abridge2far - WordPress.com · with a BCR of just 1.2, only rising to 1.9 when wider benefits were...
Transcript of abridge2far - WordPress.com · with a BCR of just 1.2, only rising to 1.9 when wider benefits were...
abridge2far
1
Correspondence Address:
Margaux
Woodlands Lane
Shorne
Gravesend
Kent
DA12 3HH
Email address: [email protected]
BY EMAIL: [email protected]
Freepost RTTH–GRYG–SCXZ Lower Thames Crossing Consultation PO Box 1188 Harrow HA1 9NU
24th March 2016
Dear Sirs
LOWER THAMES CROSSING CONSULTATION: RESPONSE FROM ABRIDGE2FAR
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This consultation response is submitted by Abridge2far. Abridge2far is an organisation which
represents the views of the majority of residents in Shorne and the surrounding DA12 area of Kent in
their opposition to any new crossing at Location C east of Gravesend.
Abridge2far was formed in 2013 to oppose proposals for a crossing east of Gravesend (then referred
to as Option C). It has over 520 members of its ‘abridge2far’ facebook group, and is closely allied with
the ‘3rd Thames Crossing Kent’s Views facebook group’ which has over 1500 members. It has many
other supporters who are not connected by facebook.
In February 2016 Abridge2far initiated a petition to Kent County Council (KCC), which called on the
Council “to withdraw its support for a Lower Thames Crossing East of Gravesend and to support the
thousands of Kent residents whose lives would be devastated by this proposal. A new crossing east
of Gravesend will not address the problems at Dartford”. This petition obtained 3,768 signatures in
just 4 weeks. The petition was terminated after 4 weeks to permit the matter to be debated at KCC’s
Environment & Transport Cabinet Committee.
These figures are given in order to provide an indication of the number of people who Abridge2far
represents, and of the strength of opposition to Option C on the Kent side of the River Thames.
We are aware of similar opposition to Option C on the Essex side of the Thames. We have not
considered the impact of Option C in Essex in our response to this consultation. However, Abridge2far
opposes any routes in Essex which form part of a proposed Option C crossing east of Gravesend.
abridge2far
2
2.0 BACKGROUND TO THIS CONSULTATION
In 2013, the Department of Transport consulted on the three remaining options for a Lower Thames
Crossing. These were Option A for an extra bridge to add capacity to the existing crossing at Dartford;
Option B for a new crossing at Swanscombe; Option C for a new crossing east of Gravesend.
It is important to note that at the time of this consultation, Option A at Dartford offered the lowest
cost option at £1.25bn. It is also important to note that Option A offered the best value for money,
with a Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) of 1.8 rising to 2.4 when wider benefits were included.
By contrast, Option C was the highest cost option at £3.15bn, and offered the lowest value for money
with a BCR of just 1.2, only rising to 1.9 when wider benefits were included.
On the Kent side of the River Thames, the proposal for Option C included a new junction with the M2
motorway, which stretched from junction 1 (where the M2 joins the A2), to west of Brewers Road
overbridge on the A2. The slip roads and link road then ran through Brewers Wood and Randalls
Wood, both parts of Shorne Woods Country Park, passing to the south of Shorne village. The link road
then continued across grade 1 and grade 2 agricultural land before entering tunnels north of Lower
Higham Road near Chalk. All of this link road was located in the Green Belt, and much of the route
was through Kent Downs Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB).
It is noted that the Review of Lower Thames Crossing Options: Final Review Report published in April
2013 stated that for Option C “there are very serious environmental impacts, particularly associated
with biodiversity and ancient woodland. Some of the impacts may be mitigated slightly, through use
of bored tunnels, albeit not enough to change the overall qualitative assessment. Overall it was
considered that the non-monetised impacts reduced the case for Option C significantly”.
In the 2013 consultation, Option A at Dartford was favoured by the highest number of respondents
who expressed a preferred location, with 20% of respondents favouring Dartford. By contrast, only
6% favoured Option C east of Gravesend, and a further 11% favoured Option C variant which included
junction improvements and road widening at the A229 (Bluebell Hill).
In December 2013, the Secretary of State for Transport announced that Option B had received limited
support and instead raised serious concerns that it would jeopardise major redevelopment of the
Swanscombe Peninsula (Paramount London), a key part of the growth strategy for the Thames
Gateway area. In view of this, Option B at Swanscombe was discarded and the government would
focus on the choice between Options A and C.
In May 2014, Jacobs AECOM published a further Lower Thames Crossing study, in which Module 2
focused on scoping the cost of potential environmental mitigation of Option C, following suggestions
submitted by Kent County Council during the 2013 consultation. This proposed moving the Option C
junction approximately 2km west along the A2, so that the link road avoided Shorne Woods Country
Park and Kent Downs AONB, and included realigning and extending the bored tunnels.
This increased the estimated costs by £250m to £3.4bn, and decreased the BCR to 1.1, or 1.8 including
wider benefits, but reduced the adverse environmental impacts significantly. This route was
designated Option C2 (with the original route henceforth designated Option C1).
On 15 July 2015, the Secretary of State for Transport announced that Highways England had been
tasked with developing and assessing route options at each of the two remaining locations, Option A
at Dartford and Option C east of Gravesend, before choosing the site of a new crossing. The work will
show the possible routes at either location and identify their economic, environmental and social
impacts, as well as costs. This would be followed by a full public consultation on the preferred route.
abridge2far
3
Highways England published their preferred route on 26th January 2016 and launched the public
consultation. In this consultation, Highways England has discarded Option A at Dartford, despite this
being the clear preference expressed by consultees at the previous consultation, and is only consulting
on Option C.
In addition to a route based on Option C2, they have introduced a totally new route for Option C south
of the Thames, a route that has not been discussed or consulted on before.
This is Abridge2far’s response to this consultation.
3.0 A FLAWED AND DISCRIMINATORY CONSULTATION
3.1 Consultees Have Been Misinformed and Denied a Proper Choice of Options
A number of routes have been identified and well publicised in the past. These include Option A at
Dartford, and two possible routes south of the river, Options C1 and C2. These were the routes that
remained after the 2013 consultation, and these were the routes that the public were expecting to be
consulted on.
Instead, Highways England (HE) unilaterally decided not to include Option A in this consultation, and
introduced a totally new Option C route that has not been seen or discussed by the public before.
At the public information sessions conducted by Highways England, consultees were clearly and
repeatedly told that Option A at Dartford was not being taken forward and hence was not part of this
consultation, and that this consultation was only about the routes for Option C east of Gravesend.
Early responders to the consultation will have based their responses on this information.
However, both the Secretary of State for Transport Patrick McLoughlin and the Transport Minister
Andrew Jones subsequently told representatives from Abridge2far that Option A at Dartford is NOT
off the table and is still under consideration. These statements are now in the public domain.
Since these statements by government ministers, HE’s Consultation Manager has subsequently
attempted to claim that Option A at Dartford is not off the table, and that consultees are free to insert
their preferences in the comment boxes in the consultation forms.
This is disingenuous. It is patently obvious from the consultation documents and from the
questionnaire that Option A is totally excluded from this consultation, and that respondents are not
being consulted on Option A.
Consultees are only given choices of routes for Option C east of Gravesend. Contrary to the
statements made by the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State, it is abundantly clear that
consultees have been denied the opportunity to express their views on Option A. All the questions
are about Option C. There are NO questions in the consultation questionnaire regarding Option A at
Dartford.
This conflict of information brings the integrity of the whole consultation process into disrepute.
3.2 The Consultation is Discriminatory
Two of the communities most affected by HE’s preferred route are Chalk and Higham, and yet no
public information events were held in either of these communities.
Shorne is another community severely impacted by HE’s proposals, and yet many residents were not
even notified of the consultation. It was not until complaints were made to HE representatives that
abridge2far
4
many residents in Shorne were sent notifications, by which time a week of the 8-week consultation
period had already elapsed.
The villages of Shorne and Higham have a high proportion of older residents, many of whom do not
use the internet. However, responses to requests for hard copies of the maps, consultation booklets,
and questionnaires have been extremely slow and disjointed, taking several weeks before the
information was provided. Many of these residents have been unable to respond to the consultation.
The consultation Booklet itself is little more than a sales brochure espousing the benefits of Option C
while glossing over the details.
Maps and details of the routes south of the river have been hidden away in the extensive Scheme
Assessment Report (SAR), with no effective index, making it extremely difficult for ordinary members
of the public to locate, and impossible for non-IT literate or non-internet users to find. It was almost
three weeks into the eight week consultation period before HE even included a link to the maps on
the consultation website.
We believe that insufficient time has been allowed and that the consultation has been discriminatory
against older and non-IT literate people in contravention of the Equality Act 2010.
3.3 The Consultation is Biased and Engineered to Produce a Pre-determined Result
Highways England invited consultation responses from 250,000 people, many from well outside the
affected area, plus up to a million Dart Charge account holders, who have no knowledge of the
environment or the communities affected. We believe that this consultation was extended to large
numbers of uninformed and unaffected people purely to outnumber those who are most affected and
who are most aware of the impact these proposals would have.
It is unreasonable to expect these people to wade through volumes of documentation to reach an
informed decision. Most of the consultees invited by Highways England will base their views on what
is provided in the consultation booklet, which is little more than a sales brochure for Option C, with
no choices other than minor variations of Option C. The map they will see is this:
abridge2far
5
This extremely simplified diagram gives no detail of the route or the proximity of the villages, schools,
Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), etc.
The Dart Charge users and other consultees invited by Highways England are told that the Dartford
Crossing is one of the busiest roads in the country. They are told that the existing crossing is at
capacity for much of the time and is one of the least reliable sections of the UK’s strategic road
network. Road users regularly experience delays and unreliable journeys, and when there incidents
the congestion on the crossing quickly spreads to local roads and arterial roads in and out of London,
and that “something needs to be done to alleviate the problems”.
They are then given some scary statistics, which are somewhat misleading: they are told that traffic
volumes at Dartford Crossing are increasing, when in fact they have been falling since 2005; they are
told that a closure means a 30 mile detour via Blackwall tunnel or a 100 mile detour round the M25,
when of course this is only true for journeys between Dartford and Thurrock – the distance between
the M20 and the Midlands is not much different whichever direction round the M25 is used.
Readers are then subjected to several pages promoting the benefits of Option C, and then asked “Do
you agree or disagree with our proposal for the location of a crossing at Location C?”
Given no other choice, many will automatically tick the box to agree with Highways England’s
recommendation, and this will be presented to Government as strong support for Option C.
Do not be misled. The majority of consultees will not be making an informed choice – they are not
being informed and they are not being given a choice. They just want to see the congestion disappear
and are being led to believe that this is the only way it can be achieved. They would ‘strongly agree’
with whatever option is put in front of them, whether it is Option A at Dartford, Option B at
Swanscombe, Option C at Gravesend, or any other option which purports to remove the congestion.
We believe that the consultation is biased and has been engineered to produce the result that
Highways England has predetermined.
4.0 THE PROBLEMS AT DARTFORD
The problems at the Dartford Crossing are well known and well documented.
The original tunnel was planned in the 1930s and opened in 1964, along with the A282, as a link
between what was then the A2 at Dartford (now the A296) and the A13 at Purfleet (now the A1306).
The A2 and A13 have since been relocated, and these original junctions are now designated junctions
1b and 31. The A282 has been extended southwards to the join the A2 at what is now junction 2 and
northwards to join the A13 at what is now junction 30. A second tunnel was added in 1980, and the
M25 has been built around London, linking both ends of the A282 at junction 2 and junction 30. The
QE2 Bridge was added in 1991.
Over the years, the A282 has been dualled and widened, but not converted to motorway standard
due to its original purpose. Junction 1a, which was originally a minor restricted junction to provide
limited access to the administration facilities and the nearby Littlebrook Power Station, is now a very
busy junction with the subsequent building of the A206 and the associated commercial developments.
All this has resulted in the Dartford Crossing becoming very busy indeed. The A282 and Dartford
Crossing was not originally intended as a vital link to the motorway network, but has become so almost
by default, with no efforts made to provide an alternate route for the M25.
abridge2far
6
The two northbound tunnels and the southbound bridge have a combined designed capacity of
135,000 vehicles a day, but are now regularly operating at 140,000 vehicles a day.
Free-flow charging was introduced in 2014 to relieve congestion caused by the toll booths. This has
been successful for southbound traffic, with traffic now flowing freely across the bridge. However,
this has not been successful northbound due to the inherent restrictions caused by the tunnels.
The Dartford West Tunnel has a headroom of 4.8m, which is too small to accept larger vehicles. The
Dartford East Tunnel has a headroom of 5.0m, which is also below current headroom standard
requirements.
The use of the tunnels by large vehicles and vehicles with dangerous loads is restricted. This is
managed through a Traffic Management Cell (TMC). One reason for the restrictions on dangerous
loads is that the existing cross passages between the two tunnels are substandard in terms of width
and gradient (and cannot be upgraded economically) meaning that the tunnels cannot be made fully
compliant with European Regulations that would allow unrestricted access by dangerous loads.
In order to implement Dart Charge, and allow the toll plazas to be removed, a Traffic Management
Cell (TMC) was implemented. The TMC controls the passage of restricted vehicles, comprising over-
height, over-width, over-length and dangerous goods vehicles, through the tunnels. Over height and
dangerous goods vehicles are detected using over-height sensors and ANPR cameras capable of
reading the hazardous load codes displayed on vehicles carrying such loads. The system is coordinated
by the TMC control system, and upon detection of a non-compliant vehicle a system of traffic lights
and physical barriers are used to stop the vehicle. A traffic officer vehicle is then dispatched to
intercept and re-route the vehicle, before traffic held in the traffic management system is released.
The TMC enables segregation of restricted vehicles, to enable them to be escorted through the tunnels
safely, and stops traffic in the event of an incident in the tunnels.
However, the high usage of the tunnels by heavy goods vehicles, including foreign registered vehicles,
means that vehicles need to be frequently intercepted and this is very disruptive to free flowing traffic,
and acts as a constraint on capacity. As a result, the northbound capacity at Dartford crossing is less
than the southbound.
Vehicles carrying dangerous substances require on average 800-900 vehicle escorts per week; each of
which can hold up traffic for 2 minutes; full closures of up to 10 minutes are sometimes required.
These delays are caused by vehicles being held back to enable the convoys to proceed.
These tunnel restrictions and consequent delays, together with the large volumes of traffic now
merging from junction 1a just 500 metres from the tunnel portals, result in severe congestion,
together with weaving of traffic, resulting in one of the least reliable sections of the UK’s strategic
road network. This congestion results in severe pollution, with poor air quality and adverse impacts
on the health of the local population.
Despite Highways England’s claims to the contrary, congestion northbound has actually got worse
since the removal of the toll booths, due to failure of their traffic management system.
This is a major bottleneck on the M25 London Orbital Motorway, restricting growth and adversely
impacting the national economy.
These are serious problems, problems which Highways England is very much aware of.
The question is, what do they propose to do to address these problems at Dartford? The answer is
precisely nothing.
abridge2far
7
They intend to do nothing to address the problems caused by the outdated and restrictive tunnels.
They intend to do nothing to address the problems caused by the mixing of motorway and local traffic.
They intend to do nothing to tackle the problems caused by local traffic merging from local junctions.
They intend to do nothing to increase the capacity of the Dartford Crossing and its approach roads.
They intend to do nothing to reduce the current levels of traffic volumes using the Dartford Crossing.
They intend to do nothing to address the poor air quality and pollution near the Dartford Crossing.
They intend to do nothing to bypass this major bottleneck on the M25 London Orbital Motorway.
Instead, Highways England has decided to leave all the existing problems at Dartford and to create a
new set of problems east of Gravesend, designated Option C.
5.0 OPTION C - A BLUEPRINT FOR GRIDLOCK NOT GROWTH
5.1 Option C Does Not Address Traffic Volumes at Dartford
Highways England’s proposal for a new crossing east of Gravesend completely fails to provide relief or
an alternative route for traffic using the M25 orbital motorway for journeys other than those
originating or terminating in Kent, and it completely fails to address the congestion and pollution
problems at Dartford.
Figure 2.2 taken from Highways England’s Summary Business Case shows that the Dartford Crossing
is currently carrying an average of 140,000 vehicles a day, 3.7% higher than its designed capacity of
135,000.
abridge2far
8
Table 4.3 from Volume 5 of the SAR shows that, even if a new crossing east of Gravesend is built, traffic
volumes at the Dartford Crossing (DC) would still be between 137,000 and 138,000 vehicles a day.
This is 98% to 99% of current traffic volumes, and would already exceed the designed capacity. Traffic
volumes at Dartford would be back up to current levels within one to two years of Option C opening.
Table 4.4 below shows that within 16 years of the new crossing opening, traffic volumes at the
Dartford Crossing are forecast to be over 150,000 vehicles a day, well in excess of its designed capacity.
It is patently clear that a crossing east of Gravesend will not address congestion at the Dartford
Crossing, and there would still be an urgent need for additional capacity at Dartford.
abridge2far
9
Highways England (and Kent County Council) have ignored this, and appear to be narrowly focused on
providing an alternate route for freight transport travelling to and from the Channel Ports.
Their proposed crossing east of Gravesend would undoubtedly provide an alternative route for traffic
using the A2/M2 to travel between Dover and the rest of the UK. However, it does little or nothing to
provide an alternative route for traffic using the M20 primary route to travel to and from the Channel
Ports. The M20 is the only road that provides a motorway connection between the Channel Ports and
the rest of the UK motorway network.
The proposed crossing is being promoted as providing motorway-to-motorway connection. This is
disingenuous. Whilst it may provide a direct link between the M2 and the M25, traffic using the M2
must use ‘A’ roads to get to and from the Channel Ports. The M2 stops 25 miles short of Dover; the
remainder of the journey is via the A2. The proposed crossing east of Gravesend provides no link to
the M20 primary route, and traffic would need to cross country via the A228 or the A229. The
“motorway-to-motorway” claim is fallacious.
The situation is made worse by the omission of the ‘variant’, ie the road widening and junction
improvements to the A229. We suspect this has been omitted to conceal the real cost of Option C,
which is already significantly more expensive than Option A. (We note that junction improvements at
junction 30 and junction 2 have been ‘lumped in’ to the cost of Option A, however.) The A229
junctions with the M2 and the M20 are already heavily congested at peak times, resulting in traffic
queues onto the A229 itself. How these junctions are expected to cope with the additional traffic
trying to travel between the M20 and the proposed new crossing east of Gravesend defies credibility.
Nevertheless, Highways England and Kent County Council are missing the bigger picture, in that the
Dartford Crossing is on the M25 and a key part of the national strategic highways network, and serves
a far greater purpose than merely being a route for cross-channel traffic.
A crossing east of Gravesend will do nothing to provide an alternative route for traffic travelling around
the M25 Orbital Motorway. It is too far away from the primary route through Dartford to serve this
purpose. Little if any traffic would choose to make a lengthy detour east of Gravesend.
Nor will it provide so-called ‘resilience’ in the event of an incident at Dartford. The A2 and the
proposed link roads simply do not have the capacity to cope with an additional 75,000 to 150,000
vehicles a day on top of their existing traffic volumes, and we would quickly find that the whole of the
road infrastructure from the Medway Towns to South East London would be gridlocked, as well as the
feeder roads such as the A227, A228, A229, and A289.
Both proposed routes for the link road south of the Thames cut off Chalk Church from its community.
Both routes are entirely within protected Green Belt and internationally protected RAMSAR marshes.
There is a presumption against development in Green Belt areas, and opportunities for development
and growth in the immediate locality will therefore be extremely limited. It assumed that any growth
that occurs will be beyond the Green Belt or on 'Brown Field' sites.
With no direct link to the A289 and the Hoo Peninsula and Chatham Maritime, the Eastern Southern
Link will provide little opportunity for these areas.
Since there is poor interconnectivity between the M2 and the M20, and the likelihood of increased
congestion on the nearest interconnecting roads (ie the A227, A228, and the A229) we foresee little
opportunity for growth in the regional hinterland; in fact existing commerce may well be impeded.
Both routes south of the river (ESL and WSL) propose a junction to the A226. The presence of this
junction would result in a massive increase in traffic and heavy goods vehicles, estimated at around
abridge2far
10
8,400 vehicles a day but likely to be considerably more, to the local infrastructure, and would
encourage traffic to use the local villages as alternative routes to and from the crossing.
In the event of an incident at either Dartford or the new crossing, the A226 and the surrounding area
would quickly become gridlocked, preventing access from the local villages to schools and other
facilities in Gravesend.
The junction would put the protected Green Belt and the RAMSAR marshes under pressure from the
type of inappropriate commercial development that has happened on the approaches to the Dartford
Crossing.
We therefore strongly oppose any junction on the A226.
A crossing east of Gravesend is a recipe for gridlock, not growth. It will not address the congestion
and pollution problems at Dartford, it will not remove the bottleneck from the M25, it will not provide
resilience or a motorway-to-motorway connection for cross channel traffic, and it is unlikely to support
economic growth.
We STRONGLY DISAGREE with Option C East of Gravesend.
5.2 Option C - Value for Money has been Exaggerated
In the Review of Lower Thames Crossing Options: Final Report published for the previous consultation
in April 2013, the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) for Option C1 was estimated at just 1.2, ie barely break
even, only rising to 1.9 when wider benefits are included. Option C2, which is very similar to the WSL,
had an even lower BCR, at just 1.1 rising to 1.8 with wider benefits.
There have been no material changes since 2013; the estimated cost for Option C has risen by 18% to
£3.720bn, which might be expected to depress the BCR slightly, but there have been no material
changes to economic forecasts.
And yet in the current consultation, we find that the BCR for Option C has inexplicably risen from 1.2
to 2.4, increasing to 3.5 when wider benefits are included. The BCRs for Route 3 ESL are even higher,
at 2.7 rising to 3.9 with wider benefits. There is no valid reason why this dramatic improvement in
BCR should have occurred.
Over the same period, the BCR for Option A at Dartford has fallen, from 1.8 to 1.6, and from 2.4 to 2.3
when wider benefits are included.
We are now faced with a reversal of relative value for money. In 2013, Option A at Dartford offered
the best value for money by a considerable margin; in 2016, we find that Option C east of Gravesend
offers the best value for money, again by a considerable margin.
Highways England has set great emphasis on the supposed value for money. The benefits in BCR
forecasts are, at best, assumptions of the value of benefits that might conceivably accrue over a
considerable period of time. They cannot be proved or disproved, they are based purely by applying
monetised values to largely non-tangible items, including leisure time. As far as we are aware, damage
to the ecology and the natural environment are not monetised, nor are the very real costs associated
with dealing with health issues resulting from pollution and poor air quality.
In view of the wide disparity between the 2013 BCRs and the 2016 BCRs for Option C, we have serious
doubts about the figures quoted by Highways England, and would advise extreme scepticism.
abridge2far
11
5.3 The Eastern Southern Link (ESL)
Highways England has made the ESL its preferred route. This is a totally flawed decision.
Highways England states that ESL “would create a motorway-to-motorway connection”. This is
spurious, since there is no motorway connection to or from the Channel Ports via the M2.
The junction with the M2 would require a number of major structures as it is located at the existing
junction between the A2, M2 and A289. The complexity of the junction requires four levels of slip
roads and the heights of the slip roads are further increased by the topographical dip located between
the existing junction and the LTC mainline located on the Shorne to Higham ridge. A series of five
viaducts would therefore be required with lengths varying from 300m to 1000m with pier heights up
to 23m. This overlooks and partly impinges on Kent Downs Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, and
would require the demolition of up to 8 residential properties.
The junction is shown in figure 4.5 in Volume 4 of the SAR and reproduced below.
As well as being extremely intrusive, the proposed connection to the M2 motorway is ill conceived
and poorly designed. It provides no connection between the A289 Wainscott Bypass and the ESL, nor
does it provide a connection to the A2 towards Strood and Rochester. Thus key areas of population
and commerce (including Chatham Maritime, Medway City Estate, Thamesport container port, and
the Hoo Peninsula) would have no direct access to the proposed crossing east of Gravesend.
All traffic heading to and from Chatham Maritime, Medway City Estate, Thamesport container port,
and the Hoo Peninsula would therefore have to continue to use the A2 to cross via the Dartford
Crossing. The only alternative would be for traffic to use the single carriageway A226 local road
through Gads Hill, Higham, and Shorne, to travel between the A289 and the proposed new crossing.
This would result in a massive increase in traffic and heavy goods vehicles, estimated at around 8,400
vehicles a day but likely to be considerably more, to the local infrastructure.
The connections between the ESL and the westbound carriageway of the M2/A2 are far too close to
the connections to and from the A289 Wainscott Bypass, allowing insufficient room for merging and
abridge2far
12
filtering, which will result in excessive braking and weaving, creating hazardous driving conditions.
Furthermore, any incident on the A2 westbound will result in westbound traffic from the M2, the A2
from Rochester, the A289 Wainscott Bypass, and the ESL, all coming to a complete standstill. This is a
recipe for gridlock.
From this highly intrusive junction and slip roads, the ESL carves a swathe through Great Crabbles
Wood, a Site of Special Scientific Interest, and cuts through Pear Tree Lane, one of the most expensive
and desirable places to live in North Kent.
This dual carriageway then crosses agricultural land on an 800m embankment, before cutting through
the village of Shorne.
The map below provides an illustration of how close the road would be to the village of Shorne, and
how the dual carriageway and embankment would effectively cut the community of Shorne in two.
The properties shown above the link road are in Shorne Village, the properties below the link road are
in Lower Shorne.
After crossing over Forge Lane, the main road into the village, and Crown Lane, the link road then runs
parallel to the A226, crossing through grade 1 and grade 2 farmland, before reaching the proposed
new junction with the A226.
On ESL, this junction would provide the only route for traffic travelling between the proposed crossing
and the A289, since there is no other route. We have already discussed that this would result in a
massive increase in traffic and heavy goods vehicles, estimated at around 8,400 vehicles a day but
likely to be considerably more, to the local infrastructure. All traffic travelling between the crossing
and the A289 (ie to or from Chatham Maritime, Medway City Estate, Thamesport container port, and
abridge2far
13
the Hoo Peninsula) would have to use the single carriageway A226 local road through Gads Hill,
Higham, and Shorne. This is totally unacceptable, and we strongly object to any junction to the A226.
In our opinion, the ESL has absolutely no merits whatsoever. It blights an AONB, it destroys ancient
woodland and an SSSI, it destroys grade 1 and grade 2 agricultural land, and blights and divides an
ancient village community.
It is noted that the Review of Lower Thames Crossing Options: Final Review Report published in April
2013 stated that for Option C “there are very serious environmental impacts, particularly associated
with biodiversity and ancient woodland. Some of the impacts may be mitigated slightly, through use
of bored tunnels, albeit not enough to change the overall qualitative assessment. Overall it is
considered that the non-monetised impacts act to reduce the case for the scheme significantly”.
There is little in this latest ESL proposal that changes this position. Instead of passing through Brewers
Wood and Randalls Wood, an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), the link road now passes
through Great Crabbles Wood, a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). Instead of passing to the
south and west of the village of Shorne, it now passes to the east and north of the village, so close in
fact that it requires the demolition of residential properties and cuts off Lower Shorne from the Village
centre. For the remainder of its route, it crosses the same grade 1 and grade 2 farmland as the
discarded route, before passing close to Chalk Church, thereby cutting the church off from its
community.
It really appears as though no proper survey of the route has been carried out, which are no more than
lines on a map. It is clear that no thought has been given to the impacts to the environment or the
community. Little can be done to mitigate these impacts, and if for no other reason than this, the
route should be quickly and decisively rejected, as was the previous one.
We STRONGLY DISAGREE with the Eastern Southern Link (ESL).
5.4 The Western Southern Link (WSL)
The WSL is based on the route considered by Jacobs AECOM in 2014, in Module 2: Scoping the cost of
potential environmental mitigation of Option C, following suggestions submitted by Kent County
Council during the 2013 consultation. In doing so, it attempts to address some of the worst impacts
of Option C south of the River Thames.
However, in this version, Highways England has chosen to introduce a junction to the A226. Due to
the close proximity with the tunnel portals, this would mean moving the A226 southwards by a
considerable distance, causing yet more destruction to valuable agricultural land and to the
environment in general.
In our enquiries, we have been unable to find any local authority prepared to admit to requesting this
junction. We can therefore only assume that Highways England has taken this decision themselves to
unlock the Green Belt and RAMSAR marshes for commercial development, in an attempt to generate
further ‘benefits’ to help offset the cost of Option C.
We have already discussed that a junction on the A226 would result in a massive increase in traffic and
heavy goods vehicles, estimated at around 8,400 vehicles a day but likely to be considerably more, to
the local infrastructure, and it would encourage traffic to use the local villages as alternative routes to
and from the crossing. In the event of an incident at either Dartford or the new crossing, the A226 and
the surrounding area would quickly become gridlocked, preventing access from the local villages to
abridge2far
14
schools and other facilities in Gravesend. As with the ESL, we strongly object to any junction to the
A226.
As with the ESL, the full length of the WSL is within the Green Belt. Although marginally less
environmentally destructive than the ESL, it blights the rural hamlet of Thong, and is located very close
to properties in the Shorne West / Riverview Park area.
Highways England has proposed an extremely restrictive junction on the A2, and cites this as one of
the main reasons for preferring the ESL. The junction is shown in figure 4.4 in Volume 4 of the SAR,
and is reproduced below.
In our view, this junction design is unnecessarily restrictive, and it would be a relatively easy task to
produce a more free flowing design.
However, the only technical merits the WSL has, in comparison to the ESL, is that it provides a direct
access to and from the A289 Wainscott Bypass and to and from the A2 to Strood and Rochester. This
would provide a direct route for traffic to and from Chatham Maritime, Thamesport, and the Hoo
Peninsula, and would render any junction on the A226 superfluous.
In addition, because the junction with the A2 is further west and the link road is shorter than the ESL,
this effectively moves its traffic attraction area further west. We do not believe that the WSL would
be any less attractive than the ESL for traffic to and from the M2, but we do believe it would attract
more traffic to and from the A289, and from areas served by the A2 to the west. We estimate that the
WSL moves the effective centre point between the Dartford Crossing and the proposed crossing east
of Gravesend westwards by over a mile, from the A227 to the B262.
Nevertheless, we cannot support the WSL since it does not address the problems at Dartford, and is
only marginally less environmentally intrusive than the ESL.
We STRONGLY DISAGREE with the Western Southern Link (WSL).
abridge2far
15
6.0 OPTION A – ADDRESSING THE CAPACITY PROBLEMS AT DARTFORD
The quickest and cheapest way to increase capacity at Dartford, in order to get traffic moving and
reducing the delays and pollution, is to build a bridge adjacent to the existing one.
It has already been demonstrated that an unrestricted, 4 lane bridge provides relatively free-flowing
traffic from Essex into Kent, certainly no worse or better than other 4 lane sections of the M25. It is
reasonable to assume that a similar bridge from Kent into Essex would achieve similar results.
In fact the improvements in traffic flow would be significantly better in both directions, since an extra
bridge would increase capacity of the crossing itself by over 50%.
It would also overcome the restrictions caused by the tunnels, since oversize vehicles and hazardous
loads would have unrestricted access to the new bridge, whilst the tunnels would be available for cars
and light goods vehicles, thereby speeding up traffic flows.
This would immediately remove the underlying causes of the congestion (capacity restrictions and
tunnel restrictions) and would get the traffic flowing again, thereby reducing pollution significantly.
It is noted that the cost of this option was given as £1.25bn in the 2013 consultation.
In May 2014, Jacobs AECOM published a further Lower Thames Crossing study, in which Module 3
focused on the cost of junction improvements at junction 30 and widening of the A282 north of the
crossing, and Module 4 which focused on widening the A282 between junction 1a and junction 2. The
most likely costs of these works were estimated to be £402m for Module 3 works and £439m for
Module 4 works.
This would increase the total cost for Option A, including junction improvements and road widening,
to £2.1bn.
However, we note that in the 2016 consultation, Highways England has increased the cost to £3.365bn.
They have done this by adding in further junction improvements, and the replacement of major
overbridges at junction 1a and at the B260. Both of these are unnecessary works.
We believe that Highways England has deliberately exaggerated the scope, cost, and difficulty of
Option A at Dartford in order to make it appear less attractive, and that the work could realistically
carried out for far less than the £3.365bn stated.
We TEND TO AGREE with Option A, an additional bridge at Dartford.
In view of the fact that Option C does NOT address the traffic volumes and capacity constraints at
Dartford, it is inevitable that this work would still need to be carried out even if a crossing east of
Gravesend was built.
It is therefore essential therefore that Option A, an extra bridge at Dartford, is built in preference to
Option C east of Gravesend.
However, there is a better solution which obviates the need for either Option A or Option C, which
provides a strategic, 21st century solution to a 20th century problem.
abridge2far
16
7.0 OPTION A14 – THE TOTAL STRATEGIC SOLUTION
Highways England has already dismissed an option which would not only provide significant additional
capacity for traffic travelling to and from the Channel Ports but would also provide relief for other
traffic using the M25, while relieving traffic and pollution at Dartford by at least 40%.
This is known as Option A14, which provides for a 3 lane dual carriageway, mainly in tunnel, linking the
M25 just south of junction 2 with the M25 just north of junction 30.
It would increase crossing capacity by 75%;
It would finally 'complete' the M25, which has never been completed. Is it not about time this
was achieved? Neither Option A (an extra bridge at Dartford) nor Option C achieves this;
At the moment, all M25 traffic still has to use the A282 between junction 2 and junction 30, and
will continue to do so even if an extra bridge or tunnel is built alongside the existing crossing at
Dartford, and even if a new crossing is built east of Gravesend;
With this solution, M25 through-traffic (including traffic travelling to and from the Channel Ports
via the M20 primary route) would no longer use the A282 or the existing crossing; neither Option
A or Option C would achieve this;
The A282 would revert to its original intention, ie to carry non-motorway traffic between the A2
and the A13;
It provides a true motorway-to-motorway link, Highways England's clear preference; Option C
does not achieve this for traffic travelling via the M20, and M2 traffic still needs to use the A2,
the A228, or the A229 to get to and from the Channel Ports;
It provides a high degree of resilience, providing an alternate route without the need for lengthy
diversions;
It provides a massive reduction in traffic through junctions 2, 1B, 1A, 30, & 31, far more than
would be achieved by Option C; Highways England estimates that traffic on the A282 and the
existing crossing would be reduced by 40% - we believe it may be more;
It would result in a massive reduction in noise and pollution through the populated parts of
Dartford, far more than would be achieved by Option C, and without spreading it to others;
5 or 6 miles of vehicle emissions can now be 'captured' and filtered and/or directed away from
population centres;
It does not interfere with the existing bridge or tunnels, and there would be minimal disturbance
to the existing approach roads while the construction work is carried out;
There would be no need for Option C, or the link roads and new intersections, or the associated
pollution and environmental damage;
There would be no need for the A229 variant;
There would be no need for a new bridge at Dartford either;
No buildings would need to be demolished;
It would be a 'Win-Win' for Dartford & Gravesham, and for the national economy;
abridge2far
17
It would cost less than the combined cost of Option C and a bridge at Dartford, which Highways
England’s traffic forecasts clearly demonstrate will be needed.
This is the only solution that would complete the M25, provide massive relief for the people of
Dartford, and avoid further pollution and environmental harm.
Highways England estimates that the cost of this option would be around £6.6bn. This estimate seems
high in comparison to the costs of other tunnel projects that have been carried out around the world.
It is certainly very high in comparison to the £6bn estimated cost for the proposed 18 mile dual
carriageway Trans Pennine tunnel, which was the subject of a recent Highways England report.
But even at £6.6bn, it is less than the estimated combined cost of the proposed crossing east of
Gravesend and providing additional capacity at Dartford, which Highways England’s own traffic
forecasts show will still be needed even if a new crossing at Gravesend is built.
Highways England forecasts that Option A14 would attract 40% of traffic from the existing crossing, far
more than the 15% which would be achieved by Option C. However, Highways England’s estimate of
40% would suggest that 60% of all traffic using the Dartford Crossing either joins or exits between
junction 2 and junction 30. This estimate needs to be corroborated. Observed experience from regular
users suggests that this through-traffic estimate of 40% is understated; there is a general belief that
the proportion of traffic which is genuine through traffic, ie travelling beyond junctions 2 to 30, is at
least 50%.
This would have a significant positive impact on value for money BCR.
Highways England estimates the BCR for this Option A14 at just 0.4 to 0.8. There is no proper
information to support this, and this estimate should be treated with scepticism.
We suspect that Highways England has not taken into account the full effect of the savings in time and
congestion for through traffic on the M25, which would include traffic travelling to and from the
Channel Ports via the M20 primary route. It may not factor in the savings in other traffic using the
crossing to and from the A2 and A13 due to the reduced congestion.
We do not believe that it has taken full account of the pollution savings from the removal of up to 50%
of the traffic from the populated areas adjacent to the A282.
In any event, Highways England’s BCR calculations need to be treated with scepticism. We have seen
how the BCR for Option C has been doubled from 1.9 to 3.8 since 2013, even though there has been
no fundamental change in the design and economic factors affecting that option. There is no
satisfactory explanation for this, and we suspect that the BCR for Option A14 may have been
manipulated to reduce its attraction.
Nevertheless, we believe that Option A14 is the only route which addresses at the problems at
Dartford, as well as providing additional capacity, resilience, and reduced congestion and pollution.
Not only does it provide a true motorway-to-motorway connection for cross channel traffic, it
completes the final link in the in the M25 Orbital Motorway, and provides a strategic solution to the
national motorway infrastructure, rather than a tactical solution to address a regional problem.
We STRONGLY AGREE with Option A14, a tunnel linking the M25 to the M25, and recommend that
the Government invests in this solution.
abridge2far
18
9.0 SUMMARY
We consider that the Consultation is flawed and discriminatory.
Consultees have been misinformed and denied a proper choice of options. There has been conflicting
information given out by Highways England and Government Ministers. This conflict of information
brings the integrity of the whole consultation process into disrepute.
We believe that the delays in providing hard copies of the consultation booklets and questionnaires
has resulted in insufficient time being allowed for the consultation. We also consider that the
consultation has been discriminatory against older and non-IT literate people in contravention of the
Equality Act 2010.
We believe that the consultation is biased and has been engineered to produce the result that
Highways England has predetermined. The consultation booklet is little more than a one-sided sales
brochure for Option C, and it is not reasonable to expect people to wade through volumes of
documentation to reach an informed decision.
Abridge2far is prepared to support any legal action taken to challenge the consultation process.
Highways England has decided to do nothing to address the problems at Dartford, but merely to create
a new set of problems east of Gravesend instead.
Option C does not address the problems at Dartford. Even if a new crossing east of Gravesend was
built, traffic volumes at Dartford will be back up to current levels within one to two years of it opening.
This information was not published in the consultation booklet.
A crossing east of Gravesend will do nothing to provide an alternative route for traffic travelling
around the M25 Orbital Motorway, nor will it provide ‘resilience’ in the event of an incident at
Dartford. It will do little to promote economic growth in the region.
We STRONGLY DISAGREE with Option C East of Gravesend.
In view of the wide disparity between the 2013 BCRs and the 2016 BCRs for Option C, we have serious
doubts about the figures quoted by Highways England, and would advise extreme scepticism.
The Eastern Southern Link (ESL) has absolutely no merits whatsoever. It blights an AONB, it destroys
ancient woodland and an SSSI, it destroys grade 1 and grade 2 agricultural land, and blights and divides
an ancient village community.
We STRONGLY DISAGREE with the Eastern Southern Link (ESL).
Despite the technical advantages that the Western Southern Link (WSL) has in comparison to the ESL,
we cannot support the WSL since it does not address the problems at Dartford, and is only marginally
less environmentally intrusive than the ESL.
We STRONGLY DISAGREE with the Western Southern Link (WSL).
We strongly oppose any junction on the A226 on either route.
Option C does not address the problems at Dartford. The quickest and cheapest way to increase
capacity at Dartford, in order to get traffic moving and reducing the delays and pollution, is to build a
bridge adjacent to the existing one.
We TEND TO AGREE with Option A, an additional bridge at Dartford.
abridge2far
19
We believe that Highways England has deliberately exaggerated the scope, cost, and difficulty of
Option A at Dartford in order to make it appear less attractive, and that the work could realistically
carried out for far less than the £3.365bn stated.
It is clear from Highways England’s own traffic forecasts that even if a new crossing is built east of
Gravesend, an extra bridge at Dartford will still be needed.
But for a total solution, we believe that Option A14 is the only route which addresses all the problems
at Dartford, as well as providing additional capacity, resilience, and reduced congestion and pollution.
Not only does it provide a true motorway-to-motorway connection for cross channel traffic, it
completes the final link in the in the M25 Orbital Motorway, and provides a strategic solution to the
national motorway infrastructure, rather than a temporary solution to address a regional problem.
We STRONGLY AGREE with Option A14, a tunnel linking the M25 to the M25, and recommend that
the Government invests in this solution.
We attach a table which provides an illustrative comparison of the relative benefits for Option C,
Option A, and Option A14 for your consideration, and we would ask you to give this serious
consideration.
In the longer term, the Government must consider other ways in tackling the ever-growing volume of
freight on the UK highways infrastructure. It cannot be allowed to continue unabated while we
continue to concrete over the countryside.
We need to take a more holistic approach, which could include transferring freight onto rail, and the
use of shipping, and ferry ports other than Dover.
Otherwise we will be looking at widening our motorways to 5 or 6 lanes, and will be considering yet
another Lower Thames Crossing in 25 years’ time.
Yours faithfully
Bob Lane
For and on behalf of Abridge2far
See Attachment.
abridge2far
20
Illustrative Comparison of Relative Benefits for Option C, Option A, and Option A14
Option C – a new crossing east of Gravesend
Option A – an extra bridge or tunnel at Dartford
Option A14 – a long tunnel from M25 to M25
Provides additional capacity at Dartford
No Yes – 50% Yes – 75%
Relieves congestion on the A282 at Dartford
Minimal. Traffic volume is forecast to be 98% of current level
Yes, by providing additional capacity on the Dartford crossing
Yes, by providing additional capacity and removing 40% of traffic
Completes the M25 No No Yes
Addresses tunnel problems at Dartford
No – the problems at Dartford remain
Yes – provides alternate route via a bridge
Yes – provides alternate route via tunnel
Segregates motorway and non-motorway traffic
No No Yes
Provides a motorway to motorway connection to the Channel Ports
No – M2 does not link to the M20 or the Channel Ports
No, but provides easy access to the M20
Yes – via M25 and M20
Provides resilience/alternate route
Partial – lengthy detour required but will result in gridlock
Local resilience provided by tunnels
Yes – provides full resilience with no detour
Reduces noise and pollution at Dartford
Minimal reduction at Dartford
No reduction in noise – but reduced pollution due to less congestion
Massive reduction in noise and pollution
Introduces noise and pollution east of Gravesend
Yes No No
Destruction to Green Belt, SSSIs, AONB, grade 1 & 2 agricultural land
Yes No No
Demolition of property 10 properties ESL 4 properties WSL
Minimal residential but bridge may result in commercial demolitions
None
Cost £3.72bn plus £3.4bn to relieve congestion at Dartford, total £7.1bn
£3.4bn (£2.0bn if 2014 AECOM Modules 3 & 4 proposals are chosen)
£6.6bn