Aceh rpt ICWA conf

Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Agreement

was Possible in August 2005

Michael MorfitAugust 2006

Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Agreement

was Possible in August 2005

Prepared for the international conference on ‘Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One Year After the Helsinki Accord’ sponsored by the Indonesian Council for World Affairs (ICWA) in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 14 August, 2006.

Michael MorfitAugust 2006

Staying on the road to Helsinki

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Table of ContentsAcknowledgements 5

List of Acronyms 6

Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Agreement was Possible in August 2005 7

1. The Core Question 72. Conventional Wisdom 83. Through the Looking Glass: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Risks 10

A Surprising Asymmetry 10The Pursuing and the Pursued 10Greater Challenges for the Government than GAM 12Higher Risks 14Potential Personal and Institutional Benefits 14

4. Key Success Factors 166. Looking to the Future: Crossing Arcs 24

For the National Government: A Stepping Stoneto Improved Governance? 24For GAM: New Challenges to Coherence, Focus and Discipline 25

A Note on Methodology and Information Sources 26

Bibliography 28

Endnotes 30

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AcknowledgementsResearch for this analysis was assisted by the Office of the President, Republic of Indonesia. I am very appreciative of the support and assistance I received from Dr. Dino Patti Djalal (Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Office of the President) and his assistant, Tri Sukma Djandam, in helping to arrange appointments with many of the key actors on the government side. They were very gracious in responding to my agenda and requests, and then standing aside to allow me to conduct this research with complete freedom and independence.

All the individuals interviewed were generous with their time, very open to my project and patient in responding to my questions. Each participated in the Helsinki process in a different way, making their own contribution and bringing their own perspective. Inevitably, each has a partial view. Together, however, they share a remarkably consistent picture of how the negotiations unfolded. I am grateful for their willingness to help me pull the pieces together into what I hope is a coherent analysis.

Earlier conceptual frameworks and versions of this paper were reviewed and vigorously critiqued by a number of international experts. I am thankful for their openness and willingness to share their insights, perspectives and assessments with me. These include Sidney Jones (International Crisis Group), Kristen Schulze (London School of Economics) and Edward Aspinall (Australian National University). I am particularly grateful to Marcus Mietzner for his unrelenting quest for more complete, coherent, comprehensive and compelling analyses that drove me to review, reconsider and revise several earlier drafts of this paper.

Finally, I owe a great debt to my wife, Christine Morfit, who not only tolerated frequent absences to allow me to complete interviews and research, but also provided thoughtful comments and careful reviews of each draft.

The views expressed, however, are entirely my own, and any errors of fact or analysis are my sole responsibility. Drafts of this analysis have not been reviewed or approved by any external agency, and the views expressed do not necessarily represent the views or positions of any government official or agency, academic institution or expert.


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List of AcronymsAMM Aceh Monitoring Mission

CMI Crisis Management Initiative

CoHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement

DPR Dewan Perwakila Rakyat People’s Representative Council, Indonesia’s national parliament

GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Free Aceh Movement

HDC Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (formerly the Henry Dunant Centre)

MOU Memorandum of Understanding (August 15, 2005 between the Government of Indonesia and GAM)

NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia

SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Military

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Staying on the Road to Helsinki:Why the Aceh Agreement was Possible in August 2005

1. The Core Question On 15 August, 2005, representatives of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and Government of Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki that signaled the end of nearly thirty years of armed conflict in the resource-rich and historically unique province at the northern tip of Sumatra. Amidst the celebrations and congratulations, there was still an undercurrent of skepticism or even anxiety. Reaching agreement was remarkable, but would it hold?

After all, this was not the first such effort to resolve a long-simmering and costly conflict. The previous three decades had seen a pattern of armed conflict alternating with abortive efforts to find a negotiated settlement. GAM’s tenacious armed insurgency and the national government’s increasingly intensive military operations were punctuated by periodic efforts to reach a negotiated agreement, but nothing had yielded a sustainable peace. The result was a seemingly intractable cycle of violence, with gradually deteriorating security, law and order, increasing uncertainty and disruption, and the emergence of criminal extortion and human rights abuses. With each failed peace effort and return to violence, it seemed as if the gap of suspicion, hostility and mutual recrimination grew wider, with the vision of a peaceful and prosperous province (or independent state) constantly receding.

Yet, despite the frustrations and disappointments of previous efforts, the negotiations in Helsinki reached agreement – a significant achievement in itself. A year later Helsinki seems to have achieved something even more remarkable: a negotiated peace settlement that is taking hold, launching a new era in Aceh’s political life. How did this happen? Given the great distrust that followed the collapse of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in May 2003, how was it possible for each side even to start down the road to Helsinki? And once on that road, what were the forces that kept them on it? Why was it possible for the opposing parties to reach agreement in a relatively short space of time (five rounds of negotiations over seven months)? And what does this achievement tells about prospects for the future – both in Aceh itself and in Indonesia as a whole?

There have already been some excellent descriptions of the events leading up to the Helsinki negotiations, and step-by-step narratives of the negotiations themselves as they unfolded over the January-August period.1 In addition, recent publications have given more in-depth and personal perspectives drawing on the accounts of those participating in the negotiations.2


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This analysis builds on these earlier efforts. But it departs from them in one important respect. Whereas previous works largely discuss what happened, this analysis tries to illuminate why and how it happened. It is not a chronology or a history, but an effort to get inside the minds of those who labored to reach agreement in Helsinki and worked to keep the peace process on track afterwards. Drawing largely on direct personal interviews with key participants from all sides, including GAM, government, mediators and advisors, this paper tries to illuminate the objectives, strategies risks and benefits as these were understood by each side; how these evolved in response to the Helsinki dialogue; and how they were shaped by external forces and events.3

This paper gives particular attention to the internal dynamics and perspective of the national government in Jakarta, with less emphasis on GAM. There are several reasons for this. First, the issues, options and actions of the Jakarta government were far more transparent and readily accessible. The key actors were part of an increasingly vigorous democratic system and their policies and decisions could not escape public debate. In the period leading up to Helsinki and during the negotiations themselves, the government’s position was subjected to the scrutiny of the press, parliamentary oversight and commentary, and analysis by foreign observers and academics. Issues were openly debate and options actively discussed.

In contrast, GAM was not an established national government but a political movement that included an armed insurgency. Not surprisingly, its internal processes and deliberations were far from transparent, accessible or participatory. The physical survival of the GAM leadership and their movement depended on GAM’s internal discipline and unity, and their experience demonstrated the necessity of moving with extreme caution with regard to any external actors. Even today, it is still not easy to penetrate the world of the GAM leadership, understand their issues and trace their internal debates. The discipline that helped hold GAM together through nearly three decades of armed struggle is still largely intact and the leadership tends to close ranks around agreed positions, rather than talk about differences and choices.

More importantly, however, this paper argues that in many ways the national government in Jakarta faced bigger challenges and a more complex environment than GAM. Their path to Helsinki was significantly harder, and the consequences of missteps or failures greater. This is the aspect of the Helsinki process that has not yet been fully explored, yet it is essential if we are trying to understand how it was possible to reach agreement.

In addition, the way in which the government responded to these challenges has important implications for Indonesia’s future political system. A narrowly focused study that only examines Aceh, and not the wider political context, tends to miss or obscure these wider implications and to overlook the extent to which the Helsinki MOU is a key milestone in the nation’s democratic development..

2. Conventional Wisdom Several different explanations constitute the prevailing conventional wisdom about the reasons for the success of the Helsinki negotiations. While not mutually exclusive, they are

�


distinct and focus on different aspects of the negotiation process and emphasize different forces at play. The first might be called the ‘tsunami factor’. Here the argument is that everything in Aceh changed fundamentally as a result of the tsunami on December 26, 2004, forcing both sides to reconsider their positions and take advantage of significant international assistance to respond to a devastating crisis. This is why negotiations began in January 2005, after the tsunami hit Aceh and profoundly altered not only the physical and human environment, but also the political environment.4

A second explanation often mentioned might be called the ‘TNI factor’. There is broad agreement that the military operations launched by the TNI when the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) collapsed in May 2003 had a significant impact on the political presence, systems of financing and military capacities of GAM. Some argue that GAM was essentially a broken force militarily. Its ability to sustain the armed conflict was severely, even mortally weakened, and as a result it had no choice but to seek a negotiated settlement.5 A third conventional explanation is the ‘Kalla factor’. Vice President Jusuf Kalla, with his energetic and entrepreneurial style, was actively involved in Aceh issues long before the formal Helsinki process was launched, and was prominent throughout the negotiations. His investment of time, energy and political capital was both very unusual and highly visible, and is often cited as a key factor in reaching agreement. 6

These conventional explanations are not completely wrong, but neither are they entirely satisfactory. A closer examination of the evidence suggests that they are pieces of the puzzle, but are incomplete and even misleading. The first clue that they are only part of the story emerges from a careful review of the chronology of events leading up to the first round of negotiations in January 2005. Key sources interviewed for this study agree that by mid-December 2004, concrete plans were already well underway to convene the first round of negotiations in Helsinki in January 2005. Formal invitations had been issued to both the Government of Indonesia and GAM by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in Helsinki on December 23, 2004 – three days before the tsunami disaster unexpectedly hit Aceh.7 This fact alone is enough to call into question the ‘tsunami factor’ as the key reason for success in the negotiations.

The formal invitations were themselves the culmination of continuous efforts to establish a foundation for direct negotiations that stretched back for at least eighteen months to June 2003. Interviews with key participants illuminate the extent to which this earlier period was critical to what was later achieved in Helsinki. These earlier efforts laid the foundation for the Helsinki talks, but they were largely managed separately from the TNI military operations (although these clearly had an impact). In addition, while Kalla was a key figure in this preparations, he was not acting in isolation but enjoyed critical support from SBY.

In short, the road to Helsinki started long before December 2004. To understand how it was possible to reach agreement in Aceh, we need to understand at this earlier period. What was going on before formal negotiations got underway? Who was involved? What were they trying


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to accomplish? Most importantly, what do these preparations tell us about the dynamics of the negotiations once they did get underway in Helsinki? What do they reveal about how each side managed their own complicated web of constituencies and forces? The further these questions are explored, the more it becomes clear that the conventional explanations fail to capture the complexity and richness of the various political, military, institutional and personal forces at play on the road to Helsinki.

3. Through the Looking Glass: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Risks

A Surprising AsymmetryIn assessing the positions and capacities of the two negotiating parties at the end of 2004, the initial impression is one of a clear asymmetry between the national government and GAM; of a highly unequal contest between a large and powerful state enjoying broad international support, and a tough but severely weakened and struggling armed insurgency under increasing military pressure. GAM’s political presence and military capabilities had been severely degraded as a result of the military operations during the martial law and civil emergency period.8 GAM was also unable to mobilize significant international opposition to the government’s military operations following the collapse of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) and the imposition of martial law in May 2003. As a result, during 2003-2004, GAM appeared increasingly isolated and vulnerable. Several external observers and direct participants have characterized the GAM leadership as unsophisticated and even inept in the lead-up to the Helsinki negotiations.�

This initial impression of a strong national government facing a weakened insurgency appears to support the conventional wisdom about the success of the Helsinki negotiations. The argument would be that Indonesian national military (TNI) operations were so successful that GAM’s military capacity had been severely degraded and its political presence greatly reduced. 10 This was certainly the perception of Sofyan Djalil, one of the key government negotiating team members, who argues that ‘militarily GAM was defeated. They had been reduced to the point of military insignificance.’11 The tsunami then gave GAM a face-saving reason to accept the realities of military defeat, relinquishing its claims for independence and accepting special autonomy. The energy, flexibility and skill of Jusuf Kalla and his hand-picked team then allowed the government to exploit their clear advantage and push negotiations to a successful conclusion.

A closer examination of the eighteen months preceding the invitation to Helsinki, however, suggests that this is a misleading assessment of the positions of the two sides. Looking at this earlier period, a far different, more complicated and more intriguing picture emerges. That picture is exactly the reverse of the initial impression regarding the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks of the two parties. As is discussed in the following sections, the evidence suggests that in many respects, GAM was in a stronger position than the government, with a more manageable range of vulnerabilities and fewer risks than the national government in Jakarta.

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The Pursuing and the Pursued One indication of this surprising asymmetry is the extent to which both President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) and Vice President Jusuf Kalla invested their personal time, energy and political capital in developing, nurturing, and pursuing the idea of a negotiated settlement, far in advance of the start of formal talks in January 2005 . While military operations were being pursued under martial law and the civil emergency (2003-2004), SBY and Kalla were at the heart of a parallel stream of maneuvering, trial and error, informal discussions and preparation – virtually all of which were initiated by the Jakarta government. 12

Kalla was at the forefront of most of these efforts. Very shortly after the collapse of CoHA and the imposition of martial law in May 2003, Kalla took the initiative to propose to then-President Megawati that he continue to seek ways of re-engaging GAM in a dialogue. While Megawati did not oppose this initiative, neither did she enthusiastically embrace it or make it part of a coherent overall government strategy. Instead, Megawati appears to have been content to let Kalla proceed at his own pace, while at the same time giving more or less free rein to the TNI to pursue military operations. Kalla was given no written instructions or authorization, and the scope of his authority appears to have been vague. To protect his efforts, he made sure that both SBY (then Coordinating Minister for Security and Politics) and Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (then TNI Commander-in-Chief ) were present when his proposal was discussed with Megawati. Only when he knew he had their support for his efforts – effectively covering his flank with the TNI -- did he proceed.13

With this ill-defined mandate, Kalla turned to his trusted assistant, Farid Husain, charging him to find a way to talk to the GAM leadership. Over the next eighteen months, Husain (and sometimes Kalla personally) pursued opportunities to re-establish a dialogue with GAM. There were several dead-ends and false starts, as the energetic and personable Husain tried to make contact wherever he could. These ranged from Farid’s traveling to Aceh to seek out the extended family of Malik Mahmud (the effective GAM leader living in exile in Sweden), to both Farid and Kalla meeting with various GAM leaders in Batam.14 By his own account, Farid was driven more by instinct than strategy, and simply set out to explore every avenue he could find. 15

Re-establishing a dialogue, however, was clearly not an easy sell, even for the irrepressible Farid Husain or energetic Jusuf Kalla. After all, there was every reason for GAM to believe that the real strategy of the government was pursuit of complete military victory, not resurrecting peace negotiations. In the eyes of the GAM leadership, the government had to meet a significant burden of proof before any negotiations could be taken seriously. Although Malik Mahmud has acknowledged that ‘the existing strategies applied by both parties had caused a costly stalemate,’ GAM was not actively seeking negotiations, despite the damage inflicted by the TNI.16 Even after the Helsinki talks got underway, GAM leaders were skeptical about the government’s commitment and intentions. According to one of the GAM negotiating team, Nur Djuli, ‘at this point, we were not that serious. We were just being polite, but we did not have any expectations that new talks would have any success and we were not really committed to the process.’17


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This is not to suggest that GAM was completely indifferent to the idea of re-establishing a dialogue with Jakarta. (According to one of GAM’s international advisors, in 2003 the GAM leadership had discussions with the Norwegian government about serving as a third-party mediator.18) Nonetheless, the picture that emerges is one of surprising asymmetry. Both in and out of government, Kalla and SBY were in one way or another pursuing GAM, trying to establish contact, open communications, establish their credibility and create a basis for negotiations. In contrast to the intensity of the engagement of the two most senior Indonesian leaders, GAM was distant, cautious and skeptical. They had to be pursued and persuaded to go down the road to Helsinki.

Greater Challenges for the Government than GAMThe close attention that SBY and Kalla gave to pursuing GAM is perhaps not surprising when we understand that it was the government in Jakarta – not GAM – that faced the greatest challenges, incurred the greatest risks and had to go the furthest distance in order to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. This is why negotiating with GAM was not a simple or routine task that could be easily delegated. It was highly sensitive responsibility, and success was far from assured. It is not surprising, therefore, that it commanded such high level attention.

How is this possible – or even plausible? How can it be argued that that the national government in Jakarta faced greater challenges and more significant risks than GAM, notwithstanding its superior resources, international support, and military position? The starting point is the recognition that any successful negotiation requires credible partners. Each party has to believe that if agreement is reached, the other side will be able to deliver what it has promised. Even robust monitoring mechanisms presume that each side will be capable of fulfilling its obligations. Regardless of the specific issues and details, no negotiation can succeed or endure if one or both of the parties is unwilling, uncertain or incapable of meeting its agreed obligations.

This basic requirement is precisely where GAM was in a stronger position than the government in Jakarta. GAM faced a host of adverse factors, including the pressures of the TNI and disruption of GAM political and military structures in Aceh and the resulting shrinking of its revenues, the extraordinary logistical challenges in holding a geographically dispersed movement together, the increasing international isolation and a relatively insular and inexperienced negotiating team. Yet despite these pressures, GAM consistently demonstrated ‘remarkable discipline and remarkable strength in their chain of command, as well as a willingness to change tactics’. 1� Farid Husain noted the ‘strong collective leadership of GAM’ and commented that ‘we could not isolate one from another, and build a separate relationship with only one of them.’20 The government made several attempts to marginalize the GAM leadership in Sweden and to deal directly with field commanders. All were uniformly unsuccessful.

According to SBY, ‘they listened, but told us “Mr. President, it all depends on the leadership in Sweden.” This was a consistent response: “we need approval from Hasan di Tiro, Malik, Bakhtiar or Zaini.” Therefore, we tried to establish good relationship with the GAM leadership in Sweden. They held the key.’21 Kalla has confirmed that ‘our theory was that there must be

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a disconnect between the GAM leadership in Sweden and the field commanders. If we cannot get talks going with the leadership in Sweden, maybe we can talk to the field. That is what we tried to do on several occasions, but it didn’t work. They would listen to us politely, but then say that the decision would be made by the leadership in Sweden and we would have to talk with them.’22

GAM’s extraordinary discipline can in part be explained by its limited goals (independence from Aceh), with no specific social program or agenda, and none of the institutional checks and balances of an emerging democratic system. This made it easier to ensure the coherence and discipline of the movement. In contrast to GAM, the national government in Jakarta faced much more complex and wide-ranging issues, competing objectives, diverse constituencies and strongly vested interests. These included issues similar to Aceh, such as separatist movements in Papua and continuing religious conflict in Poso and Ambon, as well the ongoing headaches of government, such as the continued threats of terrorism, avian flu, and economic performance.

To address these challenges, SBY and Kalla also were operating in a relatively less disciplined and reliable institutional environment. The unclear policies, incoherent strategies, weak chain of command and conflicting agendas of the government during the Gus Dur and Megawati administrations stand in stark contrast to the ability of the exiled leaders of GAM to manage and control their organization. Aspinall and Crouch have observed that ‘manifest disunity characterized the Indonesian government’s position’ during the Gus Dur administration, but similar problems plagued Megawati and faced the new SBY administration as well.23 As Mietzner notes, the some senior TNI commanders had already made it plain that they were prepared to criticize and undermine government policies and agreements in Aceh. For example, the then-Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu ‘fuelled discontent with the HDC-led [Henri Dumas Center] peace initiative [i.e., CoHA] by expressing sympathy for military attacks on peace monitors.24

Neither SBY nor Kalla were in any doubts about the challenges they faced from within their own system of government. SBY believed that the most important opposition to his whole approach came from some very senior elements of the TNI, and from vocal nationalist politicians in the DPR (national parliament). In his view, both groups were ‘very rigid’; unwilling to compromise and highly suspicious of or even opposed to any negotiations with GAM.25 They also knew that these groups both had wide-reaching and powerful networks in the military, civil service, political parties and private sector, and both groups had demonstrated that they had the capacity to undermine, erode or sabotage any agreements that they did not support. Previous efforts to secure a sustainable peace arrangement during the Humanitarian Pause and CoHA were consistently criticized by nationalist politicians in the parliament and actively undermined by military commanders in the field.26

Ironically, Indonesia’s democratic transition has made managing opposition from these two groups more complicated. There is now a greatly expanded range of opportunities and instruments available to them. With a free and active press, expanding and lively civil society, vibrant (if undisciplined) political parties, a vocal (if not always mature) national parliament, any and all policies are now subject to increased demands for transparency, public debate and accountability.27


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The failure of earlier peace efforts had something to do with GAM, but it also had a great deal to do with the failure of previous administrations in Jakarta to master this complex, evolving and unruly political environment. Previous administrations were unable to articulate a coherent approach to Aceh, forge agreement among key stakeholders, and enforce discipline within their own ranks. Habibe was too distracted by the magnitude of the turmoil of the reformasi era; Gus Dur was too erratic and unpredictable; Megawati was too disengaged not inclined to expend energy and political capital on a risky process of political negotiations. To succeed where previous administrations had failed, SBY and Kalla manage these powerful constituencies in Jakarta before they could engage GAM as a credible, constructive and coherent negotiating partner.

Higher Risks In addition to a more complex and challenging political and institutional environment, the national government also risked greater consequences. For GAM, failure in Helsinki would almost certainly have resulted in intensified military pressure from the TNI. It would have been very difficult, but GAM had already demonstrated both its discipline and resilience. They could be forced to retreat, but they were confident that they could not be forced not to surrender. The TNI could continue its military offensive, ‘but GAM would not be cowed by that. We were tough and we knew we could survive their attacks.’28

For the new SBY/Kalla administration, however, the costs of failure would have been much higher. SBY’s support for the peace process during the CoHA period had already faced strong criticism and increasing pressure from both senior TNI officers and nationalistic politicians2� In reviving the idea of negotiations with GAM, his administration was again taking on the same powerful vested interests that had thwarted earlier administrations. Had SBY and Kall failed to enforce discipline and support for the new administration’s policies in Aceh, there would have been significant consequences for the evolving national political culture. Failure would have reinforced a pattern of undisciplined and unfocused policy processes, with wide latitude for covert influence and subterfuge of declared government policies by the military and ultra-nationalists. SBY’s ability to pursue other priorities – from separatist movements in Papua, to governance reform and anti-corruption – had to confront many of these same vested interests at different barricades, and his ability to make progress on these other fronts would have been significantly weakened from the outset of his administration.

Failure to negotiate a settlement in Aceh would also undermine efforts to project an image of security and stability within Indonesia, a critical requirement in attracting private investment, strengthen economic growth and meet one of SBY’s key election promises of improving the economic welfare of the Indonesian people in all parts of the country. Prolonged conflict in Aceh would also undermine the clear aspiration of the SBY administration to raise Indonesia’s international profile (which declined significantly in the turbulence of the Era Reformasi), revive Indonesian leadership within the region, and advance the administration’s aspirations for Indonesia to be accepted as a neutral, reasonable, steady and reliable international partner.

Potential Personal and Institutional Benefits Given the complexities of the issues and political environment, the challenge of establishing

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a coherent policy and enforcing discipline, the significant risks and relatively costly consequences of possible failure, why did SBY and Kalla take such a deep and personal interest in Aceh? Certainly neither was indifferent to the fate of the Acehnese people, especially after the tsunami.30 Nonetheless, in the critical period of preparation in advance of the Helsinki talks, the conflict in Aceh was not a central political issue in Indonesia. There were, after all, a lot of other issues that dominated national political discourse during the 2003-2005. The political ambitions of both SBY and Kalla were not going to be significantly advanced by a negotiated settlement in Aceh. Public opinion polls showed strong support for Megawati when she imposed martial law in Aceh and launched the largest military operation in Indonesian history in May 2003.31 Parliamentary opposition to military action in Aceh was nonexistent, and the press was neither aggressive nor inquiring, being content largely to report the campaign from the TNI perspective. Both SBY and Kalla have said that Aceh was not a major public issue during their successful presidential campaign.32 What then accounts for the willingness of both men to invest such significant time and energy on this issue?

Personal pride may be part of the explanation. SBY’s direct involvement in Aceh issues goes back as far as Gus Dur’s administration and included the period when he served as Coordinating Minister for Political, Security and Defense Affairs. Although not the leader of the government efforts, he was closely involved with the negotiations that led to the CoHA and remained a defender of that agreement even in the face of public complaints from senior TNI commanders that GAM was only using the agreement to expand its military and political presence.33 His conviction that no purely military solution was possible was directly opposed to confident predictions from some TNI leaders that the military operations launched in May 2003 would permanently crush GAM and resolve the conflict in Aceh. But he had had always been in the minority.34 SBY had a personal stake in disproving that basic position.

Similarly, Jusuf Kalla took understandable pride in his leading role in settling religious conflicts in South Sulawesi and Ambon when he served as Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare under Megawati. His success in resolving these difficult and bloody conflicts could be followed by a third achievement in Aceh. Kalla already had secured the informal mandate from Megawati to seek ways of re-establishing dialogue with GAM. Furthermore, he is not someone who is easily discouraged. If one approach fails, then he reviews his strategy and develops another plan of attack. He was already committed to the path of finding a negotiated settlement. If he persevered and found the path to success in Helsinki, it would enhance his prestige and standing even further.

These personal considerations are almost certainly important. However, resolving the conflict in Aceh was also important for reasons that went beyond the immediate confrontation with GAM. Aceh was also the venue for a clash that had broader national significance. How the government articulated, developed and implemented its policies with regard to Aceh would have great impact on the prestige, power and prospects of the new SBY/Kalla administration. It also had direct implications for Indonesia’s transition toward more open, accountable and effective government. Success in reaching agreement in Helsinki would demonstrate the resilience and flexibility of the national system to accommodate regional differences and yet maintain national unity. Bringing potential spoilers (especially in the TNI) board and limiting the opportunities to undermine the negotiations and subsequent implementation of the


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MOU was critically important for continued progress in establishing civilian control over the military. Enforcing some coherence and focus to the governments approach was important in strengthening the ability of the executive to formulate and implement policies without informal subversion by dissident factions.

4. Key Success FactorsThe preceding analysis suggests that answering the question ‘how was it possible for the Helsinki process to succeed?’, to a significant degree requires understanding the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks as these were perceived by the national government in Jakarta. Given their assessment of this environment, how did SBY and Kalla proceed? How did they seek to take advantage of their strengths, compensate for their weaknesses, seize their opportunities and minimize their risks? What were the key factors that allowed the administration to confront, convince, co-opt, manage or marginalize the key opponents from within their own side?

Risking Political Capital for a Common Vision. Being willing to risk some of their political capital in an effort to find a negotiated settlement was an essential requirement for success in Helsinki. Even before their inauguration, SBY and Kalla shared a common vision for approaching the Aceh problem. According to SBY, ‘I believed very strongly that a military solution could not solve the problem permanently and conclusively. We have 50 years of experience to prove this, not only in Aceh.’35 Similarly, ‘Kalla had a strong philosophical commitment to dialogue as a means of resolving disputes. As he told one newspaper as the Aceh negotiations neared their conclusion in June 2005, “In our history, resolving problems must always be achieved through dialogue.”’36

The clear and strong commitment of SBY and Kalla provided the often elusive ‘political will’ that is a critical ingredient of successful political change. SBY describes his commitment as providing the crucial ‘political umbrella’ that protected the work of the negotiators. He had learned from the Megawati administration when there is no clear political guidance and no “political umbrella” from the top leadership, there is little to protect the people trying to work on the issue from the attacks that came from within the executive branch or the DPR.37

This unity and commitment at the top most level of the government was a huge advance over previous administrations. In the words of Adm. Widodo Adi Sudjipto, ‘we were one team with one agreed policy.’38 SBY did not have to worry about a conflicting policy coming from within his own staff, or in a competing political center in the Office of the Vice President. SBY and Kalla had already worked together in the negotiations to settle the conflicts in Poso and Ambon. Although there appears to have been no explicit or detailed strategy developed before they were elected, they were united in a common conviction that no military solution was possible. One way or another, they agreed that negotiations with GAM were inevitable. They understood that the challenges was not simply to restart talks, but be able to defend and implement them in the face of what they knew would be strong internal opposition.

The SBY-Kalla Team. Given their common commitment to finding a negotiated settlement, SBY describes his role as setting the objectives and developing the broad strategy. This

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included careful calibration of competing demands and interests. According to SBY, these included three distinct groups of stakeholders. The first was the local population directly affected by the situation in Aceh. ‘I had to demonstrate that we were making progress in reducing the armed conflict and turning the province to some kind of normal state.’ Second, he had to assess and manage powerful national constituencies that would be strongly opposed to any settlement they regarded as a betrayal of fundamental nationalist principles. These included political parties, the current TNI leadership and retired TNI commanders who retained informal links and commanded loyalties within the TNI. Third, SBY had an eye on the international community. With the very large support of the international community for post-tsunami reconstruction, Aceh was very much in the news. But he also felt that the international community was also quietly watching how his administration would resolve the conflict with GAM and the longer-term implications for political developments in Indonesia.3�

Effectively managing these three different groups of stakeholders – local, national and international -- was key to reaching agreement in Helsinki. ‘I had to be engaged on all three fronts,’ SBY has commented. This was a lesson he believed he had learned from the past when Megawati’s failure to keep fully engaged in managing key stakeholders mean that there was not the political support and coverage required. 40

While SBY had his eye on this larger strategic picture, he then delegated Kalla responsibility for overseeing and managing the Helskinki negotiations on a day-to-day basis. If SBY provided the political umbrella, then Kalla is widely credited with being the motor that drove the negotiations forward. This included closely monitoring ongoing talks, identifying key issues, examining technical questions and identifying options, reviewing and amending texts, and recommending final approvals by the President. Kalla was deeply immersed in the details of the negotiations, often personally drafting analyses of different options or background papers on key issues.41 As the negotiations reached their final stages, Kalla closely reviewed, commented and amended each of the progressive drafts of the MOU between the two sides. Hamid Awaluddin, head of the government negotiating team, reports that ‘Kalla was on the phone to us every two hours, and in the final stages we ran up a Rp. 20 million [approximately US$2,000] phone bill.’42 At one point, some members of the GAM side wondered if the government delegation could exercise any judgment on important issues or if everything had to be referred back to Kalla for his personal review and approval. 43

Kalla’s direct day-to-day engagement was highly visible, frequently putting him (or those on the Indonesian delegation who were seen as ‘Kalla’s men’) in the spotlight, while the engagement of SBY was less evident. SBY argues that this was deliberate. ‘I could not always be the forefront. Sometimes I had to be in the background’ and let others take the lead, preserving political capital until it was really needed.44 This gave the administration greater flexibility and more depth in dealing with potential opponents. (Others have suggested that SBY let Kalla take all the risks and that he was in fact a ‘Johnny-come-lately’ to the whole process.45 But this critical assessment overlooks SBY’s support of CoHA in the past and his consistent support of the search for a negotiated agreement in Helsinki.)

The contrasting political bases and personal networks of the two men, sometimes cited as a source of tension or conflict within the administration, was key to their effectiveness as a


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team in resolving the Aceh conflict. Their differences greatly increased their reach across the spectrum of stakeholders and their ability to contain and manage potential spoilers. Each had their strengths in distinct but equally necessary constituencies. In the words of Jusuf Kalla, ‘there was a division of labor. SBY took care of the TNI and I took care of the political parties, as well as the technical issues.’46 Neither man would have been able to accomplish the task of co-opting and managing both these potential spoilers on their own. Together they were able to manage all key constituencies and to bring an unusual degree of coherence and discipline to the government’s approach.

There is another sense in which the contrasting personal styles of the two men were complementary and effective. SBY is well-known for his extremely measured, cautious and deliberative style. His responses to questions are typically slow, thoughtful and considered. Kalla, in contrast, is quick, clipped and often leaping from one thought to another in an effort to reach a conclusion. One can imagine that a conservative TNI commander or ultranationalist politician might be a little nervous about what Kalla might agree to. SBY, in contrast, presents a calm, balanced and thoughtful image, with a record of cautiously balancing competing interest and calculating how fast and how far he could go. For many who were highly suspicious of any negotiations with GAM, this had to offer a reassuring sense of restraint and balance.

Bringing the TNI on Board. All assessments of earlier efforts to resolve the Aceh conflict in the post-Soeharto era agree that ensuring TNI support for a political settlement was a challenge that previous administrations had failed to meet.47 In general, key elements of the TNI leadership seemed to be opposed to anything other than a complete military defeat of GAM. For example, ‘when Operasi Terpadu was launched [in May 2003], TNI commander-in-Chief General Sutarto ordered his troops to “destroy GAM forces down to their roots” by “finishing off, killing, those who still engage in armed resistance.”’48

There are various explanations for this often strongly stated position, ranging from principled nationalism and an unwillingness to compromise the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state, to craven economic self-interest fueled by corruption.4� Whatever the explanation, the TNI was clearly a force that had enjoyed considerable latitude in earlier administrations, often not hesitating to dissent from declared government policies. Somehow the TNI leadership had to be brought on board.

SBY moved remarkably quickly in the very early weeks of his administration to address this challenge. In the final days of her administration, after she had already lost her re-election bid to SBY, President Megawati had sent a letter to the national parliament (DPR) nominating Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu (then the army chief of staff ) as the next TNI Commander-in-Chief. Ryacudu was widely regarded as a ‘natural’ choice and had strong support from within the TNI. Nonetheless, SBY recalled the letter of nomination and instead proposed extending the tenure of the incumbent, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto. This was a critically important decision. Ryacudu was ‘the most vocal representative of the anti-reform wing of the armed forces…. As army chief of staff, he was not only a visible symbol for the military’s reluctance to further reform, but he also had the power to influence the outcome of important policy processes. In early 2003, Ryacudu had belonged to the fiercest opponents of the Aceh peace process, and

1�


many believed that he played a major role in its failure.’50 Various key government participants in the Helsinki process have stated categorically that it would have been impossible to reach an agreement with GAM had Megawati’s proposed appointment of Ryacudu gone forward.51

In contrast, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, although not a radical reformer, was trusted by SBY as someone ‘able to look at the wider picture’ and ‘a supporter of the peace process.’52 Those most closely involved in the negotiations felt that Sutarto had a more sophisticated world view, more finely tuned political instincts, and was less doctrinaire, with a pragmatic willingness to adapt and adjust.53 SBY then used Sutarto to help pull the TNI into line with his policies. When Ryacudu continued to speak out against negotiations with GAM, SBY asked Sutarto to ‘control statements of the military and to follow government policies’.54 Sutarto has confirmed that ‘I told the TNI leadership that I don’t want any senior officers talking out against government policies. If you want to oppose government policies, then you must leave the TNI.’55 SBY followed this up in March 2005 by delivering the same message at TNI headquarters when he attended the ceremony for the installation of new service chiefs.56

SBY claims that this was a calculated risk, but he was confident of the outcome. Shortly after the fall of Soeharto, when public opinion was demanding significant military reforms, SBY distributed a questionnaire to senior officers to get their views on how the military should respond. He learned about 60 percent supported reforms, but felt they must be gradual and well-controlled. These ‘moderates’ were the largest group, but not outspoken or high-profile, and this is where SBY placed his own views. About 25 percent were hostile to any reforms, and about 15 percent wanted faster reforms. The younger generation of officers (i.e., colonels and below) were less political, more flexible and open-minded, suggesting the time clearly favored some kind of reform process.57 ‘I knew my audience’ and ‘I had it mapped out,’ although still ‘I had to calculate carefully because I knew that I needed their support.’58

The significance of SBY’s decision to recall the nomination of Ryacudu and his subsequent steps to bring the TNI on board extends beyond the Helsinki negotiations. By denying Ryacudu the supreme command position in the TNI in the first few weeks of his administration, and later replacing him as army chief of staff in February 2005, SBY was asserting his leadership and control of as the civilian president over the military. ‘Yudhoyono’s success in enforcing military compliance in Aceh marked a watershed in post-Suharto civil-military relations. For the first time, the government was able to secure the military’s support for a negotiated settlement with separatist rebels.’5�

Establishing a Clear Framework. SBY argues that in the Gus Dur administration, there was a lack of coordination and direction to the government’s Aceh policy. Under Megawati, there was better coordination and clearer objectives, but still no clear strategy that had the commitment and full support of the president. In his administration, SBY felt it was critical to establish a clear framework or ‘comprehensive solution’ that could help orient, direct and coordinate the work of the negotiating team.60

The negotiating team was told that there were two fundamental requirements for any agreement: first, GAM must accept the principle of the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state (Kesatuan Negara Republik Indonesia, or KNRI); and second, any agreement must be


20

consistent with and in the framework of the Indonesian constitution. According to SBY, this was the harga mati or fixed bottom line. All else was negotiable, and the negotiating team had great latitude as long as they remained within this framework.61 Either working on his own initiative or with the explicit encouragement and approval of SBY, Jusuf Kalla developed the basic government approach in a memo formally transmitted to the President on January �, 2006. Once SBY blessed this statement, it provided the common reference point for the team and was the basis for SBY’s public announcement on January 10 that negotiations with GAM would begin at the end of the month. In the words of Kalla, ‘this provided the clear framework that we did not have for CoHA. This was the basic framework for the whole negotiation. We did not really stray from this.’62 Hamid Awaluddin has confirmed that ‘the President gave clear instructions, and those were the foundation for everything we did subsequently.’63

Although broadly stated, the framework was based on a careful calculation of what SBY and Kalla believed they could ultimately sell successfully to key stakeholders in Jakarta, such as the TNI leadership and leaders of political parties represented in the DPR. It was in some senses too general to be useful in refining the government’s response to difficult but critically important issues (such as the possibility of creating locally based political parties). Nonetheless, it had two great advantages over earlier peace negotiations: it was clear, and it had the full support of both the President and Vice President.

Working Out of Channels. Having committed themselves fully to the search for a peaceful resolution of the Aceh conflict, and with a clear framework for the government delegation, SBY and Kalla then pulled together an unusual team to meet with GAM in Helsinki. They side-stepped the formal government bureaucracy and deliberately appointed an ad hoc team comprised of hand-picked individuals who enjoyed their personal confidence, could talk directly and frankly to the President and Vice President and brought specific skills and experience to the table. The three core members of the team were selected for these personal qualities rather than because of their formal rank or government departments. Hamid Awaluddin (Minister of Justice and Human Rights), was the delegation leader and had worked closely with Jusuf Kalla on the Poso and Ambon conflicts. Sofyan Djalil (Minister of Communications) is Acehnese by origin and was in part selected because of a desire to establish direct and personal connections with the GAM delegation. Farid Husain (a Director-General in the Department of Health) had been pursuing the GAM leadership for over eighteen months and was valued because of his affable personality and skills as a facilitator.

The fact that none of the leading members of the Indonesian team were Javanese was also a consideration. It was an effort to be sensitive to GAM’s aversion to ‘Javanese colonization’ of Aceh.64 In addition, the Indonesian delegation deliberately avoided bureaucratic formalities. ‘We were determined to deal with GAM with dignity, not the take-it-or-leave-it attitude of past negotiations.’ ‘If we had approached this in the normal way, as if we were involved in a normal diplomatic negotiation, with all the formality and structures of the bureaucracy, we probably would have found it difficult to reach agreement. It was necessary for us to have great flexibility, although we consulted regularly with Jakarta.’65

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There were some concessions to a more conventional representation on the delegation. Adm. Adi Sudjipto Widodo, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, participated only in the first two rounds of negotiations in Helsinki. He says that once he was satisfied that the basic framework established by SBY and Kalla was firmly established and not threatened by the negotiations, he felt comfortable excusing himself from subsequent sessions.66 His deputy, Usman Basja was then left to represent his interests. Only in the final few rounds, when issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration were being discussed, did TNI representatives join the delegation. Wesaka Pudja from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was present throughout as the notetaker, providing daily summaries to Jakarta, but seems not to have played a major role in any of the decision-making.

There appears to have been remarkably little in the way of bureaucratic involvement or support for this team. Most of the discussions were by telephone between the government delegation in Helsinki and Kalla in Jakarta. Before departure to Helsinki and after returning to Jakarta, the team would routinely meet with the President to brief him and discuss plans for the next round. (As an indication of the interest and support of the President, Hamid Awaluddin stated that SBY took time away from his son’s wedding reception in order to make sure that he was briefed before the team left for the next round in Helsinki.67 ) Beyond this, there appears to have been little in the way of a formal inter-agency process, laboriously drafted position papers, or lengthy clearance process.

All this clearly indicates that SBY and Kalla deliberately reduced opportunities for bureaucratic delay, equivocation and sabotage by hand-picking the negotiating team, managing the process ‘out-of-channels’ and relying on a highly informal policy process. Information flows were carefully controlled – a singular achievement in a political culture where informal networks, unauthorized leaks and rumors are commonly used to influence the political process. The resulting combination of high level political support, maximum flexibility and relatively disciplined communications were key to the government’s ability to manage its own constituencies and stakeholders, including critically important potential spoilers in the TNI.

A Characteristically Indonesian Process. Finally, although assistance and support from outside agencies was critically important at pivotal moments (as noted below), this was fundamentally an Indonesian process driven by Indonesian actors and managed in an Indonesian manner. International institutions and foreign experts could facilitate and support, but they could not determine the outcomes. From the very earliest stages of the road to Helsinki, there is a pattern of informal and highly personal contacts, use of intermediaries and personal networks, informal and behind the scenes negotiations, ad hoc trial-and-error approaches.

These patterns were reminiscent of typical Indonesian negotiations over marriages or business alliances. They may help explain not only why the Helsinki negotiations reached agreement, but also why that agreement has endured. Despite provocations from various sources that could have frayed or critically undermined the MOU, the program agreed to in Helsinki has not withered or lost credibility, but on the contrary have proved to be robust and largely implemented.


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5. International Friends: Inspired Amateurs and Experienced Experts Notwithstanding the commitment and engagement of SBY and Kalla, and their success in getting GAM to the negotiating table, both the government and GAM had some invaluable help from international friends. This assistance came from an intriguing combination of inspired amateurs and experienced experts that were able to help narrow the gap of distrust that separated the two sides.

One inspired amateur was a private Finnish citizen, Juha Christensen, who played a key role in getting the process moving, involving the Helsinki-based nongovernmental organization Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and providing support at critical junctures during the actual negotiations.68 Lacking any special training as a conflict mediator and without any formal institutional affiliation, Christensen took a personal interest in trying to help the government establish some connection with the GAM leadership. Energetic, sincere and committed, but slightly quixotic, Christensen invested considerable personal time and resources to this end. Although he had previously lived in Makassar in the 1��0s, at the time of the CoHA collapse in 2003, he was back in his native Finland. From there he tried to establish a relationship with the GAM leadership living in exile in Sweden, and then to help the government establish contact with them.

Initially, his efforts were not very successful. GAM leaders asked themselves ‘who is he? What does he want? Why is he doing this? Can we trust him?’6� Despite his earlier Makassar connections, Christensen’s efforts also had to be a disappointment to the government. In February 2004, acting on the basis of assurances from Christensen that he could arrange a meeting with the GAM leadership, Farid Husain went to Stockholm in hope of at last having a face-to-face encounter. However, Husain was kept waiting for nearly four hours in a hotel lobby as Christensen tried unsuccessfully to persuade the GAM leaders upstairs at least to hear what he had to say. In the end, the GAM leaders walked through the hotel lobby, glanced briefly at Husain and kept moving out the door and into the night.70

At this point, eager to salvage his credibility, Christensen called a Finnish journalist to see if an introduction to former Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari could be arranged. A former high ranking U.N. official and ex-president of Finland, Ahtisaari was the head of CMI. After a series of phone calls, Ahtisaari agreed to meet with Christensen and Husain in Helsinki. But they would have to get there immediately because he had a late flight to Brussels that very evening. Fortunately, they were able to rush to the airport, make the flight from Stokholm to Helsinki and initiate a dialogue with Ahtisaari.71

This was the fortuitous entrance of a key figure who was later to chair the negotiations in Helsinki and help steer them to success. Both sides credit Ahtisaari’s skills as an experienced diplomat, shrewd politician and forceful personality for pushing them past difficult moments and toward final agreement.72 In the eyes of the GAM leadership, Ahtisaari brought international stature and credibility that the Henry Dumas Center (HDC) lacked during the CoHA period. Ahtisaari’s international prominence and connections gave the skeptical GAM leaders the reassurance they needed that it was at least worth listening to what the government had to say.73

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Ahtisaari also had an unusual range of assets that proved critical in keeping the negotiations on track. These were personal rather than institutional, unique to Ahtisaari and derived largely from his experience as an international civil servant and politician. First, he was a forceful and energetic chairman who was rigorous about keeping discussions focused and not hesitant about browbeating the delegations when he felt they were wandering into unfruitful topics. (Both sides mentioned his habit of throwing down his pen in disgust and saying ‘Gentlemen! You are wasting my time!’74)

Mindful of his own reputation and credibility, Ahtisaari was prepared to be tough and demanding with both sides. ‘I made it clear that I was doing them a favor. If both sides did not come prepared for serious negotiations, I told them I was not interested in wasting my time and energy.’ At various points throughout the negotiations, Ahtisaari says he ‘set up tests to determine if they were really committed,’ such as insisting that there be no leaks about the progress of negotiations and that the information made available to the press be carefully controlled.75

Second, he was clear from the outset about the scope and ground rules of the discussions, as well as the mandate of CMI. The negotiations would specifically not include full independence for Aceh (a condition which the government insisted upon), but they would explore options for an expansion of local government authorities beyond the established legal framework of ‘special autonomy’ (which was an anathema to GAM). He established the basic principle that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. This forced both sides to look for a comprehensive settlement that included even the most difficult issues, rather than seeking quick agreement on individual issues but evading some of the core problems that separated the two sides.76 Finally, CMI would facilitate discussions, but (unlike the HDC), it would not undertake any responsibility for monitoring implementation.77

Third, Ahtisaari was able to draw on an exceptionally wide personal network to bring outside resources and expertise to the negotiations. Out of deference to Ahtisaari’s previous position as head of state, the Government of Finland agreed to provide the venue and logistical support. As the negotiations proceeded, Ahtisaari was able to borrow the services of a Finnish colonel to help advise on issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. He also used his connections with the EU to persuade them to send some ‘observers’ to the final rounds of negotiations, and then to expand that involvement to EU participation in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). 78

The engagement of the EU in monitoring the implementation of the agreement was particularly important for both sides. Notwithstanding progress on other issues, there was still strong distrust about the ability of their opposite numbers to adhere to any agreement. Both sides regarded the other as having exploited and subverted previous peace agreements, and both believed the same pattern could easily be repeated in the future. Only a robust monitoring mechanism would allay these concerns. To be credible, this mechanism had to involve some international presence – a highly sensitive issue for the government of Indonesia, which had to be concerned about attacks from ultra-nationalist politicians.7� Ahtisaari was able to bring in the EU as a counterweight to ASEAN, providing a level of international involvement in and support for the peace agreement that was critically important to both GAM and the government. It


24

was also through Ahtisaari’s personal network that Peter Feith, an experienced international civil servant who had been involved in mediating conflicts in the Balkans in the 1��0s, was made the head of the AMM.

Fourth, Ahtisaari was prepared to risk some of his own political capital when he felt the progress of the negotiations was threatened. ‘My role was to help make sure the agreement is fair, but also realistic and can endure,’ he has commented. ‘I have to tell people hard truths.’ This included being ‘very tough the GAM about this framework [for the Helsinki negotiations]. I was not afraid to tell them the hard facts: I don’t see one single government in the world that supports you.’80 As a result, some on the GAM side were inclined to see Ahtisaari as condescending and favoring the national government in Jakarta.81 Nonetheless, Ahtisaari was also prepared to challenge Jakarta at the highest levels. Responding to ‘alarming and very credible reports’ about escalating human rights abuses he received from GAM, Ahtisaari traveled to Jakarta in May 2005. ‘I wanted to bring these directly to the attention of SBY. I myself edited the reports so that the source of the information could not be determined, and then handed them directly to the government. I told the government, “Get rid of the worst offenders. If you cannot punish them, then at least transfer them.”’82

6. Looking to the Future: Crossing ArcsAt the first anniversary of the agreement, what are the prospects for the future and continued progress in Aceh’s peaceful democratic development? And what are the implications for the larger political development of Indonesia?

This paper argues that explaining the success of the Helsinki negotiations requires an understanding of the ‘surprising asymmetry’ between a remarkably disciplined GAM and a national government in Jakarta struggling to bring coherence and discipline to its own house. The ability of the SBY/Kalla administration to meet this challenge was a critically important factor in reaching agreement in Helsinki. This also helps explain why the government has (largely) met its commitments under the MOU, and avoided the subversion and sabotage that characterized earlier peace efforts.

The future, however, suggests crossing arcs, with the government having the potential to use the success of Helsinki to strengthen its own systems of governance. Conversely, GAM is likely to encounter greater threats to its coherence and discipline. Each side faces a very different set of dynamics and challenges than when they first sat down together in January 2005. How well they understand these new challenges and how effectively they respond will be important in determining if peace in Aceh is to continue to endure and grow stronger, and if Indonesia’s democratic system is to flourish.

For the National Government: A Stepping Stone to Improved Governance?The ability of the SBY/Kalla administration in bringing greater coherence, focus and discipline to the government’s approach to Aceh has given them increased credibility and authority within the broader context of Indonesia’s democratic reforms. SBY and Kalla have demonstrated that they are able to enforce greater discipline and impose significant

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sanctions on those who try to undermine government policies. Their success in Aceh has increased their leverage in the ongoing struggle to bring the TNI firmly under the control of civilian authorities, and has strengthened their ability to formulate policies, control the agenda and persuade national parties to support executive initiatives.

It is possible (as Mietzner argues in his recent assessment of military reforms) that SBY has relied more on personal connections than on institutional reforms, and that the process of reform is incomplete and ‘counterbalanced by serious omissions and failures’.83 Nonetheless, Aceh marks the most significant step forward in this process.

The question for the future is how SBY and Kalla will follow this up and build on this achievement. They appear to be poised for the next step forward, but it is unclear that they have yet exploited this advantage and applied it to other key areas. Discussions on Papua appear stalled and it is not clear that the government has developed a clear strategy. The much-discussed KADIN roadmap for economic reforms seems to have fallen by the wayside, and earlier anti-corruption efforts may be losing momentum. Celebrating the first anniversary of the Helsinki agreement may be an important opportunity to recapture the initiative and momentum that the administration had established and to build on this in other key areas of governance reform.

For GAM: New Challenges to Coherence, Focus and DisciplineUp to now, GAM’s conscious policy has been to continue to demonstrate its internal coherence and discipline by clearly meeting its commitments under the MOU. The AMM credits GAM with having demonstrated great discipline in adhering to the terms of the agreement.84 Although GAM leaders have expressed frustration that the government has not met its commitments in a number of important areas (such as assistance for demobilized GAM fighters, and key provisions of the recent law on the governance of Aceh), GAM itself has carefully kept its objections within the framework of the Helsinki agreement. ‘We want to be clear that the failure is on the side of the government, which is not meeting its obligations.’85

Will this discipline hold in the future? In direct contrast to the national government, GAM now faces a range of new challenges with fewer resources. With the disarmament and demobilization of GAM forces, however, it has lost its structure of command and control. It is no longer an armed insurgency, and the GAM leadership can no longer rely on a cadre of field commanders and troops. In a very real sense, as one GAM leader observed ‘GAM is finished in the sense that this is an irreversible change. We cannot go back to fighting.’86

At the heart of its dilemma is a key question of political identity: now that GAM is not an armed insurgency, what should it be? And how does it get there? Any transformation is unlikely to be simple or straightforward. GAM must forge a new identity in the new and unfamiliar realm of competitive democratic politics. Therefore, it is likely that GAM will demonstrate less discipline, coherence and focus, at least in the near term. There is likely to be a period of experimentation, trial and error, increased internal debate and conflict, and leadership changes. How GAM leaders handle this transition – and how it is viewed and supported (or opposed) by the national government and international agencies – will be key questions as both GAM and Aceh enter the next phase of their development.


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A Note on Methodology and Information SourcesThe primary source of information for this article were extensive face-to-face interviews r with key informants from both sides are who were directly involved in the Helsinki process. All interviews were conducted by the author during May and July 2006 in Jakarta and Aceh. Most ran for one to two hours and in some cases, there were also follow-up interviews, clarifications or continuing dialogue by e-mail. A written protocol with core questions or areas of concentration was developed in advance for each interview. In practice, however, the conversation often took a life of its own and followed its own logic. Given the emphasis on capturing the personal understanding, perspectives and strategies of key participants, I believed it was important to let each respondent develop themes they thought important, even if these deviated from the order and structure of the formal research protocol.

Interviews with direct participants in the Helsinki process were supplemented with face-to-face interviews or (in a few cases, e-mail communications) with a range of international observers, scholars, journalists and political analysts. (See below for a list of those interviewed.)

Government of Indonesia(with current titles, followed by role in Helsinki negotiations, where appropriate): President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono; Vice President Jusuf Kalla Hamid Awaluddin, Minister of Justice and Human Rights Leader of government delegation to Helsinki Sofyan Djalil, Minister of Communications Member of government delegation to Helsinki Farid Husain, Director General Member of government delegation to Helsinki Adm. Widodo Adi Sutjipto, Coordinating Minister for Political, Security Member of government delegation to Helsinki Juwono Sudarsono, Minister of Defense Gen. (ret) Endriartono Sutarto, former Commander-in-Chief, TNI

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, or GAM)(with previously asserted titles, followed by role in Helsinki negotiations, where appropriate): Malik Mahmud, Prime Minister of Acheh Leader of delegation to Helsinki Bakhtiar Abdullah, GAM Spokesman Member of delegation to Helsinki M. Nur Djuli Member of delegation to Helsinki

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Irwandi Jusuf Negotiator for CoHA and Advisor to Helsinki delegation Teuku Kamaruzzaman, Negotiator for CoHA Amni Ahmad Marzuki, Negotiator for CoHA

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman of Helsinki negotiations Juha Christensen Meeri-Maria Jaarva

Aceh Monitoring Mission Pieter Feith, Head of Mission

Indonesian and International Analysts, Journalists and Academics Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group (ICG) Edward Aspinall, Australian National University Damien Kingsbury, Deakin University, Kristen Schulze, London School of Economics Marcus Mietzner, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), Jakarta Nezar, Tempo John McBeth, Straits Times


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BibliographyAspinall, Edward and Harold Crouch. 2003. The Ached Peace Process: Why it Failed. Policy Studies 1 (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington)

Aspinall, Edward. 2005. The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? Policy Studies 20 (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington)

Hamid, Sandra and Douglas Ramage, ‘Autonomy for Aceh’, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2006.

Huber, Konrad. 2004. The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implication. (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington)

International Crisis Group (ICG). 2000. Aceh: Escalating Tension. ICG Indonesia Briefing. (7 December 2000)

_______________. 2001. Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace. ICG Asia Report. No. 17. (27 June 2001)

_______________. 2003a.. Aceh: A Fragile Peace. ICG Asia Report No. 47 (27 February 2003)

_______________. 2003b. Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won’t Work. ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper. (� May 2003)

_______________. 2003c. Aceh: How Not to Win Hearts and Minds. ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper. (23 July 2003)

_______________. 2005a. Aceh: A New Chance for Peace. ICG Asia Briefing NO. 40. (15 August, 2005)

_______________. 2005b. Aceh: So Far, So Good. ICG Asia Briefing No. 44. (13 December 2005)

Kingsbury, Damien. 2006. Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of the Helsinki Peace Process (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing)

Kingsbury, Damien and Lesley McCulloch, ‘Military Business in Aceh’ in Anthony Reid, ed., Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006).

McGibbon, Rodd. 2004. Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Policy Studies 10. (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington)

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Mietzner, Marcus. 2006. The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance. Policy Studies 23. (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington)

Schulze, Kristen. 2004. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization. Policy Studies 2. (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington)

Schulze, Kristen. 2005. The Helsinki Peace Process: Reaching Understanding in Aceh in the Wake of the Tsunami.

Schulze, Kristen. 2006. “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1�76-May 2004’ in Anthony Reid, ed., Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006).


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Endnotes1 See especially Aspinal (2005) and Aspinall and Crouch (2003)

2 Kingsbury (2006) presents a highly personal account from the perspective of a GAM advisor, and thus has relatively little to say about the dynamics on the side of the Indonesian government. The Finnish journalist, Katri Marikallio, is also about to publish an account of the negotiations drawing on interviews with both sides and the Finnish mediator, former President Martii Ahtisaari. (Making Peace: Aceh and Ahtisaari, forthcoming).

3 This essay is an overview or summary statement from a longer work current in progress. It presents the main themes or conclusions of a more detailed and lengthy monograph that is under preparation. Therefore, the arguments are presented here in summary form, with the forthcoming complete study providing detailed and specific evidence and analyses.

4 See for example the Wall Street Journal article by Asia Foundation staff members Sandra Hamid and Douglas Ramage, which cites the tsunami as the key factor ‘that finally pursuaded both sides to put an end to the conflict.’ Hamid (2006).

5 Aspinall (2005), pp. 7-10. The International Crisis Group (2005a) also cites the impact of military operations on GAM.

6 Reports from the International Crisis Group, for example, prominently feature the role of Jusuf Kalla, referring to ‘the Kalla initiative’. See ISG (2005a), pp. 1-4. Similarly, Aspinall describes Kalla as ‘the most active government advocate of the talks’. See Aspinall (2005), p. 14.

7 Separate author interviews with Juha Christensen (May 16, 2005) and Martti Ahtisaari

(June 21, 2005) have confirmed Aspinall’s chronology. See especially Aspinall (2005), p. 1�.

8 Aspinall (2005), pp. 7-10. Also, ICG (2005a), pp. 4-6.

� Damien Kingsbury’s recent book perhaps makes this point most strongly. Although a strong advocate for GAM and occupying a unique position as a foreign advisor actively engaged throughout the Helsinki negotiations, his impatience, frustration and even despair over what he sees as the sloppy preparations and thinking on the GAM side are a recurring theme. See Kingsbury (2006).

10 Schulze (2006), pp. 244-255.

11 Author interview with Sofyan Djalil (May 13, 2006)

12 Aspinall (2005), pp. 15-1�, gives a good overview of many of these efforts, although author interviews with Juha Christensen (May 16 and 17, 2005) suggests some differences in

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detail. The main point, however – the SBY and Kalla were very interested in re-establishing a dialogue with GAM and were actively seeking ways of achieving this, is not in doubt.

13 Author interview with Jusuf Kalla (July 25, 2005)

14 Author interview with Farid Husain (May 23, 2005). See also Aspinall (2005), pp. 14-18.

15 Author interview with Farid Husain (May 23, 2005).

16 Quoted in Apsinall (2005), p. 13

17 Author interview with Nur Djuli (July 17, 2006)

18 Author interview with Palisamy Ramasamy (July 26, 2006). According to Ramasamy, these conversations were with Eric Solheim, who was at that time Special Ambassador appointed to assist in finding a solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka.

1� Author Interview with Peter Feith (July 1�, 2006).

20 Author interview with Farid Husain (May 23, 2006).

21 Author interview with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21, 2006)

22 Author interview with Jusuf Kalla (July 25, 2006). . 23 Aspinall and Crouch (2003), p. 13. See also Schulze (2006), pp. 25�-60.

24 Mietzner (2006), p. 4�

25 Author interview with Susila Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21, 2006)

26 Aspinall and Crouch (2003), pp. 23-24

27 This suggests that unqualified enthusiasm for strengthened democratic processes may be too uncritical or even naïve. Contrary to arguments such as those advanced by Hamid and Ramage (2006), the active and vociferous national political parties in the DPR constituted a challenge to be overcome in reaching agreement in Helskini, rather than a fundamental cause of success of the Helsinki process.

28 Author interview with Malik Mahmud (May 17, 2005)

2� See for example, Aspinall and Crouch (2003), pp. 2�-30

30 In the course of two extensive personal interviews for this analysis (May 21 and 23, 2006), the only occasion when SBY revealed deep personal anguish and emotion was in his descriptions of what he witnessed on his first trip to Aceh after the tsunami.


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31 ‘Perdamaian di Aceh Saatmu Diwujudkan,’‘Perdamaian di Aceh Saatmu Diwujudkan,’ Kompas, June 13, 2005. Cited in MetiznerCited in Metizner (2006)

32 Author interviews with Susila Bambang Yudyono (May 21 and 23, 2006) and with Jusuf Kalla (July 25, 2006)

33 ‘TNI Sanggup Selesaikan Masalah Aceh’, Kompas, April 5, 2003.

34 Aspinall and Crouch (2003), p. 54.


36 Cited in Aspinall (2005), p. 15, quoting Kalla’s interview in Media Indonesia, June 2�, 2005.


38 Author interview with Widodo Adi Sudjipto (May 24, 2006)

3� Author interview with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21, 2006)

40 Ibid.

41 Of all the interviews conducted for this study, Kalla alone produced thick volumes of files, each carefully organized and tabulated, and filled with his memos, marginal comments, revisions and recommendations. He stated that most of the document he had drafted himself with little assistance from staff.

42 Author interview with Hamid Awaluddin (May 23, 2006)




46 Author interview with Jusuf Kalla (July 25, 2006).

47 For example, see ICG 2000, pp. 4, 7-8. Also, ICG 2001, pp12-15. Aspinall and Crouch (2003), p. 35

48 Schulze (2006), quoting from Kompas, 20 May 2003.

4� Kingsbury, Damien and Lesley McCulloch (2006),

50 Mietzner (2005), pp. 4�-50.

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51 Author interviews with: Juwono Sudarsono (May 23, 2006); Sofyan Djalil (May 13, 2006);


53 Author interview with Sofyan Djalil (May 13, 2006) and Juwono Sudarsono (May 23, 2006)


55 Author interview with Endriartono Sutarto (May 23, 2006)


57 Author interview with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21 and 23, 2006)


5� Mietzner (2006), p. 51.

60 Author interviews with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21, 2006)

61 Ibid.

62 Author interview with Jusuf Kalla (July 25, 2006).

63 Author interview with Hamid Awaluddin (May 23, 2006)

64 Author interview with Sofyan Djalil (May 13, 2006). Ironically, Djalil says that his own Acehnese origins may have been viewed negatively by some on the GAM delegation who he thinks might have regarded him as a traitor to his people. Nonetheless, as negotiations proceeded, he was able to revert to informal conversation in Acehnese, and also to help the government delegation interpret some of the GAM approaches, positions and sentiments.

65 Ibid.

66 Author interview with Widodo Adi Sudjipto (May 24, 2006). Interestingly, Widodo referred to his role in the delegation as ‘supervisor’ acting on behalf o fthe President, suggesting he was there to make sure that ‘Kalla’s men’ did not wander from the agreed framework. However, others – including Kalla himself -- have suggested that Widodo was uncomfortable with Hamid (with a more junior rank) was leading the delegation.

67 Author interview with Hamid Awaluddin (May 23, 2006).

68 In addition to Juha Christensen, another ‘inspired amateur’ – Damien Kingsbury – was a key advisor to GAM. A strong advocate for Acehnese independence and deeply opposed to what he saw as the exploitation and oppression of Aceh by the Jakarta government, Kingsbury served as a combination of brain-trust, technical advisor and secretariat for the


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GAM delegation. Although highly partisan in his views, he made a valuable contribution by helping GAM to examine its options, articulate its strategy and review proposed texts of the final agreement. His own personal account of the Helsinki process is contained in Kingsbury (2006).

6� Author interview with Nur Djuli (July 17, 2006)

70 Author interview with Farid Husain (May 23, 2005), and confirmed in two separate author interviews with Juha Christensen (May 16 and 17, 2005).

71 Author interview with Juha Christensen (May 16 and 17, 2006) and confirmed by author interview with Martti Ahtisaari (June 21, 2003).

72 Author interviews with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21, 2006); Sofyan Djalil (May 13, 2006); Malik Mahmud (May 17, 2006).

73 Author interview with Malik Mahmud (May 17, 2006)

74 Author interviews with Sofyan Djalil (May 13, 2006) and with Malik Mahmud (May 17, 2006). This is consistent with Kingsbury’s own memoir of Ahtisaari’s style in the negotiations. See Kingsbury (2006), p. 16, where he notes that he was occasionally a direct target of Ahtisaari’s impatience.

75 Author interview with Martti Ahtisaari (May 21, 2006)

76 Kingsbury (2006), p. 26. Also author interview with Martti Ahtisaari (May 21, 2006)


78 Author interview with Martti Ahtisaari (May 21, 2006) and Meeri-Maria Jaarva (June 21, 2006).

7� Author interview with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (May 21, 2006).


81 Kingsbury (2006) p. 16. also author interview with Nur Djuli (July 17, 2006).


83 Mietzner (2005), p. viii and also pp. 5�-66.

84 Author interview with Pieter Feith (July 1�, 2006)

85 Author interview with Irwandi Jusuf (July 1�, 2006)


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