ACJ Outline (Spring 2010)

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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010

Introduction

PURPOSEOF PROCEDURAL RULES

Powell v. Alabama

Patterson v. Chicago Police Lt. Burge

KEY PROVISIONSOFTHE BILLOF RIGHTS

APPLICATIONOFTHE BOR TOTHE STATES

Incorporation

Duncan v. Louisiana

RETROACTIVITY

Searches and Seizures

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shallnot be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the placeto be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

WHATISA SEARCH?

In order for there to be a search, there must be action by agovernment official that interferes with a persons reasonableexpectation of privacy. Whenever confronted with a is this a search?question, use the test in Katzbelow.

Katz v. United States (1967)

Facts: Katz was running a sports book from a public phone booth. The police,without a warrant, used a listening device on the outside of the phone boothto obtain information against Katz. The lower court held that, under currentlaw, there must be a physical intrusion to find the action to be an illegalsearch and that, because there was no trespass, the recordings wereadmissible.

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Holding: The SC dismissed the existing trespass rule used by the lower court.The court held that even though the defendant made the calls from a publicplace, and there was no trespass into the inside of the booth, the defendantsreasonable expectation of privacy was violated. The Fourth Amendmentprotects people, not places.

Harlans Concurrence: The test to determine whether a violation has occurredasks: (1) whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy(subjective); and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectationas reasonable (objective).

Open Fields

In Hester v. US (1924), the SC held that the special protection of the FourthAmendmentdoes not extend to open fields.

Oliver v. United States (1984) reaffirming Hester

Facts: Defendant owns a one-hundred acre farm. In the middle of the 100

acres, defendant grows marijuana. On a tip, officers investigate the tipand enter defendants property. Marijuana is found and defendant ischarged. He objects on the grounds that his Fourth Amendment rightswere violated.

Holding: Open fields cannot support a reasonable expectation of privacy andare thus not protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: "Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimateactivities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from governmentinterference or surveillance." The Court also cited practical considerationsas weighing on its decision, since open fields "usually are accessible to thepublic," and "no trespassing" signs are generally ineffective at "bar[ring]

the public from viewing open fields in rural areas," and "the public andpolice lawfully may survey lands from the air."

The court in Oliversays that the Fourth Amendment applies if police search apersons home or the curtilage immediately adjacent to the home, butnot if the police are searching in an open field.

Thus, the SC in Dunn attempted to clarify the distinction between curtilageand open fields which is crucial in deciding if the Fourth Amendmentapplies

United States v. Dunn (1987)

Facts: Dunn was manufacturing phenylacetone and amphetamine in a barnbehind his ranch house. DEA agents entered onto respondents ranchproperty and acquired probable cause which allowed them to get thewarrant. Dunn argues that these confirmatory searches violated the 4thAmendment.

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Elements: Four factors are developed to determine if the property was withinthe curtilage: (1) Proximity of curtilage to the home; (2) whether curtilageis within enclosure surrounding home; (3) the nature of the use to whicharea is put; and (4) the steps taken by resident to protect area fromobservation.

Holding: the SC holds that the barn is outside of the curtilage of the homeand is thus not protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: Although the factors test is not dispositive, the elements bearupon the central relevant consideration of the Fourth Amendment:whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that itshould be placed under the homes umbrella of protection from illegalsearches.

Dissent: the dissent is concerned with the inconsistency of this opinion whenweighed against the Katzcase. In that case, the court found that theFourth Amendment was about people and their reasonable expectations ofprivacy, not about places; that the defendants expectations of privacy in

the barn were reasonable.

Aerial Searches

When the police use an aircraft to view defendants property from the air,anything the police can see with the naked eye falls within the plainview doctrine (so long as the aircraft is in public, navigable airspace).

California v. Ciraolo (1986)

Facts: Defendant was growing weed in his yard within the curtilage of hisproperty. Police used a low-flying plane to observe this activity in order toobtain a search warrant.

Holding: There is no violation of the Fourth Amendment when officers are at alawful vantage point above the curtilage; if you are exposed to the public,there is no protection.

Reasoning: Anyone flying in airspace above the house could have seeneverything police saw, so expectation of privacy is not reasonable.

Florida v. Riley(1989) plurality opinion dissents are important here.

Facts:The facts of this case are similar to Ciraolo except the police here used ahelicopter and flew much lower (400 ft. vs. 100 ft.) above the home. A Floridacounty sheriff received a tip that a man was growing marijuana on hisproperty. Unable to see inside a greenhouse, which was behind thedefendant's mobile home, the sheriff circled over the property using ahelicopter. The absence of two roof panels allowed the sheriff to see, with hisnaked eye, what appeared to be marijuana growing inside. A warrant wasobtained and marijuana was found in the greenhouse. The Florida SC upheldthe lower court finding that the aerial search violated his reasonableexpectation of privacy.

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Holding: The SC overturned the FSC and held that helicopter surveillance at analtitude of 400 feet did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

OConners Concurrence: Whether or not helicopter had right to be there is notrelevant. Instead, OConner held that the court should determine whetherhelicopter was in an area that the public travel with such regularity that

defendants expectation of privacy was not reasonable. She also consideredthat flying at altitudes lower than 400ft. my be sufficiently rare that there is areasonable expectation of privacy.

Brennans Dissent: Believed that the plurality had misstated the issue,agreeing with O'Connor that the frequency of public air travel was a necessaryconsideration, and that the key issue in the case was whether ordinarycitizens were normally in the air above the defendants home. The vantagepoint the police enjoyed was not one any citizen could readily share.However, Brennan disagreed with O'Connor in that he believed the defendantdid not necessarily need to show that public flight was rare, but rather thatthe state needed to show that it was common.

Blackmuns Dissent: He recognized that five of the nine justices (O'Connor andthe four dissenters) had agreed that "the reasonableness of Riley'sexpectation of privacy depends on the frequency of non-police helicopterflights at an altitude of 400 feet." Blackmun noticed that the maindisagreement among these five justices was whether the government or thedefendant had the burden of proof in establishing whether public flights aboveRiley's home were common or rare.

Thermal Imaging of Homes

Kyllo v. United States (2001) 5 to 4 decision dissent is important

Facts: A federal agent used a thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating

off of defendants home. The presence of increased heat sources implied theuse of additional lighting for marijuana growth. The agent then obtained awarrant to search the home and marijuana was indeed found. The defendantargues that use of thermal imaging equipment is a search and, in theabsence of a warrant, is a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Holding: Thermal imaging of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search"and may be done only with a warrant.

Reasoning: Obtaining information by sense-enhancing technology that wouldotherwise require intrusion into constitutionally protected areas constitutes asearch, when technology is not in general public use. Furthermore, theinformation gathered is not visible to the naked eye and the device is capable

of determining the intimate details of happenings inside the home. The homeis sacred and deserves the highest standard of protection againstunreasonable searches.

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Stevens Dissent: The Justice argued that any person could detect the heatemissions; this could be done by simply feeling that some areas in or aroundthe house are warmer than others or observing that snow was melting morequickly on certain sections of the house. Since the public could gather thisinformation there is no need for a warrant and the use of this technique is notunconstitutional. Moreover, the use of the thermal imaging device was

merely "off the wall" surveillance and did not detect any "intimate" details ofKyllo's home. It was absurd of Kyllo to try to incorporate something asintangible, fluid and public as heat into the private sphere. "Heat waves, likearomas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enterthe public domain if and when they leave a building."

Searches of Trash

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what a person chooses todiscard outsideof his curtilage.

California v. Greenwood(1988)

Facts: Local police suspected defendant was dealing drugs from his residence.Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search hishome, they searched the garbage bags defendant had left at the curb forpickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used toobtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegalsubstances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.

Holding: Garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the FourthAmendment.

Reasoning: There was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on publicstreets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and othermembers of the public." The Court noted that the police cannot be expected

to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of thepublic."

Brennans Dissent: A trash bag is a common repository for ones personaleffects and should inevitably be associated with an expectation of privacy.

The possibility that meddlers might rummage through the trash should notnegate the expectation of privacy.

Note: It is important to note that the SC has not yet ruled on a case where thegarbage was still inside the curtilage of the home.

Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior

Use of Beepers/Tracking Devices

United States v. Knotts (1983)

Facts: A beeper was placed in a drum in defendants possession so that hecould be tracked by law enforcement.

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Holding: The monitoring of the beeper did not violate the 4th Amendmentwhen it revealed no information that could not have been obtainedthrough visual surveillance.

Reasoning: A person traveling on a public thoroughfare has no reasonableexpectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.

United States v. Karo (1984)

Facts: Agents installed an electronic beeper in a can of ether with theconsent of the owner and tracked it as it was moved between variousresidences and commercial storage lockers. The investigators determinedthe location of the can and obtained an arrest warrant.

Holding:The use of an electronic beeper device to monitor a can of etherwithout a warrant constituted unlawful search and seizure.

Reasoning/Distinction from Knotts:There was an illegal search in thiscase because the beeper was used to determine whether an object was

within the suspects home; it revealed a fact that could not have beenvisually verified. This was a violation of defendants subjective andobjective expectation of privacy within his house.

Public Conversations

United States v. White (1971) plurality opinion of four

Facts: The court here considered whether there was a search when agovernment informer carrying a radio transmitter engaged in aconversation with a suspect.

Holding: Listening in on a conversation is not a search when at least one of

the parties involved is aware of the recording.

Reasoning: When a person is talking in pubic, and loud enough for anotherto hear, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy as to thesubject of the conversation. However, when a person makes reasonableefforts to guard against others from hearing, efforts to listen are inviolation of the Fourth Amendment.

Note: It is still questionable as to whether a search has taken place whenneither party is aware of the recording.

Pin Registers

Smith v. Maryland(1979)

Facts: McDonough was robbed and began receiving threatening phone callsfrom a man identifying himself as the robber. The police used a penregister (trace) to monitor the calls and record the numbers. Thedefendant argues that he has a reasonable right to privacy in the numbershe dials and any recording of such numbers is a search in violation of thatright.

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Definition

The classic definition of PC as stated in Carroll v. United States is whetherthe facts and circumstances are such to warrant a man of prudence andcaution in believing that the offense had been committed.

What is Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for PC?

The SC stated that in dealing with PCwe deal with probabilities. However,the court never said what probabilities are sufficient. The court simplysaid that PC is something more than bare suspicion and something lessthan evidence which would justify conviction.

What informant information is sufficient to constitute PC?

Aguilar-Spinelli two-part test: (1) was the informant credible likely they weretelling the truth? And (2) was the informant reliable was it likely that theinformant actually had the knowledge? If the informant did not meet these

requirements, there was not probable cause.

This was the test until the court departed from it in Illinois v. Gates below. Therethe court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances.

This is now the general approach to determining whether there is PC, evenbeyond the issue of informant reliability.

Illinois v. Gates (1983)

Facts:The police received an anonymous tip that Gates was dealing drugs. Thetip detailed the process that Gates used and his movements that would occurin the future. The police independently corroborated the details in the tip,obtained a warrant, and searched Gates care where they found marijuana.

Procedural History: The Illinois court suppressed the evidence for lack ofprobable cause. Using the Aguilar-Spinelli test, they found that neither theveracity of the claims nor the basis of knowledge were clear enough to findPC.

Holding: The court found no constitutional violation in this case; probable causewas sufficient.

Reasoning: Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, andbasis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but thatthose issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued thatthe "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the

correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials whoobtained a warrant abided by it in this case.

Maryland v. Pringle (2003)

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Facts: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seizedmoney from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seatarmrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they deniedownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after hesigned a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction,

holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle wasin the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establishprobable cause for arrest for possession.

Issue: Does an arrest of a front-seat passenger in a car driven by its owner, afterpolice find cocaine in the car's back armrest, lack probable cause and violatethe Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures?

Holding: The arrest did not violate defendants Fourth Amendment rights as theofficer had probable cause to arrest him.

Reasoning: As it is an entirely reasonable inference from the facts here that anyor all of the car's occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and

control over, the cocaine, a reasonable officer could conclude that there wasprobable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession ofcocaine, either solely or jointly.

Is it an Objective or Subjective Standard?

A crucial question is whether PC focuses on the subjective knowledge andintent of the officer or the objective intent and knowledge of thereasonable officer under similar circumstances.

Whren v. United States (1996)

Facts: Defendants car was stopped due to a traffic violation. During the ensuing

stop, the officer saw drugs in the car and arrested defendant. Defendantargues that the officers reason for pulling his over in the first place wasbecause he was black; that he officer lacked either reasonable suspicion orprobable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing.

Holding: Questions of probable cause are reviewed under an objective standardand under that standard, the officers conduct was reasonable.

Reasoning: Regardless of whether the officer pulled the defendant over for hisown subjective reasons, there was still a valid, objectively reasonable trafficoffense to warrant the stop.

THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

Function:

Warrants function as a check on the police.

Limit the police conduct by restricting the scope of the search or seizure.

Issued by a neutral and detached magistrate

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The scope of the search should be no greater than necessary to effectuate theobject of the search

Two views on the warrant requirement:

A search or arrest requires probable cause, and a search not supported by

probable cause/warrant is for the most part per se unreasonable.

Prevailing understanding until 1970s

The alternate view is that the two clauses are independent:

Warrant clause means that police need to have probable cause when theyseek a warrant.

But they dont need to seek a warrant when their actions are governed byprobable cause.

What Information Must be Included in the Application for a Warrant?

The warrant must have enough particularity to distinguish between thingsthat the police are seizing, and things that they are not seizing.

Generally, less specificity is demanded regarding contraband.

More specificity is required for stolen goods or items that are given firstamendment protection (books or paper).

The particularity requirement is evaluated by assessing what police knew orshould have known.

Warrant must be based on probable cause and supported by oath oraffirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search, and thepersons or things to be seized,

The affidavit supporting the request for a warrant must include information thatprovides a basis for probable cause.

Warrant must specify the time period for its execution.

The officer must execute the warrant between 6:00AM and 10:00PM unless thejudge, for good cause, authorizes execution at another time.

What Form Must the Warrant Take?

Andresen v. Maryland(1976)

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Facts: Investigators concluded that there was probable cause to believe thatAndresen had committed crime of false pretenses. They applied for, and wereissued, warrants to search law office and corporation office. The warrantincluded a residual clause at the end of it. Andresen moved to suppressseized documents contending that, because of the residual clause, thewarrants were too general and therefore invalid. General warrants are

prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: The defendants 4th amendment rights were NOT violated when thewarrant specifically stated what documents could be taken, although the finalclause was extremely vague, and seemed all encompassing.

Reasoning: The warrant had an exhaustive list of things that could be seized,but a vague phrase, together with known fruits of crime at this timeunknown. This is unclear but obviously refers to only the Lot 13 case whenread in the totality of the document.

Groh v. Ramirez(2004) 5 to 4 decision dissent is important

Facts: Petitioner searched respondents home pursuant to warrant that failed todescribe the person or things to be seized. The application, however,particularly described the place to be searched, but the warrant did not referto the application.

Holding: Unless the particular items described in the affidavit are set forth in thewarrant (or incorporated by reference and attached), the warrant is invalid.

Reasoning: This requirement lets the person being searched know what is beingsearched for. It also helps subsequently reviewing courts to know what themagistrate authorized the police to do. The mere fact that the magistrateissued the warrant does not necessarily establish that he agreed that thescope of the search should be as broad as the affiants request.

Thomas Dissent: There is a difference between a search conducted pursuant toa defective warrant, and a warrantless search. If the search is conductedpursuant to a defective warrant, it may still be reasonable and thusconstitutional.

What are the Requirements in Executing Warrants?

How May Police Treat Those Who Are Present When a warrant is BeingExecuted?

Ybarra v. Illinois (1979)

The SC held that a person who happens to be present in the premises subjectto search cannot be searched as well just by virtue of being there.

Michigan v. Summers (1981)

The SC held that, when there is a search of a residence, those present at thetime may be detained. Allowing such detention serves many purposesincluding: preventing flight; minimizing risk; and helping complete thesearch in the case of any questions.

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Muehler v. Mena

Facts: Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched thehouse they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about herimmigration status. The police had a search warrant to search thepremises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena

sued the officers in federal district court for violating her FourthAmendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district courtruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs todetain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and thatthe officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status alsoviolated the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: Mena's detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: Officers with a search warrant for contraband had authority todetain occupants of the premises during the search in order to minimizeany risk to officers. Handcuffing Mena was also justified by officer safetyconcerns and because officers had to deal with detaining multiple

occupants. The Court further held that the officers' questioning of Menaabout her immigration status during her detention did not violate theFourth Amendment. The officers did not need to have reasonablesuspicion to question Mena. Moreover, the Court had held repeatedly thatmere police questioning did not constitute a seizure.

Do Police Have to Knock and Announce before Searching a Dwelling?

Absent exigent circumstances, police must knock and announce their presencebefore entering a residence to execute a search warrant

Wilson v. Arkansas (1995)

Facts: Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas statepolice. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms.Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found themain door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlockedscreen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, andsaid that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion tosuppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid onthe grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" beforeentering.

Holding: A unanimous Court held that the common-law "knock-andannounce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendmentreasonableness inquiry and should have been used in this instance.

Reasoning: "Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of thepractice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries,constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting theknock-and-announce principle. The Amendment's Framers thought that,whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering adwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search'sreasonableness." Countervailing law enforcement interests, such asofficer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of anunannounced entry.

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Richards v. Wisconsin (1997)

Holding: After noting the general importance of following conventional"knock-and-announce" procedures, the Court held that in thosecircumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcingtheir presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the

destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified.

Reasoning: The Court added that by immediately closing the door afterwitnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient

justification for breaking into his room, especially considering thedisposable nature of the substances they were seeking.

In its most recent cases concerning the knock and announce rule, the court hasbeen deferential to law enforcement.

United States v. Banks (2004) the court held that the police did not violatethe Fourth Amendment when they waited only 15 to 20 seconds if theyreasonably believed that waiting longer would provide the opportunity for

the suspects to destroy contraband.

Hudson v. Michigan (2006) more dramatically and more importantly, thecourt in this case held that the exclusionary rule does not apply toevidence gained after police violate the knock and announcerequirement.

What if there are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing aWarrant?

Maryland v. Garrison (1987)

Facts: Police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search McWebbs

apartment on 3rd floor of 2036 Park Ave. At the time, the policereasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the 3rd floor.After finding drugs, the officers realized that they were actually in anotherapartment on the third floor and that the floor was in fact divided into twoapartments.

Issue: If a mistake is made in executing a warrant, is the search permissibleso long as the police action is reasonable?

Holding: Judging the constitutionality of the officers conduct in light ofinformation available at the time they acted, the warrant was valid when itwas issued.

Reasoning: The officers were required to stop their search when the realizedtheir mistake, which they did. Prior to their realization, their conduct wasconsistent with the warrant.

Blackmun Dissent: The warrant was limited to the third floor apartment ofMcWebb; the search of the additional apartment was warrantless andpresumed unreasonable.

LA Country v. Rettele (2007)

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Facts: Deputies obtained a valid warrant to search a house, but wereunaware that suspects being sought had moved out 3 months prior.Officers knocked and announced and found two occupants in the bedroom.

They ordered the residents, who were sleeping, unclothed, out of bed andrequired them to stand a few minutes before allowing them to dress.Plaintiffs bring suit claiming that the officers violated their Fourth

Amendment right to be from unreasonable search and seizure.

Holding: The court held no violation of plaintiffs Fourth Amendment Rights

Reasoning: Deputies searching a house, where they believe a suspect mightbe armed, possess the authority to secure premises before decidingwhether to continue with search. There is no allegation that the deputiesprevented residents from dressing longer than necessary to protect theirsafety. And although the warrant stated that the suspects were black (andthe occupants found were white), it was still reasonable to believe that theoccupants could have been comingling with the suspects.

Arrest in Anothers Home

If the police have an arrest warrant, they are within their rights to enter thesuspects home to arrest him.

However, if the suspect is in another persons home, the police need an arrestwarrant for the suspect as well as a search warrant to enter the other personshome.

Even so, the suspect cannot use a warrantless search of the friends home toinvalidate his own arrest because the suspect has no standing.

No warrant is necessary to arrest someone in public.

EXCEPTIONSTOTHE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

In creating exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court hasbalanced the privacy interests involved against the extent to whichadhering to the warrant requirement would unduly hamper effectivelaw enforcement.

Searches Incident to Arrest

Chimel v. California (1969)

Facts:Three officers arrived at home of petitioner with warrant authorizing his

arrest. He was not present, and his wife let officers in. They waited for him toreturn from work, and then handed him the arrest warrant and searched thepremises based on the lawful arrest. The officers seized numerous items.

Rule: Police, while performing a valid, in home, custodial arrest, may search thearea within the immediate control of the arrestee.

Holding: The search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the FourthAmendment.

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Reasoning: Searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within theimmediate control of the suspect (the area in which he might access aweapon or destroy evidence). While police could reasonably search and seizeevidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited fromrummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Courtemphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary

bulwarks against government abuse.

Whites Dissent: That the search included places outside the reach of thedefendant should not be enough to prove such searches unconstitutional.When there is probable cause to search and it is impractical for one reasonor another to get a search warrant, then a warrantless search may bereasonable.

United States v. Robinson (1973)

Facts: Robinson is pulled over for an expired tag. He is arrested for operating

after revocation and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation. The officersconducted a custody search incident to arrest and found heroin.

Holding: Police may search a person incident to arrest regardless of the crimethat led to the arrest.

Reasoning: The search incident to arrest is not based on the probability in aparticular situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found. Thesearch is reasonable even if there is no reason to believe that the individualhas weapons. The court, therefore, rejected the claim that only a frisk forweapons was permissible when a person is arrest for a traffic violation.

Knowles v. Iowa (1998)

Facts: Knowles was stopped for speeding. The officer issued a citation and thenconducted a full search, and found marijuana.

Holding: The Fourth Amendment does not authorize an officer to conduct a fullsearch of a car incident to a citation.

Reasoning: For a search incidental to an arrest, there must actually be an arrest.The reasons are (1) to disarm suspect to take him into custody, and (2) topreserve evidence for trial. Neither is applicable if there is only a citation.Once issued the citation, all evidence necessary for that offense had beenobtained.

Searches Made in Hot Pursuit

Warden, MD Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967)

Facts: Armed robber entered business premises and stole money and ran. Cabdrivers followed the man and called police and told them that the manentered a residence. Police searched the premises and seized items relatedto the search.

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Holding: Neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor thesearch for him without warrant was invalid.

Reasoning: the defendant entered the residence less than 5 minutes beforepolice did. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay inthe course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or

the lives of others. Only a thorough search of the house could have insuredthat the defendant was the only occupant and that police had control of allweapons which could be used against them.

Payton v. New York(1980)

Facts: A New York statute authorized police to enter a private residence withouta warrant to make a routine felony arrest. Police had probable cause tobelieve that Payton had committed a murder. Without a warrant, policeentered his home to arrest him pursuant the statute. Payton was not home,but a gun was in plain view in the house and later used as evidence againsthim.

Holding: The Court holds that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police frommaking a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home to makea routine felony arrest.

Reasoning: It is the basic principal of the Fourth Amendment that warrantlesssearches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable.

Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold of a home may notreasonably be crossed without a warrant.

Whites Dissent: White does not believe the Fourth Amendment was intendedto outlaw the types of police conduct at issue in this case. I cannot join theCourt in declaring unreasonable a practice which has been thought entirelyreasonable by so many for so long. After knocking and announcing, police

may make a daytime arrest without a warrant when there is probable causethat the suspect committed a felony and is present in the house.

Plain View (this is a seizure doctrine, not a search doctrine)

Coolidge v. New Hampshire: Police may, without a warrant, seize evidencethat is in plain view, provided that:

The evidence is initially viewed from a lawfully gained vantage point (police wereallowed to be there by warrant, consent, or hot pursuit);

The incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent (this is aprobable cause standard); and

Arizona v. Hicks (1987) Police entered a home to execute a search warrant.They saw stereo equipment that they thought was stolen but they had noprobable cause to support this. They moved the stereo equipment to finda serial number and determine if the items were stolen. The Court heldthat moving the equipment constituted a search separate and apart fromthe search as part of warranted search. The plain view doctrine did notapply in this case. The officers needed probable cause for this search.

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The encounter of that particular evidence was inadvertent (this requirement isnot longer necessary since the Horton case below).

Horton v. California (1990)

Facts: Police executed a search warrant of defendants home to look for stolen

jewels. The police were also knew they might find a gun. The gun, however,was not included on the search warrant. They seized the gun which was lyingin plain sight. Defendant argued that, because the finding of the gun was notinadvertent, the seizure was invalid.

Holding: The court held that inadvertent discovery is not required.

Reasoning: Difficult standard to define. As long as the officers are lawfullylocated in a place from which the object can be plainly seen and the criminalnature of the evidence is immediately apparent, then the conditions aresatisfied for warrantless seizure.

Brennans Dissent: In eschewing the inadvertent discovery requirement, the

majority ignores the Fourth Amendments express command that a warrantdescribethe things to be seized.

Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) the plain touch doctrine

Facts: Defendant exited an apartment building with a history of cocainetrafficking. He spotted police officers and turned to walk in the oppositedirection. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop andproceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacketpocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it wascocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that thelump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Defendant argues that the seizure ofthe cocaine was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: The Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detectedthrough a police officer's sense of touch during a protective pat-down search.

Reasoning: There has been no invasion of a suspects privacy beyond thatalready authorized by the officers search for weapons; if the object iscontraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practicalconsiderations that inhere in the plain-view context.

The Automobile Exception

One of the most important exceptions to the warrant requirement is that carsand other movable vehicles can be searched without a warrant if there is

probable cause.

The Exception and its Rationale

Carroll v. United State (1925) one of the first articulations of the warrantrequirement; the SC stressed that a warrant was not needed to search a carbecause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction inwhich the warrant must be sought.

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California v. Carney(1985) this was a significant extension ofCarroll casebecause it involved a mobile home that was realistically no longer mobile.

Facts: Police had probable cause to search a mobile home for drugs. Withouta warrant, they entered the mobile home to conduct a search for the drugswhich they found.

Holding: The vehicle was so situated that an objective observer wouldconclude that it was being used as a vehicle and not a residence.

Therefore, the auto exception to the warrant requirement applies.

Reasoning: Although the case deals with a mobile home (where the utmostexpectation of privacy exists), the justifications for the auto exception arestill in place: (1) the vehicle is readily mobile; (2) there is a reducedexpectation of privacy (even if it can also be a home) due to the range ofpolice regulation for its use as a motor vehicle.

Searches of Containers in Autos

California v. Acevedo (1991)

Facts: Police have probable cause to believe that a container (brown paperbag) within defendants car contains drugs. The officers stopped the car,searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made amotion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had nothad a search warrant. Defendant cited a previous SC ruling (Chadwick)that stated that officers needed a warrant to search a closed containerwithin a car.

Holding: The "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's generalsearch-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation wherethe police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a

specific movable container within the car.

Searches of Autos Incident to Arrest

New York v. Belton (1981)

Holding: When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of theoccupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident ofthat arrest, search the passenger compartment (not the trunk or under thehood) of that automobile.

Reasoning: The rationale is that this search is for the officers safety and thepreservation of evidence; no probable cause is needed.

Thornton v. United States

Facts: Here, the defendant was a recent occupant of the vehicle but officerscontact with him originated from outside the vehicle.

Holding: A recent occupant may still be treated as an occupant for thepurposes of a search incident to an arrest.

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Reasoning: The proximity to the car, whether having just exited or about toenter, still provides for the circumstances necessary to protect officersafety and evidence. "Once an officer determines there is probable causeto make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safetyand to preserve evidence by searching the entire passengercompartment."

Arizona v. Gant(2009)

Facts: Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstandingwarrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffedGant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle,discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant askedthe judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because thesearch had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the FourthAmendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The

judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct resultof Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general FourthAmendment warrant requirement.

Issue: Is a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing thedefendant and securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment'sprotection against unreasonable searches and seizures?

Holding: Police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrestonly ifit is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access thevehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence ofthe offense of the arrest.

Reasoning: "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject onlyto a few, very narrow exceptions. Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for asuspended license and the narrow exceptions did not apply to his case.

Alitos Dissent: the majority improperly overruled its precedent in New Yorkv. Belton which held that "when a policeman has made a lawful arrest hemay, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passengercompartment of that automobile." The previous rule was workable,easier for judges and officers to apply.

Inventory Searches

Police may inventory property when (1) it is lawfully in the possession of thepolice and (2) established procedures are followed. This is an exceptionto both the probable cause and warrant requirements.

Three bases for this exception are: (1) the protection of the owners property; (2)the protection of the police against false claims; and (3) the protection ofpolice from potential danger.

Vehicle Inventory Search

South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 5 to 4 decision

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Facts: Opperman's car was found illegally parked on a street in Vermillion,South Dakota, in the early morning hours of December 10, 1973. Actingpursuant to police procedures, Opperman's car was impounded. Becausethere were sundry items scattered about in the passenger cabin, thepolice decided to inventory the contents of the car. During the inventory,police found some marijuana in the glove compartment.

Holding: Warrantless routine inventory searches of automobiles impoundedor otherwise in lawful police custody, pursuant to standard policeprocedures, are reasonable and not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: These procedures protect the owner's property from vandalism,protect the police from disputes about damage to the property, andprotect individual officers from unknown danger associated with vehiclestorage. And because inventory searches are not intended to discoverevidence of criminal activity (even though discovering such evidencemight incidentally result), the abuses against which the warrantrequirement is intended to protect did not arise in the case of inventorysearches.

Marshalls Dissent: A diminished expectation of privacy does not meanthere is no expectation of privacy at all. Although protecting valuablesinside an impounded car is important, searching each and everyimpounded car without the owner's consent exceeded the owner's privacyinterest.

Personal Inventory Search

Illinois v. Lafayette (1983)

Facts: Defendant is arrested for fighting. At the police station, his belongingsare inventoried and amphetamines are found in his bad.

Holding: Police may, as part of the procedure incident to incarcerating anarrested person, search any article in the persons possession, inaccordance with established inventory procedures.

Reasoning: The purposes for vehicle inventory above are applicable to apersonal inventory at a police station. In fact, the court felt that thegovernmental interests underlying a stationhouse search can be greaterthan those of search incident to an arrest.

Border Crossing and Checkpoints

The government has broad authority to conduct warrantless searches of

people, vehicles, and mail entering the border.

Inspection of Cars at the Border

United States v. Flores-Montano (2004)

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Facts: Defendant was crossing the border into the states when he wasstopped and his vehicle was searched. The agent tapped the gas tankwhich sounded solid. The gas tank was disassembled and marijuana wasfound. Defendant moved to suppress the marijuana finding on FourthAmendment grounds; he argued that the search that yielded themarijuana finding was intrusive and non-routine and therefore required

reasonable suspicion

Holding: The government had authority to inspect a vehicle's fuel tank at theborder without suspicion.

Reasoning: The court balanced the interests of the government to protectthe boarders and prevent illegal items entering the country versus theburden on the defendant. As the disassembly and reassembly of the tankinvolves a brief procedure, it is justified by the governments paramountinterest in protecting the border.

Inspection of Mail Entering the Country

United States v. Ramsey(1977)

Facts: Custom officials, with reasonable cause to suspect a violation ofcustoms laws, opened for inspection incoming international letter-classmail without first obtaining a warrant.

Holding: Officers can open international envelopes coming into this countrywithout a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion.

Reasoning: The court analogizes to the interests in protecting the border andfinds nothing the rationale which suggests that the mode of entry will becritical in the balance of protection versus reasonable search.

Border Searches of a Person

Though border searches of cars and mail require no basis of suspicion, moreintrusive searches (body cavity, detentions) require at least reasonablesuspicion.

United States v. Montoya-Hernandez(1985)

Facts: Defendant is detained at the airport. She had made several trips fromMiami to LA, she had a lot of cash, no hotel reservation, and no family inthe states. She was suspected of smuggling drugs in her colon so she washeld for several hours waiting for her to pass them. After 16 hours, theyfinally x-rayed her; they found 88 balloons in her colon.

Holding: Detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routinecustoms search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customagents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip,reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in heralimentary canal.

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Reasoning: the facts, and their rational inferences, known to the customsofficials clearly supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was analimentary canal smuggler. Again, using the balancing test, there arediminished expectations of privacy at the border, at least relative to thegovernments interest in stopping smugglers.

Brennans Dissent: Holding someone in indefinite, involuntary,incommunicado isolation without probable cause or a judicial warrantviolates the constitution regardless of suspected criminal activity.

Checkpoints

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz(1990)

Facts:The case involves a police checkpoint of all vehicles passing through inwhich drivers are briefly examined for signs of intoxication. Defendant wasnot stopped by the checkpoint but challenges its constitutionality.

Holding:The Court holds that a warrantless, suspicion-less checkpoint designed

to detect drunk driving is permissible.

Reasoning: Advancing a state interest in preventing drunk driving is outweighedby the brief stop of individual motorists. Everyone is stopped; procedurefollows established guidelines; and only if police have reasonable suspicion isanyone given secondary examination.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond(2000)

Facts: the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effortto interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct anopen-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office wouldwalk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five

minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

Holding: because the checkpoint program's primary purpose wasindistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpointsviolated the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized andever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that anygiven motorist has committed some crime."

Rehnquists Dissent: the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended onwhether they served a "significant state interest with minimal intrusion onmotorists."

Consent

A search is permissible without a warrant or probable cause if undertakenpursuant to valid consent

What constitutes valid consent?

Consent must be voluntary/not coerced by police

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Who has authority to authorize consent?

US v. Matlock: One resident may validly consent to a search of a sharedresidence if the other is not present.

Georgia v. Randolph: If one resident refuses to consent, that refusal is

dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of the other occupant.

What is the scope of a consensual search?

Defined by the consent itself;

Scope limited by the consenter.

What would a reasonable person have understood from the exchange?

Example: If consent to search for drugs, reasonable to expect officer tosearch anywhere drugs may be present.

Subject of search may limit search to certain areas, to a fixed duration, or mayend search at any time (unless police have found probable cause to continuesearch).

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973)

Facts: Officer stopped vehicle for burnt headlight. Officer asked if he couldsearch the car, to which driver said sure, go ahead. Officer then found threestolen checks.

Issue: What must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that consent wasvoluntarily given?

Holding: The question of whether consent to a search was voluntary and not theresult of duress or coercion is a question of fact to be determined from thetotality of the circumstances.

Reasoning: Account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well aspossible vulnerability of person who consents. Proof of knowledge of a rightto refuse consent is not a prerequisite in demonstrating voluntary consent.

What constitutes coercion?

Example:Threats, show/application of force

Arizona v. Fulminante: Positive inducements can be regarded as coercion (will

give X if you consent).

Bumpers v. North Carolina: False assertions of authority by police render consentinvoluntary.

Proper assertions of authority are permitted (i.e. Can we search your house? Ifnot, we will go get a warrant; must have probable cause to get that warrant).

Georgia v. Randolph (2006)

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Facts: Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine inhis home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, butRandolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at thetime of the search, however, and objected to the police request. He arguedthat the search was unconstitutional because of his objection to the search,while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient.

Holding: when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search whilethe other refuses, the search is not constitutional.

Reasoning: Compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casualinteraction. Souter wrote, "it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door ofshared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation wasa sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying,'stay out.' Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go insideunder those conditions." A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote,would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the FourthAmendment.

Searches of Those on Probation and Parole

The SC has often upheld warrantless and suspicion-less searches of those onprobation or parole. Many times the person has consented to suchsearches as a condition for their release. Regardless, the court hasemphasized the diminished expectation of privacy for those individualsand governments interest in preventing recidivism.

United States v. Knights (2001) probation case

Facts: Defendants probation order included the following condition: that Knightswould "submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, and personaleffects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant ofarrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcementofficer."

Holding: The warrantless search of Knights, which was supported by reasonablesuspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable withinthe meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Samson v. California (2006) parole case

Facts: A police officer stopped and searched Samson on the street in San Bruno,California. The officer had no warrant and later admitted he had stoppedSamson only because he knew him to be on parole. The officer found thatSamson was in possession of methamphetamines. Samson was arrested andcharged with drug possession in state court. At trial Samson argued the drugswere inadmissible as evidence, because the search had violated his FourthAmendment rights.

Holding: The search is valid; Samson "did not have an expectation of privacythat society would recognize as legitimate."

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Reasoning: An inmate who chooses to complete his sentence outside of directphysical custody, however, remains in the Department of Correction's legalcustody until the conclusion of his sentence, and therefore has significantlyreduced privacy rights. In this case, Samson had also been required, as acondition of his parole, to sign an agreement that he would be "subject tosearch or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer..., with or without a

search warrant and with or without cause." This written consent tosuspicionless searches, along with his already reduced privacy interests as aparolee, combined to make the search constitutional.

Special Needs Searches

These searches generally involve searches for reasons other than criminallaw enforcement.

Administrative Searches

Camara v. San Francisco (1967) administrative search of homes

An inspector of any type, unless responding to an emergency situation or afterobtaining consent, needs a warrant in order to enter someones home todo an inspection.

However, you do not need individualized suspicion or probable cause to obtainthat warrant. You must merely show that the regulations require theinspection regardless of whether or not you believe the house is inviolation.

New York v. Burger(1987) administrative search of business

Facts: In this case, there is an inspection of an auto junkyard.

Holding: Although there is an expectation of privacy on commercialproperty, that expectation is particularly attenuated when the businessparticipates in a closely regulated industry.

Reasoning: A warrantless search of this type of property is reasonable when:(1) there is a substantial government interest; (2) the inspection isnecessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the inspectionprogram (statute) must provide a constitutionally adequate substitutionfor a warrant (i.e., knowledge of the search, discretion of the inspectors).

The statute must act as a substitute for a warrant by limiting the timing,scope, and place of the search.

Drug Testing

Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton (1995)

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Facts: An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletesin the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. Schoolofficials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-relatedinjury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted theStudent Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drugtesting of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied

participation in his school's football program when he and his parentsrefused to consent to the testing.

Holding: Random drug testing of high school athletes does not violate thereasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing theintrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against thepromotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of highschool athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, theyare subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interestscompromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions ofcollection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only

by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over thesafety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any,intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.

OConners Dissent: the Court's decision did not rest on the requirement ofindividualized suspicion and did not adequately explain why individualizedsuspicion was not required in this context. Historically, the Court haddisapproved of blanket searches, particularly in the criminal context,where the search was more than minimally intrusive. More recently, theCourt had limited its willingness to dispense with the individualizedsuspicion requirement only in particularly dangerous contexts, such asprisons.

Pottawatomie County v. Earls (2002) 5 to 4 decision

Facts: School drug testing policy of students who engage in anyextracurricular activities. This is beyond the policy stated in Vernoniawhich only did drug testing of athletes.

Holding: Mandatory drug testing of students in extracurricular activities isconstitutional.

Reasoning: While schoolchildren do not shed their constitutional rights whenthey enter the schoolhouse, Fourth Amendment rights are different inpublic schools than elsewhere; the "reasonableness" inquiry cannotdisregard the schools custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.

In particular, a finding of individualized suspicion may not be necessarywhen a school conducts drug testing.

Although the safety interest is not as great when we are just taking aboutstudent athletes, the need to prevent and deter the substantial harmof childhood drug use provides the necessary immediacy for schooltesting policy.

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Ginsburgs Dissent:The particular drug testing program upheld in this caseis no reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse. Petitioners policy targetsfor testing a student population least likely to be at risk from illicit drugsand their damaging effects. This case is too distinguishable from Vernoniato rely on it (e.g., in that case, there was already a drug problem amongstudent athletes; here, no such problem exists).

Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001)

Facts: Pregnant patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine.They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory thatwarrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminalinvestigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches.

Holding: the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if thepatient has not consented to the procedure.

Reasoning: The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deterpregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the

general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if notauthorized by a valid warrant.

Schools Search of a Students Possessions and Person

New Jersey v. TLO (1983) The SC held that students possession may besearched in schools if there is reasonable suspicion that they have evidence ofillegal activity.

Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009)

Facts: A student is strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip byanother student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in

violation of school policy. Student argues that her Fourth Amendmentright to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated.

Holding: In this case, the students Fourth Amendment rights were violatedwhen school officials searched her underwear for non-prescriptionpainkillers.

Reasoning: Based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used byschool officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to theobjectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the ageand sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, schoolofficials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the searchof Savanna to her underwear.

Exigent Circumstances

In an emergency, the police can search without a warrant if there is probablecause. When the officer has probable cause to believe a crime hasoccurred, exigent circumstances may include:

Preventing destruction of evidence of a serious crime;

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Case law in this circumstance favors the entering officer when the crimecommitted is a felony; however, the courts are less likely to allow awarrantless entry when the crime is a misdemeanor.

Preventing escape of a fleeing felon;

Preventing harm to someone.

Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984)

Facts: A DUI suspect had wrecked his car, walked home and went to bed.Officers entered without a warrant and arrested him. Police claim that entrywas justified as hot pursuit.

Holding: Warrantless entry in this case was unreasonable and unconstitutional.

Reasoning: An important factor to be considered when determining whether anyexigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest isbeing made. The court rejected the claim of hot pursuit because there was no

immediate or continuous pursuit of the defendant. Because the suspect hadalready arrived home, there was little remaining threat to public safety.

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart

Facts: Police responded to a noise complaint at a party. Upon arrival, the policeobserved a fight through the screen door of the home. Police entered to stopthe fight.

Holding: Law enforcement may enter a home without a warrant to renderemergency assistance to an injured occupant, or to protect an occupant froman imminent injury.

SEIZURESAND ARRESTS

Is a Warrant Needed for Arrests?

Although the Court has expressed a preference for warrants, it also has beenclear that a warrant is not required for an arrest so long as there isprobable cause.

United States v. Watson (1976)

Facts: an informant told a postal inspector that the defendant had stolen creditcards. The inspector told the informant to hold a meeting with the defendant

and if the defendant had stolen credit cards with him, the informant wassupposed to give a signal to the inspector. The meeting took place in arestaurant and the informant gave the signal and the defendant was arrested.Inspector found no credit cards with the defendant but upon the consent ofthe defendant, the inspector searched the car and found 2 stolen credit cardsand the defendant was convicted. Defendant claims that the warrantlessarrest was unlawful and thus the search was unlawful.

Holding: Watsons arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

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Reasoning: A peace officer can arrest a person without a warrant for felony ormisdemeanor when it takes place in his presence; he can arrest a felon whenhe has reasonable grounds to believe that the felony took place.

When is a Person Seized?

When a show of authority has occurred, and a person yields to suchauthority, a seizure has occurred.

United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 5 to 4 decision

Facts: Defendant is stopped at the airport because she fit the "drug currier"profile. Officers asked for her ID and asked her some questions and thenasked her to move to their office. They obtained consent to a strip searchwhich revealed that the defendant was carrying heroine. Defendant claimsthat the search and seizure were unconstitutional.

Rule: A person is seized if a reasonable person under the circumstances wouldbelieve that he or she was not free to leave.

Holding: No seizure occurred prior to defendants consent to the searchtherefore no Fourth Amendment right has been violated.

Reasoning: Examples of circumstances which a reasonable person might feelthey are NOT free to leave include: threatening presence of multiple officers,display of weapon, physical touching, or use of language or tone of voice. Thecourt found that under the circumstance a reasonable person would believethat they were free to leave and therefore the seizure was not illegal.

Other use of the Mendenhall definition of seizure.

Florida v. Bostick(1991) The Court considered whether there was a seizure

when police boarded a bus and asked passengers permission to search theirluggage. The Court here adjusted the test to ask not only whether areasonable person thought they were free to leave, but whether a personwould feel free to decline the officers request or terminate the encounter.

United States v. Drayton (2002) Another bus boarding case; the Courtreaffirmed the test laid out in Bostick.

Brendlin v. California (2007) The court expressly applied Mendenhall andconcluded that passengers (not just the driver) are seized when they areriding in a car stopped by police officers. The effect of this ruling is thatpassengers can invoke the exclusionary rule by arguing that the police actedillegally.

California v. Hodari D. (1991)

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Facts: Officers saw suspicious youths around a car and when the youths saw theofficers' car approaching they ran away. The officers gave chase. Defendantdid not see the officer behind him until the officer was almost upon him.Defendant threw what appeared to be a rock, and later turned out to be crackcocaine, to the ground. The officer tackled and handcuffed defendant.Defendant argues that he had been "seized" when he saw the officer running

towards him, that this seizure was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.Because the cocaine was discovered as a result of the illegal seizure, it shouldbe excluded.

Holding: Although there was a show of authority, since defendant did not complywith that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.

Reasoning: The word "seizure" readily bears the meaning of lying on of hands orapplication of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimatelyunsuccessful. It does not remotely apply to a police officer telling a fleeingsubject to "stop in the name of the law." That is not a seizure. An arrestrequires physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion ofauthority.

For What Crimes May a Person be Arrested?

Progression of Precedent

Watson felony arrest can be made without probable cause and no warrant.

Atwater misdemeanor arrest can be made when crime is carried out in thepresence of the officer.

Moore the Fourth Amendment determines when a person may be arrested, notstate law.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 5 to 4 decision; dissent is important

Facts: Defendant was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater'schildren, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts (amisdemeanor in TX). Lago Vista policeman observed the violations and pulleddefendant over. Defendant was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released onbond. Defendant then filed suit alleging that officer's actions had violated herFourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

Holding: The Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-lawrestrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, does not limit a policeofficer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses.

Reasoning: "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual hascommitted even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.

OConners Dissent: the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment'sexpress command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks thepointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle ofreasonableness."

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Virginia v. Moore (2008)

Facts: Virginia police stopped Moore after receiving a radio call alerting themthat he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedurefor punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear incourt. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. They searched his person

and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged withpossession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtainedincident to an arrest when the arrest violates a provision of state law? No.

Holding: The Court held unanimously that the search did not violate Moore'sconstitutional rights.

Reasoning: the existence of probable cause gives an arresting officer the rightto perform a reasonable search of the accused to ensure the officer's safetyand to safeguard evidence.

STOPAND FRISK

Generally

To approach a person and ask them questions, an officer does NOT needreasonable suspicion.

An officer may make an investigatory stop when the officer has reasonablesuspicion to believe that the person is involved in criminal activity.

If the person is stopped, there can be a frisk but ONLY if there is reasonablesuspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity AND there is a

belief that he is armed and dangerous.

For an arrest there must be probable cause that the person has committed acrime.

The Authority for Police to Stop and Frisk

Terry v. Ohio (1968) development of the Terry Stop

Facts:Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in

what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stoppedand frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry wasconvicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.

Terry argues that the stop and search were a violation of his FourthAmendment rights.

Holding: the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the FourthAmendment; the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against

Terry.

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Reasoning: the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonablyprudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed andthus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating hissuspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken werelimited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to theinvestigation.

The Distinction Between Stops and Arrests

Dunaway v. New York(1979) an arrest has occurred if police officers take asuspect to the station house for questioning. Detention intrudes soseverely on interests as necessary to trigger traditional safeguardsagainst illegal arrest.

Florida v. Royer(1983) taking a suspect from a public area of an airport intoa small room constituted an arrest.

Hayes v. Florida (1985) the court held that taking a suspect to the police

station house for fingerprinting was an arrest and had to be based uponprobable cause.

United States v. Place (1983) detaining a person's luggage for 90 minuteswas a seizure.

United States v. Sharpe (1985) detainment of a suspect for 30-40 minuteswhile waiting for the DEA is ruled a stop, not an arrest.

What May Police Do When They Stop an Individual?

Terry v. Ohio police may frisk an individual if there is reasonable suspicion

that he has a weapon.

Michigan v. Long (1983) if the police reasonably believe that the person isdangerous, they can conduct a limited investigation of an area from whicha person could obtain a weapon (e.g., a glove compartment).

Michigan v. Buie (1990) police may conduct a protective sweep if theyhave reasonable suspicion that a person might be there who poses athreat to them. Such a sweep may only extend to a cursory inspection ofthose places where a person may be found.

Hiibel v. Nevada (2004) 5 to 4 decision

Facts: Defendant was arrested and convicted in Nevada state court for failing toidentify himself (as required by state law) to a police officer who wasinvestigating an assault. Hiibel challenged the conviction, claiming it violatedhis Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

Holding: The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

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Reasoning: The search was based on reasonable suspicion (the police officerwas investigating the assault, and Hiibel was nearby) and involved only aminimally intrusive question (his name). A state may compel the defendant todisclose his/her identity; this is consistent with investigative purposes of the

Terry stop.

What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion?

RS for Stopping Cars

United States v. Arvizu (2002)

Facts: Defendant was stopped by border patrol. A search of his car turned up100 pounds of marijuana. Officers had observed many facts, which bythemselves are not evidence of a crime, but taken together, createdreasonable suspicion to stop the car. The factors included: (1) driverslowed down; (2) driver failed to acknowledge officer; (3) children hadraised knees; (4) children were waving; (5) the road is used by smugglers;(6) the defendant was using the road during a shift change; and (7)

defendant was driving a minivan.

Holding: the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant wasengaged in illegal activity, having considered the totality of thecircumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn bythe law enforcement officer.

Reasoning: Although each factor alone could have appeared innocent, whentaken together they sufficed for the officer to form aparticularized andobjective basis for stopping the vehicle. This is less than a hunch, whichwould only allow an officer to approach someone but not to stop or friskthem.

RS Based on Informant Tips

Alabama v. White (1990)

Facts: An anonymous tip told police that White would be leaving hisapartment at specific time in specific car and will be driving to a hotel.

There has been no self-verifying detail that only an insider would have thisinformation. Detail is sparser and less culpable that Illinois v. Gates.However, after tip has been corroborated, police stop White and findmarijuana and cocaine.

Holding: If police can corroborate/verify the accuracy of some of the detailsof an anonymous tip, that tip can provide reasonable suspicion.

Reasoning:The Court first stated that an informant's veracity, reliability andbasis of knowledge are highly relevant in the reasonable suspicioncontext. However, the facts of this case involve more than just a tip itself;it involves the cops' independent investigation to confirm the tipster'sclaims. With respect to reasonable suspicion, not only the quantity ofinformation may be less, but the quality or reliability may be less thannecessary to establish probable cause.

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Florida v. JL (2000)

Facts: Police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaidshirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. Officers who respondedfound a black male wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officersdid find a firearm. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing

that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the FourthAmendment.

Holding:The Court concluded that the anonymous tip did not meet theminimum requirements to perform a warrantless search.

Reasoning: An anonymous tip must possess a moderate level of reliability,including "predictive information" that offers police a "means to test theinformant's knowledge or credibility. An accurate description of a personwithout a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime inquestion, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet thisstandard. "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report ofan unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew

about the gun nor supplied any basis for believe he had insideinformation.

RS Based on a Persons Trying to Avoid Police Officer

Unprovoked flight from officers is not enough to gain reasonable suspicion to stopthat person. However, unprovoked flight in a high crime area is enough tofind reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry stop; reasonable suspicion is alsocreated to do a frisk for weapons.

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 5 to 4 decision

Facts: Defendant inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy

narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. Whenofficers caught up with him they conducted a protective pat-down searchfor weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in thevicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow afterdiscovering that he was carrying handgun. The Illinois Appellate Courtfound that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

Holding: In this case, a person's sudden and unprovoked flight fromidentifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, is sufficientlysuspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person.

Reasoning: The officer was justified in suspecting that the accused wasinvolved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further.

Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonablesuspicion" to justify a stop. "Flight is the consummate act of evasion."

Stevens Dissent: The dissenters concurred with the majoritys decision notto create a per se rule about flight and its effect on reasonable suspicion.

The dissenters did not agree that in the totality of the circumstances, inthis case, the officer had sufficiently obtained reasonable suspicion to stopthe defendant.

RS Based on Profiles

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United States v. Sokolow (1989)

Facts: DEA agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after hisbehavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash forairline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his originaldestination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he

checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched hisluggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtainedwarrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063grams of cocaine.

Holding: The search did not violate defendants rights under the FourthAmendment.

Reasoning: the agents had a "reasonable suspicion that respondent wasengaged in wrongdoing." The validity of such a stop should be based onthe "totality of the circumstances," which, in this case, gave agents a clearreason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking.

The Exclusionary Rule

ISTHE EXCLUSIONARY RULEA DESIRABLE REMEDYFOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICEBEHAVIOR?

Costs/Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule

Benefits: deterrence of police misconduct; judicial integrity.

Costs: guilt go free; juries not being able to see all the evidence.

Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 5 to 4 decision

Facts: Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state courtafter police found cocaine and a gun in his home. The police had a searchwarrant, but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment "knock and announce"rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knockingand announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial

judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not beused.

Holding: the general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of theFourth Amendment does not apply to the "knock-and-announce" rule.

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Reasoning: Scalias opinion look like arguments against the exclusionaryrule all together. The interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police"have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence." The knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, andimpositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search forwhich they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social

costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce ruleoutweighed any possible "deterrence benefits," and that alternativemeasures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequatelydeter violations.

Breyers Dissent: the Court has a long history of upholding the exclusionaryrule; the majority's cited precedents do not support its conclusion. Thedissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could bedeterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.

THE ORIGINSOFTHE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Weeks v. United States (1914)

Facts: Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and

ACJ Outline (Spring 2010)

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