet Minh, who used it as a cash crop to

pay for weapons. It also contained a Japanese built dirt airstrip constructed

during World War II. By setting up a base of operations in this fertile valley,

Navarre made the decision to accept battle in northwest Tonkin. He would use

Dien Bien Phu to engage the Viet Minh in a pitched battle and protect Laos from

invasion. At the same time interdict the Viet Minhs supply and trafficking of rice

and opium in that area.

Six days later on Friday, November 20, 1953, Major Bigeard and his 6th

Colonial Parachute Battalion and Major Brechignac and his 2d Battalion, 1st

Parachute Light Infantry, along with an artillery battery and an engineer section

totaling 1,487 men, exited their aircraft. Upon landing they engaged Viet Minh

Independent Regiment 148 elements in fierce close-in combat before they

withdrew. Five hours later Dien Bien Phu was in French hands. Additional


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airborne battalions arrived and, by the end of the third day, there were nearly

5,000 French Union forces occupying the Vietnamese village. Construction

started on rebuilding the 3,500 foot airstrip, establishing hardened bunkers and

command posts, along with emplacements for the heavier artillery pieces that

would soon arrive via airlift.

At the same time as the airborne assault on Dien Bien Phu, Navarre was

also planning to conduct a six month offensive in Annam codenamed Operation

Atlante. The operation was to be conducted in three phases with its objective

being the destruction of Viet Minh units along the coastal plains of southern

Annam. However, General Cogny was concerned that by conducting offensive

operations both in the north at Dien Bien Phu and the south in Annam

simultaneously, Giap would be able to concentrate the majority of his divisions

known to be in Tonkin against the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre heard his

subordinates concerns yet two weeks later issued the order to executeAtlante.

The first phase began in January 1954 with twenty-five infantry battalions,

three artillery groups, two armor squadrons and nearly as many Vietnamese

National Army units.44 The impact on Dien Bien Phu was not that these units

could have been dedicated to the defense of the besieged fortress, more

importantly it was the logistics required to support two major simultaneous

operations with the French logistics infrastructure. The French Air Force, already

strained by conducting multiple operations all over Indochina, was forced to

dedicate vital transport aircraft away from Dien Bien Phu to supportAtlante. The


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troops within the fortress strong-points would notice a significant decrease of

resupplies they were receiving in late January and February because ofAtlante.

After receiving reports of French activities at Dien Bien Phu, Giap and his

staff analyzed what they believed Navarres plans for the fortress were. He

believed that by establishing a base deep in Viet Minh territory, Navarre had

made a serious operational mistake which provided an opportunity that if

successful, would allow the communist forces to deliver a decisive blow against

the French. Giaps staff formulated a strategy to take advantage of the French

action with one endstate: Wipe out at all costs the whole enemy force at Dien

Bien Phu.45

He ordered three divisions to encircle Dien Bien Phu and prevent

the French units there from withdrawing.46

On November 28, General Navarre was briefed by his Chief of Military

Intelligence at Hanoi that at least three and possibly four Viet Minh divisions were

preparing to move towards Dien Bien Phu and would close in that area sometime

before the second week of December. Navarre refused to believe that Giap had

three or four complete divisions to maneuver towards the northwest. He instead

thought that only elements of one or more divisions were moving towards the

French fortress. His underestimation was just one of many serious mistakes the

French commander would make that would cost the French Expeditionary Corps

dearly in the months ahead.

At long last Giap believed his forces

were ready for the decisive third phase of his strategic plan. If things went well,

the coming battle at Dien Bien Phu would end the war.


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Navarre was planning at Dien Bien Phu and sent reports to that effect back to

Washington.

On November 30 General Cogny issued Directive 739 to Colonel

Dominique Bastiani whose Paratroop Operational Group (GOP) had just

replaced Brigadier General Gilles Airborne Division Command Element (EDAP).

In effect this meant that the airborne forces which had recaptured Dien Bien Phu

were to be replaced by conventional units in the very near future. The directive

stated that Bastiani was to: 1) guarantee at the very least the free usage of the

airfield; 2) gather intelligence from as far away as possible; and 3) proceed

with the withdrawal to Dien Bien Phu of the units from Lai Chau.49

Lai Chau,

located just twenty miles from the Chinese border and sixty miles north of Dien

Bien Phu, was the capital of the pro-French Tai Federation in northwestern

Tonkin. With Dien Bien Phu being established as a base aero-terrestre, the

French had planned to evacuate Lai Chau once it was known that the Viet Minh

planned to assault the French and Vietnamese garrison there.A warning order

for the evacuation was issued on November 13 and the actual evacuation

(Operation Pollux) began on December 8. More than 3,500 Vietnamese civilians

were successfully evacuated by air to Hanoi. Several French and Vietnamese

battalions were airlifted to Dien Bien Phu while twenty companies of Tai Light

Irregular Infantry, a total of 2,101 men, were ordered to move by land to join the

forces at Dien Bien Phu. The twenty companies were virtually wiped out by the

Viet Minh with only 101 survivors making it alive to the French fortress.50


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Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an

address to cadets and faculty at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New

York on December 2 reinforced the fact that the French were taking the offensive

in Indochina against the Viet Minh and the outlook seemed both positive and

hopeful. He did add that if China came in on the side of the Viet Minh, the war

would take on a whole new dimension:

In the past, the efforts to win the war in Indo-China have beenlimited. General Navarre, however, has sparked his entire military

commandwith a fighting spirit. This fact, combined with the planned augmentation

and improved training of the military forces, should rapidly improve themilitary position of the French and the Associated States.The United States is providing military assistance to this area.

With our programs of assistance, we hope that increased militaryoperations

in Indo-China will defeat the communist military forces of Ho Chi Minh.Of course, the entire outlook on the war in Indo-China could

change if Red China chose to intervene overtly with military forces.In that event, the war would no longer be localized. The free world couldnot permit Indo-China to go under the communist yoke.51

On December 3, Navarre issued his final operational orders to General

Cogny. Within the order he stated: I have decided to accept battle in the

Northwest under the following general conditions. 1. The defense of the

Northwest shall be centered on the air-land base of Dien Bien Phu which must be

held at all costs.52 Navarres order was based on two assumptions: 1) The

garrison at Dien Bien Phu would face only one enemy division, and 2) the landing

strip would be operational throughout the expected battle. Navarre failed to take

into account not only Viet Minh capabilities but also the unpredictable weather

that his Air Force advisors had warned him about. What was most striking about

the order however was the fact that suddenly Dien Bien Phu had become a


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defensive base instead of a platform to conduct offensive operations as was

Navarres original intent. He had specifically picked Colonel de Castries, a

cavalryman, for just that purpose. Limited offensive operations of battalion and

company strength were conducted up to twenty miles from the Dien Bien Phu

perimeter in the first few weeks after the initial airborne operation on November

20 but none achieved their objective of interdicting Viet Minh infiltration into Laos

or their supply operations in the area. Bernard Fall wrote that Dien Bien Phu

indeed had ceased to fulfill its mission [a base that would facilitate offensive

operations] even before the French had a chance to build the sort of defenses

that would have made it a true fortress.53

Why did Navarre not evacuate Dien

Bien Phu before his strong-points became encircled? (This question was one of

the major topics for analysis by the commission tasked by the French

government in1955 to analyze the battle of Dien Bien Phu). Navarre responded

that because he had not determined the true strength of the enemy forces

moving to Dien Bien Phu, it was not fathomable to consider evacuation so soon

after seizing and occupying the valley there.54

Only after Dien Bien Phu was

completely encircled in mid-December did Navarre order Cogny to prepare a

detailed withdrawal plan. Three weeks later Cogny sent a completed plan back to

Navarre which stated that the chances of breaking through the Viet Minh

encirclement were so poor that it would be paramount to suicide to attempt a

breakout. His recommendation was for the garrison to remain within the

defensive strong-points and fight it out.55 By the end of December French forces

could not move freely out of their defensive network without drawing fire from


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Viet Minh units. As Cogny stated later, any attempt at breakout after that date

would have resulted in serious and possibly catastrophic losses for the French.

By December 26, the Viet Minh completely surrounded Dien Bien Phu.

Inside the fortress the French combat forces consisted of nine infantry battalions

supported by three artillery batteries. On this day Giap made what he considered

the most important military decision56 of his life by changing the tactics for the

assault on the French fortress. Instead of sending mass human waves against

barbed wire and machine gun positions, he decided to conduct piecemeal

attacks on each of the nine strong-points that made up the French perimeter of

Dien Bien Phu.57

Before he could launch his attacks though, Giap had to set the stage for

his decisive battle by ensuring the logistics were in place to ensure success.

Between mid December 1953 and early March 1954 Giap assembled four

divisions supported by over two hundred artillery pieces and several engineer

battalions around Dien Bien Phu-nearly 50,000 combat troops with another

31,000 support troops and an additional 23,000 available as a reserve.

58Moving

largely at night or over trails that were masterfully camouflaged, the Viet Minh

soldiers were able to transport several battalions worth of artillery (primarily

75mm and 105mm) and anti-aircraft weapons into the valley. This feat was

accomplished only after having built a series of roads and trails from the Chinese

border through inhospitable terrain and under repeated attacks from the French

Air Force. Using a fleet of Chinese and Soviet trucks, plus an estimated 100,000

porters carrying loads up to two hundred pounds each and manhandling light and


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heavy artillery broken down in pieces, hundreds of kilometers, the Viet Minh

moved into positions that were cleverly concealed all around Dien Bien Phu. By

doing this Giaps forces accomplished what both the French and U.S. military

leadership believed was impossible. Viet Minh forces also began the Herculean

task of digging what in fact would be hundreds of kilometers of trenches and

tunnels from their positions outside the perimeter of Dien Bien Phu towards the

nine major strong-points they would ultimately assault.

While Giap was preparing the proper conditions to launch his offensive,

Eisenhower reiterated to the National Security Council on January 8, 1954 that

he was totally against sending U.S. ground forces to fight in Indochina but

acknowledged that the U.S. had vital interests in the region. He compared

Indochina to a leaky dike and he warned that it was sometimes better to put a

finger in than let the whole structure wash away.59

At the conclusion of a Four-Power (U.S., Great Britain, France, and the

Soviet Union) conference held in Berlin on February 18, it was announced that

their respective foreign ministers should meet in April at Geneva to conduct an

East-West conference to discuss the Korean conflicts unresolved issues. The

Chinese were also invited to attend.

Shortly thereafter Eisenhower

appointed a special committee to analyze the conditions under which the United

States might have to become directly involved in the Indochina conflict.

60 Against U.S. opposition, France requested

that Indochina be added to the agenda in anticipation of negotiating an end to the

fighting in Indochina. France, the United States and the Viet Minh understood

that the tactical situation in Indochina, and most especially what was taking place


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at Dien Bien Phu, would have a huge impact on any negotiations that took place

in Geneva.

After more than three months of a grueling and back-breaking logistics

build-up, Giap was ready to strike. On March 12 the first phase of the battle of

Dien Bien Phu began when Viet Minh artillery opened fire on the airstrip

destroying several fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft. Within minutes it

was made untenable for aircraft takeoffs and landings. French counter-battery

fire was totally ineffective. Twenty-four hours later, while Viet Minh artillery

bombarded the French artillery batteries, the Viet Minh infantry launched division-

level attacks against strong-points Beatrice and Gabrielle, the two most

northern positions of the French fortress (see Map 2). Both were vital to the

overall defense of Dien Bien Phu as they contained artillery batteries within their

perimeters. In both attacks Giap sent division-size elements supported by heavy

mortars and artillery against strong-points held by battalions. After intense and

heavy fighting, both strong-points were overwhelmed and captured. Three days

later strongpoint Anne Marie was also captured. In less than five days of

fighting Giaps soldiers had captured all three of their initial objectives for the

battles first phase. The French had lost nearly one-third of their infantry and one

third of their precious few artillery pieces.


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Map 2: Dien Bien Phu showing the locations of the nine Frenchstrong-points that formed the defensive perimeter from December

1953 through the start of Giaps opening phase of the battle 12 March1954. (Map courtesy of www. dienbienphu.org/English).


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The French artillery commander at Dien Bien Phu, Colonel Charles Piroth,

distraught after his perceived failure for breaking the promise he had made to his

commander that his artillery would quickly destroy whatever enemy artillery

managed to fire on the fortress, committed suicide with a hand grenade.

By March 14 the airfield at Dien Bien Phu with its runway, covered with

prefabricated pierced-steel plates, was cratered by the impacts from hundreds of

artillery shells. Landings and takeoffs could no longer be conducted until it was

repaired. That same day the French Air Force began dropping supplies by

parachute to the besieged garrison. For the remainder of the battle all supplies

would have to be delivered by parachute and except for a few daring C-47 pilots

who landed amidst falling artillery to evacuate several dozen wounded during the

last week in March, the growing number of casualties could no longer be

evacuated.

Two days later Major Biegeard and 612 of his paratroops (332 were

Vietnamese) of the 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion made their second jump into

Dien Bien Phu, this time as reinforcements for the encircled garrison. The 6th

Colonial parachute Battalion was followed by three complete gun crews from the

35th

Airborne Artillery and one hundred replacements for the 1st Foreign Legion

Parachute Battalion and 8th Parachute Assault Battalion.61 The arrival of the

reinforcements lifted the spirits of those on the ground. Over the coming weeks of

constant and exhausting combat Biegeard would recall I kept telling my men, we

must hold on one more day. The Americans will not let us down.62


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The U.S Central Intelligence Agency notified Eisenhower that in their

estimation the French had no better than a fifty percent chance of defeating the

Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. It was becoming clearer with each passing day of the

battle that the United States might have to take some drastic measures to stave

off a French defeat or even worse a total collapse in Indochina.

Operation Vulture and United Action

A week later, on March 20, after a trip to Indochina to survey the situation

there, the chief of staff of the French armed forces, General Paul Ely, met with

President Eisenhower, his Secretary of State John Dulles, and the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford in Washington. Ely believed that

the French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu had only a fifty percent chance of

beating the Viet Minh units encircling the fortress. He admitted that a French

defeat would be a serious blow to morale both in Indochina and in France. He

added that if Dien Bien Phu fell, it would greatly effect the negotiations to be held

in Geneva and that the U.S. might not find the terms that France could be forced

to agree with acceptable. He also wanted to impress on the American leadership

that the French government wanted iron-clad assurances that the U.S. would

support France against the risks it was taking of drawing direct Chinese

intervention into Indochina, especially tactical air support to the Viet Minh.63

Having already received two squadrons of B-26 bombers for use in Indochina, he

requested a third squadron of bombers and also asked for twelve F-8-F fighters,

fourteen C-47 cargo planes, and twenty helicopters to evacuate wounded from

the fortress along with eighty maintenance personnel to service the helicopters.


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Eisenhower approved all of the requests except for the cargo aircraft and the

helicopters (along with the maintenance personnel) because they were not

available without affecting U.S. readiness in the Pacific. It was also agreed upon

that the French could man C-119 cargo aircraft to drop napalm on Dien Bien

Phu.64

The meeting concluded with Ely further requesting that the financial and

military aid that the U.S. was providing would continue as agreed upon.65

After the meeting Eisenhower directed Radford to conduct an analysis to

see if the U.S. could offer more assistance to the French. Radford, a naval

aviator and an advocate of airpower, had commanded aircraft carriers in the

Pacific during World War II. Only six months before the crisis of Dien Bien Phu

he had been commander of naval forces in the Pacific and firmly believed that

Asia, not Europe, should be the focus of U.S. foreign policy for the long-term

future. As early as January 8, at a meeting of the National Security Council

(NSC), Radford had suggested that American pilots, trained to suppress

antiaircraft weapons, could do much even in one afternoons operations to save

the situation at Dien Bien Phu.

66

Eisenhower restated that he would not commit U.S. ground forces to aid

the French but he did not rule out U.S. air and naval intervention. A week later

Radford (having Eisenhowers approval) agreed to support a French request for

ten more B-26 bombers (without crews) and that a further twenty-five would be

sent if the French had maintenance personnel to support them. Lieutenant

General Jean Valluy, the French representative to the NATO Standing Group in

Washington, had already requested 400 American ground-crewmen as the


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French were drastically short of trained and experienced maintenance specialists

for their bomber aircraft and reiterated this requirement once more. Getting a

guarantee that none of the American servicemen would be exposed to combat or

capture, Radford submitted the request through channels to Eisenhower who

directed that the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force send twenty-two B-26s and 200

USAF maintenance personnel to Saigon.67

Radford then directed that American officers in Saigon develop a plan in

which American airpower, primarily B-29 medium bombers based in the

Philippines and carrier based aircraft from the USS Essex and USS Boxer

operating off the coast of Indochina, would conduct a bombing campaign to

destroy the Viet Minh artillery. He concluded that without artillery Giaps forces

could not defeat the garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

68

Radford met the next day with Ely and when the question was raised

about what the U.S. would do to assist the French if it appeared that the fortress

was in jeopardy of falling, Radford replied that as many as 350 U.S. aircraft

operating from carriers could be dispatched to conduct bombing missions to

break the siege at Dien Bien Phu. The proposed plan, code-named Operation

Vulture, could go into effect within two days after receiving a formal request from

the French. However, only if it was approved by both the President and

Congress. Ely left Washington believing that if the French government requested

it, the U.S. would launch Operation Vulture, an air operation consisting of B-29

medium bombers and conventional weapons to prevent a disaster at Dien Bien

Phu. Radford also advocated using atomic weapons if conventional weapons


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did not break the siege. This was in adherence to Eisenhowers New Look

defense policy being proposed by Radford and others within the government

which called for sharp reductions in U.S. ground forces and the reliance of

nuclear weapons in their stead. Later he would state, We could have helped the

French with air strikes. Whether these alone would have been successful in

breaking the siege of Dien Bien Phu is debatable. If we had used atomic

weapons, we probably would have been successful.69

Eisenhower, in a meeting with Dulles on March 24, had discussed the idea

of a single [air] strike [flown by American pilots in unmarked aircraft], if it were

almost certain this would produce decisive results. He then added Of course, if

we did, wed have to deny it forever.

70

The next day, Dulles met with the NSC and stated that before the Geneva

Conference opened in April, the U.S. would have to know the answers two critical

questions: 1) what would the U.S. do if the French decided to sacrifice Indochina

by accepting terms that were unacceptable to the U.S.?; 2) what should the U.S.

do if France quit Indochina altogether? Dulles stated that he believed the United

States had to be prepare to execute one of two courses of action: either write off

Indochina to communism or assume the full responsibility if the French left.

Eisenhower had identified four conditions he wanted met before he would agree

to American military intervention: 1) the Associated States would have to request

assistance, 2) the United Nations should sanction the response, 3) a coalition of

nations must join the United States response, and 4) Congress must authorize

any proposed military action.

71


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Radford attempted to gain support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

Operation Vulture. He called a special meeting of the JCS on March 31 to

consider the necessity or desirability of recommending to Eisenhower that the

U.S. offer France naval and air units for use in Indochina. The Army Chief of

Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, argued that the formulation of policy was

beyond the scope of authority of the JCS. Somewhat frustrated, Radford then

met with the Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and gained a formal

request from him for the JCS to make a recommendation on what the United

States should do if the French requested naval and air support.

The request triggered a heated debate amongst the chiefs of staff with

General Ridgway heading the opposing view. Having just completed his

command of United Nations forces in Korea, Ridgway strongly believed that

airpower alone would not save the garrison at Dien Bien Phu . . . I felt sure that if

we committed air and naval power to that area [Dien Bien Phu and/or Indochina],

we would have to follow them immediately with ground forces in support. 72 He

also added, In Korea, we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win

a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either. It was incredible

to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon-that we were on the verge

of making that same tragic error.73

Each service staff had studied the potential use of nuclear weapons in

Indochina, especially in the defense of Dien Bien Phu. The Joint Advanced Study

Committee had concluded that three atom bombs could defeat the Viet Minh

forces that surrounded the French fortress.

74More importantly though was the


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fact that all of the planners did not agree that nuclear weapons would be effective

and that more than likely the second and third order effects of using the atomic

bomb could start a war with China and the Soviet Union and probably create an

unfavorable reaction among European allies and would alienate the Asian

nations the United States was rallying to resist communism.75

The Armys G3

Plans division also conducted two studies on the use of nuclear weapons and

had determined that their use in Indochina would be technically and militarily

feasible76

Ridgway had earlier dispatched a team of experts to Indochina from the

U.S. Army on a fact finding trip to ensure the nations decision-makers had

accurate data to base their decisions on before they committed troops to that

theatre. The team consisted mainly of combat veterans from the Korean War

who analyzed the enemy, the terrain, the weather, the logistics infrastructure on

hand, and every aspect of planning and conducting operations in Vietnam. The

team confirmed that the terrain favored guerrilla type operations with a mix of rice

paddies, mountains, and jungle and that the area severely lacked the logistics to

support large scale operations. The nearest U. S. base of operations was in the

Philippines nearly 1,000 miles away and the nearest supply bases were in Japan

and that their use would break the Viet Minh stranglehold on Dien

Bien Phu. Ridgway believed these studies just reiterated the oversimplification of

modern warfare that Radford and other military and political leaders were

advocating. There were many in the government who believed the next war

would be a nuclear one therefore, large armies were redundant and were a

financial burden that could be greatly reduced.


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almost 2,500 miles away. After he received and analyzed the report, Ridgway

believed that it would take five divisions initially and another ten divisions to

secure all of Indochina.77

Ridgway submitted the report to the chain of command.

Eisenhower read it and understood its implications. Ridgway believed it was this

report that convinced the President to abandon the idea of committing ground

forces to Vietnam.78

Although most of the top U.S. civilian leadership did not support air

intervention to save Dien Bien Phu, Vice President Richard Nixon did. A strong

advocate for halting the spread of communism in Asia and having visited

Indochina in 1953, he believed that the administration had not done enough to

assist the French in Indochina. He also prescribed that a collective security

system similar to NATO be constructed in the Far East. Nixon firmly supported

both Operation Vulture and the use of nuclear weapons if necessary.

79The day

the Viet Minh captured strong-point Gabrielle he had stated, We have adopted a

new principle. Rather than let the communists nibble us to death all over the

world in little wars, we will rely in the future on massive, mobile retaliatory

forces.80

Leaving his options open, Eisenhower had Dulles begin formulating a plan

that would become known as United Action. The background of it had been

started by Dulles three years before when he proposed a regional security

program while negotiating the Treaty of San Francisco with Japan. The intent

was to build a coalition of nations committed to the defense of Indochina and the

rest of Southeast Asia against communism. The U.S., Britain, and France would


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be the three major partners, supported by Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the

Philippines, and the Associated States. Eisenhower hoped that the establishment

of such a coalition along with stern warnings to the Soviets and the Chinese

might convince the French to maintain their campaign in Indochina and deter

Chinese intervention. The bottom line for Eisenhower was that if forced to

intervene in Indochina because of Chinese intervention or a French military

collapse, he would do it from a position of strength and as part of a coalition. A

multilateral effort would ensure that the U.S. could not be accused of conducting

a war for colonialism and would force the French to share both political and

military decision making in Indochina.

On March 30, at Dien Bien Phu, after nearly a two week lull in the fighting,

Giap began phase two of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. After completing many

kilometers of trenches that stopped only hundreds of meters from the barbed

wire obstacles that encircled the strong-points, he launched several mass human

wave assaults. The French were facing odds from five to one to ten to one, and

again with a Viet Minh division attacking a single French or Vietnamese

battalion.81

The fighting had not been all one sided. French counter-attacks forced two

Viet Minh divisions back with heavy losses and recaptured sections of two key

strong-points on the eastern perimeter. This was how the battle progressed for

As the French became fully engaged at one part of their perimeter,

another wave of Viet Minh assaulted an adjacent strong-point, forcing de

Castries to commit his reserves early in the fight. Within twenty-four hours, he

was out of reserves and had only one days supply of ammunition remaining.


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45

most of April. The Viet Minh would attack and make small gains or be bloodily

repulsed. Since the beginning of the battle the French had killed or wounded

nearly 10, 000 Viet Minh.82

On April 3, Eisenhower instructed Dulles and Radford to meet with a

congressional delegation that included the House Majority Leader Lyndon B.

Johnson and Senator John F. Kennedy. The intent was to discuss the conditions

that they believed would have to be met for them to approve the use of American

military power in Indochina. Dulles and Radford were met by a storm of

resistance. Johnson opposed the intervention outright. Kennedy was also against

intervention and went on record stating No amount of American military

assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the

same time nowhere. . .

By the middle of the month Giap halted his mass

wave attacks and once more focused on digging trenches to get his men even

closer to the French positions so they would not be forced to attack over

hundreds of meters of open terrain. The French garrison was now down to

approximately 5,000 combat effective soldiers. In many ways it became

reminiscent of the trench battles of the First World War where artillery dominated

and attrition warfare was practiced on a daily basis.

83The members of Congress would only consider

authorizing force if the U.S.s allies provided firm commitments of support. They

demanded that there must be no more Koreas, with the U.S. providing 90

percent of the manpower.84

On April 4, General Ely officially requested U.S. intervention on behalf of

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