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Firearms and Domestic Violence: How Effective is the 2014 Domestic Violence Firearms Act at

Preventing Firearm-Related Intimate Partner Femicide in Minnesota?

Megan L. Sanders

School of Public Health

University of Minnesota

May 2018

An Analysis of the 2014 Domestic Violence Firearms Act

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Rachel Hardeman, Carrie Henning-Smith, Safia Khan and Liz Richards for serving as my project committee. In addition to providing support and guidance, the work these women do in the community has provided me with the knowledge and inspiration necessary to not only complete my project, but also continue working to ensure the rights and safety of all women. I would also like to thank Representative Jamie Becker-Finn, who took the time out of her busy schedule as a domestic violence lawyer and state representative to lend her knowledge, advice, and unique perspective to my project. Finally, I would like to thank Rebecca Wurtz and Lesley Weaver, my program director and master’s project teaching fellow, for helping to guide the development of my project and offer outstanding advice. This project, which aims to provide more evidence to the plights faced by women and domestic violence victims in Minnesota, would not have been possible without the help of these seven women.

I would also like to acknowledge the countless women who have been victims of domestic violence and intimate partner femicide in the state of Minnesota. We recognize you and we will not stop fighting in your honor and memory to gather better evidence and create better policies to ensure the safety of all members of our community.

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Abstract

Background

Intimate Partner Femicide (IPF), or the murder of women committed by previous or

current intimate partners because they are women, kills dozens of Minnesotan females every

year. The kind of weapon most commonly used in these murders is firearms; the presence of

firearms can increase lethality in domestic violence cases by 500%. The Domestic Violence

Firearm Act (DVFA) passed in 2014 was intended to reduce firearm-related murder by

preventing domestic violence perpetrators from accessing firearms.

Objective

The purpose of this study was to assess the law’s effectiveness at preventing domestic

violence from escalating to firearm-related IPF.

Methods

I conducted an analysis of IPF cases involving firearms in the state of Minnesota. I also

did an analysis of existing domestic violence policies nationwide to identify potential policy

solutions to either replace or add on to the 2014 act. I used the theory of incrementalism and

Eugene Bardach’s eightfold path on policymaking to identify and understand potential areas for

improvement in the act and similar policies in other states. I also collected data from courthouse

records and media sources on all domestic violence-related murders in Minnesota from 2012 to

2016. I then analyzed the data trends that occurred between the period both before and after the

policy was enacted. In addition, I had personal communication with a state representative and

domestic violence lawyer about this issue.

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Results

My analysis showed that the number and proportion of IPF cases involving firearms has

increased in the two years since the legislation was passed. Therefore, the DVFA has been

ineffective at preventing firearm-related IPF in Minnesota. Furthermore, analyses show that

inefficacy was due to improper planning, a lack of resources, lack of complete authority, lack of

legal clarification, and the inability to control all firearms.

Conclusion

While other states have had some success with similar policies, some of which have more

resources or authority to implement and enforce the laws, most states face these same barriers to

implementation that were never considered when creating the DVFA. The act was also not an

adequate way to address the issue of firearm-related IPF to begin with; in the two years prior to

enactment, there were low numbers of IPF perpetrators with a documented history of abuse and

no perpetrators who were under an Order for Protection at the time of murder. I recommend

further research and believe my analysis shows a need for more evidence-based policy work. I

also recommend that policymakers work together to pass legislation making language in the

DVFA clearer and providing the resources and authority necessary to enforce it.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................2

Abstract..........................................................................................................................................3

Table of Contents...........................................................................................................................5

Introduction....................................................................................................................................6

Methods.........................................................................................................................................10Research Sample.....................................................................................................................................12

Results...........................................................................................................................................14Literature review.....................................................................................................................................14

Barrier 1: Lack of Resources.............................................................................................................14Barrier 2: Lack of Legal Clarity........................................................................................................17Barrier 3: Lack of Complete Authority.............................................................................................18Barrier 4: Inability to Control All Firearms.....................................................................................19

Data Analysis..........................................................................................................................................20

Discussion.....................................................................................................................................21Limitations..............................................................................................................................................22Implications and Future Steps...............................................................................................................24

References.....................................................................................................................................26

Graphs and Tables........................................................................................................................30Figure 1: Number of Intimate Partner Femicide Cases in Minnesota: 24 Months Before and After Enactment of the Domestic Violence Firearm Act (DVFA) of 2014.......................................30Figure 2: OFP History and Status at Time of Murder by Murder Method....................................31Figure 3: Documented Perpetrator History of Abuse........................................................................32Figure 4: Documented Perpetrator History of Assault (Disorderly Conduct, Physical Assault, or Sexual Assault).......................................................................................................................................33

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Introduction

Intimate Partner Femicide (IPF) is defined as the murder of women, committed by the

victims’ spouse, other intimate partner, or past intimate partner (Zahn, 2003; Messing, Campbell,

& Snider, 2017). Femicide is of great importance when discussing intimate partner homicide

(IPH); Nationally, 85% of IPH victims are women and IPH accounts for half of all female-

related homicides each year (Diez, et. al, 2017). This makes women 6.6 times more likely than

men to die from domestic violence (NCADV, 2015). The link between IPF and domestic

violence occurs because IPH is often preceded by acts of domestic violence; past violence, recent

violence, and frequent violence are all risk factors for a lethal outcome (Zahn, 2003). Similarly,

homicide is the ultimate act of domestic violence.

Firearms are important when studying IPF because they have a higher case fatality rate

than other weapons when inflicting assaultive injuries (Sorenson & Wiebe, 2004). Firearms are

also the weapon most often used in both IPH and intimate partner homicide-suicide cases

(Vigdor & Mercy, 2006; Salari & Sillito, 2015). A 2013 report by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation states that approximately 50% of IPH committed in the U.S. are done using a

firearm (Diez, et. al, 2017). Firearms also increase the likelihood that domestic violence

situations will escalate to murder fivefold (Everytown, 2015). Similarly, women who have

previously been assaulted or threatened with a firearm are 20 times more likely to be murdered

than other women (Campbell, et. al, 2003). This is especially troubling as households that

experience chronic violence are 20% more likely to own a firearm (Fleury-Stiner, Miller, &

Carcirieri, 2016).

Although rates of IPF committed by firearm in Minnesota are relatively low (0.22 per

100,000 individuals in 2016), it is an important public health issue (MCBW, 2017; US Census

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Bureau, 2012-2016). It not only takes the lives of the victims, but oftentimes the lives of their

friends, family members, or other individuals who try to intervene (MCBW, 2017). These

homicides impact between 2,000 and 3,000 children a year, the same number claimed by

childhood leukemia or Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) (House of Ruth: Maryland, n.d.).

Sometimes these children or loved ones are even present at the time of the homicide, leading to

trauma and emotional and behavioral problems (MCBW, 2017; House of Ruth: Maryland, n.d.).

The impact of femicide can extend beyond the family as well. A 2014 report says that

57% of mass shootings in the U.S. have involved domestic violence, indicating that IPF affects

entire communities (GCADV & GCFV, 2016). An example is that of Devin Patrick Kelley,

whose domestic abuse escalated to family abuse and later mass murder when he shot and killed

26 people in Southerland Springs, Texas at a church he knew his partner’s family frequented

(Barned-Smith, Harden, & Blakinger, 2017). Kelley was supposed to be subject to firearms

restrictions due to an order for protection filed against him but because U.S. Air Force officials

failed to enter his conviction into the National Instant Criminal Background Check System

databases, he still had access to firearms (Barned-Smith, Harden, & Blakinger, 2017).

Most firearm-related IPF cases result in the perpetrator committing suicide, increasing the

costs associated with IPF (Banks, Crandall, Sklar, & Bauer, 2008). In addition, many men who

commit IPF or domestic violence are likely to have experienced abuse personally or in their

home environment as a child, showing larger trends in violent behavior and their potential

cyclical effects (Modi, Palmer, & Armstrong, 2014). They are also likely to have a history with

drug abuse, unemployment, sexually risky behavior, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and

psychiatric illness (Modi, Palmer, & Armstrong, 2014). IPF therefore has implications for

thousands of Minnesotans’ physical and mental health, as well as for the state healthcare system.

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To deal with both issues of IPF and firearms, federal and state policymakers passed bills

that attempted to restrict domestic violence perpetrators’ access to firearms. In 1975 Minnesota

enacted the Minnesota Gun Control Act, which was a compliment to the federal Gun Control Act

of 1968 (Cleary & Fastner, 2012). The federal Lautenberg Amendment of 1996 then built upon

the pre-existing federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Sorenson & Wiebe, 2004). This amendment

restricted firearms access to those subject to a court order that “restrains such person from

harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner” (p.211) or to those convicted of a felony

or misdemeanor domestic violence offense (18 U.S.C. §931). The Lautenberg Amendment

preempted Minnesota state law by effectively extending a lifetime prohibition of firearms to

perpetrator of a domestic violence misdemeanor at the state level (Cleary & Fastner, 2012).

To ensure policies like the Lautenberg Amendment were effective at the state level, state

policymakers across the nation decided to not only match federal regulations but also create state

legislation that exceeded existing federal policies. States like Rhode Island and California were

quite successful at implementing stricter policies for domestic violence offenders by utilizing

Orders for Protection (OFPs) as a delivery method for firearm restrictions (Everytown for Gun

Safety, 2015; Green et. al, 2014). An OFP is a court order that requires an alleged perpetrator of

domestic violence to cede contact with his or her victim (Domestic Violence Firearms Act, 2014;

MCBW, n.d.). The abuser must be a family or household member and the OFP petition must

allege domestic abuse (Domestic Violence Firearms Act, 2014; MCBW, n.d.). Notice must be

given to the perpetrator and a hearing must take place to assess the legitimacy of the order and

grant or refuse the order (Domestic Violence Firearms Act, 2014; MCBW, n.d.). Judges can also

issue ex parte, or emergency temporary orders, when an imminent threat to the victim exists

(Domestic Violence Firearms Act, 2014). Seeing the success of this delivery method in other

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states, Minnesota policymakers decided to build a new firearms restriction policy based upon the

provision of OFPs outlined in the state’s 1979 Domestic Abuse Act (Pirius, 2012). The

significant effort on behalf of these policymakers culminated in the 2014 Domestic Violence

Firearm Act.

The Domestic Violence Firearms Act (DVFA) states that not only are those convicted of

felony crimes of violence restricted from accessing firearms, but also those convicted of any

stalking or domestic assault crimes (i.e. domestic assault, first through fifth degree assaults and

strangulation against a family or household member), including misdemeanors (MCBW, 2014).

In addition, those individuals under qualifying OFPs or Domestic Child Abuse Orders, which are

similar to OFPs but are specifically aimed at protecting child victims of domestic abuse

(Domestic Child Abuse Act, 2014), are also restricted from accessing firearms (MCBW, 2014).

These restrictions make someone an “ineligible person”, meaning they must surrender firearms

or are unable to access firearms, which include pistols; long-gun rifles; and any gun that

discharges compressed air, gas, or explosives (MCBW, 2014). Once in place, these restrictions

can last for the duration of the order or from three years of conviction to life (MCBW, 2014).

Firearm surrender/transfer is not required for ex parte (temporary) orders or orders that do not

utilize a hearing or provide adequate notice and hearing opportunity to the abusing party

(MCBW, 2014). Violating these firearms restrictions is a gross misdemeanor (Pirius, 2012).

In support of a policy like the DVFA, past studies have shown that limiting access to

firearms through policies like the restrictive licensing of handguns is effective at reducing

homicides (Loftin, McDowall, Wiersema, & Cottey, 1991). The literature also shows that OFPs

can be an effective delivery method for reducing IPH through said restrictions (Vigdor & Mercy,

2006; Zeoli & Webster, 2010). However, there is no consensus among studies about how

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effective an OFP-based firearms restriction policy is; studies estimate a reduction to IPH can

range from 10% to 25%, although the latter estimate could be due to social and political

confounders (Vigdor & Mercy, 2006; Zeoli & Webster, 2010). The literature also reveals that

while OFPs can be effective at stopping or decreasing the severity of abuse, this tool is not

always reliable or effective at deterring domestic violence perpetrators from committing

homicides because they are easily violated or often not in place at the time of murder (GCADV

& GCFV, 2016). In addition, laws that combine OFPs and firearm restrictions like the DVFA

have issues ensuring perpetrator compliance and can elevate the risk of violence for law

enforcement attempting to remove weapons (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006).

The effect of this policy on firearm-related IPF in Minnesota was previously unknown;

no analysis on the challenges or successes that the policy has faced in the past two years had

been done. Thus, the primary goal of the following analysis was to inform policymakers on ways

in which they can modify the existing policy- and future policies- to better address firearm

access and domestic violence to prevent them from escalating to femicide.

Methods

In this study, I analyzed firearm-related IPF trends in the state of Minnesota both prior to,

and after, the Domestic Violence Firearms Act. I also reviewed the literature on the effectiveness

of offender firearm restriction laws in other states at preventing IPF. States that were included in

the literature review had in-depth studies or documented policy outcomes and included

Maryland, Rhode Island, California, and Georgia. General nationwide studies were also used so

data from other states provided supplemental information. The results presented in this study

were based on a mixed methods design and therefore have two components: a data analysis and a

literature review. I hypothesized that while the literature would show restrictive firearm policies

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are effective in other states, trends in Minnesota firearm-related IPF would show that the 2014

DVFA has not significantly reduced rates in the state. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that

other states enacted similar policies prior to Minnesota, so the policies must have been somewhat

effective in those states. In addition, preliminary glances at the Minnesota Coalition for Battered

Women’s annual femicide reports indicate that the number of femicides in Minnesota has

remained relatively constant since 1989.

To understand the current and potential impact of the act, I conducted a literature review

on both the 2014 DVFA and similar policies in other U.S. states. This was supported by personal

communication with Minnesota State Representative Jamie Becker-Finn. This research analyzed

the policy through the lens of the incrementalism theory, which states that public policies are

created by making incremental, marginal adjustments to already existing policies through a cycle

of experimentation, reaction, and adjustment (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Rostron, 2008). I

believed this theory was most applicable due to knowing previously that many domestic violence

and firearm laws had been enacted separately in the past few decades, signaling that

policymakers were strengthening existing laws rather than creating new, groundbreaking

policies. I also analyzed the policy using Eugene Bardach’s eight-fold path to more effective

problem solving, as it offers a clear, step-by-step guide for analyzing policies and identifying

solutions. This eight-fold path included defining the problem, gathering evidence, constructing

alternatives, selecting criteria, projecting outcomes, confronting trade-offs, deciding on a

solution, and telling the story (Bardach & Patashnik, 2015). The incrementalism theory and the

eight-fold path were used to understand how domestic violence policies in Minnesota have

changed and evolved from the 1979 Domestic Abuse Act, whether such small changes in policy

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have reduced the number of women killed due to the escalation of domestic violence and firearm

usage, and what can be done to improve upon the policy in the future.

The literature review was used in conjunction with data analysis, which was done using a

dataset of women murdered by firearm at the hands of intimate partners for the 2 years prior to,

and 2 years after enactment of, the Domestic Violence Firearm Act. I collected supplemental

data by examining statewide civil and criminal records at the Dakota County Service Center and

cross-referencing information with media records. I then used the combined analysis to make

recommendations for positive policy change.

Research Sample

Documents were included in the literature review if they contained information on

domestic violence and firearm policies in any U.S. state, and if the policies discussed were

enforced or enacted any time after 1990. The latter was done to ensure relativity. Academic

studies, reports, and news sources were included. Electronic searches were conducted in Google,

PubMed, and OvidMedline. Search terms included varying combinations of one or more of the

following: “domestic violence”, “intimate partner femicide”, “intimate partner homicide”,

“intimate partner homicide-suicide”, “policy”, “firearms”, “firearm restrictions”, “order for

protection” and “Minnesota”. This search resulted in the identification of 10 documents that

contributed to the aims of this study. I supplemented the review with information gathered from

a personal communication with domestic violence lawyer and Minnesota State Representative

Jamie Becker-Finn.

The data for the data analysis component were taken partially from a dataset of all

females murdered by intimate partners in Minnesota from 2006 to 2016. The Minnesota

Coalition for Battered Women (MCBW) provided the dataset. MCBW compiled the dataset from

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the following sources: news outlets, public records (e.g. MNCIS- the statewide public records

system for criminal and civil cases), and local MCBW member programs that may have been

aware of an IPF case in their local area. The dataset was used to identify the number of victims

and cause of death for the years 2012-2016, as well as the names and ages of perpetrators for

those crimes so that further data could then be collected at a Minnesota district courthouse. Other

factors included in the MCBW dataset were excluded from the study because they could not be

directly tied to the action of murder or were not applicable to the end goal of identifying points

of intervention in domestic violence cases. Additionally, MCBW staff felt some of the variables

included in the dataset (e.g. history of abuse) were not collected from enough verifiable sources

to be publicly declared.

Data to be included from the courthouse was pulled from the 24 months prior to, and 24

months after August 1st, 2014, when the Domestic Violence Firearms Act became effective. This

limited range was used because, at the time of collection, data only existed through 2016 and had

to be balanced prior to the effective date. Data collected at the courthouse included history of

allegations of abuse, history of OFPs, and status of OFP at the time of murder. To better

understand the legal processes and enforcement of the law, I limited data collection to state

criminal and civil records. I also used news and media sources to help identify whether cases fit

the parameters of the study. Because this study defines IPF as having to be a result of domestic

violence, not by accidental means, certain cases were excluded based on data collected from the

courthouse and news sources. Per the definition, IPF requires the victim and perpetrator to either

be in an intimate partner relationship or have been in an intimate partner relationship. I chose to

also include women who were being pursued by men for an intimate relationship. Finally, I

chose to exclude those women murdered while engaging in prostitution because, while they do

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fall into the category of femicide, they are not considered victims of IPF as they were

participating in an economic exchange; this issue is beyond the scope of these analyses. After

excluding such cases that did not meet the definition of IPF, I used Microsoft Excel to generate

descriptive statistics for the pre- and post-periods. I identified 73 cases of IPF as fitting the

parameters for study. Of those cases, 37 involved firearms as a method of murder and 36

involved other methods.

Results

Literature review

The literature and personal communication with Minnesota State Representative Jamie

Becker-Finn revealed that OFP-based restriction policies like the DVFA face four common

barriers to adequate implementation and enforcement. These barriers impact the effectiveness of

the policies across cities, counties, and states (Green, Reilkoff, Moore, Schich, & Frey, 2014;

Frattarolli & Teret, 2006). They include a lack of resources, lack of legal clarification, lack of

complete authority, and the inability to control all firearms.

Barrier 1: Lack of Resources

A lack of resources to support increased policing functions is a major barrier to the

adequate implementation of OFP-based firearm restriction policies and is an issue that has been

seen with the implementation of the DVFA in Minnesota (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal

communication, Feb 16, 2018). In the case of Minnesota, a lack of resources stems from the fact

that policymakers designed the DVFA from a loose template based off what other states had

done previously (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication, Feb 16, 2018). The political

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environment at the time was staunchly bipartisan and it seemed the policy was intended to satisfy

community demand for action without having the partisanship necessary to plan for, and make

real change (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication, Feb 16, 2018).

Overall, higher police staffing levels are known to reduce the risk of IPH (Zeoli &

Webster, 2015), because there are enough officers to be able to perform the ideal functions of

removing of weapons from offenders’ homes (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication, Feb

16, 2018). However, because most law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to

perform home visits, they rely on the self-reporting of offenders through signed affidavits and

rarely follow up on their own initiative (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication, Feb 16,

2018; Frattaroli, 2009; Green, et. al, 2012; Green, et. al, 2014). This results in less voluntary

relinquishing of weapons and therefore decreased compliance with the law (Jamie Becker-Finn,

personal communication, Feb 16, 2018; Frattaroli, 2009; Green, et. al, 2012; Green, et. al, 2014).

When follow-up does occur, it is often because of pressure from the victim who knows the judge

has given the order (Green et. al, 2012).

In Minnesota, the lack of follow-up has led to the murder of at least one individual since

the DVFA’s enactment (Lagoe & Eckert, 2018a). In 2016 alone, there were 2,937 cases of OFPs

which automatically required gun transfers (Lagoe & Eckert, 2018a). Out of those cases, only

119 firearm affidavits (4%) were on file with the court (Lagoe & Eckert, 2018a). It is unknown

how many of these perpetrators had access to guns, but experts say at least some of them did

(Lagoe & Eckert, 2018a).

Other resources such as those for training officers and managing surrendered firearms are

also an issue for law enforcement when it comes to implementing these laws (Frattaroli & Teret,

2006). In a study of Maryland law enforcement sites, those with specialized domestic violence

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units could visit houses personally rather than send surrender orders through the mail, talk

respondents into compliance, and return to court for a search warrant when necessary, ensuring

more guns would be surrendered (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). Sites that did not have these

specialized units felt they had insufficient experience serving firearm surrender orders to

comment on how implementation of these policies went (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). The

interviewees at these sites also noted that limited resources like a lack of secure space to store

and maintain surrendered firearms led to liability and safety concerns (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006).

This resource is important to making law enforcement feel they can have an impact in the field

and is one that ensures firearm surrender is logistically possible (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal

communication, Feb 16, 2018).

Some funding and training opportunities do exist to ensure state laws more closely match

federal firearm restriction laws and so states are able to enforce federal firearms regulations

(Green et. al, 2012). One of these opportunities is offered through the Violence Against Women

Act of 1994 (VAWA), administered by the Office for Violence against Women; to qualify for

these funds, states must confirm that their practices include notifying offenders of firearms

restrictions (Green et. al, 2014). VAWA grants have increased resources for states to enforce

state-level offender firearms restriction laws adequately. One example of this is the San Mateo

County Sherriff’s Office in California, which received a VAWA grant in 2010 to develop a

program to enforce California’s OFP-based firearm restriction law (Green et. al, 2014). By 2012,

the department had collected 324 firearms and gone its third consecutive year without reporting a

single gun-related domestic violence homicide (Green et. al, 2014).

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Barrier 2: Lack of Legal Clarity

The literature also identifies a lack of legal clarity as a common theme in making

offender firearm restriction policies less effective and more difficult to implement. Issues with

wording in these laws (regardless of the state), such as narrow definitions of what an intimate

partner is, leads to inconsistencies and inadequacies in the ordering of OFPs (Rose, 2014).

Clearer language in regards to firearms restrictions and surrender processes is also shown to

increase the likelihood that firearms will be surrendered (GCADV & GCFV, 2016). Another

problem related to a lack of clarity is that the law does not require judges to inform victims/OFP

respondents of their right to request a firearms restriction request, leading to fewer respondent

requests and therefore fewer firearms confiscated from abusers (Green et. al, 2012). In

Minnesota’s Roseau county, transfer affidavits for firearms were filed in 73% of OFP cases (as

compared to Hennepin County’s 2% of OFP cases and the state’s average of 4%), something

county Judge Dixon claims is due to ensuring the question regarding firearms being present in

the home is asked from her bench (Lagoe & Eckert, 2018b).

In addition to ambiguous wording in the bills themselves, law enforcement officers are

often unclear on what the policies entail or what their authority is. In situations where felons are

encountered in possession of firearms (e.g. at a traffic stop), most officers are aware that

immediate surrender of those weapons is required (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication,

February 16, 2018). However, if the same situation occurs where a domestic violence offender is

encountered, most officers are not aware of the law that restricts those individuals from holding a

firearm and so do not request surrender (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication, February

16, 2018).

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Barrier 3: Lack of Complete Authority

Legal authority without required action is another common barrier to the implementation of

OFP-based firearm restriction policies. This stems from many states using the word “may”

instead of “shall” in their legal verbiage; if a state is a “shall” state, judges must order the

removal of firearms from offenders, but if a state is a “may” state, judges are given the power to

order the removal of firearms without requiring them to do so or only requiring them to do so in

certain situations (e.g. if the OFP is permanent, if the offender had a previous felony, or if the

offender violated an OFP) (Domestic Violence Firearms Act, 2014; Frattaroli, 2009). Minnesota

is considered a “may” state because, while judges shall order the surrender firearms in qualifying

cases, they may in those that don’t qualify (e.g. for ex-parte orders or those that automatically

convert to permanent OFPs and have not had a hearing set) (Domestic Violence Firearms Act,

2014).

This language allows judges to have discretionary practices at various levels of decision-

making such as when they “check the prohibition box on a protective order form, include

prohibition language, or verbally confirm that firearms should be confiscated” (Green et. al,

2012, pg. 15). In a study of California, a “may” state, only 52% of active orders in place at the

time of study included a firearms surrender order by a judge (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). Even in

situations where there is evidence abusers have access to firearms and are a lethal threat to

victims, the case of Rhode Island shows judges only require abusers to surrender their firearms

13% of the time; the law does not require them to do so (Everytown for Gun Safety, 2015). This

is because, in addition to the lack of resources previously discussed, Rhode Island is a “may”

state like Minnesota; the discretionary nature of the wording in the statutes allows for it

(Everytown for Gun Safety, 2015). It also leads to courts being inconsistent in the

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implementation of such policies (Green et. al, 2012); in Rhode Island, the rate at which county

courts ordered abusers to surrender their firearms ranged from 2% to 53% (Everytown for Gun

Safety, 2015).

A lack of authority to enforce firearm surrender also leads to implementation problems.

Because law enforcement does not always have the authority to remove firearms from the

offenders’ homes, most of these laws (such as the DVFA) rely on the self-surrender of weapons

(Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). During this self-surrender process, offenders will often lie on

surrender affidavits or refuse to turn firearms over (Jamie Becker-Finn, personal communication,

February 16, 2018; Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). In these situations, the laws do not give law

enforcement the authority to do searches or arrest for noncompliance (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006).

One law enforcement agency following a law that relied on self-surrender called this feature the

“Achilles’ heel” of the law and had never received a surrendered gun (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006).

Barrier 4: Inability to Control All Firearms

The literature also identifies the inability to control the buying and selling of all firearms

as a barrier to adequate implementation (Green et. al, 2012; Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). Some

states have attempted to limit private sales of firearms to prohibited persons, but these firearms

can still reach the individuals (Green et. al, 2012). According to Green, et. al (2012), “Forty

percent of all guns are sold through unlicensed private sellers, or those who are not ‘in the

business of firearm sales and are exempt from performing background checks” (pg. 8). These

untraceable private and online sales have led to a large black market for guns that facilitate the

ownership of firearms by prohibited persons (Green et. al, 2012). Because of this, many victims

of domestic violence do not request firearm surrender; they believe the law cannot apply to

19


illegal guns and that a surrendered firearm could easily be replaced with an illegal one (Frattaroli

& Teret, 2006).

Data Analysis

The criminal and civil court records examined for this analysis did not include any signed

firearm affidavits attached to, or mentioned in, any records for those with a history of OFPs.

Both the number of firearm-related IPF cases and all IPF cases increased in the 24 months after

the DVFA’s enactment, as is shown in Figure 1. Firearm-related IPF increased by 31% and all

IPF cases increased by 28%. I was unable to test these results for significant differences due to a

shortage of variables; I did not have access to the numbers of individuals who had OFPs and did

not get murdered, so was unable to run a Fischer’s exact test. Despite this, I could note the

proportion of firearm-related murders to all other cases also increased, although only slightly.

Figure 2 reflects findings that in both the 24 months before and after the enactment of the DVFA,

the majority of firearm-related IPF perpetrators (81%) had no history of OFPs and none of those

perpetrators had active OFPs at the time of murder. It also shows that out of all perpetrators, only

31% had a history of OFPs and only 3% had active OFPs at the time of the murder. Finally, it

shows that a history of OFPs increased slightly (by 7%) among firearm-related IPF perpetrators,

but decreased amongst overall perpetrators in the 24 months after enactment.

Figures 3 and 4 show perpetrator history of abuse and assault. Figure 3 shows that only

19% of firearm-related IPF cases before the DVFA had a documented history of abuse, meaning

they were arrested (but not necessarily convicted) for domestic abuse or domestic assault. This

number increased to 29% after. It also shows that of all IPF perpetrators, only 31% had a history

of abuse. Figure 4 shows that slightly more perpetrators had a history of assault or aggressive

behavior (i.e. disorderly conduct, physical assault, or sexual assault); 25% of firearm-related IPF

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perpetrators and 41% of all IPF perpetrators had a history of assault beforehand. This percentage

increased to 38% for firearm-related IPF cases after DVFA enactment.

Discussion

The results from the data analysis show that Minnesota’s DVFA law enacted in 2014 has

been remarkably ineffective. Results show that there was a 31.2% increase in firearm-related IPF

found in Minnesota after enactment of the DVFA, meaning rates of firearm-related IPF in

Minnesota increased from .280 cases per 100,000 population to .390 per 100,000, (U.S. Census

Bureau, 2012-2016). This shows that many domestic violence offenders still have access to

firearms. In addition, Minnesota had zero active OFPs at the time of murder amongst firearm-

related IPF perpetrators both before and after the DVFA’s enactment, which shows that, since

the law’s conception, OFPs have been an ineffective method of delivery for firearms restrictions

on domestic violence perpetrators. To supplement the data analysis, observations that not a

single OFP had a signed affidavit attached to them demonstrates that judges may not be

following requirements that they shall order firearm restrictions for some perpetrators. Along

with an ineffective delivery method, the literature shows that, being a “may” state that lacks the

resources to enforce the law, the legal clarity regarding the law, and the ability to control illegal

firearms, Minnesota faces all four major barriers to implementation and has therefore seen less

success from this law than other states have seen with similar laws.

These results reflect many past findings in the literature. Firstly, the results confirm the

literature claiming firearms are the most common weapon used in IPH cases (Vigdor & Mercy,

2006; Salari & Sillito, 2015; Diez, et. al, 2017); firearm cases comprised 50% or more of all IPF

cases both before and after enactment of the DVFA, making it the most common weapon used to

commit IPF in Minnesota. The findings are also consistent with studies that show that, while

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OFPs can decrease IPF (Vigdor & Mercy, 2006; Zeoli & Webster, 2010), they can be also

ineffective because they are frequently violated or not in place at the time of murder (GCADV &

GCFV, 2016). While other states have reported 10-25% decreases in IPF after such policies, I

found that the literature reveals more widespread problem areas and barriers to implementation

than I would have expected, resulting in very different outcomes for different states. Because of

this, I did not expect to see such a notable increase in the number of firearm-related IPF cases

after Minnesota’s enactment of the law.

The findings from this study suggest that policymakers designed the DVFA out of a sense

of duty to constituents to do something about both firearms and domestic violence and was

created in the absence of both state-specific information (e.g. data on the percentage of

perpetrators that have an OFP in place at the time of murder) and problem-specific information

(e.g. data on the number of OFPs and charges dropped or never pursued by victims due to the

cycle of domestic violence). Rather, the DVFA may have been designed with incrementalism in

mind, imitating other state’s OFP-based firearm restriction policies that made incremental

changes to existing laws such as the Domestic Abuse Act and Gun Control Act of 1968, without

looking to improve on their failures. Because it did not improve on commonly noted barriers to

the implementation of similar policies, it seems the DVFA has failed the citizens of Minnesota.

Limitations

Potential data limitations do exist, primarily due to unclear, inadequate, or incorrect court

records. Because of the limited information included in court records, cross-referencing news

articles and the MCBW dataset was necessary to identify that information on the correct

individuals was being collected; this information could have been misleading due to the number

of individuals in the record system with the same name born in the same year. The digitalized

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court records also do not include data prior to the 1980s, nor do they include records from other

states, meaning that older perpetrators or those who lived in other states could have been missing

information; one case out of state was marked as unknown for each of the variables but the in-

state cases were considered complete based on available court records. The lack of adequate

record-keeping (e.g. the tendency of some perpetrators to be charged under multiple names, the

occurrence of some domestic assault being coded as general assault with a note that it was a

domestic incident), as well as the fact that a history of abuse or assault was only collected from

court records and not other sources such as shelter records, means that some information may be

missing.

There were also additional issues ensuring the correct data was included and excluded.

Due to the unclear, often subjective definition of “intimate partner relationship”, some cases may

have been unintentionally misclassified or excluded from the potential dataset by myself or by

MCBW. In addition, the cause of death was unknown for some individuals and so the cases

could not be identified as having involved a firearm, leaving these victims excluded from the

study on firearms. Also, due to a recent case that was identified as a murder years after it had

been deemed a suicide, MCBW staff determined that more cases of IPF exist but have gone

unreported due to perpetrators’ staging of the crime scene to look like a suicide (Liz Richards,

personal communication, September 29, 2017).

Another limitation involved getting adequate information for the original MCBW dataset.

In some cases, a perpetrator was never charged were identified in the dataset as a perpetrator due

to their probable culpability; these individuals were considered as perpetrators without enough

evidence against them to be convicted. Similarly, MCBW marked some perpetrators as

“unknown” but categorized the murder as IPF due to signs that the murder was a result of

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unrequited feelings by an unknown individual; these perpetrators’ history of abuse was therefore

impossible to collect.

One final note is that I was not able to observe what the rates of IPF would have been in

the absence of the law; the rates without the DVFA could have been even higher than the

observed rates. The timeframe limitation of 24 months prior to, and after, the law, has also

limited the visible impact of the law.

Implications and Future Steps

This study has brought to light the ineffectiveness of the DVFA; policymakers and

Minnesota citizens can use this study to cite statistics and show others that more evidence-based

research and change is needed to prevent domestic violence from escalating to IPF. It has also

identified not only the common barriers to adequate implementation of OFP-based firearm

restriction policies but also how they apply to the DVFA in Minnesota specifically. Finally, it

has clarified that the justice and law enforcement system need to be held accountable for

enforcing laws enacted in the state.

Based on the progression of domestic violence laws, policymakers have historically preferred

to make incremental changes. Because of this, because the DVFA is already in place, and

because the major barriers have been identified in this study, the following recommendations for

future action revolve around informed incremental changes:

1. Ensure the laws are enforced in as many domestic violence situations as possible- make Minnesota a “shall” state instead of a “may” state and ensure that court employees are forced to ask about firearms at the time of OFP filings so victims are aware of their rights (GCADV & GCFV, 2016)

2. Ensure more resources are funneled to law enforcement. This includes funding for domestic violence units, training officers on the authority given to them by the DVFA, and creating more secure storage units for surrendered firearms.

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3. Ensure all officers are entering domestic assault into the court system adequately and completely so that further, more comprehensive research can be done:

a. All domestic assault cases should be entered as domestic assault b. Records should be complete with correct birth dates c. Record systems should merge all names/alternate identities under one person if

they have been entered incorrectlyd. Names should be entered correctly with no misspellings

In addition, because so many more of the perpetrators had a history of abuse rather than a

history OFP, and because this history often included charges only rather than convictions, I

would recommend there be an additional amendment to the domestic abuse act requiring that the

victim not need to press charges for the perpetrator to be convicted. As is the case with child

abuse, once law enforcement is called to the scene, the state can charge the perpetrator without

needing the child’s consent. Policymakers should allow this level of intervention with domestic

violence as well. This tactic would have increased the number of individuals on the perpetrator

list in Minnesota who would not have had access to firearms because they would have been

convicted for the countless violent misdemeanor and felony charges on their arrest record.

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Graphs and Tables

Figure 1: Number of Intimate Partner Femicide Cases in Minnesota: 24 Months Before and After Enactment of the Domestic Violence Firearm Act (DVFA) of 2014

After

Before

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

51%

50%

49%

50%

Number of Intimate Partner Femicide Cases in Minnesota: 24 Months Before and After Enactment of the Domestic Vio-

lence Firearm Act (DVFA) of 2014

Firearm Other

Number of Identified Cases

*Data obtained from the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women Femicide Dataset (2006-2016).

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Figure 2: OFP History and Status at Time of Murder by Murder Method

Firearm IPF

Other IPF Total Firearm IPF

Other IPF Total0%

10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

13%

53%

31%19%

15% 17%

81%

40%

61%81% 79% 78%

6% 5%

7% 3% 11% 5%

OFP History and Status at Time of Murder by Murder Method

Active OFP History of OFP No History Unknown History

IPF Cases Before DVFA Enactment IPF Cases After DVFA Enactment(August 2012-July 2014) (August 2014-July 2016)

Perc

ent o

f Ide

ntifie

d Ca

ses

*Data obtained from the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women Femicide Dataset (2006-2016) and Minnesota criminal and civil court records.

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Figure 3: Documented Perpetrator History of Abuse

Firearm IPF

Other IPF Total Firearm IPF

Other IPF Total0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

6% 6% 6%

19%

44%

31%29%

60%

44%

75% 50% 63% 71% 40% 56%

Documented Perpetrator History of Abuse

Unknown History of Abuse History of Abuse No History of Abuse

IPF Cases Before DVFA Enactment IPF Cases After DVFA En-actment

(August 2012-July 2014) (August 2014-July 2016)

Perc

ent o

f Ide

ntifie

d Ca

ses


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Figure 4: Documented Perpetrator History of Assault (Disorderly Conduct, Physical Assault, or Sexual Assault)

Firearm IPF Other IPF Total Firearm IPF Other IPF Total0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

6% 6% 6%

25%

56%

41%

38% 40% 39%

69% 38% 53% 62% 60% 61%

Documented Perpetrator History of Assault (Disorderly Conduct, Physical Assault, or Sexual Assault)

Unknown History of Assault History of Assault No History of Assault

IPF Cases Before DVFA Enactment IPF Cases After DVFA Enactment(August 2012-July 2014) (August 2014-July 2016)

Perc

ent o

f Ide

ntifie

d Ca

ses


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